42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right is too general to establish that their conduct violated clearly established law.

Burney v. Carrick · filed 1999-01-22

Burney’s assertion of a constitutional right to family integrity is too general to defeat a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 damages claim against officials must show that their conduct violated a clearly established federal right to overcome qualified immunity.

Muhammad v. Klotz · filed 1999-01-28

As the defendants have asserted a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment, Muhammad must show that the defendants’ conduct violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional right. ... Therefore, in accordance with Siegert, Muhammad cannot overcome defendants’ qualified immunity defense.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim only if the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista · filed 1999-01-29

Determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is a two-step process requiring the court to determine (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and (2) whether the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law as it existed at the time of the conduct in question. ... He is not, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts do not state a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Feigin v. Digital Interactive Associates, Inc. · filed 1999-02-04

The commissioner contends that the trial court erred in denying his summary judgment motion requesting a finding that he was immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. We agree. ... Under the first prong of the Brace test, we must first determine whether the facts sufficiently state a violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment right. We conclude they do not.

A public official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the official knew or should have known that the conduct violated constitutional rights.

Aubrey L. Hart and Judy D. Hart, Cross-Appellants v. Dudley Walker, Cross-Appellee · filed 1983-12-16

Walker knew, or should have known, that he did not have probable cause to arrest Hart. Further, he knew or should have known that his unilateral destruction of the Harts’ culverts and the consequent denial of access to their property constituted a deprivation of property rights without due process of law. Thus, the district court’s finding that Walker was not entitled to qualified immunity is correct.

Police officers may invoke immunity from § 1983 damages when they reasonably believe probable cause supports a search and arrest.

Bates v. City of Ft. Wayne, Ind. · filed 1983-12-19

Defendants are entitled to invoke immunity from this suit for civil damages under section 1983 for alleged violations of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.

Qualified immunity can support dismissal of a § 1983 damages claim when defendants raised it as an affirmative defense, even if the district court relied on other grounds.

A.E. v. Mitchell · filed 1983-12-28

Although the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Anderson and Higashi on other grounds, we need not address those grounds because both of these defendants raised good faith immunity as an affirmative defense below.

Qualified immunity under Section 1983 for an arresting officer is assessed using arguable probable cause, rather than actual probable cause.

Franklin v. Consolidated Government of Columbus · filed 1999-02-15

Although we conclude the officer had actual probable cause to arrest, we note that the appropriate standard when determining if the officer is entitled to qualified immunity under 42 USC § 1983, is not whether there was actual probable cause, but whether there was “arguable” probable cause.

A municipal officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable to believe the officer’s actions complied with existing law.

Trzaskos Ex Rel. Trzaskos v. St. Jacques · filed 1999-02-17

The entitlement to qualified immunity does not depend on the lawfulness of an official’s actions, but on whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe he or she acted in accordance with existing law.

Qualified immunity is unavailable for a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs because the claim requires a subjective inquiry into the official’s conduct.

Weaver v. Tipton County, Tenn. · filed 1999-02-22

When a plaintiff bases a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against a government official for his or her deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs, the necessity of examining the defendant’s conduct under the subjective deliberate indifference standard pronounced in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), precludes the availability of a qualified immunity defense.

A § 1983 defendant has qualified immunity if the conduct did not violate clearly established law or the defendant reasonably believed it did not.

Rouse v. Bolden · filed 1999-03-01

In our circuit, “[a] qualified immunity defense is established if (a) the defendant’s action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.” ... Accordingly, Bolden’s motion for qualified immunity is denied, with leave to renew at trial.

An individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when he violated no clearly established constitutional right.

Mr. and Mrs. H. v. Region 14 Bd. of Educ. · filed 1999-03-05

Defendant Bond is also entitled to qualified immunity under the facts of this case. Mr. Bond violated no "clearly established constitutional right”, the essence of the qualified immunity doctrine.

Reliance on counsel’s advice does not by itself establish qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Nunez v. Davis · filed 1999-03-12

Reliance on the advice of counsel, however, is not dispositive on the issue whether Davis acted reasonably.

A police officer sued under § 1983 for excessive force is not entitled to qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under the facts found.

Weyel v. Catania · filed 1999-03-16

Given these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court improperly determined that the defendant’s actions were not objectively reasonable. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not shield an officer through qualified immunity at summary judgment when a reasonable jury could find that the arrest lacked probable cause and was objectively unreasonable.

Lederman v. Adams · filed 1999-03-25

Moreover, a reasonable jury could conclude, on the evidence before the Court, that Adams’s arrest of Lederman for disorderly conduct was not supported by probable cause and was not objectively reasonable. Accordingly, Adams is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law and his motion for summary judgment in this respect is denied.

In a § 1983 deliberate-indifference suit, prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity when there is no evidence they knew of a substantial risk of harm.

Murray v. West · filed 1999-03-29

Though a genuine question exists whether Langston consulted medical doctors, Murray has offered no evidence that Langston knew a substantial risk of harm existed, and he has thus not shown that this question is material. ... Langston is thus entitled to qualified immunity. A fortiori, so are the other defendants, whose involvement was no greater than Langston’s.

An officer may have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when a mistaken belief that probable cause existed was objectively reasonable.

Kuehl v. Burtis · filed 1999-03-29

Nevertheless, law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they arrest a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so--provided that the mistake is objectively reasonable. ... Under these standards, we cannot conclude that Burtis is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, probable cause and qualified immunity merge into one defense when the law of probable cause has not changed since the arrest.

Saffold v. City of Calumet Park · filed 1999-03-30

Thus, as long as the concept of probable cause has not changed since the plaintiffs arrest and his lawsuit, the concepts of probable cause and qualified immunity become one defense.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing qualified immunity must show that the right was sufficiently clear at the time for a reasonable official to understand that the conduct violated it.

Wayne Powell, as of the Estate of Dana Kimberly Devilla v. Sunny Schriver, Superintendent Thomas A. Coughlin, III C.O. L · filed 1999-04-02

In order to overcome a defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity, a § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate that at the time of the violation, the contours of the allegedly violated right were “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.”

In a § 1983 damages action against a government official, qualified immunity requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff alleges an actual constitutional violation before deciding whether the right was clearly established.

Conn v. Gabbert · filed 1999-04-05

In order to prevail in a § 1983 action for civil damages from a government official performing discretionary functions, the defense of qualified immunity that our cases have recognized requires that the official be shown to have violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus a court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

In a § 1983 action, officials are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine factual disputes remain about whether they should have known their conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights.

Goff v. Bise · filed 1999-04-06

Reviewing the evidence that was before the District Court when it denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, we conclude that Mr. Goff had created a number of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mayor Bise and Chief Shoemake should have known that their conduct violated these clearly established constitutional rights.

Government employees sued personally for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violated clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known.

Boylan v. Arruda · filed 1999-04-13

Qualified immunity shields government employees sued in their personal capacity from suits for damages under § 1983 unless their conduct violated clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known. ... Thus, Arruda is entitled to immunity with respect to both causes of action in the complaint.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct.

Greene v. Barrett · filed 1999-04-19

We therefore hold that plaintiff has failed to show that the asserted property right was clearly established at the time defendant reduced his rank. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

A county sued under Section 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity.

Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation · filed 1999-04-19

Nevertheless, as we noted in our earlier opinion, the County cannot avail itself of qualified immunity in the present case, see id. at 1071 n. 1, 1077 n. 9, and, under the circumstances, the district court’s decision to set damages at the symbolic level of one dollar was just about right, see id. at 1077.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the claimant offers no evidence that the officer participated in violating a clearly established right or could not reasonably rely on a fellow officer’s identification.

Devose v. Addison · filed 1999-04-20

He failed, however, to offer evidence that Addison was involved in a violation of these rights. ... Further, Devose failed to offer evidence that Addison could not reasonably rely on Thomas’s identification of Devose, which occurred after Addison sent Thomas a single photo of Devose taken upon his June 3 arrest for possession of marijuana. ... Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Addison on the ground of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 action, a plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

Thomas v. Leslie · filed 1999-04-21

Once a defendant claims he is qualifiedly immune, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish both that defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when the First Amendment right they allegedly violated was clearly established.

Estate of Kenneth G. Dietrich v. Burrows · filed 1999-04-23

We note, however, that Supreme Court decisions rendered long before the actions at issue in this case recognize that government actions may not retaliate against an individual for the exercise of protected First Amendment freedoms. ... The district court thus appropriately denied summary judgment to the defendants on the Dietrichs’ first Amendment retaliation claim as well.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiffs fail to establish a constitutional violation.

McCann v. Fort Zumwalt School Dist. · filed 1999-04-27

Additionally, DuBray is entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs' § 1983 claims because they have failed to establish a constitutional violation.

Good faith immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 damages claim when the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, could show conduct violating a clearly established right known to a reasonable person.

McGee v. Hester · filed 1983-12-30

When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to McGee, we do not feel that this is the “insubstantial claim” contemplated by Harlow to be disposed of on summary judgment. ... At some point, the methods of surveillance become so intrusive as to violate the clearly established property right of McGee of which a reasonable person would have known. Thus, the objective test of Harlow has been met in this case.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, a court must resolve material factual disputes about probable cause before taking qualified immunity away from the jury.

Ham v. Greene · filed 1999-05-04

Therefore, before taking the issue of qualified immunity away from the jury as a matter of law, the trial court must first determine that there are no material issues of fact relevant to the existence of probable cause.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when it was reasonable for him to believe his conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Pritzker v. City of Hudson · filed 1999-05-04

Thus, there was no reason for Moon to believe that he was using excessive force in placing the handcuff on plaintiffs wrist. ... Accordingly, Moon is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity when an officer reasonably could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful, even if it violated a constitutional right.

Murray v. Frye · filed 1999-05-04

Even if we were to conclude that the seizure was unreasonable, we conclude that Officer Frye acted reasonably under the circumstances, entitling him to immunity for his actions.

When qualified immunity is raised in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing through closely analogous case law that the defendant violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Arneson v. Jezwinski · filed 1999-05-05

Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, once raised, the plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim bears the burden of demonstrating by closely analogous case law that the defendants have violated his clearly established constitutional right.

Government officials sued individually for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a clearly established right that a reasonable official would have known about.

Cockrell v. Board of Regents of New Mexico State University · filed 1999-05-07

Put another way, qualified immunity is “the usual rule,” such that “only in exceptional cases” will governmental actors have no immunity from § 1983 claims brought against them for money damages in their individual capacities.

A state actor is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Rhodes v. Guarricino · filed 1999-05-10

It is well-established that if, at the time of the complained of conduct, the law of the Supreme Court or the applicable circuit has not clearly established that such conduct violates the Constitution, the state actor is entitled to qualified immunity. ... The Court’s own search of the case law confirms this assertion, and it is precisely for this reason that Guarricino is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield a police officer from a § 1983 claim when the officer violates a clearly established right and could not reasonably believe the conduct was lawful.

Clark v. City of Norwalk, No. X01 Cv 93 0147230 (May 11, 1999) · filed 1999-05-11

Defendant Lowe further claims that the jury could not reasonably have found his actions not to be protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which shields police officers from liability if their conduct either did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonably person would have known or if it was objectively reasonable for an actor to have believed at the time that his actions did not violate these rights. ... If the jury found that Lowe fired when the vehicle was posing no risk to his safety or the safety of others, but was merely fleeing, then the rejection of the qualified immunity defense was warranted.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when facts material to that defense remain disputed.

Lloyd v. Jefferson · filed 1999-05-12

Nevertheless, there are factual disputes between the parties regarding the establishment of the underlying retaliation claim that must be resolved before this court can rule on the issue of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an official from § 1983 damages when the alleged conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Webb v. Haas · filed 1999-05-13

Because the facts of this case are outside the parameters of the case law existing in 1989, we conclude that qualified immunity shields Haas from damages pursuant to section 1983.

Police officers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 arrest claim when they act reasonably under settled law and in light of the information they possess.

Dang v. Ehredt · filed 1999-05-17

We conclude that in arresting Ms. Dang, the officers acted reasonably under settled law and in light of the information they possessed. The officers are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from liability both under section 1983 and common law.

An official exercising a discretionary function is immune from § 1983 damages unless the conduct violates clearly established federal rights.

Sanders v. Montoya · filed 1999-05-19

When exercising a discretionary function, a government official is not liable for damages under § 1983 unless the challenged conduct “violate[d] clearly established [federal] statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 excessive-force claim when mandatory precedent did not clearly establish the specific right at the time of the officer’s conduct.

McCall v. Williams · filed 1999-05-19

Without any mandatory precedent clearly establishing the specific right as of June 1994, Lieutenant Williams is entitled to qualified immunity, so that summary judgment is appropriate for this claim.

In a § 1983 claim, qualified immunity requires the court to determine first whether the plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation, then whether clearly established law would have made the conduct’s unlawfulness apparent to a reasonable official.

Assaf v. Fields · filed 1999-05-19

In Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991), the Supreme Court explained that "the proper analytical framework" for addressing qualified immunity claims is to ascertain first whether plaintiff's claims make out a violation of a constitutional right. See also Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1110 (3d Cir. 1990). Only if such a violation has been alleged need we proceed to determine whether, in the light of "clearly established law," the unlawfulness of the action would have been apparent to a reasonable official.

In a § 1983 claim, a court may, in appropriate cases, decide qualified immunity without first deciding whether the plaintiff alleged a constitutional violation.

Horne v. Coughlin, III · filed 1999-05-21

We nonetheless believe, like the Eleventh Circuit in Santamorena v. Georgia Military College, 147 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (11th Cir.1998), that courts may, in appropriate cases, go directly to the qualified immunity issue.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the same qualified immunity analysis as Bivens claims.

Wilson v. Layne · filed 1999-05-24

Although this case involves suits under both §1983 and Bivens, the qualified immunity analysis is identical under either cause of action.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the undisputed facts show they acted at most negligently and were objectively reasonable in light of what they knew.

Doran v. Condon · filed 1999-05-24

Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the district court properly granted partial summary judgment on this issue. The undisputed facts demonstrate that the defendants were at most negligent and otherwise acted in an objectively reasonable manner in light of the facts known to them.

Individual defendants may be shielded from § 1983 liability by qualified immunity.

Hufford v. Ross · filed 1999-05-26

The court further found that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and that the County defendants are immune from liability under Arkansas Code § 21-9-301, and under Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). We agree with the well-reasoned...opinion of the district court regarding the section 1983 and tort claims, and write only to expand the discussion of the claim brought under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.

Qualified immunity protects officers from a § 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have found probable cause, regardless of the officers’ subjective motivations.

Delacueva v. TABC · filed 1999-05-27

However, because the test is one of objective reasonableness, the agents’ motivations and subjective beliefs as to the lawfulness of their conduct are irrelevant if a reasonable officer could have found probable cause existed for the arrest.

Qualified immunity does not entitle an officer to summary judgment on a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when disputed facts prevent the court from finding the officer's conduct objectively reasonable as a matter of law.

Nelson v. Suraci, No. 403034 (May 28, 1999) · filed 1999-05-28

For the same reasons, and even considering the affidavit of Reginald Allard, Jr., an instructor at the Connecticut Police Training Academy, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim when there is no evidence beyond the plaintiff’s bare assertions that the official lied and a reasonable officer would have believed the person was dangerous.

No. 98-3389 · filed 1999-06-03

Accordingly, because there is no evidence, other than Hedges' own bare assertions, that Poletis lied and since a reasonable officer in Poletis' position would have believed Hedges to be dangerous, Poletis is entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim.

When qualified immunity is raised on a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim, the complaint must allege facts showing a violation of a clearly established right that a reasonable public official would have known.

Flores v. Danfelser · filed 1999-06-04

When a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss a claim alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an appellate court, like the trial court, reviews the plaintiffs’ pleadings to determine whether they have pleaded facts which, if true, set forth a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable public official, viewed under an objective standard, would or should have known.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment in a § 1983 action when resolving it requires weighing disputed evidence.

Rosales v. Coughlin · filed 1999-06-04

I also reject defendants’ contention that the they are entitled to summary judgment based upon their qualified immunity. The Second Circuit has held that where factual disputes exist, a court cannot resolve the question of qualified immunity without engaging in some weighing of the evidence, a function that falls within the province of the jury.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges facts showing a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Jandro v. Foster · filed 1999-06-07

Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs § 1983 claim at this stage of the proceedings.

A police officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim if the officer reasonably believed probable cause existed or reasonable officers could disagree about whether it existed.

Posr v. Court Officer Shield 207 · filed 1999-06-09

Even when there is no probable cause to arrest, a police officer is nonetheless immune from a claim of false arrest “if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.”

In a § 1983 false-arrest claim, qualified immunity cannot support dismissal at the pleading stage when the alleged facts do not establish that officers reasonably believed probable cause existed.

No. 98-9205 · filed 1999-06-09

On grounds similar to those underlying our analysis of the probable cause question, we hold that it was improper for the district court to conclude, at this stage of the litigation, that it was reasonable for the officers to believe that probable cause existed. Accordingly, dismissing Posr's complaint on qualified immunity grounds was inappropriate.

Government officials facing a § 1983 claim are entitled to qualified immunity when their challenged conduct was objectively reasonable.

Umar v. Scott · filed 1999-06-10

Appellant also argues that the policy of not allowing “close custody” inmates to attend Muslim services known as Jumu'ah and religious study known as Taleem violates his rights to free exercise and equal protection, invoking 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and section 501.001 of the Texas Government Code. ... Furthermore, we hold that Appellees’ actions in complying with the policy were objectively reasonable, and Appellees’ have established, as a matter of law, their entitlement to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim applies to officials sued in their individual capacities, but not their official capacities.

Trifax Corp. v. District of Columbia · filed 1999-06-14

The defense of qualified immunity applies only to the extent that the Defendants are sued in their individual capacities.

A defendant in a § 1983 damages action is not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law put the defendant on notice that the alleged conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Prager v. LaFaver · filed 1999-06-15

We therefore hold the law was clearly established in Mr. Prager’s favor at the time Mr. LaFaver suspended and terminated him.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law was insufficiently clear for a reasonable official to know the conduct violated established rights.

Blake v. Wright · filed 1999-06-15

In sum, we hold that Wright is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 because the law regarding the administrative monitoring of police phone lines was sufficiently unclear at the time of the alleged violations that a “reasonable” officer in Wright’s position would not have known he was violating clearly established law.

Qualified immunity protects officials from damages under Section 1983 when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their official acts complied with constitutional and statutory limits.

Thomas Wilkinson, Benjamin Wilkinson, by Next Friend Thomas Wilkinson and Jonathan Wiegand v. Caroline S. Russell, James · filed 1999-06-17

Under this formulation, all government officials are protected from liability in connection with their official acts provided that “it is objectively reasonable for [them] to believe that [they are] acting within constitutional and statutory bounds.” Zahra, 48 F.3d at 686 (quoting Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 927 F.2d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir.1991)).

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right that an objectively reasonable officer would have known.

Driscoll v. Townsend · filed 1999-06-18

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields police officers acting in their official capacity from suits for damages under § 1983, unless their actions violate clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known.

Qualified immunity does not warrant judgment for a § 1983 defendant when the jury’s verdict may rest on other supported conduct to which the defendant has not applied the defense.

Harris v. Huston · filed 1999-06-21

The defendant does not argue that qualified immunity applies to this other conduct. Thus, despite my conclusion that at the time of his discharge Mr. Harris’ right to advance notice was not clearly established, it does not justify the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 are protected by qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Parent Ex Rel. Student v. OSCEOLA COUNTY SCHOOL · filed 1999-06-21

The defense of qualified immunity further insulates Paradiso and Collins from the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. ... The plaintiffs cannot point to any cases or statutes that would show that Paradiso's or Collins' actions violated any established law, and thus Collins and Paradiso are protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant violated a clearly established right and acted objectively unreasonably.

Daviston v. LA St Bd of Nursing · filed 1999-06-22

To succeed in making out a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Daviston must demonstrate that the board members’ conduct (1) violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right and (2) is objectively unreasonable.

A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for alleged acts outside the scope of his discretionary authority.

Woodley v. City of Jemison · filed 1999-06-25

Clearly, making obscene telephone calls is not within the scope of a police officer's discretionary authority. Because Northcutt's alleged acts are outside the scope of his authority, he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, disputed material facts about officers’ knowledge and the reasonableness of their actions can preclude summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Lyles v. City Of Barling · filed 1999-06-28

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that material issues of fact exist concerning the officers' knowledge and the reasonableness of their actions in light of the facts, thus precluding a grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when material facts about the objective reasonableness of the defendants’ actions remain disputed.

Randall v. Reeves · filed 1999-06-29

When these items are considered, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the objective reasonableness of the defendants’ actions against Randall and the cause of his injuries. ... The magistrate judge erred in granting summary judgment on Randall’s excessive-force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the decision should be reversed.

Section 1983 claims against individual officials are barred by qualified immunity when their actions did not violate clearly established law.

Mentzel v. Gilmore · filed 1999-06-29

This defense bars § 1983 suits against individual officials if their actions did not violate clearly established law.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known the conduct exceeded clearly established limits on his authority.

Showers v. Spangler · filed 1999-06-29

Because the boundaries of his inspection authority were, in fact, clearly established -- and did not include the use of administrative inspection to randomly and extensively search for evidence of crimes -- Spangler is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when material facts bearing on an officer’s objective reasonableness remain disputed.

Archuleta v. LaCuesta · filed 1999-07-02

A person acting under color of state law who violates the rights of a plaintiff established by the United States Constitution or federal statutes may be held personally liable for his or her action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Such a person is entitled to qualified immunity from suit, however, if his or her action was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. ... We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer LaCuesta because there are genuine issues of material fact.

Qualified immunity is available to officers sued under Section 1983 in their personal capacity, but not in their official capacity.

Butera v. District of Columbia · filed 1999-07-07

The qualified immunity defense is only available to the Defendant officers for those counts in which they are sued in their personal capacity (Counts XII-XIV).

An officer cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action when disputed material facts prevent the court from assessing whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable.

McCaslin v. Wilkins · filed 1999-07-07

We conclude, however, that a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the basis of the alleged reasonableness of Officer Wilkins' actions.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their alleged conduct.

Lytle v. Wondrash · filed 1999-07-07

Accordingly, the constitutional right Lytle asserts was not clearly established at the time the Appellants allegedly retaliated against her, and as a result they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable official would not have known that the challenged conduct violated clearly established constitutional law.

Bessman v. Powell · filed 1999-07-09

Under these circumstances – where both the protected nature of the speech and the viability of retaliation allegations are doubtful – the appellees were entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 in their individual capacities may claim qualified immunity when their conduct was reasonable under the law established at the time.

Brown v. Thompson · filed 1999-07-13

Although Thompson and Tyndzik erred in failing to provide Brown with a hearing regarding the impoundment of vessel 7430, they are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was reasonable.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against officials when the evidence does not support knowing or reckless material falsehoods in a warrant application and the applicable probable cause requirements were not clearly established.

Balsa U.S.A., Inc. v. Austin · filed 1999-07-16

Based upon this Court’s determination that the evidence does not support a finding that Defendants made material false statements in the warrant application either knowingly or in reckless disregard for the truth, and because the probable cause requirements for an administrative search warrant were not clearly established at the time the affidavit was prepared, the § 1983 claim against the Defendants is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officials sued individually under § 1983 when probable cause for an arrest defeats the claimed constitutional violation.

Cline v. Binder · filed 1999-07-19

The district court properly concluded that there was probable cause to arrest Cline and Hagler and that they thus failed to establish a con- stitutional violation -- a necessary predicate for§ 1983 liability. Accordingly, Binder and the other defendants were entitled to quali- fied immunity in their individual capacities against Cline and Hagler's § 1983 claims.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 damages if an objectively reasonable officer would not have understood that the conduct violated clearly established federal law.

Painter v. Bill Robertson Robert Tush · filed 1999-07-20

Thus, even if a public officer has deprived the plaintiff of a federal right, qualified immunity will apply if an objective reasonable official would not have understood, by referencing clearly established law, that his conduct was unlawful.

A prior appellate decision denying qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim bars reconsideration of that defense under the law of the case doctrine when no exception applies.

Dicks Ex Rel. Montgomery v. Jenne · filed 1999-07-21

Here, in affirming the trial court's initial denial of qualified immunity, we decided the issue by necessary implication. Further, none of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine apply to warrant reconsideration of the qualified immunity issue by either the trial court or this court, i.e., the record does not reflect any substantially different evidence produced in support of Deputy Biernacki's motion for reconsideration; there were no intervening changes in the law applicable to the qualified immunity issue which would overrule this court's prior decision on the qualified immunity issue; and the record before this court does not support a finding that the prior rulings were clearly erroneous. As in Riley, therefore, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine governs the qualified immunity issue in this case.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim need not be considered further when the court finds no constitutional violation.

Benjamin v. Washington State Bar Ass'n · filed 1999-07-22

The doctrine of qualified immunity limits the exposure of public officials to liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [107] ... The first step in this analysis is to determine whether a violation of a constitutional right has occurred. [110] ... Qualified immunity is not invoked because there is no constitutional violation.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity turns on whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, if so, whether the official’s actions were objectively reasonable.

Williams v. Bramer · filed 1999-07-22

In a § 1983 suit, we must make two separate inquiries. We must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1991); Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1993). If we find that a constitutional right has been violated, our second inquiry is whether the governmental official’s actions were objectively reasonable.

Qualified immunity does not shield an individual-capacity defendant from injunctive relief under § 1983.

Smith v. Plati · filed 1999-07-22

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant in his individual capacity from a claim for injunctive relief.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from § 1983 liability when it was unclear whether the asserted right applied to the defendant’s conduct.

O'Hagan v. Soto · filed 1984-01-16

Though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is well established, the uncertainty as to whether it had attached at the time Soto questioned O’Hagan entitles Soto to resist liability on the basis of qualified immunity.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if the conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right or was objectively reasonable.

Lukan v. North Forest ISD · filed 1999-07-28

In determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983, we apply a two-step analysis. First, if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, the official is entitled to qualified immunity. See Jones v. Collins, 132 F.3d 1048, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998). Second, even if the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, the official is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable. See id.

A § 1983 claim against a state official fails, and qualified immunity shields the official, when the plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional deprivation.

Saenz v. Heldenfels Bros. · filed 1999-07-30

Because the appellants have failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right, their § 1983 claim fails and Gonzalez is shielded by his qualified immunity.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims if their conduct did not violate clearly established rights or they reasonably believed it did not.

McCullough v. Wyandanch Union Free School District · filed 1999-07-30

A government agent enjoys qualified immunity when he or she performs discretionary functions if either (1) the conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was objectively reasonable to believe that the conduct did not violate clearly established rights.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity when a government employee reasonably believed that their actions were lawful.

Wayne Thomas Ahlers and Nina Ahlers v. Schebil · filed 1999-07-30

Section 1983 claims are limited by the qualified immunity exception, such that a government employee will be shielded from liability so long as the employee acted under the objectively reasonable belief that his or her actions were lawful.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when a material factual dispute remains about the force used.

Lambert v. City of Dumas · filed 1999-08-09

Such a factual dispute, however, establishes a genuine issue of material fact for trial precluding summary judgment for the Appellants on their claim of qualified immunity with respect to the Appellee’s claim of excessive force.

For a § 1983 qualified immunity defense, the court first asks whether the plaintiff alleged a violation of a protected right.

Brenda Mattox and Dona Holly v. City of Forest Park Stephen Vollmar, Police Chief Ray Hodges and Kenneth Hughes · filed 1999-08-11

The qualified immunity inquiry entails a determination of whether the law allegedly violated was “clearly established” at the time of the events at issue. However, courts must answer a threshold inquiry first: Did the plaintiffs sufficiently allege violation of a constitutionally or statutorily protected right?

Qualified immunity bars monetary damages under § 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established, but it does not bar equitable relief.

Nicholas v. Miller · filed 1999-08-13

Without Second Circuit or Supreme Court authority defining with reasonable specificity Nicholas’s right to form an inmate legal services organization, appellees are entitled to qualified immunity. However, since qualified immunity only shields appellees from monetary damages, Nicholas’s claims for equitable relief may proceed.

A defendant asserting qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Sugg v. Albuquerque Public School District · filed 1999-08-16

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a required element of qualified immunity, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

A § 1983 defendant’s qualified immunity defense can be denied without prejudice at the motion to dismiss stage when the complaint lacks enough facts to resolve it.

De Rinaldis v. Llavona · filed 1999-08-16

After a close inspection of the pleadings, and further recognizing the need to focus on specific facts, the Court finds that the complaint discloses insufficient facts to adequately resolve the qualified immunity issue at this motion to dismiss stage. The qualified immunity of codefendant, Ms. Morales, is denied without prejudice of the same being requested under a summary judgment standard enabling the court to focus on specific facts.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their actions could reasonably be thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.

Burda Bros., Inc. v. Walsh · filed 1999-08-16

Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil suits for damages arising out of the performance of their official duties as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 seizure claim when existing precedent clearly established the governing law at the time of the conduct.

Donald Hawkins etc. v. City of Farmington · filed 1999-08-16

Walters finally argues that even if he seized Hawkins and even if the seizure were unreasonable, he is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established in September 1994 that his actions in creation of a partial roadblock with means of escape would violate any constitutional right. We disagree. Brower was decided in 1989, five years before this incident occurred, and as we have held, that case established the law to be applied here.

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 damages when it was not clearly established that the challenged conduct was an actionable employment decision.

Bevill v. UAB Walker College · filed 1999-08-17

However, it was by no means clear at the time of Watkins’s ratification of the Plaintiffs termination that the ratification of her termination would constitute an “employment decision” actionable in the First Amendment context. Therefore, as to Watkins, qualified immunity will be GRANTED.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a constitutionally protected right.

Pindell v. Wilson-McKee · filed 1999-08-17

Under Siegert, this court holds that even viewing the facts most favorable to plaintiff, he has failed to show a claim for violation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest and therefore defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on plaintiffs liberty interest claim.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 child-removal claim when disputed facts could show that officials lacked sufficient investigation, credible information, and reasonable suspicion of abuse.

Strail v. DEPT. OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES · filed 1999-08-23

Although the outer limits of the right may be abstract, within the context of these facts, its meaning is straightforward: a state agency may not separate parent and child without sufficient investigation, credible information, and a reasonable suspicion of abuse, past or imminent. Though rights within the familial context may not always be clear enough to destroy the formidable qualified immunity defense, the facts of this case not only pierce the narrow gap in the armor, they find the flesh.

An official whose actions did not contribute to an alleged rights violation is entitled to qualified immunity from an individual-capacity § 1983 claim.

Schaffrath v. Thomas · filed 1999-08-25

Here, even assuming a violation of a clearly established right occurred, we hold that McNeil is entitled to qualified immunity because her actions did not contribute to the violation.

A court deciding a § 1983 claim may dismiss on qualified immunity without first deciding the constitutional question when that question can readily be reviewed in a suit for injunctive relief.

Horne v. Coughlin · filed 1999-08-25

We do not understand Wilson and Conn, to have, intentionally but without explanation, abandoned the carefully modulated position taken in Sacramento and adopted instead a rigid rule requiring federal courts to express advisory constitutional opinions in every case governed by qualified immunity. ... Because the constitutional question in this case is easily amenable to adjudication in a suit for injunctive relief by any adversely affected prisoner, and because this does not represent an instance of egregious, outrageous conduct, we reaffirm our decision to rely on the lack of clearly established law to dismiss Horne's action on grounds of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim is evaluated separately for each defendant based solely on that defendant’s conduct.

Davis v. Carey · filed 1999-08-27

With respect to each defendant, the qualified immunity claim is to be evaluated, of course, solely on the basis of that defendant’s conduct.

Disputed facts material to an officer’s reasonableness preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages claim.

McKelvie v. Cooper · filed 1999-08-27

Where, as here, there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness, summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate.

Section 1983 permits a claim against state child welfare officials who remove a child without sufficient investigation and reasonable suspicion of abuse; qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment when the facts, viewed favorably to the plaintiffs, show no reason to think the child needed protection.

Strail v. Department of Children, Youth, & Families · filed 1999-08-28

Though rights within the familial context may not always be clear enough to destroy the formidable qualified immunity defense, the facts of this case not only pierce the narrow gap in the armor, they find the flesh. As a result, this is not even a case where the issue of qualified immunity becomes entangled in a complex balancing test. If the record is read in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, then no facts exist to suggest that Sarah might have needed protection.

Officials sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity from a First Amendment retaliation claim when the claimant holds a confidential policymaking position and the officials violate no clearly established right.

Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger · filed 1999-08-30

The council defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Julie Biggs’ First Amendment retaliation claim because Julie Biggs held a confidential, policymaking position with respect to the City of Redlands.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim as a matter of law when disputed facts permit the jury to reject it.

District of Columbia v. Minor · filed 1999-09-09

On the record here, we are quite unable to conclude that the jury was compelled to find that qualified immunity protected Kelsey from liability under § 1983,- or that we could do so as a matter of law on the disputed facts of this case.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit uses an objective standard; an official’s intent and motivation do not determine immunity.

Crosby v. Paulk · filed 1999-09-10

Because "we have 'rejected the inquiry into [an official's] state of mind in favor of a wholly objective standard,' " the government actor's intent and motivation are insignificant in determining qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim is assessed objectively, without considering officials’ alleged ill will.

Crosby v. Paulk · filed 1999-09-10

Thus, we need not address the alleged ill will between Sheriff Paulk and his agents and the Crosbys for qualified immunity analysis.

Qualified immunity protects officials from individual liability under Section 1983 for discretionary acts unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Malik v. Arapahoe County Department of Social Services · filed 1999-09-14

The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Government physicians are qualifiedly immune from Section 1983 liability when they act objectively reasonably in deciding to commit a person involuntarily.

Katzman v. Khan · filed 1999-09-17

The undisputed facts show that both the state and city defendant doctors acted in an objectively reasonable manner in finding plaintiff to be a danger to others and deciding to commit him involuntarily to the CPC; therefore, they are qualifiedly immune from liability under Section 1983.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly established at the time.

B.C. ex rel. B.C. v. Plumas Unified School District · filed 1999-09-20

When the dog sniff in this case occurred, it was not clearly established that the use of dogs to sniff students in a school setting constituted a search. ... Accordingly, we conclude that all defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity from B.C.’s claims for money damages.

A government official may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff presents no evidence of a constitutional violation and the official acted reasonably.

Christian v. City of Dallas · filed 1999-09-22

In this case, viewing the facts and drawing inferences most favorably for Plaintiff, Defendant Bennie Click is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence supporting his constitutional claims, and Defendants’ evidence establishes that Chief Click was reasonable in his actions since Plaintiff was given a full and fair hearing by Chief Click.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff offers no evidence supporting an allegation that the defendant knowingly presented false information to a court.

Niemet v. The County of Cole · filed 1999-09-22

As the district court acknowledged, Niemet failed to provide any evidentiary support for his claim that Hemeyer knowingly presented false information to the juvenile court, and, accordingly, Hemeyer is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 damages action, qualified immunity turns on the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct; the official’s motivation alone does not defeat the defense.

Sound Aircraft Services, Inc. v. Town of East Hampton · filed 1999-09-22

Because the focus of the qualified immunity inquiry is on the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s actions, motivation does not come into play.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer could believe the seized items were within the warrant’s scope or evidence of a crime.

Brindley v. Best · filed 1999-09-22

No reasonable officer in the defendants’ position could have believed that certain seized items were within the scope of the warrant or evidence of a crime. Thus, the officers are not entitled to the protections of qualified immunity.

Government officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct was lawful.

Brown v. Selwin · filed 1999-09-24

Based on the record presented to the Court, it is clear that it was objectively reasonable for the State Defendants to believe that their actions were appropriate and lawful.

Individual officers sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Furfaro v. City of Seattle · filed 1999-09-27

The contours of the right to perform a nude stage dance without fear of warrantless arrest are not clearly established. The lower courts from other states where the issue has been confronted have reached inconsistent results. The trial court properly dismissed the claims against the individual police defendants based on qualified immunity.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Lukan v. North Forest Isd, Gloria S. Scott, L v. Brisco · filed 1999-09-27

In determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983, we apply a two-step analysis. First, if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, the official is entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, show conduct that was objectively unreasonable under clearly established federal law.

Shelton v. La Dept Corrctns · filed 1999-09-28

When Shelton’s allegations are taken as true, the facts do not show that McGovern’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established federal law.

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the official’s action.

Marcum v. Catron · filed 1999-09-28

The court further holds, however, that it was not clearly established as of September 17,1997 that such a relationship was constitutionally protected. Hence, the plaintiff may proceed with his claim against the defendant in his official capacity, but the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, barring suit against him in his individual capacity.

A defendant may have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim even when information underlying an objectively reasonable decision later proves inaccurate.

Lee v. Thompson · filed 1999-09-29

Even if Greg’s and Greer’s allegations about Lee were not wholly accurate in retrospect, that is not enough to defeat Thompson’s entitlement to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when they violate a clearly established right and show no extraordinary reason they could not have known the governing law.

Truelove v. Hunt · filed 1999-09-29

In this case, Defendants have not offered any extraordinary circumstances that would explain why the deputies did not know and could not have known of the applicable legal standard. As a result, this court will not grant summary judgment based upon the defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects § 1983 defendants who neither knew nor should have known that enforcing a prison publications policy violated clearly established rights.

Lepine, et al. v. NH Dept, of Correct · filed 1999-09-30

But more to the point for purposes of analyzing defendants' entitlement to gualified immunity, defendants neither knew nor should they have known that their decision to enforce the provisions of that policy and prohibit plaintiffs from obtaining specific materials which plainly fall within the scope of the PPD likely violated plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional rights.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in the circumstances.

Warren v. Swanson · filed 1999-10-04

In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to present any authority to suggest a clearly established right to a more invasive search than a pat-down, or that any reasonable police officer would know that handcuffing a loud, abusive arrestee to a wall violated her constitutional rights. Accordingly, all defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Counts I and II.

Officials lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when no informed official could reasonably believe that firing an employee to punish another person’s protected speech was constitutional.

Camacho v. Brandon · filed 1999-10-15

To summarize, defendants have argued that even if plaintiffs allegations are true, it was objectively reasonable for them to punitively fire plaintiff in retaliation for Fuentes’ speech. We hold that no informed person in 1998 could reasonably believe that such conduct is constitutionally permissible.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim that proceeds to trial need not be evaluated under a purely objective good-faith standard.

Mcelveen v. County Of Prince William · filed 1984-01-26

Thus, the County's argument that the standard for good-faith immunity must be purely objective, is untenable, and its claim that the trial court erred by not directing a verdict or granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, must fail.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not justify summary judgment when the evidence could show that officials violated a clearly established property right of which a reasonable person would have known.

McGEE v. HESTER · filed 1984-02-01

The district court disposed of the section 1983 claim against Hester and Gammon by employing the doctrine of good faith immunity. ... When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to McGee, we do not feel that this is the "insubstantial claim" contemplated by Harlow to be disposed of on summary judgment. We feel that the district court erred in focusing solely on the purpose of the surveillance. At some point, the methods of surveillance become so intrusive as to violate the clearly established property right of McGee of which a reasonable person would have known. Thus, the objective test of Harlow has been met in this case.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that the particular defendant must plead and does not support a motion to dismiss.

LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake · filed 1984-02-06

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the particular defendant and thus is not an appropriate ground to support a motion to dismiss.

A plaintiff seeking to hold a public official personally liable under § 1983 must overcome qualified immunity by proving bad faith or malicious conduct.

Tobin v. Goggins · filed 1984-02-06

The judge's charge to the jury adequately stated the law, placing the burden on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants acted towards her with malicious intent or bad faith, and that the transfer was “in retaliation for her filing the grievance.”

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a claim under § 1983.

Harris v. Morales · filed 1999-10-19

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense against claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A privately employed prison physician cannot assert qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim.

Hinson v. DeKalb County · filed 1999-10-20

For the same reasons that the Richardson Court declined to extend the doctrine of qualified immunity to privately employed prison guards, we decline to extend qualified immunity to this privately employed prison physician.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Powers v. Plumas Unified School District · filed 1999-10-21

When the dog sniff in this case occurred, it was not clearly established that the use of dogs to sniff students in a school setting constituted a search. ... Accordingly, we conclude that all defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity from B.C.'s claims for money damages.

In a Section 1983 claim where the legality of an official’s conduct depends on motive or intent, the qualified immunity analysis must consider that intent.

Carrera v. Yepez · filed 1999-10-28

Thus, in motive-based cases such as this one, where the legality of a defendant’s actions depends on the defendant’s motive or intent, the qualified immunity analysis necessarily encompasses a consideration of the defendant’s intent.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of a constitutionally protected right.

Soper ex rel. Soper v. Hoben · filed 1999-11-02

As discussed above, plaintiffs cannot show a violation of a constitutionally protected right. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity permits dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation.

X-Men Security, Inc. v. Pataki · filed 1999-11-02

For the reasons stated in parts II.B. and C. below, we conclude that the complaint does not state a constitutional claim against King or Polonetsky and that their motions to dismiss on qualified-immunity grounds should have been granted.

Qualified immunity does not shield correction officers from § 1983 liability for retaliating against an inmate’s exercise of the clearly established right to petition for redress of grievances.

Gaston v. Coughlin · filed 1999-11-03

The Court holds that the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity to liability in this action. The crucial issue is whether the right or rights that Plaintiff claims Defendants violated was clearly established. It cannot be seriously disputed that the First Amendment right to petition government for redress of grievances is clearly established.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when they had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.

Campbell v. Sletten · filed 1999-11-04

We conclude Sletten and Nibbe had arguable probable cause to arrest Campbell for criminal trespass. ... We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Sletten and Nibbe are entitled to qualified immunity in this action.

Qualified immunity protects a public official from a Section 1983 claim when the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time.

Martinez v. Smith · filed 1999-11-05

Second, the defense of qualified immunity will succeed if the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable at the time in light of clearly established law.

In a § 1983 action, qualified immunity turns on whether the alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, if so, whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Hill v. Hathaway · filed 1999-11-05

We have jurisdiction to determine, as a matter of law, whether Wright and Boyd are entitled to qualified immunity, after accepting all of Hill’s factual allegations as true, by determining whether Hill has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, if so, whether the defendants’ conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Qualified immunity may shield a prison official from a § 1983 claim arising from efforts to accommodate an inmate’s medical need for food while maintaining discipline.

Payne v. Revell · filed 1999-11-17

Furthermore, defendant Harrell is entitled to qualified immunity in connection with his efforts to accommodate Payne’s medical need for food while still maintaining discipline.

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Dotson v. City of Youngstown, Ohio · filed 1999-11-17

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff Dotson has failed to show that any clearly established constitutional rights were violated. Therefore, Defendant Chaibi is entitled to assert qualified immunity regarding plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

In a § 1983 suit, an official seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity must show that no genuine issue of material fact defeats immunity, while the plaintiff must allege and prove a violation of a clearly established right.

Hoard v. Sizemore · filed 1999-11-17

The defendant, as the movant in a motion for summary judgment, must show that no genuine issues of material fact remain that would defeat his claim of qualified immunity, and the plaintiff carries the burden to allege and prove that the defendant official violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim cannot be resolved at the pleading stage when the defense requires factual development.

Jackson v. City of Columbus, Gregory Lashutka, Thomas W. Rice, Sr. · filed 1999-11-17

Whether a reasonable official should have known that imposing a gag order on a high-ranking public official would violate this right in connection with an investigation about issues relating to public corruption by that official is not obvious as a matter of law. Because no discovery has yet taken place and the defense of qualified immunity is not clear cut, we find it inappropriate to resolve this issue at the present stage of the case.

A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when the officer lacked grounds to reasonably but mistakenly believe probable cause existed.

Overstreet v. Myers · filed 1999-11-22

I find that they did not provide her with grounds for a reasonable but mistaken belief that probable cause existed. Sergeant Myers is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

An official lacks qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when using supervisory authority to demand sexual favors was plainly unlawful.

Kelly v. City of Oakland · filed 1999-11-23

In short, McNab had fair warning from the statute that to use his position as a supervisor to attempt to extract sexual compliance from Kelly was a breach of federal law for which he has no immunity.

An error in a qualified-immunity instruction in a § 1983 action is harmless when the jury does not reach immunity.

Wilson v. Hinds · filed 1999-11-30

Officer Hinds’s testimony was also sufficient to support the instruction on qualified immunity; however, any error in the instruction would be harmless because the jury did not reach the issue of qualified immunity.

A public official may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 sexual harassment claim when established law gave sufficient notice that the alleged conduct could create liability.

Dunegan v. City of Council Grove, Kansas Water Department · filed 1999-11-30

We believe that these cases provided sufficient notice to Masters that he could be held liable for sexual harassment under § 1983 for the type of conduct he allegedly engaged in here. Accordingly, the court shall not grant summary judgment on this basis either.

Qualified immunity does not protect an official from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable official in that position would have known the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Lee v. Arapahoe County · filed 1999-12-01

We hold an employer in Mr. Gibbs’ position could reasonably have been expected to know employee speech concerning public safety is protected by the First Amendment. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641. We thus affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Gibbs’ claim of qualified immunity.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages unless their conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Rainey v. Hartness · filed 1999-12-02

Generally, government officials performing discretionary functions are granted a qualified immunity from suit under section 1983 and are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). ... Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, Hartness was entitled to qualified immunity from Appellants’ federal civil-rights claims.

In a § 1983 claim, whether a right was clearly established for qualified immunity is a legal question for the court.

Dubuc v. Isaac · filed 1999-12-03

Whether the law was clearly established is a legal question, not appropriate for jury review.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for a prison officer whose use of force was reasonable to restore discipline.

Rios v. Holbrook · filed 1999-12-03

Reviewing the record de novo, and not considering the facts Rios submits are contested and the affidavit relied upon by the district court, we conclude that Holbrook’s use of force against Rios was not unreasonable in light of the circumstances, that Holbrook’s actions were reasonable to restore discipline, and that Holbrook was thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when reasonable officers could believe their use of force was lawful, even if that belief was mistaken.

McGruder v. Heagwood · filed 1999-12-07

Accepting as true McGruder’s version of the facts, we conclude that objectively reasonable police officers could have believed that they were not using excessive force, though this belief may have been erroneous.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they reasonably believe no clearly established law requires them to investigate a suspect’s mistaken-identity claim before arresting him on a matching warrant.

Waldon v. Borough of Upper Darby · filed 1999-12-09

Thus, given the confidence that the officers likely had in the warrant, and the unique circumstances presented to the officers, the officers were reasonable in believing that no clearly established law required them to investigate plaintiffs claims before arresting him. ... The officers are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, and summary judgment will therefore be entered in their favor on the § 1983 claim.