42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a nexus between a private defendant’s challenged conduct and the state; public funding and a lease of school property do not establish that nexus when the state did not compel or influence the conduct.

McDonald Ex Rel. McDonald v. New Palestine Youth Baseball League, Inc. · filed 1983-04-15

Based upon the evidence submitted to this Court, it is apparent that even if the five factors (pp. 1168 and 1169, supra) upon which plaintiff, Kelly McDonald, alleges the existence of a nexus between the defendants and the state are assumed to be true, she has failed to allege or prove that the League’s allegedly discriminatory act (requiring her to play in a girl’s softball league instead of a boy’s hardball league) has been compelled or influenced by the state. Absent such an allegation or proof, the plaintiff has not, and cannot, establish the requisite nexus. Accordingly, not only is it unlikely that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits of her § 1983 claim, but she also has failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not treat an insurer’s actions as state action.

Wachtel v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 1988-10-11

While Federal and State Constitutions ... guarantee religious freedom and separation of church and State, generally an insurer’s actions ... cannot be deemed "State actions” for purposes of civil rights actions under 42 USC § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an entity charged with a Fourteenth Amendment violation to be a state actor; an entity sufficiently entwined with public schools and the state meets that requirement.

Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 2004-07-27

An entity or individual charged under § 1983 with a Fourteenth Amendment violation must be a “state actor.” ... We therefore conclude that MHSAA is so entwined with the public schools and the state of Michigan, and that there is “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action,” Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 295 (quotation marks omitted), that MHSAA should be considered a state actor.

Section 1983 applies only to actions by state actors.

Williams v. Discovery Day School · filed 1996-05-01

It is undisputed that the First Amendment only restricts actions by the federal government and that the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only restrain the actions of state actors.

An attorney appointed to represent a prisoner does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely because the government retains him.

Herrera v. Cowley · filed 1996-06-11

Further, an attorney appointed to represent a prisoner does not become a state actor merely because he is retained by the government.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private association whose regulated activities lack a sufficient nexus to the state.

Doe v. LA Psychiatric Med · filed 1996-11-08

Like the district court, we conclude that LPMA was not a state actor therefore summary judgment was properly entered against Doe.

Section 1983 does not make a private actor a proper defendant solely for a landlord dispute.

Segler v. Felfam Ltd. Partnership · filed 2009-05-11

Felfam is a private, not state, actor and therefore not a proper defendant in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not treat private litigants as state actors merely because a judge allegedly acquiesced in their fraud.

Wallace v. Fed Empl US Dist Ct · filed 2009-05-21

It is also clear from their complaint that they neither alleged nor can allege anything that might transform the private JADO defendants into state actors for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 requires state action for claims alleging deprivation of federal rights, and the foreclosure related conduct here did not satisfy that requirement.

Pease v. First National Bank · filed 2009-06-22

Consequently, neither the forcible detainer action nor the actions of Appellees in pursuing it gave rise to state action sanctionable under §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that each defendant is a state actor.

Hu v. American Bar Ass'n · filed 2009-06-22

Because Hu filed suit under § 1983, his complaint had to plausibly allege that the ABA and IIT are state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action, so private union actions under internal rules do not support a claim without sufficient state involvement.

Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7 · filed 2009-06-25

And union actions taken pursuant to the organization’s own internal governing rules and regulations are not state actions.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to plead state action as an element of a claim, and failure to do so warrants dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lo · filed 2009-06-25

Although the district court ultimately concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to plead the state action necessary for maintaining an action pursuant to § 1983—a conclusion that invokes Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)—the court should have instead dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 requires a plausible connection to state action when private parties are sued for constitutional-rights violations.

Marangos v. Swett · filed 2009-06-25

Viewing these allegations as true, the factual matter falls far short of permitting us to infer a plausible connection among Land Options, Performance Credit, and/or Select Portfolio, all private corporations, and a governmental agency or official such that their private actions would constitute “state action.”

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for ineffective assistance by appointed counsel because a public defender's representation is not state action.

Introcaso v. Curry · filed 2009-06-25

We also note that Introcaso does not frame these claims as legal malpractice under state law, and ineffective assistance of appointed counsel in representing a defendant is not actionable under § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981) (no state action for the purposes of § 1983 where public defender represented defendant in criminal matter).

Section 1983 provides a civil action against persons who, under color of state law, deprive another of a federal right.

Mazzeo v. Gibbons · filed 2009-06-29

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mazzeo must allege Defendants deprived her of a federal right while acting under color of state law. ... Under the joint action test, a private party acts under color of law if she is a willful participant in a joint action with the state or its agents. ... The Court concludes Mazzeo has sufficiently alleged Defendants were all state actors and are therefore subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983’s state action requirement can reach a private citizen who performs functions that are the state’s exclusive prerogative.

Berntson v. Indiana Division of Family and Children, Indiana Department of Family and Social Services · filed 1998-10-20

A private citizen may be considered a state actor, however, if she performs functions that are "the exclusive prerogative of the State." ... There is no indication, nor even an allegation, about how these private citizens performed exclusive state functions. Thus, Counts 13, 15, and 16 of the complaint were properly dismissed without prejudice for failure to meet the state action requirement.

Section 1983 requires a private entity's challenged conduct to be attributable to the state; government funding, regulation, and public officials on its board did not make these employment decisions state action.

Archer v. ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY COMM'N OF NASSAU · filed 1998-12-23

In sum, since the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the EOC and its local CAPs were acting under color of law, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on each of plaintiffs' constitutional claims.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a private landlord’s self-help distraint absent conduct attributable to the state.

T.R. Ashe, Inc. v. Bolus · filed 1999-02-02

Our holding is limited to a conclusion that, absent state action, the proper remedy is not to be found under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state involvement in the challenged conduct; allegations of federal involvement alone do not state a claim.

Brug v. National Coalition for the Homeless · filed 1999-03-19

The basis for these claims is the alleged relationship between HUD, an agency of the federal government, and the NCH. Because there is no mention in plaintiffs complaint of any state influence on the activities which allegedly took place, plaintiff has not stated a claim under either § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 does not permit a member school to sue a private athletic association whose challenged actions are not fairly attributable to the state.

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association Ronnie Carter, Executive Director and Individually · filed 1999-06-21

Based on the above analysis, we conclude that (1) Brentwood has failed to establish that TSSAA’s actions are fairly attributable to the state of Tennessee, and (2) we are not obligated to hold otherwise because of any prior binding precedent. As a result, no § 1983 claim may be brought against TSSAA by a member school that has voluntarily associated with the private organization.

A private school does not become a state actor under Section 1983 merely because it provides services to, receives funding from, and is regulated by the state.

Lopez v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville · filed 2009-07-07

Given Rendell-Baker and its progeny, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Genesis was a state actor for purposes of her Section 1983 claims in this case, notwithstanding the fact that Genesis provided its services to, received funding from, and was regulated by the state.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private corporation’s tax-exempt status alone does not make it one.

Stone v. Elohim, Inc. · filed 2009-07-10

The validity of his claim thus depends on Elohim being a state actor, and Mr. Stone has alleged no facts which suggest this is the case. ... Tax exempt status alone, however, does not transform a corporation from a private institution to a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant was a state actor.

Thornton v. Merchant · filed 2009-07-10

Because the unnamed employee of Rockler Company is not a state actor, Thornton has not alleged a viable § 1983 claim against this employee.

Section 1983 requires state action; government funding and regulation alone do not make a private university a state actor.

Brogan v. La Salle University · filed 1999-10-14

But as outlined above, it is now well-settled that neither factor, alone or together, creates a symbiotic relationship sufficient to create state action.

A hospital and its board can be state actors under § 1983 when their peer review activities are actively supervised by the state.

Nicholas v. North Colorado Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1999-12-09

In summary, we conclude that the defendants are state actors for the purposes of § 1983 liability, and that Nicholas has pled facts sufficient to support such a violation because the procedures provided to him by NCMC violated the due process required by the federal Constitution.

Section 1983 does not treat cadets as state actors merely because their state college uses a military model; education and military-model training are not exclusive state functions.

Mentavlos v. Anderson · filed 2000-02-15

This court must, therefore, conclude that the exclusive state function model does not provide a basis for finding defendants to be state actors.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private landlord whose receipt of a federally subsidized mortgage and rent subsidies does not make it a state actor.

Carey v. Edgewood Management Corp. · filed 2000-07-06

Assuming both of these assertions are true in fact, they nonetheless do not suffice to make Edgewood a state actor. ... Our holding on the constitutional claims likewise requires rejection of Carey’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover federal agents acting as federal officials rather than state actors.

Salcedo v. Rossotti · filed 2009-07-20

In keeping with the obligation to liberally construe a pro se complaint, because all of the defendants were federal agents, not state actors, at the relevant time, the Court construes this Complaint as one brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 does not make a private airline a state actor merely because the government regulates its security policies and provides financial and administrative aid.

Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Group, Inc. · filed 2009-07-24

In conclusion, U.S. Airways is not a state actor for purposes of the § 1983 denial of transportation claim. Having its security policies regulated by the state and regularly receiving financial and administrative aid from the government does not render U.S. Airways a state actor.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a conspiracy among private individuals alone does not state a claim.

Schrader v. Turner · filed 2009-07-24

In any event, Schrader’s conspiracy theory fails because she has not identified a state actor involved in the alleged conspiracy. She simply argues Defendants, all private individuals, conspired with each other. Thus, her new allegations are still insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private party to allege facts showing that the party acted under color of state law.

Vander Linden v. Wilbanks · filed 2000-12-06

However, in order to claim jurisdiction under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that defendants are state actors or that they acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not make private litigants or their lawyers state actors merely because they obtain court orders.

Read v. Klein · filed 2001-01-09

In other contexts, a private party’s “mere invocation of state legal procedures” does not constitute joint participation and thus is not state action.

Section 1983 requires defendants to be state actors; unsupported allegations of a conspiracy with prosecutors do not establish that requirement.

Timmons v. Alexion · filed 2001-03-23

The Court held that Timmons’s claims were meritless since the defendants were not state actors under § 1983 and, further, Timmons’s allegations were insufficient to support the existence of a conspiracy. ... For substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court opinion dismissing Timmons’s complaint, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against private directors who are not state actors, even when a state official allegedly influenced their votes.

Terra Foundation for the Arts v. Perkins · filed 2001-06-29

Since enjoining Mr. Perkins would be pointless, and Drs. Marshall and Stebbins are not state actors and cannot be sued under Section 1983, there is no relief that I can give that would redress plaintiffs’ complaint.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private defendant’s conspiracy with a state actor can satisfy that requirement.

McGhee v. Bradshaw · filed 2001-08-23

McGhee provides no argument on the issue whether Epps conspired with Bradshaw to deny him the records he sought, so as to make Epps a state actor as required for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against retained defense counsel for representation in a state criminal case because the attorney is not a state actor.

Deloach v. Burdine · filed 2001-10-03

The defendant is not a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private psychiatrist does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by invoking a state involuntary-commitment statute.

Hendricks v. Rasmussen · filed 2002-01-28

We agree with the district court that Rasmussen was not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor; a private corporation does not become one merely by supporting state regulatory work without assuming regulatory authority.

Oregon Ex Rel. Department of Transportation v. Heavy Vehicle Electronic License Plate, Inc. · filed 2002-04-19

A threshold issue on this argument is the question of whether HELP is a “state actor.” I hold that it is not.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private property owners’ association’s refusal to allow a “For Sale” sign does not satisfy that requirement merely because the deed restriction could be enforced in court.

Loren v. Charles M. Sasser, Jr. · filed 2002-10-17

Therefore, summary judgment correctly was granted to appellees on Counts V and VI relating to the “For Sale” sign because appellants failed to establish state action required for a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; using a state-authorized conversion process and obtaining regulatory approval do not make a private insurer a state actor.

Gayman, Esther L. v. Principal Finan Serv · filed 2002-11-22

But a claim under §1983 is tenable only if the defendants acted under color of state law—in other words, if they are state actors.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only against persons acting under color of state law.

AL-WATAN v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2009-09-03

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only provides a remedy against persons acting under color of state law. ... There was not in Ibrahim, nor is there in this case, any evidence that Defendant acted under guise of state authority or acted in concert with the San Diego Police.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private hospital defendants to show that their actions can be attributed to the state.

Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc. · filed 2002-12-13

The hospital defendants are all private actors. Therefore in order to prop- erly bring a section 1983 claim against them, Dr. Freilich must not only demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred, but must also show that their actions can be properly characterized as those of the state. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999). The Maryland credentialing statute and regulation both require hospitals to establish a formal reappointment process. But the State plays no role whatsoever in the actual decision as to whether or not to terminate or reappoint any particular physician. Because the private hospital defen- dants cannot properly be considered state actors, Dr. Freilich’s section 1983 claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendants are state actors.

Hogan v. A.O. Fox Memorial Hospital · filed 2009-09-18

To survive summary judgment on her § 1983 claims, Hogan must establish, inter alia, that the defendants are state actors.

Section 1983 permits a civil rights claim against a state actor, but allegations of conspiracy do not sustain a claim against a private defendant when they lack supporting facts.

Boyd v. Pearson · filed 2009-09-18

A civil rights action brought pursuant to section 1983 is sustainable against state actors only. ... Pearson, the sole defendant, is not a state actor, and, notwithstanding Boyd’s claims that Pearson conspired with state and federal courts to gain custody of their son and to embezzle funds from his trust account, Boyd’s accusations are insufficient to sustain her claims.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors for violations of federal constitutional rights.

Mauro v. Freeland · filed 2009-09-21

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only provides a cause of action against state actors for violations of federal Constitutional rights, it is an adequate vehicle only for the constitutional claims against defendant Freeland and the single conspiracy claim against all defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a defendant who is not a state actor.

Burgess v. Harris Beach PLLC · filed 2009-09-21

Burgess’s Section 1983 claim against Harris Beach also fails because Harris Beach is not a state actor within the meaning of the statute.

Section 1983 does not cover personal-capacity claims against federal agents who are not state actors.

Pittman v. Lappin · filed 2009-09-22

After his administrative tort claim was denied, Pittman filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, suing Butler and several of Butler’s superiors for alleged constitutional violations. ... In keeping with the obligation to liberally construe the pro se plaintiffs complaint, because all the defendants are federal agents, not state actors, the court construes the personal capacity claims as ones brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

Section 1983 requires alleged conduct by a state actor.

Amiri v. Kelting · filed 2009-09-22

The district court correctly held that appellant alleged no conduct by a state actor within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as appellant concedes on appeal.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law; a claim against private corporations cannot support federal question jurisdiction without them.

Mulkey v. Land America Title Assoc., Inc. · filed 2009-09-23

... both Defendants are private corporations and nothing in the complaint indicates that they are state actors. So, Plaintiffs could not rely on section 1983 as a basis for federal jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party as a state actor only when the state encouraged, conspired in, or acted in concert with the conduct at issue.

Bias v. Chante Bias Crosby · filed 2009-09-24

A private party will be viewed as a state actor for § 1983 purposes only in rare circumstances, such as when the state has played an affirmative role by encouraging, conspiring, or acting in concert with the private actor in the particular conduct underlying the claimant’s civil rights grievance.

Section 1983 does not cover private conduct that cannot fairly be attributed to the state.

Jones v. Wal-Mart Corp. · filed 2009-10-01

Again, the district court’s dismissal of her § 1983 claims was based on well-established Tenth Circuit precedent. See id. at 492 (“[P]rivate conduct that is not fairly attributable to the state is simply not actionable under § 1983.” (quotations omitted)).

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim that relies on none must be dismissed.

Beal v. Western Farmers Electric Cooperative · filed 2009-10-15

As a result, Landowners rely on no state action, which is a requirement for a § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This claim was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant is a state actor.

Gwiazdowski v. County of Chester · filed 2009-10-20

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must also prove that Defendant is a state actor.

Section 1983 can reach a private party who willfully joins state officials in a conspiracy to deprive someone of a constitutional right.

Max v. Republican Committee of Lancaster County · filed 2009-11-13

Although a private party can be liable under § 1983 if he or she willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional right, see Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 147-48 (3d Cir.1998), this is not such a case.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not cover conduct by federal employees acting solely for the federal government.

Nurriddin v. Bolden · filed 2009-12-04

Of course, defendants are also correct that plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails because that statute is limited to “state action,” which is wholly absent here.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not cover conduct by federal officials acting without it.

Nurriddin v. O'Keefe · filed 2009-12-04

Of course, defendants are also correct that plaintiff's § 1983 claim fails because that statute is limited to "state action," which is wholly absent here.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against defendants who were not state actors.

Smith v. Ozmint · filed 2009-12-14

In these consolidated appeals, Kevin Smith, a/k/a Bar None Royal Blackness, appeals the district court’s orders accepting the recommendations of the magistrate judge and dismissing two Defendants because the Defendants were not state actors and granting summary judgment to the remaining Defendants and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Wang v. Miller · filed 2009-12-16

The District Court did not err in determining that Wang failed to state a claim under § 1983 because Miller is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor or to act under color of state law.

Davis v. Ryan Oaks Apartment · filed 2009-12-17

In the interest of completeness, however, we note that a claim under § 1983 requires the defendant to be a “state actor” or to be acting “under color of state law.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992). That is not the case here.

Section 1983 does not treat a private entity as a state actor for all conduct merely because state law designates it public for some purposes.

Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center, Inc. · filed 2010-01-04

Under § 1983, a state’s statutory characterization of a private entity as a public actor for some purposes is not necessarily dispositive with respect to all of that entity’s conduct.

Section 1983 requires a private charter school’s challenged employment conduct to be attributable to the state; its status as a public school alone does not make it a state actor.

Caviness v. Horizon Community · filed 2010-01-04

Because the allegations in Caviness’s complaint are insufficient to raise a reasonable inference that Horizon was a state actor and thus acted under color of state law in taking the alleged actions after Caviness was terminated, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Section 1983 liability extends only to state actors.

Malcolm v. HONEOYE FALLS-LIMA EDUC. ASSOC'N · filed 2010-01-11

It is well-settled that Section 1983 liability extends only to state actors. Here, defendants consist of two unincorporated associations and three private citizens, none of whom are state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action, so a claim fails when private defendants are not linked to state action.

Bagley v. Blagojevich · filed 2010-01-15

In this case, there is insufficient evidence of a conspiracy to link the AFSCME Officials to state action. A claim under Section 1983 fails without state action.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation to occur under color of state law for a claim to be actionable.

Shell v. Foulkes · filed 2010-01-19

Furthermore, the district court did not err by dismissing Shell’s § 1983 action for failure to state a claim. Private conduct is not actionable under § 1983; rather, to state a claim for relief, the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right must occur “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law; private store employees who refuse to sell alcohol are not state actors on these facts.

Jackson v. Walgreens Corp. · filed 2010-01-22

The district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because, for § 1983 purposes, the defendants were not state actors, and, to the extent that the complaint invokes statutes prohibiting discrimination, there is no federal law preventing a private business from refusing to sell alcohol under these circumstances. Applying the usual liberal standard to our reading of the complaint, and de novo review of the district court’s decision, see Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007), we agree with the district court.

Section 1983 allows a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights by someone acting under color of state law.

McCoy v. McCoy · filed 2010-01-25

That statute applies only to persons acting under "color" of state law to deprive a person of his or her civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint, however, involves a dispute between brothers over their deceased parents' estate. See Compi. at 6. On its face, the complaint does not state a claim that may be redressed under § 1983. It alleges no facts that even remotely suggest that the defendant, plaintiffs younger brother, see id., is a state actor or that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the § 1983 claim will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private citizen who is not a state actor.

Dongon v. Banar · filed 2010-01-25

The remaining defendant, Donna Bañar, is a private citizen and not a state actor, and therefore cannot be subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; privately retained attorneys do not meet that requirement.

Krug v. McNally, Jr. · filed 2010-03-08

The district court did not err in determining that Krug failed to state a claim under § 1983 because the Defendants are not state actors.

State licensing, funding, or regulation alone does not make a private party a state actor under § 1983 without concerted action with state officials.

White v. St. Joseph's Hospital · filed 2010-03-10

Insofar as White alleged that the private defendants were licensed by the state, the presence of state funding or regulation, in the absence of some concerted action with state officials, does not transform a private party’s actions into state action.

Section 1983 requires state action, and amendment is futile when additional allegations cannot cure its absence.

Donnelly v. O'malley & Langan, PC · filed 2010-03-16

Here, no additional allegations would cure the defects in the Complaint regarding the state action requirement under § 1983.

A private entity exercising eminent domain power delegated by the state is a state actor subject to suit under Section 1983.

Albert Leggett III as Trustee of the Albert E. Leggett Family Trust v. Sprint Communications Company, L.P. · filed 2010-03-18

Even though Sprint is a private entity, when it exercises the power of eminent domain delegated to it by the state, it is deemed to be a state actor subject to suit under 42 U .S .C. § 1983 .

Section 1983 does not treat a private counseling provider as a state actor merely because a juvenile court refers a child to the program and requires reports to the court.

Reguli v. Guffee · filed 2010-03-31

These referral and reporting requirements are insufficient to make LaBo’s personal actions in providing counseling services through Teen Peace state action, and summary judgment for LaBo was therefore appropriate.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, and private attorneys are not state actors for § 1983 claims.

Licari v. Voog · filed 2010-04-26

To successfully state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant was acting under color of state law. Here, plaintiff alleges that Voog, a private attorney hired by Licari to represent him during criminal proceedings, committed malpractice. It is well established that private attorneys—even if the attorney was court appointed—are not state actors for the purposes of § 1983 claims. See Rodriquez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, a suit alleging that Voog violated Licari’s rights under federal law is frivolous, and thus the District Court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing state involvement before a private hospital or its physicians can be treated as state actors.

Keh v. Americus and Sumter County · filed 2010-04-29

Finally, Keh alleges no facts in her complaint suggesting any state involvement with any of the defendants or their decisions. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing her § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private resort does not meet that requirement by providing basic amenities and services to its members.

Snowdon v. Preferred Rv Resort Owners Association · filed 2010-05-18

The color of law requirement is an element of a § 1983 claim. ... Defendant Preferred RV Resort did not perform the traditional and exclusive public function of municipal governance.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against defendants who are not government actors.

Crowder v. Bierman, Geesing, and Ward LLC · filed 2010-05-20

Plaintiffs references to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986 are inapposite, as none of the defendants is a government actor, so they are not governed by these statutes, and there are no allegations sufficient to state a claim of conspiracy under § 1985.

Section 1983 does not treat a private employer’s independent termination decision as state action merely because it relied in part on a state agency’s directive.

Mead v. INDEPENDENCE ASS'N · filed 2010-05-27

IA made the independent decision to terminate Plaintiff without the participation of any employee of DHHS. Plaintiffs termination is not state action simply because it was based in part on the state-issued Directed Plan of Correction.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor; a private bar association does not become one by filing a lawsuit authorized by state law.

Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information Services · filed 2010-06-21

Unless REBA was a "state actor" there can be no § 1983 claim against REBA.

A hospital’s non-profit status alone does not make it a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Johnson v. Grays Harbor Community Hospital · filed 2010-06-22

GHCH’s non-profit status does not make it a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; the guardian ad litem and her assistant were not state actors.

Long v. Pend Oreille County Sheriff's Department · filed 2010-06-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to the guardian ad litem and her assistant because, as a matter of law, they are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Justo Roque, Jr. v. Harrah's Casino New Orleans, e · filed 2010-07-22

Roque’s § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law because Jazz Casino and Newell are not state actors.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is satisfied when a government official personally takes the challenged action, even if a private party later causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Paige v. Coyner · filed 2010-07-26

Blum’s tests are limited to suits where the private party is the one allegedly responsible for taking the constitutionally impermissible action. Here, Coyner is clearly a state actor because she works on behalf of local government entities, and Paige contends that Coyner violated § 1983 when Coyner called Bunnell Hill and made false statements in retaliation for Paige’s criticism of the proposed interstate project. Paige has therefore properly alleged state action.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a municipality acting as a state actor for deprivation of constitutional rights.

Pilchen v. City of Auburn, NY · filed 2010-08-05

To prevail, plaintiff must show that a state actor under color of a statute, acted in a manner which deprived Pilchen of her right to due process prior to infringing upon her property interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The City of Auburn is a municipality in the state of New York, and is therefore a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to be a state actor or to have acted in concert with the state.

Amiri v. GELMAN MANAGEMENT CO. · filed 2010-08-19

Nothing in the complaint suggests that Gelman is a state actor or acted in concert with the District of Columbia. Plaintiff, then, fails to state a claim under § 1983 upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a liquor license alone does not make a private nightclub a state actor.

Hollander v. Copacabana Nightclub · filed 2010-09-01

To assert a Section 1983 claim, Den Hollander must plead that the Nightclubs’ conduct was done under the color of state law. ... The Supreme Court specifically held that a liquor license is insufficient to establish state action. Den Hollander alleges no basis for state action other than the Nightclubs’ liquor licenses, therefore, his complaint is insufficient.

Section 1983 requires sufficient facts showing that a private defendant acted as a state actor or colluded with state actors.

Cooke v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints · filed 2010-09-07

The district court properly dismissed Cooke’s action because defendants are not state actors and Cooke failed to plead sufficient facts to show that they colluded with state actors in the alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not treat private foreclosure litigants or their counsel as state actors merely because they use state courts or laws.

Miller v. Countrywide Home Loans · filed 2010-09-30

The only Defendants here are the plaintiff, its privy, and its counsel in the State of Ohio foreclosure proceeding on Plaintiffs debt and mortgage; and, in general, neither litigants nor their counsel are “state actors” for purposes of stating a viable § 1983 claim merely because they are making use of the state’s courts and/or its laws.

Section 1983 does not make a private party a state actor merely because the party provides false information to police.

Baez v. Jetblue Airways · filed 2010-10-15

Baez’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim that either JetBlue or Malabet acted under color of state law. Baez contends that Defendants acted under color of state law because they provided false information to law enforcement officials who then interrogated and arrested her. But “providing false information to the police does not make a private individual ... a state actor and liable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 requires a state actor for a constitutional claim.

Edwards v. Rich · filed 2010-11-04

The district court properly dismissed appellant’s constitutional claims for lack of a state actor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant who cannot be held liable as a state actor.

Mergia v. Adams · filed 2010-12-01

He attempts to sue Adams, his ex-wife, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the district court correctly concluded that she cannot be held liable as a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that state action caused the claimed harm.

Daniel Goodson, III v. Kardashian · filed 2011-01-20

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the claimed harm was caused by state action.

Section 1983 does not treat a private nursing home's care decisions as state action merely because the home receives public funds or is subject to government regulation.

Baum v. Northern Dutchess Hospital · filed 2011-01-24

The receipt of public funds does not make a nursing home’s course of treatment of bed sores an act of the State.

A § 1983 claim requires plausible allegations that the defendant acted as a state actor.

Baker v. Publishers Clearing House · filed 2011-02-17

In sum, Mr. Baker fails to make plausible allegations either identifying the Appellee and its subsidiaries as state actors, which is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim, or alleging an employment or other relationship with the Appellee, as required by Kansas law.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts indicating that the defendant is a state actor.

Rodenbaugh v. Gulf Insurance · filed 2011-02-17

The amended complaint says that her civil rights were violated, but it does not, for example, set forth any facts that would indicate that the defendant is a state actor, as would be required to pursue a federal civil rights claim.

Section 1983 does not treat a private corporation running a fair on public property as a state actor when the city has no role in its decisions or its speech restriction.

Rundus v. City of Dallas Texas · filed 2011-02-21

We hold that the facts here clearly indicate SFOT is not a state actor; it runs a private event on public property. The pervasive entwinement present in Brentwood is not presented in the facts before us. The City has no say in SFOT’s internal decision making, and had no role in enacting or enforcing the restriction on distribution of literature.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; private conduct can qualify when the defendant acts with state officials, exercises a power reserved to the state, or has a sufficiently close nexus with the state.

Boggi v. Medical Review and Accrediting · filed 2011-02-23

The allegations in Boggi‟s pleadings do not show that those defendants engaged in any conduct that could be considered state action for purposes of § 1983 liability: they did not “act[] with the help of or in concert with state officials”; none was “delegated . . . a power traditionally exclusively reserved to the State”; and it cannot be said that “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the [private] entity so that the action ... of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State itself.”

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant was a state actor or acted under color of state law.

Bullock v. Sloane Toyota Inc · filed 2011-03-02

However, while Bullock seems to present her claim as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she has not set forth any facts to demonstrate that her attorney was a state actor or acted under color of state law, as is required under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat private parties as state actors merely because they complain to police and sign a sworn criminal complaint.

Harrell v. Costco · filed 2011-03-18

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because defendants’ complaint to the police and execution of the sworn criminal complaint, without more, did not convert them into state actors.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private entity’s conduct qualifies only when it has a sufficiently close nexus to the state.

Rumbin v. Association of American Medical Colleges · filed 2011-03-21

Not only is Mr. Rum-bin’s motion for leave to amend his complaint vastly untimely, given that his proposed cause of action is based on allegations known to him well before trial, but it also futile, given that the AAMC is a non-profit entity, not a state actor, and ”[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted 'under color of state law,” ... Mr. Rum-bin neither alleges in his proposed complaint nor has pointed to any evidence from trial that there was any nexus between the State and the AAMC’s actions in reviewing his request for accommodations. Thus, Mr. Rum-bin's motion for leave to amend is denied.

A city is a state actor, and a § 1983 equal protection claim based on a hostile work environment may proceed when the parallel Title VII claim survives summary judgment.

Harris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore · filed 2011-05-06

Because the City is clearly a state actor, Harris’s § 1983 claims rise and fall with her Title VII claims.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation of federal rights to be fairly attributable to the state.

Bernard Delprato, Jr. v. Day Chevrolet Inc · filed 2011-05-12

We further agree with the District Court that DelPrato’s equal protection claim fails for lack of state action. Day Chevrolet’s infringement of DelPrato’s federal rights was not properly alleged to be “fairly attributable to the State,” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, and, for this reason alone, a section 1983 action will not lie.

Section 1983 does not treat private landlords as state actors merely because a sheriff acquiesces in their conduct.

Moral v. Grant County Sheriff · filed 2011-06-07

Thus, the complaint’s allegations against both the Dudleys and Sheriff Babcock failed to state a viable § 1983 claim: The Dudleys cannot be considered state actors; and Sheriff Babcock merely acquiesced in their conduct.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a court-appointed attorney who is not a state actor.

Eaves v. State of Texas · filed 2011-06-07

Eaves’s court-appointed attorney is not a state actor and, as such, is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats physicians’ credentialing decisions on behalf of a county hospital as state action even when the physicians are not county employees.

Chudacoff v. UNIV. MED. CENTER OF SOUTHERN NEVADA · filed 2011-06-09

The individual committee members may not be county employees, but their physician credentialing decisions on behalf of a county hospital constitute state action.

A § 1983 claim against a bounty hunter fails when he was not functioning as a state actor during the incident.

McGregor v. Shane's Bail Bonds · filed 2011-06-10

We have carefully examined Ms. McGregor’s arguments and authorities and agree with the court’s conclusion that Mr. Snyder was not functioning as a state actor during the incident.

Section 1983 requires facts showing state action to state a claim.

Bright v. United States · filed 2011-06-13

Reviewing de novo, see Hastings v. Wilson, 516 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir. 2008), we conclude that to the extent Bright attempted to proceed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), he failed to state a claim. He alleged no facts showing state action or a conspiracy, ... and a Bivens action cannot be prosecuted against the United States, see Buford v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1998).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; an unsupported allegation that a private business sponsored an event with a city does not satisfy that requirement.

Hottenstein v. CITY OF SEAL ISLE CITY · filed 2011-06-17

Lastly, the Court agrees with the moving Defendants that the § 1983 claims and the parallel New Jersey Civil Rights Act claim fail because neither Defendant is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a union, its officials, or a federal court appointed union monitor when they are not state actors.

Duffy v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 14-14B · filed 2011-06-29

Plaintiffs therefore cannot state a plausible § 1983 claim for relief against the EPA and the Union Defendants; those claims are hereby dismissed.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; government involvement in a defendant’s other activities does not suffice.

Cacchillo v. Insmed Inc. · filed 2011-06-29

Because this decision forms the underpinning of Plaintiffs claims, there is no plausible basis upon which to find state or federal action sufficient to support a § 1983 or a Bivens claim.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a sheriff’s participation in a Michigan foreclosure by advertisement does not satisfy that requirement.

Drew v. Kemp-Brooks · filed 2011-07-21

The Sixth Circuit has held that a sheriffs participation in Michigan’s foreclosure by advertisement statute is not “state action.” As such, Plaintiff cannot make out a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action that deprives a person of federal statutory or constitutional rights.

Bormuth v. Conservancy · filed 2011-07-26

Section 1983 has two basic requirements: (1) state action that (2) deprived an individual of federal statutory or constitutional rights. ... Thus, a private entity can be held to constitutional standards when its actions so approximate state action that they may be fairly attributed to the state. ... The Sixth Circuit has three tests for state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the state compulsion test; and (3) the symbiotic relationship or nexus test.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the conduct causing a constitutional deprivation is attributable to state action.

Abulkhair v. Liberty Mutl Ins Co · filed 2011-08-04

To bring an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish not only the deprivation of a constitutional right, but also that the conduct which allegedly caused the deprivation is attributable to state action.

Section 1983 permits relief against a person acting under color of state law, so a claim against a court-appointed attorney fails when the plaintiff has not shown he was an official state actor.

Henderson v. Jasper Police Department · filed 2011-08-22

Henderson’s similar claim against her court-appointed attorney is without merit because she has not shown that he was an official state actor.

Section 1983 permits suits against state actors, but not federal actors.

Ford v. Astrue · filed 2011-09-02

In other words, § 1983 permits suit against state, rather than federal, defendants.

Section 1983 permits claims against officials at the Wyatt detention facility because they act under state law.

Hodge v. Murphy · filed 2011-09-07

This Court has previously held that a Bivens action is not available against officials and employees at Wyatt, because such defendants are not federal agents, and relief is available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against those defendants as state actors. ... Thus, the claims against the two Wyatt defendants, Murphy and White, shall be measured against the prerequisites for § 1983 relief.

Section 1983 reaches a private entity’s conduct when state compulsion or joint action makes that conduct attributable to the state.

TZ Manor, LLC v. Daines · filed 2011-09-27

Assuming the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are true, either theory is sufficient to support a conclusion that, in continuing to occupy the Adult Home after March 3, 2006, Long Hill acted under color of state law for § 1983 purposes either on a “compulsion” or “joint action” theory.

Section 1983 reaches a private contractor’s employment decision only when that decision is fairly attributable to the state; performing a public function in other work does not alone make its hiring and firing state action.

Eastes v. ACS HUMAN SERVICES, LLC · filed 2011-09-30

ACS was not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983 when it was making its decision to terminate Eastes’ employment.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted as a state actor.

Trammell v. All Other Collateral Heirs of the Estate of Polk · filed 2011-10-04

Nothing in the complaint suggests that Carroll is a state actor subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988), or that Carroll was involved in a conspiracy to violate Trammell’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not reach tribal officers acting solely under tribal authority.

Young v. Duenas · filed 2011-10-10

We hold that the officers’ action did not constitute state action, and thus, that Young has not supported his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 claim against an attorney requires the attorney to have acted under color of state law.

Catanzaro v. Collins · filed 2011-10-11

The District Court thoroughly addressed Catanzaro’s allegations and concluded that: ... (3) Collins and Rogan are not state actors for § 1983 purposes; ... After reviewing the record, however, we agree that Catanzaro’s complaint fails to state a claim for the reasons thoroughly and adequately explained by the District Court.

Section 1983 does not treat private parties as state actors merely because they acted in concert with government defendants.

Hines v. Langhenry · filed 2011-11-30

Hines’s allegation that the Tyson Defendants simply acted “in concert with” the City Defendants to deprive him of his constitutional rights is not sufficient to convert the Tyson Defendants into state actors.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity to show that it acted under color of state law.

Hebrew v. Houston Media Source · filed 2011-12-13

In general, private entities are not liable to suit under § 1983. To survive HMS’s motion for summary judgment, Hebrew must present evidence that HMS was “acting under color of state law,” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988), such that its conduct was “fairly attributable to the State.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).

Section 1983 requires the alleged infringement of federal rights to be fairly attributable to the government.

Vickerman v. Bixler · filed 2012-01-12

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Vickerman’s claims seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights because Vickerman failed to provide any admissible evidence to rebut defendants’ showing that private parties managed the apartment complex and conducted the inspection of Vickerman’s rental unit.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against private actors whose conduct is not attributable to the state.

Altman v. PNC Mortgage · filed 2012-01-20

As private actors, defendants are subject to no section 1983 claim to further warrant dismissal of the complaint’s due process violation claim.

A private care provider does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by contracting with the government or receiving public funding.

Harvey v. Mohammed · filed 2012-01-27

Neither a contractual relationship between a state and a private entity nor the entity’s reliance on public funding is sufficient to transform the private entity into a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege state action; a claim against private defendants with no alleged state action is legally frivolous.

Jackson v. Brown · filed 2012-01-31

“To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, in other words, that there was state action.” ... Jackson names private individuals and entities as defendants, and there is no alleged state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; a state's permission to use foreclosure procedures and sheriff sales does not by itself establish it.

Farren v. Option One Mortgage Corporation · filed 2012-01-31

The proposed amended complaint failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harper v. Fed. Land Bank of Spokane, 878 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he fact that a state permits the use of foreclosure procedures and subsequent sheriff sales as the execution of a judgment is not sufficient to constitute state action.”).

Private medical professionals who provide expertise integral to a government child abuse investigation can be state actors under Section 1983.

Mohil v. Glick · filed 2012-02-01

There is no gainsaying the fact that they were brought into the process for exactly the same reason, and to perform exactly the same function, as under the contract, and to do so precisely because their expertise was vital to, and an integral part of, the governmental act — and therefore they are by definition “state actors” for Section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against corporate defendants that are not state actors.

Rochester v. Papermate Paper Corp. · filed 2012-03-12

We note that the corporate defendants are not state actors amenable to suit under § 1983, see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988), and that certain of Rochester’s claims are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, see S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim cannot be sustained without it.

Jones v. TD Bank · filed 2012-03-14

Without satisfaction of the “state action requirement,” a suit under § 1983 cannot be sustained.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor; a claim against private persons who are not state actors fails.

Smith v. Bastrop Med Clinic, P.A., Inc., et · filed 2012-04-02

He sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the defendants are private persons and not state actors.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against defendants who are not state actors.

Ferranti v. Heinemann · filed 2012-04-16

The defendants are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as they are not state actors, see Touraco v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 615 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2010), or under 5 U.S.C. § 702, because the federal courts are not an agency of the government, within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(B).

Section 1983 does not treat private actors as state actors merely because they use municipal police to enforce their property rights.

King v. Friends of Ayotte · filed 2012-05-14

Finally, Political Defendants’ use of municipal police officials to enforce their rights does not convert their private actions into state conduct.

Section 1983 requires the alleged wrongdoer to have acted under color of state law.

Jones v. Astrue · filed 2012-06-11

Plaintiff does not allege that defendants were acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As plaintiff seeks to bring a § 1983 claim against the defendants based on an alleged violation of his constitutional rights, the claim must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires state action; private parties must act jointly with or receive significant assistance from a state official.

Powers v. Nash Equip. Inc. · filed 2012-06-26

A claim under section 1983 does not lie absent state action.

A private attorney is generally not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 merely because the attorney is licensed.

Kareem v. Amer Home Mtge Holdings, Inc., e · filed 2012-06-26

Although Kareem contends that Arnold is a state actor for purposes of § 1983 because he is a licensed attorney, private attorneys are not official state actors and generally are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action to support a due process claim against political party officials.

Kurita v. State Primary Board of Tennessee Democratic Party · filed 2012-07-03

The district court dismissed her complaint, finding that Kurita could not “establish two prerequisites that are necessary in order to sustain the . . . due process claims . . . : (A) state action by the State Primary Board of the Tennessee Democratic Party and (B) her possession of a protected property right in the certified results of votes cast in the primary election.” ... After carefully reviewing the record, the settled law, the well-reasoned briefs, and the oral arguments on appeal, we conclude that the district court’s order and opinion correctly sets out the applicable law under § 1983 and correctly applies that law to the facts in the record.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant is a state actor.

Pack v. Mt. Morris Consolidated Schools · filed 2012-07-03

In any event, Pack has not shown that she is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private entity as a state actor merely because it receives state funding or is subject to state regulation.

Gross v. R.T. Reynolds · filed 2012-07-06

However, a private entity does not become a state actor for the purpose of § 1983 simply because it is subject to state regulations or receives funding from the state.

Section 1983 does not make a private employer liable for a firing that the state did not compel.

Mead v. Independence Association · filed 2012-07-11

Hence, IA's choice to fire Mead cannot "be deemed to be that of the State," Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, and IA cannot be held accountable for that choice under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats an animal rescue organization as acting under color of state law when it sterilizes animals seized through delegated animal-control authority.

Fabrikant v. French · filed 2012-08-16

On the contrary, when the SPCA, operating under the delegated animal-control authority provided by New York’s Agriculture and Markets Law, seizes animals from their owners and then sterilizes them, it acts under color of state law because it performs an exclusively public function that has been delegated to it by the state.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by a state actor; federal funding alone does not make a private university a state actor.

Osei v. Univ · filed 2012-08-20

Osei failed to plead facts that would demonstrate a greater level of state entanglement and, accordingly, the Section 1983 claims were properly dismissed.

Private parties who conspire with a judge can act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes, but the plaintiff must plead facts that plausibly show an agreement.

Wiggins v. 11 Kew Garden Court · filed 2012-08-28

However, the Supreme Court has held that “[p]rivate parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with [an official judicial act] are ... acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980). As such, Wiggins’ claims that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy involving his state suit allege federal causes of action. ... We hold that Wiggins’ allegations are inadequate to properly plead an agreement.

A § 1983 claim against private defendants fails if the complaint does not allege state action.

Ramsey v. Citibank, N.A. · filed 2012-08-29

Plaintiff’s second cause of action likewise failed because their § 1983 claim, which was predicated on defendants’ “malicious abuse of process” of Colorado’s unlawful detainer statute, R. at 965, did not allege state action to support their claim.

Section 1983 claims against private defendants require an allegation of state action.

Stewart v. California Deptartment of Education · filed 2012-09-20

The district court properly dismissed the § 1983 claims against the law firm defendants and defendant Keenan & Associates because the complaint failed to allege state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private hospital for civil commitment because that conduct is not state action.

Smolian v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey · filed 2012-09-26

Civil commitment by a private entity such as the Hospital, however, does not constitute state action ... Therefore, the Hospital cannot be liable to the plaintiff pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Sybalski v Indep. Group Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F3d at 257).

A Section 1983 claim alleging a constitutional violation requires an underlying violation by an official of a state or the District of Columbia.

Abdelfattah v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2012-09-27

The Court will therefore dismiss his constitutional claims, as well as the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which require an underlying constitutional violation by an official of a state or the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private party who is not a state actor cannot be sued under it.

Turner v. Spaley · filed 2012-10-12

The District Court correctly determined that Spaley, a private party, is not a state actor and thus not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a hospital a state actor merely because it reports possible child neglect as state law requires.

Mueller v. City of Boise · filed 2012-10-25

St. Luke’s did not become a state actor simply because it com- plied with state law requiring its personnel to report possible child neglect to Child Protective Services.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Whitner v. United States · filed 2012-11-07

Whitner’s allegations against all Defendants except the United States and the State of Michigan also fail to state plausible claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations, as the complaint does not allege facts establishing any basis for concluding these Defendants took any action fairly attributable to the state.