42 U.S.C. § 1983

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 when its officers caused no constitutional deprivation.

Haines v. Saginaw Police Dept. · filed 1994-08-17

Of course, if the plaintiff has suffered no constitutional deprivation at the hands of the individual police officers, then the municipality cannot be held liable. ... Furthermore, because the officers committed no constitutional violation, summary judgment to the City of Saginaw and the Saginaw Police Department was also appropriate.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for excessive force or an invalid arrest on a failure to train or municipal policy theory only if the underlying substantive claim succeeds.

Abbott v. City of Crocker, Missouri James Stone · filed 1994-09-20

The City cannot be liable in connection with either the excessive force claim or the invalid arrest claim, whether on a failure to train theory or a municipal custom or policy theory, unless Officer Stone is found liable on the underlying substantive claim.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a deputy’s constitutional injury even if the deputy has qualified immunity, but a finding that no constitutional injury occurred forecloses municipal liability.

Gilliam v. County of Los Angeles Sherman Block, Sheriff P. Geisler Jerome Russick · filed 1994-10-06

Monell liability may attach to the sheriff and county employing a deputy who causes a constitutional injury, even though the deputy himself may be exonerated from liability by reason of his qualified immunity. In this case, the jury finding that defendants did not cause a constitutional injury precludes a further inquiry under Monell.

Section 1983 official-capacity and municipal failure-to-train claims cannot stand without an underlying constitutional violation.

Senk v. Village of Northfield · filed 1994-12-21

The District Court also granted summary judgment as to the EMTs in their official capacity, as well as the city's motion for summary judgment on a claim of failure to train. Under Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) and Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because plaintiff has failed to show that the medical assistance was sufficiently inadequate to amount to a constitutional violation, neither of the claims can stand.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability on a failure-to-train theory without an underlying constitutional violation.

Schulz v. Long · filed 1995-01-03

It is the law in this circuit, however, that a municipality may not be held liable on a failure to train theory unless an underlying Constitutional violation is located.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a custom or policy requires an underlying constitutional violation caused by that custom or policy.

Washington v. Vogel · filed 1995-01-25

However, that a governmental entity had a particular custom or policy is relevant only if there was an underlying constitutional violation caused by that custom or policy.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for its officers’ conduct when the officers violated no constitutional rights.

Robinson v. Town of Colonie · filed 1995-03-02

Having determined that the defendant police officers did not violate any of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, it follows that there can be no liability on the part of the Town of Colonie for the officers’ conduct.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Dukes v. City of New York · filed 1995-03-07

In order to state a claim of municipal liability under § 1983, plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) a person acting under color of state law committed acts (2) that deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by federal law. ... In the instant case, where no constitutional violations have occurred and Morgan’s actions were deemed proper, the municipality cannot be found liable.

Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires both a municipal policy and an underlying constitutional violation; a municipality cannot be liable when its officers acted constitutionally.

Palmerin v. City of Riverside · filed 1986-07-21

A valid claim of municipal liability under ... requires a showing that the individual’s constitutional violation “implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers.” ... it is not possible, by its own terms, if the officers acted constitutionally.

Municipal policy becomes relevant to Section 1983 liability only after the plaintiff establishes an underlying violation of civil rights.

Miller v. Mecklenburg County · filed 1986-08-20

In any event, the existence of official policy in section 1983 actions becomes significant only if there is an underlying violation of civil rights. In this instance the jury found, however, that no violation of Raymond Miller's civil rights occurred.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires both an underlying constitutional violation by an officer and a municipal policy that caused the officer to commit it.

Kuklica v. City of Cleveland · filed 1986-09-15

In order to find the City liable, the instructions clearly require plaintiffs to prove (1) that a police officer acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's medical needs, and (2) that a policy of the defendant City of Cleveland caused the officer to act in such a manner.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on a policy or custom requires an underlying constitutional duty; the policy or custom does not itself create the right.

Was v. Young · filed 1992-05-22

The “policy or custom” only becomes relevant after a constitutional duty has been imposed.

Section 1983 does not support municipal liability based on an officer’s inadequate training or adherence to municipal policy or custom when that officer did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Gregory v. City of Rogers, Arkansas · filed 1992-09-09

The appellants base their claim against the City of Rogers on theories that Officer Howell's conduct resulted from inadequate training and from following municipal policy or custom. Having concluded Officer Howell did not violate Fields's and Gregory's constitutional rights, the appellants cannot press a claim against the City of Rogers on either theory.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional duty and an injury resulting from an unconstitutional policy or custom; the policy or custom does not itself create the duty.

Garrett v. A.C. Gilless · filed 1995-01-17

Plaintiffs first must establish an affirmative constitutional duty has been imposed on the defendants. The custom or policy does not create this constitutional duty; its relevance is in proving, once a duty is established, that a state's action or inaction was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Liability attaches only if a plaintiff can establish that her injuries were the result of an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Section 1983 liability of a county and sheriff that depends on a deputy’s liability fails when the jury finds that the deputy did not seize the plaintiff.

Sturges v. Matthews · filed 1995-05-30

Because it is clear that those defendants' liability, if any, is derivative of Matthews' liability under Sec. 1983, the jury's verdict in favor of Matthews on the seizure question also obviates the need to address this issue on appeal.

Section 1983 claims based on an alleged constitutional violation fail unless the plaintiff proves an underlying constitutional violation.

Evans v. City of Neptune Beach · filed 1998-12-23

As noted, Plaintiff has asserted claims against both the City and Marshall pursuant to § 1983, based on his federal constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. ... However, all of these claims fail without proof of violation of some underlying constitutional right.

Section 1983 municipal liability for an excessive-force policy requires an underlying constitutional deprivation.

Saman v. Robbins · filed 1999-03-23

By finding that officers did not use excessive force against Butres Samaan and Alfaorr, the question whether the City had a policy authorizing or condoning the use of excessive force is moot because the plaintiffs suffered no constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a supervisor or municipality when the officer committed no constitutional violation.

Wilson v. Spain · filed 2000-04-05

Since Spain's acts were objectively reasonable, however, no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred, and there was no "deprivation of rights," 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for which Jones or the City could be liable.

A city is entitled to summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive-force claim when the officer caused no constitutional deprivation.

Debera MacE Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Jacob Vincent Revill, Deceased v. City of Palestine Pat · filed 2003-07-24

Because Henderson did not violate Revill’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force, he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit on Mace’s excessive force claim and the City of Palestine is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a policy, custom, or failure to train or supervise when the officer’s conduct caused no constitutional violation.

McCoy v. City of Monticello · filed 2005-06-16

Therefore, the City cannot be held liable on either an unconstitutional policy or custom theory or on a failure to train or supervise theory.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation.

Maestas v. Segura · filed 2005-07-25

In any event, Plaintiffs' claims against the City necessarily fail because we hold Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a constitutional violation against either Defendant. See Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 239 F.3d 1150, 1154-56 (10th Cir.2001) (§ 1983 requires a predicate constitutional violation to support municipal liability).

Section 1983 failure-to-train and failure-to-intervene claims require a viable underlying constitutional claim.

Allaway v. McGinnis · filed 2007-02-08

My findings on the excessive-force claim also renders moot plaintiff's claims for failure to train and failure to intervene, since there is no viable underlying ... Eighth Amendment claim to support those claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on non-shooting officers, a supervisor, or a municipality for excessive force when no underlying excessive force occurred.

Gregory v. Zumult · filed 2008-09-26

As Handy’s actions were reasonable, we need not address any claims against the other officers, the police department, the chief of police, and the town of North Charleston because “[i]n the absence of any underlying use of excessive force . . ., liability cannot be placed on either the non-shooting officers, a supervisor, or the City.” Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 420 (4th Cir. 1996).

Section 1983 liability requires an underlying violation of constitutional rights.

Minnis Ex Rel. Doe v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ. · filed 2011-03-29

Because a violation of those rights is a required element of the claims asserted against both the School Board and Weidenbenner individually under § 1983, those claims must fail and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an official when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Bonneville v. Basse · filed 2013-07-22

Wallace cannot be held liable under § 1983 in the absence of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation; a claim without one must be dismissed.

Marshall v. Indiana University · filed 2016-03-15

As a result, Marshall’s Section 1983 claim, which requires the showing of an underlying constitutional violation, must be dismissed as well.

Section 1983 liability requires an underlying violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Montgomery-Smith v. La. Dep't of Health & Hosps. · filed 2018-03-01

An underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 conspiracy and municipal liability claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Gary Oram, Jr. v. the City of Dillon · filed 2019-02-27

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Oram’s conspiracy and Monell claims because Oram failed to demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 conspiracy, failure to intervene, and municipal liability claims require proof of an underlying constitutional violation.

Coleman v. City of Peoria, Illinois · filed 2019-05-24

Coleman’s conspiracy, failure to intervene, and municipal liability claims each depend on proof of an underlying consti‐ tutional violation.

Section 1983 supervisory liability, failure-to-intervene, and municipal liability claims fail when the underlying constitutional claim fails.

Orr v. Jackson · filed 2019-12-13

Because the court has granted summary judgment on the underlying constitutional violation, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on these claims. ... Because the court has granted judgment on the underlying false arrest claim, however, the City is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Section 1983 claims for conspiracy, supervisory liability, and private party liability that depend on an alleged malicious prosecution require an underlying constitutional violation.

Jonathan Banks v. James Owens, III · filed 2019-12-13

His claim for conspiracy, his attempt to impose supervisory liability, and his allegations against private parties all depend on the malicious prosecution claim establishing a constitutional violation in order to be viable.

Section 1983 failure-to-supervise and failure-to-train claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Sadler v. Greenville Independent School District · filed 2020-02-14

Section 1983 claims require an underlying constitutional violation, and the parents have not pled a viable one.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation; a claim based on due process fails when no due process violation is established.

America West Bank Members v. State of Utah, The · filed 2020-04-02

“There can be no ‘violation’ of § 1983 separate and apart from the underlying constitutional violations.” Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1162 n. 9. (10th Cir. 2016). In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to tie its Section 1983 claim to the alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process. Because the court has held that Plaintiff has not established a violation of its due process rights, and because it does not allege any other constitutional violations, its Section 1983 claim fails.

A Section 1983 claim must plead an underlying constitutional violation when it identifies no other enforceable federal right.

Laface v. Eastern Suffolk BOCES · filed 2020-05-14

The Court denies the motion as to this claim because the Plaintiff fails to plead an underlying constitutional violation, an essential element to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims for failure to intervene, supervisory liability, municipal liability, and official capacity liability require an underlying constitutional violation.

Rowell v. Muskogee County Board · filed 2020-10-27

Because the claims under § 1983 against Officer Slay, Shift Supervisor Rosson, the County, and Sheriff Frazier cannot be maintained without an underlying constitutional violation committed by Officer West, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the remaining Appellees.

Section 1983 does not support Monell liability or conspiracy claims without an underlying constitutional violation.

Yagman v. Garcetti · filed 2020-12-03

Because Plaintiff did not identify any purported constitutional violations, Plaintiff fails to state claims for violations of section 1983. Additionally, as the Ninth Circuit noted in one of Plaintiff’s prior suits regarding his traffic tickets, “[b]ecause we hold that Yagman has not alleged a violation of his constitutional rights, he cannot maintain derivative constitutional claims based on that conduct,” including for Monell liability and conspiracy.

Section 1983 municipal liability and failure to intervene claims require an underlying constitutional violation.

Ventillo v. Falco · filed 2020-12-18

As Plaintiff failed to state—and Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to—the four underlying claims of relief (i.e., false arrest, malicious prosecution, deprivation of the right to a fair trial, and violation of procedural due process), Plaintiff has not pled the constitutional violation required for the final three claims of relief to proceed. Accordingly, these claims for relief are dismissed as well.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a jail authority’s policy was the moving force behind a constitutional violation to hold the authority liable.

Rose v. Southwest Virginia Regional Jail Authority · filed 2020-04-22

To hold the SWVRJA liable for failing to protect him against the alleged assault by Lester, Rose must state facts showing that SWVRJA policy was “the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981). Rose has made no such allegation.

A viable § 1983 claim against government respondents must be based on their official policy or practice.

Kissane v. Wing · filed 2000-11-21

Petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under 42 USC § 1988 (b) because she did not establish that she had a viable claim under 42 USC § 1983, based on an official policy or practice of respondents (see, Matter of Auguste v Wing, 244 AD2d 252; Matter of Riley v Dowling, 221 AD2d 446).

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for a constitutional violation based on generic law enforcement policies that were not the moving force behind the violation.

Crowder v. Sinyard · filed 1989-09-21

There is nothing in the record before us that indicates that any policies of the City of Texarkana reflected deliberate indifference to any constitutional concerns or were anything other than generic policies favoring effective law enforcement. Such general policies cannot be read as the “moving force” behind any asserted unconstitutional acts.

Section 1983 permits a suit against a local government only when the government itself is a moving force behind the alleged violation.

Lipscombe v. Ridley · filed 1991-12-09

Under § 1983, local governments can be sued only where the entity is a “moving force” behind the violation.

In an official-capacity § 1983 action, a county need not be named as a defendant, but it must be a moving force behind the deprivation to be liable.

Bosse v. Duvall · filed 1992-01-27

While it is not necessary that the County be named as a party defendant in an action such as this, when the named official is sued in their official capacity, it must be shown that the County was a “moving force” behind the deprivation of which Mrs. Bosse complains.

Section 1983 permits local government liability only when the government entity is a moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Charles v. Kelly · filed 1992-04-23

Apart from a respondeat superior theory, under § 1983, local governments can be sued only where the entity is a “moving force” behind the violation.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal link between a municipality’s failure to train its officers and the alleged constitutional violation to impose municipal liability.

Darrow v. Schumacher · filed 1993-02-03

Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that City failed to train its officers specifically for special events such as the Days of ’76 Celebration, Darrow must show that such failure to train was a direct cause of the constitutional violation which he alleges. Since directing traffic, dealing with citizens in confrontational situations and effecting arrests are all part of a police officer’s normal day-today activities, we fail to see any direct causal link between City’s failure to specifically train its officers to deal with special events, such as the Days of '76 Celebration, and the alleged constitutional violation asserted by Darrow — excessive use of force.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a municipality’s inadequate training policy and the alleged deprivation; the policy cannot support liability when better training would not have prevented the arrest.

McNulty v. Prince Georges County, Md. · filed 1993-02-18

For that matter, even if Cohee's actions had been unreasonable, and assuming that the County had a policy of not educating its Check and Fraud Unit detectives on corporations, McNulty's evidence failed to show causation between that policy and his arrest. Even if Cohee had been trained sufficiently on the complexity of corporate records to have known how to verify the Falchicks' allegations, representatives of the bank, the accounting firm, and the comptroller testified that they would not have given Cohee any exculpatory information. Therefore, McNulty's evidence failed to establish a § 1983 violation by the County or the police chief.

Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation pursuant to an official policy or custom and a direct causal link between that policy or custom and the deprivation.

Atkins v. School Com'rs of City of Indianapolis · filed 1993-06-21

Therefore, to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must not only establish that an alleged constitutional deprivation ensued pursuant to an “official policy” of the municipality, ... the plaintiff must also demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal policy and the constitutional deprivation. ... Judged against these standards, the Court concludes that summary judgment must enter in favor of the Board.

A § 1983 claim based on a city’s alleged practice of permitting excessive police force requires evidence of deliberate indifference and a causal link between the policy or custom and the constitutional deprivation.

Consolo v. George · filed 1993-10-19

Thus, in order to establish liability, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a policy or custom of the city as well as the causal link between that policy or custom and the constitutional deprivation alleged. Only where a policy or custom of a municipality evidences a “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants is it actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability cannot rest on respondeat superior and requires a direct causal link between a municipal policy, custom, or deficient training and a constitutional violation.

Nicholson v. Kent County Sheriff's Department · filed 1993-11-29

A section 1983 claim against a municipality cannot be based on a theory of vicarious liability or the doctrine of respondeat superior. ... There must also be a direct causal link between the policy, custom, or deficient training and the alleged constitutional violation. ... In this case, I have already determined that the officers’ conduct did not violate-the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Thus, a direct causal link between the allegedly deficient practice and a constitutional violation is missing.

Section 1983 permits an official-capacity claim against a county only when a county policy, custom, or practice is the moving force of a constitutional violation.

Hodges v. Waters · filed 1994-02-03

Although qualified immunity shields Defendant Waters in his individual capacity as a Bulloch County deputy, Plaintiff also brought this action against Waters in his official capacity. This claim is effectively against Bulloch County. Qualified immunity does not apply to governmental entities, only government officials acting pursuant to their discretionary authority. To implicate the County, Plaintiff must show that some policy, custom, or practice of the County was the “moving force” of a constitutional violation.

When a municipal policy is not itself unconstitutional, a single alleged constitutional violation without evidence of other incidents does not establish the causal link required for municipal liability under § 1983.

Donovan v. City Of Milwaukee · filed 1994-02-18

This, too, is a heavy burden, and in light of the fact that Donovan has submitted no evidence of additional incidents of allegedly unconstitutional actions stemming from the City's "ramming and roadblock" policy, we conclude that she has not sufficiently shown a direct causal link between the policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged deprivation; respondeat superior alone does not establish municipal liability.

Helzer v. County of Alpena · filed 1994-03-22

Helzer did not allege that there was a direct causal link between any municipal policy or custom and the alleged unconstitutional deprivation, see Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1067-68 (1992), and liability solely under the theory of respondent superior does not support Sec. 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires proof that a supervisor’s action or failure to act caused the deprivation, or that a governmental custom was the moving force behind it.

Tilson v. Forrest City Police Department · filed 1994-07-05

Section 1983 requires more. Tilson must have shown that Goffs lack of action caused Tilson’s deprivation of liberty. As to the Department, Tilson must similarly have shown some departmental custom was the moving force behind Tilson’s incarceration.

Section 1983 requires a causal link between a governmental policy and an injury for municipal liability.

Moore v. City of Muskegon · filed 1994-07-06

Moore is not entitled to relief against the remaining defendants because he failed to establish a causal link between a governmental policy and any injury in connection with the issuance and execution of the petition for involuntary commitment.

Section 1983 requires a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation to state a claim against a governmental entity.

Steen v. The City of Detroit Detroit Election Commission Wayne County Board of Commissioners · filed 1994-10-05

Further, the district court properly dismissed Steen's claims against the governmental entities, because she failed to allege a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a municipal policy or custom to cause the constitutional injury; failure to investigate unrelated officer misconduct does not establish that causal link.

Vickey Searcy, of the Estate of Lawrence Eugene Hileman, and Jerry L. Smith v. City of Dayton and James E. Newby, Roger · filed 1994-10-26

Regardless of whether the City failed to investigate the allegations of misconduct, and regardless of whether such failure amounted to a policy or custom, plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to indicate that the failure to investigate other unconnected misconduct was the moving force behind the shooting of plaintiffs.

Municipal liability under § 1983 for inadequate police supervision or discipline requires a direct causal link between the policy and the officer’s use of excessive force.

Hicks v. City of Westbrook · filed 1994-10-28

Hicks satisfied only two of the three requirements: that the City employee used excessive force on the plaintiff, and that the police maintained a policy of inadequate supervision and discipline “amounting to approval of the use of excessive force against arrestees by its police officers.” He failed to establish the third requirement as evidenced by the jury finding that the city’s policy was not the direct cause of the use of excessive force. Accordingly, a judgment against him on his section 1983 claim was properly entered.

Section 1983 applies the general proximate cause standard to municipal liability claims based on failures in police oversight, requiring a direct causal link between the municipal policy and the constitutional injury.

Cox v. District of Columbia · filed 1994-10-28

Contrary to the District's contention, nothing in City of Canton v. Harris suggests that the Supreme Court was abandoning the general proximate cause standard in failure to train cases. Rather, the Court simply repeated the admonition of Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), that there must be a substantive connection between the particular defect in training and the officer's wrongful act. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388-89. The law of causation developed since Monell therefore continues to apply after City of Canton v. Harris.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government for failing to preserve a constitutional right only when a deliberately indifferent policy is the moving force behind the violation.

Jodice v. County of Humboldt, Humboldt County Bd. of Sup'rs · filed 1994-11-01

In order to impose liability on a local government for failing to act to preserve a constitutional right, a section 1983 plaintiff must establish: (1) that she possessed a constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) that the government body had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or custom is the moving force behind the constitutional injury.

McClelland v. City of Highland Park · filed 1995-01-05

For a municipality to be held liable under Section 1983, "a municipal policy or custom must be the moving force behind the constitutional injury."

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a municipal policy or custom causes and is the moving force behind a deprivation of constitutional rights.

McCabe v. City of Lynn · filed 1995-02-02

To establish liability against a municipality under § 1983 after Monell, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the municipality maintained a policy or custom; and (2) the same custom or policy was the cause of and the moving force behind the deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for isolated, unauthorized misconduct by municipal employees.

Schroeder v. City of Chicago, John J. Tully, and Audley Connor · filed 1991-03-13

The isolated misconduct of two employees in refusing to furnish a certificate to another agency is precisely the type of random and unauthorized act which, even if deliberate, is not deemed the act of their municipal employer.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based on a single incident of officer misconduct combined with broad allegations of a municipal policy or custom.

Chudzik v. City of Wilmington · filed 1992-12-30

Single incidents of misconduct, when joined with broad allegations of a policy or custom, do not give rise to liability for municipalities.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting a municipal custom or policy to hold a city or its officers in their official capacities liable; one incident involving officers below the policymaking level generally does not suffice.

Dwares v. City of New York · filed 1993-02-05

A single incident alleged in a complaint, especially if it involved only actors below the policymaking level, generally will not suffice to raise an inference of the existence of a custom or policy. ... We conclude that the district court correctly ruled that the complaint failed adequately to plead a custom or policy on the part of the City contributing to Dwares’s injuries. Accordingly, the complaint also failed to state § 1983 claims against the defendant police officers in their official capacities.

A single alleged constitutional violation is insufficient to establish a municipal policy or custom for liability under § 1983.

Sweeney v. Chapman · filed 1993-02-16

The United States Supreme Court has held that an allegation of a singular occurrence of a constitutional violation is insufficient to show a policy or custom. ... Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to allege a viable section 1983 action against the defendant City.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee’s misconduct only when the misconduct implements a municipal policy or custom; an isolated incident without evidence of such a policy or custom does not establish liability.

Hagenaar v. City of St. Joseph · filed 1993-03-11

"A city is not vicariously liable for the acts of its employees, but is liable under § 1983 when the employee's acts execute or implement a municipal custom or policy." Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1992). We have held that "[g]enerally, an isolated incident of police misconduct by subordinate officers is insufficient to establish municipal policy or custom." Wedemeier v. City of Ballwin, 931 F.2d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1991). Even assuming that the officers used excessive force (an issue on which we do not express an opinion), Hagenaar did not present any evidence of municipal policy or custom independent of the alleged misconduct. See id. Further, Hagenaar presented no evidence of other instances in which police officers employed by the City used excessive force. See id. We conclude that no inference of an unconstitutional City policy or custom may be drawn from this isolated occurrence.

A § 1983 claim against a city can be stated by alleging that a single decision of its policy-making police chief deprived a person of constitutional rights.

Perez v. City of Key West, Fla. · filed 1993-06-01

This Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim under § 1983 by alleging (in response to Defendant’s motion) that thé single decision, of the policy-making Chief of Police of Key West, to withdraw the sponsorship required for police academy attendance deprived Plaintiff of his constitutionally guaranteed rights to due process.

Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires proof of a municipal policy, which a single allegedly discriminatory inspection by an employee not shown to be a policymaker does not establish.

Baugh v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1993-06-16

The plaintiffs have failed to prove any policy of discrimination against the black community in regard to housing inspections. Whether or not the September 8, 1987, inspection of Ms. Phillips’s home was performed discriminatorily, at most the plaintiffs can show only this single incident in support of their “policy”. The plaintiffs have not contended that Ms. Maglio was in any way a policymaker. And, they have not established that any other one- or two-family dwelling received a discriminatory inspection.

Section 1983 does not impose county liability for an official's isolated acts of sexual harassment that were neither officially sanctioned nor sufficiently widespread and pervasive to establish a policy or custom.

SAUERS v. SALT LAKE COUNTY · filed 1993-08-09

There is no indication in the record that Cannon's individual acts relating to plaintiff were officially sanctioned or ordered. Cannon's alleged sexual harassment could not have imposed liability on Salt Lake County "unless they were so widespread and pervasive as to establish a 'custom' within his office." Id. ... Those specific acts do not rise to the level of a policy or custom within the Investigation Division, and Salt Lake County was properly dismissed as a defendant on the Sec. 1983 claim.

Municipal liability under Section 1983 requires a policy or custom causing the deprivation; proof of random acts or isolated events is insufficient.

Campbell v. Dianne Feinstein, an Individual, Mayor of the City and County of San Francisco City and County of · filed 1993-08-19

While Campbell may have shown that he was treated unfairly during his Rent Board hearing, proof of random acts or isolated events is insufficient to establish the necessary custom or policy under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a single incident of unconstitutional conduct by a municipal employee without proof that the conduct occurred pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.

Bell v. City of Albany · filed 1993-09-23

In some instances a single decision by municipal policymakers, or a single implementation of a municipal policy or custom by a municipal employee, may be sufficient to establish that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation, but municipal liability may not be imposed pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 for a single incident of unconstitutional conduct by a municipal employee without proof that the conduct was taken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on a single act by an official authorized to make policy.

Glatt v. Chicago Park District · filed 1994-03-21

A single act of a municipal official, if that official has the authority to make policy, can constitute a municipal policy for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity liability for a single decision by a sheriff who is the final policymaker under state law.

Hvorcik v. Sheahan · filed 1994-03-24

Obviously even a single decision or action by the legislative body that governs a municipality — or given the status of a sheriff under Illinois law, a single decision or action by Sheriff Sheahan himself — will meet that test for Section 1983 purposes (id,.).

Section 1983 allows municipal liability for a single unconstitutional decision made by authorized municipal policymakers, even if the incident is isolated.

Meyers v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1994-03-31

The City’s contention that Meyers’ constructive discharge was an isolated incident does not, therefore, save the City from liability. If the decision to punish him for exercising his constitutional rights was made by the “government’s authorized decisionmakers” the City is responsible.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for inadequate training of a single officer without evidence that the training shortfall resulted from a conscious or deliberate municipal choice.

Alexander v. City And County Of San Francisco · filed 1994-07-08

Much of that assurance would be removed if plaintiffs could proceed to trial against a municipality on the basis of the failure to train a single officer, and without any showing that this failure was the result of a conscious or deliberate choice. By limiting her proof to the adequacy of the training of a single officer, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to the alleged deliberate indifference of the municipality.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based on a single incident without other proof of inadequate training or a wrongful policy.

Stark v. County of Westchester · filed 1994-09-02

To allow evidence of a single incident to establish inadequate training or an unconstitutional policy, cannot support liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without other proof of lack of training or of a wrongful policy.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability based solely on an isolated constitutional violation by a low-level county employee without a county policy or custom.

Telfair v. Gilberg · filed 1994-10-24

A single constitutional violation by a low-level County employee cannot by itself establish a municipal policy or custom sufficient to impose government liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional violation caused by a single act of an official with final policymaking authority.

Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre · filed 1994-12-29

It is implicit in this charge that the trial judge determined that the jury reasonably could find that the Chief Housing and Zoning Officer, Joseph Chabala, was a high-ranking policy-making official on whose actions the jury could impute municipal liability to the City. Therefore, the jury charge was not erroneous and the trial judge did not err in denying the City’s motion for a new trial.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single employment decision made by officials with final policymaking authority.

Morancy v. Hillsboro · filed 1995-02-13

Accordingly, the decision to fire Morancy is one that ... may give rise to municipal liability under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a final policymaker’s single inadequate hiring decision if deliberate indifference and causation are proved.

Brown v. Bryan County · filed 1995-06-02

Thus, if Mrs. Brown proves the necessary “deliberate indifference” and “causation” elements, we need not wait for Sheriff Moore to hire several other unqualified applicants, and wait for other citizens’ rights to be violated, before section 1983 liability can be imposed.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on a single decision by municipal policymakers that directs conduct violating constitutional rights.

Rossi v. Town of Pelham · filed 1997-12-18

Here, Pelham policy specifically directed the conduct resulting in violation of Rossi’s Fourth Amendment rights. Thus this policy was a sufficient ground for Pelham’s liability, even though it was only a single decision.

A single decision by county officials may support a claim against the county under § 1983.

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1986-05-29

We had reasoned that one single, discrete decision by County officials was insufficient to establish that the acts complained of were a product of a municipal policy of the County. ... In accordance therewith, it is hereby ORDERED that this Court's prior judgment is VACATED, the district court order dismissing the claim against the County is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED with instructions to reinstate the County as a defendant.

Section 1983 can impose municipal liability for a single decision by an official with final policymaking authority.

Waltman v. Payne · filed 2008-07-10

The district court failed to recognize the single-incident exception to the general rule: a single decision by an individual with “final policy-making authority” can in certain instances be grounds for liability under § 1983.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim does not protect officials performing a ministerial duty imposed by clear court orders.

Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal · filed 1989-03-16

Using both the common language understanding of discretionary acts as well as the standards normally applied by courts, this court finds that the provision of sewer lines, under the specific aegis of two very explicit annexation orders, was not a discretionary function emblematic of the executive and suitable for qualified immunity, but was indisputably a ministerial function.

An official is not immune from a Section 1983 suit merely because she followed a superior’s orders.

O'Malley v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1993-08-11

Winston is not immune from suit merely because she followed Friedus’ orders.

Qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim protects an official from personal liability but does not defeat a claim against the official in an official capacity.

Hall v. Tollett · filed 1997-10-22

Qualified immunity shields defendant from personal liability, but it does, not shield him from the claims brought against him in his official capacity.

Qualified immunity does not apply to official-capacity claims under § 1983.

Joseph Ruffino, Randall A. Noble, and Emmett Doherty v. Michael Sheahan, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sh · filed 2000-06-27

Because the rationale that supports qualified immunity from suit in individual capacity cases is absent in official capacity cases, it is well established that the qualified immunity doctrine does not apply to official capacity claims.

Official immunity in a Section 1983 action applies only to liability for damages, not injunctive relief.

Greenawalt, Kristin v. IN Dept Corrections · filed 2005-02-14

The judge was mistaken about the defendants’ immunity concerning the injunctive relief sought, because the de- fense of official immunity is applicable only to liability for damages.

Section 1983 permits suits against school board members in their official capacities, but qualified immunity bars backpay when they acted in good faith.

Paxman v. Campbell · filed 1980-01-02

The next issue before us is whether, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, monetary relief in the form of backpay may be awarded from the school board’s treasury by suing individual school board members in their official capacities. We hold that in the instant case it may not.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law, subject to qualified immunity from damages.

Winsett v. McGinnes · filed 1980-03-24

On remand, the district court should consider whether, even though we have found the denial of work release by defendants Anderson and Keve to be constitutionally infirm, they are entitled to the benefit of good faith immunity for actions of officials when they are sued for damages pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 damages claims are subject to official immunity when the applicable immunity protects the official's conduct.

Hill v. Robert Bogans and the City and County of Denver · filed 1984-05-30

In judging the immunity of Officer Bogans we use an objective standard of good faith.

Officials sued only in their official capacities cannot claim qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim.

Matthews v. TOWN OF AUTAUGAVILLE · filed 2008-08-20

Because these defendants are being sued in their official capacities only, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law who deprive others of constitutional rights, subject to qualified immunity.

Savidge v. Fincannon · filed 1988-03-17

We conclude that the plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 preserves common-law official immunity, shielding a sheriff who executes a court-issued writ of attachment from suit.

Brother's Distributing Company, Inc. v. Heidtman · filed 1973-01-15

On the contrary, it is well established that Congress did not intend to abolish the common-law immunity of public officials by the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the same rationale should be applicable to the scope of Fuentes. ... In light of the foregoing authority, this Court is obligated to find the defendant sheriff immune from suit and that plaintiff has consequently failed to state a claim for relief.

Section 1983 permits state officials to assert official immunity against damages when their conduct was undertaken in good faith within their official duties.

Poindexter v. Woodson · filed 1973-04-02

In summary, under the amended pleadings, we find that the Defendants are not liable for damages to the Plaintiffs due to the doctrine of official immunity.

Official immunity does not bar injunctive relief against a governor in a § 1983 suit.

James v. Wallace · filed 1974-12-12

As pointed out in United States v. McLeod, supra, immunity does not extend to injunctive relief: ... This Court, therefore, concludes that the defense of official immunity is not available to the Defendant in this case.

Municipal mayors and aldermen have qualified immunity against § 1983 claims for their official acts.

Crowe v. Lucas · filed 1979-07-27

We conclude that the Mayor and Aldermen of Mound Bayou are entitled to the same qualified or limited immunity accorded to other state executive officials.

Section 1983 permits claims against state officials in their personal capacities, while official capacity damages claims and claims barred by qualified immunity are limited.

Shilling v. Crawford · filed 2010-04-28

State officials sued for damages in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. ... The Eleventh Amendment does not bar § 1983 claims against officials in their personal capacities. ... However, in this case, qualified immunity was correctly applied to Shilling’s § 1983 claims because defendants could not reasonably have known that transferring Shilling from one correctional facility to another to accommodate his request for a kosher diet violated a clearly established First Amendment right.

A municipality cannot avoid § 1983 liability by authorizing agents to devise programs, learning of them, and silently acquiescing in their implementation.

Pena v. Board of Educ. of City of Atlanta · filed 1985-09-25

A municipality should not be permitted to insulate itself from section 1983 liability merely by authorizing its agents to develop programs, being “informed” of them, and then silently acquiescing in their implementation.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 based solely on its ratification of an employee’s actions after they occur, because the later approval did not cause the constitutional violation.

Looney v. City of Wilmington, Del. · filed 1989-10-23

Clearly, a government’s later ratification of an employee’s actions could not in any sense be viewed as the cause of those actions.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official policymaker knowingly acquiesces in subordinates’ constitutional violations and approves the challenged action.

Keenan v. City Of Philadelphia · filed 1993-01-21

Further, the evidence in this case shows that Tucker knowingly acquiesced to many of the actions of his subordinates. In the light of his knowledge, Tucker's approval of the transfer requests establishes municipal liability.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable when officials with final policymaking authority ratify a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.

Hall v. Marion School District No. 2 · filed 1993-01-25

At a minimum, the board ratified Foil’s unconstitutional actions. Ratification of unconstitutional actions by officials possessing final policymaking authority subjects a municipality to § 1983 liability.

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 for a subordinate’s decision through ratification only when a final policymaker affirmatively approves the decision; mere acquiescence is insufficient.

Feliciano v. City of Cleveland · filed 1993-03-16

Ratification of a subordinate's action requires more than acquiescence--it requires affirmative approval of a particular decision made by a subordinate.

A county can be liable under § 1983 when its governing officials direct, authorize, and ratify a commission’s action on the county’s behalf.

Skydiving Center of Greater Washington, D.C., Inc. v. St. Mary's County Airport Commission · filed 1993-04-16

The Airport Commission and the County Commissioners spoke for the County in adopting the ban, and the County is therefore responsible for their actions under Section 1983.

Section 1983 ordinarily requires joint action with state officials for private-entity liability, and municipal liability requires conduct executing official policy or taken or ratified by an official with final policymaking authority.

McIntyre v. City and County of San Francisco · filed 1993-07-01

Because McIntyre did not demonstrate that Safeway acted jointly with state officials, it cannot be liable under § 1983. ... The complaint as amended did not allege that these actions represented the execution of official policy or that they were taken or ratified by an official with final policy-making authority. Consequently, no municipal liability could be established under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an unconstitutional custom without a formal policy when policymaking officials know of and acquiesce in the established practice.

McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1993-11-24

A municipal “custom” may be established by proof of the knowledge of policymaking officials and their acquiescence in the established practice. ... We find the evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Board knew of Hughes’ practice and failed to stop it.

A school district may be liable under § 1983 when its final policymaking board ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct and itself takes the challenged action.

Hall v. Marion School District Number 2 · filed 1994-07-26

Therefore, by dismissing Hall the Board not only ratified Foil’s unconstitutional behavior, but also participated in the violation of Hall’s First Amendment rights. Since the Board is the final policymaker in this area of the District’s business, we find that the District may be held liable for the act of the Board in dismissing Hall.

Under § 1983, a subordinate county prosecutor’s discretionary acts do not establish municipal policy unless a final policymaker expressly ratifies and approves them.

City of Phoenix v. Superior Court · filed 1994-08-04

Accordingly, a deputy county attorney’s individual exercises of judgment of when and how to pursue his case do not reflect municipal policies unless they are expressly ratified and approved by the policy maker with final authority, which, in this case, would be the County Attorney.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a discriminatory employment custom only when the practice is sufficiently widespread that responsible policymakers knew or should have known of it and acquiesced in it.

Lawrence v. METRO DADE COUNTY, FL · filed 1994-11-17

Assuming arguendo, however, that this evidence reflects that the Canine Unit customarily excluded women from its ranks, the County cannot be held liable for the employment practices in the Canine Unit unless those practices were sufficiently widespread or pervasive that the County’s responsible policymakers had actual or constructive knowledge of them and acquiesced in them.

A Section 1983 damages claim challenging a parole revocation does not accrue until the revocation has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside.

McGrew v. Bush · filed 1997-12-24

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaints under Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994) because McGrew has not demonstrated that the revocation of his parole has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside. Therefore, any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for damages that McGrew ...may have has not yet accrued.

Section 1983 does not allow damages for alleged improprieties in parole revocation proceedings that call confinement into question unless the underlying conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

Rome v. Quin · filed 1995-06-14

Since Rome's seeks monetary damages for alleged improprieties in his parole revocation proceeding, this claim is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge parole proceedings unless the challenged action has been invalidated by a state court or called into question by a federal habeas writ.

Carson v. TDCJ Commissioners · filed 1995-07-06

First, Carson cannot bring his § 1983 action complaining of parole proceedings because the action he challenges has not been ... invalidated by a state court or "called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254."

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole review procedures when success would not automatically entitle the prisoner to accelerated release.

Allison v. Kyle · filed 1995-09-21

It appears that a favorable determination on these issues would not automatically entitle Allison to accelerated release. Therefore, his claims are properly raised under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim that denial of law library access caused a parole revocation.

Bray v. Walker · filed 1996-03-08

Bray's claim that his parole was revoked because he was denied access to a law library is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim whose success would imply the invalidity of a parole revocation unless that revocation has already been invalidated.

Mueller v. Wark · filed 1998-09-08

These principles also apply “to proceedings that call into question the fact or duration of parole,” Crow v. Penry , 102 F.3d 1086, 1087 (10th Cir. 1996), whether damages or declaratory relief is sought, see White v. Gittens , 121 F.3d 803, 807 n.3 (1st Cir. 1997).

Section 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a parole revocation must be dismissed under Heck unless the revocation has already been invalidated.

Mueller v. Wark · filed 1998-09-08

We agree with the district court that "plaintiff's allegations of error [in his parole revocation proceedings] would implicate the validity of his continued confinement," and, thus, his § 1983 claims must be dismissed under Heck.

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to parole conditions that are part of a sentence unless the conditions have been invalidated.

Moreno v. State of California · filed 1998-11-12

Because the parole conditions at issue are part of Moreno’s sentence, Plaintiffs’ challenge to these conditions is not cognizable under § 1983 unless and until Plaintiffs demonstrate that the conditions have been invalidated.

Section 1983 allows a prisoner to challenge a parole board’s general criteria, but not the denial of that prisoner’s parole request.

Isreal v. Ayers · filed 2001-04-06

A prisoner may challenge the lawfulness of the general criteria employed by parole boards under section 1983. ... However, a prisoner may not allege that the parole board improperly denied his request for parole.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim effectively challenging a parole revocation unless the revocation decision has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Mitchell v. Garrett · filed 2001-04-10

Because he has not shown that the parole revocation decision itself has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, Mitchell’s claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 may provide a way to challenge the denial of parole or work release; such challenges are not categorically limited to habeas proceedings.

Marvin v. Goord · filed 2001-06-19

As to Marvin’s second claim, which challenges the 'denials of his applications for work release and parole, we disagree with the district court’s determination that such challenges are cognizable only in habeas proceedings.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the outcome of a parole hearing; that challenge must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Brower v. Michigan Supreme Court · filed 2002-06-27

...he cannot pursue such relief under § 1983, because such a challenge must be brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole eligibility when success would not necessarily affect the duration of confinement.

Dotson v. Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director John Kinkela and Margarette T. Ghee · filed 2002-08-12

Therefore, our unpublished decisions notwithstanding, we now join our sister circuits and hold that when a prisoner challenges his parole eligibility, and the challenge does not necessarily affect the duration of his confinement, the suit is cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole revocation unless a state court or federal habeas decision has invalidated the revocation.

Miskowski v. Martin · filed 2003-02-06

Second, to the extent Miskowski sought to challenge the revocation of his parole, he could not do so through a § 1983 complaint because he has not demonstrated the invalidity of his parole revocation by either a Michigan state court or a federal habeas corpus decision.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a parole ineligibility classification when the prisoner seeks a determination about the classification rather than release from custody.

Israel v. Director, Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 2003-03-12

Because Israel does not seek release from custody, but rather seeks only a determination that he should not have been classified as ineligible for parole, Israel’s claim was properly brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole denial when the challenge necessarily implicates the validity of the denial and continued confinement; it must be brought in habeas corpus.

Jones v. Thompson · filed 2003-10-22

Accordingly, his “challenge must be brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not under § 1983.”

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would yield, at most, a new discretionary hearing rather than immediate parole or a shorter sentence.

Mujihadeen v. Tennessee Board of Parole & Members · filed 2003-10-23

The Dotson court concluded that: “where a prisoner does not claim immediate entitlement to parole or seek a shorter sentence but instead lodges a challenge to the procedures used during the parole process as generally improper or improper as applied in his case, and that challenge will at best result in a new discretionary hearing the outcome of which cannot be predicted, we hold such a challenge cognizable under section 1983.” ... Because the district court reached its decision without the benefit of the Dotson opinion, we remand the case in order ... for the district court to consider Mujihadeen’s complaint under this standard.

Section 1983 does not provide the route for challenging an individual parole hearing when the requested remedy is a new hearing; the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

Royse v. Scafe · filed 2003-01-27

Plaintiff-Appellant Daniel Royse, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. ... The district court dismissed Royse’s due process and equal protection claims without prejudice, concluding that under binding Tenth Circuit precedent, Royse was obligated to raise the claims in a habeas petition. ... we affirm for substantially those reasons set out in the district ... court’s order dated August 21, 2002.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the terms of state parole custody; such a challenge must proceed under § 2254.

Arnett v. Kemp · filed 2004-12-28

Parole is a form of custody, and a person seeking federal review of the terms of state custody must proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, not under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner’s challenge to parole proceedings must be brought by habeas petition rather than under § 1983.

Roberts v. California Department of Corrections · filed 2002-01-24

We review de novo, and affirm. See Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that a prisoner’s challenge to parole proceedings must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and not as a section 1983 action).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole revocation procedures when success would not necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s confinement or its duration.

Sams v. Crawford · filed 2006-08-07

Because success on their due process claims would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of their current confinement or its duration, plaintiffs can challenge Missouri’s parole revocation procedures in this section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a challenge to a parole denial that would imply the denial was invalid unless the parole decision has been reversed or otherwise called into question.

Jeffery v. Owens · filed 2006-12-12

The district court did not err in determining that Jeffery may not obtain relief under § 1983 until the decision to deny him parole is reversed or otherwise called into question.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge future parole procedures when he seeks neither to invalidate prior parole proceedings nor immediate release.

Kyles v. Garrett · filed 2007-03-15

Kyles does not seek to invalidate prior parole proceedings or to obtain immediate release; rather, he seeks only to have the former parole scheme apply to his future parole hearings. Thus, his action is properly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole eligibility procedures when success would not necessarily result in earlier release.

Thomas v. McDonough · filed 2007-06-15

We agree with the district court that Thomas’s challenge to the parole eligibility procedure is not properly brought under § 2254. The Court in Wilkinson held that claims like Thomas’s are cognizable under § 1983. Because § 1983 and § 2254 are mutually exclusive, Thomas’s claim cannot be brought under § 2254.

Section 1983 permits a parolee to challenge the process used to impose parole conditions.

Jennings v. Owens · filed 2008-12-12

He is challenging the process by which the conditions were imposed on his parole, not the imposition of the conditions, accordingly, he properly relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to challenge parole procedures when the requested relief does not lie at the core of habeas corpus.

Tooma v. Florida Parole Commission · filed 2009-04-10

This does not lie at “the core of habeas corpus,” and may be brought in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge parole eligibility procedures on due process grounds without exhausting state habeas remedies when they seek neither release nor a shorter sentence.

Bradford v. Weinstein · filed 1974-11-22

If so, may the prisoners complain of a denial of due process in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where the sole basis of their complaint is the manner in which the proceedings were conducted and there is no claim that they are entitled to immediate or even earlier release? We think that both questions should be answered in the affirmative; but, for present purposes, we refrain from defining the effect of the application of the due process clause to the procedure for granting paroles.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole decision procedures when success would at most produce a new hearing and would not necessarily speed release.

Brown v. Johnson · filed 2006-02-27

Because Brown’s claim even if successful would not necessarily result in a ... speedier release, it does not lie at “the core of habeas corpus,” and may be brought in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of a law restricting parole eligibility.

Miller v. Buddy D. Nix, Jr. · filed 2009-09-17

Miller questions the constitutionality of a statute that allegedly restricts his eligibility for parole, a claim cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole procedures when success would not necessarily require immediate or speedier release.

Hunter v. TX Board of Pardons · filed 2010-04-23

Under Dotson and Kyles, Hunter is not precluded by Heck from bringing a § 1983 claim challenging the retroactive application of T EX. G OV’T C ODE A NN. § 508.046 as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for a parole revocation that would be rendered invalid by the claim unless the revocation has been invalidated.

Johnson v. Chip Box · filed 2011-03-24

The rule set forth in Heck applies to a challenge to the validity of confinement resulting from a parole-revocation hearing. ... Johnson’s claim for damages based upon the revocation of his parole and his continued incarceration implicates the validity of the revocation hearing. Johnson does not explicitly argue that the parole revocation has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a state parolee to challenge a parole condition if success would neither speed release from parole nor imply the invalidity of the underlying criminal judgment.

Thornton v. Schwarzeneggar · filed 2013-07-31

In sum, we hold that a state parolee may challenge a condition of parole under § 1983 if his or her claim, if successful, would neither result in speedier release from parole nor imply, either directly or indirectly, the invalidity of the criminal judgments underlying that parole term.

A prisoner may use § 1983 to challenge parole procedures when success would provide a new hearing but would not necessarily speed release.

Cheatham v. Muse · filed 2013-09-05

Because Cheatham’s claim would not necessarily result in a speedier release, it does not lie at “the core of habeas corpus” and, therefore, may be pursued in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole hearing procedures when success would not necessarily invalidate continued confinement or require immediate or speedier release.

Lopez v. Edmund Brown, Jr. · filed 2014-01-02

However, success in this action would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his continued confinement and, therefore, Lopez’s claims are not barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-87 (1994). See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (prisoner may challenge procedures used in parole hearing under § 1983, provided he does not seek “immediate or speedier release”).

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge parole eligibility when success would not necessarily speed the prisoner’s release.

Cheatham v. Muse · filed 2014-02-18

Because Cheatham’s claim would not necessarily result in a speedier release, it does not lie at “the core of habeas corpus” and, therefore, may be pursued in a § 1983 action.

A § 1983 claim challenging a parole revocation cannot proceed if success would invalidate the revocation and the board’s decision remains valid.

Butler v. Pennsylvania Board of Probatio · filed 2015-06-01

Because Butler sought both administrative and state court review without success, and the Board’s decision remains valid, he cannot proceed under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to parole hearing procedures when success would not necessarily mean immediate or speedier release.

Erler v. Bisbee · filed 2015-09-03

The district court dismissed Erler’s action under Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), because it concluded that Erler’s claims sound in habeas and challenge the validity of his confinement. However, because Erler sought a new parole hearing and not immediate or speedier release, success in this action would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of Erler’s continued confinement or its duration.

Section 1983 did not provide an adequate remedy for this challenge to the parole board’s consideration of rehabilitative progress, because the inmate did not challenge the application of parole eligibility rules.

State ex rel. Stith v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. · filed 2016-11-22

Given the fact that relator's complaint does not challenge the application of the Ohio Administrative Code which pertains to parole eligibility, relator's claim in this case differs from the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim recognized in Dotson.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for challenging the imposition of parole conditions.

Johnson v. Lorie Davis, Director · filed 2017-08-25

A challenge to the imposition of conditions of parole sounds under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rather than as a habeas action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek a new parole hearing when success would only have a probabilistic impact on custody.

Edward Ford, Jr. v. Massarone · filed 2018-09-04

Ford’s claims, then, have only a probabilistic impact on his custody, which means they were properly raised in a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to how officials implement a parole condition when success would leave the condition and sentence intact.

Frazier v. Jeffreys · filed 2019-01-23

The dispositive question, then, is whether Plaintiffs’ substantive due process challenge to the way IDOC implements the Contact Condition may be brought under § 1983 or instead must be brought in a habeas petition. The answer is that the challenge may proceed under § 1983.