42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not determine which state actor must pay a judgment or how the money must be raised.

Margaret M. Carver and Randall S. Carmean v. Sheriff of Lasalle County, Illinois, and Lasalle County, Illinois · filed 2001-03-15

Neither § 1983 nor Title VII provides which state actor is responsible for paying a given judgment or how the ... money will be raised; neither statute authorizes sheriffs to write checks on county treasuries, if state law denies sheriffs that power.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for employment discrimination covered by GERA when that claim would bypass GERA’s mandatory administrative procedures.

Dyer v. Radcliffe · filed 2001-03-30

Nonetheless, this Court concludes that because GERA provides substantially similar, mandatory administrative procedures which could be bypassed if a § 1983 claim were allowed to proceed, GERA erects the same bar to § 1983 claims that Title VII erects.

Section 1983 does not let a survivor recover for her own injuries through a claim based solely on the decedent's constitutional injuries.

Andrews v. Neer · filed 2001-06-07

She cannot shoehorn recovery available to her under such separate claims into the recovery she may receive under § 1983 for her father's injuries.

Section 1983 does not let a survivor recover for her own injuries through a claim seeking damages for the decedent’s injuries.

Andrews v. Neer · filed 2001-07-24

We believe that, by allowing the measure of damages in Andrews’s suit to be entirely defined by the language of the Missouri wrongful death statute, we would impermissibly broaden the types of injuries for which Congress intended recovery to be available under § 1983’s authorization of liability “to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... She cannot shoehorn recovery available to her under such separate claims into the recovery she may receive under § 1983 for her father’s injuries.

Section 1983 damages must compensate actual injury and be limited to the amount necessary for that compensation, with more than nominal recovery requiring proof of actual injury.

Doe v. District of Columbia · filed 1983-03-07

It is equally apparent that the Court intended to require, not just that plaintiffs demonstrate actual injury before they secure more than a nominal recovery, but that damage awards be limited to sums necessary to compensate plaintiffs for actual harm.

Section 1983 does not allow a decedent’s survivors to recover their own loss-of-companionship damages through the decedent’s claim.

Blair ex rel. Estate of Blair v. Harris · filed 2014-01-27

Ms. Blair’s testimony in this case as to how she, her children and her parents missed Marquis, the emotional distress she has suffered as a result of his untimely demise, and the counseling she sought to cope with her feelings, support only the damages she, her other children, and Marquis’s grandparents personally suffered as a result of the loss of companionship of Marquis Blair. The law is clear, however, that such damages are not to be allowed in this Section 1983 action.

A § 1983 excessive force claim is not barred by minor injuries; nominal damages may be available when a constitutional violation causes no compensable injury.

Brown v. Neddermann · filed 2020-01-06

The Defendants also contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because a plaintiff cannot state an excessive force claim based on de minimis injuries, such as those suffered by the Plaintiff. They are wrong. “While the main purpose of a § 1983 damages award is to compensate individuals for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, a litigant is entitled to an award of nominal damages upon proof of a violation of a substantive constitutional right even in the absence of actual compensable injury.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a prisoner’s disagreement with his medical classification.

Baltimore v. TX Dept Cr Justice · filed 2001-06-13

Baltimore’s refusal to work amounted to a disagreement with his medical classification, which is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits intended beneficiaries to enforce rights under Title VI.

Lucero Ex Rel. Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools · filed 2001-08-30

There is no doubt that Title VI creates a federal right of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where Plaintiffs, who are African American and Hispanic, were the intended beneficiaries.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Title VI regulations that prohibit retaliation for opposing disparate impact practices outside Title VI § 601.

Peters v. Jenney · filed 2003-04-22

Insofar as they forbid retaliation for opposing disparate impact practices not actionable under § 601, the regulations may not be enforced either via the § 601 private right of action or § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim to enforce Title IX rights against state actors even without an implied private right of action under Title IX.

De La Cruz v. Tormey · filed 1978-09-13

The consequent availability of an action under § 1983, independent of any implied private right of action under Title IX, confronts us with a question not reached by the Cannon court: namely, whether Title IX is to be read as establishing a right which may be vindicated by way of an action under § 1983. Although we have been unable to find any authority directly on point, we believe the answer must be in the affirmative.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages action against a state official in an individual capacity to enforce rights under Title II of the ADA.

Rivera v. Dawson · filed 2007-04-25

Rivera may not bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages against a state official in his individual capacity to vindicate rights conferred by Title II of the ADA.

Section 1983 does not allow individuals to enforce Title X when Title X confers no individually enforceable right on them.

Anspach v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2008-10-29

We therefore conclude that in enacting Title X Congress had no intention of conferring a private right of action under Section 1983 on individuals situated such as the Anspachs.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Title II ADA rights against a county because the ADA provides a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Pena v. Bexar County, Texas · filed 2010-06-21

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs claims against Bexar County under section 1983 for violations of Title II are precluded by the comprehensive enforcement scheme of the ADA.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of the Medicaid Act’s right to a fair hearing and decision ordinarily within 90 days of a hearing request.

Shakhnes Ex Rel. Shakhnes v. Berlin · filed 2012-08-13

The District Court correctly held that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3)—as construed by the regulation—creates a right, enforceable under § 1983, to receive a fair hearing and a fair hearing decision “[o]rdinarily, within 90 days” of a fair hearing request.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a statutory right only when Congress created that right; an implementing regulation alone cannot create an enforceable right.

Sylvester B. Lane v. Fort Walton Beach Housing Authority · filed 2013-05-20

And we can locate no specific statutory provision in the Housing Act that confers a federal right relevant to the Defendants’ alleged violations of various HUD and local PHA regulations. Furthermore, this Court has held that in the absence of a federal right created by Congress, an implementing regulation cannot create a right enforceable under § 1983.

A defendant claiming that the ADA forecloses a § 1983 remedy bears the burden of showing that the remedy conflicts with Congress’s enforcement scheme.

Mercer v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority · filed 2014-06-18

Furthermore, the defendant bears the burden of “showing that allowing a § 1983 action to go forward in these circumstances ‘would be inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored [enforcement] scheme.’ ” ... Here, SEPTA has not made such a showing, instead summarily concluding that “Congress has foreclosed the enforcement of the ADA through Section 1983” because various non-binding opinions have said so.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of ADA Title I or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because those statutes provide independent remedies.

Mohsin v. California Department of Water Resources · filed 2014-10-01

Because these statutes provide independent remedies, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims under ADA Title I and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are dismissed without leave to amend.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce substantive rights provided by the ADA.

Eskenazi-McGibney v. Connetquot Central School District · filed 2015-02-06

As an initial matter, the Court notes that to the extent JEM’s claim of disability discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause is premised upon substantive rights provided by the ADA, the claim is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce ADA rights because the ADA's comprehensive enforcement scheme forecloses that remedy.

Quidachay v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections · filed 2015-03-13

As numerous federal courts have found, we find that the ADA's comprehensive enforcement scheme reflects the intent of Congress that the rights protected in the act are not to be enforced through § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce FMLA rights because the FMLA provides the exclusive remedy for violations of those rights.

Jones v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District · filed 2018-03-27

It follows that, the FMLA is the also sole remedy for the enforcement of FLMA rights, and where the plaintiff’s only claim is a violation of the FMLA, she cannot pursue enforcement of that violation through Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce § 1981 claims against state actors even when the complaint does not expressly cite § 1983.

Locke v. Choctaw City of · filed 2020-04-14

Section 1981 claims are enforceable through § 1983.

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights and cannot be used to enforce ADA rights through a parallel retaliation claim.

Doe v. McHenry County College · filed 2020-09-01

As Defendants argue, “Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but operates as ‘a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’” ... Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, whether based on § 1983 or the ADA, is dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 suits remain subject to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal district court review of state court judgments.

Wilson v. Genisis of Laconia · filed 2001-09-10

We are not persuaded by this argument ... and decline to reverse our prior determination that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 affords jailers and institutional superintendents broad immunity for confining a prisoner under facially valid court process, even when malice is alleged.

Delaney v. Shobe · filed 1964-11-12

As for the defendant Clarence T. Gladden, as Warden, the unvarying rule appears to be that jailers, institutional superintendents and keepers of almost all varieties enjoy a sweeping immunity under the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, as will be noted shortly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has extended the immunity to cases involving alleged malice.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to a facially valid court order.

Hamilton v. Leavy · filed 2003-02-28

The defendants are correct that action taken pursuant to a facially valid court order receives absolute immunity from S 1983 lawsuits for damages.

An officer who executes a facially valid bench warrant is absolutely immune from a § 1983 false arrest claim based on that execution.

Zamora v. City of Belen · filed 2005-04-27

Under the circumstances, therefore, absolute “quasi-judicial” immunity bars Zamora’s § 1983 claim for false arrest.

A jail warden has absolute immunity from § 1983 damages for detention under a facially valid court order.

Rivera v. Algarin · filed 2009-08-26

An “action taken pursuant to a facially valid court order receives absolute immunity from § 1983 lawsuits for damages.”

Section 1983 damages are not reduced by a prior settlement for different claims when a reduction would undermine the statute’s deterrent purpose.

W.S. v. Daniels · filed 2019-10-24

With respect to the § 1983 claims against Daniels and Best, the Court finds that set-off is not applicable. The constitutional duties owed to Plaintiff by Daniels and Best were different from the duties owed by BHOTS. Moreover, Plaintiff raised different claims with respect to Best and Daniels and BHOTS. Finally, allowing set-off in this instance would be inconsistent with the policy objective of deterrence through a § 1983 action.

Section 1983’s remedial policy precludes New York’s dollar-for-dollar settlement setoff; apportioning damages to settling parties requires a requested jury instruction on their share of liability.

Nelson v. County of Suffolk · filed 2019-08-22

Restivo does not support Defendants’ position. First, it found federal law deficient and New York’ dollar for dollar set off as inconsistent with the purpose of §1983. As in Restivo Defendants did not request an instruction that the jury determine the appropriate share of the Settling Defendants liability; submitting a proposed verdict form addressing the issue without any accompanying proposed request to charge is not sufficient.

Section 1983’s deterrence purpose bars applying New York’s settlement setoff rule when it would reduce a nonsettling wrongdoer’s damages below the cost of the harm they caused.

Restivo v. Hessemann · filed 2017-01-19

The New York rule is inconsistent with the deterrent goal of Section 1983, as it allows nonsettling tortfeasors to bear less than the full cost of the harm they inflicted if settling tortfeasors settle for more than their proportional share of liability.

Section 1983’s deterrent purpose prevents a state setoff rule from fully eliminating a liable officer’s judgment because other defendants settled.

Banks Ex Rel. Banks v. Yokemick · filed 2001-12-03

Accordingly, the Court concludes that application of G.O.L. § 15-108 to the circumstances of this case is inconsistent with the policies § 1983 was intended to promote, and that Yokemick is not entitled to the full setoff he claims under the state statute.

Section 1983 damages are reduced by a settling defendant’s proportionate share of liability because a dollar-for-dollar setoff would undermine the statute’s deterrent purpose.

Harrington v. Wilber · filed 2010-10-22

The Court finds that the second articulated purpose, preventing abuses of power by those acting under color of state law, would be left largely unfulfilled if pro tanto setoff were the applicable approach. ... The Court will employ a proportionate share approach to damages at trial in this matter.

Section 1983 can support a challenge to the enactment and validity of a zoning ordinance, even when the dispute arises in land use regulation.

JSS REALTY CO., LLC v. Town of Kittery, Maine · filed 2001-12-11

The Court finds that although this action arises in the context of land use regulation, it is distinguishable from Creative Environments. In Creative Environments, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims were based on the town’s denial of their subdivision plan. Whereas here, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims arise out of the enactment and validity of the land use ordinance.

When a § 1983 claim is analogous to malicious use of civil process, liability requires the elements of that tort, including lack of probable cause and an improper primary purpose.

Herr v. Pequea Township · filed 2001-12-11

Herr's S 1983 claim against the defendants in this case is analogous to the common law tort of malicious use of civil process by a state actor. Accordingly, liability cannot be imposed under the teaching of McArdle unless all elements of the common law tort are satisfied. This includes the requirement that the defendants resisted Herr's efforts to secure approval "without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than securing the proper adjudication" of Herr's claim.

A § 1983 claim for malicious use of civil process must include the elements of the common law tort, including a special grievance involving liberty or property.

Dunne v. Township of Springfield · filed 2012-10-02

We have held that “a claim of malicious use of process may state a Section 1983 claim if it includes the elements of that common law tort as it has developed.” ... Consequently, the lack of a special grievance is fatal to his malicious use of process claim.

Section 1983 claims accrue when the facts supporting the cause of action are or should be apparent.

Mata v. Anderson · filed 2010-01-13

Because J. Mata has not shown that Anderson engaged in actions after November 2005 that constituted new, discrete acts of retaliation, the Court finds that J. Mata’s claims for First-Amendment retaliation accrued at the latest in February 2005.

When a habeas petition also contains civil rights claims under § 1983, the district court should separate and address those claims.

Nubine v. Rick Thaler, Director · filed 2010-09-13

Where a habeas petition contains both habeas claims and civil rights claims properly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court should separate out the § 1983 claims and address them.

A court must consider possible § 1983 civil rights claims in a prisoner's pleading even when the pleading is styled as a habeas petition.

Rosin v. Barnett · filed 2010-09-20

The label attached to a prisoner’s pro se pleading is not controlling; rather, courts must look to the content of the pleading. ... The district court’s dismissal of Rosin’s civil rights claims is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for the district court to consider whether Rosin has alleged any civil rights claims cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a prisoner's claimed deprivation of constitutional rights, subject to the Heck bar when success would invalidate a final disciplinary finding.

Moore v. Mahone · filed 2011-07-15

That the plaintiff was disciplined didn’t trigger the application of Heck, as the judge implied; what triggered it was the fact that the plaintiff was challenging the findings of the disciplinary board.

Section 1983 provides a method for vindicating federal constitutional or statutory rights against a person acting under color of state law.

Steinbock v. FERRY COUNTY PUBLIC UTILITY · filed 2011-12-29

42 U.S.C. § 1983 "`is not itself a source of substantive rights,'" but rather provides "`a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" ... To maintain a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that some person deprived him or her of a federal constitutional or statutory right and (2) that the person was acting under color of state law. ... Given these multiple obstacles to establishing a civil rights claim, the trial court properly concluded that amendment to assert such a claim was futile.

Section 1983 bars injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in the officer’s judicial capacity unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Kennedy v. Staples · filed 2011-03-01

This absolute judicial immunity extends to civil rights cases when a judge acts in a judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228-30, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). That holding was expandéd by statute when Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, which amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that, in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, even injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Section 1983 lets a person sue someone acting under color of state law for violating a right protected by the Constitution or federal law.

Nace v. Pennridge School District · filed 2016-05-06

Plaintiffs’ state-created danger theory thus fails, and the Pennridge Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim shall be granted.

Section 1983 permits a civilly committed person to pursue claims concerning that confinement.

Pelichet v. Gordon · filed 2019-09-20

Because Bickerstaff is under civil commitment and not State criminal confinement, he can seek relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 civil rights claims against state actors belong in a separate civil suit and are not cognizable in a post-conviction habeas proceeding.

Kornse v. United States · filed 2019-11-19

As such claims are not cognizable in the present proceeding, the Petitioner’s claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are therefore dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a detainee’s claim that jail conditions infringe his right to practice his religion.

Darboe v. Decker · filed 2020-04-13

To the extent he is making such a challenge, the proper vehicle is acivil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner seeking relief under both § 1983 and § 2254 must file separate actions.

Engel v. Payne · filed 2020-09-11

Plaintiff Engel may not proceed under both statutes simultaneously in one action. If plaintiff wishes to bring both actions in this Court, he must file two separate actions, seeking separate relief under the separate statutes.

Section 1983 plaintiffs cannot receive a separate back-pay award when the jury’s compensatory damages award already allowed for lost earnings.

LeBeau v. TOWN OF SPENCER · filed 2002-02-04

Here, the jury heard evidence concerning lost wages and received explicit authorization to consider back pay in determining compensatory damages. The plaintiffs therefore received their “bite of the apple” when this Court instructed the jury on compensatory damages and “are not entitled to a second bite.”

Section 1983 does not permit a second compensatory award for the same injury when the plaintiff also recovers under local law.

Medina v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-07-01

But careful examination of the jury‘s verdict sheet confirms Questions 13–15 (relating to the federal claim on which Medina prevailed) implicate § 1983, not Title VII. ... Medina‘s D.C. law and federal law theories of retaliation arose from the same facts (MPD‘s failure to transfer him to Internal Affairs) and sought identical relief (compensation for emotional distress and humiliation).

A plaintiff with one constitutional claim may recover damages only once, even if the jury awards damages under separate theories of municipal liability.

Long v. Gill · filed 2017-05-10

The jury made separate damage awards under both of Long’s theories seeking to impose liability on the LCSO under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But Long admits he advanced only one Fourteenth Amendment claim, and therefore was entitled to recover only once.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages, but a plaintiff cannot receive duplicate compensatory awards for the same injury under Section 1983 and state tort law.

Clappier v. Dennis Flynn, Sheriff of Laramie County, Wyoming, Individually and in His Representative Capac · filed 1979-09-04

Thus, the relief afforded under the common-law of torts and Section 1983 is identical (compensatory damages). As such, the two claims for relief pled in this case are simply alternative bases for seeking the same relief, in much the same way as negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and strict liability are alternative theories for according a damaged plaintiff in a products liability action identical relief.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to collaterally attack a prison disciplinary conviction unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Taylor v. Dukes · filed 2002-02-11

In addition, a prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack the hearing’s validity or the conduct underlying the disciplinary conviction unless the conviction or sentence is reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has otherwise been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages for prison discipline without first succeeding in a collateral attack when no good-time credits were lost.

Strong, Dion v. David, Alphonson · filed 2002-07-23

Because in the end Strong did not lose any good-time credits, he is entitled to seek damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 without first waging a successful collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. §2254.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to bring a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction.

Payton-Bey v. Harrington · filed 2002-09-20

Since granting Payton-Bey his requested relief would call into question the validity of the disciplinary conviction he received regarding the incident, his Eighth Amendment claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to collaterally attack a disciplinary conviction or its underlying conduct unless the conviction has been invalidated or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Clemons v. Cook · filed 2002-12-11

It is well-settled that a prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack the hearing’s validity or the conduct underlying the disciplinary conviction unless the conviction or sentence is reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has otherwise been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to obtain relief that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction.

Harris v. Truesdell · filed 2003-10-23

A prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack the hearing’s validity or the conduct underlying the disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to bring a claim whose success would imply that a prison disciplinary conviction is invalid.

Lewis v. Pendell · filed 2004-02-04

A prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack the hearing or the conduct underlying the disciplinary conviction. ... Because a favorable ruling on Lewis’s claim of retaliation would imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction, this claim is not cognizable.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would undermine a prison disciplinary conviction that cost the inmate good-time credits unless the conviction has been invalidated.

McClain, Bill O. Jr. v. Leisure, D · filed 2006-08-28

His claims are not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction is invalidated.

Section 1983 bars a prisoner’s damages claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of an unoverturned prison disciplinary conviction.

Jackson v. Mizzel · filed 2010-01-20

Jackson’s prison disciplinary proceeding found that Jackson had staged the phony fight. Therefore, a victory on Jackson’s § 1983 damages claim necessarily would imply the invalidity of his otherwise undisturbed disciplinary conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that would call a prison disciplinary conviction into question unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Moore (ID 85744) v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 2019-08-13

Because Plaintiff has not asserted that his disciplinary conviction has been invalidated, his § 1983 claim for damages is subject to dismissal as barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a prison disciplinary due process claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction involving lost credit time unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Doolin v. Toben · filed 2020-03-26

To the extent that he was found guilty of an offense and sanctioned with a loss of credit time, he cannot seek damages for a violation of the Due Process Clause if a finding in his favor here would imply the invalidity of that conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to bring a civil rights claim that would undermine a state conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated.

Blair v. Leaders · filed 2020-05-14

A prisoner may not bring a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that collaterally attacks his state court conviction.

Section 1983 does not permit damages claims that would undermine a conviction or sentence unless it has been invalidated.

Benzing v. Treadway · filed 2020-06-23

Neither of the underlying convictions for criminal contempt nor Plaintiff’s conviction for probation violations have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or questioned on habeas review, and therefore these claims must be dismissed in accordance with Heck; to hold otherwise would allow an impermissible collateral attack on Plaintiff’s convictions through a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional injury caused by city policy even when individual officers are exonerated.

No. 99-56483 · filed 2002-02-15

If a plaintiff establishes he suffered a constitutional injury by the City, the fact that individual officers are exonerated is immaterial to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest solely on a violation of a consent decree that did not establish or remedy a constitutional violation.

Cagle Ex Rel. Estate of Butler v. Sutherland · filed 2003-06-18

Therefore, section 1983 liability cannot be established merely because Praytor’s terms were not followed.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based on a consent decree violation without an independent constitutional violation.

Wells v. Edwards · filed 2002-02-22

In the absence of alleging an independent constitutional violation, Wells cannot rely on violations of the consent decree ... to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages does not bar § 1983 liability for a constitutional violation, even when the damages are small.

Audio Odyssey, Ltd. v. Brenton First National Bank · filed 2002-04-10

A failure to mitigate damages is not an affirmative defense to a constitutional tort. And it is not the law that state actors may violate the constitutional rights of others, yet avoid liability for their actions simply because the injured victim does not suffer very much.

Section 1983 does not let a property purchaser revive a predecessor’s time-barred takings claim by acquiring the property.

Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara · filed 2002-04-18

They cannot, by virtue of their purchase, obtain greater rights than those held by their predecessors in interest. They therefore cannot bring the time-barred state administrative and judicial challenges, or the § 1983 takings challenge, that Johnson and the Bucklews failed to bring.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against defendants sued in their official capacities.

Sostre v. De Canovanas · filed 2002-04-26

Furthermore, the Court rules that plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages on their Title VII and § 1983 claims against any defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against a state agency or a state official acting in an official capacity.

Rafferty v. Cranston Public School Committee · filed 2002-12-30

As we have said before, "it is well settled that neither a state agency nor a state official acting in his official capacity may be sued for damages in a section 1983 action."

Section 1983 does not authorize damages claims against a state or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Peterson v. North Dakota ex rel. North Dakota University System · filed 2003-01-03

It is well-established that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state agency or state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Coleman v. State of New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services · filed 2003-03-03

Section 1983 creates liability for any “person” who under color of state law, deprives another person of a constitutional right. ... Thus, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims against DYFS, as a state agency, and Acevedo and Pellot in their official capacities, cannot be sustained.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim against a state, a state agency, or state officials acting in their official capacity.

Nieves-Marquez v. Commonwealth of PR · filed 2003-12-24

No cause of action for damages is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state, its agency, or its officials acting in an official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a state officer in an official capacity when the suit is treated as one against the state, because a state is not a “person” under the statute.

Broner v. Flynn · filed 2004-03-31

Therefore, a Section 1983 suit against Sheriff Flynn in his official capacity is deemed to be a suit against the Commonwealth. Since a state is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983, all claims against Sheriff Flynn in his official capacity are barred.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against state officials acting in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Buseck v. State · filed 1990-01-19

Not being “persons” under § 1983, Simons and Cotherman, acting in their official capacities are hot subject to suit for damages.

Section 1983 does not permit suits against state officials in their official capacities because they are not persons under the statute.

Kay v. Likins · filed 2005-12-22

The district court properly dismissed Kay’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendant-appellees in their official capacities because they are not “person[s]” under the meaning of the statute.

States and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons under § 1983 and cannot be sued for money damages under it.

Washington v. Jackson State University · filed 2006-03-15

The Supreme Court has declared that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” for purposes of Section 1983 litigation. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment remains a bar to suits brought against them for money damages under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or state officials in their official capacities because they are not “persons” under the statute.

Whalen v. Commonwealth · filed 2006-06-26

For these reasons, Whalen may not bring a claim against the Commonwealth or the individual defendants in their official capacities for violation of his federal rights to due process under §1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against states or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Holder v. State of NH et al. · filed 2006-10-26

First, with respect to Holder's § 1983 claim against the State of New Hampshire, I note that it is well-established that neither states nor state officials sued in their official capacities are amenable to suit for damages pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a state or its officials acting in their official capacities as persons subject to suit.

Campos-Martinez v. Superintendence of the Capitol of Commonwealth · filed 2007-04-19

Consequently, neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons” under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit money damages claims against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities because a state is not a person under the statute.

Kruger v. State of Nebraska · filed 2016-04-07

Even if the state waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the defendants cannot be sued for money damages under § 1983 because claims against state officials in their official capacities are really suits against the state and a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a governor acting in his official capacity as a person who can be sued for violating constitutional rights.

Ibeabuchi v. Ducey · filed 2018-09-18

Instead, assertion of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be required, Yanes v. Maricopa Cty., 231 Ariz. 281, 283, ¶ 11 (App. 2012), and although § 1983 generally applies to “every person” who violates the constitutional rights of another, Governor Ducey is not such a person when he is acting in his official capacity, Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

A state official acting in an official capacity is not a “person” under § 1983 for claims seeking retrospective relief.

DO NOT FILE IN THIS CASE TRANSFERRED TO TRENTON - NEW CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-cv-02519 · filed 2019-07-29

Because Defendant Lanigan, acting in his official capacity is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court will dismiss with prejudice all claims against Defendant Lanigan in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a state official acting in an official capacity because that official is not a “person” under the statute.

Robison v. Salemen · filed 2020-02-11

For purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state official acting in an official capacity is not a “person.” As such, plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim against Lawson in an official capacity.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a state or a state official sued in an official capacity because neither is a “person” under the statute.

Wallace v. Patterson · filed 2020-03-30

The Supreme Court has held, however, that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” See Will, 491 U.S. at 71. The federal constitutional claims (Counts I–III) thus will be dismissed.

A state and its officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

Marin v. Doe · filed 2020-05-22

Such claims are barred because a state is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983, and because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials acting in their official capacity.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek damages and injunctive relief.

(PC) Cortinas v. Vasquez · filed 2020-02-04

Plaintiff may seek damages and injunctive relief under section 1983.

Section 1983 provides an action for damages, equitable relief, or other proper redress to a person injured by a violation of constitutional rights.

Brown v. Doe · filed 1993-02-01

These actions, which are still pending, provide a viable potential avenue for relief assuming petitioner’s allegations can be established; § 1983 specifically provides for a party injured by violation of constitutional rights to have “an action at law [suit for damages], suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

Section 1983 permits legal and equitable relief against individuals who violate constitutional rights and governmental units when violations result from established policies and practices.

Shook v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 2003-07-29

Both legal and equitable relief are avail‘able under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individuals whose conduct is violative of these constitutional protections and from the governmental units if the violations result from established policies and practices.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action to vindicate rights granted by federal statutes or the Constitution but does not itself create rights.

Toledo v. Puerto Rico Labor & Human Resources Dept. · filed 2002-04-29

Sections 1983 and 1985 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, do not create rights. Rather, §§ 1983 and 1985 provide a cause of action to vindicate rights granted by other statutes or by the Constitution.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federal statutory and constitutional rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

MD Hodges Enterprises, Inc. v. Fulton County, Georgia · filed 2003-11-05

As an initial matter the court notes that even though Hodges has set forth three counts in its complaint, section 1983 does not itself create any substantive rights; it merely creates a remedy for deprivation of federal statutory and constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal statutes and creates no substantive right.

Young v. City of Killeen · filed 1985-11-08

The extent of § 1983 liability is not fully defined as yet by the Supreme Court, but we know that this statute creates no substantive right and provides remedies only for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal statutes.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle to vindicate rights conferred by the Constitution or federal statutes; it does not create substantive rights.

Dibella v. Beachwood · filed 2005-04-29

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a source of substantive rights but a vehicle for vindicating rights conferred by the U.S. Constitution or by federal statute.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights established elsewhere; it creates no substantive rights.

Carlisle Ex Rel. Scott v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1989-03-28

42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivation of rights established elsewhere.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal court to remand a case to a state agency; a purported remand is an injunction.

Lightfoot v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-05-23

Thus, even when a district court purports to remand to a state agency under § 1983 – as did the district court here – it actually issues an injunction.

Section 1983 provides a means to vindicate federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

INTERNATIONAL PARKING MANAGEMENT, INC. v. Padilla · filed 2007-09-11

§ 1983 does not confer substantive rights. It solely provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.

Section 1983 enables individuals to seek redress for constitutional violations.

Oberhausen v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government · filed 2007-12-19

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs have pled § 1983 as an additional count to their constitutional claims, the Court observes that § 1983 is an enabling statute for individuals to redress constitutional violations.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law but creates no substantive rights.

Smith v. Greenlee · filed 2008-08-14

That statute creates no substantive rights; instead, it provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights but creates no substantive rights of its own.

Jarrett v. Township of Bensalem · filed 2009-02-20

Section 1983 does not create new substantive rights, but instead provides a remedy for the violation of federal rights, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); no such right appears here.

Section 1983 provides a remedy but creates no substantive rights of its own.

LeBoeuf v. Ramsey · filed 1980-09-16

42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a remedy but does not itself confer any substantive rights.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce constitutional or federal statutory rights against a person acting under color of state law, but creates no rights itself.

Estate of Costobile-Fulginiti v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2010-06-15

Section 1983 does not itself establish any particular federally protected right but instead acts as a vehicle through which an injured person may raise a claim against an individual who, acting under color of state law, violated the rights afforded to that injured person by the Constitution or a federal statute.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights established elsewhere; it creates no substantive rights of its own.

Flagg Ex Rel. J.B. v. City of Detroit · filed 2013-04-25

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but “merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.”

Section 1983 provides a way to vindicate federal rights against persons acting under color of state law, but creates no substantive right of its own.

Whethers v. Nassau Health Care Corp. · filed 2013-07-08

42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows an individual to bring an action against a “person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Though plaintiff raises it as a separate claim (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80-105), it is not itself a substantive right, but provides a method for vindicating federal rights, such as equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits civil damages and declaratory or prospective injunctive relief, but does not authorize criminal sanctions.

Hagley v. Western Regional Jail · filed 2020-08-19

Section 1983 allows civil monetary damages, declaratory, and prospective injunctive relief, but not criminal sanctions. Therefore, a portion of the relief requested by Plaintiff is unavailable in this action.

Section 1983 generally does not provide a claim for mere insults.

Siggers v. Renner · filed 2002-04-30

Nevertheless, we note that mere insults are generally not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a person as acting under color of state law merely because the person makes a citizen’s arrest under Illinois law.

McCloughan v. City of Springfield · filed 2002-05-24

The Court agrees with Patterson that the Illinois Citizen’s Arrest Statute cannot be invoked by McCloughan as a basis for the jury to find that Patterson’s actions toward him were taken under the color of state law as that phrase is used for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides relief when a public school board denies a teacher employment solely in retaliation for exercising constitutionally protected free-speech rights.

Shumate v. The Board of Education of the County of Jackson, a Corporation · filed 1973-05-04

Therefore, we hold that a claim grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and based on the allegation that the county school board has denied employment to a public school teacher solely because of his exercise of his constitutional free speech rights will, if proven, entitle Shumate to relief.

Section 1983 provides a claim for deliberate racial discrimination by a state official in employment decisions.

Taylor v. Jones · filed 1980-05-08

The Court finds that she was treated as she was because of her race and that this treatment was deliberate and conscious on the part of the defendant that Title VII has been violated, and that 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 has also been violated.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law under color of state law, and when used as a parallel employment-discrimination remedy its elements track those of the related § 1981 and Title VII claims.

Whiting v. Jackson State University · filed 1980-04-28

Section 1983 serves as a basis for relief for violations of federal law under color of state law. Insofar as it is used as a parallel remedy for transgression of section 1981 and section 706 of Title VII rights, the elements of the causes of action do not differ from those discussed above.

Section 1983 provides a basis for liability for internal employment practices that discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

22 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1073, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,871 Joyce Harless v. Duck · filed 1980-04-23

We hold that defendants’ internal employment practices before March, 1972 violated the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the continuation of the same practices and policies after March 24, 1972 violated Title VII.

Section 1983 does not prohibit a job-related, business-necessary employment requirement absent a discriminatory or invidious purpose.

Metropolitan Dade County v. Wolf · filed 1973-02-27

The trial court was of the view that fixing of such a weight regulation, as a condition of employment, was a discrimination against a person in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We cannot agree. The regulation relating to weight or overweight, like other health requirements, may properly be made a condition of employment, since there is reasonable basis to conclude that one who is obese or overweight, as for other health conditions, is thereby more likely to become disabled during employment, to the detriment of the county financially and otherwise. As such, the regulation can be said to be grounded on business necessity. ... In this case there is no claim or indication that this regulation, which is applicable to all alike, had a discriminatory or other invidious purpose.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a public-school teacher alleging that nonrenewal of employment was retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights.

Hajduk v. Vocational Technical & Adult Education District No. 13 · filed 1973-04-18

Jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I find that plaintiff’s procedural claim no longer presents a cause of action in light of the Supreme Court decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Plaintiff’s substantive claim, however, plainly does present a cause of action, and, accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 1983 is not limited to claims against employers.

Vulcan Society of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire Department of White Plains · filed 1982-02-25

This suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, as well as under Title VII. Neither of those statutes is limited to employers, and thus 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is an independent ground for recovery of attorney’s fees.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging employment discrimination to prove that the employer acted with discriminatory intent.

Parker v. Board of School Commissioners · filed 1983-03-09

Under § 1983 a plaintiff must prove an employer’s discriminatory intent.

A fixed-term employment contract does not preclude a § 1983 due process claim when state law also creates a for-cause property interest.

Prichard v. Lafferty · filed 1992-08-25

The district court is not correct in finding that Prichard's claim is "nothing more than a contractual dispute." ... And, in any case, Prichard had a property right created by Kentucky statute as well as by a contract for a definite period of time, and therefore this case presents a different situation from that described in dicta in Ramsey.

Section 1983 permits non-tenured teachers to bring First Amendment claims despite their lack of tenure.

Cherry v. Burnett · filed 1977-11-23

Nevertheless, it is established that First Amendment claims asserted by teachers under § 1983 are not defeated by the fact that the teacher did not have tenure.

Section 1983 covers a claim that a state governmental unit dismissed an employee for expressing political beliefs or opinions.

Boyce v. Rizzo · filed 1978-05-24

The suit is brought under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... which authorizes suit for deprivation of federal rights committed under color of state law. Dismissal from employment by a state governmental unit because of the expression of one’s beliefs and opinions on political or other matters is encompassed within the scope of that statute.

Section 1983 does not permit public officials who intentionally impose racially or ethnically discriminatory burdens to invoke good-faith immunity.

Flores v. Pierce · filed 1980-05-07

We also conclude that officials who discriminate invidiously are not entitled to good faith immunity in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 generally provides no immunity from liability, but certain local officials may receive qualified immunity when their conduct was reasonable and undertaken in good faith.

Jones v. District VIII Planning Council · filed 1980-05-02

Section 1983 on its face admits of no immunity from liability, but certain types of immunity have been traditionally recognized. ... A qualified immunity dependent upon a showing of good faith and reasonableness under all the circumstances is available to certain types of local officials such as school board members. ... Defendants argue that public policy favors immunity for persons acting as directors of non-profit corporations, but they are not now entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s due process claims. ... whether or not this right was violated and whether the individual defendants acted reasonably and in good faith would be for the trier of fact to determine.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability on school officials who act in good faith within the scope of their authority; such officials have qualified immunity.

Strickland v. Inlow · filed 1972-09-29

But it is not the Arkansas statute alone which confers immunity because immunity was created by the common law and case law as well as by statutes. The Federal Courts have balanced the compelling interest of the various affected parties in school civil rights cases and have adopted the qualified immunity doctrine and have applied it to school civil rights cases. ... This case involves the qualified immunity for school authorities acting within the scope of their authority and in the performance of their official duties. ... The Court has carefully reviewed the entire evidence in the case and finds as a matter of law no evidence from which any malice toward a plaintiff can be found or inferred. ... But since the Court finds no evidence of malice on the part of any defendant and no circumstances or set of circumstances from which malice of any defendant can be inferred, the Court merely notes that the school administrators and the school district itself had more defenses than the other defendants, but that a verdict should be directed in favor of each and all of the defendants.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for public employees whose contracts are not renewed or who are dismissed for exercising constitutional associational rights, while nonlegislative and nonjudicial officials retain only qualified immunity dependent on good faith.

McLaughlin v. Tilendis · filed 1968-06-12

Even though the individual plaintiffs did not yet have tenure, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 gives them a remedy if their contracts were not renewed because of their exercise of constitutional rights. ... However, other officials, such as present defendants, retain only a qualified immunity, dependent on good faith action. ... To hold defendants absolutely immune from this type of suit would frustrate the very purpose of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose personal damages liability on officials who acted in good faith and on reasonable grounds, under qualified immunity.

Briscoe v. Stanley T. Kusper, Jr. · filed 1971-01-22

Even without broad ju*1058dicial immunity, damages are inappropriate where defendant officials have acted out of good faith and upon reasonable grounds. Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288; McLaughlin v. Tilendis, supra, 398 F.2d p. 290. S.uch a defense of qualified immunity, we believe, is available to defendants in this case. Although found unconstitutional by this Court, the practices of the. Board were nevertheless within the ambit of permissible discretion as it appeared at that time. The defendants acted, as the district court indicated, “in apparent good faith.” Bacon v. Holzman, 264 F.Supp. 120, 133 (N.D.Ill.1967). Under these circumstances, personal liability for damages should not attach, regardless of whether such state action technically contravened the Fourteenth Amendment.

In a § 1983 damages action, qualified immunity applies as a matter of law when the record shows no malicious intent and no clearly established constitutional right was apparent to the officials.

Reese v. Nelson · filed 1979-05-02

Similarly, in Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 715 (3d Cir. 1978), we affirmed a summary judgment in favor of defendants in a § 1983 damage claim on the basis of uncontradicted depositions and affidavits establishing good faith. ... But we are firmly convinced that no perversion of legal process occurred in the temporary commitment proceedings here and thus are persuaded that the defendants were entitled to findings of qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits damages against an officer in an official capacity only when the governmental entity itself would be liable for injury caused by an official policy or custom, and qualified immunity protects individual officers from damages for simple negligence.

Hughes v. Blankenship · filed 1982-03-03

Official capacity suits generally represent but another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the officer is an agent, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and damages may be awarded against a defendant in his official capacity only if they would be recoverable against the governmental entity itself. ... A local governmental entity is not liable, under a theory of respondeat superior, for injury inflicted solely by its agents or employees. Rather, "it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." ... Individual liability for actions taken in the performance of official duties arises only when an officer "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within the sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the ... (individuals) affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury...." ... simple negligence is not sufficient to thus deprive an official defendant of his qualified immunity.

Section 1983 permits state employees to invoke good-faith immunity when they could not reasonably have known their acts would violate constitutional rights.

Enberg v. Bonde · filed 1983-03-18

We must still decide whether respondents are entitled to good faith immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In the present case, both Dr. Bonde and Dr. Fielding were state employees. Appellant does not argue that persons in respondents’ position are not protected by good faith immunity, but claims that respondents did not act in good faith. As already noted, the jury found otherwise. It would appear that respondents are immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In a § 1983 claim over an arrest, an officer has qualified immunity if an objective officer could reasonably have believed probable cause existed, even if it did not.

Gomez v. Atkins · filed 2002-07-11

In our assessment of whether Atkins is entitled to qualified immunity, however, the question is not whether there actually was probable cause for the murder warrant against Isidro, but whether an objective law officer could reasonably have believed probable cause to exist.

Section 1983 does not impose personal liability on an officer who reasonably believed an arrest warrant was supported by probable cause, even if the officer made mistakes.

Gomez v. Atkins · filed 2002-07-11

In the circumstances of the case, Atkins did not transgress any bright lines, Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992), and to the extent he made mistakes, they are entirely insufficient to render him liable to a § 1983 action.

An official-capacity § 1983 claim is treated as a claim against the governmental entity, which cannot assert qualified immunity.

Simpson v. Gallant · filed 2002-07-17

Qualified immunity is available to individuals, not to governmental entities. ... Simpson’s granted second amendment specifies that he is suing the defendants only in their official capacity. ... This is the equivalent of suing a governmental entity. ... Therefore the assertion of qualified immunity is mooted.

Section 1983 permits a social worker to assert qualified immunity when the claimed constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.

Roe v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services · filed 2002-07-17

Social workers may assert a qualified immunity defense when sued under § 1983.... Accordingly, on July 10, 1999, Jackie’s rights, in the context of this case, were not clearly established, so Strickland is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that she unconstitutionally conducted a visual body cavity search.

Qualified immunity does not shield a § 1983 defendant from a claim of intentional discrimination based on membership in an identifiable class when the equal protection rule was clearly established.

Miguel v. Guess · filed 2002-07-18

The law is well established that intentional and invidious discrimination against an individual because he or she is a member of an identifiable class violates that person’s right to equal protection. That proposition was as evident in 1994 as it is today. Dr. Guess has no qualified immunity from Ms. Davis’s § 1983 action.

To overcome qualified immunity at the pleading stage, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege the violation of a cognizable constitutional right.

Dacosta v. Nwachukwa · filed 2002-07-18

In order to overcome the defense of qualified immunity at the 12(b)(6) stage, a plaintiff must first assert the violation of a cognizable constitutional right. Dacosta has not done that in this case. Hence, the district court erred in denying Appellant qualified immunity.

Government officials defending a § 1983 damages claim are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct violates no clearly established right.

Duamutef v. Melvin L. Hollins, Superintendent, and P. Almstead · filed 2002-07-18

And because we conclude that there was no violation of a clearly established right, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 excessive-force suit, officers cannot obtain judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity when the plaintiff’s account could support findings that the force was excessive and no reasonable officer could believe otherwise.

Diana Mickle, John R. Williams v. Sean Morin and Ronald Smith · filed 2002-07-18

A jury as factfinder, of course, would not be required to credit Mickle’s version of the events, but it could permissibly do so; and her version,, which the court was required to credit in ruling on defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, was sufficient to support findings that the force used against Mickle was excessive and that no reasonable police officer could objectively have believed otherwise.

A supervisor may receive qualified immunity from a § 1983 failure-to-train or supervise claim when the alleged failure was not obviously likely to cause a constitutional violation.

Whiting v. Tunica County · filed 2002-07-19

Having found that an application of the qualified immunity standard in light of clearly established law reveals that any failure to train or supervise on Ellington’s part was not “obvious and obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation,” City of Canton, 109 S.Ct. at 1205 n. 10, the Court concludes that Whiting has failed to make a showing sufficient to survive summary judgment based on qualified immunity for her failure to train and supervise claims.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim when the evidence does not show that a reasonable official in the same position would have known the conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Edwina Bridges v. Rhodes · filed 2002-07-22

She fails, however, to produce any evidence showing that a reasonable official in Andrews’s position would have known that his actions violated Harley Bridges’s Eighth Amendment rights.

An officer who acted objectively reasonably during an investigation is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages claim.

Kampfer v. Vonderheide · filed 2002-07-23

The defendant acted as an objectively reasonable police officer for the duration of the investigation, entitling defendant to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Qualified immunity in a § 1983 action depends on whether an official’s conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law; factual disputes about that conduct can prevent summary judgment.

Bastian v. Dipaola, No. Cv 98 0418322 S (Jul. 24, 2002) · filed 2002-07-24

The defendants' final argument is that they have qualified immunity. ... Given these factual disputes, the court cannot make a determination of what action was reasonable because the court, on summary judgment, cannot determine what actually happened on April 22, 1996.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects line officers who inquire into a search warrant’s nature and scope and reasonably rely on their leaders’ representations; they need not read the warrant themselves.

Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County · filed 2002-07-25

They do not have to actually read or even see the warrant; they may accept the word of their superiors that they have a warrant and that it is valid. ... So long as they "ma[k]e inquiry as to the nature and scope of [the] warrant," Guerra, 783 F.2d at 1375, their reliance on leaders' representations about it is reasonable.

Section 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity when the constitutional rule governing their alleged conduct was not clearly established at the time.

Williams v. Ollis · filed 2002-07-26

Consequently, the analysis for retaliation claims, as set forth in Thaddeus-X, was not “clearly established” at the time of the defendants’ alleged improper conduct in 1995 and 1996, and the district court properly concluded that they are entitled to qualified immunity for claims based on that decision.

In a § 1983 retaliation suit, officials are not entitled to qualified immunity when the facts viewed in the employee’s favor show termination for protected speech and that right was clearly established.

Briscoe-King v. Terhune · filed 2002-07-26

Briscoe-King’s right not to be terminated for her protected speech was clearly-established before she was fired in 1998. ... Taken in the light most favorable to Briscoe-King, the facts here fail to establish entitlement to qualified immunity.

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity when the claimed constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

Pike v. Osborne · filed 2002-07-29

Because the law in this area was not clearly ... established at the time the plaintiffs were not reappointed, Sheriff Osborne is entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 qualified immunity protects employees who follow their superiors’ orders only when those orders are facially valid.

Sorensen v. City of New York · filed 2002-07-30

Although it is true that low-level employees have been granted qualified immunity where they followed orders promulgated by their superiors, immunity has been granted only when the orders were facially valid.

An officer has qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim when the facts known at the time of arrest provide arguable probable cause.

Caldarola v. Calabrese · filed 2002-07-31

Looking, as we must, at the facts as Calabrese knew them at the time of the arrest, see Lowth, 82 F.3d at 569, we conclude that there was arguable probable cause to arrest Caldarola. ... Calabrese is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest charge, and the order of the district court must be reversed.

Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim when their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right and is objectively unreasonable in the circumstances.

Kinney v. Weaver · filed 2002-07-31

The district court correctly determined that the Police Chiefs and Sheriffs are not entitled to qualified immunity from Kinney’s and Hall’s § 1983 claims alleging violations of their rights to freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Qualified immunity does not warrant summary judgment on a § 1983 claim when a reasonable prison dentist would have known that delaying an examination for three months despite an inmate’s untreated pain was unlawful.

Jones v. Greer · filed 2002-07-31

At the time of the dentists’ alleged conduct, the law on deliberate indifference to medical needs was clearly established. It would be clear to a reasonable prison dentist that delaying a dental examination for three months in the face of an inmate’s untreated pain was deliberately indifferent. ... Accordingly, the district court properly denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

In a § 1983 challenge to an intoxicated-driving arrest, an officer is protected if a reasonable officer could have believed the plaintiff was driving under the influence.

Flowers v. City of Whitehall, Unpublished Decision (8-1-2002) · filed 2002-08-01

In order to find in favor of Plaintiff you must find and determine that no reasonable law enforcement officer could have believed that Plaintiff was driving under the influence of alcohol. ... We agree with defendant's contention that the instruction was an accurate statement of the law.

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot overcome qualified immunity without showing that a reasonable government agent would have known the conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

White-Bey v. Griggs · filed 2002-08-01

In summary, even under the more lenient standard that now applies to retaliation claims, White-Bey could not overcome defendant’s qualified immunity defense, because he could not show that a reasonable government agent would have known that he was violating White-Bey’s constitutional rights under the circumstances.

Section 1983 defendants performing discretionary functions are protected from damages by qualified immunity unless their conduct violates a clearly established right a reasonable person would have known.

Kalimah v. CITY OF McKINNEY, TEX. · filed 2002-08-02

The defense of qualified immunity, however, protects § 1983 defendants from liability for civil damages when performing discretionary functions, unless such conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.

Officers seeking qualified immunity from a § 1983 excessive force claim must address whether their use of force was objectively reasonable or whether the law was clearly established.

Gutierrez v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 2002-08-02

Both motions were properly denied, as the defendants failed to argue that the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable or that the law was not clearly established so as to inform a reasonable officer that his use of excessive force was unreasonable. The qualified immunity defense will therefore be unavailable at any retrial.

Qualified immunity cannot be decided on summary judgment in a § 1983 action when disputed historical facts are material to the immunity analysis.

Curley v. Klem · filed 2002-08-02

Just as the granting of summary judgment is inappropriate when a genuine issue exists as to any material fact, a decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there are unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity analysis.