42 U.S.C. § 1983

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is available only to defendants sued in their personal capacities.

Walker v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, REGIONAL TRANSP. · filed 1999-12-13

The defense is only available to those defendants sued in their personal capacities.

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant in a § 1983 action when the constitutional violation is obvious, even without a prior case on matching facts.

Skurstenis v. Jones · filed 1999-12-20

When a violation of a fundamental right is so obvious that no half-way intelligent public official could conclude in good faith that his proposed action is constitutional, a public official who does it anyway cannot claim qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield a defendant from damages under § 1983 for violating a clearly established constitutional right.

Smith v. RECTOR & VISITORS OF UNIV. OF VIRGINIA · filed 1999-12-22

Here, what plaintiffs are alleging involves a deprivation of an actual constitutional right that was clearly established at the time; thus, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for their actions surrounding the November UJC hearing.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on false statements or omissions in an arrest warrant application if the corrected application still establishes probable cause.

John G.Hulse v. Hall · filed 1999-12-23

If Hall's verified complaint contained deliberate falsehoods or omitted certain information as Hulse and DeMars allege, Hall is only entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability "if all the false and reckless portions of [the verified complaint] are corrected and the corrected [complaint] still supports a finding of probable cause." ... We have carefully reviewed the record and the parties' arguments and conclude a corrected version of Hall's verified complaint, which includes the test results and specifically references the information provided by the custom combiners, still presents evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Hulse and DeMars. Hall was thus entitled to qualified immunity, see Bagby, 98 F.3d at 1099-1100, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Hall.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity if their actions were objectively reasonable, even if those actions violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Kipps v. Caillier · filed 1999-12-30

Even if defendants violated Kipps's clearly established constitutional right, they are still entitled to qualified immunity if their actions were objectively reasonable.

Government agents are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known.

Rigle v. County of Onondaga · filed 1999-12-30

Moreover, the 42 USC § 1983 causes of action against defendants James R. Miller and Nicholas J. Pirro were properly dismissed on the ground of qualified immunity. Government agents are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818).

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted right was clearly established in a particularized sense relevant to the case.

Franklin v. AR Police Dept. · filed 2000-01-04

We conclude that Franklin has not demonstrated a right which is “clearly established in a particularized sense relevant to the case at hand.” Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Hadaway on this claim.

An officer does not gain immunity from a Section 1983 claim merely by acting on an alleged crime victim’s tip.

B.C.R. Transport Co., Inc. v. Fontaine · filed 1984-02-08

Fontaine may have been acting on a tip of an alleged crime victim. However, this no more immunized him from liability under section 1983 than it automatically established probable cause for the warrants he sought and obtained.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead.

Gavrilles v. O'CONNOR · filed 1984-02-14

Defendants’ claims of qualified immunity are premature. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the defendant.

A separate good-faith immunity instruction is unnecessary in a § 1983 action when the jury must find purposeful sex discrimination that clearly established law prohibited and defendants identify no extraordinary circumstances.

Stella STATHOS, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Russell E. BOWDEN, Et Al., Defendants, Appellants · filed 1984-02-22

Under the court’s instructions, to find liability under § 1983 the jury had to find that the defendants “purposefully” discriminated against plaintiffs “because they [were] women.” ... The law was clear throughout this period that public officials, acting in their official capacities, could not purposely discriminate (in this sense) on the basis of sex. ... Thus, a special Harlow instruction was unnecessary.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim depends on whether the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the act.

Staats v. Brown · filed 2000-01-06

Claims of qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 must fail if the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the act.

Officers cannot obtain qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim by relying on training that endorses conduct a reasonable officer would know violates clearly established rights.

California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts · filed 2000-01-08

The fact that Los Angeles and Santa Monica may have trained their police to violate the rights of individuals does not provide any defense for these officers.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an official who dismissed a volunteer in retaliation for protected speech when the volunteer’s asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Ziskend v. O'LEARY · filed 2000-01-10

Because no other pertinent case law appeared between August of 1994 and October of 1997 when Ziskend was dismissed, the qualified immunity that exists for public officials who discharge volunteers in retaliation for exercising free speech rights is applicable to O’Leary in the instant action.

Municipalities cannot claim qualified immunity from liability under § 1983.

Kelly v. City of Oakland · filed 2000-01-12

The City is not entitled to claim qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim alleging an arrest without probable cause, an officer has qualified immunity unless the warrant application was so deficient that belief in probable cause was unreasonable.

Pace v. Danner · filed 2000-01-13

When the plaintiff in an action under § 1983 contends that an officer acted without probable cause, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless the "warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." George v. City of St. Louis, 26 F.3d 55, 57 (8th Cir. 1994).

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim when a reasonable officer would recognize that the alleged force was unlawful.

Papp v. Snyder · filed 2000-01-20

The Court finds that no reasonable officer would use a choke hold and a carotid sleeper hold on a suspect who is both handcuffed and restrained by four other individuals. ... For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Snyder is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity if the challenged conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional right.

Jordan v. Weddle · filed 2000-01-21

Weddle is entitled to qualified immunity if he did not violate Jordan's constitutional right to equal protection. ... We thus reverse the district court's denial of Weddle's motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 false arrest claim when the asserted Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of arrest.

Staats v. Brown · filed 2000-01-24

However, Staats' arrest under this state statute under these circumstances is not a heretofore clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. We therefore affirm the trial court, and reverse the Court of Appeals, and hold that Officer Brown is entitled to qualified immunity from Staats' § 1983 claim for false arrest.

A social worker sued under § 1983 has qualified immunity for withholding a child’s whereabouts from a custodial parent when the worker did not help take or hide the child and no clearly established right required disclosure.

Dunlap v. Hilgenkamp · filed 2000-01-25

In summary, I find and conclude that there was no clearly established constitutional right that required a social worker to notify the custodial father of the whereabouts of his daughter when the social worker had done nothing to assist the noncustodial parent in taking or hiding the child. That being the case, Shippen’s silence is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity cannot be granted on summary judgment in a § 1983 claim when disputed material facts prevent the court from deciding whether the officers acted objectively reasonably.

Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi · filed 2000-01-26

We therefore hold that, because of the disputed facts, Gaines and Perez are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Nominal damages in a § 1983 action are legal relief barred by qualified immunity.

Hopkins v. Saunders · filed 2000-01-26

Hopkins' claim has much in common with the claim in White: it is based on section 1983 and is being challenged, at least in part, on qualified immunity grounds. ... In summary, then, we conclude that because the award of nominal damages to Hopkins constitutes legal rather than equitable relief, it runs counter to our remand instructions and our immunity holdings in Hopkins I and therefore must be reversed.

Qualified immunity cannot support summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when disputed facts permit different conclusions about whether officers reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Cerrone v. Cahill · filed 2000-01-28

In this case, for the reasons previously stated, the question of whether Defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable in the absence of probable cause requires resolution of genuine issues of material fact and, thus, a reasonable finder of fact could reach more than one conclusion. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official whose conduct violated no clearly established right.

Mercure v. Van Buren Township · filed 2000-01-31

Having already concluded that Defendants acted on a legitimate concern that Plaintiffs conduct had implications to the operation of the Township police force, the Court finds that Defendant Brooks violated no clearly established rights in his investigation of Plaintiffs relationship with Ms. Yono, and that Brooks is entitled to qualified immunity from the constitutional claims against him.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Suarez Corp. Industries v. McGraw · filed 2000-02-02

A court "`must first deter- mine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all.'" Id. at 1697 (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295 (1999)). If so, the court then proceeds to "`deter- mine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.'" Id. (quoting Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1295).

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds when the plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, sufficiently show a violation of clearly established law.

Stewart v. City/County Denver · filed 2000-02-04

Stewart has alleged facts which are sufficient to preclude summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer making a warrantless arrest if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Walker v. City of Oklahoma · filed 2000-02-07

Under the qualified immunity standard, an officer effecting a warrantless arrest is “‘entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest’ the plaintiff.” ... However, upon review of the record and the applicable law, we agree with the district court that “‘a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest [Ms. Walker].’”

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show that the asserted right was clearly established.

Wallace v. Wellborn · filed 2000-02-08

To establish that the agents are not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity, Wallace must satisfy a three-part test. ... Therefore, Appellant has not shown a clearly established right to a pre-seizure hearing.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against an official when the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a constitutional right; the court need not then decide whether the right was clearly established.

Pryor v. Coats · filed 2000-02-09

Plaintiff has not persuaded us that defendant’s bulletin board policy violated his First Amendment right of free speech or that the policy unconstitutionally respects an establishment of religion, and therefore, the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to defendant was correct. Having determined that plaintiff failed to assert a violation of a constitutional right, we need not determine whether the law was clearly established.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities may receive qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Thornhill v. Breazeale · filed 2000-02-10

Accordingly, Sheriff Breazeale and Deputy Perry are immune from Section 1983 liability in their individual capacities under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not support summary judgment when the governing law was clearly established and material facts remain disputed about the officer’s conduct.

Hill v. Martinez · filed 2000-02-11

Because the law regarding excessive force was “clearly established when the alleged violation occurred,” Losavio, 847 F.2d at 645-46, and because I concluded above that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of Defendant Martinez’s seizure of Preston Hill, summary judgment is inappropriate on Defendant Martinez’s defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield a state official from personal-capacity § 1983 damages when the violated constitutional rule was clearly established and the official knew or should have known of it.

Starlight Sugar Inc. v. Soto · filed 2000-02-14

The Court holds that the law was clearly established at the time the conduct occurred and that Soto knew or should have known that such conduct violated the Commerce Clause. ... Defendant is not entitled to either a blanket or qualified immunity under the facts of this case as Soto knew or should have known that Market Regulation No. 13 violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when no reasonable fact finder could find that every officer in the defendant’s position would have recognized deadly force as unjustified.

Wood v. City of Lakeland, FL · filed 2000-02-16

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a fact finder could not find that no reasonable person in the defendant's position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant's acts. ... Defendant Thompson is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action, if qualified immunity remains undecided until trial, the jury determines the objective legal reasonableness of the officers’ conduct.

McCoy v. Hernandez · filed 2000-02-17

However, we have previously held that while qualified immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial, if the issue is not decided until trial the defense goes to the jury which must then determine the objective legal reasonableness of the officers’ conduct. Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 1998). Therefore, McCoy’s argument regarding the submission of the qualified immunity issue to the jury is without merit.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiffs fail to establish a violation of the asserted constitutional right.

Resendiz v. Miller · filed 2000-02-25

Accordingly, appellants have failed to establish a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonable officer would have known their conduct was unlawful under clearly established law.

Lalonde v. County of Riverside, Robert Moquin, and Jason Horton, Opinion · filed 2000-02-25

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, unless a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct at issue was unlawful under clearly established law.

A municipality sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity and may be subject to discovery on claims against it.

Estate of Sorrells v. City of Dallas · filed 2000-02-25

A municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity. ... Therefore, plaintiffs should be allowed to conduct discovery in order to pursue their claims against this defendant.

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 damages only if the official’s conduct does not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Amaechi v. West · filed 2000-02-28

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the challenged search crossed evident Fourth Amendment lines and, therefore, precludes Officer West from invoking the protection of qualified immunity.

An official performing discretionary functions has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 damages claim if a reasonable official, considering the law and facts available at the time, could have believed the conduct lawful.

Paff v. Kaltenbach · filed 2000-02-28

The ultimate issue will then be whether, given the established law and the information available to Kaltenbach, a reasonable law enforcement officer in Kaltenbach’s position could have believed that his conduct was lawful.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action depends on whether the plaintiff asserts a violation of a clearly established right and whether a reasonable official would have known the alleged conduct violated that right.

Trammell v. Norris · filed 2000-02-28

In evaluating claims of qualified immunity, we must determine whether appellee asserted a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right and whether, given the facts most favorable to appellee, there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether reasonable officials in appellants’ positions would have known that their alleged actions violated that right.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer who could reasonably believe, under the established law and facts available at the time, that his conduct was lawful.

Paff v. Kaltenbach · filed 2000-02-28

Because we believe a reasonable officer would, and in fact should, consider the views of the postmaster in this situation, we have no difficulty concluding that Kaltenbach could have believed the restriction imposed here was reasonable, and that his own conduct was therefore lawful. Thus, Kaltenbach is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiffs' claimed violation of their First Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim depends in part on whether the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the law clearly established at the time.

Jones v. City of Jackson · filed 2000-02-29

The second step is to “decide whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable” in light of the legal rules clearly established at the time of the incident.

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity dispute, the official must first show that he acted within his discretionary authority; the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of showing that the official is not entitled to immunity.

Katherine Gardenhire and Walter Gardenhire v. Donald Schubert, in His Individual and Official Capacity as Chief of Polic · filed 2000-03-02

The ultimate burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Wegener v. Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir.1991). The defendant bears the initial burden of coming forward with facts to suggest that he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority during the incident in question.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct violated a right that was clearly established at the time.

Mervin v. Furlong · filed 2000-03-06

When a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the plaintiff must make the following two-part showing: (1) demonstrate that the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) show that the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. ... Accordingly, we do not find that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not give state officials qualified immunity when clearly established law made it unreasonable to believe their conduct was lawful.

LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh · filed 2000-03-06

We conclude that in 1997 no reasonable official could have believed that Section 143.4 could constitutionally be employed to impede LSO’s right to display non-obscene art on the premises of an ABC licensee. Thus, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Officials on the ground of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against officials entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not established when they acted.

Chambers v. Colorado Department of Corrections Margaret Heil, in Her Individual and Official Capacity · filed 2000-03-07

Because the state of the law was not established when these actions were taken, the prison officials named in this lawsuit are entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, Mr. Chambers’ claim for damages cannot be sustained.

Public officials sued under § 1983 for discretionary acts are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

C.A. v. Lowndes County Department of Family & Children Services · filed 2000-03-13

Public officials are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit for discretionary acts occurring in the course of their official duties. ... As such, Defendants Hannah, Reeves and Stockman are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit requires the court to ask whether the plaintiff alleged a constitutional deprivation and, if so, whether the right was clearly established when the defendants acted.

Howard v. Henderson · filed 2000-03-10

In determining defendants’ entitlement to immunity, we determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of constitutional magnitude, and, if so, whether that right was so clearly established that defendants would have known their conduct violated the Constitution at the time of their acts.

A good faith defense to a Section 1983 claim shields defendants from damages, including nominal damages.

Solomon v. Emanuelson · filed 1984-02-29

The Court therefore agrees with the Magistrate’s finding that defendants good faith defense presently shields them from all damage liability, including nominal relief.

In a § 1983 action, the judge decides qualified immunity as a question of law.

Pouillon v. City of Owosso Sergeant Sharon Little and Officer W. G. Blanchett · filed 2000-03-16

Finally, the question of qualified immunity, which was improperly submitted to the jury under general instructions, is rather a question of law for determination by the judge.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed for the detention.

Colon-Berezin v. Giuliani · filed 2000-03-17

In any event, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff has met her burden in that regard, the facts referred to above are more than sufficient to justify a finding that reasonable police officers could disagree as to the existence of probable cause. ... That circumstance in itself requires the Court to sustain Pap-pas’s motion to dismiss ... on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when the facts cannot support a reasonable belief that their conduct was lawful.

DeBoer v. Pennington · filed 2000-03-17

Consequently, the facts alleged by the Bellingham Defendants cannot support a reasonable belief that their conduct was lawful. Accordingly, the Bellingham Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit turns on whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the law at the time.

Jones v. City of Jackson, Malcolm McMillin and Les Tannehill · filed 2000-03-20

The first inquiry in examining a defense of qualified immunity asserted in a motion for summary judgment is whether the plaintiff has alleged “the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” ... The second step is to “decide whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable” in light of the legal rules clearly established at the time of the incident.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action does not turn on state law’s distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts.

Ulichny v. Merton Community School District · filed 2000-03-21

However, il is well-established that the common law's distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts for state law immunity purposes is irrelevant to a qualified immunity defense asserted in a federal § 1983 action.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages claim depends on whether an official’s conduct violated clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Diruzza v. County of Tehama · filed 2000-03-21

Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity only “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot obtain qualified immunity merely because the record is unclear about an employee’s duties when the officials may have known those duties at the time.

Diruzza v. County Of Tehama · filed 2000-03-21

This lack of clarity, however, does not support Floyd's and Heard's claim of qualified immunity. The fact that the specifics of DiRuzza's job duties are unclear to the court on the current state of the record, does not mean that Heard and Floyd did not know those specifics at the time they acted.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit when the plaintiff cannot show that the defendant violated a constitutional right.

Nelson v. McMullen · filed 2000-03-23

However, because Ms. Nelson controlled the time, place, and manner of the search at issue here, we hold she cannot show Officers McMullen and Ratzlaff violated her constitutional rights. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity from suit, and summary judgment is appropriate.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 strip-search claim when the facts known to the officer make the search objectively unreasonable.

Kelleher v. New York State Trooper Fearon · filed 2000-03-23

I therefore find as a matter of law that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 if their conduct does not violate a clearly established right a reasonable person would have known.

Defoor v. Rotella · filed 2000-03-24

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages if their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An official sued individually under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law made the challenged conduct objectively unreasonable.

Sowards v. Loudon County, Tennessee and Timothy Guider, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Lo · filed 2000-03-24

Because the law was so clearly established that he could not reasonably take political considerations into account when terminating Sowards, Guider is not entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity for Sowards’s political association claim.

An official who exercises reasonable professional judgment in obtaining an arrest warrant may receive summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff does not rebut that showing.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2000-03-27

The appellees’ summary judgment evidence showed that they exercised reasonable professional judgment in obtaining the warrant for appellant Smith’s arrest, and Smith’s summary judgment evidence was insufficient to rebut this showing.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, minimal force and injury will not defeat an officer’s qualified immunity.

Judicial Complaint, In Re: · filed 2000-03-28

We again hold, as we did in a line of cases beginning with Post, that a minimal amount of force and injury, as present in the facts of this case,4 will not defeat an officer's qualified immunity in an excessive force case.

Qualified immunity under § 1983 is a question of law, but the fact finder must resolve disputed facts before the court rules on it.

Wald v. City of Margate · filed 2000-03-29

Although the defense of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a question of law, there can be issues of fact which must be resolved by the fact finder before the trial court can rule on the question of law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer protected by qualified immunity when a reasonable officer with the same information would have believed the officer’s conduct lawful.

Milstead v. Kibler · filed 2000-03-30

Under this doctrine, government officials performing discretionary functions are not liable under § 1983 so long as their conduct does not run afoul of “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Social workers sued under § 1983 may claim qualified immunity when the asserted right to family integrity is nebulous amid overlapping child-protection and family-privacy interests.

T v. Ward · filed 2000-04-05

Morris, however, is distinguishable as appellant sued social workers whose primary duty is to investigate allegations of child abuse. The facts of the instant case place it in the center of the continuum where the State’s interest in protecting children and a family’s interest in privacy overlap, and the right to family integrity may properly be characterized as nebulous. Morris, 181 F.3d at 671. Accordingly, the defendants may claim the protection of qualified immunity.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show through closely analogous case law that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Stipetich v. Grosshans · filed 2000-04-06

We agree that the trial court should have granted summary judgment because Tupper was entitled to qualified immunity on Stipetich's § 1983 invasion of privacy claim. ... However, Stipetich has not demonstrated "by closely analogous case law" existing at the time, that Tupper violated her federal constitutional right to privacy by requiring her to provide a complete release of information to Dr. Hummel.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from individual liability under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established rights.

Bailey v. Pacheco · filed 2000-04-06

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be decided on summary judgment when disputed facts about the defendants’ motive prevent the court from determining whether their conduct was objectively reasonable.

Hunter v. Heath · filed 2000-04-11

Because the true reason why defendants removed Hunter from his position is disputed, this court cannot decide whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A court may defer deciding qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit when the issue requires further factual development.

Benedict v. Town of Newburgh · filed 2000-04-11

It is inappropriate to resolve the issue of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation. The issue appears to be somewhat fact intensive. ... That portion of the motion is denied with leave to renew after the pleadings are closed and pretrial discovery has been concluded.

Qualified immunity bars damages under § 1983 against an eligible state official when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time.

Denius v. Wayne Dunlap and Gary Sadler 1 · filed 2000-04-11

Thus, even if we find that Dunlap violated Denius’s constitutional rights by requiring him to sign the Authorization, Dunlap is immune from suit for damages under § 1983 if those rights were not clearly established at the time in question.

In a § 1983 action, a court may stay discovery to allow defendants to assert qualified immunity defenses.

Christian v. Gourd · filed 2000-04-12

The district court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery to enable the defendants to assert qualified immunity defenses.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.

Oliver v. Woods · filed 2000-04-17

Mr. Oliver failed to show Officer Woods violated his clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. ... We conclude Officer Woods is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officials sued in their individual capacities when a reasonable official would not have known that the challenged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Angie Chesser, A.K.A. Angie Kimball v. Amos Sparks, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Haralson County Commiss · filed 2000-04-18

The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the defendant county Commissioner, who is being sued for money damages in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiffs claims that he terminated her employment in violation of her First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom of association. ... The district court erred in not granting Sparks qualified immunity with respect to the free speech component of Count Two. ... The district court erred in not granting qualified immunity to Sparks on this Count Two claim.

A public official sued under § 1983 for retaliating against employees’ protected speech cannot obtain qualified immunity based on unsupported claims that the speech disrupted the workplace.

Sexton v. Martin · filed 2000-04-19

For these reasons, Martin’s failure to establish workplace disruption is fatal to his claim of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a constitutional right.

Lighton v. University of Utah · filed 2000-04-24

Having conducted a de novo review of the district court decision granting summary judgment to Ms. McCreary and Dr. Ehleringer on the issue of qualified immunity, we hold Dr. Lighten has failed to make the requisite showing of a violation of any constitutional right. See Romero, 45 F.3d at 1475. As a result, we conclude Ms. McCreary and Dr. Ehleringer are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Section 1983 defendants cannot claim qualified immunity for retaliatory prison transfers or the retaliatory initiation of gang validation proceedings when the prohibition on retaliatory punishment was clearly established.

Koch v. Lewis · filed 2000-04-24

On the retaliation claims (retaliatory transfer, retaliatory initiation of validation proceedings) qualified immunity is unavailable, as the prohibition against retaliatory punishments is “clearly established law” in the Ninth Circuit.

Prison officials may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 failure-to-protect claim when they lacked knowledge of a substantial risk of an inmate attack.

Cohrs v. Rick Toney · filed 2000-04-24

Therefore, Toney and Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity on Cohrs’s claim that they failed to prevent the attack.

A defendant has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable jury could find it objectively unreasonable for the defendant to believe the conduct did not clearly violate an established federal right.

Bonide Products, Inc. v. Cahill · filed 2000-04-25

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action when “no reasonable jury” viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff “could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the defendant ... to believe that he was acting in a fashion that did not clearly violate an established federally protected right.”

An individual defendant sued for damages under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable to believe the conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Locurto v. Giuliani · filed 2000-04-27

An individual defendant sued for damages under § 1983 may be entitled to qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for him to conclude that his actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. ... The Court disagrees with defendants, as discussed above, that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim or, given the murky factual record before the Court, that defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable. ... Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity must be denied.

Qualified immunity shields police officers from § 1983 liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Loney v. Miles · filed 2000-05-03

Qualified immunity shields police officers from§ 1983 liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when an officer could reasonably mistake a disconnected 911 call for evidence of exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry.

Sanders v. Marovich · filed 2000-05-03

Here, the unlawfulness of the alleged conduct would not have been apparent. In view of the 911 call, a reasonable officer might have plausibly thought that exigent circumstances existed. ... Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if reasonably competent officers could disagree about whether an arrest warrant should issue.

Freeman v. County of Bexar · filed 2000-05-04

Even if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, the Appellees are still entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 excessive-force claim cannot be decided as a matter of law when material facts about the force and the officials’ knowledge and actions are disputed.

Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt · filed 2000-05-04

In sum, because historical facts were in dispute concerning the reasonableness of the use of pepper spray in this case, as well as what Lewis and Philps knew and did when they authorized its use, the district court erred in deciding that these officials were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 shields officers from damages when plausible instructions from a superior could lead a reasonable officer to believe their actions were legally justified.

Bilida v. McCleod · filed 2000-05-08

Plausible instructions from a superior or fellow officer support qualified immunity where, viewed objectively in light of the surrounding circumstances, they could lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the necessary legal justification for his actions exists (e.g. a warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances).

An official has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Sutton v. Village of Valley Stream, NY · filed 2000-05-08

In light of the fact that Plaintiffs claim is based upon a case not decided in this circuit until 1999, and even then, acknowledged by the court to present a close question, the court holds that the right claimed was not so “clearly established” so as to defeat a claim for qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

McFarland v. Childers · filed 2000-05-10

In light of the uncertainty in Oklahoma law, we conclude that it was not clearly established when Agent Childers executed the challenged probable cause affidavits in 1996 that Ms. McFarland’s false statements to law enforcement officers were not sufficient to support an accessory-after-the-fact charge. Agent Childers is therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to the claim arising out of the execution of the probable cause affidavits.

In a § 1983 due process claim against officers asserting qualified immunity, the claimed liberty or property interest must have been clearly established.

Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge · filed 2000-05-11

In order to recover under § 1983 for violations of their due process rights, Wooley and Jordan must demonstrate that they were denied a cognizable liberty or property interest clearly established either by state law or the United States Constitution.

Government officials acting within their discretionary authority are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless the plaintiff shows a violation of clearly established law.

Maggio v. State of Florida · filed 2000-05-17

After review, we conclude that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Maggio's § 1983 claim and reverse.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their conduct violated clearly established law.

Maggio v. State of Florida · filed 2000-05-17

For these reasons, we conclude that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The order of the district court denying qualified immunity to the individual Defendants is reversed and vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to grant the individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss Maggio’s § 1983 claim against them.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity analysis ends if the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional deprivation; the court need not decide whether the right was clearly established.

Wilson v. Russo · filed 2000-05-19

The qualified immunity defense requires that we engage in a two-step analysis. First, we must “determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all.” ... Only if he has should we “proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” ... In this case, since we conclude that Wilson has not adduced facts from which a jury could conclude that his constitutional rights were deprived at all, we need not engage in the second inquiry.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Leon v. Johnson · filed 2000-05-22

Even if a violation could be found, however, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields a humane investigator from a procedural due process claim for following an untested, presumptively constitutional state statute that provides only post-deprivation process.

Siebert v. Severino · filed 2000-05-24

This untested statute is presumptively constitutional, and it was not up to Severino to second guess the General Assembly. It is the State, not a humane investigator or any other law enforcement official, which provides the due process either prior to or subsequent to a seizure. When the General Assembly has provided for post-deprivation process only, civil liability should not attach to a humane investigator for his failure to create and initiate predeprivation process. Accordingly, the Court finds that the extraordinary circumstances, qualified immunity defense bars P. Siebert’s due process claim, and summary judgment is granted in favor of Sev-erino and against P. Siebert.

Qualified immunity can bar an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when the constitutional rule was unclear at the time of the official’s conduct.

Washington Initiatives Now v. Rippie · filed 2000-05-25

WIN does not challenge this ruling on appeal, a ruling which we believe to be undoubtedly correct. The constitutional status of the statute was not clear, at least prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley, 525 U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999). Because we affirm the district court’s decision on the basis of qualified immunity, we need not consider its ruling that Warheit was not subject to suit in her individual capacity for official acts, under Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) and Ashker v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir.1997).

Qualified immunity protects an individual defendant from a § 1983 claim when the constitutional status of the challenged statute was unclear at the time.

Washington Initiatives Now v. Ripple · filed 2000-05-25

The constitutional status of the statute was not clear, at least prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley, 525 U.S. 182 (1999). Because we affirm the district court's decision on the basis of qualified immunity, we need not consider its ruling that Warheit was not subject to suit in her individual capacity for official acts, under Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28 (1991) and Ashker v. California Dep't of Corrections , 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997).

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe that reporting suspected crime did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Rohman v. New York City Transit Authority (Nycta), Carmen J. Bianco · filed 2000-05-26

We conclude that as a matter of law it was not objectively unreasonable for Bian-co to believe that his actions did not violate Rohman’s constitutional rights. Bianco was therefore entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Rohman’s § 1983 claim, and the district court erred in denying Bianco’s motion for summary judgment on that claim.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably should have known their conduct would violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Bunker v. City of Olathe, Kan. · filed 2000-05-31

The court also concludes that at the time of their actions, Defendants Major, Sherman, and Kannady reasonably should have been aware that any adverse actions taken against Plaintiff in retaliation for his reporting the alleged misconduct of Defendant Major to Defendant Sherman would violate clearly established First Amendment constitutional rights. ... Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based' upon qualified immunity is denied.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine factual disputes remain over protected speech and a violation of clearly established rights.

Beach v. City of Olathe · filed 2000-05-31

Defendants Sherman and Major contend that, with respect to Plaintiffs § 1983 freedom of speech claim, they are immune from liability in their individual capacities because of the doctrine of qualified immunity. The court disagrees; ... The court ultimately concludes that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment. Defendants have failed to show the absence of a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff engaged in protected speech; moreover, Defendants have failed to show the absence of a genuine issue of fact as to whether their conduct violated Plaintiff s clearly established First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 qualified immunity depends on whether an officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

City of San Juan v. Gonzalez · filed 2000-06-01

Official immunity to state claims is distinct from federal qualified immunity to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... If there is, we determine whether the government official’s “actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law,” entitling him to qualified immunity. ... Reviewing Rodriguez’s affidavit and Gonzalez’s deposition excerpts, we are unable to conclude the officers’ conduct was objectively reasonable; thus, appellants Rodriguez, Lara, and Martinez are not entitled to qualified immunity under federal law.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for an unlawful seizure when the alleged conduct violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

Jacobs, Willie v. City of Chicago · filed 2000-06-01

Therefore, we hold that, under the allegations presented in the complaint, the Defendant Officers do not enjoy qualified immunity to Jacobs’ claims that their unlawful seizure of his person violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Police officers lack qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when the alleged conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Jacobs v. City of Chicago · filed 2000-06-01

Therefore, we hold that, under the facts as alleged in the complaint, the Defendant Officers do not have qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' claims.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a § 1983 retaliation claim when a reasonable official would recognize the alleged conduct as unlawful.

Leach v. Manning · filed 2000-06-02

In apparent recognition of this, Defendants assert that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields them from liability under this theory of vindictive prosecution. This doctrine protects government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Thus, a reasonable person in Defendants’ position would have readily recognized the unlawfulness of the retaliatory conduct alleged by Plaintiffs, and Defendants’ claim to the contrary is without merit.

For § 1983 qualified immunity, a prosecutor’s authorization of an officer’s warrant application weighs in assessing reasonableness but does not automatically confer immunity.

Wadkins v. Arnold · filed 2000-06-02

Of course, the mere fact that Detective Arnold acted upon the Commonwealth's Attorney's authorization in applying for the war- rants does not automatically cloak Arnold with the shield of qualified immunity. However, this authorization -- by the elected chief law enforcement officer of Washington County -- is compelling evidence and should appropriately be taken into account in assessing the rea- sonableness of Arnold's actions.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from § 1983 liability when the officer acts objectively reasonably in seeking an arrest warrant.

Wadkins v. Robert Arnold, and the First Bank & Trust Company · filed 2000-06-02

Pursuant to the foregoing, Detective Arnold’s actions satisfy the requirements of objective reasonableness upon which qualified immunity rests.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest have qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on the information available to them and reasonable officers could disagree about probable cause.

Harford v. County of Broome · filed 2000-06-05

Because DiRienzo and Cashman reasonably relied on the informa-' tion provided by the 9-1-1 dispatcher, Patrick Cleary, Theresa Cleary, and Plaintiff himself, their actions are protected by qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Walker v. Benjamin · filed 2000-06-08

Accordingly, there is no evidence that Dr. Benjamin’s conduct violated clearly established constitutional or statutory rights and she is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint alleges no violation of established constitutional rights.

Sweatt v. Raney · filed 2000-06-14

Under the above authorities, the trial court did not err in holding that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and that the allegations of the complaint do not state a claim because there was no violation of established constitutional rights.

A state defendant claiming qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit is entitled to it unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Mitchell, Johnnie v. Randolph, Lonnie · filed 2000-06-15

First, after a state defendant has properly invoked this defense, the plaintiff must show that her claim states a violation of her constitutional or statutory rights; and second, the plaintiff must show that the applicable legal standards were clearly established at the time the defendants acted. ... We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to deny Judge Randolph’s motion for summary judgment based on the qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 does not permit a false-arrest damages claim when the arresting officers reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Mendenhall v. Riser · filed 2000-06-21

His arrest was reasonable, as it was based on arguable probable cause and a civil action for damages under § 1983 cannot be maintained on these facts.

Qualified immunity protects police officers from § 1983 liability unless they violate a clearly established right.

Sabir v. District of Columbia · filed 2000-06-22

Absent violation of “a clearly established right,”a police officer will not be subject to § 1983 liability.

In a § 1983 action, the qualified immunity inquiry ends when the official’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Piazza v. Mayne · filed 2000-06-29

Determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 is potentially a two-step inquiry. ... We need not reach the second step of this analysis because the summary judgment evidence, construed in the light most favorable to Piazza, indicates that Mayne’s conduct did not violate Piazza’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution.

Qualified immunity protects a § 1983 defendant when the complaint fails to allege deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable right.

Yates v. Stalder · filed 2000-06-30

Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest, the district court did not err by granting Stalder qualified immunity on this claim.

In a Section 1983 qualified immunity inquiry, a court may address whether an asserted right was clearly established before deciding whether the right exists when circumstances warrant.

Powers v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2000-07-05

Accordingly, the Court concludes that it is appropriate to deviate from the normal order and to address first whether the constitutional and statutory rights asserted by the plaintiff were clearly established on November 12,1997.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must show that the defendant violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Hicks v. Woodruff · filed 2000-06-28

When the defendant bases a motion for summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s actions violated a specific statutory or constitutional right, and “the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.”

A Section 1983 plaintiff must show that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established when the defendant acted to overcome qualified immunity.

Herring v. Keenan · filed 2000-07-10

Even though a plaintiff correctly alleges a violation of a constitutional right, he or she has the burden of demonstrating that the law was clearly established at the time of the deprivation of that right. ... The plaintiff has further failed to demonstrate that the contours of that right were sufficiently clear in late 1993 so that a reasonable probation officer would understand that he or she could not disclose to a probationer’s close relative or restaurant employer that the probationer had tested positive to HIV.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred by qualified immunity when the challenged conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights known to a reasonable person.

Woodward v. Gray · filed 2000-07-13

Finally, no 42 USC § 1983 action for damages can lie against either defendant, because the doctrine of qualified immunity applies where the “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Genuine issues of material fact can preclude summary judgment on a defendant’s qualified immunity claim in a § 1983 action.

Galloway v. City of Houston · filed 2000-07-14

Officer Whalen moved for summary judgment asserting that he is qualifiedly immune from the claims and arguing (1) that he did not violate Galloway’s Fourth Amendment rights both because no seizure occurred and because his actions were reasonable, and (2) that his actions did not violate Galloway’s substantive due process rights as they were not shocking to the conscience. ... Having fully considered the arguments of counsel as advanced in briefs and at oral argument, and having carefully reviewed the record on appeal, we conclude that there are genuine issues as to material facts precluding Deputy Whalen’s entitlement to summary judgment.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s alleged facts show that officials refused treatment for a serious medical need unless the inmate consented to an unwanted procedure.

Harrison v. Barkley · filed 2000-07-17

Assuming these facts to be true, as we must for purposes of this motion, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless their conduct violates a clearly established right a reasonable person would have known.

Youngblood v. Bender · filed 2000-07-18

While performing discretionary functions, government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 claims against police officers are subject to qualified immunity when the officer’s actions were reasonable in light of clearly established law and the information the officer possessed.

Pullen v. Vandertuin · filed 2000-07-19

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officers from suit if the officers’ actions were reasonable “in light of clearly established law and the information the . . . officers possessed.” ... Faced with such a situation, Vandertuin did not act unreasonably in throwing Pullen to the ground and standing on him in order to bring Pullen under control quickly and to ascertain the threat posed by the unidentified male.

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary official functions have qualified immunity from monetary liability when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Weiss v. Missouri Dept. of Mental Health · filed 1984-03-29

As a general rule, governmental officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to enjoy a qualified immunity from monetary liability while acting in their official capacities insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Thus, the Court concludes that such a right was not clearly established in March, 1979, and that defendants are therefore immune under Harlow for failing to provide such a hearing.

A prison officer sued under § 1983 may assert good-faith immunity when the law did not clearly establish that the challenged conduct was unconstitutional.

Bailey v. Turner · filed 1984-06-07

Since this is so, it cannot be said that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that his action in gassing the plaintiff was unconstitutional and, therefore, under Harlow, the defendant was entitled, as the magistrate without objection instructed the jury, to a good-faith defense.

A public official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the employee received the kind of pretermination hearing required by clearly established law at the time.

Walt v. State · filed 1988-03-18

We hold that Walt had this “pre-Loud-ermill” type of hearing in the instant case ... and thus the superior court correctly concluded that Commissioner Lyon had qualified immunity.

A defendant sued for § 1983 damages may raise qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss when the basis for the defense appears on the face of the complaint.

Munjoy Sporting & Athletic Club v. Dow · filed 2000-07-21

Contrary to Munjoy’s contentions, immunities and other affirmative defenses “may be raised by a motion to dismiss if facts giving rise to the defense appear on the face of the complaint.” ... Because Munjoy specifically sued Dow for “monetary damages pursuant to section 1983” arising from Dow’s official actions, Dow’s motion to dismiss may raise the immunity issue.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials performing discretionary functions are subject to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates clearly established rights.

Perry, Rixson M. v. Sheahan, Michael · filed 2000-07-21

Our analysis begins with the well-established proposition that government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when their force was not excessive under the circumstances.

Watkins v. City of Southfield, Mark Wood, L. Porter, and Jane Doe · filed 2000-07-21

We do not deem this force, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Watkins, to have been excessive under the circumstances. Thus, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in this claim as well.

Section 1983 officials cannot claim qualified immunity from damages when clearly established law makes their alleged seizure unconstitutional.

Perry v. Sheahan · filed 2000-07-21

No exception to that rule or other circumstances apparent in this motion to dismiss would render objectively reasonable their belief that this seizure was constitutional. Therefore, there is no basis for qualified immunity, and the decision of the district court in Perry I must be reversed on this issue.

An officer sued under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity when the plaintiff adequately alleges a constitutional violation, the right was clearly established, and the officer should have known the conduct was unconstitutional.

Feist v. Simonson · filed 2000-07-25

Upon analyzing each element of qualified immunity as it applies to this case, we find Feist successfully alleged a constitutional violation, the law was clearly established at the time, and Simonson should have known his actions were constitutionally suspect. Thus, Simonson cannot invoke the protections of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity shields public officials unless the plaintiff shows a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Garcia v. Shanks · filed 2000-07-27

In sum, Garcia has failed to demonstrate that defendants’ actions violated any clearly established law or constitutional right. The district court correctly granted the defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action is assessed without regard to a government official’s subjective intentions.

Okwa v. Harper · filed 2000-07-28

Under the recognized test for qualified immunity, the subjective intentions of a government official play no role in the analysis and the Circuit Court erred in factoring malice into the § 1983 immunity equation.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional unlawfulness of the conduct was not clearly established at the time.

John Lauro, Jr. v. Michael Charles, the City of New York and the Police Department of the City of New York · filed 2000-07-28

Accordingly, we hold that, because the unconstitutionality of the staged perp walk was, until today, not clearly established, Detective Charles is entitled to qualified immunity for his participation in the perp walk.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the law governing the alleged violation is not clearly established.

Chandler Natural Gas Corp. v. Barr · filed 2000-07-31

But the law is far from clear that the actions taken violate the due process clause. Therefore, all defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity under this claim.

A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for an arrest that violated clearly established First and Fourth Amendment rights.

Nichols v. Chacon · filed 2000-08-01

We also believe that this right was clearly established on August 6th of 1998 when Chacon arrested Nichols. Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law that Chacon is not entitled to qualified immunity and that his arrest of Nichols violated Nichols’ First and Fourth Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity shields an official from personal liability under § 1983 when the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Charmaine Hunter v. Namanny · filed 2000-08-01

Qualified immunity shields Namanny from personal liability if his actions, though unlawful, were “nevertheless objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the events in question.” Rogers v. Carter, 133 F.3d 1114, 1119 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987)).

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from § 1983 damages when they could not reasonably believe their seizure was constitutional.

Perry, Rixson M. v. Sheahan, Michael · filed 2000-08-02

No exception to that rule or other circumstances apparent in this motion to dismiss would render objectively reasonable their belief that this seizure was constitutional. Therefore, there is no basis for qualified immunity, and the decision of the district court in Perry I must be reversed on this issue.

When qualified immunity is asserted against a § 1983 claim, the court first asks whether a constitutional violation occurred.

Littlefield v. Forney Independent School District · filed 2000-08-03

When the defense of qualified immunity is asserted against a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the initial inquiry is whether a constitutional violation has occurred.

Qualified immunity can bar Section 1983 claims against prison officers in their individual capacities.

Hakim v. Moore · filed 2000-08-04

With respect to Hakim's cross-appeal in case number 98-3062, we affirm without discussion the portion of the district court's September 15, 1997, order dismissing under the doctrine of qualified immunity Hakim's claims against DOC officers in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims against prison officers are subject to qualified immunity.

Hakim v. Hicks · filed 2000-08-04

With respect to Hakim's cross-appeal in case number 98-3062, we affirm without discussion the portion of the district court's September 15, 1997, order dismissing under the doctrine of qualified immunity Hakim's claims against DOC officers in their individual capacities.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Bartholomew v. PA · filed 2000-08-07

Because the issue of whether one has a constitutional right to be free from a search pursuant to a warrant based on a sealed list of items had not been addressed by this or, indeed, by virtually any other court, it cannot be said that Agent Fraley violated a “clearly established constitutional right.” Because, therefore, Agent Fraley is entitled to qualified immunity, we will reverse the order of the District Court denying his motion for summary judgment.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 in their individual capacities have qualified immunity when their conduct is objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Eaton v. Dooley · filed 2000-08-09

We agree with the District Court that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from damages in their individual capacities, as it was objectively reasonable for defendants to institute and implement a new inmate legal-assistance program.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from individual-capacity damages when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Scholl v. Delaney III · filed 2000-08-09

We find it was objectively reasonable for defendants to believe Scholl was not denied access to the courts by expecting him to cooperate with the contract attorney assigned to assist him, and by declining to provide him further legal assistance after he filed a bar complaint against the contract attorney who in fact had been attempting to assist him.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless a reasonable official would have known the challenged conduct violated clearly established law.

Elwell, Scott v. Dobucki, Kenneth P. · filed 2000-08-10

Dobucki is protected by qualified immunity unless, based on such clear legal standards, a reasonable person would have known that the hiring decision would violate the Constitution.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct did not violate clearly established rights at the time.

Elwell v. Dobucki · filed 2000-08-10

Nothing in 1992 would or should have led Warden Dobucki to the conclusion that such an action would be a clear violation of Elwell’s equal protection rights. He is therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and the judgment of the district court is Affirmed.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim may be denied on a Rule 12(c) motion when the pleaded facts establish a violation of a clearly established right.

Ramirez v. Department of Corrections · filed 2000-08-11

Accepting Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true, as we must when reviewing the denial of a Fed. R. 12(c) motion, Beck, 195 F.3d at 556, we conclude Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to establish both that Defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right and that the rights violated were clearly established at the time of Defendants actions. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion for qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ § 1983 equal protection and § 1981 discrimination claims.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against officers when a reasonable officer would not have understood the conduct to violate a clearly established right.

Ransom v. Baltimore County · filed 2000-08-11

He seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The County defendants assert that they are protected from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. In assessing a claim for qualified immunity, the Court must: (i) identify the right allegedly violated; (ii) determine whether the constitutional right violated was clearly established at the time of the incident; and (iii) evaluate whether a reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct at issue violated the clearly established right. ... Defendants Vaughan and Bonsall are therefore entitled to qualified immunity concerning Officer Ransom’s arrest. The Court will grant summary judgment for Defendants Vaughan and Bonsall on Count IV.

Public officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity if they did not violate a constitutional right or the law was not clearly established when they acted.

Taylor Ex Rel. Estate of Mason v. Adams · filed 2000-08-11

If either question is properly answered in the negative, then qualified immunity must be granted. ... Here, we hold that summary judgment should have been granted to both the firemedics and Threadgill because they did not violate the Constitution.

In a Section 1983 suit, a defendant found to have proximately caused a constitutional violation cannot obtain qualified immunity based on a lesser degree of personal involvement.

Kennedy v. Dexter Consolidated Schools · filed 2000-08-14

We hold: (1) the strip-to-undergarments search of Randy Ford violated his clearly established rights in 1992, and the school officials therefore are not entitled to qualified immunity for that search; (2) where the jury determined that Defendants proximately caused the violation of the students’ constitutional rights, the specific involvement of each Defendant is irrelevant to a qualified immunity inquiry; (3) the jury instruction on the pre-search detention was improper but harmless and did not constitute reversible error; (4) evidence presented at trial supported the jury’s award of punitive damages; and (5) under 42 U.S .C. § 1988 (1998), attorney’s fees cannot properly be awarded absent specific evidence of hours expended.

Officers who conduct a lawful investigative stop based on objectively reasonable suspicion are immune from liability for a Section 1983 false arrest claim.

Weaver v. Hanna · filed 2000-08-15

Because the defendant officers conducted a lawful Terry stop grounded on objectively reasonable suspicion, they are immune from liability for the section 1983 false arrest claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the defendant should reasonably have known that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Joan Gruenke, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Leah Gruenke, a Minor v. Seip · filed 2000-08-21

We hold, therefore, that Seip is not entitled to qualified immunity from Leah’s Fourth Amendment, § 1983 claim, because Seip should have reasonably known that his conduct would violate a clearly established right.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law governing an officer’s reading of a prisoner’s legal materials is unsettled.

Barstow v. Kennebec County Jail · filed 2000-08-22

All of this contradictory case law points out that, regardless of whether a constitutional violation occurred when Turcotte temporarily seized and read Barstow’s letter to his attorney, all Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 shooting claim, qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment when the evidence permits a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the shooting was objectively unreasonable.

Ribbey v. Cox · filed 2000-08-31

Nevertheless, in order to defeat a motion for qualified immunity, it need only be permissible for a reasonable finder of fact based on the evidence and on the finder of fact's assessment of witness credibility to conclude that the shooting was objectively unreasonable.

Qualified immunity protects prison superintendents from § 1983 liability when a reasonable official would not have known that the prisoner’s exposure to secondhand smoke violated a clearly established right.

Mills v. NC Department Corr · filed 2000-09-05

Qualified immunity will continue to protect superintendents who make discretionary decisions in situations where a prisoner's expo- sure to environmental tobacco smoke is not clearly unreasonably high.