42 U.S.C. § 1983

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a § 1983 excessive force claim when no reasonably competent officer could consider their use of force against a subdued suspect lawful.

Coleman v. Rieck · filed 2003-03-24

The force used by officers while Coleman was actively resisting arrest may have been reasonable, but the court cannot find that any “reasonably competent officer” could have concluded that Officers Kruse and Tomsu were justified in kicking Coleman for fifty-three seconds as he lay on the ground. ... Accordingly, the court will not adopt the magistrate’s recommendation to grant qualified immunity to defendants Kruse and Tomsu.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 liability for an arrest if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed, even if that belief was mistaken.

Liser v. Smith · filed 2003-03-26

In sum, even if Detective Smith’s judgment were mistaken, and the arrest of Liser was not actually supported by probable cause, his conduct is sheltered by qualified immunity from liability under § 1983.

Officers sued under § 1983 for false arrest or malicious prosecution cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether reasonably trained officers would have known the arrest warrant application lacked probable cause.

Chipperini v. Crandall · filed 2003-03-26

For the reasons discussed above, the Connecticut law was clearly established notwithstanding the issuance of the warrant and there is a least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether reasonably well-trained officers in the defendants’ position would have known that the warrant application failed to establish probable cause for an arrest. ... For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to counts seven and eight of the amended complaint for § 1983 malicious prosecution and false arrest on the basis of qualified immunity is DENIED.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit may be premature to decide at the pleading stage when the complaint adequately alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim.

Rodriguez v. Board of Trustees · filed 2003-03-26

Properly limiting our focus to Rodriguez’s complaint, we find that it satisfies the minimal pleading standard for each of the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court therefore erred in dismissing Rodriguez’s First Amendment claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Likewise, the district court’s finding of qualified immunity in this case at the pleading stage was premature.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim when disputed facts bear on whether the officers’ conduct violated clearly established law.

Martinez v. G.D. Stanford W. Owen M. Atkinson D. Rockholt J. Stovall · filed 2003-03-26

Although the law had changed, the facts in dispute bearing on the question of qualified immunity had not, and thus the district court erred in granting summary judgment.

Qualified immunity protects defendants in a Section 1983 action when the plaintiff cannot show they violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Gamble v. Reamer · filed 2003-03-27

Plaintiff cannot show that defendants violated any clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 equal protection claim for sexual orientation discrimination merely because no Ninth Circuit case has nearly identical facts when the right was clearly established.

Massey v. Banning Unified School District · filed 2003-03-28

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. The law has been clearly established for several years that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation gives rise to an equal protection claim. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause, and Defendants may not immunize themselves from liability because another case with nearly identical facts has not been decided in the Ninth Circuit.

Government officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right that a reasonable person would have known.

Meyers v. Nebraska Health And Human Services · filed 2003-03-28

Qualified immunity shields government officials from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could fail to recognize that the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Spier v. Elaesser · filed 2003-04-01

Plaintiffs constitutional right of free speech was violated due to his arrest by Defendant, but because it would not be clear to a reasonable police officer that Defendant’s conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted, Defendant has a valid defense under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when the right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Ross v. City of Ontario · filed 2003-04-07

The officers are entitled to qualified immunity, however, because the contours of the right against excessive force in this context were not so clearly established at the time that a reasonable official would have known that his or her conduct was unlawful.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against school administrators when clearly established law gave them fair warning that discriminatory enforcement of school policies was unlawful and the evidence permits a finding of deliberate indifference.

Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified School District · filed 2003-04-08

We conclude, however, that in light of the evidence plaintiffs presented, a jury could find that the defendants took no more than the minimal amount of action in response to the complaints of harassment. ... Thus, qualified immunity is not appropriate.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage when the alleged facts, if proven, would show that a reasonable official understood the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Foreman v. PA BECKWITH · filed 2003-04-10

Moreover, the defendants, at this juncture in the case, are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because the plaintiffs have asserted violations of the clearly established right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and because the facts alleged, if proven, would show that a reasonable official would have understood that his actions violated that right.

Officers acting within their discretionary authority may invoke qualified immunity against individual-capacity § 1983 claims.

Lumley v. City of Dade City Florida, Michael Wilkes, Linda Leggett Register, Ray White · filed 2003-04-10

Here, it is clear that the defendants were acting – if they acted at all – in their discretionary capacities when they restrained and guarded Lumley or acted to obtain the bullet from his body.

In a § 1983 suit, once officials show they acted within their discretionary authority, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that qualified immunity is unavailable.

Lumley v. City of Dade City · filed 2003-04-10

Once the defendants establish that they were acting within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate.

Government officials sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when they reasonably believe their conduct was lawful.

Cinaglia v. Levin · filed 2003-04-11

For the reasons stated above, Defendants held an objectively reasonable belief that they were authorized by the Supervision Act to dismiss Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for suits brought under § 1983.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct was reasonable in light of clearly established law and the circumstances known at the time.

Christie v. Barats · filed 2003-04-11

Accordingly, the sheriffs, prosecutors, and county clerk were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct towards the Christies was reasonable under the circumstances known to officials at the time, in light of clearly established Nevada law.

Qualified immunity does not protect defendants in a § 1983 claim when the jury finds that they dismissed an employee for exercising First Amendment rights rather than for the asserted lawful reason.

Tejada-Batista v. Agostini · filed 2003-04-14

In all, the verdict against co-defendants Morales and Alvarez evidences two pertinent conclusions: (1) that the jury found plaintiffs discharge was motivated by the exercise of his First Amendment rights, and not based on his domestic abuse conviction; and (2) that said finding took co-defendants outside the ambit of qualified immunity protection.

In an individual-capacity § 1983 suit, plaintiffs bear the burden of defeating an officer’s qualified immunity defense.

Molina, Raul v. Cooper, Gary · filed 2003-04-15

The Molinas bear the burden of defeating this de- fense.

Police officers are protected from § 1983 liability for a detention when they could reasonably believe it was lawful because they had probable cause to believe the detainee broke the law.

Annan-Yartey v. Harris · filed 2003-04-15

The district court properly granted defendants judgment as a matter of law because the police officers could have reasonably believed that their conduct in detaining Annan-Yartey was lawful where they had probable cause to believe that Annan-Yartey broke the law.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 excessive-force claim against individual officers when, taking the plaintiff’s evidence as true, a reasonable officer would have known the force was excessive.

Federman v. County of Kern · filed 2003-04-15

In short, plaintiffs have alleged two separate excessive force violations under the Fourth Amendment. Taking their evidence as true for summary judgment purposes, the SWAT team entry into Federman’s home and the officers’ shooting of Federman were unreasonable. Qualified immunity was, thus, properly denied the individual defendants on the excessive force claims.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Sonntag v. Papparozzi · filed 2003-04-16

Because Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants’ conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, the Defendants in this matter are entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers have qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false-arrest claim when their determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, even if mistaken.

Wrubel v. Bouchard · filed 2003-04-16

As long as their determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, Defendants are entitled to immunity, even if their determination was mistaken.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would know that forcibly entering a motel room violates clearly established rights.

Finsel, Charles F. v. Cruppenink, Thomas · filed 2003-04-21

Given the facts as we must inter- pret them, Cruppenink should have known that he could not break down the door and forcibly enter Finsel’s motel room.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action requires deciding whether the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and, if so, whether the right was clearly established at the time.

Finsel v. Thomas Cruppenink, in His Individual and Official Capacities as Vermilion County Deputy Sheriff · filed 2003-04-21

We engage in a two-part inquiry in civil rights actions to assess whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. We first determine whether a plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right. ... If a constitutional right is violated, we next determine whether it was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Government officials sued for damages under § 1983 have qualified immunity when an objectively reasonable officer would not have known the conduct violated clearly established rights.

Tower v. Leslie-Brown · filed 2003-04-22

Because objectively reasonable officers would not have known they were violating the Towers' Fourth Amendment rights by entering their home, the defendants enjoy qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 qualified-immunity inquiry, the court first asks whether the alleged facts establish a constitutional deprivation, then whether the right was clearly established.

Williams v. Hansen · filed 2003-04-22

Initially in considering this contention we determine whether plaintiffs have alleged facts setting forth valid claims for a deprivation of a constitutional right. ... Then, if plaintiffs' equal protection claims survive this threshold review, we must determine whether the right plaintiffs advance was clearly established at the time of its alleged violation so that a reasonable person would have known of the right.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim when his traffic enforcement conduct was objectively reasonable.

Johnson v. Crooks · filed 2003-04-23

At a minimum, Crooks is entitled to qualified immunity from her Fourth Amendment claim because his conduct in enforcing the Nebraska Rules of the Road was objectively reasonable.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the officer’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Cunningham v. Hamilton · filed 2003-04-25

The officers’ use of force however, did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation under the facts of this case. The defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when their conduct violates no clearly established right.

Sullivan v. Bornemann · filed 2003-04-28

Accordingly, I find that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs federal claims, whether on excessive force grounds or on due process grounds, as there is no clearly established right to be free from the actions of the officers complained of in this case. Plaintiffs § 1983 claims must therefore be dismissed.

In a § 1983 suit, a court considering qualified immunity first determines whether the plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation, then whether the right was clearly established.

Roska v. Peterson · filed 2003-04-29

Order is important; we must decide first whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, and only then do we proceed to determine whether the law was clearly established.

A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer would have known the alleged conduct violated clearly established law.

Leisure v. City of Cincinnati · filed 2003-05-06

Because a reasonable officer would have known that it violated the principles of Gamer to pursue a fleeing suspect allegedly with a firearm drawn and a finger on the trigger, Defendant Roach is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show deliberate or reckless falsehoods material to probable cause.

Deen v. Corning City · filed 2003-05-07

The district court did not err in concluding that Officer Jellison was entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are not entitled to qualified immunity when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, they arrest and search someone without any basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause and the violation would have been clear to them.

Lynn v. O'LEARY · filed 2003-05-08

The second inquiry is whether it would have been clear to the defendants that their actions violated Lynn’s rights. Under Lynn’s version of the facts, the officers arrested and searched him without any basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Accordingly, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violates no constitutional right.

Saumur v. Robles · filed 2003-05-08

The officers who executed the warrant were therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim when the pleadings leave unresolved facts needed to assess the asserted due process liberty interest.

Wilkerson v. Stalder · filed 2003-05-14

Because the inmates’ Complaint does not allege whether the inmates’ confinement in extended lockdown resulted from their initial classification or from violations of prison rules, we cannot determine whether the inmates have asserted facts that would give rise to denial of a liberty interest. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s Order denying the prison officials’ Motion to Dismiss the inmates’ procedural due process claims based on qualified immunity.

A corrections officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for sexually assaulting an inmate when a reasonable officer would have known the assault violated the inmate’s constitutional rights.

Williams v. Prudden · filed 2003-05-19

Further, Lanon is not protected by qualified immunity. Any reasonable corrections officer would have known in January 1999 that sexually assaulting an inmate would violate the inmate’s constitutional rights.

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 damages claims unless their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights.

Singfield v. Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority · filed 2003-05-20

It is well settled that government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil suits for damages arising out of the performance of their official duties unless their alleged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. ... Therefore, O’Leary is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for both the due process and equal protection claims.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when material factual disputes prevent the court from assessing the official’s conduct.

Camilo v. Ramirez · filed 2003-05-21

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary functions from suit and from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, due to the factual disputes regarding a possible political discriminatory motivation and the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s personnel decisions, all of which are vital to this case as a whole and the Court’s assessment of the qualified immunity defense in particular, the Court is not in a position to grant Defendant’s motion for qualified immunity at this time.

Officials sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when the law governing their conduct was not clearly established.

Gross v. Carter · filed 2003-05-22

The Court believes all three— Brandon Carter, Lt. Spradlin and Mayor Coberly — are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiffs claims against them.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when a reasonable officer would not have understood that the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Alexander, Nathan D. v. Deangelo, Joseph · filed 2003-05-22

This case is just over the line from that one; for we cannot say that it would have been obvious to the average officer that the deceit employed in this case rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Hence DeAngelo (and Hannaford, if as we doubt he is still in the case) is protected from liability.

Qualified immunity can bar a § 1983 claim based on malicious prosecution, false arrest, or abuse of process.

Savino v. City of New York · filed 2003-05-22

For the reasons stated above, we hold that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to Savino’s claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest and abuse of process, as well as his § 1983 claim based on these state-law causes of action.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff alleges no constitutional violation and fails to show that their conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Green v. Stanley · filed 2003-05-23

Additionally, the district court did not err in finding that Dr. Stanley was qualifiedly immune. Green has not alleged a constitutional violation under current law and he has not shown that Dr. Stanley’s actions were objectively unreasonable with reference to the clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question.

An officer facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity if the alleged conduct violated no constitutional right; the court need not then decide whether the asserted right was clearly established.

Chavez v. Martinez · filed 2003-05-27

In deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we must first determine whether the officer's alleged conduct violated a constitutional right. See Katz, 533 U. S., at 201. If not, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity, and we need not consider whether the asserted right was "clearly established." Ibid.

Officials sued under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless their conduct violates a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Dwan v. City of Boston · filed 2003-05-27

Under well-established law, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for official action unless (1) their conduct violated Dwan's constitutional rights and, in addition, (2) the law to this effect was "clearly established" under then-existing law so that a reasonable police officer would have known that his behavior was unlawful.

Qualified immunity does not shield officials from a § 1983 claim when the factual premises of their immunity defense are unsupported by the record.

Dimartino v. Richens · filed 2003-05-27

Next, we address the defendants’ claim that the trial court improperly found that they were not entitled to qualified immunity in its ruling on their motion for a directed verdict. ... The defendants’ factual premises concerning their actions, however, are simply unsupported by the record. ... Because the defendants’ factual premises are flawed, the legal contentions that rest on those premises must fail as well.

Officers lack qualified immunity from a Section 1983 unlawful arrest claim when no reasonable officer could believe the arrest lawful under clearly established probable cause rules.

Earles v. Perkins · filed 2003-05-29

We find that Perkins had the right to be free from arrest absent a showing of probable cause and that the undisputed facts fail to indicate that a reasonable officer, under the facts and cireumstances presented to Earles and Jones, could have believed Perkins' arrest to be lawful. ... For all of these reasons, Earles and Jones are not entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not plead facts anticipating and overcoming a qualified immunity defense.

Bond v. AGUINALDO · filed 2003-05-29

Mr. Bond is not required to plead facts that anticipate and overcome a defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect an official who unreasonably fails to investigate whether a release form he drafted reaches constitutionally protected medical records.

Denius, Ronald C. v. Wayne · filed 2003-05-30

With just minimal investigation, Dunlap could likely have discovered that vet- erans’ medical records are housed at the NPRC, but he chose not to conduct such a search. This was plainly unrea- sonable, so the district court was correct to deny Dunlap’s defense of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect a § 1983 defendant who unreasonably fails to investigate whether a release form he drafted covers protected medical records.

Denius v. Dunlap · filed 2003-05-30

Furthermore, we believe that a reasonable official in Dunlap's position would, at a minimum, have made some effort to look into the form's legal effect. With just minimal investigation, Dunlap could likely have discovered that veterans' medical records are housed at the NPRC, but he chose not to conduct such a search. This was plainly unreasonable, so the district court was correct to deny Dunlap's defense of qualified immunity.

For a § 1983 claim arising from a prison disciplinary hearing, qualified immunity is assessed using the confinement sentence imposed when officials acted, rather than the time the inmate ultimately served.

Hanrahan v. Doling · filed 2003-05-30

In conclusion, because defendants’ claim of qualified immunity is properly analyzed in relation to the 120-month SHU sentence imposed on Hanrahan, rather than the 335-day sentence which Hanrahan actually served, the District Court properly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a Section 1983 claim when allegations raise factual issues about an official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs.

Abdus-Samad v. Greiner · filed 2001-08-13

Moreover, Plaintiffs allegations that Defendant Superintendent Greiner was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs raise sufficient issues of fact concerning Defendant Superintendent Greiner’s actions towards Plaintiff to preclude dismissal on qualified immunity grounds at this stage of the litigation.

Section 1983 protects individual defendants from damages through qualified immunity when their conduct did not clearly violate a constitutional right.

Henn v. City of Highland Heights · filed 1999-07-28

5. That all individual defendants are protected from damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity, in that the action taken herein did not clearly violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, but rather the law is not totally clear in this area; ... 8. That the plaintiffs file a status report herein within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Opinion & Order, specifying what, if any, evidence they intend to offer on the claim for damages made in the complaint, or requesting the court to dismiss such claim.

Section 1983 claims against a public official may be resolved by summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.

Shearer v. Bowen · filed 2000-05-24

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred in denying summary judgment to Bowen on the ground of qualified immunity and vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of judgment for Bowen on qualified immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 excessive force claim when, on the plaintiff's version of the facts, the officer's use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable.

O'Bert v. Vargo · filed 2003-06-02

On appeal, Vargo contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law on the ground that, even on plaintiff's version of the events, which Vargo states he adopts for these purposes, it was objectively reasonable for him to use deadly force against O'Bert in the belief that O'Bert posed an immediate threat of death or serious injury to Vargo and/or the other officers. We disagree, for as the district court concluded, under plaintiff's version of the events, with all permissible inferences drawn in plaintiff's favor, Vargo's use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to an official when the constitutional right was clearly established and no reasonable official could believe the challenged conduct was lawful.

Barrow v. Greenville Independent School District, Herman Smith, Dr. · filed 2003-06-02

Brantley and Fyfe also confirm that the constitutional right of public-school employees to select a private-school education for their children was clearly established when Smith refused to consider Barrow for the position of assistant principal. ... We therefore hold that no reasonable official could conclude that the application of the school district’s public-school patro'nage policy to Barrow was constitutional.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit has qualified immunity if the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable at the time in light of clearly established law.

Crape v. Brazoria County · filed 2003-06-03

Second, a defense of qualified immunity will succeed if the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable at the time in light of clearly established law.

In a § 1983 suit against a public official in an individual capacity, qualified immunity supports dismissal only when it is established on the face of the complaint.

No. 02-3929 · filed 2003-06-05

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, to be upheld in a motion to dismiss only when the immunity can be established on the face of the complaint.

Qualified immunity shields officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established rights that a reasonable person would have known.

Diaz v. Albuquerque, New Mexico Police Department · filed 2003-06-09

“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” ... Having carefully reviewed the record on appeal, the parties’ briefs, and the pertinent case law, we agree with the district court’s analysis and its conclusions. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, for substantially the same reasons set forth in the order entered by the district court.

Officials sued under § 1983 for delaying a prisoner’s marriage have qualified immunity from damages when the unconstitutionality of the delay was not clearly established.

Steven Martin and Tammy Stolka v. Donald N. Snyder, Jr. · filed 2003-06-12

It is very hard to see how it could be deemed clearly established that delay is forbidden, when a federal judge with ample time for legal research has reached the conclusion that delay is constitutional. Qualified immunity thus is appropriate in this case, but in the future district judges should not dismiss similar complaints at the pleading stage.

For qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim, whether an asserted constitutional right was clearly established is a question of law; the official’s subjective view does not control.

Barrow v. Sch · filed 2003-06-17

The question whether an asserted constitutional right is clearly established is one of law. Smith’s subjective reasonableness has no place in our inquiry.

Defendants in a Section 1983 cell-extraction claim are entitled to qualified immunity when the allegations do not show that the officers acted maliciously with intent to cause harm.

Holestine v. Cambra · filed 2003-06-17

Moreover, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Holestine’s allegations regarding the cell extraction did not show that the officers acted maliciously with the intent to cause harm.

Reliance on an attorney’s advice alone does not entitle an official to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Putnam v. Keller · filed 2003-06-18

We reject the College officials' separate argument that they are insulated from liability due to "extraordinary circumstances" – that is, their reliance on the advice of their attorney.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a prisoner's drug-testing claim when the prisoner does not show that the testing was meant to harass or was unreasonable.

Sheehy v. Palmateer · filed 2003-06-18

Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Sheehy did not demonstrate that the drug testing was meant to harass or that the testing was unreasonable.

Qualified immunity does not shield an officer from a § 1983 claim when a disputed fact could establish a violation of a clearly established right.

Thompson v. University of California Regents · filed 2003-06-18

Thompson raised a material issue of fact as to whether there was reasonable suspicion, and his right not to be stopped absent reasonable suspicion was clearly established. Accordingly, Officer Cresap was not entitled to qualified immunity.

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when no clearly established law prohibits their conduct.

S.G. v. Sayreville Bd Ed · filed 2003-06-19

In any event, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law to the contrary.

Individual defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

S.G., as Guardian Ad Litem of A.G. A Minor and Individually v. Sayreville Board of Education Georgia B. Baumann William · filed 2003-06-19

In any event, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established law to the contrary.

Qualified immunity is available in a § 1983 action unless clearly established law would make a reasonable state actor understand how it applies to the conduct at issue.

West, Edwin v. Schwebke, Kurt · filed 2003-06-20

Qualified immunity is available unless the rules of law on which plaintiffs rely are so clearly established that a reasonable state actor is bound to understand how they apply to the situation at hand.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit cannot use an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal to have an appellate court resolve disputed facts before trial.

West v. Schwebke · filed 2003-06-20

An interlocutory immunity appeal may not be used to present factual disputes for pretrial appellate resolution.

A defendant in a Section 1983 action is not entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s alleged facts could establish a violation of a clearly established right.

Wright v. Moise · filed 2003-06-20

Because the right allegedly violated in this case is clearly established, and the facts construed in Wright’s favor could be found to establish a violation of that right, the denial of the motion for summary judgment is affirmed.

Officers cannot invoke qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim when clearly established law made the arrest impermissible to every objectively reasonable officer.

Alford v. Haner · filed 2003-06-23

Because in light of the facts and clearly established law no objectively reasonable officer could have concluded that arresting Alford for taping the traffic stop was permissible, defendants were not entitled to immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity cannot rest on probable cause for unrelated, uncharged offenses when officers lacked an objectively reasonable basis for the arrest.

Alford v. Haner · filed 2003-06-23

It would eviscerate the "objective reasonableness” standard, and the "closely related offense” doctrine, to allow the officers to invoke qualified immunity by claiming reliance on probable cause for other uncharged and unrelated offenses.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect an arresting officer when, viewing the facts in the plaintiff’s favor, no reasonable officer could believe probable cause existed.

Codling v. City of New York · filed 2003-06-23

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Codling, it was not objectively reasonable for Hughes or any reasonable officer in his situation to believe that probable cause existed because Hughes knew that Codling’s response was precipitated by his own actions. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in granting Hughes’s motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the record shows no facts establishing that they violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Milstein v. Cooley · filed 2003-06-23

Because there were no facts to show that either Cooley or Foltz violated Milstein’s constitutional rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity shields an officer from civil liability on a First Amendment theory with no decisional support.

Bruette v. Montgomery County · filed 2003-06-24

It is simply unsupported by any citation of law in any brief before the district court or in this appeal. And, we know of no decisional support for it. Thus, the district court correctly held that Birch enjoyed qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when material factual disputes determine whether an officer’s conduct was reasonable.

Brooks v. Sevier County · filed 2003-06-24

With respect to the claim against Schults in his individual capacity and the issue of qualified immunity, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the entry of summary judgment.

Qualified immunity protects an officer from a § 1983 suit unless the officer’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Mace v. City of Palestine · filed 2003-06-24

Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when a reasonable officer would not have understood that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Anderson v. Cash · filed 2003-06-25

Even if a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to Anderson’s excessive force claim, Trooper Cash is entitled to qualified immunity from Anderson’s claim. In civil damage actions arising out of a government official’s performance, the official is generally entitled to qualified immunity from suit insofar as the official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

A § 1983 claim alleging that child-welfare officials knowingly ignored severe harm to a child they removed from his mother can survive a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.

Omar Ex Rel. Cannon v. Lindsey · filed 2003-06-26

The complaint alleges constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against these individuals. The gravamen of the allegations is that these individuals knowingly and deliberately ignored the physical, mental and emotional harm being caused this child by the intentional infliction of known cruel and unusual punishment that shocks the conscience of any reasonable person. The ruling of the district court denying the motion to dismiss is affirmed for the reasons set forth in its ORDER of January 14, 2003 which is attached as an appendix.

A school official sued under § 1983 for excessive forcible restraint is not entitled to qualified immunity when the student's right was clearly established at the time.

John Doe, a Minor, (Born 01/28/90) by His Next Friend Jane Doe Jane Doe, Individually v. State of Hawaii Department of E · filed 2003-06-30

The district court therefore properly concluded that Doe’s right to be free from excessive forcible restraint was clearly established in 1998, when the events giving rise to this case occurred.

Public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged facts show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Catletti v. Rampe · filed 2003-07-02

Thus, we find that the facts alleged in Catletti's complaint state a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Accordingly, we hold that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 qualified immunity inquiry ends when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Alicea v. Puerto Rico Tourism Co. · filed 2003-07-03

Because plaintiffs here have been unable to allege a claim of political discrimination, the Court need not go on to determine whether the right was “clearly established” or whether the state officer would have understood that the challenged conduct violated the plaintiffs clearly established rights. If no violation of a clearly established constitutional right is found, then the analysis halts because “there is qualified immunity.”

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to police officers whose conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Morris v. Johnson · filed 2003-07-08

“Government officials, including police officers, are entitled to immunity from personal liability under 42 USC § 1983 if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Since the evidence shows that qualified immunity applies to Johnson and Gerido, they are entitled to summary judgment on the Administrator’s federal claims.

Qualified immunity shields a government official from a § 1983 suit over discretionary conduct unless the official violates a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Pagels v. Dean Minor · filed 2003-07-09

Qualified immunity shields a government official from suit in his performance of a discretionary function unless that official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known. ... For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that part of the District Court's order denying Minor qualified immunity, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Qualified immunity shields officials sued under § 1983 for discretionary conduct unless they violate a clearly established right a reasonable person would have known.

Pagels v. Morrison · filed 2003-07-09

Qualified immunity shields a government official from suit in his performance of a discretionary function unless that official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.

A government official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the alleged conduct violated no constitutional right.

Lisle v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County · filed 2003-07-09

Having not found any constitutional violation, we must answer the qualified immunity question in the affirmative.

Section 1983 does not shield officers through qualified immunity when no reasonably well-trained officer would believe the warrant affidavit established probable cause.

Williams v. County of Santa Barbara · filed 2003-07-14

The affidavit that Detective Means submitted to Judge William McLafferty failed to establish probable cause as to the Schades. Neither Means nor any officer who claims to have acted in reliance on the affidavit is entitled to qualified immunity.

Officers have qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim if reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed.

Boyd v. City of New York · filed 2003-07-15

Moreover, if police officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether there was probable cause, there is "arguable" probable cause sufficient to warrant qualified immunity for the defendant officers.

Qualified immunity does not protect officials from a Section 1983 claim when they objectively unreasonably enforce a policy that violates clearly established rights.

Chiu v. Plano Independent School District · filed 2003-07-16

Davis and Criswell’s enforcement of a school speech policy that was an unconstitutional prior restraint as applied was objectively unreasonable.

Qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim does not protect officers when the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and established law gave them fair warning that their conduct was unlawful.

Thompson v. Douds · filed 2003-07-18

Because the facts as alleged by Thompson show the violation of a constitutional right and because that right was sufficiently clearly established for the individual officers to have fair warning that their conduct was unlawful, the trial court erred in granting final summary judgment in favor of the individual officers on this issue.

Qualified immunity may protect officials from a Section 1983 claim when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established.

Putnam v. Keller · filed 2003-07-22

We affirm the denial of qualified immunity to the College officials with respect to Putnam's procedural due process and First Amendment claims, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the College officials based on qualified immunity on Putnam's substantive due process claim.

Qualified immunity bars a Section 1983 damages claim against officers when the plaintiff has not stated a cognizable constitutional violation.

Carr v. Tatangelo · filed 2003-07-23

Because Carr has not a stated cognizable constitutional claim on the facts of this case relating to denial of medical assistance, Officers Tatangelo, Fortson, and Mercer are entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim if, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, no reasonable officer could believe the arrest was lawful.

Henderson v. City of Seattle · filed 2003-07-23

Swank’s appeal fails because, “[although it is possible in the context of qualified immunity to act ‘reasonably* but still exceed the bounds of the law, summary judgment based on qualified immunity should be denied if under the plaintiffs version of the facts the officer could not reasonably believe his conduct was lawful.”

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a constitutional right.

Chandler v. Rodriguez · filed 2003-07-17

For the reasons stated above, and for substantially the same reasons relied upon by the district court, we conclude that Defendants are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity and entitled to summary judgment.

Qualified immunity does not protect officers from a Section 1983 claim when no reasonable officer would have concluded that the plaintiff consented to the detention.

Hatheway v. Thies · filed 2003-07-18

Detectives Thies and McGuire contend that a reasonable official would have concluded that Mr. Hatheway consented to the detention and interrogation. We disagree and therefore affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

An individual official is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the alleged conduct violated a right sufficiently clear for the official to understand that it was unlawful.

Becerra v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City · filed 2003-07-25

Based on Supreme Court precedent, and these specific facts as alleged by Plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint, the Court finds Becerra’s constitutional rights should have been sufficiently clear to Defendant Mots for him to have understood that his conduct — as alleged — violated them.

An individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Boggess v. Housing Authority of City of Charleston · filed 2003-07-25

Assuming for purposes of argument that Plaintiff could show a violation of Plaintiffs First Amendment rights by the individual Commissioner defendants, Plaintiff has not cited any authority for her position that those rights were clearly established at the time she was put on administrative leave and later discharged. In short, Plaintiff has cited no pre-existing law, from which it is apparent that the individual Commissioner defendants’ alleged actions in Count II were unlawful. Thus, the court finds that the individual Commissioner defendants are granted qualified immunity from liability for the claim alleged in Count II.

A police officer has qualified immunity from personal liability under § 1983 when a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed for the arrest.

Esposito v. Williamson · filed 2003-07-25

Ordinarily, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity, which shields them from personal liability under § 1983. ... Here, the undisputed facts require the application of the qualified immunity defense.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their belief that their conduct was lawful was reasonable.

Brant v. Volkert · filed 2003-07-25

Under these circumstances, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because it cannot be said that their belief that their actions were lawful was unreasonable.

Defendants in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe their conduct conformed with the law.

Matecki v. Marion County · filed 2003-07-28

Therefore, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive-force claim when the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that their force was excessive.

Hendershott v. Cook · filed 2003-07-28

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hendershott’s Eighth Amendment claim finding that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Hendershott failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants’ use of force to restore discipline and quell a fight between Hendershott and his cellmate was excessive.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from personal-capacity claims when their alleged conduct violates no clearly established constitutional right.

Velez v. Levy · filed 2003-07-29

As explained above, the defendants’ conduct, as alleged, did not constitute a violation of either the First or Fourth Amendments, or procedural or substantive due process. Consequently, with respect to these claims, the defendants could not have violated the clearly established constitutional rights of the plaintiff, and they are entitled to qualified immunity.

When a district court denies summary judgment on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 suit, it must identify the disputed material facts and explain their materiality.

Carroll v. Rochford · filed 2003-07-30

This rule requires District Courts to “specify those material facts that are and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their materiality.” Id. ... The District Court’s order was entered prior to our opinion in Forbes, and we do not fault the District Court for failing to comply with a rule that had not yet been announced, but in order to ensure that we do not exceed our jurisdiction, we vacate the order of the District Court and remand for compliance with the Forbes rule.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 damages when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Laura Toms and Ira Chaiffetz v. Bob Taft Reginald J. Wilkinson Anthony J. Brigano Lawrence Belskis Mark Clark · filed 2003-07-31

Because the case law fails to show that an inmate’s right to marry was so clearly established that an official reasonably would believe that declining to assist an inmate in obtaining a marriage license is unconstitutional, the Chaiffetzes have failed to meet their burden. We affirm the finding of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 damages, but factual disputes about a politically motivated reassignment can prevent summary judgment on that defense.

Morales v. Agosto-Alicea · filed 2003-08-01

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary functions from suit and from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for qualified immunity is hereby DENIED at this stage of the litigation as to Defendant Agosto Alicea’s decision to assign the particular duties and working conditions Plaintiff held at the PRHFA and GRANTED as to his decision to reclassify her position from trust to career and place a person sympathetic to his political views in that position.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity if a constitutional violation occurred and no reasonable officer could have believed their conduct lawful.

Durrell v. Cook · filed 2003-08-01

If it is determined subsequently that a violation did occur, no reasonable officer could have believed that defendants’ conduct was lawful, so defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when a reasonable official would have known that the alleged conduct violated a clearly established right.

Lilienthal v. City of Suffolk · filed 2003-08-04

The court also concludes that a reasonable person in defendant Outlaw’s position would have known that his conduct would violate that right. Accordingly, qualified immunity on plaintiffs section 1983 free speech claim under the First Amendment is inappropriate at this early pleading stage of the litigation.

An individual official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff cannot establish a violation of a known constitutional right.

Abel v. Auglaize County Highway Department · filed 2003-08-04

Since Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of any known constitutional right, Defendant Reinhart is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity on all of Plaintiffs federal claims in his individual capacity. ... Defendant Reinhart is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs claims against him in his individual capacity brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when they could reasonably believe their conduct was lawful under the circumstances.

Huss v. Rogerson · filed 2003-08-05

Even considering the facts in a light most favorable to Huss, the Court concludes that a reasonable person could have believed that because Huss was a danger to himself and others, and given the realities of then-available facilities and services, placing him in Living Unit B was reasonable under the circumstances. This case turns on the unique-circumstances of this Plaintiffs security issues and the unique circumstances of temporarily unavailable facilities and services. On these facts, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 damages claim when the facts, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, show a violation of a clearly established right.

Delgado v. Jones · filed 2003-08-11

The initial inquiry is whether, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show that a constitutional right was violated. ... The second step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. ... For the above reasons, at this point in the proceeding, Jones’s invocation of qualified immunity fails.

In a § 1983 damages action, qualified immunity shields an official whose conduct a reasonable official could have believed lawful under clearly established law.

Olson v. Hauglin · filed 2003-08-11

A government official is shielded by qualified immunity from suit for damages if a reasonable official could have believed his or her conduct to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the official.

A state official is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff has not shown a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Schafer v. Carmona · filed 2003-08-11

As Shafer has not demonstrated a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, we do not reach the issue of the objective reasonableness of Warden Carmona’s conduct and conclude that the warden is entitled to qualified immunity.

A government official sued for damages under § 1983 has qualified immunity if a reasonable official could have believed the conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the official possessed.

Olson v. Bloomberg · filed 2003-08-11

A government official is shielded by qualified immunity from suit for damages if a reasonable official could have believed his or her conduct to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the official.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is not entitled to qualified immunity when the right violated was clearly established.

Young v. Seling · filed 2003-08-11

We also hold that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because the right to telephone access was clearly established.

A state employee exercising delegated supervisory authority over a prisoner is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim for violating the prisoner’s clearly established right to be free from sexual abuse.

Smith v. Cochran · filed 2003-08-12

Accordingly, Cochran is not entitled to qualified immunity and we AFFIRM the decision of the district court denying Cochran’s motion for summary judgment on that issue.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense available to public officials in Section 1983 actions.

Mimics, Inc. v. Village of Angel Fire · filed 2003-08-12

Defendant Hasford seeks summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and shields public officials from “trial or ... other burdens of litigation.”

Qualified immunity can provide an alternative basis for summary judgment on a Section 1983 claim.

Haynie v. County of Los Angeles Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca David Mertens Jensen, Deputies, in Their Perso · filed 2003-08-12

Accordingly, we conclude that qualified immunity is a proper, alternative basis for the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim proceeds to trial when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether the officers used excessive force.

Minchella v. Bauman · filed 2003-08-13

Because the case was before it on summary judgment, the district court should have ended its analysis there and proceeded to a trial on the merits of the § 1983 claim.

Qualified immunity shields an officer from damages under Section 1983 when the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established rights.

Ingersoll v. Laplante · filed 2003-08-13

We also conclude that the district court correctly granted qualified immunity to LaPlante with respect to Susan Cino’s claim for excessive force.

Officers sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity when their reliance on prosecutors’ review of a search warrant was reasonable.

Lesoine v. County of Lackawanna · filed 2003-08-14

Moreover, it was not unreasonable for Jordan and Fox to rely on the experience and expertise of the ADAs who helped draft and who approved the warrants. ... Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Jordan and Fox were entitled to qualified immunity.

Courts, rather than juries, decide qualified immunity in a § 1983 action.

James Johnson, Iii v. County Of Los Angeles · filed 2003-08-15

This requirement calls upon courts, not juries, to settle the ultimate questions of qualified immunity.

Officials are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim when a valid grand jury indictment establishes probable cause for the arrest.

Bakos v. City of Olmsted Falls · filed 2003-08-19

Because the facts show that probable cause did exist based on the indictment, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and we may end our qualified immunity analysis here. ... Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

An officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts fail to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Hernandez v. Jarman · filed 2003-08-21

Accordingly, Jarman is entitled to qualified immunity for his conduct because the facts as alleged by Hernandez fail to state a violation of Six Feathers's clearly established constitutional rights.

Qualified immunity does not protect prison officials from a § 1983 deliberate-indifference claim when the law was clearly established and a reasonable official would have understood that the alleged conduct was unlawful.

Stinson v. Galaza · filed 2003-08-21

The law concerning deliberate indifference was clearly defined at the time the Defendants refused Plaintiff the prescribed ice, and a reasonable official would have understood that the alleged actions were contrary to law.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to state a violation of federal law.

Butler v. Rio Rancho Public Schools Board of Education · filed 2003-08-25

Since the Butlers failed to state a substantive due process violation, we conclude the School is entitled to qualified immunity on the Butlers’ substantive due process claims.

Qualified immunity does not require dismissal of a § 1983 claim alleging race-based enforcement when reasonable officers could not disagree that such conduct is prohibited, even if probable cause supported the citation.

High v. Fuchs · filed 2003-08-25

Because reasonable police officers could not disagree that enforcing laws differently on the basis of race is clearly prohibited, dismissal of High’s complaint on the basis of qualified immunity, even with a finding of probable cause for the prosecution of the citation, would be inappropriate.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

Santana v. Calderon · filed 2003-08-26

The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the facts alleged show the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the contours of this right are "clearly established" under then-existing law so that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct was unlawful.

In a § 1983 suit, an officer is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds when the facts show no constitutional violation; the court need not ask whether the asserted right was clearly established.

Knox, Paul v. Smith, Deborah · filed 2003-08-26

Given this, she did not violate Knox’s constitutional rights in requesting the May warrant and therefore is entitled to entitled to summary judgment. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”). Our inquiry here is at an end.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.

Rahn v. Hawkins · filed 2003-08-26

We also hold that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established. ... Accordingly, we reverse the grant of qualified immunity to Officers Hawkins, Jansen, and Fitzgerald, and we remand for further proceedings.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to establish a violation of a constitutional right.

Ortlieb v. Howery · filed 2003-08-27

She therefore could not meet Saucier’s first requirement that she allege facts establishing a violation of a constitutional right. The district court properly concluded that Mr. Smith is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect officers whose arrest was objectively unreasonable in the specific circumstances.

Pappas v. New Haven Police Department · filed 2003-08-29

Finally, regardless of whether, in general, defendants’ actions were clearly contrary to established case law, the specific facts of this case preclude any finding of qualified immunity.

An officer sued under § 1983 for seeking an arrest warrant is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonably competent officer with the same knowledge could have found probable cause.

McCall v. Peters · filed 2003-08-29

Because a reasonably competent law enforcement officer with Johnson’s knowledge of the facts of this case could have found probable cause to seek the arrest warrant, Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity for having done so.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim at summary judgment when, on the plaintiff’s version of the facts, a reasonable officer could not have believed the use of deadly force was lawful.

Vaughan v. Cox · filed 2003-08-29

Taking the facts as alleged by Vaughan, an objectively reasonable officer in Deputy Cox’s position could not have believed that he was entitled to use deadly force to apprehend Vaughan and Rayson. ... Thus, Deputy Cox is not entitled to summary judgment, on qualified immunity grounds, regarding Vaughan’s § 1983 claim predicated on the Fourth Amendment.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 damages action cannot be resolved at summary judgment when disputed facts prevent the court from deciding whether an officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable.

Glass v. Abbo · filed 2003-09-03

Therefore, because of the “fact-intensive nature of the requisite inquiry” of determining objective reasonableness in this case, the Court cannot resolve the qualified immunity question at this stage of the proceeding.

A public official sued under § 1983 may receive qualified immunity for discretionary acts when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of clearly established constitutional law.

Ex Parte Sawyer · filed 2003-09-05

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant Marsh, as we are required to do under our summary-judgment standard of review, we conclude that Sawyer was engaged in a discretionary function. ... Marsh's version of Sawyer's actions, standing alone, is not sufficient to create a fact question that takes Sawyer out from under the protection of the qualified-immunity doctrine.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 excessive force claim when, viewing the facts favorably to the plaintiff, no jury could properly find the officer’s conduct objectively unreasonable.

McCoy v. City of Monticello · filed 2003-09-08

Based on the totality of circumstances, and viewing the summary judgment facts in a light most favorable to the McCoys, we conclude a jury could not properly find Ouellette’s act of drawing his gun was objectively unreasonable, entitling Ouellette to qualified immunity.

An officer who had probable cause to make an arrest is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim arising from that arrest.

Thompson v. Gregory · filed 2003-09-08

The district court correctly determined that defendant had probable cause to make the arrest and he was entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield a defendant from a § 1983 retaliation claim when the right was clearly established and the alleged conduct was not objectively reasonable.

Hart v. Hairston · filed 2003-09-09

Furthermore, Hairston was not entitled to qualified immunity because, as noted above, the right to be free from retaliation of the sort alleged by Hart was “clearly established” by the 1980s, see Woods, 60 F.3d at 1164 & n.12, and defendant Hairston’s conduct, as alleged by Hart, was not objectively reasonable.

Officers sued under Section 1983 lack qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would have known their use of force violated clearly established law.

Drummond v. City of Anaheim · filed 2003-09-10

We hold, on the record before us, that the officers violated Drummond's constitutional rights and that, because the law was clearly established, any reasonable officer would have known that the force used amounted to a constitutional violation. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the individual officers and remand for trial.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when clearly established law would give a reasonable officer fair notice that the conduct was unlawful.

Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim · filed 2003-09-10

We hold that, under the circumstances, a reasonable officer would have had fair notice that the force employed was unlawful, and that any mistake to the contrary would have been unreasonable.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct violates no clearly established constitutional right.

Thunderbird v. Lampert · filed 2003-09-16

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Thunderbird’s claim that prison officials violated his rights by not making a Native American translator available to him because prison officials had not violated any clearly established constitutional right.

A public official has qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable official could have believed the conduct complied with the Constitution.

Grayden v. Rhodes · filed 2003-09-17

In Part B, we examine the relevant caselaw at the time of eviction and conclude that a reasonable public official could have believed that § 30A.11 of the City Code provided constitutionally-adequate notice to the plaintiffs of their right to challenge the condemnation decision and thus that Rhodes did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Sallier v. Deborah Brooks and Christine Ramsey · filed 2003-09-18

Given this lack of clarity with regard to the status of prisoner mail received from courts at the time that the plaintiffs mail was opened in this case, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability on claims involving mail from the courts.

Correctional officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 retaliation claim when reasonable officers could not believe that retaliating against an employee for reporting excessive force was lawful.

Bounds v. Taylor · filed 2003-09-18

If Appellants took the actions alleged, and did so to retaliate for Bounds’ report, reasonable officers in Appellants’ positions could not have believed that their conduct was lawful. It follows that the District Court did not err in rejecting qualified immunity as a defense.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to summary judgment on a qualified-immunity defense when the facts viewed favorably to the plaintiff show no constitutional violation.

Knox v. Smith · filed 2003-09-22

To determine the availability of qualified immunity in a particular case we must engage in a two-step inquiry. The initial, threshold question is whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. ... Given this, she did not violate Knox’s constitutional rights in requesting the May warrant and therefore is entitled to entitled to summary judgment.

An officer has qualified immunity from a § 1983 false-arrest claim when it was objectively reasonable to believe the arrestee was the person named in an outstanding warrant.

Vasquez v. McPherson · filed 2003-09-23

At the very least, it was not objectively unreasonable for McPherson to conclude that a woman named Flor Vasquez, who had the same birth date and physical characteristics as the plaintiff, was the woman named in the warrant, thus entitling him to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

In a § 1983 damages action, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity when the alleged facts fail to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

No. 02-3519 · filed 2003-09-24

Accordingly, Jarman is entitled to qualified immunity for his conduct because the facts as alleged by Hernandez fail to state a violation of Six Feathers's clearly established constitutional rights.

In a § 1983 action, genuinely disputed material facts can make a qualified immunity determination inappropriate before trial, though the defendant may raise the defense at trial.

D'Agastino v. City of Warren · filed 2003-09-24

Because we have held that the material facts surrounding this incident are genuinely in dispute, we further hold that a determination with regard to the claim of qualified immunity is not appropriate at this stage in the proceedings but the qualified immunity defense may again be raised by the defendant at trial.

A § 1983 claim survives a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds when the record is too undeveloped to determine whether the asserted right was clearly established.

Evans v. Morgan · filed 2003-09-25

At this point, however, the record is not sufficiently developed to permit a determination of “the specific contours of [this] case,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, and whether plaintiff had a clearly established right to a pre-deprivation hearing. Therefore, I will deny the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that their actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time.

Temple v. Wells · filed 2003-09-25

The district court correctly determined that defendants Day and Stalder enjoy qualified immunity because Temple failed to show that their actions were not objectively reasonable “in light of clearly established law” in existence at the time of his parole revocation and ARP.

Government officials may be entitled to qualified immunity from damages on a § 1983 due process claim.

Serrano v. S.W. Francis · filed 2003-09-26

In so doing, we hold that Officer S.W. Francis is entitled to qualified immunity as to the due process claim, but conclude that the -district court erred in granting summary judgment on the equal protection claim because Serrano raised a genuine issue of material fact as to Francis’ motives.