42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not impose liability for deadly force based on a reasonable but mistaken belief that probable cause exists.

Carr v. Tatangelo · filed 2003-09-29

A reasonable but mistaken belief that probable cause exists for using deadly force is not actionable under § 1983.

State officials have qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when they could reasonably believe their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

Schneider v. California Department Of Corrections · filed 2003-09-29

Prior to these holdings, Terhune and Gomez could have reasonably believed that failure to account for any interest accrued to individual inmate accounts from ITAs did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Terhune and Gomez are thus entitled to qualified immunity from any damages in the present suit.

Qualified immunity protects a defendant from a § 1983 claim when the defendant’s conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Norton v. Hall · filed 2003-09-30

Even if the Nortons had produced facts sufficient to support a constitutional claim, Hall would be entitled to qualified immunity because, given the information she possessed, her conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Qualified immunity protects an individual official from § 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established to a reasonable official.

McCormick v. City of Lawrence · filed 2003-09-30

Qualified immunity shields an individual government official performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... For the foregoing reasons, the court determines that a reasonable person in Defendants’ position would not have known that he was violating Plaintiffs’ rights by searching the recording devices and their contents without a warrant.

Qualified immunity can protect government officials from damages under § 1983, but disputed facts about political animus can preclude summary judgment on that defense.

Canada v. Hernandez · filed 2003-09-30

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary functions from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Due to the factual disputes regarding possible discrimination based on political animus, this Court cannot grant defendants’ motion for qualified immunity at this time.

Prison officials cannot obtain dismissal of a § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds for disciplining a Muslim inmate who refused to handle pork when his right to refrain was clearly established.

Williams v. Bitner · filed 2003-09-30

In these circumstances, the court finds that plaintiffs right to refrain from handling pork was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation and will deny defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.

Prison officials sued under Section 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for retaliation when no reasonable official would believe the conduct lawful.

Vance v. Barrett · filed 2003-09-30

Under the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that the prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity for Vance's termination.

Officials sued for damages under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their enforcement of a presumptively valid statute was objectively reasonable.

Connecticut v. Crotty · filed 2003-09-30

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that each individual Appellant facing personal liability in this case was objectively reasonable as a matter of law in enforcing the Nonresident Lobster Law and, therefore, each is entitled to qualified immunity.

A supervisor sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity for gender-based harassment and discrimination when a reasonable person in his position would know the conduct was unlawful.

Dunnom v. Bennett · filed 2003-10-01

Defendant Bennett is not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in his position would know that it was illegal to harass and discriminate against Plaintiff because of her gender.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their actions were objectively reasonable.

Skrobacz v. Sweeney · filed 2003-10-01

The actions of DiRago and Bruckenthal were objectively reasonable to entitle them to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an officer from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer could believe the use of deadly force was justified by a threat of serious physical harm.

Forbes v. Township of Lower Merion · filed 2003-10-01

Under these circumstances, Forbes did not pose an immediate threat to SalkowsM, and no reasonable officer could have believed that the use of deadly force was justified to prevent serious physical harm to himself.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim depends on whether the evidence supports a constitutional violation of a clearly established right and conduct that was objectively unreasonable in light of that right.

Scicluna v. Wells · filed 2003-10-02

We evaluate a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity by determining whether (1) a constitutional violation occurred, (2) the right violated was clearly established, and (3) “the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts, and supported the allegations by sufficient evidence, to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights.”

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Gausvik v. Perez · filed 2003-10-03

He also has not proven Perez violated his constitutional rights. The judgment of the district court denying Officer Perez qualified immunity is therefore REVERSED.

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant from a § 1983 retaliation claim when the right was clearly established and the alleged conduct was not objectively reasonable.

Hart v. Kenneth Hairston Karl Thomas, Major Jimmy D. Craig · filed 2003-10-06

Furthermore, Hairston was not entitled to qualified immunity because, as noted above, the right to be free from retaliation of the sort alleged by Hart was “clearly established” by the 1980s, ... and defendant Hairston’s conduct, as alleged by Hart, was not objectively reasonable.

Defendants in a Section 1983 suit are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Ziegler v. Eby · filed 2003-10-07

We are satisfied, however, that even if those allegations may be deemed true, (and as noted there is no evidence supporting them), the defendants did not violate any “clearly established” right under the First, Fourth, or Sixth Amendments and therefore are entitled to qualified immunity.

A school principal is eligible for qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when disciplining students falls within his general discretionary authority.

Kirkland Ex Rel. Jones v. Greene County Board of Education · filed 2003-10-07

We agree with Morrow that disciplining students lies within his general discretionary authority. Thus, he is eligible for the qualified immunity defense.

In a § 1983 suit, officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless clearly established law would make the constitutional violation clear to a reasonable officer in the particular situation.

Lucero v. City of Albuquerque · filed 2003-10-08

The officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless, under clearly established law, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that his or her conduct violated a constitutional right in the particular situation.

Social workers may assert qualified immunity against § 1983 claims; they are entitled to it when the claim cannot be sustained.

Martin v. Saint Mary's Department of Social Services · filed 2003-10-08

Because a § 1983 claim cannot be sustained, it follows that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

A supervisor may be denied qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges a violation of a clearly established right and that the supervisor had notice of the abuse.

Ex Parte Alabama Dept. of Youth Services · filed 2003-10-10

The Doe plaintiffs' complaint alleges Wood's violation of their clearly established constitutional right to "bodily integrity" pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see C.B. v. Bobo , 659 So.2d at 104 . The Doe plaintiffs' complaint further alleges that Wood failed "to protect the plaintiffs from harm and from further harm after he received notice of the sexual harassment and abuse and the potential for sexual harassment" (emphasis added) committed by DYS employees against the plaintiffs. Therefore, Wood has not shown a clear legal right to a dismissal of the Doe plaintiffs' § 1983 claim on the ground of federal qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim cannot be granted on summary judgment when material disputes about the officials’ motive affect that defense.

Figueroa v. Torres · filed 2003-10-14

Therefore, due to the factual disputes regarding a possible political discriminatory motivation and the circumstances surrounding Defendants’ personnel decisions, all of which are vital to this case as a whole and the Court’s assessment of the qualified immunity defense in particular, the Court is not in a position to grant Defendants’ motion for qualified immunity at this time.

Qualified immunity bars § 1983 damages against prison officials when existing law did not clearly establish that the challenged transfer was unconstitutional.

Osterback v. Kemp · filed 2003-10-15

The authorities in place at the time of the transfer in the case at bar did not make it clear that the second transfer, even on Plaintiff's version of the facts, would be unconstitutional.

A school official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 procedural due process claim when a reasonable official would not have known that denying a post-termination hearing was unlawful.

Kelly v. Independent School District No. 12 · filed 2003-10-23

Thus, we agree with the district court that Simpson is entitled to qualified immunity on Kelly’s procedural due process claim, and we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Simpson.

In a § 1983 excessive force action, a factual dispute material to qualified immunity can prevent summary judgment for the officer.

Buchanan v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2003-10-27

Because I cannot decide on summary judgment whose version of the facts is correct, I cannot determine as a matter of law whether Sullivan is entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity must be denied.

When a § 1983 defendant raises qualified immunity at summary judgment, the plaintiff must show a violation of a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time.

Unzueta v. Steele · filed 2003-10-29

When a § 1983 defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity on summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that 1) the official violated a constitutional or statutory right; and 2) the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred.

A police officer may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the officer's actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Elkins v. McKenzie · filed 2003-10-30

This Court finds that the trial court erred by denying Elkins summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity pursuant to the § 1983 claim. Elkins's actions were objectively reasonable under the facts of this case.

Police officers may obtain qualified immunity from § 1983 claims for excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.

Wilder v. Village of Amityville · filed 2003-10-30

Defendants Sergeant Thompson and Officer Slack are granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs claims of excessive force, false arrest and malicious prosecution on the additional grounds of their qualified immunity from such suits.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the law did not clearly put him on notice that his conduct was unlawful.

Mooring v. San Francisco Sheriff's Department · filed 2003-10-31

Because the law did not put Gonzalez on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.

Prison officers sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer could have believed their conduct was lawful.

Glenn v. Berndt · filed 2003-11-03

In addition, the undisputed facts make clear that the responding officers are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. A reasonable officer could have believed that waiting to enter C Section until Officer Kelly opened the door after exhausting his efforts to control the situation with the gas gun and pepper spray was lawful.

An officer sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have known the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Swipies v. Kofka · filed 2003-11-03

We further conclude that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that removing Kendra in those circumstances would violate Mr. Swipies’s parental liberty interest.

When a § 1983 plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation, a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity without an inquiry into whether the right was clearly established.

Burleigh v. City of Detroit · filed 2003-11-05

All things considered, Burleigh cannot establish that his Fourth (and Fourteenth) Amendment rights were violated. He therefore cannot defeat Sergeant Williams’ claim to qualified immunity, and we need not consider whether his constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the violation.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim turns on the objective reasonableness of the defendant’s acts, not the defendant’s subjective state of mind.

Rodriguez v. Cruz · filed 2003-11-06

Qualified immunity turns only upon the objective reasonableness of a defendant’s acts, and a defendant’s subjective state of mind has no bearing on whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Child protective officials have qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that initiating neglect proceedings violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Garcia v. Scoppetta · filed 2003-11-06

In the absence of clearly established law on what constitutes a neglected child, defendants can not reasonably have been expected to know whether or not the initiation of neglect proceedings against plaintiff violated her rights. They are entitled to qualified immunity.

A state actor sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged conduct does not violate a constitutional or statutory right.

Tuggle v. Mangan · filed 2003-11-06

Because Mangan is entitled to qualified immunity, we reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Mangan.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct does not establish a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Tuggle v. Tom Mangan, Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission · filed 2003-11-06

We conclude Tuggle has failed to establish Mangan violated her constitutional rights because his conduct was not so severe or pervasive to constitute hostile work environment sexual harassment. Because Mangan is entitled to qualified immunity, we reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Mangan.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a government official when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established right.

Hammons v. Saffle · filed 2003-11-13

Since Hammons failed to show that his clearly established First Amendment rights were violated, this court affirms the district court’s holding that Saffle is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for a mistaken arrest when the identifying information reasonably matches a facially valid warrant and no reasonable officer would know that further investigation was required.

Hill v. Scott · filed 2003-11-14

In light of all the circumstances, we hold Scott had sufficient consistent identifying information to reasonably conclude the warrant was for appellant Hill and no reasonable officer would have known failing to investigate further would violate the Fourth Amendment.

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit must show a constitutional violation, a clearly established right, and a factual dispute over whether reasonable officers would have known their conduct violated that right.

Hill v. Scott · filed 2003-11-14

To avoid summary judgment based on qualified immunity, Hill had to proffer sufficient evidence to find a violation of a Constitutional right, show the alleged right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, and raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether reasonable officers would have known their conduct would have violated this clearly established right.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when clearly established law requires them to consider strong exculpatory evidence before concluding that probable cause exists.

Navarro v. City of South Gate · filed 2003-11-14

Given the clearly established nature of both the law defining the offense at issue and the requirement that officers consider the totality of the circumstances (exculpatory as well as inculpatory), as well as the presence of strong evidence indicating that Navarro acted in self-defense, a reasonable officer would not have sought to arrest Navarro without first considering whether the discharge of the firearm was privileged.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether her conduct was objectively unreasonable.

Watkins v. Millennium School · filed 2003-11-18

This Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Defendant Apley is entitled to qualified immunity. ... Hence, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

An official performing discretionary actions is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless those actions violated a clearly established federal right.

Evans v. City of Zebulon, Georgia · filed 2003-11-18

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity for liability arising out of his discretionary actions unless those actions violated a clearly established federal right of which a reasonable person would have known.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could have understood the conduct to be authorized by statute and constitutional.

Tremblay v. McClellan · filed 2003-11-20

On the undisputed facts, there is no doubt that a reasonable officer could have understood that his actions were authorized by the statute and constitutional.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when the officers' entitlement depends on resolving disputed facts in their favor.

Wilkins v. City of Oakland · filed 2003-11-20

Where the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity depends on the resolution of disputed issues of fact in their favor, and against the non-moving party, summary judgment is not appropriate.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that the official’s conduct was unlawful.

Easton v. Fallman · filed 2003-11-21

The result is that the law was not clearly established, so even if Easton’s allegations were sufficient to support a claim of constitutional violation, the State Defendants were properly entitled to qualified immunity, in any event.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff fails to establish that the officer violated a clearly established right.

Rogers v. Gooding · filed 2003-11-24

Furthermore, Rogers has not directed this court or the district court to any cases or other law to establish that Gooding violated any clearly established rights. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Gooding was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim depends on whether the official violated a clearly established right; an inmate’s right to care for serious medical needs was clearly established by 1998.

Minor v. Barwick · filed 2003-11-25

“Government officials, including police officers, are entitled to immunity from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983 if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Thus, the general right which Minor and Carter are alleged to have violated was well established at the time of Barwick’s overdose and subsequent death.

An officer sued individually under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the officer’s conduct did not violate a clearly established federal right.

Darruthy v. City of Miami · filed 2003-11-26

After thorough review of this record, including a series of videotaped recordings of the incident at issue, we conclude that Pastor is entitled to qualified immunity on Durruthy’s wrongful arrest and excessive force claims.

Section 1983 affords individual officials qualified immunity when their conduct violates no constitutional right or the asserted right was not clearly established in the circumstances.

Dwan v. City Of Boston · filed 2003-12-06

Because the individual defendants did not violate Dwan's Fifth Amendment rights, the first prong of the Saucier inquiry is decisive in their favor. And, as to the second prong, a violation of the Fifth Amendment in these circumstances is not "clearly established" or readily apparent. Whether a Fifth Amendment right exists in the "abstract" — as it obviously does — is not the question. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Thus, there is qualified immunity here even if we are wrong in finding that Dwan's constitutional rights were not violated.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the facts alleged show no violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Desyllas v. Daniel Bernstine Roderic Diman John Fowler Rick Roe · filed 2003-12-09

For the foregoing reasons we hold that the Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. The Appellees did not violate Desyllas’s constitutional rights under the facts as alleged by Desyllas.

Section 1983 damages claims against government officials are subject to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights.

Moorer v. Price · filed 2003-12-09

The district court properly dismissed Moorer’s claims against defendants Sutherby and Beardslee because they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from a prisoner's retaliation claim when the prohibition against retaliatory punishment was clearly established.

Bruce v. Ylst · filed 2003-12-10

We hold that as to the retaliation claim, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when probable cause existed and no constitutional right was violated.

Hamilton v. Collett · filed 2003-12-11

Because probable cause existed, even absent the allegedly false statements, the defendants did not violate Hamilton’s constitutional rights and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is protected by qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when no constitutional right was violated.

Mitchell v. City of Tulsa Ex Rel. Tulsa Police Department · filed 2003-12-12

Because there has been no violation of constitutional rights, Officer Fish is protected by qualified immunity.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when the employee cannot show an adverse employment action.

Foley v. Univ of Houston Sys · filed 2003-12-18

Even if Dr. Hutto were able to cite a specific example of protected speech, she still could not overcome the defense of qualified immunity because, as noted supra, she cannot show the occurrence of an adverse employment action. ... The district court erred in rejecting the defense of qualified immunity with respect to Dr. Hutto's § 1983 First Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a Section 1983 claim for refusing to process a grievance naming himself when a reasonable officer could not believe the conduct lawful.

Knight v. Nimrod · filed 2003-12-19

The district court improperly granted Nimrod qualified immunity, however, with regard to Knight’s allegation that Nimrod refused to file a grievance in which Nimrod himself was a named party. ... Because the record is devoid of evidence that Nimrod acted pursuant to established policy, the district court incorrectly concluded that a reasonable officer could have believed such conduct lawful.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against an officer for an alleged double jeopardy violation arising from his pursuit of criminal charges.

Jackson v. City of Cambridge · filed 2003-12-31

Qualified immunity would protect him from any damages claim based on the alleged double jeopardy violation arising out of his pursuit of the armed robbery charges.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity for conduct that violates clearly established law.

Yurchak v. County of Carbon · filed 2003-12-31

Therefore, Carbon County’s termination of Yurchak’s employment because of his political affiliation was in violation of clearly established law and that action is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when they should have known their alleged conduct was unlawful.

Sims v. Schultz · filed 2004-01-09

Thus, the court finds that defendants Lynn and Schultz should have known it would be unlawful to harass and discharge plaintiff for his comments. Accordingly, defendants Lynn and Schultz are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false-arrest claim when probable cause defeats the alleged Fourth Amendment violation.

Campbell v. Moore · filed 2004-01-14

Here, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because Andrew failed to show as a matter of law that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. For the reasons described above, Joseph had probable cause to arrest Andrew for criminal mischief after witnessing the events outside his window, and Dennis had probable cause to assist in the arrest after having learned of these events from Joseph. Thus, we hold that both officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Andrew’s Fourth Amendment claim.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim is a question of law that should be decided at the earliest stage of litigation.

Colao v. Mills · filed 2004-01-15

To be sure, whether qualified immunity exists is purely a question of law (see Martinez v Simonetti, 202 F3d 625, 632 [2d Cir 2000]) and should be determined at the earliest stage of litigation (see Baez v City of Amsterdam, 245 AD2d 705, 707 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 810 [1998]).

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful.

Hall v. Stewart · filed 2004-01-16

Because no “offensiveness to others” element was clearly established under Fla. Stat. § 796.07 at the time of the arrests, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants may obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact about their entitlement to it.

Sager v. Thurston County · filed 2004-01-16

Summary judgment was proper because Sager failed to controvert the defendants’ evidence that county employees did not violate Sager’s constitutional rights and also failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county employees were not entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer facing a § 1983 excessive force claim may receive qualified immunity if the officer reasonably misunderstood whether the force used was lawful.

Kent v. Katz · filed 2004-01-20

In contrast, in a qualified immunity determination the relevant question is whether the officer’s mistake about the legality of his conduct was reasonable.

A police officer is protected from damages under § 1983 by qualified immunity when it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe there was probable cause for an arrest.

Abramowitz v. Romano · filed 2004-01-23

Accordingly, because a neutral magistrate issued a warrant, and because the plaintiff has failed to make the requisite substantial preliminary showing that Romano misled the issuing judge, the court concludes that it was objectively reasonable for Romano to believe that there was probable cause.

Qualified immunity protects an official facing a Section 1983 claim when the official’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the information available at the time.

Dopp v. Rask · filed 2004-01-27

To be entitled to qualified immunity, Mr. Rask had to show only that his actions were objectively reasonable in light of the information he possessed at the time of his actions.

An officer sued under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and the right was clearly established at the time.

Lyons v. City of Xenia · filed 2004-01-27

Only if the answer to both questions is yes may an officer’s motion for qualified immunity be denied.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when no reasonable officer could believe the use of force was lawful under clearly established law.

Parker v. Town of Swansea · filed 2004-01-28

For all these reasons, Officer Roussel is not entitled to qualified immunity and his motion for judgment as a matter of law on Parker’s claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is denied.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Losleben v. Oppedahl · filed 2004-01-28

Recognizing the division in authority which existed prior to Olech and the confusion that continues to loom in this area of the law, we conclude that any equal protection right held by Losleben at the time of his termination from employment was not well enough established to impute knowledge of it to Capp. Thus, Capp is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

A jailer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when his conduct is objectively reasonable and violates no clearly established constitutional right.

Smith v. Patri · filed 2004-01-29

Thus, Patri is entitled to summary judgment on his defense of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, a court may deny discovery that does not relate to a defendant’s qualified-immunity claim.

Greer v. Litscher · filed 2004-01-30

The discovery sought by Greer did not relate to any defendant’s claim of qualified immunity. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Greer’s motion to compel discovery.

Section 1983 hearing officers are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the evidence supporting a disciplinary finding was constitutionally insufficient.

Alejandro Luna, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Jose Pico and Allen Cave, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees · filed 2004-01-30

We hold that defendants are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, for at the time of their decisions, a reasonable hearing officer would not have known that the quantum of evidence relied on by Pico and Cave was clearly an insufficient basis for finding Luna guilty.

Individual officials are shielded from § 1983 damages liability when they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Sutherland v. Tooele City Corp. · filed 2004-02-03

We are in accord with the district court’s holding that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for the reasons given by the district court in its memorandum opinion and order.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Singletary v. Stalder · filed 2004-02-09

It follows that Singletary does not have a clearly established constitutional right to be present when non-privileged mail from the media is opened and inspected.

In a § 1983 suit, officers are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor show a violation of clearly established rights.

Aczel v. Labonia · filed 2004-02-12

Accepting the undisputed facts and, where disputed, the version most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because on that version of the facts plaintiff invokes constitutional rights that were clearly established at the time of the event.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim at summary judgment when the plaintiff’s version of the facts would make the use of deadly force plainly unlawful to a reasonable officer.

Hernandez v. City of Miami · filed 2004-02-13

And under those facts, Mr. Hernandez has met his burden of showing that Officer Hernandez is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 1983 claims against officials are subject to qualified immunity when the officials do not violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known.

Preston v. Quinn · filed 2004-02-18

In addition, dismissal of Preston’s § 1983 claims against Matos and White was proper because they possessed qualified immunity under federal law as well as state law.

Public officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity from damages if they acted in good faith.

Robert R. Thonen and William Schell, Jr. v. Leo W. Jenkins, President of East Carolina University · filed 1975-05-29

But the.Supreme Court has consistently held that public officials sued under § 1983 have a qualified immunity from damages if they acted in good faith. ... The district court’s decision on the damage claim will be vacated and the cause remanded to enable the court to enter findings as to defendants’ good faith under the standards of Wood v. Strickland.

Government officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Jacobs v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources · filed 2004-02-20

Therefore, Sewell and Rhoades are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Individual officials cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit when a reasonable official would have known that their conduct violated a clearly established right.

Cox v. Roskelley · filed 2004-02-20

We further hold that the contours of the right to a name-clearing hearing upon placement of stigmatizing material in a personnel file were clearly established, such that a reasonable official in these defendants' position would have known that his conduct was unlawful. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Boxer and Farnell.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim for injunctive relief against officials in their official capacities.

Meiners v. University of Kansas · filed 2004-02-24

Qualified immunity applies to claims for monetary relief against officials in their individual capacities, but it is not a defense against claims for injunctive relief against officials in their official capacities. ... Because Dr. Meiners sued the defendants only in their official capacities and only her reinstatement claim survives the Eleventh Amendment bar, qualified immunity is inapplicable.

Officers sued under § 1983 for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation are entitled to qualified immunity when their actions were objectively reasonable.

Rosen v. County of Suffolk, NY · filed 2004-02-25

First, in the unlikely event that a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment actually occurred during the execution of the TOP, Defendant Schreiber and the officers are still entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were not objectively unreasonable.

Section 1983 defendants sued individually are shielded by qualified immunity when their conduct violates no constitutional right or the right was not clearly established.

Stavropoulos v. Firestone · filed 2004-02-25

The district court correctly held that Stavropoulos failed to show an adverse employment action, and therefore failed to establish a constitutional violation by either Firestone or Squires. And, even if we had found that Firestone or Squires’s actions amounted to a violation of Stavropoulos’s First Amendment rights, our discussion of the caselaw in this area shows that there was no clearly established law to put them on notice that their actions were a violation. Thus, the district court properly held that Firestone and Squires were shielded by qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect officials from a § 1983 claim when they had fair warning that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights.

Moran v. Clark · filed 2004-02-26

Appellants, especially as law enforcement officials, knew or should reasonably have known that the specific conduct outlined by Moran was unlawful.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to officials whose egregious, conscience-shocking conduct is clearly outside their discretionary authority.

Moran v. Clarke · filed 2004-02-26

When government officials engage in conscious-shocking, egregious behavior that is clearly outside the scope of their discretionary authority, they are not entitled to qualified immunity under section 1983.

A factual dispute over whether a reasonable officer would have known his conduct violated a prisoner's rights can support denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim.

Ondrey v. Patterson · filed 2004-02-27

The record evidence reflects a genuine issue of material fact: whether a reasonable person in Corporal Ondrey's position would have known that his actions and omissions, under all of the circumstances, amounted to a deliberate indifference to Mr. Patterson's psychiatric needs and constitutional rights. See id. at 834-35. Accordingly, the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law by denying Corporal Ondrey's motion for summary judgment as to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit is a question of law for the court, decided without deference to the jury’s resolution.

Riccardo v. Rausch · filed 2004-02-27

Immunity, however, is a matter of law for the court, to be decided without deference to the jury’s resolution — and preferably before the case goes to the jury.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action protects officials from monetary damages, but not injunctive or declaratory relief.

Johnson v. Pearson · filed 2004-03-01

Qualified immunity only protects defendants from being sued for monetary damages. ... It does not protect the same individuals from Plaintiffs requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.

Qualified immunity protects a Section 1983 defendant when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established.

Spier v. Elsaesser · filed 2004-03-01

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must decide: (1) whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged are sufficient to show a violation of the Constitution; and (2) whether the right was clearly established.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Sullivan, Connie v. Ramirez, Robert · filed 2004-03-03

Mr. Ramirez is entitled to qualified immunity on Ms. Sullivan and Ms. Blanco’s First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts establish no constitutional violation; the court need not decide whether the right was clearly established.

Connie Sullivan and Mary Blanco v. Ramirez · filed 2004-03-03

Neither must we consider whether the law was clearly established under the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis because we conclude that the facts as alleged do not establish a First Amendment violation. ... Mr. Ramirez is entitled to qualified immunity on Ms. Sullivan and Ms. Blanco’s First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a § 1983 action, a prior ruling that officers entered a home unlawfully does not preclude a qualified immunity defense when that defense requires a different inquiry.

Strutz v. Hall · filed 2004-03-11

Although that question also is relevant here, Defendants’ assertion of a qualified immunity defense results in a slightly different inquiry — specifically, this Court must decide whether an objectively reasonable officer in Defendants’ position could have believed it permissible to enter Plaintiffs’ home without a warrant. This lack of exact identity of issues precludes the application of collateral estoppel here.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Martin v. City of Oceanside Shawn Kelly Benjamin Ekeland · filed 2004-03-11

The district court correctly determined that the “emergency aid” exception provided the officers with qualified immunity; however, the court applied the exception under the second prong of Saucier rather than the first.

Section 1983 does not provide qualified immunity to correctional officers when clearly established law would have put a reasonable officer on notice that their use of force was unconstitutional.

Jones v. Cunningham · filed 2004-03-12

We hold that, at the time of the use of force against Jones, the law was sufficiently clearly established to place a reasonable correctional officer on notice that “the type of intentional, unjustified, unprovoked, and brutal conduct” in which the guards engaged constitutes unconstitutionally excessive force.

State and local executive or administrative officials have only qualified immunity from liability under § 1983.

Williams v. Anderson · filed 1977-08-31

State and local executive or administrative officials are accorded only a qualified immunity from liability, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State prison officials who act without good faith are not immune from damages under § 1983.

Zaczek v. Hutto · filed 1978-03-29

Therefore, the court finds that respondents did not act in good faith and consequently do not have any immunity.

Qualified immunity can shield an officer from a § 1983 claim based on an arrest without probable cause when the legality of the arrest was unclear.

Blackstone v. Quirino · filed 2004-03-17

In this way, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects a state actor from § 1983 liability in circumstances where the proper application of the underlying constitutional standard might be unclear and, therefore, not otherwise suited for dismissal or summary disposition. ... Thus, summary judgment for the defendant officers will enter on the § 1983 count, in part, to the extent that it seeks to establish liability based on an absence of probable cause.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive force claim when a reasonable officer would have known that using excessive force while handcuffing violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.

Kopec v. Tyrone Tate, Officer Township of Whitemarsh · filed 2004-03-17

Therefore, we hold that the right of an arrestee to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of his handcuffing clearly was established when Officer Tate acted in this case, and that a reasonable officer would have known that employing excessive force in the course of handcuffing would violate the Fourth Amendment.

A qualified-immunity defense to a § 1983 claim against a school official may be denied on a motion to dismiss.

Starkey Ex Rel. Starkey v. Somers Central School Dist. · filed 2004-03-18

The eighth cause of action arises out of a different set of facts. It does not involve a claim under the IDEA, but instead is based under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, the New York State Constitution, Article Eleven § 1 and under New York Education Law § 3214(3), all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The Defendants have made a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs amended complaint (the “Complaint”) on three grounds: ... (3) Dr. Brodow is entitled to qualified immunity. ... For the reasons set forth in greater detail below, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to the first argument and denied as to the second and third arguments.

Officers sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when they violate a clearly established limit on the scope of a search warrant.

Doe v. Groody · filed 2004-03-19

We hold it to be clearly established that unless a search warrant specifically incorporates an affidavit, the scope of the warrant may not be broadened by language in that affidavit. We also conclude that, under any reasonable reading, the warrant in this case did not authorize the search of the mother and daughter, and that the search was not otherwise justified. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's determination that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts establish no constitutional violation.

Linbrugger v. Abercia · filed 2004-03-22

If no constitutional right has been violated, the inquiry ends and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim when the right was clearly established and the official’s conduct was not objectively reasonable.

Ceballos v. Gil Garcetti Frank Sundstedt Carol Najera County of Los Angeles · filed 2004-03-22

The individual defendants’ actions were not objectively reasonable. We therefore reject the qualified immunity defense.

Qualified immunity protects a government official from § 1983 damages when a reasonable official would not know that the alleged conduct violated a clearly established right.

Doe Ex Rel. Doe v. Detroit Board of Education · filed 2004-03-24

Furthermore, the Court determines that a substitute teacher would not reasonably know that leaving the classroom, ordering a student to sit next to another student, or knowingly refraining from intervening to help a student would violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court determines that Defendant King is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits supervisory liability for deliberate indifference to a known danger of sexual abuse, and qualified immunity does not protect a supervisor whose conduct a reasonable official would understand was unlawful.

Doe v. Warren Consolidated Schools · filed 2004-03-24

Accordingly, we find that there is ample evidence in the record demonstrating Stamatakis’s deliberate indifference to what he knew was the imminent danger posed by Kearly. ... In these respects, Stamatakis’s actions were objectively unreasonable and a reasonable official in his position would understand that his actions were unlawful. Therefore, we deny Stamatakis’s claim for qualified immunity and affirm the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment.

Public officials sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when they reasonably believe their conduct is lawful.

Cady v. South Suburban College · filed 2004-03-26

The defendant officers here are entitled to qualified immunity based on their reasonable belief that the arrest was justified.

Officers facing a § 1983 claim are entitled to qualified immunity when the law governing an arrest was not clearly established.

Lawyer v. City of Council · filed 2004-03-26

Even if an Iowa court were to conclude later that conduct such as Timothy's does not violate the statute, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim depends on whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, whether the law was clearly established, and whether a reasonable official would have understood the conduct to be unlawful.

Rivera-Jimenez v. Pierluisi · filed 2004-03-29

To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity we use a three-part test: first, whether a constitutional violation has been alleged if plaintiffs' allegations are established as true; second, whether the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and last, whether a reasonable official, similarly situated would understand that the challenged conduct violated a constitutional norm.

A child protective services worker is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when an investigation supported by reasonable cause violates no clearly established constitutional right.

Petcu v. State · filed 2004-03-30

Because Smith's investigation was founded upon reasonable cause to believe that Petcu sexually abused his children, we affirm the trial court's ruling that qualified immunity shielded her from Petcu's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Government officials have qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Phillips v. Hust · filed 2004-03-31

The defense of “qualified immunity” protects “government officials ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

In a § 1983 damages claim against a prison official, the subjective prong of qualified immunity requires intent to harm or conduct substantially certain to cause harm.

William Hardin Bogard, Jr. v. Thomas D. Cook, Former Superintendent of the Mississippi State Penitentiary · filed 1978-12-15

In light of the Court’s reference to the Restatement, we read the malicious intent prong of the official immunity defense to require proof that an official either actually intended to do harm to the plaintiff, or took an action which, although not intended to do harm, was so likely to produce injury that the harm can be characterized as substantially certain to result.

Section 1983 permits qualified good-faith immunity for officers who rely on state law authorizing their conduct.

Garner v. Memphis Police Department · filed 1979-06-18

Applying the qualified "good faith" privilege or immunity from liability for constitutional claims, as announced in our previous decisions cited above, we affirm that portion of the District Court's judgment dismissing the case against the individual defendants.

A defendant in a § 1983 excessive-force suit is entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have clearly known the challenged force was unlawful in the circumstances.

Avery v. Anderson · filed 2004-04-05

Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because “the amount of force described by [Mr. Avery,] even if objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, was not so far disproportionate to the perceived threat that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

An official seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no clearly established right was infringed and that the official is entitled to immunity.

Palmer v. Paul Richards, Ronald Goss · filed 2004-04-06

It was, of course, Richards’s burden at summary judgment to show the nonexistence of a clearly established right and his entitlement to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against a prison officer when existing law did not give fair warning that the challenged search violated an inmate’s constitutional rights.

Lay v. Porker · filed 2004-04-08

The volume of applicable precedent examined by the Court does not make apparent the unlawfulness of the conduct of which Plaintiff complains. ... Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity for the claims asserted against him.

Qualified immunity does not support dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts could establish an objectively unreasonable violation of clearly established rights.

Pena-Borrero v. Estremeda · filed 2004-04-09

In our view, such a seizure could be objectively unreasonable and a violation of appellant's clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. If a jury so finds, defendants would not be protected by qualified immunity, and dismissal on that basis is therefore unavailable.

Officers cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit when their conduct violates a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Bevan v. Smartt · filed 2004-04-09

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and the Court finds that Defendants do not enjoy qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action requires a threshold inquiry into whether the alleged facts show a constitutional violation.

Howard v. Columbia Public School District · filed 2004-04-13

In evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, we ask the threshold question of whether the facts alleged show that the official’s actions violated a constitutional right.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a statutory or constitutional right.

Rollins v. Missouri Department of Conservation · filed 2004-04-14

Because Rollins has failed to produce sufficient evidence to show that Hohman violated Rollins’ statutory or constitutional rights, Hohman is entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 false arrest claim, qualified immunity turns on whether the officer had a reasonable basis to believe probable cause existed.

Kijonka, Henry S. v. Seitzinger, Michael · filed 2004-04-14

The question for us is whether there was any rea- sonable basis to suppose there was probable cause, as that is the test for qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from a false-arrest claim when they reasonably believe there was probable cause for the arrest.

Kijonka v. Seitzinger · filed 2004-04-14

The question for us is whether there was any reasonable basis to suppose there was probable cause, as that is the test for qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit against a state prison official, the official bears the burden of producing evidence to support a qualified immunity defense after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.

Gullatte v. Potts · filed 1981-08-31

The defendant then has the burden of coming forth with some evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that the defendant acted in good faith or without malice.

Qualified immunity bars damages against individual defendants when the right was not clearly established, but it does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief under § 1983.

Donhauser v. Goord · filed 2004-04-15

Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages against defendants. Qualified immunity does not, however, mandate dismissal of the second amended complaint, as plaintiff also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts could show that prison officials retaliated against an inmate for filing grievances, a clearly established right.

Lodato v. Ortiz · filed 2004-04-16

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the right allegedly violated is a clearly established one. A reasonable official would understand that transferring a prisoner to Administrative Segregation to retaliate against him for exercising his constitutional right to file grievances is a violation of the law. Therefore, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is inappropriate.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when, on the plaintiff’s version of disputed facts, a reasonable officer would know the arrest was unlawful.

Gerald Wall, Dr. v. County of Orange, a Political Sub-Division of the State of California H. Watson · filed 2004-04-16

On Wall’s version of the facts, a reasonable officer would know that an arrest would be unlawful under the circumstances.

In a § 1983 claim requiring proof of an official’s intent, a factual dispute over that intent can justify denying qualified immunity.

Kinney v. Weaver · filed 2004-04-19

When an official’s intent or the reasons for his or her actions are an essential element of the underlying violation, we have treated factual disputes over intent just like any other factual dispute that can justify a denial of qualified immunity.

Individual defendants may receive qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff neither argues nor presents factual evidence that the force used was unreasonable.

Wells v. The City and County · filed 2004-04-21

The district court granted summary judgment on the assault and battery claim and granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on the excessive force claim, based on its conclusion that appellant had neither argued nor presented factual evidence about whether the force used in effectuating his arrest was reasonable. We agree with the district court ’s reasoning.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on a failure-to-protect claim when the evidence does not establish that the prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm.

Berry v. Sherman · filed 2004-04-22

Given our holding that the evidence does not establish that Berry objectively faced a substantial risk of harm, we need not address whether the appellants subjectively acted, or failed to act, with deliberate indifference to Berry's safety. ... For the foregoing reasons, the district court's order denying qualified immunity to the appellants on Berry's failure-to-protect claim is reversed.

A § 1983 plaintiff who fails to assert a constitutional violation cannot overcome a qualified immunity defense.

Mahaffey v. Winston County Sheriff's Department · filed 2004-04-22

Failure to assert the violation of a constitutional right results in the failure to overcome the defense of qualified immunity.

Government officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity for discretionary conduct unless they violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Berry v. Robb Sherman Roger Rutledge Susan Embree James J. Burgess Richard Fongemie, Sgt. · filed 2004-04-22

Qualified immunity shields government officials from suit in performance of discretionary functions. However, when an official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known, qualified immunity does not prevent suit by the injured party.

A defendant in a Section 1983 suit is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage when a jury could find deliberate indifference on the facts assumed for the appeal.

Rodriguez v. Walrath · filed 2004-04-22

To preclude qualified immunity at this time, however, it is enough that a jury could, on those assumed facts, find that level of indifference.

Qualified immunity does not shield state actors from a Section 1983 state-created-danger claim when established law put them on notice that their alleged conduct, if proved, was unlawful.

Rivas v. City of Passaic · filed 2004-04-26

In sum, we find that the preexisting law of “state-created danger” jurisprudence was clearly established. As such, it was sufficient to put Garcia and Rodriguez on notice that their conduct, if deemed unlawful, would not shield them with immunity.

Officers sued under § 1983 for excessive force may have qualified immunity if they reasonably believed their force was lawful under the circumstances known to them.

Rivas v. City Of Passaic · filed 2004-04-26

Consequently, even if an officer uses force that was objectively unreasonable, he may nevertheless be protected from individual monetary liability if he reasonably believed, based on the facts and circumstances known to him, that the force used was lawful.

In a § 1983 action, officials are entitled to qualified immunity when reasonable officials in their position would not have clearly understood that their conduct was unlawful.

Smith v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2004-04-26

The district court properly determined that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Smith, does not show that reasonable officials in the defendants’ position would have clearly understood that their response or non-response to Smith’s concerns about a gang contract was unlawful.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against officials when they have not violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Hoffer v. Ancel · filed 2004-04-28

Further, even if we could find that plaintiff could withstand summary judgment with respect to the substance of his claims, we must affirm the trial court’s decision because defendants have not violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the asserted right was not clearly established.

Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock · filed 2004-04-29

Nevertheless, this precedent is insufficient to clearly establish the law for this circuit. Officers Ahlfinger, Brink and Rui-si are thus entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to immunity when their conduct did not violate rights clearly established at the time.

Yoggerst v. Stewart · filed 1983-06-22

In determining whether an official is entitled to a grant of immunity the court must decide whether his conduct, at the time it was undertaken, violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Accordingly, in the alternative, I find that defendants are entitled to a grant of immunity for their conduct in this case.

A defendant must plead qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to a § 1983 claim.

Dufrin v. Oakland County Sheriff Johannes Spreen · filed 1983-07-29

Since the sheriff has not raised a “good faith” defense here, Sala need not detain us. “Qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.”

Qualified immunity shields officials sued for damages under Section 1983 when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights a reasonable person would have known.

Ciak v. Armstrong · filed 2004-05-03

Qualified immunity “shields government officials performing discretionary — ■ as distinct from ministerial — functions from liability for damages arising from their actions which do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Officials who act under color of state law but outside the scope of their law enforcement duties cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit.

Rossignol v. Voorhaar · filed 2004-05-05

With the benefit of the Fourth Circuit’s contrary determination, however, this Court can now only conclude that this case falls into that category of actions taken under color of law, yet outside of the scope of the actors’ employment as law enforcement officers. ... Accordingly, the same arguments made in Defendants’ briefs that persuaded this Court in its prior opinion that their actions were not taken under color of state law, now lead it to conclude that the defense of qualified immunity is unavailable to any of the defendants in this action.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when they reasonably believe probable cause exists for an arrest.

Townes v. City of Tulsa · filed 2004-05-10

Further, the defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity as they reasonably believed that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Townes, a holding born out by the fact that the trial court bound him over for trial.

An officer sued under § 1983 for arrest without probable cause has qualified immunity if the officer had arguable probable cause to arrest.

Gliatta v. Jones · filed 2004-05-10

Therefore, if an officer has arguable probable cause to arrest, he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct is objectively reasonable under clearly established law.

Harris v. Mississippi Valley State Univ. · filed 2004-05-13

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Harris' termination was reasonable.

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant in a § 1983 suit when the principles establishing the violation are well settled.

Hadley, Sean L. v. Williams, Hilda · filed 2004-05-14

The principles on which we reverse are well settled, which precludes a defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit requires the court to ask whether the officer violated a constitutional right and, if so, whether that right was clearly established.

Draper v. Reynolds · filed 2004-05-17

To determine whether Reynolds is entitled to qualified immunity, we apply a two-part inquiry. First, applying the facts in the light most favorable to Draper, we must ascertain whether Reynolds violated Draper’s constitutional rights. ... Second, if we decide that a constitutional violation occurred, we then must determine whether the rights violated were “clearly established.”

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the evidence cannot support a finding that they violated a constitutional right.

Richard Deters and Derrick Storzieri v. Collete Lafuente, Ronald Knapp, the City of Poughkeepsie, and the City of Poughk · filed 2004-05-18

In the absence of a violation of a constitutional right, Lafuente and Knapp are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 suit have qualified immunity from a perceived political association claim when existing law would not alert a reasonable official that the conduct violated the First Amendment.

Good v. BD. OF COUNTY COM'RS OF COUNTY OF SHAWNEE · filed 2004-05-19

Here, we could not find that a reasonable government actor would know that the First Amendment right to association extends to “perceived” association. No Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision has so held. Nor have we found any other circuit court case that provides any support. In sum, the court believes that the individual defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued for damages under Section 1983 have qualified immunity when their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they allegedly violated.

Torres v. Irvin · filed 2004-05-19

We “provid[e] government officials performing discretionary functions with a qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” ... Therefore, the district court was correct in concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim when the asserted right was not clearly established and a reasonable officer would not know the conduct violated it.

Frierson v. Goetz · filed 2004-05-19

Furthermore, a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not know that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment for the same reasons set forth above to establish the good faith defense to liability under the federal statute. Defendant obtained an ostensibly valid court order in reliance on Tennessee law by a Tennessee judge and received verification of its propriety from the local district attorney. We therefore agree with the district court that defendant has qualified immunity from liability for a Fourth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield officers merely because the facts differ from precedent when established law clearly applies to their conduct.

Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati · filed 2004-05-20

Additionally, it must be noted that the possibility that these procedures interject some arguably novel facts distinguishing this case from the facts contained in the controlling precedent does not entitle the officers to qualified immunity.

A state official asserting qualified immunity from § 1983 damages has the burden of proving that defense.

Boals v. Gray · filed 1983-11-09

The qualified immunity defense is an affirmative one and must be proven by the defendant official.

Section 1983 lets a person sue a state or local official for depriving the person of federal rights under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity.

Bowser v. Borough of Freehold · filed 2004-05-27

Because the officers had probable cause to arrest Bowser, they acted reasonably in bringing charges against him for violating New Jersey’s firearms laws, and they are entitled to qualified immunity.