42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 lets a person sue a state actor for violating a federal right under color of state law.

DiCicco v. Voccola · filed 2004-05-28

Finally, Voccola moves in his individual capacity for summary judgment on DiCicco’s equal protection claim, contending that he is entitled to qualified immunity for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Public officials are entitled to such immunity in their individual capacities “for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or -constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 authorizes a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Kilroy v. State · filed 2004-06-02

The issue decided in the federal proceeding (whether evidence must be suppressed because of deliberate and material omissions) is not identical to the issue to be decided here (whether Paulus is entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct was objectively reasonable). ... The judgment is affirmed.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation.

Burton v. Richmond · filed 2004-06-02

Richmond and Allen are entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs have failed to show a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 allows a person to bring a civil action against someone acting under state authority who deprives them of a constitutional right.

Reynolds v. Powell · filed 2004-06-03

“In an action under section 1983, individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless it is demonstrated that their alleged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person in their positions would have known.”

Section 1983 generally shields public officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages when their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Williams Ex Rel. Allen v. Cambridge Board of Education · filed 2004-06-04

Public officials who perform discretionary functions “generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or laws.

Camden v. Hilton · filed 2004-06-07

We reject the contention that a jury verdict awarding punitive damages preempts a good faith defense in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional-rights violations against state actors, subject to qualified immunity.

Peterson v. Jensen · filed 2004-06-08

Therefore, we find that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings and AFFIRM the ruling of the District Court.

Section 1983 claims against officials may be barred by qualified immunity when the right was not clearly established.

Walker v. James H. Gomez Kingston W. Prunty R.R. Rath, Correctional Sergeant · filed 2004-06-07

Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against officials whose conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Cooper v. Town of Bar Nunn · filed 2004-06-10

Defendant-appellant Charles Anderson, Fire Chief for the Town of Bar Nunn, Wyoming, has filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. ... Thus, under plaintiff’s version of the facts, the district court correctly ruled that Anderson violated clearly established law.

Section 1983 claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when their actions were objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Moore v. Vega · filed 2004-06-10

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The district court erred as a matter of law when it denied defendants' motion for summary judgment based on that doctrine.

Section 1983 claims are subject to qualified immunity when officials reasonably believe their actions were lawful.

Moore v. Vega · filed 2004-06-10

Second, government officials will be immune if they can establish that it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions were lawful at the time.

Section 1983 claims against state actors are subject to qualified immunity, assessed by whether the conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Limone v. Condon · filed 2004-06-14

Although these appeals involve claims based on two different legal theories — Bivens and section 1983 — the analytical framework is, for our purposes, identical. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Drawing on Supreme Court precedent, see, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-02 (2001), we have developed a three-part algorithm for assessing whether a federal or state actor is entitled to qualified immunity. We consider (i) whether the plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation; (ii) whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the putative violation; and (iii) whether a reasonable officer, situated similarly to the defendant, would have understood the challenged act or omission to contravene the discerned constitutional right.

A prison official may assert good-faith immunity against a Section 1983 damages claim when the unlawfulness of using mace on a confined inmate was not clearly established.

No. 82-6552 · filed 1984-10-02

Since this is so, it cannot be said that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that his action in gassing the plaintiff was unconstitutional and, therefore, under Harlow, the defendant was entitled, as the magistrate without objection instructed the jury, to a good-faith defense.

School officials cannot claim qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when they were clearly on notice that their conduct violated constitutional rights.

Williams v. Anderson · filed 1977-08-31

Accordingly, the defendants cannot claim immunity from damages under § 1983 under the doctrine developed in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, and Wood v. Strickland, supra, since they were clearly on notice that their actions were in violation of the constitutional rights of both Black faculty members and Black applicants.

Section 1983 qualified immunity can protect a corrections official during a reasonable period to establish a jail law library.

Harris v. Richard Young, Terrell Don Hutto · filed 1983-08-16

Finally, we agree with the District Court that a law library cannot be built in one day, and therefore do not find that the lag between April 1977 and June 1978 is so long that Hutto should be stripped of his immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield an official from damages under § 1983 for intentional sex discrimination.

Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County · filed 1984-03-06

We reject this argument and hold that the defense of "good faith" or qualified immunity is not available in this case. By definition, there can be no liability in such an action unless the plaintiff shows that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her because of her sex.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is unavailable when the governing law was clearly established and defendants showed no reason they should be excused from knowing it.

Whisenant v. Yuam · filed 1984-07-17

Estelle and Wolfish establish beyond dispute the law governing defendant’s duty to Whisenant. The law therefore is “clearly established.” Defendants offered no evidence of any reason why they should be excused from knowing the law. It follows that it was inappropriate for the district court to give the immunity instruction.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to good faith immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Jensen v. Conrad · filed 1984-10-05

All of the defendants were entitled to a good faith immunity defense against liability under Sec. 1983.

In a § 1983 action, a government official’s good faith defense turns primarily on objective factors rather than subjective intentions.

Gagne v. Reddy · filed 1984-12-06

Second, the state of mind or the subjective intentions of the defendants are irrelevant to a determination of the defendants’ good faith. The good faith defense “turn[s] primarily on objective factors.”

Section 1983 permits a person deprived of constitutional rights under color of state law to seek redress, while qualified immunity may limit an official's individual liability for money damages.

Littlejohn v. Rose · filed 1985-07-16

Rose is only entitled to such immunity in his individual liability for money damages, not in his official capacity as the superintendent of schools.

Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for constitutional violations by officials, subject to qualified immunity.

Jones v. Edwards · filed 1985-08-20

We agree and we conclude that appellees are not protected by qualified immunity in the circumstances of this case In Davis v. Scherer, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984), the Supreme Court declared that: ... No other "circumstances" are relevant to the issue of qualified immunity. ... We hold that the fourth amendment's protection against the kind of search of which Jones complains was well-established at the time his search took place.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages against officials who, under color of state law, deprive people of federal rights, subject to applicable official immunities.

Olagues v. Russoniello · filed 1985-09-03

There is also an issue of whether the organizations' complaint can be read fairly to include a request for damages based on constitutional claims or statutory claims such as section 1983, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. We agree with the district court, however, that the officials involved in this action would be entitled to immunity from such damage claims. ... We need not determine whether the district court erred in denying absolute immunity, because we agree that all those sued are entitled at least to qualified, good faith immunity. The controlling standard is "the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Moreover, summary judgment is encouraged as an appropriate tool to "avoid excessive disruption of government." Id. ... Under this objective standard, all the officials are entitled to immunity. The county officials did no more than submit information in the public record to the United States Attorney at his request, with some later, voluntary interviews of those voters whose citizenship the INS was unable to ascertain. Such actions do not violate any "clearly established" rights. ... The district court's order finding qualified immunity for all federal and state officials sued is therefore affirmed.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors for violating federal rights, subject to defenses such as qualified immunity.

William Donta, Jr. v. Thomas Hooper Charles F. Hunter Larry Brooks Floyd Rose Jeff Altherr Jack Morgan James Mannering A · filed 1985-10-11

As an initial matter, it was improper for the district court to give the jury the issue of the defendants’ objective good faith.

Section 1983 allows damages claims for constitutional violations by state actors, subject to qualified immunity when the right was not clearly established.

Buschi v. Kirven · filed 1985-10-29

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions if such actions do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" at the time.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities may be completely barred by qualified immunity.

Hartley v. Fine · filed 1985-12-31

Because Hartley sued James and Russell only in their individual rather than their official capacities, the qualified immunity defense completely shielded James and Russell from any liability in their individual capacities.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights, subject to qualified immunity from money damages in appropriate circumstances.

McCabe v. Arave · filed 1986-01-27

Prison officials, such as defendants Murphy and Arave, are entitled to qualified immunity from money damages in § 1983 suits.

Section 1983 claims for damages against individual government officials can be barred by qualified immunity.

De Villar v. City of New York · filed 1986-01-27

Gliedman and Silverman are therefore within their qualified immunity and are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the action.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a § 1983 claim when they should have known their conduct infringed protected rights.

Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City Of Pontiac · filed 1986-05-30

The defendants should have known that their actions infringed upon Huron Valley's rights. ... The district court correctly denied these defendants the protections of the defense of qualified immunity, and we affirm on that issue only.

Section 1983 lets a person sue for deprivation of federal rights caused by someone acting under color of state law.

Arrington v. William McDonald Robert Nill · filed 1986-12-30

Upon reviewing the record in this case, this court concludes that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to determine if the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 allows suits against state officials for rights violations, subject to qualified immunity.

Craft v. Wipf · filed 1987-01-26

Thus, this Court has not said that all denials of qualified immunity will be immediately appealable, no matter how “factual” the question, but it has indicated that Mitchell should be interpreted liberally in terms of finding in favor of appealability.

Section 1983 claims against state executive officers performing discretionary functions may be subject to qualified immunity from damages.

Rodriguez v. Rivera · filed 1987-03-04

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defense of qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 does not shield officials from damages when the federal right they violated was clearly established.

Straub v. Monge · filed 1987-05-05

We agree with the district court’s ruling regarding immunity. The right in this case is well established.

Section 1983 lets a person sue for damages and equitable relief when someone acting under state law deprives the person of a federal right.

Aurea E. Vazquez Rios v. Rafael Hernandez Colon, Etc. · filed 1987-05-20

We also find, on the bases articulated herein, see supra Parts II, III, that the district court erred in failing to grant the summary judgment motions as to the remaining two plaintiffs (Maldonado-Felici-ano and Salvatella-Schmidt); the defendants, because they enjoy qualified immunity, cannot be held liable in damages to either of these claimants.

Section 1983 permits damages claims against state executive officers, subject to qualified immunity when discretionary conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Rosado v. Santiago · filed 1987-06-19

In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, a defense of qualified immunity from liability for damages is available to state executive officers performing discretionary functions, “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 lets a person sue a state official for depriving them of constitutional rights under color of state law, subject to applicable defenses such as qualified immunity.

Peery v. Brakke · filed 1987-08-12

We hold therefore that the district court did not err in retroactively applying Loudermill to this case and that qualified immunity is not available to Brakke.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity rules.

Allen v. Phillip G. Dantes, Chairman Frances G. Stepter, Appeals Clerk · filed 1987-08-12

Because Allen sought only injunctive relief, that doctrine is inapplicable.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Hynson v. City of Chester · filed 1987-09-02

The Supreme Court has squarely addressed the issue of whether qualified immunity under section 1983 extends to municipalities and has clearly held that it does not. ... Owen's holding that municipalities are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity is still good law. Since the Prison Board is a municipal corporation, it is not entitled to assert the qualified immunity defense.

State officials are protected from damages under § 1983 by qualified immunity when the right they violated was not clearly established.

Matiyn v. Henderson · filed 1988-03-01

We therefore conclude that, even if Matiyn was subjected to administrative detention under the protective admission regulations, and even though appellees' failure to provide Matiyn with notice and an opportunity to present his views violated his right to due process, qualified immunity protects appellees from liability upon the facts of this case.

State officials are shielded from damages liability under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Matiyn v. Henderson · filed 1988-03-01

Nevertheless, we believe that, even if appellant was the subject of an administrative protective admission, appellees are entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. As a general rule, state officials are shielded from liability for civil damages in § 1983 actions “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Section 1983 qualified immunity is unavailable when an officer obtains an arrest warrant and makes an arrest solely to identify a suspect.

Tillman v. Edward Coley, Jr., Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff of Bleckley County, Ga. · filed 1989-10-18

We hold that while the absence of probable cause will not always defeat a qualified immunity defense, no reasonable law enforcement officer may conclude that an arrest warrant may be obtained and an arrest made for the sole purpose of identifying a suspect.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield university officials from liability for retaliating against a professor’s protected classroom speech.

Dube v. The State University Of New York · filed 1990-04-12

Accordingly, the defendants are not qualifiedly immune from section 1983 liability on Dube's First Amendment claim.

A county sued under § 1983 cannot assert qualified immunity.

Ross v. Neff · filed 1990-07-19

Regardless of the state of the law at the time the arrest took place, however, the qualified immunity defense is not available to the county.

An officer’s qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim depends on whether the circumstances made it reasonable to believe probable cause existed, even if it did not.

Gooden v. Howard County · filed 1990-11-09

The availability of qualified immunity turns not on whether the officers actually had probable cause but whether the circumstances made it reasonable for them to think they did.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when the asserted federal right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Price v. State Of Hawaii · filed 1990-12-26

Appellants, therefore, are not asserting clearly established rights in this case; they are only asking that we now clarify the reach of federal law for the State and its officials. This is exactly the kind of case in which qualified immunity was designed to operate.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects sheriffs from damages for politically motivated deputy dismissals when the deputies’ asserted right was not clearly established at the time.

Upton v. Thompson · filed 1991-04-22

We conclude therefore that since the law was not clearly established in 1986 the sheriffs in these cases are protected by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity did not bar the Section 1983 claim on the record before the court.

Patrick v. Miller · filed 1992-01-27

Therefore, the district court's October 12, 1990 order denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on grounds of qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is AFFIRMED.

An officer has qualified immunity from § 1983 damages if she could reasonably have believed a strip search was supported by reasonable suspicion, even if it was not.

Martinez v. County of San Diego Elizabeth Foster · filed 1992-05-08

We conclude Foster is entitled to qualified immunity because she could reasonably have believed the search was founded on reasonable suspicion even if it was not.

A § 1983 complaint against government officials must identify the clearly established rights at issue and explain how the officials’ conduct violated them to overcome qualified immunity at the pleading stage.

No. 91-4084 · filed 1992-09-09

We agree with the district court that the complaint itself is insufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion. It does not articulate with sufficient specificity the clearly established constitutional rights involved or how the conduct of the defendants violated those rights.

In a Section 1983 action, officers are entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts establish no constitutional violation.

Carman v. Fuentes · filed 2004-06-15

“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Thus, we must reverse the judgment of the district court denying the Officers qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity analysis, whether officers identified themselves as law enforcement officers may be immaterial to the immunity determination.

Alpha v. Hooper · filed 2004-06-21

Hooper correctly argues, however, that whether he and Officer Muñoz identified themselves as law enforcement officers raises no material issue in the immunity calculus, see Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992), although if the jury believes they did so identify themselves, it would enhance Hooper’s argument that Anderson intended to run him down.

Qualified immunity does not protect a § 1983 defendant when the governing constitutional principles were well settled.

Hadley v. Williams · filed 2004-06-21

The principles on which we reverse are well settled, which precludes a defense of qualified immunity.

An officer may be denied qualified immunity at summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim.

Darlington v. Bromseth · filed 2004-06-21

Having had the benefit of the parties’ briefs, and after careful con- sideration of the record and applicable law, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Officer Bromseth was not entitled to summary judgment as to Darlington’s claims of excessive force and assault and battery. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity as to those claims for the reasons stated by the district court.

A court may consider qualified immunity for all § 1983 claims when defendants raise the defense generally in their briefs.

McCormick v. City of Lawrence · filed 2004-06-24

However, they have raised the defense of qualified immunity generally in their briefs, and the court concludes that the defense should be considered with respect to all of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment claim when a reasonable official in the same circumstances would not have understood the conduct to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Lafond v. City of Manchester · filed 2004-06-23

Mayor Baines is entitled to qualified immunity as to Lafond’s First Amendment claim.

Section 1983 permits a civil action against a government official for a constitutional violation, subject to qualified immunity.

Carlson, Phillip D. v. Gorecki, Mary E. · filed 2004-06-29

Finally, based on this record, Gorecki is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for constitutional-rights violations by persons acting under color of state law, subject to defenses such as qualified immunity.

Dubay v. Craze · filed 2004-07-01

Therefore, taking the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the court must for purposes of this motion, Defendant Craze is not entitled to qualified immunity and his motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim must be denied.

Section 1983 generally does not provide qualified immunity to private litigants.

Derfiny v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital · filed 2004-07-06

As discussed above, since qualified immunity is reserved for state actors, private litigants are generally not eligible to receive qualified immunity pursuant to § 1983.

Prison officials who conduct administrative hearings have only qualified immunity from § 1983 claims.

Wesley King, (83-1705), (83-1774) v. H. Gary Wells and Richard Christiansen, (83-1705), (83-1774) · filed 1985-07-02

Nevertheless, it is the law of this Circuit that prison officials who conduct administrative hearings are entitled only to qualified immunity.

Public officials performing discretionary duties have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when their conduct violates no clearly established right.

Snyder v. Kurvers · filed 1985-07-12

The purpose of the doctrine of qualified immunity is to protect public officials called upon to perform discretionary tasks from personal liability for the good faith performance of these tasks. ... The record supports the conclusion of the district court that the executive secretary and the Board on Judicial Standards acted in good faith and violated no clearly established constitutional rights to privacy.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when brandishing a weapon was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and caused no injury.

Gonzales v. City South Houston · filed 2004-07-07

We hold that the district court did not err in its determination that Officer Tina Perez was entitled to qualified immunity; brandishing her weapon was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and Gonzales suffered no injury as a result thereof.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the evidence shows no constitutional violation.

Lester v. City of College Station · filed 2004-07-07

Because the evidence does not show that Officer Piersall used her authority to create or increase any danger to Lester, there is no constitutional violation, and the district court did not err in determining that Officer Piersall was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit is a legal question for the court, decided without deference to the jury’s resolution.

Riccardo v. Rausch · filed 2004-07-12

Immunity, however, is a matter of law for the court, to be decided without deference to the jury’s resolution' — and preferably before the' case goes to the jury.

Qualified immunity does not shield prison officials from a § 1983 claim for continued detention when they know of a release order and fail to act.

Davis v. Knell · filed 2004-07-14

Based on Slone and the law of other circuits, see supra, we have no difficulty concluding that Davis alleged the deprivation of a clearly established right and that a reasonable government actor would know that failing to respond to Davis’s requests to be released in keeping with the court order that he possessed was unlawful.

Qualified immunity protects an official from individual liability under Section 1983 when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Burge v. Pearl River County · filed 2004-07-15

Even if it is arguable whether Burge stated a viable freedom-of-association claim under the First Amendment, the district court cited no decisional authority, and we are aware of none, which suggested that Johnson violated a “clearly established” right of Burge to freely associate with her husband. The district court thus erred in denying Johnson’s qualified-immunity defense with respect to this claim as well.

Government officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Burge v. Pearl River County, Mississippi · filed 2004-07-15

Government officials performing discretionary functions are protected from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity if their conduct violates no “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive force claim at the pleading stage when the alleged facts could establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Brown v. Long Beach Police Department · filed 2004-07-16

Qualified immunity shields police officers from suit “unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.” ... The district court did not err in denying Officer Kallas’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from civil damages when their conduct does not violate clearly established federal rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Squaw Valley Development Company Squaw Valley Ski Corporation Squaw Valley Preserve v. Martin Goldberg Harold Singer · filed 2004-07-20

“Qualified immunity, however, shields § 1983 defendants ‘[fjrom liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ”

Prison officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims when no clearly established law required the religious diet inmates requested.

Hudson v. Maloney · filed 2004-07-23

In light of this legal precedent, no reasonable prison official would have concluded that Muslim inmates had an established right to Halal meals prepared by other Muslim inmates or that prison administrators did not have broad discretion in the matter of prison dietary alternatives. ... Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an official from a Section 1983 political firing claim when closely analogous precedent clearly established that employees performing ministerial duties were protected.

Phillip D. Carlson and Thomas R. Smith v. Gorecki · filed 2004-07-23

Her claim of qualified immunity fails because the record shows that Carlson and Smith had jobs involving functions more ministerial than the functions of the investigator in Matlock.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against a prison official when disputed facts could establish that the official violated an inmate’s clearly established right to protection.

Brown v. Scott · filed 2004-07-26

The Court finds that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim.

Law-enforcement officers sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate clearly established constitutional rights.

Durney v. Doss · filed 2004-07-28

Law-enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate clearly estab- lished constitutional rights.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the facts do not establish a violation of a constitutional right.

Forest v. Pawtucket Police Department · filed 2004-07-28

Therefore, there was no violation of Forest’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the Pawtucket Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 qualified immunity defense based on objective reasonableness is premature at dismissal when the facts officials relied on are not before the court.

Hollenbeck v. Boivert · filed 2004-07-28

“A government actor performing a discretionary task is entitled to immunity from § 1983 suits if either (a) the defendant’s action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.” ... Any evidence of other prior allegations of abuse or other facts upon which ACS relied as justification for the children’s removal is presently not before this Court. Defendants’ motion for dismissal under the theory of qualified immunity, therefore, is premature and is denied without prejudice.

Qualified immunity shields public officials from damages under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Speiser v. Engle · filed 2004-07-28

Qualified immunity shields public officials from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Government officials performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from section 1983 claims unless they violate clearly established law.

Melissa Dawn Beck v. Joy · filed 2004-07-29

Generally, government officials are entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983 when executing discretionary functions, unless the officials violate clearly established law.

Qualified immunity is unavailable as a defense to a § 1983 claim against a state official in an official capacity.

Shipman v. Crooks · filed 2004-07-29

Qualified immunity is not available as a defense in official capacity actions.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims unless they violate clearly established law.

Beck v. Wilson · filed 2004-07-29

Generally, government officials are entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983 when executing discretionary functions, unless the officials violate clearly established law.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation under the first prong of the immunity inquiry.

Aldarondo-Lugo v. Municipality of Toa Baja · filed 2004-08-02

In this case Plaintiffs have failed the first prong of the qualified immunity test. They have failed to show a constitutional violation because they have not provided the Court with evidence of political animus. ... Therefore, the Court holds that Defendants are entitled to the qualified immunity defense.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiffs fail to show a constitutional violation.

Burton v. Richmond · filed 2004-08-02

Governmental officials are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 when performing discretionary functions unless they violate clearly established law in executing their duties. ... Richmond and Allen are entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs have failed to show a constitutional violation.

In a § 1983 qualified immunity analysis, alleged violations of local policies or codes do not establish a claim without an alleged federal constitutional or statutory violation.

Eaton v. Meneley · filed 2004-08-03

Second, although the plaintiffs make much of the fact that running their names through the III system violated Sheriff Department policy and official III guidelines, ... those potential violations of local codes are not issues before us when considering qualified immunity under § 1983. We evaluate the plaintiffs’ arguments only for whether there are allegations sufficient to support the finding of a federal constitutional or statutory violation, here of the First Amendment.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim against an officer for an unreasonable seizure when the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s non-deadly threat of physical harm was unlawful.

Smith v. Wampler · filed 2004-08-05

We conclude the law regarding the non-deadly threat of physical harm was not clearly established and Wampler is entitled to qualified immunity regarding his conduct in seizing Smith while executing the search warrant.

Section 1983 claims against officials in their individual capacities are barred by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Torres-Rivera v. Calderón-Serra · filed 2004-08-05

Therefore, the Court has room for only one conclusion: that plaintiffs have failed to establish the second prong of the qualified immunity test, that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Therefore, any actions by Governor Calderon, Miranda, or Charriez, insofar as they were carried out in accordance with or for the implementation of Law 94, are covered by the doctrine of qualified immunity and all claims against them in their individual capacities must be dismissed.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, Leslie Watson, Jefferson County Officer · filed 2004-08-09

That is because we agree with the district court that Officer Watson had qualified immunity for conducting the search.

Individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they have violated no constitutional right.

Fleming v. City of Detroit · filed 2004-08-09

All individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because none of Fleming’s constitutional rights have been violated.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that a law enforcement training exercise violated clearly established constitutional law.

Humes v. Gilless · filed 2004-08-10

Though Defendants’ actions might support a claim of unreasonable seizure, such a claim was (and is) not clearly established with respect to this law enforcement training situation. Accordingly, we find that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, no reasonable officer could believe the force was lawful.

Burden v. Carroll · filed 2004-08-12

Under the facts as presented by Burden, which must be credited on Carroll’s summary judgment motion (though of course we make no factual findings in that respect), no reasonable officer could have concluded that it was lawful to violently shove Burden in the manner he describes. Because Carroll is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity on Burden’s Section 1983 claim, the district court’s order is AFFIRMED.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action when a clearly established right would make the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct apparent to a reasonable officer.

Hamilton v. Jackson · filed 2004-08-16

If an Eighth Amendment right is so clearly established that a reasonable officer would know his or her conduct is unlawful in the circumstance he confronted, the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A court may dismiss an individual-capacity § 1983 claim without requiring a Schultea reply when another reply would not assist its qualified-immunity analysis.

Fitts v. Crain · filed 2004-08-18

Thus, it would not have assisted the district court for Fitts to have filed another reply pursuant to Schultea. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Fitts’s individual-capacity claims without requiring her to file another reply.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim at this stage when the alleged facts could establish a violation of clearly established rights.

Johnson v. Ronald Testman, Lonnie James · filed 2004-08-18

For substantially the reasons stated orally by the district court in its denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, ... we agree that qualified immunity is not appropriate at this time.

When defendants raise qualified immunity in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must present facts establishing a violation of clearly established law.

Figetakis v. City of Cuyahoga Falls · filed 2004-08-18

Because defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity, Figetakis was required to present facts establishing a violation of clearly established law, which he failed to do.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violates clearly established rights.

Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., Debbie Miller · filed 2004-08-19

While the Officers undoubtedly faced unenviable choices in their interactions with Champion, they are not entitled to qualified immunity. Based upon the testimony presented at trial, the Officers’ actions in this particular situation violated Champion’s clearly established rights.

Prison officials can be denied qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit when a factual dispute over their knowledge of a danger affects whether their conduct was clearly unlawful.

Sweet v. Hernandez · filed 2004-08-19

The district court properly denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Sweet established a material issue of fact as to whether he had alerted the officers to the danger to his safety. ... If, as Sweet alleges, he made the prison officials aware of his fear of being attacked by the same gang members who had previously targeted him, it would be clear to a reasonable state official in the Defendants’ position that knowingly reassigning Sweet to the same prison yard where he had just been the victim of a violent attack was unlawful.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Snyder v. Blagojevich · filed 2004-08-20

It is also worth observing that because State Officials' conduct plainly does not violate Snyder’s clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, State Officials are also shielded from liability by the umbrella of qualified immunity (see, e.g., Pounds v. Griep-enstrok, 970 F.2d 338, 339 (7th Cir.1992)).

Qualified immunity does not protect a sheriff from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable sheriff could believe that using checkpoints to stop a concert was lawful.

Collins v. Ainsworth · filed 2004-08-20

We find that, under these circumstances, no sheriff could reasonably believe his actions aimed at stopping the Concert were legal and would entitle him to qualified immunity.

Officers sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when clearly established law would make their alleged conduct unlawful to a reasonable officer.

Hays v. Ellis · filed 2004-08-23

Accordingly, I find as a matter of law it would be clear to a reasonable officer in December 1999 that it was unlawful to act as Curnow, Grove and Ellis allegedly did. These officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for their alleged violation of Hays’s constitutional rights.

A defendant in a § 1983 action cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when disputed facts determine whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable.

Sample v. Bailey · filed 2004-08-24

Here, like Sova, the question of qualified immunity turns on which versions of the events are accepted, Bailey’s version or Sample’s version. ... Whether Bailey’s actions were reasonable is contingent on the fact-finder’s resolution of that factual conflict.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Griffin v. Troy State University · filed 2004-08-25

Therefore, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a constitutional violation as required to defeat the Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the Plaintiffs’ claims are due to be DISMISSED.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when his conduct violates no constitutional right or clearly established law.

Kesinger v. Herrington · filed 2004-08-26

Here Herrington acted in self defense. He did not violate the Constitution or any clearly established law. He is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against officials who, under color of state law, violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Dahly v. DCFS · filed 2004-07-02

The remaining question is whether Powell, by writing the letter to Wheelhouse's board, may be held liable for a violation of § 1983. Powell, as a mid-level Department official, belongs to the broad class of state executive officials who are entitled to assert qualified immunity in opposition to a federal civil rights lawsuit. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity from a federal civil rights claim means that government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from personal liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727.

Government officials sued individually under § 1983 may invoke qualified immunity, but fact issues about whether their conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established rights can defeat summary judgment.

Scott v. Godwin · filed 2004-08-31

Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit available to government officials sued in their individual capacities under section 1983. ... Here, Godwin has presented a fact issue sufficient to survive summary judgment as to whether appellants acted in an objectively reasonable manner in light of Godwin’s clearly established rights.

Section 1983 allows claims against government officials in their individual capacities, subject to qualified immunity.

Wayne Scott and Gary Johnson v. Godwin · filed 2004-08-31

Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit available to government officials sued in their individual capacities under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for damages against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of federal rights.

Spafford v. Romanowsky · filed 2004-09-03

As government officials performing discretionary functions, a defendant enjoys a qualified immunity that shields him from personal liability for damages under section 1983 “insofar as [his] conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Municipalities cannot claim qualified immunity in actions under § 1983.

Sadallah v. City Of Utica · filed 2004-09-03

Qualified immunity is not available to municipalities in cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts determine whether officers violated a clearly established right.

Johnson v. Perry · filed 2004-09-03

However, Johnson’s claim that the force was unprovoked, along with the variety of statements from the guards, renders qualified immunity inappropriate in this case.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to allege a constitutional violation.

Livant v. Clifton · filed 2004-09-07

Here, Defendants Clifton (Town Investigator), McGowan (Town Supervisor), Town John and Jane Does, and the Town Agents are all entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of a constitutional right.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts establish no constitutional violation.

Nunn v. Lynch · filed 2004-09-08

Because no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations in Nunn’s complaint established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. ... Lynch is entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court’s denial of Lynch’s motion to dismiss must accordingly be reversed.

A government official sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when he knew or reasonably should have known his conduct would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Byar v. Lee · filed 2004-09-09

To the contrary, the Court has no hesitancy in concluding that defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the Detainee Rules would violate plaintiffs rights under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court, therefore, concludes that defendant is not entitled to the protection of the defense of qualified immunity in this matter.

Qualified immunity can bar a § 1983 claim against prison officials.

Daise v. Goord · filed 2004-09-09

For the reasons stated in substance by the district court, Daise’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was correctly dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity.

Police officers performing discretionary functions have qualified immunity from personal liability under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known.

Byrd v. Cavenaugh · filed 2004-09-15

While it is true that police officers performing discretionary functions are generally entitled to qualified immunity shielding them from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983, such immunity exists only “insofar as (the officer’s) conduct does not violate ‘clearly established’ statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... As such, the trial court erred by dismissing Byrd’s claims brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 regarding excessive force used during an arrest.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant when the conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, even if courts disagreed about which constitutional provision applied.

Allen v. Guerrero · filed 2004-09-16

Therefore, although we agree that a reasonable public official could have believed in 2000 that deliberately incarcerating Allen beyond his MR date violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of under the Eighth Amendment, we conclude that no reasonable public official could have believed that such continued detention was constitutionally permissible.

Caseworkers may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when their child abuse finding has a reasonable basis.

Carroll v. Ragaglia · filed 2004-09-16

We therefore hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of qualified immunity on Carroll’s claim that the DCF investigation was shocking to the conscience.

A § 1983 defendant cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when relevant facts remain disputed.

Tate v. Fish · filed 2004-09-17

Since the record demonstrates an unresolved dispute of relevant fact, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is denied.

In a § 1983 suit, qualified immunity requires asking whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Crull, Misti v. Sunderman, William · filed 2004-09-17

To establish qualified immunity, a court must first ask whether, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the [defen- dants’] conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, the court must deter- mine if the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. See id.

Qualified immunity does not shield a prison official from a § 1983 claim for failing to act on a prisoner's release request when the official knows of a court order requiring release.

Davis v. Calzona Hall · filed 2004-09-21

Based on Slone and the law of other circuits, see supra, we have no difficulty concluding that Davis alleged the deprivation of a clearly established right and that a reasonable government actor would know that failing to respond to Davis's requests to be released in keeping with the court order that he possessed was unlawful.

In a Section 1983 claim against officers, qualified immunity requires examining whether the constitutional right was clearly established such that a reasonable officer would know the conduct was unlawful.

Motley v. Parks · filed 2004-09-21

If we determine that there is a constitutional violation, we then examine whether the constitutional right was clearly established, such that a reasonable officer would have been aware that he was acting unlawfully.

Section 1983 defendants may receive qualified immunity when the evidence does not establish deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.

Chavez v. Prasifka · filed 2004-09-22

Therefore, the magistrate judge did not err in granting summary judgment to Warden Hodge on the merits and finding that Warden Hodge was entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the officer’s conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Davis v. City of Cincinnati · filed 2004-09-23

The magistrate judge properly concluded that Officer Neeley was entitled to qualified immunity because Officer Neeley’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not give them fair notice that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Sabree v. Conley · filed 2004-09-27

Nevertheless, the defendants are entitled to immunity on the latter two prongs, as they were not on fair notice that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.

Qualified immunity shields individual defendants from a Section 1983 claim when they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right and a reasonable official would not have considered their conduct unlawful.

Biby v. Board of Regents of University of Neb. at Lincoln · filed 2004-09-29

Based on the foregoing facts, I conclude that the University did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. I further conclude that a reasonable official would not have concluded that the conduct was unlawful. For these reasons, I find that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to this cause of action.

Qualified immunity protects an individual defendant from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have known the challenged conduct was unconstitutional.

Theriault v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MAINE · filed 2004-09-30

I can only conclude that a reasonable person in Nye’s position would not have known that the questions at issue were unconstitutional.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff could prove they violated clearly established rights.

Levesque v. Town of Vernon · filed 2004-09-30

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because Levesque could prove that their actions violated clearly established law.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer under the circumstances would not believe he was violating the plaintiff’s rights.

DeVatt v. Lohenitz · filed 2004-10-01

Because we conclude that the constitutional rights of plaintiff Rashim DeVatt were not violated, that a reasonable officer under the circumstances presented here would not have believed that he was violating plaintiffs rights, and that defendants were privileged to arrest and prosecute plaintiff, we conclude that defendant Lohenitz is entitled to qualified immunity and official immunity and that both defendants are entitled to summary judgment against plaintiff.

Section 1983 officers may receive qualified immunity when they reasonably could have believed their conduct lawful.

Cuffy v. Van Horn · filed 2004-10-06

This disagreement with the district court is academic, however, because the court ultimately found that the officers might reasonably have believed that they were in hot pursuit and, on this basis, extended qualified immunity to them in connection with the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim. The result of invoking either analysis is the same: the motion for summary judgment was properly entered in favor of the defendants.

An official sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Kelly v. Sheriff's Department · filed 2004-10-18

As such, we conclude, with respect to individual liability, that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment based on Gresham’s qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief against officials responsible for enforcing a prison disciplinary rule.

Cassels v. Stalder · filed 2004-10-20

Because this claim is merely seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, Secretary Stalder and Warden Cain, in their individual capacities, are not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim if it was objectively reasonable to believe the officer’s actions did not violate clearly established law.

Perrelli v. Taylor · filed 2004-10-20

An official who violates a plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights will be entitled to qualified immunity where “(1) the defendant’s actions did not violate clearly established law, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his actions did not violate such law.”

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action requires a court to ask whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time.

Crull v. William Sunderman, John W. Rapp, Justice, Lindsay Parkhurst · filed 2004-10-21

To establish qualified immunity, a court must first ask whether, “[tjaken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the [defendants’] conduct violated a constitutional right?” ... Second, the court must determine if the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when established law would have told a reasonable officer that the arrest lacked a lawful basis.

Johnson v. Hawe · filed 2004-10-25

We hold that the law was sufficiently established so that Chief Nelson reasonably should have known that he had no lawful basis to arrest Johnson for violating the Privacy Act.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established by controlling authority or a consensus of persuasive authority.

Elliott v. Morgan · filed 2004-10-26

Further, the district court did not err in its summary judg- ment qualified immunity determination that Elliott had not estab- lished the violation of a clearly established constitutional right insofar as he alleged that the routine, cross-gender body cavity searches violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy; no such right is clearly established under either controlling authority or a consensus of the persuasive authority.

An officer may have qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed.

Christman v. Kick · filed 2004-10-28

Even assuming probable cause to arrest Christman was not present, Trooper Kick is protected by qualified immunity.

When a § 1983 defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right and that the right was clearly established at the time.

Wu v. Clark · filed 2004-11-02

Once a § 1983 defendant asserts a qualified-immunity defense, the plaintiff is required to show that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional or statutory right and (2) the right violated was clearly established when the violation occurred.

Individual school officials may invoke qualified immunity against personal-capacity damages claims under Section 1983.

Harper Ex Rel. Harper v. Poway Unified School District · filed 2004-11-04

Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs damages claims as to the individual defendants in their personal capacities based on qualified immunity is GRANTED.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their failure to follow a federal rule or state law did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Dearmon v. Burgess · filed 2004-11-08

As the district court held, because, at the time of the search, the officers' failure to follow Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 and state law did not constitute a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when clearly established law made the asserted basis for arrest unreasonable.

Johnson v. Hawe · filed 2004-11-08

Because it was clearly established under Washington law at the time of the arrest that recording a police officer in the performance of his public duties was not a violation of the Privacy Act and it was unreasonable for Chief Nelson to believe otherwise, we hold that the Chief is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 claim against officers, qualified immunity analysis first asks whether the alleged facts show a constitutional violation; if they do not, the court need not decide whether the right was clearly established.

Sheets v. Butera · filed 2004-11-09

As previously noted, before we determine whether the law was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, we first must determine whether the facts alleged show that the officers violated a constitutional right. We have determined that the tactics employed by the officers in obtaining Barnett's statement do not offend the Constitution.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when no reasonable officer would find the force necessary under the circumstances.

Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police · filed 2004-11-10

In viewing the facts in favor of Solomon, we conclude that no reasonable officer would find that the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Solomon required the extreme use of force that was used here. Officer Miller is no exception. Because Officer Miller’s conduct was unlawful under the circumstances, he is not able to escape liability through qualified immunity.

A government official sued under § 1983 cannot obtain qualified immunity at summary judgment when material facts remain disputed on both elements of the defense.

Singfield v. Akron Metro Housing · filed 2004-11-10

Because genuine issues of material fact remain as to both elements of the qualified immunity defense, the defense fails at the summary judgment stage.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Srisavath v. City of Brentwood · filed 2004-11-12

Based on these allegations, the district court correctly concluded that Sgt. Richardson was not entitled to qualified immunity.

A public official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for denying employment solely because a parent chooses private schooling when the constitutional protection was clearly established.

Barrett v. Steubenville City Schools · filed 2004-11-15

Because it has been clearly established that one’s involvement in constitutionally protected activity cannot be the sole basis for denying public employment, any reasonable official would know that denying employment based on a parent’s constitutional right to direct his child’s education is a violation of the law. ... In accordance with these fundamental principles of law, Lucci cannot obtain qualified immunity by claiming that no clearly established right existed.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a triable constitutional violation.

Doggett v. Perez · filed 2004-11-18

Plaintiffs Mark and Carol Doggett have not presented evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that Perez deliberately fabricated evidence against them. Accordingly, Perez is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim.

An officer is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity when a jury could find that reasonably competent officers would agree the alleged conduct was unlawful.

Davis v. Brouillette · filed 2004-11-18

The officers’ own testimony shows that a rational jury could find that reasonably competent police officers would agree that Stupik’s alleged conduct was illegal. Thus, Stupik is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

An arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have believed the arrest lawful.

Meadows v. Thomas · filed 2004-11-18

If a reasonable officer under the same circumstances as the arresting officer would have believed that the arrest was lawful, then the arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known their conduct was unlawful at the time.

Kerusenko v. New Jersey · filed 2004-11-18

Accordingly, Appellees Parenti and Parmenter are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity on a false arrest claim when a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause.

Haggerty v. Texas Southern University · filed 2004-11-18

Therefore, Williams is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in his position could have believed that, in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances of which Williams was aware, there was a fair probability that Haggerty had committed or was committing an offense. ... We conclude that Williams is entitled to qualified immunity from Haggerty’s false arrest/false imprisonment claim under section 1983.

Governmental entities sued under § 1983 cannot assert qualified immunity and are not entitled to a discovery stay on that basis.

Rome v. Romero · filed 2004-11-22

First, the Court notes that the motion is made on behalf of all of the Defendants, including the Denver Police Department and the City and County of Denver. These two entities are not permitted to assert a defense of qualified immunity, and, therefore, are not entitled to a stay of discovery on the claims against them.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the law at the time did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unlawful.

Dominguez v. METROPOLITAN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY · filed 2004-11-23

Finally, Defendant Golub is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs § 1983 claim because the case law as of December 14, 2000 made clear that Defendant’s actions were lawful.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when they violate a clearly established right and their conduct is objectively unreasonable.

Alexander v. Eeds · filed 2004-11-23

Thus, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged § 1983 violation concerning Harper.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, a court considering an officer’s pre-arrest consultation with a prosecutor must assess whether reliance on the prosecutor’s advice was objectively reasonable.

Cox v. Maine State Police · filed 2004-12-03

In considering the relevance of an officer's pre-arrest consultation with a prosecutor, a reviewing court must determine whether the officer's reliance on the prosecutor's advice was objectively reasonable.