42 U.S.C. § 1983

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts could show that officials were deliberately indifferent to prisoners’ serious medical needs in violation of clearly established law.

Clement v. Gomez · filed 2002-08-06

Various supervisory officials may also have been deliberately indifferent to obvious risks of injury. Under such circumstances, the officials’ actions are not protected by qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for restricting expressive activity on a sidewalk adjacent to a school when clearly established law protects that activity absent material disruption.

PeTA, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Rasmussen · filed 2002-08-07

Tinker and Grayned clearly established the right to engage in expressive activity on a sidewalk adjacent to a school if no material disruption occurs. Therefore, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield public officials from § 1983 damages when clearly established law would have made them aware that their conduct violated an employee’s liberty interest in reputation.

Cox v. Boxer · filed 2002-08-08

Reasonable public officials in a state where state law does not protect stigmatizing charges in a public employee’s personnel file from public disclosure would have been aware that their conduct violated Cox’s liberty interest in his reputation.

Officials sued individually under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when no clearly established law made their alleged conduct unlawful.

Niziol v. Pasco County Dist. School Bd. · filed 2002-08-09

Even if the Court could conclude that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a constitutional rights violation in this case, the claims brought against Cpl. Little and Principal O’Donnell in their individual capacities must be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds because there was no clearly established law declaring the alleged conduct to be unlawful or violative of the United States Constitution.

Qualified immunity protects an official from § 1983 damages when existing law did not give fair notice that the conduct violated a constitutional right.

Wrzesinski v. Danielson · filed 2002-08-14

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ease law as of the date Danielson terminated Wrzesinski was not sufficient to give Danielson fair notice that he was violating Wrzesinski’s First Amendment rights.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 speech or association claim when officials violate clearly established rights that a reasonable official would understand.

Bass v. Richards · filed 2002-08-14

We further conclude that Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity from Bass’ speech and association claims.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity to officials who remove an employee's commission because of his political beliefs when the right was clearly established.

Bass v. Richards · filed 2002-08-14

Because a reasonable official would understand that Bass' commission could not be removed simply because of his political alignment and beliefs, Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity from the association claim.

Correctional officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim for good-faith testimony at a prison hearing when a reasonable officer would not understand that testimony to violate a federal right.

Sand v. Steele · filed 2002-08-15

The Court Finds that a correctional officer testifying in good faith at an administrative prison proceeding as to his or her belief about what took place involving an inmate is not something a reasonable officer would understand to violate a federal right. Further, the Court Finds that Officers Steele and Hicks are entitled to qualified immunity from the Section 1983 action filed against them by Sand in the Court.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the asserted right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred to overcome qualified immunity.

Wilkins v. Jakeway · filed 2002-08-15

To avoid the bar of qualified immunity a plaintiff must show that his claimed right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that a reasonable officer would have understood that his conduct violated that right.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on a motion for judgment on the pleadings when the alleged conduct would clearly violate established law.

Keller v. Faecher · filed 2002-08-16

Further, it would be clear to a reasonable officer in Dr. Faecher’s position that this alleged conduct, which resulted in the effective denial of medical treatment, was unlawful under clearly established law prohibiting the denial of medical treatment to prisoners. ... The district court therefore properly refused to grant qualified immunity to Appellant Faecher' on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to an official sued individually when the right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Anobile v. Pelligrino · filed 2002-08-19

The doctrine of qualified immunity provides immunity to government officials sued in their individual capacity in any of three situations: (1) if the conduct at issue is not prohibited by federal law; (2) even if the conduct was prohibited, if the plaintiff's right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct; or (3) if the defendant's conduct was objectively legally reasonable in light of clearly established law. ... We therefore hold that Joel Leveson is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim requires determining whether the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and, if so, whether the right was clearly established at the time.

McGreal v. Ostrov · filed 2002-08-21

The first step is to determine if there is a constitutional violation present on the facts alleged, when those facts are construed most favorably to the party asserting the injury. ... If the plaintiff presents a constitutional injury, the second step is to determine whether the right was clearly established at the time.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the law was not clearly established at the time and reasonable people in their position would not have known their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Nicklas v. Eagle · filed 2002-08-22

We hold that because the law was not clearly established at the time, reasonable individuals in the position of these defendants would not have known that the actions of which Nicklas now complains violated his First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. We further hold that nothing else in Nicklas’s complaint can be construed to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff need not plead that no reasonable officer could have believed the challenged conduct was lawful to survive dismissal on immunity grounds.

Prentzel v. State, Department of Public Safety · filed 2002-08-23

Troopers Scott and Gilmore are entitled to protection from the § 1983 claim on official immunity grounds if they can establish that a reasonable officer could have believed that their conduct was lawful, even if it actually was not. But as a pleading matter Prentzel did not have to allege both that their conduct was unlawful and that no reasonable officer could have thought that it was lawful.

In § 1983 Eighth Amendment suits, a triable issue of deliberate indifference does not itself defeat qualified immunity; courts must analyze immunity separately.

Estate of Jeffrey Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer · filed 2002-08-23

Courts may not simply stop with a determination that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent; instead, the qualified immunity inquiry is separate from the constitutional inquiry, and courts must undertake the qualified immunity analysis separately.

Police officers who evict tenants without judicial process or exigent circumstances are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 procedural due process claim when the right to preeviction process was clearly established.

Natasha Thomas Susan Gibbs and Edwina Lewis v. Ann Cohen Glenn Craig James Embry and Susan Fischer, in Their Individual · filed 2002-08-23

Based upon Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, we hold that Plaintiffs’ eviction from the Augusta House constituted a violation of their clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights. In addition, we find that the officers had no reasonable basis to believe that the eviction was justified in the absence of exigent circumstances. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and the district court’s decision is AFFIRMED with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Section 1983 claims against officers are barred by qualified immunity when the constitutional right they violated was not clearly established at the time.

Robles v. Prince George's County, Maryland · filed 2002-08-26

Even though the officers’ actions deprived Robles of an actual constitutional right, Rozar and DeBarros may still be entitled to qualified immunity if that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. ... Robles’ federal constitutional claim failed because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity under federal law.

An officer is immune from § 1983 damages for a stop if a reasonable officer could have believed the stop was lawful.

Liston v. Steffes · filed 2002-08-30

I conclude that a reasonable jury could find that defendant Schafer stopped plaintiffs’ car without reasonable suspicion but that he is immune from a suit for damages for his actions because a reasonable officer could have believed the stop to be legal.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges conduct a reasonable official would know violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Hickman v. Laskodi · filed 2002-08-30

In light of the legal landscape at the time of the alleged harassment, we believe that any reasonable official in Laskodi’s position would have known that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits threatening a female subordinate with bodily harm based on her gender. Hickman’s complaint therefore alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly rejected Laskodi’s assertion of qualified immunity at the pleading stage.

Section 1983 defendants have qualified immunity from a courthouse ejection claim when no clearly established right prevents officials from removing someone they believe is causing a disturbance.

Day v. Sorci · filed 2002-09-03

The district court concluded that, although Day’s right to walk into the Daley Center was constitutionally protected, there was no clearly established right that could prevent court officials from ejecting him from the premises if they believed, either rightly or wrongly, that he was creating a disturbance. Day’s factually detailed complaint makes clear that his behavior in the courtroom prompted the judge’s order to stop ... and was the defendants’ stated reason for his ejection from the Daley Center that day. Accordingly, dismissal in favor of Sorci and the unnamed defendants was proper.

A defendant denied qualified immunity at the pleading stage of a § 1983 action may raise the defense again later.

Dellairo v. Garland · filed 2002-09-04

Finally I note that my conclusion at this pleading stage that Garland is not entitled to qualified immunity does not foreclose him from raising the defense at a later stage of this action.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim turns on whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, whether that right was clearly established, and whether a reasonable officer would understand the conduct to violate it.

Pouliot v. Town of Fairfield · filed 2002-09-04

In determining whether qualified immunity applies, three factors must be determined: (1) “whether the plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation”; (2) “whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation”; and (3) “whether a reasonable officer, similarly situated, would understand that the challenged conduct violated that established right.”

Qualified immunity protects an officer from § 1983 damages claims when reasonable officers could disagree about whether probable cause existed for an arrest.

Mark Rogers, Eric Pelcher and Mark Emigh v. City of Amsterdam, Thomas McQuade and Todd Stark, Mary Ann Smith · filed 2002-09-06

In sum, given these conditions, officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether probable cause existed to arrest Rogers and Emigh. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that Stark was entitled to qualified immunity as to the claims of Rogers and Emigh.

For qualified immunity purposes under Section 1983, a foster child’s right to reasonable safety in foster care was clearly established by 1996.

Weatherford v. State · filed 2002-09-10

In light of Youngberg and the federal precedents, we hold that the right to reasonable safety in foster care was clearly established by 1996.

A prison medical administrator is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when existing law did not clearly require her to override a treating physician’s decision.

Meloy v. Bachmeier · filed 2002-09-11

The law does not clearly require an administrator with less medical training to second-guess or disregard a treating physician’s treatment decision. Because the law was not clearly established that Bachmeier was deliberately indifferent to Meloy’s serious medical needs, Bachmeier is entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant sued in an individual capacity under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show that the asserted constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Sonnleitner, Harold v. York, Stanley · filed 2002-09-12

However, under the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, Sonnleitner has failed to establish that this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, sufficiently shows a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Treats v. Morgan · filed 2002-09-17

Since Treats has presented sufficient evidence at this threshold stage to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the district court did not err in denying summary judgment to appellants.

Qualified immunity is available to officials sued in their personal capacity under § 1983, but not in their official capacity.

Rodriguez v. Municipality of Barceloneta · filed 2002-09-18

Consequently, this defense is not available to Defendants, in their official capacity; it is only available to them in their personal capacity.

Qualified immunity can bar money damages on a § 1983 free exercise claim even when the claim proceeds for other relief.

Gonzalez v. Litscher · filed 2002-09-20

However, defendants are quahfiedly immune to plaintiffs demand for money damages on these claims.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable officer could believe that using deadly force against a suspect who threatened another officer was lawful.

Dorsey v. Ruth · filed 2002-09-23

Although Officer Ruth did not raise the issue, he enjoys qualified immunity against Dorsey’s suit. ... Based on the factual circumstances established by Dorsey’s guilty plea and Officer Ruth’s affidavit, the court finds that a reasonable officer in Ruth’s position could have believed that Dorsey posed a serious physical harm to Trooper Gruber and that his conduct in shooting Dorsey was therefore lawful.

An officer is qualifiedly immune from a § 1983 claim when a reasonable officer in the same position could have believed the shooting was lawful.

Norma Seiner Charles Seiner v. Drenon · filed 2002-09-23

In sum, because there is no genuine issue of material fact about whether a reasonable officer in Drenon’s position could have believed the shooting was lawful, Drenon is qualifiedly immune from liability on the § 1983 claim.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 due process claim when the plaintiff has not stated a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

Kinney v. Weaver · filed 2002-09-24

Because we conclude that Kinney and Hall have not stated a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law, we need not engage in the “clearly established” inquiry of qualified-immunity analysis.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive-force claim at summary judgment when, on the plaintiff’s facts, he knows of an arrestee’s injury and complaints about tight handcuffs but unreasonably leaves them tight.

Turek v. Saluga · filed 2002-09-24

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Turek, we find that Saluga knew that Turek had an injury because he asked him about it, Turek described his injuries and asked Saluga to handcuff him in front, and Turek complained about the tightness of the handcuffs. ... In light these facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion we presume to be true, we find that Saluga’s conduct given what he knew at the time was not reasonable, and the district court properly denied summary judgment.

Qualified immunity does not warrant dismissal of a § 1983 claim at the pleading stage when the allegations could show that no reasonable officer believed probable cause existed.

Garlanger v. Verbeke · filed 2002-09-27

Applying this standard and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor, the Court is unable to conclude that the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint are insufficient to support a finding that no reasonable police officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest, detain, and prosecute Plaintiff for the felony offense of making terroristic threats. The Court must, therefore, deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from a Section 1983 claim when it would be objectively unreasonable for them to use a defamatory misinformation campaign to destroy a family’s intimate relationships during an investigation.

Patel v. Kevin Searles and Debra Swanson · filed 2002-09-30

As a consequence, we do not think it would be objectively reasonable for the police to engage in an extended public and private defamatory misinformation campaign to destroy a family, hoping that those tactics might produce incriminating leads in a murder investigation.

Qualified immunity protects an official from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show that the official violated a constitutional right.

Aucoin v. Haney · filed 2002-10-01

We therefore hold that, based on the undisputed facts, Aucoin has failed to demonstrate that Haney violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Haney therefore is entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer is qualifiedly immune from a § 1983 suit when the asserted right was not clearly established and the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable under existing law.

Reynolds v. City of Anchorage · filed 2002-10-04

The Court concludes that in 1997 it was not clearly established that a search warrant supported by probable cause was required to constitutionally conduct a strip search of a minor suspected of possessing drugs in a juvenile home or detention center. Based on the particular facts, and in light of the then existing case law to guide Defendant, the Court concludes that the type and scope of the search preformed on Plaintiff were objectively reasonable. Therefore, Defendant is qualifiedly immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim does not protect an officer when, on the plaintiff’s version of disputed facts, a reasonable officer would have understood that the stop violated a clearly established right.

Lamarche v. Costain · filed 2002-10-07

The Court moves on to consider whether an objectively reasonable officer in Defendant’s position would have understood stopping Plaintiff to yiolate her rights. Assuming, as the Court must, that Plaintiff came to a complete stop at the red light, it would appear unreasonable to an objective officer monitoring the light to then pull Plaintiff over for failing to stop. No investigatory stop could be considered reasonable stripped of its underlying factual predicate. Consequently, a reasonable officer under the circumstances would not have mistakenly understood the challenged stop to be constitutional.

Qualified immunity protects an official from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Sparr v. McIntosh · filed 2002-10-07

Because we find no violation of a clearly established constitutional right, we reverse.

In a § 1983 action, an official performing discretionary functions generally has qualified immunity unless a reasonable person in the official’s position would have known the conduct violated clearly established law.

Sparr v. Ward · filed 2002-10-07

Toward this end, the rule has evolved that an official performing discretionary functions will generally be immune from liability unless a reasonable person in his position would have known his actions violated clearly established law.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff’s alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Samadi v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services · filed 2002-10-10

Defendants claim qualified immunity, which requires this court to determine whether a violation of Samadi’s constitutional rights occurred on the facts he alleges. ... We conclude that Samadi has not alleged a violation of his equal protection rights because he has not alleged any specific facts that would allow a jury to conclude that defendants’ failure to promote him, or any other adverse action taken against him, was motivated by his national origin, as he must to state an equal protection claim. ... We therefore uphold the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to defendants on this claim.

A defendant in a § 1983 suit is entitled to qualified immunity when existing law did not give notice that the particular conduct was unconstitutional.

Waller v. Trippett · filed 2002-10-10

Absent law that would have put the Defendant on notice that his particular conduct offended the Constitution, we find that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Municipalities cannot invoke qualified immunity against § 1983 claims.

Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock · filed 2002-10-15

It is well established that municipalities cannot avail themselves of the qualified immunity doctrine.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action may depend on facts that prevent dismissal at the pleading stage.

Knight v. Keane · filed 2002-10-16

Defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity here is an issue of fact which “cannot be disposed of at this stage.”

A § 1983 damages claim against prison officials can proceed past a qualified immunity defense when the plaintiff alleges deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Lawrence v. Norris · filed 2002-10-16

Consistent with our reasoning and disposition in that case, we now affirm the district court’s holding that plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a clearly established constitutional right.

Prison officials facing a § 1983 claim are not entitled to qualified immunity under the surprise-attack rule when the claim is based on their alleged deliberate indifference to a known substantial risk of an attack.

Krein v. Norris · filed 2002-10-16

Thus, as the district court recognized, plaintiff’s claim does not “arise from” Pruett’s attack per se, but arises from plaintiff’s substantiated allegation that defendants were deliberately indifferent to a known substantial risk that such an attack would occur. The district court therefore did not err in declining to grant summary judgment under our “surprise attack” line of cases.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when the alleged facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Rucker v. Hampton · filed 2002-10-18

Because the facts alleged by plaintiffs are insufficient to state a constitutional violation, Trooper Hampton is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 damages claim against an officer when a reasonable officer would not understand the conduct to be clearly unlawful.

Kopec v. Tate · filed 2002-10-21

Therefore, since there is no dispute in material fact as to whether a reasonable officer would consider Defendant’s actions during the course of the arrest as clearly unlawful and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we find that qualified immunity applies and summary judgment is appropriate.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when genuine issues of material fact remain about the defendant’s motivation.

Rapkin v. Rocque · filed 2002-10-22

Because the Court finds genuine issues of material fact as to Defendants’ motivation in the adverse employment actions taken against Plaintiff, we hold that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense.

An officer sued under § 1983 for excessive force does not establish qualified immunity merely by denying that he used the alleged force.

Henry v. Albuquerque Police Department · filed 2002-10-23

Rather, it amounts to no more than a general denial that Officer Hansen used what would be, if proven, excessive force. As such, Officer Hansen is not entitled to qualified immunity.

An officer who orders a strip search that violates settled constitutional law is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Sarnicola v. County of Westchester · filed 2002-10-23

Moreover, McGurn is not entitled to qualified immunity; his strip search order violated not only settled constitutional law but West-chester County’s official policy concerning strip searches. Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment against McGurn on this claim.

Section 1983 claims against an officer are subject to qualified immunity when the facts, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, show no constitutional violation.

Walker v. Disner · filed 2002-10-29

We agree with the district court that Officer Disner is entitled to qualified immunity because the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Walker, do not show that Officer Disner violated a constitutional right.

An officer sued under § 1983 for unlawful arrest is not entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s version of the facts shows no arguable probable cause and clearly established law gave fair warning that the arrest was unlawful.

Brown v. Head · filed 2002-10-30

Given this clarity in the law and the firmly entrenched nature of the right to be free from a warrantless arrest absent probable cause, the court holds that under the Plaintiffs version of the facts there was no arguable probable cause and the Defendant had fair warning that his conduct was unlawful.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability if the conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right or was objectively reasonable.

Royster v. Johnson · filed 2002-10-30

Determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 involves a two-step analysis. First, if the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, the official is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 550. Second, even if the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, the official is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable.

A directed verdict on qualified immunity in a Section 1983 claim is improper when the evidence permits more than one inference about the officer’s entitlement to immunity.

Heyward v. Christmas · filed 2002-11-04

Because the circuit court failed to make a reasoned evaluation of whether Christmas was entitled to qualified immunity and Heyward presented evidence which could lead to more than one inference regarding Christmas’ entitlement to qualified immunity, the circuit court erred in granting Christmas a directed verdict based on qualified immunity.

Officers cannot claim immunity from a Section 1983 suit when a reasonable officer would have known their conduct violated the Constitution.

Herzog, Maris v. Village of Winnetka · filed 2002-11-05

If the facts are as alleged, a reasonable police officer in the position of these defendants would have known for sure that their actions violated the Constitution, and so ...the defendants cannot shelter behind the defense of offi- cial immunity.

A state actor sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when her conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right that a reasonable person would have known.

Kentucky v. Young · filed 2002-11-05

Consequently, we hold that Detective Burns is not entitled to qualified immunity because her actions violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. ... For the same reasons that we reject Detective Burns’ assertion of qualified immunity from appellee’s § 1983 claim, we reject her assertion of immunity from the state malicious prosecution claim.

A state actor is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation.

Shade v. City of Farmington · filed 2002-11-06

Finding no evidence to support a conclusion that Officer Dau's search of Shade was unreasonable under the circumstances, we conclude that Shade has not established a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Our qualified immunity inquiry is therefore at an end, and we agree with the district court that Officer Dau is entitled to immunity for his role in the search.

To defeat qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Shipp v. McMahon · filed 2002-11-08

Qualified immunity applies to this “class of one” claim because the underlying constitutional right was not clearly established in 1996.

Qualified immunity, when applicable, shields an officer from a § 1983 suit and the burdens of discovery and trial.

Baskin v. Smith · filed 2002-11-08

Qualified immunity is not a defense to liability; where it is applicable, its purpose is to shield the officer from suit altogether, saving him from the burdens of discovery and costs of trial.

An officer sued under § 1983 for an arrest is entitled to qualified immunity unless no reasonably competent officer could have believed probable cause existed.

Martin v. Mendoza · filed 2002-11-12

To deny Mendoza the benefit of the qualified immunity defense, I would have to be persuaded that no reasonably competent officer could have concluded that probable cause existed to believe Martin was committing the offense of disorderly conduct.

Section 1983 defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity when they disregard a prisoner’s clearly established right to be free from second-hand smoke that poses a serious health risk.

Reilly v. Henry Grayson, Chris Daniels, and Joseph Cross · filed 2002-11-18

First, the defendants contend as a legal matter that they should have been granted qualified immunity because the plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to a “completely smoke-free environment,” but only the right not to be celled with an active smoker, and because, even if there is a broader right to be housed in a smoke-free facility, it was not clearly established at the time of the plaintiffs complaints in this case. ... We find no merit to either of these contentions.

A defendant to a Section 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the facts do not establish a constitutional violation.

Grauerholz v. Adcock · filed 2002-11-20

Because the facts, as developed in the summary judgment filings, are insufficient to present a constitutional violation, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 suit, disputed facts about an arrest can prevent summary judgment for officers on qualified immunity.

Roe v. City of New York · filed 2002-11-21

The motion for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity must be denied because of the factual dispute as to the circumstances of the arrest.

An officer seeking an arrest warrant is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim unless he shows a reasonable belief that probable cause existed.

Kearse v. Moffett · filed 2002-11-22

We do not agree with the district court, however, that Moffett showed he reasonably believed probable cause existed for Kearse's arrest warrant to issue and, thus, that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when their mistake about the constitutionality of their conduct was reasonable.

McCall-Bey v. Kirner · filed 2002-11-26

Because they may have made a reasonable and understandable mistake as to the constitutionality of their actions, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the constitutional right violated was not clearly established at the time.

Hill v. McKinley · filed 2002-11-26

Although we conclude that the facts establish a constitutional violation, we believe the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that their actions did not violate clearly established law.

Prison officials sued under Section 1983 may be denied qualified immunity on a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Holestine v. Harding · filed 2002-11-26

The district court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Holestine and did not err in denying qualified immunity to Appellants.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the plaintiff’s evidence does not show a constitutional deprivation.

Mallas v. City of Las Vegas · filed 2002-12-02

The district court determined, and we agree, that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Mallases, they have not shown an underlying constitutional deprivation, including a takings claim, a substantive or procedural due process claim, nor is a class or group implicated with respect to their equal protection claim. Montandon is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity can independently bar a § 1983 claim.

Perez v. Elrich · filed 2002-12-03

The district court properly found, first, that Perez failed to state a claim under § 1983 and that, in any event, the Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields an official from damages under § 1983 when a reasonable official would not have known the conduct violated clearly established rights.

Lion v. Maxwell · filed 2002-12-03

A reasonable prison official in Maxwell’s position would not have known that the brief and limited ban--during which Lion had ample alternative methods for communicating with the inmates--violated Lion’s clearly established constitutional rights. Accordingly, Maxwell is immune from liability for damages for her conduct.

In a § 1983 false-arrest claim involving a clearly established Fourth Amendment right, an officer may be entitled to qualified immunity if the officer had probable cause or reasonably believed it existed.

Kent v. Jared Katz, Individually and as a Police Officer for the Town of Colchester · filed 2002-12-10

Since the principle that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment was clearly established prior to Katz’s arrest of Kent in 1996, Katz may be found entitled to qualified immunity only if he actually had probable cause to arrest Kent for driving while intoxicated or if it was objectively reasonable for him to believe he had probable cause for that arrest.

District courts deciding a § 1983 qualified-immunity motion must identify the relevant factual issues and explain the law supporting the ruling.

Forbes v. Township of Lower Merion · filed 2002-12-11

We instead exercise our supervisory power to require that future dispositions of a motion in which a party pleads qualified immunity include, at minimum, an identification of relevant factual issues and an analysis of the law that justifies the ruling with respect to those issues.

Officials may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the evidence does not show they knew the facts underlying the alleged violation.

Proctor v. Rick Toney · filed 2002-12-11

As to the merits, the evidence before the District Court did not indicate that the appellees were aware that Mustafa was Proctor’s spiritual advisor, that their actions were preventing Mustafa from fulfilling his divine command to serve as Proctor’s religious advisor, that Mustafa was similarly situated to other “sender entities,” or that Mustafa was a member of the Nation of Islam. Thus, appellees were entitled to qualified immunity--a defense they raised below--on Mustafa’s federal claims.

In a Section 1983 suit, a factual dispute over whether reasonable officers would have made an arrest can support submitting qualified immunity to the jury.

Grant v. City of Long Beach · filed 2002-12-16

When viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that reasonable officers would not have acted as Officers Bahash and Watson did in arresting Grant. Therefore, the district court properly submitted the issue of qualified immunity to the jury and entered judgment upon its verdict.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 claim is assessed objectively; an officer's subjective belief about probable cause is irrelevant.

Grant v. City of Long Beach · filed 2002-12-16

Qualified immunity is an objective inquiry — whether the officers subjectively believed that they had probable cause to arrest Grant is irrelevant.

Qualified immunity may bar a § 1983 claim against public officials.

Wortham v. Boren · filed 2002-12-13

The district court concluded that appellees were qualifiedly immune and that appellants’ conduct in resigning and signing releases in exchange for severance benefits was voluntary. ... we conclude that the district court’s ruling was ...correct.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim could not be affirmed on this record because the law governing state rangers’ authority to detain immigrants was insufficiently clear.

Marco Antonio Carrasca Fidel Figueroa Abimael Figueroa Rigoberto Vales Barreras v. Edward Pomeroy and Steve Losey, in Th · filed 2002-12-17

There is too much uncertainty on this record of the state of the law with respect to state rangers’ authority to detain immigrants in this pre-September 11 period to affirm the District Court’s holding of qualified immunity on that ground.

Section 1983 claims against individual officials fail when the officials are eligible for qualified immunity.

Amy's Enterprises v. Sorrell · filed 2002-12-18

While plaintiffs claims against defendants as individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fall short in the pleadings because .of defendants’ eligibility for qualified immunity, they also fail because the plaintiff no longer had a possessory ... interest in the seized tickets.

Section 1983 does not give officers qualified immunity from an unlawful detention claim as a matter of law when material facts remain disputed about whether a reasonable officer could have believed the detention lawful.

Seaman v. Karr · filed 2002-12-20

Accordingly, Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law under these facts, and the trial court erred in dismissing the Seamans' claim of unlawful detention on summary judgment.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff fails to show a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.

Mills v. Davis · filed 2002-12-20

Mills also appeals the grant of summary judgment on his § 1983 claim alleging that Marendt violated his Fourth Amendment rights. ... We affirm on the ground that Marendt is entitled to qualified immunity. Mills has not presented any evidence indicating that Marendt violated “clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when a reasonable person would have known their conduct violated clearly established law.

Francisco Jose Rivero Pacific Internment Services, a California Corporation v. City and County of San Francisco, and Jos · filed 2002-12-20

On the merits, however, we conclude that a reasonable person in 1993 would have known that Surdyka and Stephens’s actions violated clearly established law, and that Surdyka and Stephens are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants in a Section 1983 suit are protected by qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.

Bates v. Bigger · filed 2002-12-26

On the intimate association claim, the defendants are protected by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity “come[s] into play if, at the time of the alleged misconduct, defendants were not acting in violation of clearly established law.”

Officials sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer would not have known that the conduct violated clearly established law.

McWaters v. Cosby · filed 2002-12-27

In this case, we cannot say that a reasonable officer would have known what retaliation test would apply, and accordingly whether his actions were in violation of the law.

In a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must rebut a qualified immunity defense by showing that the official violated a clearly established federal right and acted objectively unreasonably.

Perry v. Greanias · filed 2002-12-27

As such, the burden then shifted to Perry to rebut Greanias’s qualified immunity defense relating to his section 1983 claims based on those allegations. In this case, Perry failed to present any responsive argument that (1) Greanias’s conduct violated his federally guaranteed rights, (2) the rights were clearly established, and (3) Greanias’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established rights. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Perry’s federal constitutional claims brought under section 1983.

Section 1983 shields a government employee from damages when a reasonable official could mistakenly believe the conduct did not violate the First Amendment.

Dirrane v. Brookline Police Department · filed 2002-12-31

Under section 1983, a government employee is immune to damages where a reasonable official could believe (the test is objective), albeit mistakenly, that his conduct did not violate the First Amendment.

In a § 1983 action against public officials or those acting with them, a plaintiff must show a violation of a clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity.

Coonts v. Potts · filed 2003-01-03

In a § 1983 action against public officials or those acting with public officials, a plaintiff must show that the defendants violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

An officer sued under § 1983 may have qualified immunity when the officer reasonably could have believed probable cause existed to use deadly force.

Vaughan v. Cox · filed 2003-01-03

For qualified immunity purposes, therefore, we ask whether officers had “arguable probable cause” — that is, whether the officer reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed.

Officials sued under § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation are not entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that no contract was in force when the complaint alleges a pre-existing commercial relationship with the government.

Housing Works, Inc. v. Giuliani · filed 2003-01-03

The district court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged a “pre-existing commercial relationship” within the clearly established limits of Umbehr. It therefore properly rejected the defendants’ arguments that they enjoyed qualified immunity against the plaintiffs’ claims of First Amendment retaliation.

Qualified immunity defeats a § 1983 claim against officials and those acting with them when the plaintiffs show no constitutional violation.

Tylene J. Coonts, Larry Coonts, and Robert M. Sweere v. John Potts, Sr., Gary Koop, Vernon Johnson, Trampus Taylor, and · filed 2003-01-03

Furthermore, because Larry and Tylene have shown no violation of a constitutional right, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the sheriff, deputies, and Potts based'on qualified immunity for their actions in retrieving the items from the Coontses’ house.

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim when existing law did not give fair warning that the alleged conduct was unconstitutional.

Vaughan v. Cox · filed 2003-01-03

The issue presented by this case is whether Deputy Fred Lawrence Cox is entitled to qualified immunity and, consequently, is shielded from Jerry Charges Vaughan's suit seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights arising out of a police chase. ... Having reconsidered this case in light of Hope, we hold that Deputy Cox is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 prisoner retaliation claim alleging 1995 conduct cannot rest on a requirement that the conduct “shocked the conscience.”

Scott v. Bair · filed 2003-01-08

The court concluded that the established standard at the time of Bair’s alleged retaliatory acts required Scott to show that Bair’s conduct “shocked the conscience.” ... In light of Bell, we REVERSE the district court’s decision, and REMAND to the district court for reconsideration.

Section 1983 permits qualified immunity for a government employee who could reasonably believe that his conduct violated no clearly established right.

Kinzer v. Jackson · filed 2003-01-09

Qualified immunity shields a government employee acting in his official capacity from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless the employee’s conduct violated clearly established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have known. ... Harris has therefore shown that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his conduct did not violate any clearly established right of Kin-zer. Harris is therefore entitled to judgment dismissing the complaint on the basis of qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity does not protect a defendant who acts objectively unreasonably in light of a clearly established right asserted under § 1983.

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n · filed 2003-01-13

Carter acted objectively unreasonably in light of Brentwood Academy’s clearly established right to procedural due process and, therefore, is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 damages claims against public officials are subject to qualified immunity when the official did not violate a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Torre S. Crockett Dushon L. Greene v. Cumberland College Michael B. Colegrove K. David Kersey, City of Williamsburg, Ken · filed 2003-01-13

In civil suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages, qualified immunity protects a public official from being sued as long as the official “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” ... Accordingly, Hamlin is entitled to qualified immunity for his conduct in arresting Crockett and Greene.

Government officials sued for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 have qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows they violated a clearly established federal right.

Blackburn v. Jansen · filed 2003-01-14

If so, and as to both defendants, then I find that the plaintiffs claims against the defendants, in their individual capacity, are barred by qualified immunity. A government official, sued for damages in the official’s individual capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows that the official violated a “clearly established” federal statutory or constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Qualified immunity does not shield a sheriff from a § 1983 retaliation claim merely because he was not the plaintiff’s employer when he allegedly influenced that employer to punish protected political speech.

Frazier v. Hataway · filed 2003-01-14

We agree with the district court that these facts, if true, would not support Hataway’s qualified immunity defense.

A defendant facing a § 1983 claim is entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff cannot establish a violation of a federal right.

Lockridge v. Bd. of Trustees etc. · filed 2003-01-14

Because a violation of Mr. Lockridge's federal right to be free from race discrimination was not established, we need not determine the degree to which Dr. Jones was personally involved in the hiring process to conclude that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

A § 1983 complaint can overcome qualified immunity at the pleading stage when it alleges facts showing that each defendant violated a clearly established right through objectively unreasonable conduct.

Clarke v. Hegmann · filed 2003-01-15

Clarke has sufficiently pleaded facts to overcome the defense of qualified immunity at this stage of the proceeding.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the facts viewed in the plaintiff’s favor establish no constitutional violation.

Barnes v. McLellan · filed 2003-01-15

Because Barnes presented no evidence showing that Officer McLellan’s use of a carotid hold to restrain him was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, the facts taken in the light most favorable to Barnes do not establish a Fourth Amendment violation. ... Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim cannot be resolved on summary judgment when material facts about the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct are disputed.

Swedlund v. Foster · filed 2003-01-15

The better approach is to have the trier of fact decide when there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable. Summary judgment is not appropriate where the facts are in dispute as they are in this case.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not shield an official whose conduct is plainly beyond the scope of his official duties, even without a factually similar precedent.

Hawkins v. Holloway · filed 2003-01-17

Although the sheriff faults the district court for failing to cite to any case that is factually similar, it was not necessary for the court to do so because Sheriff Holloway's alleged conduct was so far beyond the bounds of the performance of his official duties that the rationale underlying qualified immunity is inapplicable.

A § 1983 false arrest claim survives a qualified immunity defense at the pleading stage when the alleged facts leave open whether officers reasonably believed probable cause existed.

Bullard v. City of New York · filed 2003-01-20

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to find probable cause or that reasonable officers could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.

Qualified immunity may be denied at summary judgment on § 1983 claims alleging harmful tobacco-smoke exposure, retaliation, and excessive force.

Atkinson v. Taylor · filed 2003-01-21

raise three issues on appeal: 1) whether appellants are entitled to qualified immunity for the ETS claims; 2) whether appellants are entitled to qualified immunity on the retaliation and excessive force claims; and 3) whether appellants in supervisory positions are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims because they lacked notice of the underlying events. As to the first two issues, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of summary judgment.

Section 1983 qualified immunity does not protect an officer at summary judgment when evidence of excessively forceful handcuffing implicates a clearly established right.

Lyons v. CITY OF XENIA. OH · filed 2003-01-22

With respect to Officer Foubert, evidence of excessively forceful handcuffing precludes protection by qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage of litigation, as the right to be free from such is clearly established.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 equal protection claim if a reasonable officer would understand that the alleged conduct violated clearly established rights.

Hardy v. Emery · filed 2003-01-23

In view of the close similarities between this case and the clearly established law of Alexis I conclude that a reasonable officer in Emery’s position would understand that his conduct, if proven to be as the plaintiffs assert, violated their rights to Equal Protection under sections 1981 and 1983.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when a genuine factual dispute about officials’ motives bears on the alleged constitutional violation.

Hearns Concrete Construction Co. v. City of Ypsilanti · filed 2003-01-23

These individual defendants seek qualified immunity. ... Here, the individual defendants’ alleged unconstitutional motivations form the basis for the § 1983 due process claim. ... The Plaintiffs Affidavit and allegations create a genuine issue of material fact as to the nature of the individual defendants’ motivations for issuance of the stop work order. The weight of these contentions militates against the granting of summary judgment.

Qualified immunity does not shield officers from § 1983 liability when existing case law gave fair warning that their conduct violated an arrestee’s constitutional rights.

Aceto v. Kachajian · filed 2003-01-24

The Court holds that the caselaw existing prior to May 23, 2000 gave defendants fair warning that their conduct violated Aceto’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.

In a § 1983 action, deferring a qualified immunity summary judgment motion without explaining why further discovery is needed denies officials the benefit of the defense and permits an interlocutory appeal.

Wallin v. Norman · filed 2003-01-27

By failing to elaborate on why further discovery was necessary to properly decide the motion, the district court erroneously denied the defendants the benefit of their defense from suit (if that defense is, indeed, meritorious). We therefore conclude that the district court’s refusal to address the merits of the defendants’ motion based on qualified immunity was a conclusive determination for the purpose of allowing an interlocutory appeal.

A § 1983 defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity when no reasonable officer could believe the alleged conduct was lawful under established law.

Fieldcamp v. City of New York · filed 2003-01-29

In light of the facts alleged, we believe the officers’ conduct to be so clearly unreasonable that no reasonable police officer should have believed that he was acting in accordance with established law and procedure concerning the detainment of arrestees. Consequently, Detective Lorenz is not entitled to a defense of qualified immunity.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct violated a constitutional right.

Shepard v. Ripperger · filed 2003-01-29

Because we conclude the law is not clearly established about whether refusing to identify oneself provides probable cause for arrest, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity in connection with their official acts.

A plaintiff opposing qualified immunity on a Section 1983 claim against a police officer must show both a constitutional violation and that the right was clearly established.

Rivera v. Washington · filed 2003-01-30

Accordingly, the answer to both Saucier questions must be in the affirmative in order for a plaintiff to defeat a defendant police officer’s motion for summary judgment on quali- fied immunity grounds.

A § 1983 defendant is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity when the plaintiff raises no genuine issue of material fact concerning that defense.

Lucero v. Greenlee · filed 2003-01-29

Applying the standards set out above, we conclude that Ms. Lucero ... has not raised a genuine issue of material fact relating to defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides qualified immunity to an investigator seeking an arrest warrant when a reasonably competent investigator with the same knowledge could have acted as the investigator did.

Widner v. Wells · filed 2003-02-03

The defendant investigator is entitled to qualified immunity in this case. In the context of seeking arrest warrants, investigators are entitled to broad qualified immunity protection from “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their actions were objectively reasonable and a corrected warrant application would have supported probable cause.

Crone v. Connelly · filed 2003-02-04

Having determined that the investigating officers’ actions were objectively reasonable and a corrected arrest warrant application would have established sufficient probable cause to proceed against the plaintiff, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity bars an individual-capacity § 1983 claim against an officer whose arrest was objectively reasonable and supported by probable cause.

Ellis v. White · filed 2003-02-04

We therefore conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Mayberry in his individual capacity on plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim on the ground of qualified immunity.

An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 wrongful-arrest claim when a reasonable officer would have known the arrest was unconstitutional.

Gardner v. Williams · filed 2003-02-06

Because the statutory language cited by Williams is unambiguous and not reasonably open to an alternative interpretation, we hold that Marvin’s rights were so clearly established that a reasonable officer would have been aware of the unconstitutionality of the arrest.

Officers are immune from § 1983 liability when a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct was unlawful.

Bradshaw v. Stoller · filed 2003-02-06

Because any mistake as to the legality of the tow was reasonable, the officers are entitled to immunity.

For § 1983 qualified immunity, the right of people arrested for minor offenses to be free from strip and visual body cavity searches without reasonable suspicion was clearly established by March 17, 2000, even when they were commingled with other inmates.

Savard v. State of RI · filed 2003-02-11

The law was clearly established on March 17, 2000, that people arrested for non-violent, non-drug related minor offenses could not be subjected to strip and visual body cavity searches absent reasonable suspicion that they were concealing contraband or weapons, even when those arrestees were commingled with general prison populations.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment for officers sued under § 1983 when genuine issues of material fact remain about their entitlement to it.

Weldon King v. Fletcher · filed 2003-02-11

Because the summary judgment record establishes genuine issues of material fact regarding Appellants' entitlement to qualified immunity, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Section 1983 officers are not entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct violates clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

Ganwich v. Knapp · filed 2003-02-11

We hold that Pierce County is not entitled to summary judgment and that the defendant officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from this claim.

Qualified immunity does not protect officers from a § 1983 arrest claim when they had no reasonable basis to believe probable cause existed.

Thompson, Beverly v. Wagner, David E. · filed 2003-02-13

All we are saying at this time is that qualified immunity is not a valid defense in this case.

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when they reasonably rely on a dispatch, even if the information available to law enforcement as a whole did not justify the stop.

Thomas L. Feathers Kathleen Feathers v. William Aey J.P. Donohue, City of Akron · filed 2003-02-13

So although the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the authorities’ collective information did not amount to reasonable suspicion, Feathers cannot prevail in a § 1983 suit because the individual defendants had a sufficient factual basis for thinking that they were acting consistently with Terry.

Officials sued under § 1983 for retaliating against public employees’ protected speech are not entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiffs prove the alleged facts, because the right and cause of action were clearly established.

Coszalter v. City Of Salem · filed 2003-02-18

Thus, at the time defendants acted, both the constitutional protection of employee speech and a First Amendment cause of action for retaliation against protected speech were clearly established. ... If plaintiffs' version of the facts turns out to be true, defendants will not be entitled to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 action does not waive a properly pleaded qualified immunity defense when an interlocutory appeal on that issue is dismissed.

Medina v. Bruning · filed 2003-02-21

We hold that Officer Bruning’s right to assert qualified immunity was not waived when his interlocutory appeal on the issue was dismissed.

Qualified immunity does not support summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when disputed facts bearing on the defense must be resolved by the trier of fact.

Batista v. Agostini · filed 2003-02-23

For the reasons set forth below, I find that summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is inappropriate, since there are factual issues to be resolved by the trier of fact.

Officials sued under Section 1983 are shielded by qualified immunity when the record shows no violation of a clearly established right that a reasonable person would have known.

Vukelic v. Bartz · filed 2003-02-24

The record is devoid of facts which reveal that the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known. As such, the defense of qualified immunity shields the defendants from civil liability.

Section 1983 does not afford qualified immunity when a reasonable officer should have known that the conduct violated a clearly established right.

Sepulveda v. Colon Matos · filed 2003-02-24

Third, under settled law, a reasonable officer should have known the limit of his authority to conduct inspections and that any use of force would violate Alvarez’s rights. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Colon and Rosado are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established in the circumstances they faced.

Batten v. Gomez · filed 2003-02-24

Because Morrell was decided after Shuster and Gomez’s actions in this case, Shuster and Gomez, like the defendants in Morrell, are immune from suit under the law of qualified immunity.

An officer who is deliberately indifferent to a pretrial detainee’s substantial suicide risk can be liable under Section 1983; that rule was clearly established before 1998, including when the detainee was transferred to another facility.

Cavalieri, Joann v. Shepard, Donald · filed 2003-02-24

The rule that officials, including police officers, will be “liable under section 1983 for a pre-trial detainee’s suicide if they were deliberately indifferent to a substantial suicide risk,” Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 1992), was clearly established prior to 1998.

Public officials are shielded from § 1983 liability by qualified immunity when the asserted right was not clearly established at the time of their conduct.

Sheila S. v. Commonwealth · filed 2003-02-24

A review of the relevant Federal case law reveals that, at the time of the alleged violation, Bregor and Lapidus did not violate any “clearly established” rights of the plaintiff of which a reasonable person would have known.

In § 1983 suits, qualified immunity protects an officer when the asserted right was not clearly established in the specific circumstances the officer faced.

Batten v. Gomez · filed 2003-02-24

If the right was not “clearly established” in the “specific context of the case” — that is, if it was not “clear to a reasonable officer” that the conduct in which he allegedly engaged “was unlawful in the situation he confronted” — then the law affords immunity from suit.

Qualified immunity does not shield school administrators from a § 1983 claim when the record could support a finding that they violated clearly established IDEA child find duties.

Hicks, Ex Rel. Hicks v. Purchase Line School Dist. · filed 2003-02-25

Because this record could support a finding that the individual administrators abrogated their child find duties, they cannot escape liability based on qualified immunity. Summary judgment on this ground, therefore, is denied.

Section 1983 officers are entitled to qualified immunity from damages claims arising from arrests when they had probable cause to seek the arrest warrants.

Beauchamp, Ricky v. City of Noblesville · filed 2003-02-26

Because Milligan and Dukette had probable cause to apply for warrants to arrest Beauchamp for attempted residential entry and rape, they enjoyed qualified immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Qualified immunity does not bar a § 1983 damages claim when disputed facts prevent the court from determining whether the officer is entitled to it.

Campbell v. Anderson · filed 2003-03-04

The alleged violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights provide a basis for his recovery under § 1983. As a result, we do not find this action for damages barred by qualified immunity.

Under § 1983, qualified immunity applies only to defendants sued in their individual capacities.

Hulen v. Yates · filed 2003-03-04

Qualified immunity, of course, only insulates defendants sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities.

Qualified immunity cannot dispose of a § 1983 claim against a public official when disputed facts could show discrimination or retaliation in violation of clearly established rights.

Ruscoe v. Housing Authority of City of New Britain · filed 2003-03-04

Based on this standard, qualified immunity is not available to Vayer on the facts of this case. The right to be free from discrimination in employment on account of age is well established, both by AEDA, and, with respect to state actors, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... If discrimination or retaliation played a substantial part in the employment decision not to hire Ruscoe, Vayer’s conduct could not be characterized as objectively reasonable. Accordingly, the claims against Vayer may not be resolved on the basis of qualified immunity, and Vayer’s motion is denied.

Qualified immunity bars a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim when the employee cannot show an adverse employment action.

Foley v. University of Houston System · filed 2003-03-06

Even if Dr. Hutto were able to cite a specific example of protected speech, she still could not overcome the defense of qualified immunity because, as noted supra, she cannot show the occurrence of an adverse employment action. ... The district court erred in rejecting the defense of qualified immunity with respect to Dr. Hutto's § 1983 First Amendment claim.

A § 1983 defendant cannot obtain summary judgment on qualified immunity when the record does not support the facts needed for that defense.

Giannullo v. City of New York · filed 2003-03-10

It follows that the record does not support the district court’s determination that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, either on the basis of probable cause or qualified immunity.

An official sued under § 1983 is not entitled to qualified immunity when the conduct is so obviously unconstitutional that its unlawfulness was readily apparent without prior case law.

Thomas v. Roberts · filed 2003-03-10

If the plaintiff in a § 1983 action can show that "the official's conduct lies so obviously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of caselaw," then the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.

A teacher is not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 equal protection claim when established law would make clear that abusing school authority for sexual gratification violates equal protection, even without a prior case involving a teacher and student.

Sh.A. Ex Rel. J.A. v. Tucumcari Municipal Schools · filed 2003-03-11

In light of Johnson and Franklin, we conclude that a reasonable teacher would have known in the spring of 1997 that sexual harassment which gives rise to a violation of equal protection in the employment context will also do so in the teacher-on-student context. As Johnson sets out, it was then clearly established that this standard is met by actions that amount to an abuse of governmental authority for the purpose of one’s own sexual gratification.

Government officials sued under Section 1983 have qualified immunity unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

Otworth v. Village of Lakewood Club · filed 2003-03-11

Upon consideration, we conclude that the dismissal of this complaint as to the individual defendants must be affirmed for the reason stated by the district court. Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the plaintiff fails to show a constitutional violation; the court need not decide whether the right was clearly established.

May v. Franklin County Board of Commissioners · filed 2003-03-12

Since May has not shown that Kirk’s constitutional rights were violated by Ratliff. there is no need to address the second prong of the test whether or not the right was clearly established. ... For the foregoing reasons, Ratliff is entitled to qualified immunity, so the district court’s order denying a dismissal of the substantive due process claim against him is REVERSED.

Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 false arrest claim when no reasonable officer could believe there was probable cause for the arrest.

Thompson v. David E. Wagner and Keith Gardner · filed 2003-03-14

Without probable cause or a valid charge of obstruction, their actions cannot be protected by qualified immunity.

A city and an official sued in an official capacity cannot claim qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit.

Trewhella v. City of Lake Geneva, Wis. · filed 2003-03-17

Therefore, the City and Mayor in his official capacity are not entitled to qualified immunity from suit and the court will not dismiss on that basis.

A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiff, does not show a constitutional violation.

Nelson v. Hoffman · filed 2003-03-18

The district court properly found that D’Amico was entitled to qualified immunity because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Nelson, did not show that D’Amico violated Nelson’s constitutional rights by delaying or hindering Nelson’s medical treatment.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 Eighth Amendment case requires the two-step Saucier inquiry.

Hamilton v. Jackson · filed 2003-03-18

Instead, courts must apply Saucier’s two-step qualified immunity inquiry to Eighth Amendment cases.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment in a § 1983 suit when material facts about the officers’ entitlement to immunity remain disputed.

King v. Fletcher · filed 2003-03-20

Because the summary judgment record establishes genuine issues of material fact regarding Appellants' entitlement to qualified immunity, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

An officer who knows a pretrial detainee faces a substantial suicide risk may be denied qualified immunity under § 1983 for failing to inform the facility receiving the detainee.

Joann Cavalieri, as Plenary Guardian of the Estate of Steven Cavalieri, a Disabled Person v. Shepard · filed 2003-03-20

We conclude that the law as it existed at the time of Steven’s suicide attempt provided Shepard with fair notice that his conduct was unconstitutional.