42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect officials when the plaintiff alleges a constitutional injury and the applicable legal standards were clearly established at the time.

Myers, Cynthia v. Hasara, Karen · filed 2000-09-05

A government official is entitled to immunity from suit when performing discretionary functions unless the district court determines that (1) the plaintiff alleged a constitutional injury, and (2) the legal standards applicable to the injury were clearly established at the time. ... Finally, Hasara and Danner were not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not give officials qualified immunity for retaliating against an employee's protected testimony when no reasonable officer could believe that conduct was lawful.

Hudson v. Norris · filed 2000-09-06

We have previously held that no reasonable officer could believe that retaliating against an employee for exercising free speech rights, including the right to testify on a matter of public concern such as prison administration, was permissible. See Campbell, 155 F.3d at 960. We hold, therefore, that Messrs. Guntharp, Harmon, Outlaw, and Gibson are not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Hudson's first amendment claim.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established.

McKinney v. City of Tukwila · filed 2000-09-11

In light of the above case law, we find that the impropriety of the officers’ actions here is not clearly established. We thus find that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under section 1983.

Qualified immunity bars damages under Section 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct.

Cortes v. Johnson · filed 2000-09-18

Even if a violation could be found, defendant would be entitled to qualified immunity for her actions. ... In the case at bar, the right asserted— that of an inmate to have medically qualified Spanish-speaking translators — was not clearly established in 1996 or 1997, when the events at issue occurred.

In a Section 1983 suit, qualified immunity turns on whether officers objectively could have believed their conduct lawful under clearly established law, viewing the facts in the plaintiffs' favor.

Iris Mena v. City Of Simi Valley · filed 2000-09-22

In deciding whether Defendants are entitled as a matter of law to qualified immunity, we must accept the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs and then determine whether, in light of clearly established principles governing the conduct in question, the officers objectively could have believed that their conduct was lawful.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Sacco v. Pataki · filed 2000-09-25

I have previously held that the liberty interest asserted in this case was not clearly established in June of 1995. ... Therefore, defendants Boyle and Mack cannot be expected to have known that their conduct deprived plaintiffs of a liberty interest without due process of law.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim depends on whether the alleged conduct violated clearly established rights, not solely on when courts recognized the particular cause of action.

Dickerson v. Monroe County Sheriff's Department · filed 2000-09-26

Dombroski appears to argue that this Court’s inquiry concerning qualified immunity is limited to whether the Second Circuit has affirmed the application of the tort of malicious abuse of criminal process to a state actor’s conduct prior to the events at issue here. Such an argument misstates the applicable law, and is contrary to Second Circuit precedent. ... Thus, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Dombroski did not violate plaintiffs clearly established rights.

A plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive force claim without a factually similar precedent when the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct was readily apparent.

Smith v. Mattox · filed 1997-11-19

Thus, unless a controlling and factually similar case declares the official's conduct unconstitutional, an excessive-force plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity only by showing that the official's conduct lies so obviously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of caselaw.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity if a reasonable jury could find the officer’s actions objectively unreasonable.

Reese v. Garcia · filed 2000-09-27

If any reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable, then the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment.

Officials sued under § 1983 are denied qualified immunity when forcing an inmate to participate in religious treatment was not objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Alexander v. Schenk · filed 2000-09-29

This Court therefore concludes that, under the facts of this case, Defendants did not act in an objectively reasonable manner in forcing Plaintiff to participate in the religious components of the ASAT program. Therefore, their claim for qualified immunity is denied.

A state hospital physician performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when her conduct violates no constitutional right.

Coley v. Castillo · filed 2000-09-29

As discussed above, there were no constitutional rights violated in this case. The actions of the Defendant were presumptively correct in the absence of a showing of deliberate indifference toward her patients’ needs. Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs claims in this case.

In a § 1983 action, a court evaluating qualified immunity first determines whether the plaintiff alleged a constitutional deprivation and then whether the right was clearly established.

Cole v. Oroville Union High School District · filed 2000-10-02

When government officials assert the defense of qualified immunity to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a court evaluating the defense must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right and, if so, then determine “‘whether the right was clearly established at the' time of the alleged violation.’ ” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290, 119 S.Ct. 1292, 143 L.Ed.2d 399 (1999)); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998); B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir.1999).

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the allegations establish only negligence.

Witte v. TX Board of Pardons · filed 2000-10-04

Our review of the record persuades that the district court did not err in concluding that Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. Viewed in the most favorable light, Appellants have alleged only negligence by Appellees. It is well established that mere negligence is insufficient to establish a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when a clearly established right would have made their conduct’s unconstitutional nature apparent to a reasonable official.

Petrichko v. Kurtz · filed 2000-10-04

The district court must then proceed to assess whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation, and whether the unconstitutional nature of the action would have been apparent to an objectively reasonable official. ... Therefore, I conclude that defendants are not entitled to immunity from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law prohibited their alleged participation as biased members of a tribunal.

McClure v. Independent School District No. 16 · filed 2000-10-06

As noted above, “[t]he law is clearly established that a person who is biased in fact may not sit on a quasi-judicial tribunal.” Hicks, 942 F.2d at 751. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment on the claim of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against officers are subject to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have understood the conduct to be unlawful under preexisting law.

Mollica v. Volker · filed 2000-10-06

We think that any unlawfulness in Volker’s checkpoint would not have been apparent to a reasonable officer. We therefore must affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields a school superintendent when the relevant right was not clearly established enough to give a reasonable superintendent notice that the conduct violated it.

Seal v. Morgan · filed 2000-10-06

More concretely, however, we do not believe that the contours of that right were sufficiently clear to put a reasonable school superintendent on notice in 1996 that a school disciplinary policy's lack of a conscious-possession requirement could produce irrational expulsions and thus violate the legal rights of students expelled under the policy. For this reason, we will reverse the judgment of the district court to the extent that it denied Superintendent Morgan's motion for summary judgment, and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in his favor.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right.

Oladeinde v. Birmingham, City of · filed 2000-10-16

Because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a violation of a right protected by the First Amendment, we need not proceed to an analysis of whether the law was clearly established. Likewise, we need not consider whether their transfers, and the failure to promote Sergeant Oladeinde were retaliatory. We conclude that Captain Walker and Chief Deutsch were entitled to the protection of the defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when no clearly established standard governs their conduct.

Lowery v. Stovall · filed 1996-08-06

In any event, the district court properly found that Redd would be entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because there was no clearly established standard to govern Redd's actions.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when material factual disputes bear on that defense.

Flowers v. Bennett · filed 2000-10-17

The court concludes that this is one of those cases where there are factual disputes as to both the constitutional deprivation issue and the qualified immunity issue.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for disciplining a public employee’s speech when clearly established law required balancing her speech rights against the employer’s interest in punishing insubordination.

Myers v. Karen Hasara and Gail Danner · filed 2000-10-17

It was, therefore, clear in June 1996 that government employees had a First Amendment right to speak on matters of public concern that must be weighed against the employer’s right to punish insubordination. Hasara and Danner cannot claim not to have known that disciplining Myers under these circumstances would not implicate her right to free speech.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect an officer who enlists an unauthorized civilian ride-along to stop people.

Polk v. District of Columbia · filed 2000-10-26

Specifically, the court holds that Det. Valdes does not enjoy qualified immunity with respect to his enlistment of an unauthorized civilian ride-along to effectuate a stop of the plaintiffs.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for a search when a reasonable officer might not have known the consent was involuntary and no materially similar precedent clearly established that it was.

Hudson v. Hall · filed 2000-10-30

Therefore, because the impropriety of Officer Hall's statement was not obvious and because no materially similar, pre-existing case law was around, a reasonable police officer in the circumstances might not have known that Meadows' consent was involuntary. Accordingly, Officer Hall is entitled to qualified immunity for his search of Meadows.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when their use of force was reasonable.

Campbell v. City of Leavenworth · filed 2000-11-03

In this case, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim because the uncontradicted evidence in this case showed that the officers’ acts of force were reasonable.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law made the unlawfulness of his conduct apparent.

Sterling v. Borough of Minersville · filed 2000-11-06

Accordingly, Wilinsky could not reasonably have believed that his questioned conduct was lawful in light of the established law protecting privacy rights.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when reasonable officers could disagree about the legality of their conduct or when the plaintiff fails to rebut the presumption that executing a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate was reasonable.

Malatesta v. New York State Division of State Police · filed 2000-11-07

Accordingly, because reasonable officers could disagree as to the legality of the civil standby on December 6, 1997, and because plaintiff has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness of the December 9, 1997 searches and arrests which flowed from the issuance of a warrant and an amended warrant by a neutral magistrate, Tpr. Ogden and Inv. Kelly are entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct in this case. Plaintiffs § 1983 claims must be dismissed.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established.

McKinney v. City of Tukwila · filed 2000-11-09

In light of the above case law, we find that the impropriety of the officers' actions here is not clearly established. We thus find that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity from suit under section 1983.

An officer who obtains an arrest warrant is immune from § 1983 damages unless the warrant application is so lacking in probable cause that belief in its validity is unreasonable.

Neiman, Kenneth v. Keane, T.M. · filed 2000-11-13

Accordingly, the officer procuring the warrant is immune from a suit for damages unless it can be shown that the "warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45.

An officer lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 privacy claim when clearly established law makes the unlawfulness of his conduct apparent.

Sterling v. Borough of Minersville · filed 2000-11-14

Accordingly, Wilinsky could not reasonably have believed that his questioned conduct was lawful in light of the established law protecting privacy rights.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established to overcome a public official’s qualified immunity defense.

Walker v. Henderson · filed 2000-11-17

Walker’s failure to show that her right of intimate association with her family and friends was clearly established during the period of Henderson’s alleged harassment is fatal in light of his qualified immunity defense.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity may be submitted to the jury when material facts bearing on immunity remain disputed.

Solomon v. Suggs · filed 2000-11-21

Because there were remaining disputed issues of material fact relative to immunity, the district court did not err in submitting the issue to the jury.

A teacher is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable person in the teacher’s position would have known the conduct violated a student’s bodily integrity.

Hinkley v. Baker · filed 2000-11-21

Accepting all alleged facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favdr, a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would have known that his conduct violated Plaintiffs bodily integrity. ... Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights a reasonable person would have known.

Pratt v. Ottum · filed 2000-11-27

In the present case, the defendants are entitled to the qualified immunity defense because “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding, on these facts, that defendants were not entitled to a qualified immunity and, accordingly, in denying defendants’ motion for a summary judgment.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer with the same information would not have known the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Louden v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2000-11-28

Her actions did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known. ... Perry is thus entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to an officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable from the perspective of an officer with the same information.

Louden v. City of Minneapolis, Minnesota Brenda Perry, Individually and as an Employee of the City of Minneapolis · filed 2000-11-28

In order to be entitled to qualified immunity, Perry must have acted in an objectively reasonable manner judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene possessing the same information.

An officer sued under § 1983 may have qualified immunity when the officer reasonably relies on another officer’s direction to make an arrest, even if the directing officer made a mistake of law that was not apparent to the assisting officer.

Liu v. Richard M. Phillips, James D. Goldman · filed 2000-11-28

The outcome should not be different where the agent who directs or authorizes the arrest has made a mistake of law equally invisible to the assisting officer.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim against officials in their individual capacities when factual questions remain about the alleged retaliation.

Godon v. NC Crime Control · filed 2000-11-30

On the qualified immunity rulings, however, we conclude that factual questions persist, some of which the district court seems to have recognized.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant from damages for retaliating against a state employee’s exercise of clearly established First Amendment rights.

Wallett v. Anderson · filed 2000-12-01

However, because this case concerns the right of a state employee to be free from retaliation on account of his exercise of a First Amendment right, a right clearly established at the time of the conduct alleged, see e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), the court denies the motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot raise the preponderance burden in a § 1983 claim merely because the facts are close.

Victor R. McNair and Tr K. McNair v. Coffey · filed 2000-12-08

Yet a § 1983 case is not a criminal prosecution, and the preponderance standard applies to civil claims of all sorts. ... It should not be changed covertly, through an immunity defense that imposes a heightened standard of proof.

Section 1983 false-arrest claims are subject to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have believed the arrest lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the officer possessed.

Marks, Alvin v. Carmody, Larry · filed 2000-12-12

As the district court recognized, qualified immunity protects arresting police officers from suit if a reasonable officer would have believed the arrest to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information that the arresting officers possessed.

An individual defendant may defeat a Section 1983 claim through qualified immunity when the defendant’s conduct meets the objective reasonableness standard.

Galante v. County of Nassau · filed 2000-12-12

Based on this finding, the qualified immunity test is satisfied and this defense is available to the individual defendants.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity analysis, the court first considers whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Gratz v. Bollinger · filed 2000-12-13

In order to determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must first consider, “whether, based on the applicable law, a constitutional violation occurred.”

Officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor leave it questionable whether a reasonable officer would have believed the arrest was supported by probable cause.

Naccarato v. Scarselli · filed 2000-12-14

Viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiff, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. As discussed above, supra p. 41-42, it is questionable whether, under the circumstances of the instant case, a reasonable officer would have believed there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for harassment in the second degree.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when reasonably competent officers could agree that relying on a reported active warrant was lawful.

Mason v. Village of Babylon, New York · filed 2000-12-20

At the very least, McManus is clearly entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim. McManus was informed of an outstanding warrant and acted thereupon. She was under no obligation to do otherwise and it cannot be said that no reasonable officer would have made the same choice under the same circumstances.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably should have known their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Mansoor v. County of Albemarle · filed 2000-12-20

Each defendant reasonably should have known that imposing such extraordinarily broad conditions upon the plaintiffs employment would preclude him from speaking as a private citizen upon matters of public concern, and thus would violate well-established First Amendment law. Based on the record as it now stands, the court does not find that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the First Amendment violations alleged in Count One.

Officers with arguable probable cause are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim, even if their belief in probable cause was mistaken.

Smithson v. Brown · filed 2000-12-21

At the time of appellees’ arrest in this case, the officers had, at least, arguable probable cause to conclude that Smithson and his son Ryan had committed an assault. Even if this were a mistaken belief the officers would still be entitled to a qualified immunity defense.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Domina v. VanPelt · filed 2000-12-26

Public officials, of course, are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

In a § 1983 action, a court assessing qualified immunity first asks whether the plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional violation.

Fales v. Garst · filed 2001-01-02

When an official claims entitlement to qualified immunity, we first ask whether the plaintiffs have alleged a violation of constitutional magnitude.

A public school principal is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 speech claim when the teachers’ interest in speaking is outweighed by the school’s interest in efficient administration.

Jacquelyn Fales, Dr. Mary Ann Kahmann Eileen Scarborough v. Garst · filed 2001-01-02

Because we believe that the teachers’ interest in speaking on these matters was outweighed by the interest of efficient administration of the middle school, we conclude the district court erred in not finding Garst was entitled to qualified immunity.

A police officer cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s evidence could show that the officer repeatedly struck a compliant arrestee.

Tapp v. Banks · filed 2001-01-10

Such actions by an officer would offend the Fourth Amendment and would not be saved by a qualified immunity analysis. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Tapp’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Tapp’s excessive force claim should have survived, and we will remand this claim to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate clearly established federal law, even if a state administrative appeal received no decision.

Fuller v. Linda A. Dillon, Patti Wilson, John Zielinski, Doctor Vallabhaneni and Doctor Vidal · filed 2001-01-10

We agree with the trial judge and conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity regardless of the fact that Dr. Shansky failed to issue a decision regarding Fuller’s appeal.

Qualified immunity can shield state officials from individual liability under Section 1983 even when factual disputes remain about whether they violated a constitutional right.

Garcia-Montoya v. State Treasurer's Office · filed 2001-01-18

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that, although there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the violation of Gareia-Montoya’s constitutional rights, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

State officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Greene v. Terhune · filed 2001-01-22

State officials such as Defendants have qualified immunity from civil liability under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to qualified immunity, which can protect subordinate officers who reasonably follow superiors’ orders without shaping the challenged policy.

Williams v. Goord · filed 2001-01-24

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials acting in their official capacity from suits for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their actions violate clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known. ... As these officers had no input into the development and implementation of the restraint policy and were merely following what they believed to be lawful orders, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects individual officials when the applicable law was not clearly established in the circumstances.

Anderson v. Burke County · filed 2001-01-24

We further conclude that, even if we are mistaken on the merits, the applicable law had not already been clearly established in the context of these circumstances. ... The individual Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Harmon v. Calderon · filed 2001-01-24

With respect to Harmon’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims, we conclude that he failed to establish that prison officials violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Accordingly, the district court did not err by determining that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the applicable law did not clearly establish the asserted right in the circumstances at issue.

Judicial Complaint, In Re: · filed 2001-01-24

We further conclude that, even if we are mistaken on the merits, the applicable law had not already been clearly established in the context of these circumstances. ... The individual Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a § 1983 claim when the right was clearly established by analogous case law or the conduct was plainly egregious.

Cody v. Dane County · filed 2001-01-25

We acknowledge that government officials are shielded from civil liability for discretionary actions taken in the performance of their duties unless (1) the right violated was clearly established by analogous case law, or (2) the conduct was so plainly egregious that the official ought to have known his conduct was improper.

Officials sued for damages in their personal capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity when existing case law did not make their conduct clearly unlawful.

Lutheran v. Born, Gerald · filed 2001-01-25

The ground on which the district court dismissed the claim for damages against the defendants in their personal capacities, qualified immunity, was solid too. ... Before we upheld the constitutional challenge in the first suit there was no case authority that made it unreasonable for the defendants to assume the constitutionality of their actions.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Palmer v. Wagner · filed 2001-01-29

Because Palmer failed to allege a constitutional violation, the district court properly concluded that Wagner was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Palmer’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, disputed historical facts material to qualified immunity prevent the court from granting that defense as a matter of law.

Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt · filed 2001-01-31

In sum, because historical facts were in dispute concerning the reasonableness of the use of pepper spray in this case, as well as what Lewis and Philps knew and did when they authorized its use, the district court erred in deciding that these officials were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim was not decided at the demurrer stage.

Cobbs v. Commonwealth · filed 2001-01-31

Defendants claim that any actions were taken in their official capacities and they are therefore immune under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is not a question for the Court at this stage on demurrer.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known the conduct violated clearly established rights.

Fender v. Kansas Social & Rehabilitation Services · filed 2001-02-02

The court additionally finds that a reasonable person in defendant Seymour-Hunter’s position would not have known that her conduct violated plaintiffs clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. ... Accordingly defendant Seymour-Hunter is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful arrest claim when the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Jurgens v. Wood County, Texas · filed 2001-02-02

The district court did not err in determining that Deputy Criddle’s conduct was objectively reasonable and that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest if a prudent person could believe reasonable cause existed, even if probable cause did not.

Avery v. Hoague · filed 2001-02-06

If a prudent individual could believe that reasonable cause existed to arrest Avery, Pohl and Dick are entitled to qualified immunity regardless of whether probable cause existed to make the arrest.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the relevant right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Prison Legal News v. Cook · filed 2001-02-07

Publisher and Prisoners also argue that the district court improperly determined that the Department’s Officials are entitled to qualified immunity. We disagree.

Officers sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Estate of George Ex Rel. George v. Michigan · filed 2001-02-08

The Court does not believe that Plaintiff has satisfied its burden of establishing that Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that their conduct in performing a field sobriety test in the location chosen violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Defendants are therefore entitled to entry of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

State officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their objectively unreasonable conduct violates clearly established law.

Nelson v. Stalder · filed 2001-02-13

However, Nelson has demonstrated that defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law, and that defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable. Therefore, the court finds as a matter of law that Baker, Ward, and Goines are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not resolve a § 1983 claim when the alleged employment discrimination or retaliation, if proved, would violate clearly established rights and could not be objectively reasonable.

DiLegge v. Gleason · filed 2001-02-13

The doctrine of qualified immunity is unavailable on the facts of this case. The right to be free from discrimination in employment on account of race is well established, both by Title VII, and, with respect to state actors, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as is the right to be free from retaliation for speech or union activity, or asserting claims of discrimination. If discrimination or retaliation played a substantial part in the employment decisions, Defendants’ conduct could not be characterized as objectively reasonable. Accordingly, this case may not be resolved on the basis of qualified immunity, and that portion of the motion is denied.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established such that they should have known their conduct was unlawful.

Hauge v. Brandywine School District · filed 2001-02-13

Given the fact-intensive nature of the Pickering balancing test, however, the right is not clearly established such that the individual defendants should have known whether their conduct violated Hauge’s First Amendment rights. Therefore, the court will grant the individual defendants’ motion for qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on a Section 1983 illegal-entry claim when exigent circumstances do not justify their warrantless entry.

Weimer v. Mahoning County · filed 2001-02-20

Having had the benefit of oral argument, and having studied the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not persuaded that the district court erred in its rulings. ... We therefore AFFIRM that portion of the district court’s opinion denying summary judgment on the basis of exigent circumstances, DISMISS that portion of the appeal related to the question of consent, and REMAND this matter to the district court for further proceedings.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Copeland v. Nunan · filed 2001-02-21

While in 1995, it was clearly established by cases like Farmer and Schwenk that a forced sexual assault was repugnant to the conscience of man and therefore an Eighth Amendment violation, it was not clearly established that isolated and uninvited sexual touchings with little if any resulting physical or psychological damage, like those alleged in this case, amount to constitutional violation.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 wrongful-arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest.

Glenn v. City of Tyler · filed 2001-02-22

Officer Rhodes “exercis[ed] reasonable discretion based on his perception of the circumstances on the scene,” and this court finds that he was entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claim to the extent that it was grounded on a wrongful arrest.

Qualified immunity protects officers from a § 1983 wrongful-arrest claim when they reasonably could have believed probable cause existed.

Adolphus v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2001-02-22

The defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the wrongful arrest claim on the basis of qualified immunity ... because the undisputed material facts indicate that the officers reasonably could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Adolphus.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Flagner v. Wilkinson · filed 2001-02-22

In light of our decision in Pollock, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that the law was clearly established.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on a retaliation claim when the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Johnson v. Collins · filed 2001-02-23

To evaluate a claim of qualified immunity, we engage in a two-step analysis. First, we determine whether the plaintiffs’ claim states a violation of their constitutional rights. Second, we determine whether those rights were clearly established at the time the violation occurred. ... As for the second step, these rights were clearly established at the time the violation occurred.

An officer who joins a seizure already underway may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the officer has no reason to know the basis for the seizure.

Jacobs v. Village of Ottawa Hills · filed 2001-02-26

While officers must affirmatively intervene to prevent other officers from violating an individual’s constitutional rights, ... that obligation does not extend to questioning the basis for a fellow officer’s reasons for arrest in this situation. ... He is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when a genuine factual dispute prevents the court from deciding whether the defendants’ conduct was reasonable.

Scott v. Sills · filed 2001-02-27

In this case, the court will not grant the defendants the cover of qualified immunity because there is a genuine factual dispute over the exact nature of their conduct that prevents it from ruling on this issue as a matter of law.

A state official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for releasing a social security number when the constitutional privacy right in that information was not clearly established.

Arakawa v. Sakata · filed 2001-03-06

The constitutional right to privacy in a SSN has not been clearly established, and its parameters have not been clearly defined, as the discussion in Section A of this opinion demonstrates. ... Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs federal claims and those claims are, therefore, dismissed.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim at summary judgment when sufficient evidence supports a constitutional violation and defeats the immunity defense.

Pullin v. City of Canton · filed 2001-03-09

Thus, Pullin has met her burden of offering sufficient evidence to both establish a constitutional violation and defeat Ditt-more’s qualified immunity. Accordingly, Pullin’s unlawful arrest claim under § 1983 survives summary judgment.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when similarly situated officers could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful under clearly established law.

Nelson v. Wayne Kline and Matthew Cunningham · filed 2001-03-12

We believe that similarly situated officers, confronted with similar circumstances, could reasonably believe that these actions were lawful under clearly established law. The officers are thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Private persons sued under § 1983 have no qualified immunity defense.

Keeling v. Schaefer · filed 2001-03-14

As private persons, the Impact defendants have no qualified immunity defense.

A prior denial of qualified immunity does not establish liability under § 1983 when factual disputes remain for trial.

Joseph v. Maynard · filed 2001-03-16

We find that Joseph was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability, because this court’s prior decision did not settle liability-related issues. Rather, this court determined that there were factual disputes to be decided concerning the ultimate issue of whether Maynard was entitled to qualified immunity.

In an excessive-force claim under § 1983, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity when the force was unreasonable under clearly established law.

Deorle v. Greg Rutherford, Butte County Deputy Sheriff Mick Grey, Butte County Sheriff County of Butte · filed 2001-03-16

Accordingly, in line with established Ninth Circuit precedent, it is clear that because, on the facts presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the force used was unreasonable, Rutherford is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Still v. Wilkinson · filed 2001-03-19

The defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity in light of Still’s failure to establish a First Amendment violation.

Officials executing a facially valid child-removal order have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no precedent would alert a reasonable official that the removal violates a protected parental right.

Chapman v. Lilac · filed 2001-03-20

The district court held that “[i]n removing the plaintiffs daughter from her custody Ms. Lilac and Detective Deputy Sheriff Claypool were executing a facially valid court order ... Plaintiff has not cited any precedent holding that under such circumstances a reasonable public official could/ should have considered that action as interfering with a constitutionally protected parental right.” ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in its memorandum opinion filed February 22, 2000.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when a reasonable prison official would not have understood that asking an inmate to establish the religious character of his demands violated a clearly established right.

Rawlins v. Stewart · filed 2001-03-23

The authorities were neither plainly incompetent nor knowingly in violation of the law when they asked Rawlins to establish the religious character of his demands. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials performing discretionary functions are subject to qualified immunity when their actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Bazan Ex Rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County · filed 2001-03-27

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages liability if their actions were objectively reasonable in the light of then clearly established law.

Private foster parents are not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims based on their care of a child placed by the state.

Hernandez v. Hines · filed 2001-03-29

This Court declines to extend the law of the Fifth Circuit to grant qualified immunity to foster parents. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the § 1983 claims based on qualified immunity is denied.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest or detention are entitled to qualified immunity when they had arguable probable cause.

Garcia v. New York State Police Investigator · filed 2001-03-29

Defendants had “arguable probable cause” and, thus, are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged arrest and detention.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law gave adequate warning that the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Bell v. Marseilles Elementary School · filed 2001-03-29

Because the case law has been clear for sixteen years that student searches by school agents in schools must be reasonable, Officer Long is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity applies to a § 1983 arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Muendel v. Los Angeles Police Department · filed 2001-03-29

The officers and the City are also entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Based on the facts described above, “a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed” to arrest Muendel.

Qualified immunity does not shield a prison officer from a § 1983 retaliation claim when the alleged conduct, if proved, would be an egregious abuse of governmental authority.

Johnson v. Freeburn · filed 2001-03-30

Regarding the qualified immunity issue, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... Whether considered separately or in combination, each act, if proven, would exhibit an egregious abuse of governmental authority and shock the conscience.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects government officers from suit when their actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information they possessed at the time.

Metoyer v. Connick · filed 2001-03-30

Government officers are protected from suit under the qualified-immunity doctrine when their actions were objectively reasonable “in light of clearly established law” and the information possessed by the officers at the time of their relevant conduct.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity on false arrest and malicious prosecution claims when an officer’s probable cause determination was objectively reasonable.

Menon v. Frinton · filed 2001-03-30

Because Frinton had probable cause to issue the summons to Menon, he did not violate a clearly established constitutional right and his conduct was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, Frinton is entitled to qualified immunity on Menon’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims as a matter of law.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when they implement a federal court’s remedial decree and reasonably believe their actions do not violate clearly established rights.

Ehrenberg v. Goord · filed 2001-03-30

Insofar as defendants were merely implementing the terms of the remedial decree issued by the federal district court in Santiago, they are protected by qualified immunity against plaintiff’s action for damages.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for a police chief when there is no evidence that he violated a clearly established constitutional right or knew of or was deliberately indifferent to a subordinate’s constitutional violation.

Wrenn v. Clge · filed 2001-04-03

That court was also correct in concluding that there is no evidence that Hayes’s “conduct violated any clearly established constitutional right nor that he had knowledge of or was deliberately indifferent to any constitutional violation by any of his subordinates” and that he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities are subject to qualified immunity when plaintiffs cannot show a violation of a clearly established federal right.

ABATE of Georgia, Inc. v. State of Georgia · filed 2001-04-04

Additionally, Plaintiffs have not shown that, even if a constitutional violation existed, the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. There is no case law stating that there is a federal constitutional right to a list of approved motorcycle headgear. Accordingly, the individual Defendants sued for damages in their individual capacity are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a Section 1983 qualified immunity analysis, a court need not decide whether a right was clearly established if it finds no constitutional violation.

Milstead v. Kibler · filed 2001-04-05

Because no Fourth Amendment violation was shown, we need not proceed with the remainder of the qualified immunity analysis, i.e., to determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct or to resolve whether the contours of such a clearly estab- lished right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that he was violating the right.

Qualified immunity protects officers from § 1983 liability for an arrest when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Fersner v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD · filed 2001-04-11

To deny the defendants the benefit of the qualified immunity defense, I would have to be persuaded that no reasonably competent' officer could have concluded that probable cause existed to believe Fersner was operating under the influence. On this record, even viewing the material facts in the fight most favorable to Fersner, I am not persuaded that no reasonable law enforcement officer could have concluded (as did Bailey) that probable cause existed based on the aborted investigation of Fersner’s physical and mental condition after the single field sobriety test.

Qualified immunity does not shield § 1983 defendants from compliance with an order for injunctive relief.

Herron v. Schriro · filed 2001-04-12

Likewise, the prison officials’ cross-appeal arguments are without merit, as the district court’s grant of limited injunctive relief and a partial fee award were well within its discretion, and the doctrine of qualified immunity does not shield defendants from compliance with an order for injunctive relief.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional right violated was clearly established.

Giebel v. Sylvester · filed 2001-04-12

In light of history, a solid body of Supreme Court decisions, and common sense, we reject any contention that the First Amendment violation alleged in this case was not clearly established, and conclude that Sylvester is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit does not lose eligibility for qualified immunity simply by failing to follow agency policies.

Leverette v. Bell · filed 2001-04-13

While formal sources are instructive, a defendant does not lose official status for purposes of qualified immunity analysis simply by failing to adhere to an agency’s stated policies.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the right asserted against them was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Gill v. DeFrank · filed 2001-04-16

With respect to Gill’s privacy claim, the court concluded that “Gill’s right to privacy regarding his HIV status was not clearly established law in 1997, and thus defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.” ... Having conducted such a review, we conclude that summary judgment on all claims was warranted, and affirm, for substantially the same reasons as stated in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation as to the claims for which the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal, 2000 WL 270854 at *1, and in the district court’s memorandum and order, 462 Mich. 591, 614 N.W.2d 88, 2000 WL 987152 at *1.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have understood that his conduct violated clearly established rights.

Romaine v. Rawson · filed 2001-04-17

Consequently, he is not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions against Plaintiff.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no constitutional violation is alleged.

Brown v. Armenti · filed 2001-04-17

We conclude that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as to Count V because no actual constitutional violation was alleged.

An officer facing a § 1983 wrongful arrest claim has qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest, even when actual probable cause was absent.

Walker v. Briley · filed 2001-04-18

In the context of a claim of wrongful arrest, even if an officer lacks “actual” probable cause, he will still be protected by qualified immunity if there is at least “arguable” probable cause, i.e., if a reasonable police offer, given his knowledge of the facts and circumstances, could have believed there was probable cause to make a warrantless arrest. ... Here, the Court concludes that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Walker, Briley had neither actual nor arguable probable cause to arrest Walker for disorderly conduct, as that offense is defined by § 13A-11-7 and authoritatively interpreted by the Alabama appellate courts.

Individual officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right.

Campos De Suenos, Ltd. v. County of Bernalillo · filed 2001-04-18

The individual county commissioners argue that because CDS has failed to demonstrate a violation of equal protection, their qualified immunity claim prevails. We agree.

Government officials performing discretionary functions may claim qualified immunity from individual-capacity suits under Section 1983.

Chesser v. Haralson County, Georgia · filed 2001-04-18

Qualified immunity protects government actors performing discretionary functions from being sued in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot identify a clearly established right they violated.

Lile v. Simmons · filed 2001-04-20

Absent an identifiable liberty interest, plaintiff cannot establish that defendants violated clearly established law. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 mistaken-identity arrest claim, an officer has qualified immunity unless the officer acted objectively unreasonably, such as by failing to investigate readily available exculpatory evidence.

Brown v. Wiita · filed 2001-04-23

In sum officers who mistakenly arrest the wrong person are immune from § 1983 liability unless they act in an objectively unreasonable manner in the circumstances, as for example, in failing to investigate readily available exculpatory evidence.

A police officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed or competent officers could disagree about probable cause.

Pistorio v. Fleagane Enterprises, Inc., No. Cv-00-0504270 (Apr. 24, 2001) · filed 2001-04-24

Nothing in these allegations, even construed most favorably to the plaintiff, establishes facts which show that Candels lacked an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Alternatively, at the very least, officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the test for probable cause was met.

Officers facing a Section 1983 claim are entitled to qualified immunity when their mistaken assessment of a threat was reasonable under the circumstances.

City of San Antonio v. Hernandez · filed 2001-04-25

Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” ... The fact that they failed to recognize that the gun was harmless and that the situation escalated to life-threatening proportions is most unfortunate, but under the stressful circumstances presented here, does not demonstrate unreasonableness or a knowing violation of Hernandez’s constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity is unavailable on a § 1983 public employee retaliation claim when the employee’s First Amendment right was clearly established.

Baldassare v. County of Bergen · filed 2001-05-02

Defendants insist they are immune under the doctrine of qualified immunity. ... But it r emains unavailing. ... Defendants' argument that Baldassare's First Amendment rights wer e not clearly established cannot be sustained.

In a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 2001-05-04

As we recently reiterated in Nelson v. McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying a strict two-part test once a defendant invokes a qualified immunity defense. “‘First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right. Second, the plaintiff must show that the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.’” Id. at 1206 (quoting Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995)).

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Strouss v. Michigan Department of Corrections, a State Agency and Body Politic Marie Fletcher Gerald Devoss, in Th · filed 2001-05-04

In light of this caselaw, the individual defendants did not violate a clearly established constitutional right by giving Strouss a five-day suspension without pay. Since the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, Strouss’ Section 1983 due process claim was properly dismissed.

Prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim when no reasonable official could have believed their alleged conduct was lawful.

Robinson v. Prunty · filed 2001-05-07

We agree with the district court that if Robinson’s gladiator-like scenario is true, then no reasonable prison official could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful. ' We therefore hold that the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to the defendants.

Officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could believe their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Case v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Department · filed 2001-05-09

We hold that the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could believe that the conduct did not violate Case’s constitutional rights.

Officials sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for implementing a prison policy if they reasonably believed it did not violate an inmate’s First Amendment rights; a genuine factual dispute about the policy’s justification can preclude summary judgment.

Davis v. Norris · filed 2001-05-10

Here, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if they reasonably believed that their implementation of the photograph policy did not violate Davis’s First Amendment rights. ... A genuine issue of fact therefore existed as to whether the photograph policy reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, precluding summary judgment.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against individual officials when the plaintiff has not alleged the violation of a clearly recognized constitutional right.

Mooneyham v. BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EX'RS · filed 2001-05-11

The threshold question for determining whether the doctrine of qualified immunity applies to a given constitutional claim is whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly recognized constitutional right. ... The Supreme Court's refusal in Siegert to recognize an injury to one's reputation as a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest forecloses Mooneyham's ability to defeat the individual defendants' immunity defenses. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Mooneyham's § 1983 claim against these defendants.

Section 1983 does not shield local legislators with qualified immunity when they implement their authority to indemnify police officers for punitive damages in bad faith.

Navarro v. Block · filed 2001-05-11

This much is clear after Trevino II and Cunningham: local legislators are not entitled to qualified immunity if they implement their state-created power to indemnify police officers from punitive damage awards in bad faith.

A public official may be dismissed from a Section 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint fails to allege conduct violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Jackson v. State Ex Rel. Dept. of Corrs. · filed 2001-05-15

We also agree with the trial court's finding that Secretary Stalder was entitled to immunity for the federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). ... We find that the plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish conduct by the Secretary that violated Ms. Jackson's constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established federal law.

Carroll v. Mays · filed 2001-05-16

In short, the record fully supports the District Court’s conclusion that Mays’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established federal law and that he therefore was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields officers from § 1983 liability for an arrest when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Predmore v. Schwartz · filed 2001-05-21

There is no genuine dispute of material fact that a reasonable officer, in light of the information of which he was aware at the time of the arrest, could have believed he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

A local official cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 racial discrimination claim when the right to nondiscriminatory treatment was clearly established and the evidence permits a finding that the official violated it.

Caldwell v. Caesar · filed 2001-05-22

A local official faced with a claim of violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity if the conduct alleged “does not violate ... clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... It is the constitutional right to nondiscriminatory treatment under the Fifth Amendment that must be “clearly established,” not the validity of the particular individual’s underlying substantive claim which, in this case, is his claim to exercise his First Amendment right to freedom of religion. ... Qualified immunity does not provide Rev. Caesar a defense to this action.

Public officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they should have known that firing an employee for truthful whistleblowing violated a clearly established First Amendment right.

Hufford v. McEnaney · filed 2001-05-22

The district court correctly denied qualified immunity to the defendants because they should have been aware that discharging Hufford in retaliation for his truthful whistleblowing violated his constitutionally protected right to free speech.

A plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim bears the burden of showing that the asserted right was clearly established when it was allegedly violated.

Hufford v. Mcenaney · filed 2001-05-22

Hufford, as the party seeking to deprive the defendants of qualified immunity, bears the burden of proving that the rights he claims were "clearly established" at the time they were allegedly violated.

An official who adopts an unconstitutional jail policy can have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when existing law did not clearly establish that the policy was unlawful.

Wilson v. Shelby County · filed 2001-05-23

Therefore, although we hold that the strip search of Wilson was unconstitutional, we conclude that Sheriff Jones is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A defendant performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless the plaintiff shows a violation of clearly established constitutional standards.

Ellis Ex Rel. Lanthorn v. Jamerson · filed 2001-05-25

Hence, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless Plaintiff shows Defendant’s acts or omissions “violate[d] constitutional standards in light of clearly established law at the time [he] acted .”

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity inquiry, a court must consider evidence of discriminatory intent when that intent is an essential element of the plaintiff's claim.

Thomas v. Talley · filed 2001-05-25

Because evidence of improper motive is an essential component of Mr. Thomas's affirmative case, we conclude that when ruling on Captain Talley's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the district court was indeed required to consider the evidence of Captain Talley's intent to discriminate.

A prosecutor sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the known facts support an objectively reasonable belief that probable cause exists.

McGee v. Broz · filed 2001-05-25

We hold that Mr. Broz, a Missouri prosecuting attorney, was in possession of facts sufficient to justify an objectively reasonable official in believing that Mr. McGee had committed a crime, even though this belief turned out to be wrong. ... For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Mr. Broz was entitled to qualified immunity and the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 arrest and search claim when the plaintiff fails to establish an arrest without probable cause.

Galletta v. Deasy · filed 2001-05-29

We conclude Mr. Galletta has failed to establish Sergeant Deasy arrested him without probable cause, which means the subsequent search of Mr. Galletta’s wallet did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Sergeant Deasy is therefore entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to a private health care provider that has no discretion to deny necessary medical care to incarcerated people.

Elie v. St. Barnabas Hospital · filed 2001-05-31

Finally, there is no merit to defendant’s contention that it is entitled to qualified immunity, which ordinarily attaches only when a governmental official is “performing a discretionary function” (Liu v New York City Police Dept., 216 AD2d 67, 68, lv denied 87 NY2d 802, cert denied 517 US 1167; see also, Richardson v McKnight, 521 US 399, 406). St. Barnabas, a private health care provider, having undertaken to provide necessary medical care to incarcerated persons, had no discretion to deny such care by means of institutional policies manifesting deliberate indifference to those persons’ serious health needs (see, Hinson v Edmond, 192 F3d 1342).

Qualified immunity protects deputies from a § 1983 claim when their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Hall v. City of Vicksburg · filed 2001-06-04

At the time of the situation and under the circumstances set forth in the defendants’ summary-judgment evidence, the deputies’ actions were objectively reasonable.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action turns on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct under clearly established law; that determination does not establish immunity to state-law claims that depend on intent.

Andrews v. Crump · filed 2001-06-05

Rather, the court should examine the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct based upon law clearly established at the time. ... Thus, the federal judge’s determination that defendants had qualified immunity against plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims does not operate under the doctrine of issue preclusion to mandate a finding that defendants have immunity to plaintiffs’ state law claims, which do involve issues of intent and state of mind.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint fails to allege a violation of a clearly established right.

Kies v. City of Aurora · filed 2001-06-05

Here, Kies fails to adequately allege that the conduct of either Nila or Brown violated a clearly established constitutional right, and, therefore, Kies has not met her burden of demonstrating that Nila and Brown are not protected by qualified immunity.

Officials exercising delegated discretion may be entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages.

Lombardi Rest Home, Inc. v. Richter · filed 2001-06-05

The defendants exercised their judgment in determining the rates pursuant to § 17-314, now § 17b-340, and were thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Gardner v. Vespiia · filed 2001-06-11

The facts alleged by Gardner, even if true, do not allege the violation of an actual constitutional right. Accordingly, Vespia is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield officials from a claim when they violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Brown v. Dietz · filed 2001-06-12

Because plaintiff has successfully established that defendants’ actions violated a clearly established constitutional right, qualified immunity will not shield defendants from fully defending plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is available only to a person sued in an individual capacity.

Chute v. City of Cambridge · filed 2001-06-12

For example, qualified immunity, as a defense to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is available only to a person who has been sued in that person’s individual capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a government official for filing a counterclaim when a right to be free from that counterclaim was not clearly established.

Venable v. Keever · filed 2001-06-13

There is no clearly established right to be free from a counterclaim filed by a government official.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a § 1983 claim against a public official and must be granted when undisputed facts establish that the official did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Doe v. Gayle Bowles Richard Kemp Ronald Stratton · filed 2001-06-19

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a § 1983 claim against a public official. ... Provided that there are no disputed issues of material fact precluding jurisdiction, qualified immunity must be granted by this court if, as a matter of law, defendants’ conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when they had probable cause for the arrest.

Huang v. Harris County · filed 2001-06-22

Scudder and Darbe have demonstrated probable cause for Huang’s arrest, entitling them to the defense of qualified immunity. Huang has failed to carry her summary judgment burden by producing competent evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim to the extent it was grounded on an alleged false arrest.

Government actors generally receive qualified immunity in § 1983 actions, and the plaintiff bears the burden of defeating it.

Rodgers v. Hawley · filed 2001-06-22

Government actors generally receive qualified immunity in § 1983 actions. Irvin bears the burden of defeating this immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 illegal detention claim when the law governing their asserted community caretaking authority is not clearly established.

Winters v. Adams · filed 2001-06-25

As discussed earlier in this opinion, the availability of the community caretaking function as an alternative to reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio is still a subject of debate in the courts. Thus, the appellants’ conduct cannot be found to have violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, and the appellants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment illegal detention claim.

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity based on the objective legal reasonableness of their conduct in light of what they knew at the time.

Winters v. Robert Adams and Craig Prahm · filed 2001-06-25

The determination of whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity requires consideration of the “objective legal reasonableness” of the officer’s conduct in light of the information he possessed at the time of the alleged violation.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law made the unlawfulness of their conduct apparent.

Thornburg v. Peters · filed 2001-06-28

The Defendants also are not entitled to summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense. Public officials are protected from liability for civil damages if their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim when they rely on an executive order that was patently unconstitutional under existing precedent.

Sonoda v. Cabrera · filed 2001-07-03

It was impermissible for the defendants to rely upon an executive order that was patently unconstitutional under precedent of the CNMI Supreme Court and had been expressly declared unconstitutional by a federal district court. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment for the defendants and hold that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Sonoda’s due process claims.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they violate no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Dobson v. City & County of Denver · filed 2001-07-06

In any event, we do not see that the individual defendants violated any “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff has not established a deprivation of a federally protected right.

Townsend, Gary v. Vallas, Paul · filed 2001-07-09

Because Mr. Townsend has not established that he was deprived of a federally protected property right, Mr. Vallas and Ms. Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity.