42 U.S.C. § 1983

Qualified immunity protects officers from a § 1983 due process claim when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct lawful, but it did not warrant dismissal of the pleaded excessive-force claim.

Rodriguez v. McGinnis · filed 1998-03-30

Finally, the Court notes that even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged conduct by defendants viola-tive of a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary confinement, defendants nonetheless are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to that claim (but not, as Magistrate Judge Grubin concluded, with respect to the excessive force claim).

A county defending a Section 1983 claim cannot assert qualified immunity.

Elk v. Kastning · filed 1998-04-01

The county is not entitled to assert qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants retain qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional duty was not clear enough at the time of their conduct for a reasonable official to know it applied.

Henry Greer, etc. v. Shoop · filed 1998-04-02

Therefore, we hold that the contours of the state-created danger theory, as applied to the unique facts of this case, were not defined clearly enough in 1991 to remove the defendants’ qualified immunity protection.

Section 1983 defendants retain qualified immunity when the constitutional duty at issue was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Henry Greer, Administrator of the Estate of Mora Patricia Greer v. Stanley D. Shoop Ronald Dohrman Thomas L. Frisch · filed 1998-04-02

Therefore, we hold that the contours of the state-created danger theory, as applied to the unique facts of this case, were not defined clearly enough in 1991 to remove the defendants’ qualified immunity protection.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an officer whose arrest and charging decisions were reasonable, even when the charges are later dropped.

Richardson v. Benson · filed 1998-04-13

The fact that the charges against Richardson were nolle prosequi shows that he received the benefit of the laws of Maryland. It does not establish that Officer Benson's decision to arrest Richardson and initiate the criminal prosecution was unreasonable, stripping Officer Benson of his qualified immunity.

A § 1983 defendant who raises qualified immunity on summary judgment is entitled to it if the plaintiff fails to show either a violation of a federal right or that the right was clearly established.

Williams v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1998-04-16

When a defendant pleads qualified immunity and raises it in a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant’s alleged conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. ... If the plaintiff fails to carry either part of his two-part burden, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to officials whose conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Berthiaume v. Jean Caron, Betty B. Clark, James D. Bivins and William T. O'DOnOhue · filed 1998-04-21

In section 1983 cases, the classical formulation is that an official is immune if his or hér actions did not violate the plaintiffs “clearly established” constitutional rights. ... We conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the claims under the federal Constitution.

In a § 1983 suit, violating an administrative use-of-force guideline that creates no substantive right to damages does not defeat qualified immunity.

Dorothea Gravely v. Madden · filed 1998-04-21

Even if Madden’s use of force violated the regulation, however, he would still be entitled to qualified immumty. The regulation in question does not create a substantive right that gives rise to a cause of action for damages. Rather, it provides a guideline for corrections officers with respect to the use of force. This guideline turns on the observations and conclusions of the individual officer. As such, violation of the regulation alone would not render Madden liable to suit for damages.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action may be entitled to qualified immunity.

Blair v. J. Lynch, a Correctional Officer and Sergeant at San Quentin · filed 1998-04-22

Moreover, the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.

A plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit must show that the asserted federal right was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Martin v. City of Birmingham · filed 1998-04-28

To defeat a claim for qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the federal right he accuses the defendant of violating was "clearly established" when the defendant acted.

Section 1983 claims against an officer are barred by qualified immunity when an officer could reasonably believe the challenged stop was constitutional.

Doll v. Trent Clasen, Washington State Patrol Officer Annette M. Sandberg, Chief of the Washington State Patrol · filed 1998-04-30

An officer could reasonably have thought that, in light of the information known to Trooper Clasen, the decision to stop Doll and administer the sobriety test was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Clasen is therefore shielded from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff-favorable facts show conduct that a reasonable officer would know violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Borrero v. Metro-Dade County · filed 1998-05-13

Without determining whether this is in fact how the events transpired, the Court finds that these actions, if true (and the Court must view them as such at the summary judgment stage), would have violated Borrero’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unreasonable seizure. The Court also finds that even if prior easelaw had not clearly established violation of this right under the facts of the instant case, Officer’s Serrano’s actions, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, were such that any reasonable officer should have known of their unlawfulness. Therefore, Officer Serrano is not entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity at this point.

Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims if their actions did not violate clearly established law.

Redd v. City of Enterprise · filed 1998-05-13

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a section 1983 damages action if his actions did not violate clearly established law.

Defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law at the time.

Martin v. McElvaney · filed 1998-05-15

Nevertheless, McElvaney and Dixon are still entitled to qualified immunity if their action was objectively reasonable as measured by law clearly established at the time of the incident.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, disputed facts about an officer’s use of force and intent can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Kapfhammer v. Boyd · filed 1998-05-19

In conclusion, I find that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Mr. Boyd indeed used the force to maintain discipline or if he used it to cause harm. There is also a question about what kind of force the defendant actually used. Based on the limited record before me, I cannot determine whether Mr. Boyd used the force in good faith and whether he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to a sheriff when the alleged termination violates no constitutional right.

Carter v. Good · filed 1998-05-19

Because Carter's termination violated no constitutional right, Sher- iff Good is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not permit a qualified immunity defense when a state official is sued solely for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Padron v. Feaver · filed 1998-05-20

In a § 1983 claim asserted against a state official solely for declaratory and injunctive relief, there is no qualified immunity defense.

An official sued under § 1983 cannot obtain qualified immunity based on emergency conditions without showing that those conditions justified the conduct.

Sanchez v. Taggart · filed 1998-05-22

We disagree with the district court&s conclusion that Mr. Taggart was entitled to qualified immunity in light of “emergency” conditions. Although some emergencies may warrant issuing orders without first reviewing an inmate&s physical limitations, Mr. Taggart failed to establish such circumstances here.

Section 1983 permits a municipal officer sued in an individual capacity to assert qualified immunity.

Kendrick v. Town of Winchester/City of Winsted · filed 1998-05-26

In a section 1983 case, a municipal officer may be shielded from liability in his individual capacity based on qualified immunity.

Government officials sued for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 may claim qualified immunity for discretionary acts that do not violate clearly established rights.

Doran by and Through Doran v. Condon · filed 1998-05-26

Government officials, like prosecutors or police officers, who are sued for damages in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their performance of discretionary functions are entitled to a qualified immunity defense if they prove that their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity does not shield a public official from individual liability under § 1983 when clearly established law would have made the unlawfulness of a political dismissal apparent.

Pharris v. Looper · filed 1998-05-26

As has been discussed, it is clear from the description of the duties of a field technician that it is not a position which could be regarded as “confidential” or “policymaking.” Accordingly, the Court finds that Looper is not shielded from individual liability on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield individual defendants from a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when the employee’s right was clearly established at the time of the adverse action.

Lowrey v. Texas a & M University System · filed 1998-05-27

The court concludes that the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit, had clearly established a public employee’s right of protection against retaliation for speaking on matters of public concern at .the time of Lowrey’s demotion on November 4, 1994. The court thus concludes that Low-rey has met her summary judgment burden of rebutting the qualified-immunity defense of McCabe and Reisman.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim does not arise simply because the injured person is a police officer.

Jensen v. City of Oxnard · filed 1998-05-28

As a matter of law, however, they are not entitled to immunity simply because the injured party is a police officer.

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a clearly established right and was objectively unreasonable.

State of Texas v. Walker · filed 1998-05-28

Qualified immunity shields a public official exercising discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless the public official's conduct violated clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which an objectively reasonable person should have known. ... Consequently, the Regents' and Low's actions in terminating Walker either were not unconstitutional or were not objectively unreasonable in light of the law as it existed at the time of Walker's firing. The district court properly granted qualified immunity.

Public officials facing § 1983 damages claims have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Ramdas Lamb v. University of Hawaii Mie Watanabae Madaleine Goodman Susan Hippensteele Doe 1-25 Lawrence C. Foster Marga · filed 1998-05-28

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials performing discretionary functions from personal liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Thus, investigating the complaint could not have violated Lamb's clearly established constitutional rights and the district court properly granted the University officials qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time they acted.

Clifton ELY-EL N-18287 v. Godinez · filed 1998-06-03

It does however support the alternatively dispositive claims of qualified immunity advanced by all defendants: ... the constitutional right claimed by Ely-El (an asserted right to his not being assigned to segregation under the circumstances) could not be said to have been “clearly established” at the time that defendants acted (see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim based solely on psychological injuries when the asserted Fourteenth Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Petta v. Rivera · filed 1998-06-09

We must therefore hold that in January, 1990, the Petta children had no "clearly established" constitutional right under the due process clause to be free from a police officer's use of excessive force where the only injuries allegedly suffered were psychological. We therefore find that the district court erred in denying Officer Rivera's motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim, a genuine dispute of material fact about whether an officer violated a constitutional right can preclude summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

McCaslin v. Wilkins · filed 1998-06-10

It is clear to the Court, as recited above, that there is a genuine issue as to material fact as to whether Wilkins, in shooting McCaslin, violated McCaslin’s constitutional rights. Therefore, Wilkins is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Individual defendants in a Section 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when the evidence fails to create a genuine issue that they violated clearly established law.

Hedrick v. Pfeiffer · filed 1998-06-11

Further, because the evidence fails to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendants in fact violated clearly established law, the individual defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity.

A private firm providing involuntary commitment services for intoxicated people under a municipal contract does not have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims.

Halvorsen v. Baird · filed 1998-06-11

A private firm providing a municipality with involuntary commitment services for inebriates does not enjoy qualified immunity, under Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997).

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot identify a clearly established federal right; violation of a state regulation alone is insufficient.

Auburn Medical Center, Inc. v. Andrus · filed 1998-06-12

Defendant Sanders asserts, and the court finds, that Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim fails because Defendant Sanders is protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. ... However, a state regulation is not “clearly established federal law” sufficient to withstand Defendant’s defense of qualified immunity. Rather, Plaintiff must point to some clearly established federal right.

Police officers performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when their actions are not clearly prohibited by law.

Hart v. Rogers · filed 1998-06-16

We further find that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.6 It is well-settled that police officers performing discretionary functions are shielded from civil liability as long as their actions are not clearly prohibited by law.

Qualified immunity shields officials from individual § 1983 claims when precedent does not clearly establish the asserted right in a sufficiently concrete factual context.

Blanco v. City of Clearwater, Fla. · filed 1998-06-17

A single case does not establish the law in a sufficiently concrete context so as to defeat the qualified immunity defense. Therefore, the Court dismisses Counts II-V against the individual Defendants.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity for denying a highly specialized vegetarian prison diet when the right to that diet was not clearly established.

DeHart v. Lehman · filed 1998-06-23

Based on Defendant’s good faith effort to inform themselves and the uncertain state of the law regarding the right to a highly specialized vegetarian diet, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs claim that his constitutional rights were violated when Defendants denied his dietary request.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot overcome qualified immunity without showing that the official violated a constitutional right.

Radecki v. Barela · filed 1998-06-24

There being no constitutional violation, the plaintiffs cannot sustain the first of the two-part showing required to rebut the defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity from damages for officials performing discretionary, non-ministerial functions when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Ewy v. Sturtevant · filed 1998-06-25

In actions premised on § 1983, government officials sued in their individual capacity, and performing discretionary, non-ministerial functions, are entitled to immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Government employees sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they have not violated a clearly established right.

Robinson v. Langdon · filed 1998-06-25

The DHS employees have a qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 similar to the immunity that applies to them with respect to the Arkansas law. ... Again, Mr. Langdon has demonstrated no violation of a clearly established right, and summary judgment against his claim for damages against the DHS employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was proper.

In a § 1983 action, defeating qualified immunity at summary judgment requires an alleged constitutional violation of a right that was clearly established at the time.

Guite v. Wright · filed 1998-06-26

Two requirements must be satisfied in order to defeat a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. First, the plaintiff must allege a violation of a constitutional right. Second, the allegedly violated constitutional right must have been clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit cannot claim qualified immunity when a reasonable official could not have believed the conduct complied with clearly established law.

Magno J. Ortega, M.D. v. Dennis Michael O'connor, M.D. And Richard Friday · filed 1998-06-26

A reasonable official in the defendants’ position could not have believed that a search and seizure conducted under the circumstances and in the manner described by Dr. Ortega was reasonably work related or otherwise consistent with established law. The defendants, therefore, could not have prevailed on their qualified immunity defense under any set of lawful qualified immunity instructions.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages from officers in their individual capacities to show that their conduct violated a right they should have known was protected.

Davis v. Patrick Brady and Shawn Murphy · filed 1998-06-29

Because Davis seeks to hold the officers liable in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must show not only that the officers’ actions were unconstitutional, but also that they should have known at that time that they were violating his rights.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against an officer when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct; in January 1990, that included a Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim alleging only psychological injury.

Petta v. Rivera · filed 1998-06-30

We must therefore hold that in January, 1990, the Petta children had no “clearly established” constitutional right under the due process clause to be free from a police officer’s use of excessive force where the only injuries allegedly suffered were psychological.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for entering and searching a home when he could not reasonably believe the occupant consented.

Richard v. City of Harahan · filed 1998-06-30

In this case, it was not objectively reasonable for Kuhn to believe that he had consent to enter and search Mark’s home. He had no court order authorizing police intervention of any kind. He was not faced with exigent circumstances. Mark’s consent was clearly not voluntary, especially in light of his attorney’s subsequent demand that the police leave the premises. Accordingly, the court finds that Kuhn is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to an arresting officer when no reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed under the circumstances known to the officer.

Baptiste v. Penney Company, Inc. · filed 1998-06-30

Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer therefore would not have believed there was probable cause to arrest Ms. Baptiste. The district court did not err in denying the officers qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 excessive force claim if a reasonable officer could believe the use of deadly force was justified.

Austin v. Town of Blacksburg · filed 1998-07-01

Consolidating the doctrines of qualified immunity and excessive force, the officers are not liable if a reasonable police officer, under the circumstance of this case, could believe that probable cause existed to justify the particular use of deadly force at issue.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 retaliation claim at the pleading stage when the complaint could establish that a police misconduct complaint addressed a matter of public concern.

Martinez v. Hooper · filed 1998-07-08

In order to find qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings on the basis which Hooper urges, we would, in effect, need to decide that a charge of police misconduct filed with a police oversight board could never be a matter of public concern. That is a step, of course, we will not take. We agree with the district court that the motion is “premature.” That said, we emphasize that a decision as to whether the charge actually involves a matter of public concern must wait until the charge is in the record.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from § 1983 damages when the officer reasonably enforces a facially valid guardianship order without violating clearly established rights.

King v. Beavers · filed 1998-07-09

Qualified immunity protects government officials from damage liability unless their discretionary acts violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. ... Beavers was duty bound to help enforce that order, and his actions in that regard were objectively reasonable because they were consistent with the court’s grant of full guardianship to Marilyn Johnson. ... This is precisely the kind of good faith discretionary official action that qualified immunity is intended to protect.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violates no clearly established law.

Moniz v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1998-07-09

In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that a reasonable government official in appellants' position should have known that the use of race as a factor in selecting candidates for promotion in the manner that the challenged promotion decisions were made in this case would be unconstitutional. We conclude, therefore, that, having violated no clearly established law, appellants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

A § 1983 defendant cannot claim qualified immunity for maliciously and selectively using a prosecution without probable cause to infringe constitutional rights, because that prohibition was clearly established.

Elbert B. POPPELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO; Sharren Carr; Chris Larson; Donald Albright, Defendants-App · filed 1998-07-10

Because this particular and well-defined right has been clearly established since at least 1981, Carr cannot defeat it with a claim of qualified immunity. No reasonable official could claim that he could not know that it violates the established law maliciously and selectively to use without probable cause a criminal prosecution for the purpose of infringing upon a person’s constitutional rights.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges a clearly established right of which a reasonable official should have known and the factual record is scant.

Hammett v. Oklahoma Department · filed 1998-07-21

Because Plaintiff has alleged a clearly established right of which a reasonable person should have known, and given the scant factual record on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is premature to grant qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a Section 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established right and the factual record is scant.

Hammett v. Oklahoma Dept. of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Services · filed 1998-07-21

Because Plaintiff has alleged a clearly established right of which a reasonable person should have known, and given the scant factual record on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is premature to grant qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 false arrest liability if a reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed probable cause existed.

Humphrey v. Staszak · filed 1998-07-23

With an unlawful arrest claim in a § 1983 action when a defense of qualified immunity has been raised, we will review to determine if the officer actually had probable cause or, if there was no probable cause, whether a reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Barrington v. Texas Southern Univ · filed 1998-07-24

Because Barrington failed to make the requisite allegation of the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, Yorke is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity when they should have known their conduct would extinguish a claimant’s protected rights.

NEW YORK STATE NAT. ORGAN. FOR WOMEN v. Cuomo · filed 1998-07-24

These same sources of authority compel the conclusion that the defendants should have known that the Division's policies and practices unlawfully prejudiced the substantive rights of the categories of plaintiffs-intervenors described supra page 429. Therefore, defendants are not immune from the damage claims brought against them by these individuals.

Municipalities sued for damages under § 1983 cannot claim qualified immunity, including in suits against officials in their official capacities.

Armstrong v. Squadrito · filed 1998-07-24

A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is a suit against the municipality, and a municipality does not enjoy qualified immunity from a damage claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Horne v. Coughlin · filed 1998-07-27

Horne's time served in the SHU was pursuant to a proceeding that did not violate any clearly established right. The defendants were accordingly entitled to qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Public officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Johnson v. Horn · filed 1998-07-28

We need not answer this difficult question, because we conclude that, under any standard, the law entitling the Inmates to a kosher diet was not clearly established when Horn and Sobina refused the Inmates' requests for kosher meals.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when an official violated clearly established rights and the evidence does not compel a finding that the official reasonably believed his conduct lawful.

Ayers v. Ryan · filed 1998-07-28

Therefore, because Ryan violated Ayers’ clearly established constitutional rights, and because no evidence compels the conclusion that it was objectively reasonable for Ryan to believe that his actions did not violate those rights, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity.

Government officials sued individually under § 1983 have qualified immunity from damages unless their conduct violates a clearly established right that a reasonable official would have known.

Hartman v. Middleton · filed 1998-07-30

In § 1983 actions, government officials sued in their individual capacity for performing discretionary, non-ministerial functions are qualifiedly immune from liability for damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law governing whether their search was unconstitutional was insufficiently clear at the time.

Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin · filed 1998-07-31

Because we conclude that the contours of curtilage were not sufficiently clear at the time of the search, however, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the officers involved.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional duty was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Santamorena v. GA Military College · filed 1998-07-31

Because we conclude that Plaintiff and H.S. were owed no clearly established constitutional duty by Defendants at the time of the incident, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the law governing the asserted right was unclear at the time of their conduct.

Daughenbaugh v. City Of Tiffin · filed 1998-07-31

Because of the uncertainties regarding the contours of curtilage at the time of the officers' search, however, we AFFIRM the district court's ruling in favor of the officers on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their conduct violates no clearly established federal constitutional right.

Burgess v. Howard County MD · filed 1998-08-04

Based on the facts presented, the court found "no violation of any clearly established federal constitu- tional right" and therefore determined that the defendants were enti- tled to qualified immunity from suit and entered summary judgment accordingly.6 We agree.

Individual school district officials may be qualifiedly immune from § 1983 claims arising from a student's placement outside Kansas.

Joshua W. v. Board of Education of Wichita Public Schools U.S.D. No. 259 · filed 1998-08-07

In light of the findings cited above relating to the removal of Joshua from Kansas, the court finds the individual Wichita School District defendants are qualifiedly immune with respect to the section 504 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims advanced by plaintiffs.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim depends on whether the law was clearly established and what the defendant knew at the time of the alleged violation.

Collins Ex Rel. Campbell v. Bellinghausen · filed 1998-08-10

In ruling upon a defense of qualified immunity, we first determine whether the law that the defendant is accused of having violated was clearly established and then examine the information possessed by the defendant at the time of the alleged violation.

Qualified immunity can apply to a § 1983 claim involving officials’ benefits decisions when those decisions require discretionary legal judgments.

Larsen v. Senate of The Commonwealth · filed 1998-08-11

Because appellants' decision to deny Larsen's benefits required such discretionary determinations, including legal analysis as to the applicability of the 1993 version of section 16(b), it cannot be characterized as a ministerial act outside the scope of the qualified immunity doctrine.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when reasonable officials in their position could have believed their conduct was lawful under the case law at the time.

Larsen v. Senate Of The Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania · filed 1998-08-11

Thus, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if "reasonable officials in [their] position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, that their conduct would be lawful."

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation under current law.

Systems Contractors Corporation v. Orleans Parish School Board, Kenneth J. Ducote · filed 1998-08-12

We find that Systems failed to allege the violation of a constitutional right under current law. Accordingly, we hold that Ducote was entitled to summary judgment on his qualified immunity defense.

Individual township officials sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for their actions.

King v. Township of East Lampeter · filed 1998-08-13

We need not engage in the complex sorting process required under the absolute immunity affirmative defense, because we find that the individual Township Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.

Officials are immune from a § 1983 damages claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Hutton v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk · filed 1998-08-13

Hutton’s rights were not clearly established, and the defendants, therefore, enjoy immunity from suit under the § 1983 claim and under the common law false imprisonment claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

As BY AND THROUGH BLALOCK v. Tellus · filed 1998-08-19

Therefore if plaintiff in fact has such a right, it was not clearly established by 1989. ... Therefore, even if defendants' conduct in this case violated a substantive due process right, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

An official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when the plaintiff offers no evidence that the official retaliated.

Gubitosi v. Kapica · filed 1998-08-19

Because plaintiff failed to identify evidence in the record from which a jury could find that Kapica engaged in retaliation, she failed (by definition) to show that he violated clearly established law against retaliation; or to show that it would not have been objectively reasonable for him to believe that he did not violate the law.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from personal liability under Section 1983 when the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Keith v. Schuh · filed 1998-08-20

Because Schuh's allegedly violative acts were objectively reasonable, he is shielded from personal liability for those acts under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to officials when existing law does not clearly establish that their alleged conduct constitutes adverse employment action under the First Amendment.

Barron v. Public Health Trust of Dade County · filed 1998-08-21

The Court agrees with Defendant Reardon’s arguments that it is not clearly established that Reardon’s alleged actions in response to Barron’s speech constitute adverse employment action under the First Amendment. Reardon’s threat to transfer Barron to the night shift and the transfer of one of Barron’s subordinates, rather than Barron himself, to a different unit do not clearly constitute unlawful retaliation under the First Amendment.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity from a First Amendment retaliation claim when the pleadings show the plaintiff was not engaging in the expression at issue.

Connell v. Signoracci · filed 1998-08-21

We do hold that because the pleadings show that Connell was not engaging in expression, Connell cannot have a First Amendment claim — the only type of claim not already dismissed by the district court in this case. Consequently, all of the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Connell’s sole remaining claim against them — his claim that they retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation under current law.

Sys Contr Corp v. Orleans Parish Sch · filed 1998-08-24

We find that Systems failed to allege the violation of a constitutional right under current law. Accordingly, we hold that Ducote was entitled to summary judgment on his qualified immunity defense.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing qualified immunity must show that the defendant’s actions violated constitutional law that was clearly established at the time.

Hicks v. Cassilly · filed 1998-08-24

In order to overcome a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that it was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation that the defendant's actions were unconstitutional.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects officials whose actions could reasonably be thought consistent with the rights they allegedly violated.

Baird v. County of Buncombe · filed 1998-09-01

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are immune from liability "as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated."

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the factual record permits reasonable jurors to differ on whether the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable.

Samander v. Flemmig · filed 1998-09-02

For the reasons that follow, the factual record currently before the Court is such that reasonable jurors could differ on the objective reasonableness of Flemmig’s use of deadly force, and thus the Court cannot conclude that it was objectively reasonable for defendant to view his use of deadly force as reasonable or that reasonable officers could disagree.

Section 1983 does not shield public officials from a free speech retaliation claim when existing law clearly established that their conduct was unlawful.

Kendall v. Cobb County, Ga. · filed 1998-09-02

Because the applicable law in this area utilizes a balancing test to determine when a public employee’s free speech rights have been violated, “the employer is entitled to immunity except in the extraordinary case where [the balancing test] would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the [adverse employment action] was unlawful.” ... Upon reviewing existing case law at the time of Plaintiffs demotion, this Court finds that this is one of those extraordinary cases; indeed, any reasonable government official would have realized that, .based on cases with sufficiently analogous facts, Plaintiff could not be demoted for speaking out against discrimination in the workplace and encouraging a coworker to file a complaint.

An individual defendant in a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Ferguson v. City of Phoenix · filed 1998-09-03

Therefore, we conclude that the right at issue was not clearly established, and as a result, Commander Rodabough was entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from §1983 claims when their conduct violates no clearly established right.

Fish v. Lyons · filed 1998-09-03

Therefore, without passing on whether or not the individual defendants’ action in the present case violated any right of the plaintiffs, the Court rules that since the defendants’ actions were discretionary and did not violate any clearly established rights of the plaintiffs, the Court rules that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Hennigh v. City of Shawnee · filed 1998-09-09

Because he has not established a violation of any clearly established constitutional rights, Defendants were correctly spared the burden of further proceedings in this case.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity analysis, whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right is a necessary threshold inquiry.

In Re City of Philadelphia Litigation · filed 1998-09-09

Resolution of the question of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation based upon the summary judgment record therefore was integral to the court's qualified immunity analysis.

A court may defer deciding qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit until the record is better developed on the immunity issues.

McVey v. Stacy · filed 1998-09-10

In short, we affirm the district court’s ruling to defer deciding on the qualified immunity issue until the record is better developed on the immunity issues.

Courts should evaluate qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim early by asking whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established when the defendant acted.

Mcvey v. Stacy · filed 1998-09-10

It is therefore incumbent on the courts to review the immunity defense critically at an early stage of the proceedings to determine the legal questions of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right and, if so, whether the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time the defendant acted.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they had strong reason to believe a gender-based salary plan would create a discriminatory imbalance, even if a court approved the plan.

Maitland v. University of Minnesota · filed 1998-09-16

We cannot say that it was objectively reasonable, under clearly established constitutional law, for the defendants to agree to a salary plan--notwithstanding a court's approval--when they had strong reason to believe that a likely result of the plan would be to create a salary imbalance in favor of female academic employees.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 claim if a reasonable officer could have believed the plaintiff posed a threat.

Medeiros v. Town of Dracut · filed 1998-09-18

Richardson is entitled to prevail unless no reasonable police officer could have believed that plaintiff posed a threat.

A court need not reach qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim when the officer committed no constitutional wrong.

Marla K. Kain Thomas Kain v. Gary L. Nesbitt (97-1210) Michael Powell (97-2068) · filed 1998-09-18

If an officer committed no wrong, then qualified immunity is not implicated.

Qualified immunity from § 1983 liability for a police officer depends on whether the plaintiff alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Hayter v. City of Mount Vernon, Harold Sullivan, Jr., Franklin County Reserve Deputy, Tyler Bannister, Mount · filed 1998-09-21

A determination of whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 involves a two-step analysis. ... The first step relates to whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a elearly established constitutional right. ... Next, even if a public official’s conduct has violated a clearly established constitutional right, the official is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if his or her conduct was objectively reasonable.

A public official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 privacy claim when a reasonable official lacked notice that the disclosure violated a clearly established privacy right.

Cynthia Bloch and Thomas Bloch v. Sheriff L. John Ribar · filed 1998-09-21

Despite what appears to be a possible violation of the Blochs’ privacy interests in this case, their claim against Ribar on this ground must fail because, as the district court held, a reasonable public official would not be on notice that the release of such intimate details of a rape constituted an actionable violation of a rape victim’s privacy interests.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate a clearly established right that a reasonable official would have known.

Porterfield v. Lott · filed 1998-09-22

Officials lose the protection of the immunity if they violate a constitutional or statutory right of the plaintiff and the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the defendants' position would have known of it. ... In sum, because the sheriff's deputies in this case were entitled to qualified immunity on each of Porterfield's claims against them in their individual capacities, the district court's order rejecting qualified immunity is reversed.

Section 1983 investigators receive qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that withholding exculpatory evidence from a prosecutor violated an accused’s rights.

Walker v. Sopher · filed 1998-09-23

In short, the law must simply be clearer than Goodwin made it before public officials can be stripped of qualified immunity.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable, well-trained officer in her position could have believed the facts established probable cause for a search warrant.

Gentile v. Bauder · filed 1998-09-24

Based on this uncontradicted evidence, we find no error in the trial court concluding that, as a matter of law, a reasonable, well-trained officer in petitioner's position could have believed that these facts established probable cause for the search warrant, and that therefore a summary judgment was to be entered in behalf of petitioner based on qualified immunity.

A defendant must plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Simmons v. Kolodzik · filed 1998-09-24

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the party.

A municipality may not assert qualified immunity as a defense to a § 1983 claim.

Walden v. Carmack · filed 1998-09-28

Although the parties argue the merits of qualified immunity for appellant Montgomery County, such arguments are without merit because a municipality may not assert qualified immunity as a defense.

A law enforcement officer can defend a Section 1983 claim by showing probable cause or a reasonable belief that probable cause existed.

Sanducci v. City of Hoboken · filed 1998-09-29

Suffice it to say, "a law enforcement official can defend a section 1983 claim by establishing either that he or she acted with probable cause, or even if probable cause did not exit, that a reasonable police officer could have believed in its existence."

Qualified immunity does not protect an official from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable official would have known the alleged conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

McAfee v. Deale · filed 1998-09-29

Because the constitutional right plaintiff asserts was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged conduct, and because any reasonable person in defendant’s position would have known that her alleged conduct violated those well-established rights, defendant Deale may not avail herself of the defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity applies to a § 1983 claim against an official in her individual capacity, but not to an official-capacity claim seeking injunctive relief.

P.F. v. Mendres · filed 1998-09-29

We- note initially that it appears that defendant Balasco-Barr is sued only in her official capacity and that plaintiffs seek only injunc-tive relief against Balasco-Barr; plaintiffs do not sue Balasco-Barr in her individual capacity. Thus, our discussion of qualified immunity only applies to plaintiffs’ claim against defendant Mendres, as it is clear that Men-dres is sued in her individual capacity.

In a § 1983 damages action, qualified immunity depends on whether a reasonable official would have understood the particular conduct to violate clearly established constitutional law.

Rivera-Ramos v. Roman · filed 1998-09-29

Instead, the focus must be upon the particular conduct engaged in by (or attributed to) the defendants; immunity is forfeited only if a reasonable official would clearly understand that conduct to be a violation of the Constitution.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions were not obviously unlawful under preexisting law.

Anthony v. Burkhart · filed 1998-09-30

In the present case, Defendants Burkhart and Runner are entitled to qualified immunity summary judgment because their actions were not “so obviously wrong, in the light of preexisting law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing... ” Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149.

In a § 1983 excessive force claim, the plaintiff’s account of an arrest can raise a triable issue about the officer’s qualified immunity.

Harvey v. Brandt · filed 1998-10-02

Plaintiff’s version of the arrest also raises a triable issue of fact whether Liberatore is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity (see, Stipo v Town of N. Castle, 205 AD2d 608; Ospina v Department of Corrections, 749 F Supp 572; see also, Palmer v Sanderson, 9 F3d 1433, 1436).

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from § 1983 claims for demoting employees in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights when the officials should have known the retaliation was unlawful.

Benningfield v. City of Houston · filed 1998-10-05

Similarly, in this case, we hold that the Defendants should have known that they could not retaliate against Benningfield and Frankhouser for exercising their First Amendment rights.

An individual defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Ferguson v. City of Phoenix · filed 1998-10-08

Therefore, we conclude that the right at issue was not clearly established, and as a result, Commander Rodabough was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit depends on whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable; a genuine factual dispute about reasonableness precludes summary judgment.

Hayter v. City of Mt Vernon · filed 1998-10-13

A determination of whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 involves a two-step analysis. ... Next, even if a public official’s conduct has violated a clearly established constitutional right, the official is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if his or her conduct was objectively reasonable. ... The magistrate did not err in determining that genuine issues of material fact with regard to the applicability of qualified immunity precluded summary judgment.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff establishes no violation of a constitutional or statutory right.

Jurasek v. Utah State Hospital · filed 1998-10-14

Having concluded defendants did not contravene any of Jurasek’s constitutional or statutory rights, we find defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 cannot invoke qualified immunity when controlling precedent clearly established that the alleged conduct violated the plaintiffs’ rights.

Paradis v. Montrose Memorial Hospital · filed 1998-10-14

Both of these cases clearly established that appellees’ speech was of public concern and was entitled to protection under the First Amendment. Accordingly, appellants may not invoke a qualified immunity defense.

In a § 1983 procedural due process claim, violating state law that creates a property interest does not defeat qualified immunity unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established federal right.

Harbert International, Inc. v. James · filed 1998-10-14

While state law may have created Harbert's constitutionally protected property interest, the federal right upon which the claim for relief is based is the right to due process. The holding in Davis did not obviate Harbert's burden of demonstrating it was clearly established that the defendants' conduct in this case violated that federal right.

Qualified immunity shields officials from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Jeffrey E. Johnson Bruce Howard Shore, in No. 97-3581 v. Martin F. Horn Raymond J. Sobina, in No. 97-3582 · filed 1998-10-16

The Prison Officials’ total denial of any kosher diet prior to the establishment of the cold kosher diet is relevant to the Inmates’ damages count, but summary judgment is appropriate on that count because the Prison Officials are entitled to qualified immunity. ... Because the law was not clearly established, we need not decide whether an objectively reasonable prison official in Horn's and Sobina’s positions would have believed his conduct violated die Inmates’ First Amendment right to a kosher diet.

Government officials sued personally under § 1983 have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

Florida Department of Environmental Protection v. Environmental Corp. of America · filed 1998-10-16

In light of the Environmental Trust decision, we conclude that the individual defendants here are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

A police officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim if it was objectively reasonable to believe there was probable cause to arrest, or if reasonably competent officers could disagree about probable cause.

Newby v. Town of Cromwell · filed 1998-10-19

In the case of a claim of false arrest, a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if (1) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe there was probable cause to make the arrest, or (2) reasonably competent police officers could disagree as to whether there was probable cause to arrest.

State employees are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Currier Ex Rel. Estate of Juarez v. Doran · filed 1998-10-21

However, as of 1993 and early 1994 this danger-creation exception to DeShaney’s general rule had not been developed by the courts to the point that a reasonable state employee would recognize children had a constitutional right not to be placed with an abusive natural parent. Therefore, Defendants Gonzales and Robbins are entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from a Section 1983 claim based on a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Huerta v. Hillsborough County · filed 1998-10-23

Because Huerta has a constitutional right to expression on a subject that is of public concern, the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action depends on whether the law was uncertain to an objectively reasonable person at the time of the conduct.

Jones v. Kopesky · filed 1998-10-23

Qualified immunity depends on the existence of legal uncertainty, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449 (7th Cir.1990) (en banc), and the district court did not suggest that any of the rules at issue (such as the rule against the application of unnecessary force) would have led to uncertainty in an objectively reasonable person at the time of the acts in question.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for retaliatory demotions when they should have known the retaliation violated the First Amendment.

Benningfield v. The City of Houston · filed 1998-10-26

Similarly, in this case, we hold that the Defendants should have known that they could not retaliate against Benningfield and Frankhouser for exercising their First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed the conduct lawful under clearly established law and the information available at the time.

Falkiewicz v. City of Westland · filed 1998-10-26

Even if the officers were “mistaken” in their judgment that these circumstances necessitated the immediate removal of Brittany, such error was a “reasonable error” and the Court is satisfied that a reasonable officer could have believed his conduct to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information that defendants possessed. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Washington v. St. Albans Police Department · filed 1998-10-27

Those officers could not have reasonably believed their actions were in violation of Washington’s constitutional or statutory rights and are therefore entitled to summary judgment based upon the defense of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 shields officials from individual damages liability through qualified immunity unless their conduct violates a clearly established federal right.

Horstkoetter v. Department Of Public Safety · filed 1998-10-28

Qualified immunity is a doctrine which "shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct violates 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). ... In sum, the rights of a spouse of a law enforcement officer to display signs at her residence were not clearly established at the time of Defendants' actions. Defendants' interpretation of their policy, in view of the law at the time, was not clearly unlawful. Therefore, defendants Grimes, Cason and Warlick are entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action has qualified immunity when the defendant reasonably believes the conduct is lawful.

Kulas v. Valdez · filed 1998-10-29

A reasonable belief that the conduct was lawful is sufficient to secure qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a section 1983 action does not require a good-faith element under the Harlow standard.

Lewis v. Guerrero · filed 1998-11-05

Although the Chambers standard is derived from the Harlow standard which we applied above, the Harlow standard does not include a good-faith element. The Chambers standard is inapplicable to an assertion of qualified immunity in a section 1983 action.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, an officer has qualified immunity if the warrant affidavit, corrected to include omitted information, would support a reasonable belief that probable cause existed.

Mihalick v. Cavanaugh · filed 1998-11-05

If, after adding the omitted material, the warrant is sufficient to support a reasonable officer’s belief that probable cause existed, qualified immunity applies.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects an arresting officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable.

Jackson v. Shipley · filed 1998-11-09

Having reviewed the grant of summary judgment and the issue of qualified immunity de novo, see White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 279 (8th Cir. 1994), we agree that Shipley&s conduct as arresting officer was objectively reasonable.

Officials sued under § 1983 may raise qualified immunity at summary judgment and shift the burden to the plaintiff by presenting an adequate factual record.

PRIME TIME SHUTTLE INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. California Public Utilities Commission · filed 1998-11-10

The Commissioners and the Commission’s employees are entitled to raise such a qualified immunity defense by a motion for summary judgment. Defendants did so and presented an adequate factual record to shift the burden to plaintiff.

A factual dispute over whether a gender-based salary plan was justified can preclude qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim.

Maitland v. University Of Minnesota · filed 1998-11-12

Maitland is challenging the legality of the consent decree under § 1983, and we are remanding his claim for trial because there is a disputed issue of material fact relating to whether there was a conspicuous imbalance in salaries that would justify the salary plan. The same issue of fact affects the claim of qualified immunity.

Defendants in a § 1983 action may claim qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Williams v. City of Allentown · filed 1998-11-18

In the alternative, defendants Watson and Bloom can also claim the same qualified immunity that was the basis for the summary judgment in the 1996 action. ... There is no suggestion that the actions of Mr. Watson and Mr. Bloom were in violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officers sued under Section 1983 may have qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on a search warrant with a state-law defect that does not violate federal constitutional standards.

Wullschleger v. Peters · filed 1998-11-20

However, a state law deficiency that does not also violate federal constitutional norms will not make reliance on the warrant objectively unreasonable for qualified immunity purposes if the warrant and its execution are otherwise valid.

Section 1983 claims against officials performing discretionary acts are subject to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot show a violation of clearly established law.

Bruce v. Village of Ontario, Unpublished Decision (11-24-1998) · filed 1998-11-24

Once a defendant raises the issue of qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden of showing the defendant violated clearly established law, Ohio Civil Service Employees Association v. Seiter (1988, 6 Civ.) 858 F.2d 1171 . If the plaintiff's allegations do not demonstrate a violation of clearly established law, the court should grant summary judgment as a matter of law, Id. ... We find the trial court should have granted summary judgment in favor of appellants.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the official violated clearly established law.

Becker v. Clark · filed 1998-11-25

Without more, Clark has failed to demonstrate any violation of clearly established law committed by Becker which would have violated Clark's federally protected interests under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It was therefore in error for the trial court to deny Becker's qualified immunity defense as a matter of law.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a genuine dispute over a constitutional deprivation.

Harjo v. Varnum Public School · filed 1998-11-27

Finally, because plaintiff did not raise a genuine dispute regarding the deprivation of a constitutional right, defendants were properly afforded qualified immunity for their acts taken in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 defendants may be denied qualified immunity when a genuine factual dispute remains about whether their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Kauffman v. Dawn McVay · filed 1998-11-27

The supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Having reviewed the record, we conclude the district court’s ruling was correct and affirm.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to officials whose objectively unreasonable conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Charfauros v. Board of Elections · filed 1998-11-27

In view of all these surrounding circumstances we cannot conclude that the members of the Board can be said to have acted in reasonable fashion viewed from an objective standpoint. For these reasons, we do not believe that members of the Board of Elections were entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 deadly-force claim, an officer may receive qualified immunity despite a dispute over whether the suspect held a knife when the officer reasonably perceived an immediate threat.

Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill · filed 1998-12-02

Accordingly, we reject the argu- ment that a factual dispute about whether Sigman still had his knife at the moment of shooting is material to the question of whether Offi- cer Riddle is entitled to the protections of qualified immunity in the particular circumstances of this case.

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 speech-retaliation claim when a reasonable official would not have known that the employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern.

Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority · filed 1998-12-02

Due to the unique confluence of facts in this case, however, we hold that the evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to Gonzalez, would not have compelled a reasonable official in Moran's position to believe that Gonzalez's letter constituted speech on a matter of public concern. ... We therefore hold that Moran is entitled to qualified immunity on Gonzalez's section 1983 claim, and we reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment to Moran in her individual capacity on this claim.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 First Amendment claim if it was unclear whether the employee’s speech addressed a matter of public concern.

Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing Authority · filed 1998-12-02

If it is unclear whether the letter satisfies the public concern requirement, then Moran is entitled to qualified immunity on Gonzalez’s section 1983 claim because Moran’s actions did not violate Gonzalez’s clearly established First Amendment rights.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer could have believed the force used complied with clearly established law.

Nelson v. County of Wright James R. Hudek · filed 1998-12-10

After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that under the circumstances encountered by Hudek, a reasonable officer could have believed that the use of potentially deadly force was not excessive or in violation of the clearly established law requiring an objectively reasonable response. Hudek is thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity gives government officials a limited defense to § 1983 claims arising from their public duties.

Branton v. The City of Dallas · filed 1998-12-11

Qualified immunity provides government officials with a limited affirmative defense against claims based on their performance of public duties.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 liberty claim when the asserted liberty interest was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Greenwood v. New York · filed 1998-12-11

And we can find no case law prior to 1982 holding that an injury like the one Greenwood allegedly suffered gives rise to a liberty interest under the stigma plus test. We therefore agree with the district court that the MPC doctors are entitled to qualified immunity on Greenwood’s liberty claim.

Prison officials may be liable for damages under § 1983 only if the constitutional right they violated was clearly established at the time.

Dennis M. Wolfel, Cross-Appellant v. Herbert Bates, Gary Brown, Cross-Appellees · filed 1983-06-03

Under Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562-63, 98 S.Ct. 855, 859-60, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978), prison officials like Bates and Brown can be liable for damages only if the constitutional right they violated was “clearly established at the time of the violation.”

In a Section 1983 search claim, disputed facts about whether officers reasonably believed a warrant was supported by probable cause can preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.

Mueller v. Tinkham · filed 1998-12-16

These remaining material issues of fact bearing on whether the officers reasonably believed probable cause to search existed preclude the grant of qualified immunity for Tinkham and Hanlen's conduct in executing the warrant.

Section 1983 defendants are protected by qualified immunity when their discretionary conduct violates no clearly established law.

Wilson v. Blankenship · filed 1998-12-31

Even if these space concerns were within the scope of their discretionary duties, we still conclude that Blankenship and Hall are protected by qualified immunity because failure to provide a law library for the federal detainees housed there or specific square footage for inmates to exercise violates no clearly established law for qualified immunity purposes, as we clarify.

Officials sued under § 1983 may claim qualified immunity for conduct within their discretionary authority unless the plaintiff shows that they violated clearly established law.

Wilson v. Blankenship · filed 1998-12-31

Our circuit applies a two-part test to determine if the qualified immunity defense protects a defendant government official. See Evans v. Hightower, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1997). First, the "defendant government official must prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful act occurred." Id. Second, if the defendant official meets his burden, then the plaintiff must "demonstrate that the defendant violated clearly established law based upon objective standards." Id.

Qualified immunity shields fire officers from § 1983 liability when they reasonably follow a superior’s orders without bad faith or malice; a chief’s immunity depends on whether the inspection was reasonable.

Vaill v. Franklin · filed 1999-01-06

There is no evidence that these officers acted in bad faith or with malice when they reasonably responded to such orders; therefore, the trial court did not err when it found that the officers were shielded from liability based upon qualified immunity. However, whether Franklin is shielded from liability based upon qualified immunity is dependent on whether the inspection itself was reasonable under the circumstances in this case.

Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when the law was not established at the time of their actions.

Chambers v. Colorado Department · filed 1999-01-06

Because the state of the law was not established when these actions were taken, the prison officials named in this lawsuit are entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, Mr. Chambers’ claim for damages cannot be sustained.

Employees of a private foster care agency are not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when neither historical practice nor public policy supports it.

RODRIGUEZ EX REL. KELLY v. McLoughlin · filed 1999-01-08

Accordingly, like the employees of the private firm in Richardson, the individual defendants in this case are not entitled to qualified immunity.

A correction officer’s qualified-immunity defense does not necessarily bar a § 1983 claim at summary judgment.

Mayweather v. Davis · filed 1999-01-13

Lethell Davis, a correction officer with the Arkansas Department of Correction, brings this interlocutory appeal from the district court’s1 order denying his motion for summary judgment, on the grounds of qualified immunity, in Melvin Mayweather’s lawsuit against him brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions, we conclude that the district court was correct.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

Lane v. Cty. of Sarpy · filed 1999-01-13

Because plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation, defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation.

Lane v. Sarpy County · filed 1999-01-13

Because plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation, defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages against individual officials when they lacked adequate notice that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

White v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama · filed 1999-01-15

Russell and Cook were not on adequate notice that what they were about to say constituted a violation of White’s guarantee of equal protection. Of course, if these two lower level supervisors are qualifiedly immune so are Center and Ficken, the two more remote U of A supervisors. ... Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted insofar as plaintiffs § 1983 claims for money damages against the individual defendants are concerned, and denied in all other respects.

Qualified immunity does not protect defendants sued in their official capacities under § 1983 because those claims are treated as claims against the government entity.

Padilla Ex Rel. Padilla v. School District No. 1 in the City and County of Denver · filed 1999-01-19

The claims against Defendants in their official capacities are tantamount to claims against the government entity itself and may not be defended on a qualified immunity basis.