42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires state action in the conduct alleged to have caused the injury; state involvement in other activities is insufficient.

Male v. Crossroads Associates · filed 1970-12-03

Under the circumstances here shown, there does not appear to be “state action” so as to give this Court jurisdiction to entertain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the other civil rights sections of that Title.

Section 1983 does not reach a private utility’s conduct merely because the utility is subject to state regulation.

Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company · filed 1970-12-16

§ 1343, Title 28 U.S.C. confers jurisdiction over actions to redress deprivations of constitutional rights occurring “under color of any State law * * * regulation, custom or usage,” and § 1983, Title 42 U.S.C. confers a right of action upon persons suffering such deprivations. We see no action taken under color of any State law, regulation, custom or usage alleged in the amended complaint. ... We know of no authority justifying a ruling that solely because, as a public utility, it is subject to greater regulation than other private corporations or private individuals, its action must be considéred state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a First Amendment violation on private parties who are not government or state actors.

Bennett v. United States of America Chess Federation · filed 2006-07-07

However, defendants are private parties, not government or state actors, and, therefore, they cannot violate plaintiffs First Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires allegations of state action by the defendants or a conspiracy with state officials to violate civil rights.

Nagy v. Bromme · filed 2006-07-14

The district court properly dismissed the action without prejudice on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there was no allegation of state action on the part of the appellees or conspiracy with state officials to violate his civil rights.

Section 1983 does not treat a private business as a state actor merely because it summons police about a possible disturbance, absent a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights.

Bailey v. Harleysville National Bank & Trust · filed 2006-07-18

However, in the absence of a conspiracy with the police to violate constitutional rights, a business’s summons of a police officer to deal with a possible disturbance, does not make it a state actor.

Section 1983 requires state action by the defendants; without it, the claim fails.

Furumoto v. Lyman · filed 1973-08-21

For these reasons, plaintiffs have failed to show state action on the part of defendants, and thus their claim under § 1983 must fail.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private corporation does not act under color of state law merely by following a state court decision that applies prospectively.

Ellingson v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY · filed 1973-09-20

Accordingly, we hold that the facts stated in plaintiffs’ complaints do not fall within the perimeters of “state action” as required for assertion of a federal civil rights claim under Sec. 1983, and that summary judgment will be granted to the defendant who is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires a violation committed by a person acting under color of state law; private parties must qualify as state actors to be liable.

Washington v. Veterans of Foreign Wars of United States · filed 2006-08-23

Finally, to establish a claim for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Washington must establish (1) a violation of a constitutional right and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, none of the parties were state actors.

Section 1983 does not support claims against attorneys who are not state actors.

Cox v. Guinn · filed 2006-08-28

As the district court concluded, Cox’s claims against the attorney defendants are unavailing because they are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires a state actor; the credit union and its officers and employee were not state actors here.

James v. Heritage Valley Federal Credit Union · filed 2006-09-08

To the extent James raises claims under § 1983, none of the defendants is a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead that the injury was caused by a state actor or someone acting under color of state law.

Miller v. Board of Managers of Whispering Pines at Colonial Woods Condominium II · filed 2006-09-29

Because plaintiffs fail to plead that their injuries were caused by state actors or those acting under color of state law, their § 1983 claims are dismissed.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against entirely private actors when no state actor is named.

Foster v. JLG Industries, Inc. · filed 2006-10-04

To permit amendment of these claims would have been futile, first, because Foster sued entirely private actors–he named no state actors as defendants such that a § 1983 claim might lie.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties who are not state actors.

Denston v. Chapman · filed 2006-10-10

The District Court was correct that the judges and the special master were entitled to immunity, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2001), that the Faulconers and their attorney were not state actors, and that Denston lacked standing to bring claims against Detective Watson and the three police officers.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be attributable to the state; extensive state regulation and a contract with a federal agency alone do not establish state action.

McCarthy v. Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corp. · filed 2006-10-17

Because the plaintiffs offer no support for their contention that the Cooperatives are state actors beyond the fact of the contractual relationship with the TVA and the existence of extensive state regulation, we affirm the district court as to this issue.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not provide a claim against federal defendants when no state action is involved.

Weinstein v. United States Air Force · filed 2006-10-26

The Defendants argue first in their motion to dismiss that the Plaintiffs cannot bring this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because this case does not involve state action. That argument is correct.

Section 1983 permits a claim only when state-attributable conduct causes the deprivation of a federal right.

Valentine v. Elliott · filed 2007-01-04

A § 1983 claim may go forward only when a plaintiff alleges that he or she was injured by conduct “fairly attributable to the state,” which conduct caused “the deprivation of a federal right.”

A hospital receiving substantial Hill-Burton funding satisfies § 1983’s state action requirement.

Pollock v. Methodist Hospital · filed 1975-02-07

In any event, we feel that the better view is that a hospital which receives such a substantial amount of money as that involved here under the provisions of the Hill-Burton Act satisfies the state action requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat an otherwise private hospital as a state actor merely because it receives federal financial assistance.

Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corporation · filed 1975-05-29

Federal financial assistance does not bring an otherwise private facility within the parameters of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires state action; disputed evidence of a private university’s state funding and regulatory control can require a hearing before dismissal.

10 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1331, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,294 Selene Weise v. Syracuse University, Jo Davis Mortenson v. Syr · filed 1975-07-14

Reviewing the Jackson standards, it appears that the record is insufficient, particularly on the first two factors, for us to determine whether Syracuse University was engaged in state action when it allegedly discriminated against Weise and Mortenson. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal, for failure to allege state action, of plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and we remand for a hearing ... on that issue.

Section 1983 applies to a private party’s actions only when they are fairly attributable to the state.

Bernas v. Cablevision System Corp. · filed 2007-01-30

To the extent Bernas’ complaint asserts claims under the First Amendment or other constitutional provisions via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, those claims were dismissible because CSC is not a state actor. The constitution itself does not give rise to a right of action against private actors: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to a private party’s actions only if the actions are fairly attributable to the state.

Appointed counsel and public defenders are not state actors for § 1983 purposes in a prisoner's challenge to their handling of his criminal case.

Cardone v. Ryan · filed 2007-02-02

In particular, for the reasons explained by the District Court, we agree that the judicial and prosecutorial defendants are immune from this suit, that Cardone’s counsel and the public defender defendants are not state actors for § 1983 purposes, and that the complaint does not state an actionable claim against the Delaware Attorney General.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the challenged conduct was state action.

Johnson v. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. · filed 2007-02-02

In the present case, Johnson did not allege, nor is there any indication, that the defendants were state actors.

Section 1983 does not apply to a private attorney’s representation of a client in civil litigation.

Redwood, Erik v. Dobson, Elizabeth · filed 2007-02-07

Then there is Gerstein, whose only role was to represent Welch in the tort litigation, and neither §1983 nor §1985(3) applies to that private activity.

Section 1983 does not treat defense attorneys performing traditional functions of counsel as acting under color of state law, even if they are court-appointed or public defenders.

Krug v. McNally · filed 2007-02-08

Additionally, defense attorneys— even if court-appointed or public defenders — do not act under color of State law when performing traditional functions of counsel.

Section 1983 requires state action; privately retained defense counsel were not state actors under the circumstances alleged.

Banks v. Hayward · filed 2007-02-13

The District Court concluded correctly that Banks had not alleged the state action necessary to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Under the circumstances Banks alleged, his private counsel did not serve as state actors, see Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 314 (3d Cir. 1982), or federal agents.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private search engine companies are not state actors merely because they work with state universities.

Langdon v. Google, Inc. · filed 2007-02-20

Defendants are not state actors. Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim, and therefore, the Court will grant the Motions To Dismiss the First Amendment Claims.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; private citizens who do not act with government agents are not state actors.

Alberto San, Inc. v. Consejo De Titulares Del Condominio San Alberto · filed 2007-03-13

In this case, the plaintiff has simply failed to establish that the defendants are state actors. The defendants are all private citizens and there is no indication that they acted in concert with government agents so that their actions can somehow be attributed to the state.

Section 1983 claims against private security guards fail when their conduct does not qualify as state action.

Boykin v. Van Buren Township · filed 2007-03-14

Boykin’s § 1983 claims against the Van Buren Township defendants were properly dismissed on probable cause grounds, see Part II-A-1, and his § 1983 claims against the Meijer defendants were properly dismissed because there was no state action, see Part II-A-2.

Extensive regulation and state or federal funding do not by themselves make a private care provider a state actor under § 1983.

Karaahmetoglu v. Res-Care, Inc. · filed 2007-03-28

First, plaintiff appropriately points out that Res-Care’s operations are extensively regulated and that the company benefits from state and federal funding. However, such conditions do not establish per se state action for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 covers an association as a state actor when public institutions and officials are entwined in its operations.

Heritage v. Oklahoma Secondary · filed 2007-04-09

At the outset, we agree with the district court and conclude that OSSAA is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment because it is a state actor.

Section 1983 permits claims against state actors, but not against fellow inmates who are not state actors.

Rigano v. County of Sullivan · filed 2007-04-13

It is well-established that a § 1983 claim is only cognizable against a state actor and not a fellow inmate.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public officials for merely failing to prevent a private party from disposing of someone’s property.

Jackman v. McMillan · filed 2007-04-17

Under the circumstances related in his complaint, Jackman cannot show the deprivation of a constitutional right through state action because his claims amount to nothing more than inaction on the part of the public officials.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private security guard’s conduct must have a sufficient nexus to the State to qualify.

Prowisor v. Bon-Ton, Inc. · filed 2007-04-26

We affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Bon-Ton, Inc. on the ground that its private security guards were not state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff asserting a claim for violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 must demonstrate that the challenged conduct constituted state action. ... Prowisor has failed to make the requisite showing of nexus between the actions of the Bon-Ton security guards and the State.

A § 1983 state-created danger claim does not require the defendant to exercise a power unique to the state.

Ye v. United States · filed 2007-04-30

However, there is no indication in our jurisprudence or in its Supreme Court antecedents that there exists an independent requirement that the "authority" exercised must be peculiarly within the province of the state. The "authority" language is simply a reflection of the "state actor" requirement for all § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 generally does not cover private conduct; unlicensed security personnel who lack powers beyond those of ordinary citizens do not act under color of state law by detaining patrons.

Lindsey v. Detroit Entertainment, LLC · filed 2007-05-01

Section 1983 does not, as a general rule, prohibit the conduct of private parties acting in their individual capacities. ... The fact that Defendant’s security personnel were not licensed in this case means that, under the facts of this case, Defendant’s conduct in detaining Plaintiffs was not “fairly attributable to the state.”

Section 1983 requires state action; a school district’s approval and support of a privately organized party did not satisfy that requirement.

Watson v. Methacton School District · filed 2007-05-14

Having concluded that there is no question of material fact that would lead a reasonable jury to find that there was state action, the court finds that Plaintiff cannot meet the initial threshold of a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to sufficiently plead that the defendants engaged in state action.

Shah v. Patel · filed 2007-05-23

To bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead that the defendants have engaged in state action.

Section 1983 does not cover claims against appointed defense attorneys for their legal representation because they are not state actors.

Amir-Sharif v. Dallas County Public Defenders Office · filed 2007-05-24

His claims against the attorney defendants are unavailing because they are not state actors for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not treat a private health care provider as a state actor merely because it accepts Medicare or Medicaid.

Rzayeva v. United States · filed 2007-05-31

However, a private provider’s acceptance of Medicare or Medicaid does not create the necessary nexus to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional injuries caused by state actors or persons acting under color of state law.

Palacio v. City of New York · filed 2007-05-31

As Judge Eaton correctly pointed out, plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating how these defendants action could be considered “state action.” A claim under § 1983 “does not provide a remedy for all constitutional injuries, but only for those caused by persons who either are state actors or acting ‘under color’ of state law.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Wasko v. Silverberg · filed 2007-06-11

M r. Silverberg was clearly not a state actor.

An ineffective-assistance claim against appellate counsel is not cognizable under § 1983 because appellate counsel is not a state actor.

Anderson v. Turner · filed 2007-06-19

To the extent that Anderson also raises a claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective, the claim is not cognizable because appellate counsel is not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not cover a private hospital’s denial of staff privileges when the state had no role in the challenged decision.

Allen P. Schlein, M.D. v. The Milford Hospital, Inc. · filed 1977-08-25

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, but on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter for the reason that the Hospital’s denial of staff privileges did not amount to “state action” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

A lawyer performing the traditional role of criminal defense counsel is not a state actor and cannot be sued under § 1983 for that work.

Walton, Alonje v. Neslund, Jeffrey J. · filed 2007-08-16

As the district court observed, Walton cannot proceed with his federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a lawyer is not a state actor when he performs the traditional function of counsel to a defendant in a criminal case.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Darden v. Secure Horizons · filed 2007-08-22

Because neither Dr. Unger nor Secure Horizons is a “state actor,” the district court properly concluded that Darden failed to state a claim against those defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Conclusive assertions of joint action do not make private counselors state actors under § 1983 without specific facts showing they influenced the state court’s decision.

Rivera v. Cormaney · filed 2007-09-07

His assertions against the defendants are conclusory, at best. Further, he did not assert any specific facts from which it could be inferred that the state trial court did not make an independent decision to revoke his probation due to defendants’ influence. See Gallagher v. “Neil Young Freedom Concert”, 49 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995). M r. Rivera’s argument that these defendants are state actors is without merit.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to act under color of state law or in concert with a state actor.

Burke v. APT FOUNDATION · filed 2007-09-12

Thus, Mr. Burke has failed to allege a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that any of the Defendants are state actors, or that any of the private Defendants acted in concert with a state actor to deprive him of his constitutional or federal statutory rights.

Section 1983 cannot support a First Amendment claim against a defendant who is not a state actor.

Evans v. Boyd Restaurant Group, LLC · filed 2007-09-12

The district court correctly concluded that the proposed First Amendment claims would be futile because Boyd is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s challenged conduct to be attributable to the state; regular contact with a state agency alone does not make a private credentialing body a state actor.

Vistein v. American Registry of Radiologic Technologists · filed 2007-09-13

Accordingly, Ms. Vistein does not demonstrate that the ARRT should count as a state actor, thus her § 1983 claim fails.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a victim’s relatives and a public defender were not state actors here.

St. Louis v. Wilson · filed 2007-09-13

Moreover, the father of his victim, the father’s girlfriend, and St. Louis’s public defender are not state actors, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), and the prosecutor has immunity.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of a constitutional right under color of state law and excludes purely private conduct.

Rand v. Porsche Financial Services · filed 2007-09-18

Federal law controls the adjudication of claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Baker v. Rolnick, 210 Ariz. 321, 325, ¶ 18, 110 P.3d 1284, 1288 (App. 2005). Because a person violates § 1983 by depriving another of a constitutional right under color of state law, that section excludes from its purview purely private conduct. Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir.1999). Furthermore, although only a “government actor” can be liable under § 1983, id., a private person who engages in such prohibited conduct jointly with a government official acts under color of state law for the purposes of the statute. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). Of course, the mere acquiescence by a government official in the private party’s conduct does not convert such private action into state action. United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 963-64 (6th Cir.1980).

Section 1983 permits a federal claim against a person acting under color of state law for deprivation of constitutional rights.

Hoskins, James v. TCF National Bank · filed 2007-09-21

But, as the district court observed, Hoskins cannot proceed with his federal claim under § 1983 because his allegations against the bank describe purely private business activities.

Section 1983 requires state action; receiving property devised under a will is not conduct fairly attributable to the state.

Majeed v. North Carolina · filed 2007-10-04

Defendants’ receipt of property devised under Mary R. Smith’s will is not fairly attributable to the state or the “exercise of some right or privilege created by the State.”

Court-appointed counsel are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Conlin v. Lange · filed 2007-10-11

As the district court determined, Conlin’s ineffective-assistance claims fail because court-appointed counsel are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to act under color of state law; a government contract alone does not make the contractor a state actor.

Jaramillo v. Professional Examination Service, Inc. · filed 2007-10-15

Ms. Jaramillo brings her equal protection claim by means of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore she must show that PES acted under color of state law in order to hold PES liable for that constitutional violation. ... To the contrary, all of the evidence shows that PES is simply a government contractor, and that alone is not sufficient to transform it into a state actor.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties who act jointly with state officials and therefore qualify as state actors.

Americans United v. Prison Fellowship · filed 2007-12-03

Prison Fellowship and InnerChange acted jointly with the DOC and can be classified as state actors under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor for a claim against that defendant.

Grant v. Paul · filed 2007-12-06

Because the complaint contains no allegations to suggest that Paul is a state actor properly sued under § 1983, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Grant’s complaint, and we dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Section 1983 requires state action to state a claim for relief.

Stanley v. Goodwin · filed 2007-12-28

Dismissal was proper because Stanley’s amended complaint failed to allege state action, a necessary requirement for stating a claim for relief under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private contractor does not become a state actor merely by operating a state-funded, regulated facility on state property.

Brown Ex Rel. Thomas v. Fletcher · filed 2008-01-07

The Defendants are not state actors, and as such, cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private defendants whose challenged conduct is not attributable to the state.

Cox Ex Rel. Dermitt v. Liberty Healthcare Corp. · filed 2008-01-07

The Defendants are not state actors, and as such, cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is not satisfied merely by alleging that private parties misused state court procedures.

Miles v. Funk · filed 2008-01-15

Allegations of private misuse of state procedures is not enough.

Section 1983's state-action requirement can be met at the pleading stage by sufficient allegations of conspiracy and joint activity with a state official.

Ciacciarella v. Bronko · filed 2008-01-28

These allegations of conspiracy and joint activity among Mayor Bronko and Messrs. DelGobbo and Greene are sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires state action by the alleged wrongdoer for liability to attach.

Chandler v. W.E. Welch & Associates, Inc. · filed 2008-02-05

There is a requirement of state action on the part of the alleged wrongdoer in order for liability to attach under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a person who is not a state actor.

Peters v. Peters · filed 2008-02-21

As it is undisputed that Renee Peters is not a state actor who could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the clerk is directed to close this case.

Section 1983 does not treat a nonprofit or its employees as state actors merely because the organization receives government funding.

Chance v. Reed · filed 2008-03-19

The mere fact that Operation Hope receives federal and state funding and is organized as a § 503(c)(3) nonprofit organization under the Internal Revenue Code does not make any of the defendants a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a state actor; a claim involving only federal actors fails.

Barbosa v. Drug Enforcement Administration · filed 2008-03-28

Not only does this claim fail because no state actors are involved but it also fails because “the comprehensiveness of [the] FOIA precludes the creation of a Bivens remedy” against federal officials.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; employment at a state health department satisfies that requirement.

Jaramillo v. Professional Examination Service, Inc. · filed 2008-04-11

The Court turns first to Ms. Jaramillo’s equal protection claim under § 1983. In order to succeed on such a claim, Ms. Jaramillo must show both that the defendant was a state actor and that her constitutional rights were violated. As Mr. Car-ragher was employed as a Health Program Supervisor for the Office of Practitioner Licensing and Certification at the Connecticut Department of Public Health, the first requirement is met.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of a constitutional or statutory right.

Voytko v. Ramada Inn of Atlantic City · filed 1978-01-31

In this particular case, the combination of the hotel’s available statutory remedy of initiating criminal process and arrest for nonpayment of a hotel bill with the custom of permitting a private hotel’s attorney to act as state prosecutor, constitutes a delegation of sovereign power and gives rise to state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

LURIA BROS. & CO., INC. v. Allen · filed 1978-05-11

As in Parks, and distinguished from Gibbs, Economy’s distraint rights arose solely from the Pennsylvania Landlord & Tenant Act. State involvement in the case sub iudice is therefore properly found. Accordingly, Luria is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of defendant’s distraint upon Luria’s steel plate.

Section 1983 permits a person injured by someone acting under color of state law to seek damages or equitable relief for deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights.

Dave Gibson, Jr. v. Alan J. Dixon, and the First National Bank of Lincolnwood · filed 1978-07-25

On a motion to dismiss we must accept as true the allegation that the creditor has complete discretion to select and judge the sufficiency of certain forms, and focus on whether such selection and judgment constitute state action. We hold that they do not on these facts.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Pas P. Torres, Jr. v. First State Bank of Sierra County, a New Mexico Banking Corporation · filed 1978-12-18

We do not think that the “color of law” reference in § 1983 was intended to encompass a case such as this one, where the only infirmities are the excesses of the court order itself, subject to immediate modification by a court having jurisdiction over the parties, and subject to the normal processes of appeal.

Section 1983 permits a claim when private parties jointly act with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Fries v. Barnes · filed 1980-04-10

The critical question is whether sufficient state action is alleged to invoke relief under § 1983. We hold that there is.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Jones v. Latexo Independent School District · filed 1980-09-03

The blanket inspection carried out by the “sniffer dog” and the resulting searches of selected students and private vehicles constituted state action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution and laws.

Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Services, Inc. · filed 1982-04-30

For all of these reasons, this Court must now conclude that the actions of PRLS in dismissing Gerena were not actions of the Commonwealth for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit only when the alleged infringement of federal rights is fairly attributable to the State.

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn · filed 1982-06-25

The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights “fairly attributable to the State?”

Section 1983 requires state action, and private conduct qualifies only when the State coerces or significantly encourages the challenged action.

Wilson v. Pfeiffer · filed 1983-06-17

Nothing said above is intended to indicate agreement with Wilson’s view of the state action doctrine; to the contrary, having reviewed Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, and the cases relied on by Wilson, we conclude that the coercion or significant encouragement standard which we applied in the initial decision in this action is the appropriate standard.

Section 1983 provides no basis for federal jurisdiction when the challenged action is purely private.

Lubin v. Crittenden Hospital Association · filed 1983-08-09

It is well established that if the action of the Hospital was a purely private action, then section 1983 affords no basis for federal jurisdiction and Lubin's claim was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for constitutional rights deprivations committed under color of state law.

Dr. Gadson J. Tarleton v. Meharry Medical College · filed 1983-09-20

We believe the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants was premature for two reasons. First, the district court overlooked an averment by plaintiff which bears on the question of state action. ... At this juncture, we express no opinion on the merits; we hold only that plaintiff’s affidavit created a “genuine issue as to [a] material fact,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which should be evaluated by the district court. ... Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s claims under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and § 1983 is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law; conclusory allegations of collaboration with the state do not suffice.

Lloyd v. Card · filed 2008-05-12

Lloyd’s conclusory allegations that Davis collaborated with the state to elicit Lloyd’s plea of nolo contendere failed to establish that Davis was a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private defendants whose alleged wrongful acts cannot fairly be attributed to the state.

Cruz v. State of Pennsylvania · filed 2008-05-14

We agree with the District Court that these defendants are not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they cannot be considered state actors.

Section 1983 provides a civil action to redress deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Avalon Precision Casting Co v. Industrial Commission of Ohio · filed 2008-07-25

But § 1983 confers jurisdiction only “[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State law . . . of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States . . . .”

Section 1983 allows a person to sue state actors who, under color of state law, deprive them of constitutional rights.

Estiverne v. Esernio-Jenssen · filed 2008-07-31

At this point, Medical Defendants began “acting in [their] role as an instrumentality of the government” by holding Andrew “as part of the State’s effort to detect and prevent child abuse,” id., and, as such, became subject to § 1983 as state actors.

Section 1983 lets a person deprived of constitutional rights under color of state law sue for redress.

Quinn v. Kent General Hospital, Inc. · filed 1985-08-16

The Court concludes that there are no allegations that could support a finding of state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and summary judgment will be granted for the defendants on the section 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private party is subject to suit only when its challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Giannattasio v. Stamford Youth Hockey Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1985-09-17

State action is the jurisdictional cornerstone to the granting of relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Thus, under all traditional state action tests the ultimate issue of determining whether these defendants are subject to suit must be answered in the negative; the alleged infringements of plaintiffs’ federal rights are not fairly attributable to any form of state action.

Section 1983 requires state action and can reach private parties who conspire with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Robinson v. Robert C. Daugherty and Delco Moraine Division, General Motors Corporation · filed 1986-01-21

It is elementary that 'state action' must exist to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). It is true that a private individual or entity who conspires with state officials to deprive a citizen of his constitutional rights may be held accountable under Section 1983. Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982). However, plaintiff has not alleged conspiracy in the instant case, nor has he named as defendants any officials of the state court system who allegedly discriminated against him.

Section 1983 does not cover private conduct as state action merely because it occurs under government incentives.

Gardner v. Governor Apartments Associates · filed 1986-02-03

The act of improving the housing stock of the Commonwealth pursuant to incentives established by law is not per se State action.

Section 1983 does not reach a private attorney who is not a state actor.

Leal-Rodriguez v. Keys · filed 2008-08-19

Key, a private attorney, was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make private construction attributable to a city merely because the city issued a building permit.

Shanks v. Dressel · filed 2008-08-27

We do not agree that the issuance of a building permit to the Dressels made their conduct fairly attributable to Spokane in the sense required for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not make a private developer’s construction attributable to a city merely because the city issued a building permit.

Byrd v. Dressel · filed 2008-08-27

We do not agree that the issuance of a building permit to the Dressels made their conduct fairly attributable to Spokane in the sense required for § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires facts showing a sufficient nexus between a private defendant and the government to establish state action.

Flynn v. The CIT Group · filed 2008-09-26

The Flynns’ legal argument is not tied to an allegation of facts that such a nexus exists between CIT and the SEC as to transform CIT’s actions into state action. The district court did not err in dismissing this claim.

Section 1983 generally does not allow claims based on private conduct; the defendant must have acted under color of state law.

Vs Ex Rel. TS v. Muhammad · filed 2008-09-30

Generally, private conduct is not proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment and does not give rise to Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a civil action for deprivation of rights only when the defendant acted under color of state law.

Goss v. Memorial Hospital System · filed 1986-05-14

Similarly, we agree with the district court that the Texas Medical Practice Act did not make the action of appellees state action.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be attributable to the state; tangential ties between a private association and a state court do not establish state action for the association’s employment decisions.

Jane Niehaus and Joyce Neumann v. Kansas Bar Association, John Gardner, and Marcia Poell · filed 1986-06-13

We also hold that, since appellants failed to establish that their terminations were the result of state action, the district court properly granted summary judgment to appellees on appellants’ §§ 1983, 1988, First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private company’s discharge does not satisfy that requirement merely because the company performs a public function.

Harris v. Arkansas Book Co. · filed 1986-06-25

Although a public function, the storing of textbooks has not been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. ... We are convinced that there was no state action in Harris' discharge. Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the section 1983 claim and properly granted summary judgment to ABC on this issue.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private group home defendants when their restrictions on family visits cannot be attributed to the state.

Sybalski v. Independent Group Home Living Program · filed 2008-10-15

Because the restrictions imposed by defendants on the Sybalskis’ ability to communicate with their son cannot be attributed to the state, defendants cannot be held liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be attributable to the state; a private provider’s state certification does not make its separate conduct as a Social Security representative payee state action.

Bates v. NORTHWESTERN HUMAN SERVICES, INC. · filed 2008-10-28

Because the plaintiffs do not allege facts that would permit an inference of state action with respect to the defendants’ conduct as representative payees, the Court must dismiss Count I of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 has no independent mental-state requirement; a plaintiff must prove the mental state required by the underlying constitutional right.

League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner · filed 2008-11-26

Although allegations of mere negligence will not sustain an action under § 1983, the statute “contains no independent state-of-mind requirement.” ... Rather, when litigating under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove the culpable mental state applicable to the underlying constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private spouse merely for participating in divorce proceedings, because that participation is not state action.

McWilliams v. Keith McWilliams and Don G. Humble, in His Individual and Official Capacity · filed 1986-12-03

The husband is not a proper party under Section 1983, for his participation in the divorce proceedings did not constitute state action.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to act under color of state law; here, that required a conspiracy with state officials to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac · filed 1986-12-18

To prevail in a Section 1983 suit, the plaintiff must establish the defendant acted under color of state law. The parties before this Court agree that, because only the private defendants are moving for summary judgment, to show “state action” plaintiff must establish that there was a conspiracy between the private defendants and state officials to deprive plaintiff of its rights under the United States Constitution.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a public hospital authority for its private manager’s conduct when the authority retains financial control and oversight of the hospital.

A.M. Jatoi, Md v. Hurst-Euless-Bedford Hospital Authority · filed 1987-01-14

The Authority, however, was the lessor of the facility and continued to hold the purse strings. It monitored the activity of its lessee and retained the ability to prevent or control racial discrimination by its private manager. The Authority cannot benefit from private management of the hospital and at the same time insulate itself from liability for racial discrimination by that manager.

Section 1983 does not treat a private attorney as a state actor merely for issuing a subpoena, absent an allegation that state officials enforced it.

Unknown case name · filed 2008-12-10

We agree with the district court that defendant's use of this procedural device did not transform him into a state actor, at least absent any allegation that state officials were used to enforce the process.

Section 1983 requires a complaint against a private party to allege facts showing that the party acted under color of state law.

Devers-Scott v. Markowitz · filed 2008-12-16

For substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, we agree that Devers-Scott has not alleged facts sufficient to transform Keenan into a state actor for purposes of liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant was a state actor.

Kashelkar v. Bluestone · filed 2009-01-15

Kashelkar failed to state a claim against any Defendant-Appellee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as he failed to allege that any of the Defendants-Appellees were state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action in the challenged conduct; a state university student newspaper’s editorial decision lacks state action when there is insufficient state control over that decision.

Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan · filed 1987-09-25

We believe that each case requires a separate inquiry into the underlying facts, and we merely hold here, as did Judge Urbom, that there are insufficient indicia of state control in this case to render the newspaper’s editorial decisions “state action.”

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law; an allegation that private parties acted in concert with a state actor is insufficient.

Herman v. Lackey · filed 2009-02-04

This allegation is not sufficient to include Broadway and HSC as state actors.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hospital · filed 1987-12-31

We are persuaded defendants have prevailed on their motions for summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim. In our view, plaintiff has failed to prove any state action by the defendants.

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Emil B. Milo, M.D., and Donald L. Reid, M.D. v. Cushing Municipal Hospital, an Oklahoma Non-Profit Corporation, D/B/A Cu · filed 1988-04-22

We conclude that the Hospital is a public institution and its suspension of the plaintiffs’ medical staff privileges constitutes the requisite state action to support a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Green v. Concord Baptist Church Corpora · filed 2009-03-09

Among other deficiencies, there is no basis for inferring that state action existed (for purposes of § 1983), that a conspiracy was involved (§ 1985); that some form of discrimination occurred (§ 2000a-2); that plaintiff was deprived of a protected property interest (due process); or that he was improperly subjected to differential treatment (equal protection).

Section 1983 permits a person to sue for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law when private conduct qualifies as state action.

Rimac v. Duncan · filed 2009-03-10

Because we find that Duncan was not acting in any official capacity as a correctional officer, he can only be subject to liability under § 1983 if his private actions can be fairly treated as state action.

A § 1983 claim against a volunteer fire company can proceed when municipal funding and participation in its administration create a factual dispute over state action.

Kronmuller v. West End Fire Co. No. 3 · filed 1988-11-18

Under Rule 12(b), we find that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a finding of state action. Similarly under Rule 56, plaintiff has created genuine issues of material fact concerning the question of state action. The Borough of Phoenixville contributes financially and participates in the functioning and administration of the fire company.

Section 1983 does not cover a private defendant’s conduct unless it is fairly attributable to the State.

McWilliams v. Catholic Diocese of Rochester · filed 1988-12-23

The sixth cause of action, asserting a claim under 42 USC § 1983, was also properly dismissed because the conduct of the private defendants is not fairly attributable to the State (see, Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., 457 US 922; Dahlberg v Becker, 748 F2d 85, cert denied 470 US 1084).

A state bar journal’s refusal to publish a reply to disciplinary reports can constitute state action under § 1983.

Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Association · filed 1989-01-04

On the undisputed record before us, we conclude that the Bar Journal is a state actor and that its decision not to publish Mr. Estiverne’s reply is therefore subject to first amendment scrutiny.

Section 1983 does not treat these tenant defendants as state actors merely because they may rely on the Loft Law.

640 Broadway Renaissance Co. v. Cuomo · filed 1989-07-24

The Court rejects plaintiffs' argument that the tenant-defendants can be characterized as state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action; government funding does not make a private hospital’s suspension of staff privileges state action when the state is not responsible for the decision.

Moore v. Williamsburg Regional Hospital · filed 2009-03-12

In this case, most of plaintiff’s arguments relate to WRH’s receipt of government funds through various state and federal programs and therefore do not make WRH’s suspension of plaintiff state action under Modaber. ... Therefore, WRH’s suspension of plaintiff’s privileges is not state action.

Section 1983 does not authorize a claim against a contractor who is not a state actor.

Eisenberg v. Wall · filed 2009-03-12

Because Litchfield is not a state actor, claims against him are not authorized by § 1983 and, consequently, this Court will not allow Eisenberg to amend his complaint to add such claims.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor for a claim alleging a violation of constitutional rights.

Buckley v. Dowdle · filed 2009-03-24

He did not explain how defendants violated CAPTA, see Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 901-02 (7th Cir. 1997); two defendants are not state actors for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for violation of Buckley’s constitutional rights, see Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2004); the state judge enjoys judicial immunity, see Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (per curiam); and Buckley did not explain how the remaining state actor violated his constitutional rights, see Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (pro se complaints must allege sufficient facts).

Section 1983 applies to actions under color of state law or sufficiently controlled by the state to constitute state action.

Wassif v. North Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1990-11-28

The protections afforded to citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) do not apply to private conduct. Those provisions only apply to actions occurring under color of state law or sufficiently controlled by the state as to be considered state action.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law, including through state action.

Fernandez v. Diversified Information Systems Corp. · filed 1991-04-21

It is not disputed that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires state action. A defendant, as the statute provides, must have acted “under color of” state law.

Section 1983 applies to state actors, not federal agencies or employees.

Jones v. Yanta · filed 2009-03-31

The court notes at the outset that plaintiffs fail to state a claim against the DOJ, the FBI, Yanta, O’Brien, Naugle, Lieber and Geise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 applies to state actors, not to federal agencies or employees.

Section 1983 requires an assertion that the defendant was a state actor.

Van Pelt v. St. Clair · filed 1992-07-09

properly dismissed the claim against Denwiddie as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) because there was no assertion Denwiddie was a state actor.

Section 1983 permits a person to bring a civil action against someone who, under color of state law, deprives the person of federal rights.

Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Massachusetts, Inc. v. National Real Estate Information Services · filed 2009-04-13

NREIS has met the § 1983 threshold requirement of state action because REBA is acting under color of state law. A private actor is engaged in state action for purposes of § 1983 if the private actor "assumes a traditional public function when it undertakes to perform the challenged conduct.” Perkins v. Londonderry Basketball Club, 196 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir.1999). The "public function" test requires that the private actor assume powers "traditionally [and] exclusively reserved to the State.” Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir.1994) (citations and quotations omitted). Here, the Massachusetts legislature delegated the authority to enforce the statutory prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law to any "bar association within the Commonwealth.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 221, § 46B. REBA is a Massachusetts bar association.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Partovi v. Galoski · filed 2009-04-13

Section 1983, however, is inapplicable, as the statute requires state action and does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Anderson v. Toomey · filed 2009-04-21

First, Mr. Anderson failed to provide any evidence in response to the motion for summary judgment that the Callister defendants were state actors for purposes of asserting a claim for violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an alleged violation of constitutional rights by a state actor.

Watson v. Land America Austin Title · filed 2009-04-24

Watson has no viable claim against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because he has not alleged a violation of his constitutional rights by a state actor.

Section 1983 requires state action; conduct by a private organization qualifies when the state is inextricably involved in or controls that conduct.

McDonald v. National Collegiate Athletic Association · filed 1974-02-11

Their argument must be supported by a finding that NCAA action is — (1) state action as required to sustain a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ... and (2) is violative of the guarantees of Fourteenth Amendment due process. ... What must appear is that the state must be so inextricably involved in the “private” action or must be able to so control the “private” action that this activity necessarily becomes the functional equivalent of an act of the sovereign.

Section 1983 does not cover a creditor's self-help repossession of collateral when state involvement is insufficient to constitute state action.

James v. Pinnix · filed 1974-06-10

Some state involvement in the Reitman-Moose Lodge sense may be present here, but it is simply not enough, given the nonracial nature of the case, to constitute state action.

Section 1983 permits sex discrimination claims involving state action, but does not cover claims based on federal governmental action.

New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc. · filed 1974-06-13

Actions alleging sex discrimination where state action is concerned may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... but since the gravamen of the action here is against federal “governmental action” rather than “state action,” jurisdiction may not be based on Section 1983.

A county jail policy imposed by government officials constitutes state action under § 1983.

Cudnik v. Kreiger · filed 1974-07-16

It is fostered by governmen...tal officials and constitutes state action under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires significant state involvement in the alleged injury; a private boardinghouse keeper’s distraint does not qualify merely because state law permits it.

Davis v. Richmond · filed 1975-03-11

For the Constitution and for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... to come into play, plaintiff’s injury must be caused significantly by action of the state of Massachusetts or its instrumentalities.

Section 1983 requires an act chargeable to the state; a state court’s enforcement of a neutral private lease does not make the alleged discrimination state action when the state does not approve that conduct.

Girard v. 94th Street and Fifth Avenue Corporation · filed 1976-05-19

Since it cannot be said that the state’s involvement in this case approves ... the allegedly discriminatory conduct, we affirm the dismissal by the district court of the § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires action by a state officer or a private person acting under color of state authority; conduct by a private party as such or a federal official does not suffice.

Local No. 1 (aca), Broadcast Employees of The International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. International Brotherhood of Tea · filed 1976-06-21

We dismissed plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to all defendants on a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The law is clear beyond cavil that only the action of a state officer or of a private person acting under color of authority of a state, and not of a private party as such or of a federal official, can give rise to a cause of action under that section of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against former attorneys representing a client in a bankruptcy proceeding when they are not state actors.

Williams v. Joe Livesay Sam Blaiss William C. Gosnell · filed 1993-12-03

Williams does not state a cognizable legal theory against the defendants because a liberal construction of the complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 shows that the defendants are not considered state actors for purposes of Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; conduct outside a governmental role does not support a claim.

Balisok v. Phillip L. Baker John Doe Cox · filed 1994-04-07

He cannot state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because the persons who told lies were not acting in any governmental capacity, and thus, there is no state action.

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against a labor union that is not a state actor.

Booker v. ELEC. WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 2021, IBEW · filed 1977-02-18

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a Federal remedy for a denial or deprivation of a federally protected right by a state or state agency. The instant action against Defendant labor union is not within the purview of § 1983.

Section 1983 treats the NCAA’s activities as governmental action.

Regents of the University of Minnesota v. The National Collegiate Athletic Association · filed 1977-08-02

Three courts of appeals have squarely held that Association activities do constitute governmental action for purposes of the Constitution and § 1983, and the First Circuit, in a recent opinion authored by Judge Van Oosterhout, has specifically stated its agreement with these decisions. ... We, like the First Circuit in Rivas Tenorio, supra at 495, agree with the analysis and conclusion of Judge Tamm for the District of Columbia Circuit in Howard University, supra at 216-20.

Section 1983 does not reach a private institution’s hiring decision when limited state aid and no state involvement in hiring fail to establish state action.

Myrna B. LAMB, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Talbot RANTOUL Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1977-08-24

We need not make this decision, for the two factors that gave the Weise court pause point in this case toward a holding of no state action. The dependence of RISD on state aid is miniscule and there is no suggestion of the state’s intrusion into hiring decisions.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not support a claim against federal officers on the facts alleged here.

Burrascano v. United States Attorney General · filed 1978-03-23

As to defendants Schulman and the Attorney General, it is clear that no claim against these federal officers has been or can be stated under the state-action jurisdictional basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against a private broadcaster requires state action, which the court found lacking where the F.C.C. had not approved the challenged conduct.

Central New York Right to Life Federation v. Radio Station W. I. B. X. · filed 1979-03-19

The defendants in Kuczo, like the defendants in this action, can scarcely claim F.C.C. approval of the contested practices. If anything, the conduct of the defendants is expressly condemned by the personal attack rule. The Court is therefore unable to find the requisite state action upon which its subject matter jurisdiction ultimately depends.

Section 1983 does not apply to a claim against a federal court-appointed attorney for representation in a federal criminal trial.

Housand v. Heiman · filed 1979-03-20

Since Housand was tried in federal court and his suit here is against a federal court-appointed attorney, § 1983 is not strictly applicable.

Section 1983 requires allegations of state action; a claim against federal IRS employees lacking those allegations is insubstantial.

Dema v. Feddor · filed 1979-04-30

28 U.S.C. § 1343 is inapplicable here because plaintiffs’ claim that the individual defendants violated their right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) is “wholly insubstantial ... and frivolous,” ... since the necessary allegations of state action and appropriate class membership, ... are entirely lacking in the Amended Complaint.

Section 1983 requires state action; a state hospital-licensing statute did not make this private hospital’s staff-admission policy state action.

Paul K. Berman, Physician v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., a Corporation · filed 1979-08-06

... and that the state statute regarding hospital licensing does not sufficiently implicate Florida in defendant’s staff-admission policies to constitute “state action.”

Section 1983 requires a sufficient connection between the state and a private defendant’s challenged conduct for that conduct to count as state action.

Sims v. Jefferson Downs, Inc. · filed 1980-02-11

This essentially factual determination hinges upon whether the state is shown to be sufficiently connected with the particular aspect of the defendant’s conduct complained of, so that the respondent’s act is treated as that of the state itself.

Section 1983 may reach a private school when the state retains primary responsibility for the services the school provides and the alleged facts could establish state action.

Ross v. Allen · filed 1981-05-06

Under Perez, because of the statutory scheme outlined above, and primarily because of the primary responsibility for the education of the handicapped retained by the state, I find that under the allegations of this complaint plaintiff may be able to prove that the actions of the School were state actions. She may therefore be able to sustain a cause of action under § 1983. The motion to dismiss the first cause of action in this complaint is therefore denied.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because it acted pursuant to a state statute.

Clapp v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae · filed 1994-08-22

The mere fact that plaintiff was unsuccessful in convincing the state courts of her interpretation of the partnership laws, however, does not convert LeBoeuf into a state actor or make LeBoeufs actions improper state action. The Supreme Court has clearly held that mere action by a private party pursuant to a state statute, without more, is insufficient to convert the party into a state actor, and, thus, satisfy the state action requirement of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of state law deprived them of a constitutional or federal right.

Sherman v. Berlin · filed 1994-10-06

To establish a violation of section 1983, the plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Section 1983 permits damages claims for deprivations of federal due process rights caused by the improper use of state power.

Hollis v. Itawamba County Loans · filed 1981-09-30

Here, however, the plaintiff Hollis has stated a presumptively valid section 1983 claim for damages based, not upon the facial unconstitutionality of the statute, but rather upon the improper abuse of the statutory procedure (even if presumptively constitutional) so as to deprive him of federal due process rights through improper use of state power.

Section 1983 requires a state actor; federal agencies and federal employees do not qualify.

Neville v. True · filed 1995-09-12

Although Neville brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is well-settled that § 1983 requires a “state actor.” Such a state actor does not exist in the case sub judice; Neville names a federal agency and three federal employees as the defendants to his claim.

Section 1983 does not make a foster parent a state actor merely because the government places children in the home and regulates it.

KARA B. v. Dane County · filed 1995-11-02

We also conclude Smit is not a state actor so as to subject her to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; Harvard is neither a public institution nor sufficiently intertwined with Massachusetts to meet that requirement.

Rice v. The President and Fellows of Harvard College · filed 1981-11-02

Appellant’s § 1983 claim of deprivation of her civil rights was properly dismissed. In Krohn v. Harvard Law School, 552 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1977), we held that Harvard is not a public institution and is not sufficiently intertwined with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts so as to meet the “state action” requirement for a § 1983 cause of action. ... We see no reason to overrule our prior decision and, therefore, affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claim.

A Section 1983 claim alleging sufficient state involvement may survive a motion to dismiss before discovery supplies more detail.

Davidson v. Yeshiva University · filed 1982-11-22

Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relies on an argument similar to the one defendant asserted in the fourteenth amendment context. ... Plaintiff, a pro se, has alleged sufficient involvement by the state, and it is inappropriate to dismiss the complaint before any discovery can provide additional information on this issue.