42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole eligibility when success would not necessarily speed the prisoner’s release.

Kitchen v. Whitmer · filed 2019-08-16

So success here—even if that success comes in the form of a new, shorter minimum sentence—would not necessarily speed Kitchen’s release. That would all depend on what the parole board does. As such, Heck does not preclude Kitchen from pursuing his federal constitutional claims via § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a challenge to a parole revocation when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s confinement, unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Soldan v. Robinson · filed 2019-08-19

Since Plaintiff contests a parole revocation decision, however, he actually seeks habeas relief because such claims concern the validity of his confinement. Ruling on such claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of the parole revocation decision and his current imprisonment. Such claims are not properly brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a parole eligibility date when success would not necessarily invalidate the duration of confinement.

Johnson v. State of Nevada · filed 2019-08-27

Because Plaintiff’s lawsuit revolves around his parole eligibility date and not his underlying conviction or overall sentence, he may proceed with this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to parole eligibility when the requested relief would speed consideration for parole without necessarily invalidating the duration of confinement.

Williams v. State of Nevada · filed 2019-10-04

Because Plaintiff’s lawsuit revolves around his parole eligibility date and not his underlying conviction or overall sentence, he may proceed with this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a parole-eligibility date when the challenge does not implicate the conviction or overall sentence.

Gonzalez v. Laxalt · filed 2019-11-19

Because Gonzalez’s lawsuit involves his parole-eligibility date and not his underlying conviction or overall sentence, a§ 1983 actionis the proper vehicle to raise such a challenge.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to challenge a parole condition or its imposition through a suit for damages; that challenge must proceed through habeas corpus.

Harris v. Raoul · filed 2019-11-27

Plainly stated, Plaintiff may not challenge his parole condition or its imposition in a § 1983 suit for damages.

Section 1983 permits a class to seek injunctive relief challenging parole revocation procedures when the class does not seek immediate or speedier release.

Gasca v. Precythe · filed 2020-11-12

Wilkinson held that state prisoners may bring a § 1983 action for injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of state parole procedures. ... Therefore, the claims of the plaintiff class do not lie at “the core of habeas corpus,” id. at 82 (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489), but “seek relief that will render invalid” state parole revocation procedures.

Section 1983 permits challenges to parole procedures seeking a new hearing, but does not provide an injunction ordering immediate or speedier release.

Cavalier v. Newsom · filed 2020-12-11

Under these parameters, Plaintiff may initiate a § 1983 action to seek invalidation of “state procedures used to deny parole eligibility ... and parole suitability,” but he may not seek “an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release into the community.”

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole revocation when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the resulting confinement unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Austin v. Cuomo · filed 2020-12-15

Under Heck, this constitutes a direct challenge to the validity of Plaintiff's confinement which cannot be brought under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims challenging a completed parole violation determination are barred if success would imply its invalidity, unless that determination has been invalidated.

Boyd v. Madison · filed 2021-01-19

Here, because Plaintiff expressly challenges his status as a “parole violator,” his claims are barred under Heck unless and until any parole violation determinations have been invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a way to challenge the denial of parole and seek release on parole.

Hardy v. Walker (INMATE 1) · filed 2021-01-25

However, the Plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of the denial of parole and request for release on parole is not proper in a § 1983 action.

A Fourth Amendment damages claim under § 1983 that depends on the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed until the conviction is set aside.

Schilling v. Edward L. White and Robert L. Massie · filed 1995-07-06

The language of Heck plainly refutes the argument that Fourth Amendment claims are exempted from the requirement that a conviction must be set aside as a precondition for this type of § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state and local officials for violations of the Fourth Amendment.

The Reverend Temperance E. Wright v. The State of Florida · filed 1974-06-13

With respect to the state defendants, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, cited by the plaintiff, provides a cause of action for violation of the Fourth Amendment, ... and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) provides jurisdiction.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s convictions.

Blank v. SPCA · filed 2011-06-28

Accordingly, Blank’s claims are irreconcilable with his guilty plea, and if successful, they would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages on a claim whose success would necessarily imply that an outstanding conviction is invalid.

Gatson v. State of Nj · filed 2012-01-10

Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), a prisoner may not use § 1983 to obtain damages if success on the merits necessarily would imply the invalidity of a conviction. Here, Gatson affirmatively contends that the allegedly illegal searches resulted in an unlawful conviction, and accordingly, he cannot bring these claims until and unless he successfully attacks his conviction.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for detention and incarceration when success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Hall (ID 57105) v. Kansas, State of · filed 2020-11-04

If this Court were to find that Plaintiff was entitled to damages for being detained and incarcerated, the invalidity of his criminal convictions would be necessarily implicated.

Section 1983 permits a claim to proceed when a favorable ruling would not necessarily affect the length of the plaintiff's incarceration.

Arbuckle v. Smith · filed 2004-06-11

However, the Supreme Court recently overruled this court’s decision in Huey v. Stine, and concluded that claims are cognizable under § 1983 where a ruling in plaintiffs favor would not necessarily implicate the length of plaintiffs incarceration. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1304-05, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004). Accordingly, plaintiffs § 1983 claims are not barred.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would not necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release.

Kyles v. Garrett · filed 2009-11-30

Under Dotson, Kyles is not precluded by Heck from litigating his § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 is available when the prisoner cannot seek collateral review of the challenged discipline.

Simpson, Willie C. v. Nickel, Janel · filed 2006-06-12

Take away the possibility of collateral review and §1983 becomes available.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a supervised release condition that is part of a sentence unless that condition has first been invalidated.

Savickas, Michael v. Walker, Roger · filed 2006-05-11

The ED condition is part of Savickas's sentence, and Savickas has not shown that it has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid. Therefore, by challenging the ED condition in a § 1983 suit, Savickas is attempting to do exactly what Heck prohibits.

Section 1983 does not permit damages challenging a civil commitment until the commitment is invalidated or the person obtains habeas relief.

Ring v. Appleton · filed 2004-03-26

Ring may not use § 1983 to obtain the relief he seeks. ... Ring also seeks damages because he says his commitment is unconstitutional. But a state prisoner may not sue for damages arising out of allegedly unconstitutional confinement until his conviction is either invalidated by a state court or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ... Although Ring is civilly committed rather than incarcerated under a criminal sentence, similar policy concerns apply for persons held in other forms of confinement actively supervised by state courts.

Section 1983 claims cannot proceed when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s detention.

Donaghe v. Gollogly · filed 2003-03-21

The district court correctly granted summary judgment for the defendants because a favorable judgment on Donaghe’s section 1983 claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his detention.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a condition of confinement resulting from prison discipline when federal habeas relief is unavailable.

Dewalt v. Lamark Carter, Correctional Officer Young, Carol Biester · filed 2000-08-11

To summarize, we hold today that the unavailability of federal habeas relief does not preclude a prisoner from bringing a § 1983 action to challenge a condition of his confinement that results from a prison disciplinary action.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a prison disciplinary decision despite Heck and Balisok when the plaintiff has served the sanction and no longer has a habeas remedy for it.

Johnson v. Freeburn · filed 1998-09-30

In light of Spencer, there simply is not a Heck/Balisok issue present when a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim when he or she is no longer “in custody.”

Section 1983 damages claims are not barred by Heck when success would not establish that a conviction or prison disciplinary finding was wrong.

Gibbons v. J. Higgins, Conduct Adjustment Board Chairman, Officer J. Melly, Scott Roberts, Conduct Adjustment Bo · filed 1995-12-20

Heck does not apply, disciplinary proceeding or not, since the success of Gibbons's suit for damages does not depend on establishing that either the judgment of conviction or the CAB finding of guilt is wrong. Gibbons can be guilty of resisting staff and still have been subjected to excessive force.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to prison discipline despite Heck v. Humphrey when the discipline does not create or extend custody and habeas relief is unavailable.

Gene v. Graham v. Anthony Henderson · filed 1995-07-17

The first question is whether Graham is entitled to pursue the litigation in light of Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994). We think that the answer is yes, because 28 U.S.C. Sec.2254 did not offer Graham any opportunity to contest the merits of the discipline he received. The Conduct Adjustment Board assigned Graham to 20 hours of work details and revoked his recreational privileges. Neither step creates or extends "custody," so Sec.2254 is not an available remedy and the rationale of Heck does not apply.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to prison discipline to proceed under Heck when a favorable judgment would not affect the inmate’s underlying criminal conviction.

Stone-Bey v. Swihart · filed 1995-09-22

Here, there is no evidence that a judgment in the present lawsuit will affect Stone-Bey’s underlying criminal conviction in any manner. Therefore, Heck does not apply and this court may proceed to the merits.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge prison disciplinary procedures when the challenge does not call into question the lawfulness of continuing confinement and thus is not barred by Heck.

Jerry B. Balisok, Cross-Appellee v. Gary P. Edwards Tana Wood, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants · filed 1995-11-22

These appeals are governed by our recent decision in Gotcher v. Wood, No. 94-35484, slip op. 12881 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1995), in which we held that an inmate's challenge to the procedure by which he was denied good-time credits did not call into question the lawfulness of his continuing confinement and was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). Because Balisok's due process challenges to prison disciplinary procedures were not barred by Heck, see Gotcher, slip op. at 12885-86, we reverse the district court's order staying Balisok's section 1983 action and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1983 bars a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Blandino v. Nancy Lindler Frankie Sue Del Papa Jeffrey Sobel, Judge William Maupin, Judge Rex Bell Michael Davidson · filed 1996-03-04

His claims regarding his criminal prosecution are barred because a judgment in his favor would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction" and his conviction has not been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when proving them would invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction, even if the plaintiff is no longer imprisoned.

Kay Elliott Farley, II v. Swayn E. Moore Rand Schuft Wayne Teglia and John Slansky · filed 1996-08-02

Furthermore, Farley's claims are barred as they would, if proven, invalidate his conviction. Id. at 2372. The fact that Farley is no longer imprisoned does not affect this result.

A § 1983 claim is barred when success would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid, unless it has already been invalidated.

Ellis v. Gomez · filed 1997-06-24

Heck precludes a section 1983 claim if "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," unless the sentence or conviction has previously been invalidated.

Section 1983 claims are barred when they fail to satisfy Heck v. Humphrey.

Reed v. Meridian Police Dept · filed 1998-03-12

Reed’s claims bought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred for failure to satisfy Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary conviction is premature under Heck until the conviction is invalidated.

Moore v. Gramley · filed 1998-05-20

We cannot consider the merits of Moore's second claim regarding the alleged conspiracy because it is premature under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). ... Because his disciplinary conviction has not been invalidated, we dismiss this claim without prejudice under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner's claim that would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary judgment unless that judgment has already been invalidated.

James H. Higgason, Jr. v. Shroyer · filed 1998-11-25

A prisoner's § 1983 claim is not cognizable when "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). ... Higgason's claim, if verified, would invalidate the result of the prison disciplinary hearing in which he was convicted of disorderly conduct.

Section 1983 permits a claim despite a prior conviction when the plaintiff was never in state custody and has no habeas remedy.

Leather v. Eyck · filed 1999-06-11

Because Leather is not and never was in the custody of the State, he, like Jenkins, has no remedy in habeas corpus. Having escaped the jaws of Heck, Leather should therefore be permitted to pursue his § 1983 claim in the district court unless principles of res judicata or collateral es-toppel preclude his suit.

Section 1983 damages claims attacking the validity of a parole revocation are barred by Heck.

Seaton v. Rodriguez · filed 1999-11-17

To the extent that Seaton seeks monetary damages for an alleged ex post facto violation leading to the revocation of his parole and for his assertion that his expulsion from counseling was insufficient to support his parole revocation, his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 claims for warrantless arrest and failure to charge or release a suspect are not barred by Heck when success would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction is invalid.

Hernandez v. Kenny · filed 2000-02-23

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Hernandez’s warrantless-arrest and charge-or-release claims pursuant to Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to confinement resulting from parole revocation unless the revocation has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise called into question.

High v. Scott · filed 2000-03-16

This action is, at bottom, a challenge to the validity of High’s confinement resulting from the parole board’s decision to revoke his mandatory supervision. Inasmuch as High does not allege that this decision has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise called into question, it is barred by the principle of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 provides no cause of action for allegations that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence until it is overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Nicolaus v. Thompson · filed 2000-04-12

Therefore, this claim is barred by the principle, enunciated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1992), that no cause of action exists under § 1983 for allegations which, if proved, would imply the invalidity of an underlying conviction or sentence until the underlying conviction or sentence is overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim challenging a prison disciplinary conviction when Heck v. Humphrey bars the claim.

Deemer v. Ward · filed 2000-04-14

Deemer’s claim that he was improperly convicted in a prison disciplinary proceeding is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claims are barred by Heck when success on them would call the plaintiff’s conviction into question.

Holmes v. City of Houston · filed 2000-04-17

According to the reasoning of Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1996), Holmes’s Fourth Amendment claims are also barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims arising from a delayed trial transcript are not barred by Heck when success would not invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Hargrove v. Riley · filed 2000-04-19

The Court finds that Mr. Hargrove’s section 1983 cause of action is not barred by Heck. ... Should the Court grant judgment for Mr. Hargrove and grant him the relief requested, it would not render his conviction or sentence invalid.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction.

Guillory v. Cain · filed 2000-05-01

Heck does not preclude only those claims that directly challenge a conviction. Rather, claims are precluded that "would necessarily imply the invalidity" of a conviction. 512 U.S. at 487. We conclude, based upon the same reasons given by the magistrate judge, that Guillory’s claim of excessive force necessarily implies the invalidity of Guillory’s conviction for aggravated battery.

Section 1983 due process claims concerning lost good-time credits can be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Anderson v. Booker · filed 2000-05-31

To the extent that Anderson asserts due process claims for loss of good time credits and/or loss of privileges or imposition of punishment other than the loss of good-time credits, his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when success on the claim would not necessarily undermine the plaintiff’s conviction.

Bishop v. Garretson · filed 2000-06-27

There is an absence of evidence that Bishop’s conviction was based on evidence resulting from the arrest or the filing of the probable-cause affidavit. Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of Bishop’s complaint under Heck was error.

A § 1983 claim based on a failure to give Miranda warnings may be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Bickham v. Blair · filed 2000-07-19

Bickham’s claim that he was not informed of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 443-45 (1966), is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

A § 1983 suit challenging the fact or duration of confinement is barred by Heck.

Fuller v. Garrett · filed 2000-10-17

Fuller is challenging the fact or duration of his confinement. Therefore, his suit is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint as frivolous.

Section 1983 bars a damages claim that would imply the invalidity of continuing confinement unless the confinement has been invalidated.

Lee v. Suther · filed 2001-01-04

The district court also found that any ruling favorable to Lee on the merits of his third claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continuing confinement and was therefore barred by Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (to recover damages for unconstitutional imprisonment, prisoner must show that sentence has been invalidated). ... We therefore affirm the district court for substantially the same reasons as stated in its November 8, 1999 order and judgment dismissing Lee’s complaint and its November 24, 1999 order denying reconsideration.

Section 1983 does not bar an illegal-search claim merely because the plaintiff has an unchallenged parole revocation, if the claim would not imply the revocation’s invalidity.

Mathias v. Milan Police Department · filed 2001-02-06

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the court’s conclusion that Mathias’ suit is barred merely because he is a parole violator who has not challenged his confinement. ... Therefore, even if Mathias’ parole revocation was linked to the illegal search, his § 1983 claim would not imply the invalidity of the parole revocation.

A § 1983 complaint challenging sentence computation should not be dismissed as frivolous under Heck without considering evidence that state habeas proceedings awarded additional sentence credit.

Waites v. Johnson · filed 2001-03-14

Because this additional evidence may have been sufficient to surmount the Heck bar, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Waites’ complaint as frivolous.

A § 1983 suit may proceed after a conviction is reversed, even if a retrial is pending, when success would not necessarily invalidate a future conviction.

Clay v. Allen · filed 2001-03-16

A threshold question for a Heck-type analysis is whether a successful § 1983 suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction. In our case, a judgment in favor of Clay would not render invalid a potential conviction on aggravated assault.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Mason v. Louisville Police Department · filed 2001-03-16

Mason’s claims were not cognizable because they would imply the invalidity of his convictions.

Section 1983 claims concerning a pre-parole hearing may proceed without prior invalidation of a parole denial when success would not necessarily invalidate that denial or shorten confinement.

Hiltunen v. Bayer · filed 2001-03-22

We conclude that Hiltunen’s allegations do not necessarily imply the invalidity of his parole denial and thus his continuing confinement. ... Accordingly, the district court erred by requiring that Hiltunen first seek invalidation of his parole denial via a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 claim alleging an illegal search cannot be dismissed under Heck without determining whether the search was connected to the plaintiff’s conviction.

Gordon v. Fuller · filed 2001-04-18

We are unable to discern from the record whether the alleged illegal search and seizure had any connection to the conviction for which Gordon is presently incarcerated. We vacate the district court’s dismissal and remand for the district court to give Gordon notice and opportunity to amend his complaint.

Section 1983 permits a false imprisonment claim despite Heck when the plaintiff has no habeas remedy.

Huang ex rel. Yu v. Johnson · filed 2001-05-17

Moreover, given our holding that Heck does not bar false imprisonment claims when the plaintiff has no remedy in habeas corpus, we may see other false imprisonment claims such as the present one brought under Section 1983.

Section 1983 retaliation claims based on false disciplinary charges for filing grievances are not subject to dismissal under Heck at this stage of the proceedings.

Kelly v. Sanders · filed 2001-05-25

However, Kelly’s allegations that the defendants filed false disciplinary charges against him in response to his filing grievances arguably stated claims of retaliation which are not subject to dismissal under Heck.

A § 1983 claim is not barred under Heck when a judgment for the plaintiff would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence.

Bartram v. Wolfe · filed 2001-07-12

Heck is thus inapposite. A judgment in Plaintiff's favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his state conviction and sentence.

Section 1983 excessive force claims are not barred by Heck when they do not call into question the legality of the plaintiff’s incarceration.

Wallace v. Stufflebeme · filed 2001-07-13

We note that a dismissal of this claim under Heck would be improper because this claim does not call into question the legality of Wallace’s incarceration.

Section 1983 unlawful-arrest and imprisonment claims are barred by Heck when invalidating the arrest would undermine a conviction that relied on evidence seized during the arrest.

Gordon v. City of New Orleans · filed 2001-08-08

Accordingly, Gordon’s unlawful-arrest-and-imprisonment claims against Deputies Thorne and Randon are barred by Heck.

A § 1983 claim is barred when success would require release from an existing civil commitment, regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks damages or an injunction.

Rogers v. Illinois Department of Corrections Special Evaluation Unit · filed 2001-08-14

That does not mean, however, that a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper mechanism for all of the plaintiffs to vindicate their rights. ... But the nature of the relief sought is not determinative; rather, in deciding whether the claims are barred, we ask whether the state would be obliged to release the plaintiffs if they won their case.

Section 1983 bars claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been set aside.

McClain v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2001-08-21

Under Heck, McClain may not raise claims that, if correct, would necessarily imply the invalidity of convictions that have not been set aside. Here, McClain’s convictions remain intact; thus, his vague claims of constitutional deprivations, with one exception, are Heck-barred and were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 bars an action whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Cormier v. People · filed 2001-08-29

Because a judgment in Cormier’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and he did not allege that his conviction has already been invalidated, this action is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Section 1983 bars a challenge to an arrest when that challenge necessarily implicates the validity of the resulting conviction.

Straughn v. Kimmy · filed 2001-09-17

The challenge Straughn raised in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint to the propriety of the arrest leading to his robbery conviction necessarily implicates the validity of that conviction. As such, the challenge to his arrest is barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 ... (1994).

Section 1983 claims challenging a seizure are barred under Heck when success would necessarily conflict with the plaintiff’s criminal conviction, even if the plaintiff pleaded guilty to a lesser charge.

Cleveland v. King County Police · filed 2001-09-20

Heck does not allow for an attack on the seizure of property or person even where, as here, the plaintiff plead guilty to a lesser charge than the charge for which the arrest warrant was issued. A successful outcome in this case would necessarily be “fundamentally inconsistent” with the facts underlying his confinement and criminal conviction.

Section 1983 permits an access-to-the-courts claim based on denial of an opportunity to challenge a conviction without Heck barring the claim.

Hayes v. Diaz · filed 2001-12-28

We find no authority to extend Heck to a case such as this one, where the plaintiff is not challenging his conviction and incarceration but instead the denial of his opportunity to challenge that conviction.

A section 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction is dismissed without prejudice and may be reasserted if the conviction is invalidated.

Grant v. Bakersfield Police Department · filed 2002-01-24

The district court properly dismissed Grant’s action because a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of Grant’s conviction. ... We construe the judgment as a dismissal without prejudice so that Grant may reassert his section 1983 claim if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction.

Section 1983 claims for declaratory relief or damages are premature under Heck when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of a release revocation and resulting loss of good-time credits.

Thomas v. Stalder · filed 2002-02-22

Because, however, a judgment in Thomas’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation of his release and the resulting loss of good-time credits, his claims for declaratory relief and monetary damages fall within the parameters of Heck.

Section 1983 claims that necessarily implicate the constitutionality of a conviction are barred by Heck.

Cox v. Tomball Police Dept · filed 2002-04-10

The arguments in Cox’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action make it clear that he is attempting to challenge his conviction. The district court correctly held that Cox’s claim necessarily implicates the constitutionality of his conviction and is barred by Heck.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Gonzalez v. Riley · filed 2002-04-17

If successful, Gonzalez’s claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and is therefore barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Heck does not bar a § 1983 challenge to a prison disciplinary sanction that did not affect the fact or duration of confinement.

Davis v. Biller · filed 2002-04-18

Heck, however, does not apply to this case because the administrative sanction Davis is challenging did not affect the fact or duration of his confinement.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of a parole revocation until Heck’s conditions are met.

Estrada v. Dwyer · filed 2002-05-06

Estrada argues that the claims are distinct, yet his pleadings indicate that he is using his civil rights claim as a vehicle for challenging his parole revocation. Such a challenge is barred by Heck, and the district court properly dismissed Estrada’s complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of parole revocation proceedings unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Criner v. Garcia · filed 2002-05-17

Because a judgment in favor of Criner on any of his claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of the parole proceedings, his action is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction or confinement unless that conviction or confinement has first been invalidated.

Jones v. Martin · filed 2002-06-14

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and confinement, until the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit an excessive-force claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned.

O'Neal v. Weems · filed 2002-08-12

If O’Neal were to prevail on the excessive-force claim raised in the instant suit, this victory would necessarily imply that his conviction for assault on a public servant was invalid.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when they would effectively require reversal of a state court judgment.

Dauven v. State · filed 2002-08-15

Dismissal was proper because, to the extent the Dauvens’ claims would effectively require reversal of the judgment of the Washington County Justice Court, the claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Section 1983 claims for illegal arrest or search that would undermine a conviction are barred under Heck unless the conviction has been overturned.

Hall v. Lorenz · filed 2002-08-30

Because Hall has not shown that his drug conviction was overturned, the district court’s dismissal of Hall’s illegal arrest and illegal search and seizure claims as barred by Heck was not error.

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction that has not been overturned.

Hemphill v. Haglund · filed 2002-09-16

Hemphill’s claim is not cognizable because a ruling in Hemphill’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison disciplinary proceedings are subject to the Heck and Edwards bar.

Riles v. Scott · filed 2002-11-04

Riles’s claim regarding his disciplinary proceedings was barred by Heck and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).

Section 1983 does not permit a damages claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a prison disciplinary punishment that has not been invalidated.

Easter v. Saffle · filed 2002-11-14

Therefore, as Easter’s claims “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, [they are] not cognizable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 claims based on ineffective assistance are barred by Heck unless the underlying conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.

Williams v. Eastland · filed 2002-12-11

Because Williams’ claims are based on his attorney’s alleged ineffective assistance, they are barred by Heck because he has not shown that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim when a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s sentence.

Andrews v. Lopez · filed 2002-12-11

The district court properly dismissed Andrews’s action because a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of his past and present sentences.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction unless that conviction has been invalidated.

Washington v. Stressman · filed 2003-01-29

A state prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and confinement, until the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 cannot be used to invalidate a conviction for which the plaintiff is incarcerated.

Ostuni v. Foster · filed 2003-01-30

To the extent that Plaintiff was attempting to use his § 1983 action to invalidate the criminal conviction for which he was currently incarcerated, the district court ruled that such a claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... After a full review of the record, we GRANT Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and AFFIRM the dismissal of his complaint for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its May 13, 2002, Order and Judgment.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim seeking release from confinement because of a delayed initial appearance when the claim is barred by Heck.

Diamond v. Wright · filed 2003-01-30

Diamond’s argument that he should be released from confinement because he was not given an initial appearance within 48 hours is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994).

Section 1983 permits a claim to proceed when a judgment for the plaintiff would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction is invalid.

Abney v. Trevino · filed 2003-02-14

The district court erred by dismissing this claim because on the record before us a judgment in Abney’s favor on this claim would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 damages claims are barred under Heck when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction and sentence.

Hopson v. Hicks · filed 2003-02-19

Because each of Hopson’s claims, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence, they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a sentence are dismissed without prejudice under Heck.

Smith v. Myers · filed 2003-03-14

The district court correctly dismissed certain of Smith’s claims without prejudice because, if successful, they would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence.

A § 1983 action challenging a search and seizure is barred under Heck when the seized property could be used as evidence in a pending criminal prosecution; the judgment is without prejudice.

Zessman v. Rogers · filed 2003-03-18

Because the property seized from Zessman’s home could be used as evidence against him in his pending criminal prosecution, the district court properly concluded that Zessmaris action was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

A § 1983 claim challenging a conviction or sentence cannot proceed unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated on direct appeal or through habeas corpus.

Maylender v. Prison Health Services, Inc. · filed 2003-04-21

To the extent Maylender alleges that Washington County Sheriffs Deputies’ attendance at his sentencing hearing violated his due process rights, the district court properly dismissed this claim because Maylender has not invalidated his conviction or sentence on direct appeal, or by grant of a writ of habeas corpus.

A § 1983 suit dismissed under Heck must be reconsidered when the plaintiff’s death ends the pending criminal proceedings during appeal.

Rheams v. Marler · filed 2003-05-21

Appellants appeal from a judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... Rheams’s death during the pendency of this appeal, however, necessarily brings a premature end to his criminal proceedings. See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 314 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2002). We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court dismissing the suit and remand the case for further proceedings.

A § 1983 action is barred when a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding criminal conviction.

Daniels v. Crawford · filed 2003-06-13

The district court properly concluded that the action is barred by Heck v. Humphrey because a judgment in Daniels’ favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his outstanding criminal conviction.

Section 1983 claims arising from prison disciplinary proceedings can be barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Taylor v. McElvaney · filed 2003-07-03

Taylor’s claim against Captain Richard Avants arising from his disciplinary proceedings is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Section 1983 claims challenging a search and seizure can be barred under Heck v. Humphrey.

Johnson v. Bradford · filed 2003-07-22

There is no merit to Johnson’s contention that his Fourth Amendment claims relating to the search of his apartment and ... seizure of cocaine are not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

Section 1983 cannot provide relief on a claim whose success would necessarily imply the invalidity of the claimant’s current parole status.

Vipperman v. Choncha · filed 2003-07-25

Vipperman’s claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Vipperman’s current parole status.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred under Heck while the conviction remains in place.

Aranda v. Department of Social & Health Services · filed 2003-07-25

Aranda now asserts that a number of defendants conspired to deprive Aranda of his constitutional rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, relying on section 1983, section 1985(3), and Bivens, 401 U.S. at 388, 91 S.Ct. 780. Aranda also raises a malicious prosecution claim based on the same allegations. Because Aranda’s conviction has not been set aside all of these claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

A Section 1983 false-arrest claim may survive dismissal before service when the allegations do not show that Heck bars it.

Parker v. Matthews · filed 2003-08-19

Accepting the allegations in the complaints as true, we cannot say that Parker's false arrest claims are barred by Heck.

Section 1983 claims arising from a criminal conviction are subject to the Heck v. Humphrey bar.

Miller v. Hawkins · filed 2003-08-19

Miller has not shown error in the district court’s holding that Miller’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

A § 1983 claim barred by Heck cannot proceed unless the challenged sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Joseph v. Johnson · filed 2003-08-19

The district court did not err in concluding that Joseph’s claims are barred by Heck. Joseph has failed to show that his sentence on a 1991 conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Heck does not bar a § 1983 damages claim when the complaint is consistent with the plaintiff never having been convicted of the challenged charges.

Wallace v. Cottle · filed 2003-09-18

Wallace contends on appeal that he was never convicted of the charges described in his complaint. Because we do not read his complaint as in any way inconsistent with this contention, we must conclude that Heck does not apply. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (holding that a prisoner may not bring § 1983 damages claim if prevailing on merits “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the prisoner's] conviction or sentence”).

Section 1983 bars a challenge that implicates the validity of a prison disciplinary conviction unless the disciplinary proceedings have been overturned or invalidated.

Vardas v. Stringfellow · filed 2003-10-20

Vardas’ challenge to his reduced time-earning classification implicates the validity of his disciplinary conviction, and, because he has not shown that the proceedings have been overturned or invalidated, it is barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction unless that conviction has been set aside or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.

Manthey v. Hunter · filed 2003-11-19

A prisoner does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and confinement, until the conviction has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by the appropriate tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim that would call into question a conviction that has not been invalidated.

Adams v. Minogue · filed 2003-12-11

As Adams’s conviction has not been invalidated, any ruling on Adams’s arguments would call into question the validity of his conviction. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Adams’s civil rights complaint.

A § 1983 action is not barred by Heck when the plaintiffs have not been convicted.

Miller v. Riser · filed 2003-12-23

Because Miller and Prichard were not convicted, the civil action was not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that would imply the invalidity of a conviction merely because the plaintiff let the time to seek habeas relief expire.

No. 02-56017 · filed 2004-01-29

Though habeas relief for Guerrero may be "impossible as a matter of law," as in Cunningham, we decline to extend this relaxation of Heck 's requirements to the claims of a plaintiff whose failure to timely achieve habeas relief is self-imposed.

Section 1983’s Heck bar applies to a former prisoner whose own delay prevented timely invalidation of a prior conviction.

Guerrero v. Gates · filed 2004-01-29

We decline to extend relief from Heck to plaintiffs like Guerrero who, through their own delay, have failed to timely overturn their prior convictions.

Section 1983 bars a plaintiff from pursuing a claim that would imply the invalidity of an unoverturned criminal conviction.

Arnold v. Town of Slaughter LA · filed 2004-06-14

Thus, unless his conviction has been overturned, a plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim if prevailing on that claim would imply that his conviction was invalid.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when it necessarily implies the invalidity of a parole revocation and sentence.

Jenkins v. Craven-West · filed 1994-01-22

The district court ruled that because Jenkins' section § 1983 claim necessarily implied the invalidity of the revocation of his parole and sentence, it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). We agree.

A § 1983 unlawful-search claim is barred by Heck when success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of an outstanding conviction.

Barnes v. Braaten · filed 2004-06-21

Based on these allegations, the district court properly dismissed Barnes’ complaint, which on its face, alleges that evidence obtained from an illegal search (crack cocaine) was used to initiate a criminal prosecution (for illegal possession of crack cocaine). These allegations necessarily implicate the validity of the entire criminal proceeding brought against Barnes.

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred by Heck even if the time to seek state postconviction relief has passed.

Rogers v. Adams · filed 2004-07-06

We agree with the district court that Rogers’s success on claims that the officers falsified police reports and provided false information at a probable cause hearing would imply the invalidity of his conviction for drug possession. We thus conclude that Heck bars these claims, even if Rogers’s time for filing a state postconviction motion has passed.

Heck is an affirmative defense to a § 1983 claim, and defendants must establish why it applies.

Johnson v. Sondalle · filed 2004-10-01

But we cannot speculate about what events landed Johnson in prison, and since Heck is an affirmative defense and the defendants never offered an explanation, see Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir.1999), we do not see how it applies.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging a sentence remain subject to the Heck bar after a prisoner’s release if the plaintiff has not shown that other procedural vehicles are unavailable.

Hassler v. Carson County · filed 2004-10-06

The Heck bar applies even to former prisoners for whom the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remedy is no longer available, if the plaintiff has failed to establish that other “procedural vehicle[s]” are lacking.

Section 1983 claims are barred under Heck when the plaintiff’s own allegations would undermine an outstanding disciplinary conviction that deprived the plaintiff of good time credits.

Wooten v. Law · filed 2004-11-12

Thus, whether a claim is barred by Heck turns on the plaintiffs allegations. The theoretical possibility of a judgment for the plaintiff based on findings that do not call his conviction into question is irrelevant if the plaintiffs own allegations foreclose that possibility.

A Section 1983 action must be dismissed without prejudice when a judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Woods v. Padillas · filed 2004-12-20

The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Woods’ action because a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

A prisoner may use § 1983 to challenge a disciplinary decision when success would not affect the length of incarceration.

Young v. Mandsville · filed 2005-02-14

The district court improperly dismissed this action under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because success on the merits of Taylor’s challenge would not affect the length of his incarceration.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue a claim for unconstitutional deprivation of an appeal when the remedy would not require immediate release.

Fuller v. Nelson · filed 2005-04-04

The remedy for the unconstitutional deprivation of an appeal would not be immediate release. Cf. id. at 1244 (holding that prisoners could proceed under § 1983 when they challenged parole procedures and did not seek injunctions ordering their immediate or speedier release). Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of claims as barred under Heck and remand for further proceedings.

Section 1983 damages claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction are barred by Heck while the related criminal prosecution remains pending.

Prien v. Trask · filed 2005-04-18

Because the constitutional violations Prien alleges would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction in the second criminal case, which was part of the same prosecution as the first criminal case, Heck bars Prien’s action.

A § 1983 excessive-force claim cannot be dismissed under Heck without considering whether success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction.

Jones v. Cummings · filed 2005-05-13

Jones’s complaint, although vague and lacking detail, alleges that defendants used at least some force against Jones after he was constrained by handcuffs. The district court therefore appears to have erred in dismissing Jones’s action pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). ... We vacate and remand for the district court to consider Jones’s allegations in light of our recent decision in Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d at 699 (holding that success on the merits of appellant’s excessive force claim did not necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction, and therefore was not barred by Heck).

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for illegal extradition when success would not necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s criminal judgment.

Young v. Nickols · filed 2005-06-24

Accordingly, Heck does not bar Young from invoking § 1983 to assert a damages claim for illegal extradition.

A § 1983 claim is barred under Heck when granting relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of the parole decisions it challenges.

Breshears v. Garrett · filed 2005-07-20

Even if it assumed arguendo that Breshears’s ex post facto claim is nonfrivolous, however, we conclude that it is barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because the granting of relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of the parole decisions Breshears challenges in this civil rights action.

Section 1983 claims that implicate the validity of a plaintiff’s continuing civil commitment are barred by Heck.

Huftile v. Vognsen · filed 2005-08-05

The district court properly concluded that Huftile’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) because they implicate the validity of his continuing confinement.

Section 1983 permits a post-arrest excessive force claim when success would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s convictions.

Wells v. Cramer · filed 2005-11-30

To the extent that Wells’s complaint alleged an excessive use of force after he was arrested, restrained and posed no threat to the defendant officers, his section 1983 action, if successful, would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his underlying convictions and is not Heck-barred.

Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims can be barred under Heck until the conviction is invalidated.

Corrigan v. Dale · filed 2006-01-13

The district court did not err when it dismissed Corrigan’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims against the State Troopers because these claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot maintain an unlawful-search claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction until that conviction has been invalidated.

Fox v. Michigan State Police Department · filed 2006-02-24

In addition, Fox’s claim that he was unlawfully searched was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). ... Fox may not maintain a claim, therefore, based on the search of his person until his conviction for possession of a switchblade has been invalidated.

Heck does not bar a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim unless the plaintiff has a conviction or sentence to invalidate.

Jones v. City of Rockmart · filed 2006-03-10

Furthermore, because it is not clear whether Jones was convicted or sentenced for the offense that formed the basis for his malicious prosecution claim, the district court erred in applying Heck because Heck presupposes a plaintiff’s “conviction or sentence.” See 114 S. Ct. at 2372.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that necessarily calls a criminal conviction into question unless the conviction has been reversed.

Glaude v. California · filed 2006-03-17

The district court properly dismissed Glaude’s action as barred by Heck because his complaint necessarily calls into question the lawfulness of his criminal conviction and he has failed to show that his conviction has been reversed.

Section 1983 claims are not barred by Heck when success would not undermine an outstanding conviction or sentence.

Phillips v. Kiser · filed 2006-03-23

But the claims based on Phillips’s allegations that Kiser ordered him transferred and placed in solitary confinement to punish him, rather than to impair his defense, were not Heck-barred.

Section 1983 permits a claim seeking the release or accounting of potentially exculpatory evidence when success would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the claimant’s conviction.

Jackson v. Clark · filed 2006-05-09

Because Jackson, much like the prisoner in Osborne, only seeks the release, or accounting, of potentially exculpatory evidence, success on the merits would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to challenge the validity of continued confinement through a claim barred by Heck.

Isham v. McGuiness · filed 2006-05-19

The district court properly dismissed Is-ham’s action under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), as it directly challenges the validity of his continued confinement.

Section 1983 claims must be assessed individually under Heck; a claim is barred only if success would imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.

Jackman v. Smith · filed 2006-08-03

Accordingly, this Court has recently emphasized that Heck requires district courts to make a determination with regard to each claim whether it – if successful – would imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for a claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of a sentence unless the sentence has been invalidated; a challenge to the duration of confinement must proceed through habeas.

Robertson v. Sumner · filed 2007-03-12

Robertson’s claim for damages stemming from the alleged miscalculation of his parole-eligibility date is Heck-barred, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (claim for damages that necessarily implies invalidity of conviction or sentence is not cognizable under § 1983 until conviction or sentence has been invalidated), and any challenge to his parole-eligibility date must be asserted in a habeas action, see Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (state prisoners may use only habeas remedies when they seek to invalidate duration of confinement, either directly through injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through judicial determination that necessarily implies unlawfulness of State’s custody); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (challenge to fact or duration of confinement must be through habeas corpus).

Section 1983 permits a civil action challenging parole procedures when success would produce only a new discretionary hearing rather than necessarily shorten confinement.

Terrell v. United States · filed 2009-03-26

Our cases have held that the action before us can both be brought under habeas and the equivalent civil action.

A § 1983 claim is not barred by Heck when the claimant was never in custody and could not seek habeas relief to obtain a favorable termination.

Bishop v. County of Macon · filed 2012-06-22

Because Heck does not bar Donna’s § 1983 claim, we are constrained to vacate this portion of the district court’s order and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff who cannot seek habeas relief to challenge a conviction without being barred by Heck.

Peraica v. Village of McCook · filed 2015-08-28

In sum, there really can be no arguing under the law of this circuit that Heck itself bars Peraica’s complaint.

When a conviction remains valid, § 1983 permits a former prisoner’s claim that would undermine it only if federal habeas relief was inaccessible while he was in custody.

Griffin v. Baltimore Police Department · filed 2015-10-27

A would-be plaintiff who is no longer in custody may bring a § 1983 claim undermining the validity of a prior conviction only if he lacked access to federal habeas corpus while in custody.

A § 1983 claim challenging parole is barred by Heck if the plaintiff could have sought habeas relief while still on parole when the suit was filed.

Hankins v. Lowe · filed 2019-05-24

But it follows from our ruling in the first appeal that Hankins’s case would be barred by Heck if she sued under § 1983 while she was still on parole, see Hankins I, 786 F.3d at 605–06, because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus would have been her exclusive remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring earned-time credits; that claim must be brought through habeas corpus.

Minter v. Bartruff · filed 2019-09-19

Without question, this is a claim for restoration of earned-time credits, so habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy. The district court properly concluded this claim is Heck-barred.

Section 1983 does not provide habeas-type relief challenging the fact or duration of imprisonment.

THOMPSON v. FERGUSON · filed 2019-10-02

Furthermore, to the extent Thompson seeks habeas-type relief, his claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a former prisoner to bring a claim challenging the duration of confinement despite the Heck bar when habeas relief is unavailable.

Rowell v. Dzurenda · filed 2019-10-21

However, the Court finds that, despite the Heck bar, Plaintiff may bring this § 1983 claim because habeas relief is unavailable to Plaintiff because he is no longer incarcerated.

An independent First Amendment claim under § 1983 does not require favorable termination of a criminal proceeding and is not barred by an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal.

Johnson v. Captain Wayne Bax · filed 1995-08-16

Singleton and its progeny, however, have no application to a cause of action, such as Johnson's, alleging a violation of the First Amendment that happens to have occurred in the course of events that resulted in plaintiff's arrest and imprisonment. Unlike claims sounding in malicious prosecution, false arrest, or false imprisonment, the favorable termination of a criminal proceeding is not an essential element of an independent First Amendment claim.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on verbal threats.

Wood v. Nesmith · filed 1995-08-29

In holding that Wood failed to raise an inference of retaliation, the district court reasoned that verbal threats were insufficient to state a claim under section 1983. We agree with the district court's reasoning concerning threats.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a deputy’s alleged verbal threat and use of a racial epithet during a traffic stop.

Parker v. Canham · filed 2003-12-09

... (4) Canham’s alleged verbal threat and use of a racial epithet are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985).

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for mere threats or verbal abuse without more.

Wilson v. McKeller · filed 2007-11-21

While the alleged statement was deplorable, mere threats or verbal abuse, without more, do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on mere verbal abuse by a state actor.

Johnson v. Deputy Sheriff Chris Williams · filed 2010-04-30

We further conclude that Johnson did not state a claim against defendants based on her allegations of verbal abuse, see Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992) (generally mere verbal threats made by state actor do not establish cognizable claim under § 1983), an equal protection violation, see Creason v. City of Washington, 435 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2006) (requirements to state equal protection claim), or a conspiracy, see Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999) (to prevail on conspiracy claim under § 1983 plaintiff must prove actual deprivation of constitutional right).

Section 1983 does not provide relief for verbal abuse or threats without injury or damage.

Asia Brown v. Hamilton Township Police Dept · filed 2013-12-04

As the District Court noted, allegations of verbal abuse or threats, absent any injury or damage, are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for verbal abuse, threatening language, or gestures.

Gipson v. Wilkinson · filed 2014-04-15

Gipson’s sexual harassment claim fails because verbal abuse and threatening language and gestures do not give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for verbal abuse, threatening language, or gestures.

Ponce v. Lucas · filed 2015-01-22

Ponce’s sexual harassment claim fails because verbal abuse and threatening language and gestures do not give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.

A prisoner filing a § 1983 action cannot use a mailbox rule to treat delivery of the complaint for mailing as filing before the limitations period expires.

Nelson v. Reddy · filed 1995-09-13

For the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s recommendation, I am of the opinion that a “mailbox rule” should not apply to the filing of an action by a confined person and accordingly the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge that Nelson’s complaint is time barred are adopted.

Section 1983 claims filed in federal court within the limitations period remain timely when service complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even if Louisiana’s service rule would bar them.

Manieri v. Layirrison · filed 1999-10-28

Manieri asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. ... We hold that Article 3462 does not extinguish a federal claim, filed within the prescriptive period in a federal court of competent jurisdiction and served in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A legal aid society ordinarily is not a state actor amenable to suit under § 1983.

Schnabel v. Gary Abramson and Legal Aid Society of Orange County, Inc. · filed 2000-11-08

We therefore reaffirm the validity of our conclusion in Lefcourt and Graseck that a legal aid society ordinarily is not a state actor amenable to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not specify which state actor must pay a judgment or authorize a sheriff to draw on county funds when state law denies that authority.

Carver, Margaret M. v. Condie, Anthony M. · filed 2001-03-15

Neither sec.1983 nor Title VII provides which state actor is responsible for paying a given judgment or how the money will be raised; neither statute authorizes sheriffs to write checks on county treasuries, if state law denies sheriffs that power.