42 U.S.C. § 1983

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from § 1983 liability if the right was not clearly established or a reasonable official would have thought the conduct constitutional.

Norse v. City of Santa Cruz · filed 2004-12-03

Moreover, government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Immunity attaches if the official allegedly violated a right that was not clearly established, or if a reasonable official would have thought the defendant’s actions were constitutional.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity from damages for public officials sued individually when their conduct does not violate a clearly established right.

Martin v. Curry · filed 2004-12-07

Under § 1983, “public officials sued in their individual capacity ‘ “are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ’ ” ... Thus, the appellees, in their individual capacities, are protected by qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff facing a qualified immunity defense must show a constitutional violation and that the law was clearly established when it occurred.

Tarlton v. City of Perkins · filed 2004-12-08

Plaintiff has the burden to establish both that the facts or allegations are sufficient to show a constitutional violation, and that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred such that a reasonable official would have been on notice that his actions violated the law.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s alleged facts would make the official’s conduct clearly unlawful.

Rodriguez-Rodriguez v. Ortiz-Velez · filed 2004-12-08

We are constrained to agree with the district court that Rodríguez' allegations preclude qualified immunity at the present time, although only barely so as to Medina.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 political affiliation claim against an official when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Beckmann v. Darden · filed 2004-12-08

Defendant Darden is therefore entitled to qualified immunity with respect to any political affiliation claims in this case.

Qualified immunity does not protect an official whose alleged conduct could not reasonably be believed lawful.

Rodríguez-Rodríguez v. Ortiz-Vélez · filed 2004-12-08

Here, if the mayor did without justification strike Rodriguez with a blackjack, as Rodríguez has claimed, no reasonable mayor could believe that this was lawful or entitled him to qualified immunity.

On a motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds, the court views the facts in the plaintiff’s favor.

Carter v. Fagin · filed 2004-12-09

On a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, the court is to view the facts most favorably to plaintiff.

A school official may be entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 First Amendment claim.

Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board · filed 2004-12-10

We hold that the only defendant left in the case, EAHS principal Conrad Braud, is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Adam’s First Amendment claim, and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from a § 1983 suit when the law at the time did not clearly establish that her conduct was unconstitutional.

Brosseau v. Haugen · filed 2004-12-13

If the law at that time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct would violate the Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on a public official when the constitutional right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the violation.

Wenzel v. Bankhead · filed 2004-12-14

Any award of back pay, however, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment (as against Mr. Schembri in his official capacity) and by the doctrine of qualified immunity (as against Mr. Bankhead in his individual capacity).

Qualified immunity can shield a correctional officer from personal liability under § 1983 for actions taken pursuant to discretionary authority.

Munera v. Metro West Detention Center · filed 2004-12-14

As to these claims it is clear that the defendant Correctional Officer, Cyril White, is entitled to qualified immunity which under appropriate circumstances serves to insulate governmental officials from personal liability for actions taken pursuant to their discretionary authority.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must allege a clearly established right and the defendant’s violation of it, but need not plead specific dates and times for each violation.

Jones v. Wildgen · filed 2004-12-14

To defeat qualified immunity, plaintiff must allege a clearly established right and allege that defendant violated it. The allegations, however, need not contain specific dates and times of each alleged infraction.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Orso v. Cobb · filed 2004-12-15

Accordingly, since no constitutional violation occurred, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity supports summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor raise no genuine issue that defendants violated a constitutional right.

Haynes v. Forbes · filed 2004-12-15

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants based on qualified immunity because the facts taken in the light most favorable to Haynes do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants violated his constitutional rights.

Officers sued under § 1983 for constitutional violations do not lose qualified immunity merely because their conduct violates a statutory or administrative provision.

Rosenberger v. Kootenai County Sheriff's Department · filed 2004-12-17

Likewise, Rosenberger’s argument that notice was provided via department standards is misplaced since officers sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity because their conduct violates a statutory or administrative provision.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the alleged race-based employment action violated a clearly established right.

Griffin v. New York · filed 2004-12-17

Griffin’s right to be free from these alleged adverse employment actions based on race was therefore clearly established, and the district court properly refused to grant qualified immunity at this time on defendants-appellants’ summary judgment motion.

Public officials exercising discretionary functions are immune from § 1983 liability when they act in good faith and do not violate clearly established law.

Hamilton v. Mengel · filed 1986-03-06

The other state defendants are also immune. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court held that public officials who exercise discretionary functions should not be held accountable in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they violated clearly established law. Such officials are thus cloked with an immunity when their actions are taken in good faith. An examination of the defendants’ actions and the laws under which they were operating convince us that defendants meet the good faith requirement for immunity.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the defendant did not violate a constitutional right.

Bartnof v. Messinger · filed 2004-12-20

Because Messinger did not violate a constitutional right, the district court properly concluded that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

Public officials have qualified immunity from personal-capacity § 1983 claims when their conduct violates no clearly established law.

Clevenger v. R.E. Gartner · filed 2004-12-27

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment insofar as it dismisses Clevenger’s § 1983 claims against all appellees (state employees) in their personal capacities, because appellees did not violate a clearly established law.

Section 1983 allows privately employed officers operating a state prison to invoke qualified immunity when they perform the same discretionary functions as state prison employees.

Citrano v. Allen Correctional Center · filed 1995-06-14

The mere fact that their contractual ties to the state are different does not provide a logical basis for denying these workers the benefit of qualified immunity. They are the functional equivalent of state prison employees, and as such, the same rationales underlying the grant of qualified immunity to state prison officials have equal application to them.

A juvenile probation officer who authorizes detention outside her discretionary authority is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

AM BY AND THROUGH LAW v. Grant · filed 1995-06-21

The court holds that Smith was acting outside her discretionary authority in authorizing detention without approval of the juvenile court. Therefore, she is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action turns on whether a reasonably competent public official would know the law governing the conduct.

Cynthia D. Foy, Administratrix of the Estate of Terry A. Foy, Deceased v. City of Berea James H. Hinners M. Schultz Robe · filed 1995-06-22

The test for whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is one of “objective reasonableness,” which requires “a reasonably competent public official [to] know the law governing his conduct.”

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for individual public officials when reasonable officials could differ on whether their conduct was lawful.

Hassan Ex Rel. Hassan v. Lubbock Independent School District · filed 1995-06-27

Thus, even if we find a violation of Hassan's constitutional rights, the individual defendants are immune from liability if reasonable public officials could differ on the lawfulness of their actions.

When qualified immunity is raised on summary judgment in a Section 1983 action, the court first determines whether the plaintiff has stated a Section 1983 claim before deciding whether immunity attaches.

Ward v. Dennis Dyke Fred Christians Robert J. Mayer Sherry Burt, Dan Bolden Donald Houseworth Robert Bro · filed 1995-06-29

When a claim for qualified immunity is raised within the context of a motion for summary judgment, we first examine whether the plaintiff has stated a § 1983 claim against the defendants before addressing whether qualified immunity should attach.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, no reasonable officer could believe the challenged detention or coercion was lawful.

Mulgannon v. Weller · filed 1995-07-05

Under Mulgannon's version, no reasonable officer could believe that under circumstances that do not support a conclusion that a crime had been committed or was about to be committed, he could coerce the destruction of a film or restrain a photographer. Qualified immunity is not, therefore, available as a defense to the conduct as described by the appellant.

Public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when reasonable officials in their positions would have recognized that their conduct was unlawful.

Lambert v. Richard · filed 1995-07-10

Because reasonable public officials in Richard's and Ream's positions would have recognized that Richard's conduct was unlawful, the district court did not err in granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment denying qualified immunity to the individual defendants.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action applies to damages claims against state officials sued in their individual capacities.

Saleem v. Snow · filed 1995-07-14

The trial court correctly held that Whitworth would be entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims for damages, but such immunity is limited. ... It applies only to suits in an individual capacity for damages.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim when evidence could show that officials fired public employees for protected union activity rather than poor performance.

Liberty County Officers Ass'n v. Stewart · filed 1995-07-20

Based on the summary judgment evidence presented, a reasonable jury could find that poor performance was merely a pretext for a termination grounded on plaintiffs’ pro-union activities and qualified immunity would, therefore, not protect the defendants from their actions associated with these terminations.

Section 1983 defendants lack qualified immunity when the evidence permits a finding that they knowingly exposed a prisoner to a substantial risk of serious harm despite measures taken to protect him.

Reece v. Groose · filed 1995-07-20

A factfinder viewing Davis’s record could reasonably conclude that Davis had a propensity for violence, that the defendants knew of this propensity because it was reflected by his prison record, and that exposing Reece to such a prisoner, even in administrative segregation, was unreasonable, in light of the pervasive risk to Reece. That is enough to defeat the qualified-immunity defense.

Police officers are immune from § 1983 liability when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe they had probable cause and their actions did not violate an established federal right.

Haussman v. Fergus · filed 1995-07-27

This Court finds that it was objectively reasonable for Richardson and Fergus to have believed both that probable cause existed and that their actions did not contravene an established federal right. Consequently, they are immune from liability under § 1983 on grounds of qualified immunity.

A defendant asserting qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim bears the burden of establishing that defense.

Karnes v. Skrutski & Kowalski · filed 1995-08-03

Defendants bear the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts show no violation of a constitutional right.

Christophel v. Kukulinsky · filed 1995-08-03

The legal question squarely presented by defendants' motion was whether the facts alleged by Christophel demonstrate that defendants violated her constitutional right to procedural due process, thus negating defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity from suit. The answer to this legal question is no.

In a § 1983 action, defendants bear the burden of establishing qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.

Karnes v. Thomas Skrutski, in His Individual Capacity Edward Kowalski, in His Individual Capacity · filed 1995-08-03

Defendants bear the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment for individual officials on a Section 1983 gender discrimination claim when the facts assumed for the motion support denying immunity.

Ratliff v. DeKalb County, GA · filed 1995-08-09

Given the facts which the district court assumed for the purpose of ruling on defendants' motions, we—addressing the matter of qualified immunity only—affirm the denial of summary judgment for the individual defendants on the gender discrimination claim.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions are objectively legally reasonable.

Abdullah Seifuddin Shabazz, A/K/A Douglas Maurice Rogers v. Maurice L. Van Benschoten Robert Brown, Jr., Sherry L. Burt · filed 1995-08-10

Upon review, we conclude that defendant was properly found to be entitled to qualified immunity based on the objective legal reasonableness of her actions.

Section 1983 affords no qualified immunity to officials when it would not be objectively reasonable to believe they could discharge a public employee for speaking on a matter of significant public concern.

Rao v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. · filed 1995-08-16

It would not have been objectively reasonable for the defendants to have believed that they could have discharged the plaintiff because he exercised his right to speak about a matter of significant public concern. That is precisely what the jury found the defendants to have done. There is no qualified immunity for that action.

In a § 1983 claim requiring proof of an official’s improper motive, an objectively reasonable official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff offers specific evidence of that motive.

The Gehl Group v. Koby · filed 1995-08-16

If Defendants carry their burden of showing objective reasonableness, the burden then shifts to Plaintiffs to establish that Defendants acted on the basis of a culpable subjective state of mind. Once the defendant has shown his or her objective reasonableness, the plaintiff's burden to establish subjective motivating animus becomes heightened, requiring specific and concrete evidence rather than mere speculation.

In a § 1983 suit, reliance on counsel is a factor in deciding whether a public official has qualified immunity.

Kincade v. City of Blue Springs · filed 1995-08-25

Reliance on the advice of counsel is a factor to be weighed in assessing whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants lose qualified immunity only when every reasonable official in their position would know the challenged conduct violates federal law.

Adams Ex Rel. Adams v. Poag · filed 1995-08-28

A government actor can be stripped of qualified immunity only when all reasonable government actors in the defendant's place would know that the challenged discretionary conduct violates federal law.

Qualified immunity shields public officials from § 1983 liability when the claimed extension of liability lacks support in controlling precedent.

Uhlrig v. Harder · filed 1995-08-30

Second, to the extent that Plaintiff is asking us to extend the scope of Sec. 1983 liability, we still would not assign Sec. 1983 liability to Defendants because such an extension is not directly supported by any controlling precedent (and indeed, is undercut by Medina ). ... Thus, we also affirm the district court's judgment that Defendants are protected from liability by their shield of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants who are public officials have qualified immunity when they reasonably could have believed their conduct was lawful.

Melek v. Erick Kohler Elsie Holtz · filed 1995-09-01

In other words, because the defendants reasonably could have believed that it was lawful to issue citations for housing conditions that violated the Ontario Municipal Code, they were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when officers of reasonable competence could disagree about the legality of their actions.

Lennon v. Chief William P. Miller, the City of Troy, Patrolman Donald J. Backaus, and Patrolman Peter Gordon · filed 1995-09-12

The objective reasonableness test is met — and the defendant is entitled to immunity — if “officers of reasonable competence could disagree” on the legality of the defendant’s actions.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not anticipate a qualified immunity defense in the complaint.

Lugo v. Hsing Auth City · filed 1995-09-19

Under Schultea, plaintiffs need no longer anticipate a qualified immunity defense in the complaint.

Section 1983 defendants must plead and adequately develop a qualified immunity defense during pretrial proceedings or risk waiving it.

Blissett v. Coughlin · filed 1995-09-25

However, because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, it is incumbent upon the defendant to plead, and adequately develop, a qualified immunity defense during pretrial proceedings so that the trial court can determine which claims, if any, may be disposed of by summary judgment, or, at least, which facts material to the qualified immunity defense must be presented to the jury to determine its applicability once the case has gone to trial. ... We find no error in the district court’s ruling that the qualified immunity defense had been waived.

A defendant in a § 1983 action bears the burden of pleading and proving qualified immunity and may waive the defense by failing to develop it before trial.

Blissett v. Coughlin, III · filed 1995-09-25

The defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. ... We find no error in the district court's ruling that the qualified immunity defense had been waived.

Officers may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they reasonably believe they obtained consent to enter a home.

Flud v. Rawlingson · filed 1995-10-03

In granting summary judgment, the district court found that the entry into Flud's home was consensual; that the arrest was supported by probable cause; and that the officers were protected by qualified immunity based on their reasonable belief that they had obtained consent to enter. The district court's memorandum opinion reveals a careful, well-reasoned analysis of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Section 1983 defendants cannot obtain qualified immunity from a public employee speech claim by merely asserting workplace disruption without specific supporting evidence.

Kincade v. City Of Blue Springs, Missouri · filed 1995-10-12

As noted above, the Appellants have merely asserted that Kincade's speech adversely affected the efficiency of the City's operations and substantially disrupted the work environment without presenting any specific evidence to support this assertion. They therefore have not put the Pickering balancing test at issue, and accordingly, we reject their claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity because free speech questions for public employees, as a matter of law, cannot be "clearly established."

In a § 1983 qualified immunity inquiry, an official’s intent remains relevant when discriminatory intent is an element of the constitutional tort.

Ratliff v. Dekalb County · filed 1995-10-17

We are bound by our earlier holding that, in qualified immunity cases, intent is a relevant inquiry if discriminatory intent is a specific element of the constitutional tort; and, we follow that rule here.

An officer sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer with the same information could believe the officer’s conduct was lawful.

McGory v. Metcalf · filed 1995-11-03

A police officer should prevail on an assertion of qualified immunity if a reasonable officer possessing the same information could have believed that his conduct was lawful.

Qualified immunity may be rejected as a matter of law in a § 1983 action against officers.

Parker v. Clarke · filed 1995-11-06

To the extent defendants seek clarification of the Court's October 31 order, the Court now makes explicit what was clear but implicit in the Court's rationale and rulings: the Court deliberately but impliedly rejected the qualified immunity defense asserted by defendants Boyer, Dell and Risk when it denied in part their motion for summary judgment and granted in part plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim bears the burden of defeating a defendant’s qualified immunity defense.

Al-Ra'id v. Ingle · filed 1995-11-06

Al-Ra’id, however, has not carried his burden of defeating defendants’ qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim survives trial and can be raised on appeal from the judgment even if a stay of trial was denied.

Chan v. Wodnicki · filed 1995-11-15

The trial has not made his claim of immunity moot, for while the immunity is from trial as well as from judgment, by the same token it is from judgment as well as from trial.

Police officers receive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim arising from a vehicular stop and frisk supported by reasonable suspicion.

Taft v. Vines · filed 1995-11-16

Because those cases logically suggest that qualified immunity should similarly be afforded to police officers who make vehicular stops, so long as those stops are supported by reasonable suspicion, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Appellees on the § 1983 claims arising from their initial decision to execute the vehicular stop; because the stop and frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion, qualified immunity was properly afforded to the Appellees.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant who knew or should have known that firing an employee for protected speech violated the employee’s rights.

Sagendorf-Teal v. County of Rensselaer · filed 1995-11-22

Defendant knew, or should have known, of the existence of the employee’s right to speak freely, and a reasonable person knowing of that right would believe termination based upon such speech to be in violation of that right. The defendant is not entitled to a dismissal based upon qualified immunity.

A defendant may be entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim even when his conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Wallace v. Benware · filed 1995-11-27

For the reasons that follow, we find that Benware violated Wallace’s rights under the First Amendment but that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims brought by voluntarily admitted state mental-hospital patients are subject to a qualified-immunity defense.

Kennedy v. Schafer · filed 1995-12-04

We do decide that an action for damages brought by a voluntary patient is subject to a qualified-immunity defense.

A state official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when prior case law did not clearly establish liability under analogous facts.

Elnora Camp, as Administrator of the Estate of Anthony Young, Deceased v. Gregory · filed 1995-12-04

However, we do conclude that Gregory is entitled to qualified immunity, as prior easelaw did not make clear that a state official could be liable under facts analogous to those alleged here.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 patronage dismissal claim requires assessing whether employees in the particular positions were clearly protected at the time, considering the positions’ inherent duties and the duties the official reasonably planned for them.

Judy Baker Mary Allison and Bonnie Johnson v. Pat Hadley, Columbiana County Auditor · filed 1995-12-05

We hold that the district court erred by failing to consider the duties inherent in plaintiffs' particular positions and Hadley's plans for the employees holding such positions in determining whether the law was clearly established that plaintiffs' positions were protected from patronage dismissal at the time that Hadley discharged plaintiffs, and we shall remand these questions to the district court for further consideration.

Section 1983 claims against state officials in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity when no authority clearly establishes that their alleged conduct violated a constitutional right.

D.R. Ex Rel. Robinson v. Phyfer · filed 1995-12-06

In summary, Plaintiff cites no authority to this court, nor can the court find any authority, clearly establishing that conditions of confinement at the Mt. Meigs campus violated Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment right to be protected from violence at the hands of other inmates. Therefore, defendants Phyfer and Kent are entitled to qualified immunity, and the court will dismiss the § 1983 claims against them in their individual capacities.

A judge is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable jurist in the same position would not have known the conduct violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

Shirley Ann Lehman Gold Ribbon Limited Partnership v. Wayne F. Wilke, Judge of the Probate Division of Common Pleas for · filed 1995-12-06

The district court granted summary judgment to Judge Wilke on qualified immunity grounds, determining that a reasonable jurist in Judge Wilke's position would not have known he was violating the appellants' constitutional rights given the "factual morass" regarding title to the real property in the Family Trust. ... We agree and find the district court was correct and AFFIRM, based upon the opinion of the district court.

Section 1983 qualified immunity is assessed by the objective legality of an official’s conduct, without regard to the official’s subjective motives.

Wohl v. City of Hollywood · filed 1995-12-13

Ward’s motives are irrelevant because “[t]he subjective intent of government actor defendants plays no part in qualified immunity analysis.”

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action cannot be resolved on summary judgment when a jury could find that the defendant officials performed plainly incompetently.

Rodriguez v. City of New York · filed 1995-12-19

Thus, though the defendant doctors may be entitled to qualified immunity if their performance was not plainly incompetent, their entitlement to that immunity could not properly be decided on summary judgment.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action shields only officials sued individually from damages; it does not shield governmental entities or bar equitable relief.

Rodriguez v. City of New York · filed 1995-12-19

Second, the defense of qualified immunity protects only individual defendants sued in their individual capacity, not governmental entities, see generally Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 361, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), and it protects only against claims for damages, not against claims for equitable relief, see, e.g., Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1995); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir.1988).

Qualified immunity defeats a § 1983 claim when it was objectively reasonable for officials to believe their conduct did not violate federally protected rights.

Zientek v. State · filed 1995-12-22

Furthermore, defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s cause of action based on 42 USC § 1983 on an additional ground. Such a cause of action fails where it was "objectively reasonable for defendants to believe that they were acting in a manner that did not violate plaintiff’s Federally protected rights” (Higgins v City of Oneonta, 208 AD2d 1067, 1070, lv denied 85 NY2d 803; see generally, Van Emrik v Chemung County Dept. of Social Servs., 191 AD2d 143, 147).

In a § 1983 action alleging unconstitutional motive, a plaintiff facing a qualified immunity summary judgment motion must offer particularized direct or circumstantial evidence of improper motive when the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Blue v. Koren · filed 1995-12-26

Accordingly, whether the description heightened is accurate or not, we hold: upon a motion for summary judgment asserting a qualified immunity defense in an action in which an official’s conduct is objectively reasonable but an unconstitutional subjective intent is alleged, the plaintiff must proffer particularized evidence of direct or circumstantial facts, as suggested in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236, 111 S.Ct. at 1795, supporting the claim of an improper motive in order to avoid summary judgment.

Section 1983 defendants receive qualified immunity for prehearing confinement when it was objectively reasonable to believe their actions were lawful in light of existing case law.

Lakram v. Coughlin · filed 1995-12-27

Lakram was given notice of the charges against him and confined for seven days. In light of the caselaw, it was objectively reasonable for appellees to believe that their actions were permissible. They are thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields a state judge from § 1983 damages for firing a judicial research attorney over union organizing when existing law gave the judge a reasonable basis to believe the firing was permissible.

Gregorich v. Lund · filed 1995-06-26

We hold only that, at the time he acted, Justice Lund had a reasonable basis for his conclusion and therefore could invoke the protection of qualified immunity.

A plaintiff alleging that an officer obtained a search warrant through judicial deception can overcome summary judgment on qualified immunity by substantially showing a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth; the plaintiff need not also show subjective intent to deceive the issuing court.

Robert LOMBARDI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF EL CAJON; Steven Shakowski; Does 1 Through 30, Inclusive, Defendants-Ap · filed 1997-06-30

Subjective intent to deceive or mislead the court is not an element that Lombardi must show in addition to a substantial showing of deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth in order to survive summary judgment on qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 substantive due process claim when the record fails to establish a violation of the plaintiff’s right.

Latta v. Keryte · filed 1997-07-01

As we discussed above, however, the record indicates that Officer Keryte’s actions were objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. We therefore conclude that the magistrate did not err in concluding that Officer Keryte was entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Latta’s substantive due process claim.

Officials sued under § 1983 for unlawful arrest are entitled to qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe probable cause supported the arrest warrants.

Fouquet v. Canulette · filed 1997-07-03

Considering all the information available to the detectives, including information omitted from the affidavit, it was objectively reasonable for them to believe probable cause existed to obtain and execute the warrants. The undisputed facts, especially Jane Doe II’s corroboration of Jane Doe I’s account, would, at the very least, cause reasonable police officers to differ as to the existence of probable cause. The district court was correct in its determination that appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for shooting and killing a dog when preexisting law made clear that the act was a Fourth Amendment seizure.

James Fuller, Sr., James Fuller, Jr. v. Vines, Officer Peixoto, Officer Ernest Clements City of Richmond · filed 1997-07-07

In 1991 it was apparent in light of preexisting law that shooting and killing a dog constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The district court thus erred in entering summary judgment for the officers.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer with the facts known to the defendant would not have known the conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Compton v. City of Cedar Rapids · filed 1997-07-09

Based on the facts known to Feldmann, we conclude a reasonable officer in his position would not have known he was violating Compton's rights.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer with the facts known to that officer would not have known the conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Compton v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa Steven J. Feldmann · filed 1997-07-09

Based on the facts known to Feldmann, we conclude a reasonable officer in his position would not have known he was violating Compton's rights.

Officers claiming qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force suit must establish that their actions were objectively reasonable.

City of Harlingen v. Vega · filed 1997-07-10

We conclude that Flores and Manning have not established that their actions were objectively reasonable. Accordingly, we hold that Flores and Manning have not proved that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect a parole officer from a Section 1983 claim for knowingly including false information in a report finding probable cause to revoke parole.

Mecham v. Taylor · filed 1997-07-08

If McCiver knowingly included false information in his report finding probable cause to revoke Mecham's parole, he would not be protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can bar an individual-capacity § 1983 claim arising from politically motivated dismissals.

Gordon v. Cochran · filed 1997-07-14

Insofar as Cochran was sued in his individual capacity, we affirm the grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. See Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1092-93 (11th Cir.1996)(discussing differing interpretations by circuit courts of the permissibility of patronage dismissals under Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980)).

Section 1983 shields a state official exercising discretionary authority from personal damages liability unless all reasonable officials would have recognized that the challenged conduct violated the federal law underlying the claim.

Pierce v. Smith · filed 1997-07-15

A state official exercising discretionary authority whose conduct deprives another of a right secured by federal constitutional or statutory law is nonetheless shielded from personal liability for damages under section 1983 by the doctrine of qualified immunity, unless at the time and under the circumstances of the challenged conduct all reasonable officials would have realized that it was proscribed by the federal law on which the suit is founded.

A peace officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when a material fact issue remains as to whether his actions were reasonable.

Wallace v. Moberly · filed 1997-07-17

Accordingly, we hold that Wallace did not establish as a matter of law that he was acting reasonably. We hold the trial court did not err in denying Wallace’s motion for summary judgment because there is an issue of material fact on a necessary element of Wallace’s affirmative defense of qualified immunity to Moberly’s federal claims.

A state police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for a stop, arrest, and search when his conduct is objectively reasonable.

Conrod v. Davis · filed 1997-07-17

Davis’s actions were reasonable and he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity for the stop, arrest, and search of Appellee Conrad.

Section 1983 shields a police officer from damages through qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable to believe the officer’s use of force was lawful or reasonable officers could disagree about its legality.

Weyel v. Catania, No. Cv94 0361996s (Jul. 17, 1997) · filed 1997-07-17

Qualified immunity would protect him from damages if he established that when he pushed the plaintiff, it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his action was permissible and not an excessive use of force or that officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to the permissible nature of his action.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit turns on whether an officer could reasonably believe that the conduct was lawful.

Joe v. City of Tucson Officer Conto Officer Pryor Officer Kirk Officer Valenzuela Tucson Police Department · filed 1997-07-17

By contrast, the question at issue for qualified immunity is whether an officer could reasonably believe that his conduct is lawful.

In a § 1983 action, genuine disputes of material fact can preclude summary judgment for officers asserting qualified immunity.

Liston v. County of Riverside · filed 1997-07-21

A number of individual defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. ... Because we conclude that genuine issues of material fact preclude an award of summary judgment to most of the defendant officers, we reverse as to them, affirm as to the others, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

Qualified immunity shields a public official from liability under § 1983 for a discretionary decision such as a prison hearing officer’s refusal to review evidence.

Parzyck v. Dubois · filed 1997-07-21

As the hearing officer was performing a discretionary function when he refused to view the videotape, he is protected from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 for an unannounced entry have qualified immunity only if they could reasonably believe an urgent need justified that entry.

Kornegay v. Cottingham · filed 1997-07-23

Therefore, the officers are shielded by qualified immunity only if they "could reasonably have decided that an urgent need existed for such an entry into the premises."

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when a reasonable officer could have believed their conduct was lawful.

Romero v. City of Douglas, Az. · filed 1997-07-24

Law-enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they engage in a course of conduct that a reasonable officer could have believed was lawful.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim when the challenged injury resulted only from negligence rather than an intentional means of seizure.

Evans v. Hightower · filed 1997-07-25

This record shows only that Mathis was negligent and is devoid of any evidence that Mathis intended that Hightower's car strike Evans. Therefore, Mathis is entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials may be entitled to qualified immunity from damages in a § 1983 claim.

Croslan v. HOUSING AUTHOR. FOR CITY OF NEW BRITAIN · filed 1997-07-31

It is unnecessary, for purposes of this motion, to determine whether plaintiff, as a legal matter, was an at-will employee, as defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim may be raised in a motion to dismiss.

Jenkins v. Medford · filed 1997-08-07

The district court was incorrect. Qualified immunity may be raised in a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 defendants do not automatically receive qualified immunity from racial discrimination or retaliation claims merely because their conduct appears objectively reasonable apart from motive.

Tang v. State of Rhode Island · filed 1997-08-11

We think that the Harlow-Anderson objective test does not automatically resolve a qualified immunity defense in favor of the defendant in a case of alleged racial discrimination or retaliation.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity for carrying out a superior officer’s facially valid order even if their own acts are ministerial, when the superior officer is protected by qualified immunity.

Varrone v. Bilotti · filed 1997-08-18

We need not here decide whether the distinction continues to have validity because we conclude that even if these two subordinate officers performed solely a ministerial function in conducting the strip search, they still have qualified immunity for carrying out the order, not facially invalid, issued by a superi- or officer who is protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts prevent deciding whether defendants’ conduct was objectively reasonable.

Riedinger v. D'AMICANTINO · filed 1997-08-19

Whether defendants’ conduct was objectively reasonable cannot be determined at this phase of the litigation. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs constructive discharge claim on the ground of qualified immunity is denied.

An entity that functions like a local government body has no immunity from § 1983 damages actions, even when local officials act collectively through it.

Alston v. Virginia High School League, INC. · filed 1997-08-19

Like these groups, where local government officials act collectively for the public good of providing government services, VHSL derives no immunity from § 1983 actions.

Qualified immunity does not warrant a directed verdict on a § 1983 claim when a disputed fact could establish that no reasonable officer would have believed a warrantless home entry lawful.

Van Sandt v. Brown · filed 1997-08-22

If Sgt. Brown was aware that the trailer door was opened by another officer, then he did not have sufficient information linking the escapees to the trailer to support a reasonable belief that the warrantless entry was lawful. Therefore, we hold that the superior court erred in granting Brown’s motion for a directed verdict based on qualified immunity. Rather, the determination of whether Eaton told Brown that he had caused the door to open was a disputed material fact that should have been left to the jury.

Section 1983 defendants lack qualified immunity when no reasonable prison official could believe that barring a paid subscription without a reasonable connection to a legitimate, neutral prison policy was constitutional.

Miniken v. Walter · filed 1997-08-26

Therefore, no reasonable prison official could have believed that an absolute prohibition of a paid-for subscription, without any reasonable connection to a legitimate, neutral prison policy, did not violate a prisoner’s First Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 political discrimination suit turns on whether officials could objectively and reasonably believe that party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the position.

Berrios-Cintron v. Cordero · filed 1997-08-27

The question is not whether defendants were in fact correct in believing party affiliation to be an appropriate requirement for plaintiffs position, but whether viewed objectively, they acted reasonably in so believing.

In a § 1983 arrest claim, qualified immunity is assessed using the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest.

Justman v. Imperial County Sheriff-Coroner's Office Sergeant John Lemon · filed 1997-09-04

The qualified immunity inquiry is focused on the "facts and circumstances actually known to the officer" at the time of arrest. ... Accordingly, the district court properly found that an officer in Lemon's position could reasonably believe that Justman had willfully inflicted an injury upon his wife.

Officers facing a § 1983 false arrest claim have qualified immunity when reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed.

Donohue v. Baker · filed 1997-09-05

Alternatively, and at a minimum, reasonable officers could have disagreed as to the existence of probable cause in this instance and defendants are thus entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the charge of false arrest.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages claims against officials in their individual capacities but does not bar claims for equitable relief against them in their official capacities.

Miller v. City of Nederland by and Through Wimer · filed 1997-09-08

Because Hamilton and Smith are entitled to qualified immunity, Miller may not proceed with his federal damages claims against them. Nevertheless, qualified immunity does not bar Miller’s claims for equitable relief against Hamilton and Smith in their official capacities.

Qualified immunity does not apply to a § 1983 claim seeking only injunctive relief.

Anderson v. Ramon Davila Kenneth Mapp Robert Soto Elton Lewis Government of the Virgin Islands, D/B/A Virgin Islan · filed 1997-09-10

At oral argument and throughout its briefs, the Government argued that its officers' motives were irrelevant under the doctrine of qualified immunity. We think the Government misstates this doctrine. First, because Anderson seeks only injunctive relief at this stage, the doctrine is inapplicable.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for government officials sued individually, but not for municipalities or officials sued in their official capacities.

LaSota v. Town of Topsfield · filed 1997-09-15

Government officials are generally shielded from liability as individuals by qualified immunity. But an individual acting in his official capacity and the municipality are not protected by qualified immunity.

A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity for carrying out an order when it was objectively reasonable to believe the action did not violate constitutional rights.

Heidorf v. Town of Northumberland · filed 1997-09-17

Based upon these facts, the Court concludes that it was objectively reasonable for Corlew to believe that, in carrying out the order to demolish the Church, he was not violating plaintiffs constitutional rights. Therefore, Corlew is entitled to qualified immunity, and the § 1983 claim against him accordingly is dismissed.

A foster care caseworker is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim if a jury finds deliberate indifference to foster children’s welfare.

MIRACLE BY MIRACLE v. Spooner · filed 1997-09-26

In this case, the Court finds that Defendant Spooner is not entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs' substantive due process claims against her. It has been clearly established since at least 1987, when the Eleventh Circuit decided Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.1987), that deliberate indifference to the welfare of a foster child is a violation of federal law actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the defense of qualified immunity does not apply if the jury finds that Defendant Spooner was guilty of deliberate indifference to the welfare of the Miracle children in their assigned foster home.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for a stop if a reasonable officer could have believed the stop was lawful.

Schneider v. City of San Clemente San Clemente Police Department John Doe D'auria, Officer John Kirby, Officer · filed 1997-09-26

Even assuming that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have believed that the actions in stopping Schneider's car were lawful.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity from individual-capacity damages claims for an official exercising discretion in reviewing whether proposed lawsuits meet filing prerequisites.

Hicks v. Brysch · filed 1997-09-29

The review of proposed civil lawsuits to ascertain whether those submissions comply with the prerequisites contained in Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code necessarily requires the exercise of discretion on the part of the reviewing official. Thus, the defendant is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity with regard to the plaintiffs claims for monetary damages against the defendant in her individual capacity.

Section 1983 damages claims against prison officials are barred by qualified immunity when no reasonable jury could find their conduct objectively unreasonable.

Breazil v. Bartlett · filed 1997-09-29

In this case, as the above discussion demonstrates, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the issuance and approval of the cell shield and restrictive diet orders by defendants Bartlett and Burge as a response to plaintiffs conduct on June 27, 1995 was objectively unreasonable. Those defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment dismissing the claims for damages against them on the ground of qualified immunity.

A state police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for objectively reasonable conduct during a stop, arrest, and search.

Ernest Conrod, Jr. v. Davis · filed 1997-10-03

Davis’s actions were reasonable and he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity for the stop, arrest, and search of Appellee Conrad.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment for officers sued under § 1983 when genuine disputes of material fact preclude an award of immunity.

LISTON v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE · filed 1997-10-09

The Listons brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens, 1 and state law, alleging constitutional deprivations resulting from the conduct of the officers in obtaining and executing the search warrant. A number of individual defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The district court first granted summary judgment as to all moving officers, excluding Federal Task Force Officer David Pike, and subsequently granted summary judgment in Pike's favor as well. The Listons appeal from both of the orders. Because we conclude that genuine issues of material fact preclude an award of summary judgment to most of the defendant officers, we reverse as to them, affirm as to the others, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

Qualified immunity protects a prison hearing officer from personal liability under § 1983 for refusing requested witnesses when the inmate gave no explanation of their relevance and offered no defense their testimony might support.

Walker v. Robert McClellan Superintendent, Thomas A. Coughlin, Iii, L. Bates, Hearing Officer · filed 1997-10-09

Given Walker’s refusal to explain the relevance of the requested witnesses’ testimony, coupled with the absence of any defense offered for which the testimony of the witnesses might have provided confirmation, we cannot say that the hearing officer’s refusal to allow Walker to call witnesses violated a clearly established principle of constitutional law. Qualified immunity was therefore appropriate.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for outside lawyers and their firm when they act as a city’s agents.

Cullinan v. Abramson · filed 1997-10-16

The rationales for qualified immunity apply to these lawyers and their firm in about the same way they apply to defendant Heavrin, Louisville’s sometime law director. We see no good reason to hold the city’s in-house counsel eligible for qualified immunity and not the city’s outside counsel.

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed for the arrest.

Taylor v. Paladines · filed 1997-10-28

Was Detective Paladines presented with a situation in which no reasonable officer could have believed that he had probable cause to arrest Taylor? The Court holds that Detective Paladines is entitled to summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity because a reasonable police officer could have concluded that probable cause existed to arrest Taylor.

A local government sued under § 1983 has no immunity even if its employee is entitled to qualified immunity.

Bexar County v. Giroux-Daniel · filed 1997-10-29

Unlike local governments sued under the Tort Claims Act, a local government sued under § 1983 has no immunity even if its employee is entitled to qualified immunity.

A caseworker retains qualified immunity from § 1983 liability when her failure to tell foster parents about a child’s masturbation was not objectively unreasonable.

Sherin v. Department of Human Resources · filed 1997-11-04

In this factual setting, it cannot be said that Reid’s failure to tell the Sherins about the masturbation was objectively unreasonable so as to deprive her of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect officers who make an arrest based on an unreasonable interpretation of a criminal statute merely because no court has previously rejected that interpretation.

Northen v. City of Chicago · filed 1997-11-04

In short, when a proposed statutory interpretation is arguable, the plaintiff cannot rebut the defense of immunity without showing that the argument has been authoritatively resolved, but when the proposed interpretation is cockeyed, no such showing is required.

Section 1983 does not impose individual money damages on officials protected by qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful.

Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale · filed 1997-11-05

Even assuming that the defendants acted with some discriminatory or retaliatory motives in demoting and discharging Johnson, the law did not clearly establish that a reasonable official faced with the same evidence of disobedience and deception should not have disciplined Johnson in the same manner. We therefore reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment on Johnson's § 1981 and § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for an officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Kubik v. New York State Department of Social Services · filed 1997-11-06

Martin acted in an objectively reasonable manner in these circumstances and no rational jury could conclude otherwise. Consequently, defendants were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity (see, Van Emrik v Chemung County Dept, of Social Servs., 911 F2d 863, 866).

Qualified immunity shields a defendant in a Section 1983 search-warrant claim when a reasonably well-trained officer in the defendant’s position would have believed the affidavit established probable cause.

Williams v. City of Calexico · filed 1997-11-06

Upon our review of the record, we conclude that a reasonably well-trained officer in Donelly's position would have believed that the facts set forth in the affidavit established probable cause for the search warrant. Accordingly, the district court did not err by concluding that defendant Donnelly was entitled to qualified immunity on Williams's Fourth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity bars compensatory relief under § 1983 but does not bar a claim for injunctive relief.

Shepherd v. Ault · filed 1997-11-12

Furthermore, because qualified immunity stands as a bar only to compensatory relief, even if the magistrate judge finds, and this court upholds, qualified immunity, the inmates’ claim for injunctive relief would still be triable.

An officer may invoke qualified immunity against a Section 1983 excessive force claim arising from an arrest.

Robinson v. Brown · filed 1997-11-13

The Court concludes that Deputy Brown is entitled to qualified immunity and, in any event, Robinson did not prove that Deputy Brown used excessive force against him during his arrest.

Public officials may be denied qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action alleging retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment.

Chappel v. Montgomery County Fire Protection District No. 1 · filed 1997-11-14

Robert Chappel filed a complaint alleging, in part, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the defendants violated the First Amendment by taking various retaliatory actions against him after he criticized the defendants for mismanagement, corruption, and unethical behavior. The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment on the merits or, in the alternative, on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court denied the defendants' motion, and the defendants filed the present interlocutory appeal seeking reversal of the district court's judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. We now affirm the denial of qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, the detained arrestee posed no immediate safety threat and the officer’s force was objectively unreasonable.

Pannell v. Miller · filed 1997-11-19

We conclude the district court correctly rejected Miller’s defense of qualified immunity because under Pannell’s version of the facts, she was arrested for a minor offense, posed no immediate safety threat to Miller, and was already detained at the police station. Thus, it was objectively unreasonable for Miller to hit her in the face with enough force to cause injury.

Public officials are immune from damages under § 1983 when their challenged actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Gomez v. Pellicone · filed 1997-11-20

The actions of the individual defendants were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. They are, therefore, immune from liability for damages in an action filed pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 affords a police officer qualified immunity for an arrest if the officer reasonably believes probable cause exists.

Singletary v. Gates · filed 1997-11-20

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he reasonably believes there is probable cause to make an arrest.

Section 1983 allows qualified immunity for officers who reasonably believed that exigent danger justified entering a home without first knocking and announcing.

Tracas v. Denney · filed 1997-11-24

The district court determined that an officer in the same position as the Arizona SWAT team officers could have reasonably believed that compliance with the formal knock-notice requirements would have placed his life in danger, and that exigent circumstances existed warranting a forced, no-refusal entry. The district court's conclusion was consistent with this Court's decisions on similar facts. See U.S. v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir.1991); McConney, 728 F.2d at 1206; McShane, 462 F.2d at 6. The district court properly granted the police officers qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim as a matter of law.

Section 1983 affords qualified immunity to a child protective worker who reasonably believes emergency circumstances justify removing children, even if the removal does not comply with state law.

Spencer v. Lavoie · filed 1997-12-01

Thus, if it was objectively reasonable for Lavoie or Kimieeik to believe that emergency circumstances were present, they will be entitled to summary judgment based upon qualified immunity regardless of whether their actions comported with state law.

Qualified immunity can entitle defendants in a § 1983 action to dismissal as a matter of law.

Hernandez v. Michaud · filed 1997-12-02

The record also indicates that some of the Defendants were entitled to dismissal as a matter of law, based upon their right to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim when the undisputed facts establish probable cause for the arrest.

Vermette v. Ludwig · filed 1997-12-10

The record in this case conclusively established that the defendant officers had probable cause to arrest Ludwig. Therefore, they were entitled to summary judgment in their favor on their claim to qualified immunity from Ludwig's suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 individual-capacity claims are barred by qualified immunity when the officials’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of established law.

Riggs v. City of Pearland · filed 1997-12-17

However, after reviewing the facts alleged by Plaintiffs themselves, the Court finds as a matter of law that the actions of the Defendants were objectively reasonable in light of established law, and are therefore shielded by the qualified immunity defense.

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 arrest claim if the officer reasonably believed there was probable cause to arrest.

Cantrell v. Paul Terry Stephen D. Finlayson City of Burns, a Political Subdivision of the State of Oregon · filed 1998-02-20

A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he reasonably believes there is probable cause to make an arrest.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was too ill-defined to put them on notice that their conduct was unlawful.

Strain v. Kaufman County District Attorney's Office · filed 1998-02-23

The Court concludes, that at the time of Defendants’ conduct, the right to family integrity was ill-defined such that these state actors were not on notice that their conduct unlawfully violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. On this basis alone, the State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 action cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material facts about each defendant’s role and supervisory responsibility remain disputed.

Davis v. Rennie · filed 1998-02-25

Plaintiffs motion that none of the defendants is qualifiedly immune is denied, as is the motion filed by certain of the defendants seeking a declaration of their entitlement to qualified immunity. Issues of fact exist which make it impossible to establish upon documentary evidence alone just what the role of each defendant who was present at the beating may have been or what the extent of the knowledge and responsibility of the supervisory employees was with relation to the assault on Davis.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when existing law does not clearly establish a student's constitutional right to protection from attacks by private parties during the school day.

Brum v. Town of Dartmouth · filed 1998-02-25

His dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was also proper under applicable Federal precedent, because ... (d) the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability in light of the existing state of the law as it applied to school situations, since it did not clearly establish a student’ s constitutional right to be free from attack by private parties during the school day.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Weiler v. James Purkett Leah Embly · filed 1998-03-02

Normally, a determination that the plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of a constitutional right ends the qualified immunity inquiry.

Qualified immunity will not be considered in a § 1983 action when defendants neither plead it as an affirmative defense nor assert it in their motions or submissions.

Schwenk v. Kavanaugh · filed 1998-03-05

However, defendants did not allege qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, nor have they asserted qualified immunity in motions or submissions. Therefore, it will not be considered.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim may require trial when disputed facts prevent determining whether an officer could reasonably have believed the conduct was constitutional.

Stoneking v. Jeffrey Simpson, 211 and Stuart Persky, 209 · filed 1998-03-05

A trial was necessary to determine whether a reasonable officer could have believed that Officer Simpson's and Officer Persky's conduct was constitutional in view of the information before them and whether they are entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 claim seeking injunctive relief against school officials can survive dismissal without an allegation of bad faith.

Rodriguez v. Board of Education · filed 1980-05-02

In any event, even absent an allegation of bad faith, Dr. Rodriguez’s prayer for injunctive relief was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

In a § 1983 action, the defendant must plead qualified immunity as a defense; the plaintiff need not allege bad faith.

Gomez v. Toledo · filed 1980-05-27

Since qualified immunity is a defense, the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant.

Qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 cannot be resolved on summary judgment when defendants’ knowledge and intentions present factual questions.

Brown v. Hilton · filed 1980-06-10

Defendants submit that summary judgment should be granted in their favor on the basis of their qualified immunity from liability in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). The defendants’ knowledge and intentions, however, are questions of fact. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is denied.

Municipal officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity.

Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook · filed 1980-06-17

The municipal officials, of course, are entitled to a qualified immunity which is not enjoyed by the municipality itself.

A state fire marshal performing official duties may assert qualified immunity against a § 1983 damages claim when the plaintiff fails to show a lack of good faith.

Lamartiniere v. Wilkerson · filed 1980-06-18

The court concludes that plaintiff has not demonstrated the requisite motivation on the part of defendant which would overcome defendant’s good faith — qualified immunity defense.

Officers defending a Section 1983 claim may receive qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in their circumstances could have believed the conduct lawful.

Rueckert v. City of Flint · filed 1998-03-06

The test for qualified immunity, thus, is one of “objective reasonableness” — whether an officer acting under the circumstances at issue reasonably could have believed that his action would not violate the constitutional rights asserted.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields officials from money damages, but does not bar suits for injunctive or declaratory relief.

Davis v. Lensing · filed 1998-03-11

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from money damages, not suits for injunctive or declaratory relief.

Section 1983 defendants may invoke qualified immunity for acts within their discretionary authority even when those acts violate the Constitution.

Dupree v. THOMAS COUNTY, GEORGIA · filed 1998-03-17

Qualified immunity provides that when a person is acting within his discretionary authority and he commits a constitutional violation, he may be immune from suit. The committing of a violation does not remove that person from his discretionary authority.

Qualified immunity cannot resolve a Section 1983 claim at summary judgment when genuine factual issues remain over whether officials knowingly violated the plaintiffs' rights.

Catanzaro v. Weiden · filed 1998-03-17

Because there are genuine issues as to whether Mayor DeStephano and Commissioner Fusco knowingly violated the plaintiffs rights, qualified immunity at this point is precluded.

Section 1983 defendants are protected by qualified immunity when they have not deprived a plaintiff of a clearly established constitutional right of which reasonable officials should have been aware.

Africa v. Horn · filed 1998-03-19

It follows that defendants did not deprive plaintiff of a clearly 'established constitutional right of which reasonable prison officials should have been aware in light of existing law and factual information available to them.

Qualified immunity shields a prison official from a § 1983 claim if the official did not violate a rule clearly established when the conduct occurred. Under the rule applicable to this cell assignment, liability required knowledge of a specific risk to the plaintiff.

Wilson v. Wright · filed 1998-03-19

That is, defendant Báylor is entitled to qualified immunity unless the record reflects that, at the time she made the cell assignment, she knew of and was deliberately indifferent to a specific risk Ramey posed to plaintiff. The record does not so reflect.

In a § 1983 suit, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact defeating that immunity.

Van Perry v. Pogue · filed 1998-03-20

Perry-El sued them only in their official capacities, ... and he failed to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment with information sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact defeating defendants& right to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 defendants sued in their individual capacities are not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law warned that their conduct violated a detainee’s rights.

Lancaster v. Monroe County · filed 1998-03-20

Because the law clearly established that such conduct violated a pre-trial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff opposing summary judgment must present enough evidence to create a genuine factual issue concerning the defendants’ qualified immunity.

Van Perry-El v. Michael Bowersox Ray Pogue Bill Hartley · filed 1998-03-20

Perry-El sued them only in their official capacities, see Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754-55 (8th Cir. 1997), and he failed to respond to defendants' motion for summary judgment with information sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact defeating defendants' right to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Government officials facing a § 1983 damages claim are entitled to qualified immunity when the right they allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time.

Saunders-El v. Tsoulos · filed 1998-03-25

The court cannot conclude, therefore, that Saunders-El’s right to observe Ramadan was clearly established at the time that Defendants denied him the opportunity to participate in the fast. ... For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages in their personal capacity under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they violate no clearly established constitutional right.

Nelson v. Clark County School District Edward Goldman, Individually · filed 1998-03-26

Because Nelson did not have a liberty or property interest in his application or personnel file, Goldman did not violate any clearly established constitutional right of Nelson's when he denied Nelson's request to see and rebut any negative information in the files. Goldman is entitled to qualified immunity.