42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not treat a private entity as a state actor merely because it receives state funding or holds a state license.

Cain v. Christine Valmy International School of Esthetics, Skin Care, & Makeup · filed 2016-10-20

However, neither the receipt of funding from the state nor licensure by the state are sufficient to transform the actions of a private entity into “state action” for purposes of a lawsuit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a private debt collector to allege that the collector acted as a state actor.

Carlisle v. Stellar Recovery, Inc. · filed 2016-10-28

Plaintiff neither alleges that Stellar is a state actor for purposes of § 1983, nor claims that Stellar is anything other than “a private corporation hired to collect a private debt Plaintiff allegedly owed to another private company.”

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Jones v. Christ Town Ministries · filed 2016-10-28

Jones’s amended complaint failed to show that Christ Town Ministries was a state actor, or allege facts that would satisfy any of the three methods by which a private actor can be deemed to have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; a claim against private charities cannot proceed without facts showing state action.

Thomas v. Salvation Army Southern Territory · filed 2016-11-08

Without state action, Thomas has no § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires conduct by a state actor; a private party may qualify by acting in concert with state officials.

Jones v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2016-11-09

Here, Jones failed to state a claim under § 1983. The allegations in his complaint do not support an inference that CitiMortgage and the Phelan firm were “state actors” subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against private individuals or entities require allegations that their conduct amounted to state action.

Thomas Bolick, II v. Northeast Industrial Services · filed 2016-11-17

The Bolicks, who pursued relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were required to plead that the private individuals’ and entities’ conduct amounted to state action, but they failed to do so.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a private attorney who is not a state actor.

Grigsby v. Dick · filed 2016-11-23

Lastly, we agree with the district court that the attorney who represented Grigsby’s ex-wife in the Reno County proceedings was a private actor and therefore not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a private public access channel operator to be a state actor; operating channels that are not public fora did not make MNN one.

Halleck v. City of New York · filed 2016-12-13

In short, because Plaintiffs cannot establish that MNN was operating a public forum, they fail to plead that MNN was a state actor under Section 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not treat private attorneys as state actors.

Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Leblon · filed 2016-12-20

Private attorneys — like the attorney defendants here — generally do not qualify as state actors.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that the defendant is a state actor.

Garanin v. New York City Housing Preservation and Development · filed 2016-12-21

A plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant is a state actor to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 claim against private defendants requires facts sufficient to show that they were state actors.

Joseph Cuviello, I v. Feld Entertainment, Inc. · filed 2016-12-22

The district court properly dismissed Cuviello’s First Amendment claim because Cuviello failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that defendants were state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for alleged due process violations on private defendants who are not state actors.

Akers v. Mooring Financial Corporation · filed 2016-12-23

The complaint does not present a federal question because the private defendants are not state actors subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any alleged due process violations.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant’s actions are fairly attributable to the state.

Craig v. Villicana · filed 2017-01-26

The district court properly dismissed Craig’s § 1983 claims against defendants Villicana and Page because Craig failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that their actions were fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires facts sufficient to establish that a defendant acted under color of state law.

Otchkov v. Everett · filed 2017-01-30

The district court properly dismissed Otchkov’s federal claims against defendant Lorona because Otchkov failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that Lorona engaged in state action.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity only when its actions are attributable to the state.

Cannavino v. Rock Ohio Caesars Cleveland, L.L.C. · filed 2017-02-02

Moreover, even if Cannavino had demonstrated that Williams violated his constitutional rights, he failed to establish that the actions of Atlantis Security — a private entity — are attributable to the state to impose liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor or to have acted in concert with one.

Wolff v. State University of New York · filed 2017-02-06

For a defendant to be liable under § 1983, she must be a state actor or must have acted in concert with a state actor.

Section 1983 does not treat a privately retained criminal defense attorney as a state actor when representing a client.

Gebhart v. Richard Fuschino, Jr. · filed 2017-02-09

And in any event, Gebhart’s defense attorney was not a “state actor” for purposes of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law; the allegations about this charter school did not establish state action.

I.H. ex rel. Hunter v. Oakland School for the Arts · filed 2017-02-13

Under the allegations presently before it, the Court finds that plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that OSA is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not treat a private attorney as a state actor merely because the attorney advises municipal officials or acts as their counsel.

Carney v. Town of Weare, et al. · filed 2017-02-21

An attorney does not become a state actor merely by providing advice to a municipality’s officials or acting in his professional capacity.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant’s conduct constituted state action.

Donkor v. People of the State of Calif. · filed 2017-02-24

The district court properly dismissed Donkor’s action against defendant Manhattan Beach Tow because Donkor failed to allege facts in his second amended complaint sufficient to show that Manhattan Beach Tow’s actions constituted state action.

Section 1983 does not cover a private exam administrator that is not a state actor when it sanctions a test taker.

Fox v. International Conference of Funeral Service Examining Boards · filed 2017-03-17

Therefore, the Conference was not engaged in state action when it sanctioned Plaintiff.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for claims redressing state action.

Talib v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections · filed 2017-04-05

He brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “only provides for claims to redress State action.” Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn, ... 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001). Because Talib has not alleged that his former attorney is a state actor, § 1983 does not cognize his claim.

Section 1983 provides a means to vindicate federal rights violated by persons acting under color of state authority.

Thermuthis Lee v. 4326 Broad Street LP · filed 2017-04-07

Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights violated by persons acting under the color of state authority.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a constitutional violation was committed by a state actor.

Catanzaro v. Davis · filed 2017-04-13

Catanzaro’s claims against the attorneys also lack merit because, to pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that his constitutional rights were violated “by a state actor.” ... Private attorneys — like the attorney defendants here — generally do not qualify as state actors.

Section 1983 permits liability only for state actors.

Reinwand v. National Electrical Benefit Fu · filed 2017-04-14

Only “state actors” can be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants to allege facts showing that their actions were fairly attributable to the state.

Bauerle v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2017-04-21

The district court properly dismissed Bauerle’s § 1983 claims against the private defendants because Bauerle failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that these defendants’ actions were fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires state action for a claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment.

Sledge v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co · filed 2017-05-09

We affirm the dismissal because state action is an essential element of claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 that rely on the Fourteenth Amendment.

Merely serving as a foster parent does not make a private party a state actor under § 1983.

Ismail v. County of Orange · filed 2017-05-19

Amendment as to the Fords would also be futile. Merely serving as a foster parent does not transform a private party into a state actor.

A § 1983 claim requires sufficient allegations that the defendant acted as a state actor.

Mickey Castillo v. Kelly · filed 2017-06-05

Castillo’s federal claims against Kelly fail because he insufficiently alleged that Kelly is a state actor.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that the defendant acted as a state actor when violating the plaintiff’s rights.

Morrison v. Miller · filed 2017-06-08

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead facts that, if taken as true, establish that the defendants were functioning as “state actors” when they violated her rights.

A private defendant acts under color of state law for § 1983 only when its conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Munchak v. Ruckno · filed 2017-07-05

Private actors, such as the non-governmental defendants named here, can be said to act under color of state law only if their conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

A high school athletic association entwined with the public school system is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High School Ass'n · filed 2017-07-07

IHSA is a state actor by virtue of its entwinement with the public school system.

Section 1983 claims may lie only against state actors.

Smith v. Susquehanna University · filed 2017-07-13

As claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may only lie against state actors,16 this determination mandates judgment in favor of the appellees on all of Smith’s federal constitutional claims.

Section 1983 does not cover a private university’s conduct unless that conduct is fairly attributable to the State.

Slovinec v. Georgetown University · filed 2017-07-31

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a due process violation based on the University’s refusal to assist with his job search or to provide financial assistance for courses, the claim cannot proceed under § 1983 because such conduct is not “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital’s dismissal of a clinical student as state action when the hospital controlled the decision, even though it partnered with a public university and a university official concurred.

Borrell v. Bloomsburg University · filed 2017-08-30

Ficca’s signature on the termination letter purports to do nothing more than concur with Richer’s decision, which is not enough for state action.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Harris v. Sunshine Health Agency · filed 2017-09-26

The district court properly dismissed Harris’ § 1983 claim because he failed to allege facts supporting a reasonable inference of state action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private university for due process violations to allege facts showing that the university acted under color of state law.

Faparusi v. Case Western Reserve Univ. · filed 2017-10-04

In light of the requirement to liberally construe Faparusi’s pro se complaint, we assume that his due process ... claims were properly brought under § 1983. Yet we nevertheless affirm for Faparusi’s failure to show that CWRU was a state actor susceptible to due process challenges.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against a private union must allege conduct attributable to the state.

Staten v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of N.Y., Inc. · filed 2017-10-19

Accordingly, because the plaintiff has not alleged any state action, the § 1983 claim is dismissed.

Public defenders acting as attorneys for their clients are not state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

Cotton v. County of San Bernardino · filed 2017-11-09

The district court properly dismissed Cotton’s claims against his public defenders because those defendants are not state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private business that is not a state actor cannot be held liable under it.

Lewis v. Kennemore · filed 2017-11-28

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Ayers Cleaners is not a state actor. For this reason, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead an actionable § 1983 claim against Defendant Ayers Cleaners.

Section 1983 permits a claim against private defendants to proceed when the complaint plausibly alleges that their conduct involved state action.

Brill v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC · filed 2018-01-02

The Court finds that by virtue of these substantial, non-conclusory and well-plead allegations that Plaintiff has plausibly asserted that state action was necessarily implicated by the private Defendants' conduct in this case such that, at least for purposes of the instant Motion, Plaintiff has shown that relief against the private Defendant movants under § 1983 might be granted.

Section 1983 permits a civil damages claim against defendants acting under color of state law, but does not apply to private defendants who are not state actors.

El v. Marino · filed 2018-01-08

The statute that would permit El to bring a Fourth Amendment claim for civil damages, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, would only apply if defendants were state actors.

Section 1983 claims against private defendants require state action; a conclusory allegation that they conspired with state officials is insufficient.

Bukowski v. Spinner · filed 2018-01-19

Finally, the claims against Adam Saylor (the father of Bukowski’s child), Philip Castrovinci (Saylor’s lawyer), and Mary Beth Daniels (the child’s law guardian)--which Bukowski brought under § 1983--must be dismissed because none of those defendants is a state actor, see Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 964 (2d Cir. 2015), and Bukowski’s oblique reference to those private actors conspiring with CPS to deprive her of her child is fatally conclusory or otherwise unsupported, see Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002).

Section 1983 permits a First Amendment claim against a private corporation and its employees when their conduct can be deemed state action.

Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. · filed 2018-02-09

Because MNN is a private corporation, the viability of the Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim against it and its employees depends on whether MNN's actions can be deemed state action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against defendants who are not state actors.

Norris v. Serrato · filed 2018-02-16

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to bring claims against the Store Defendants pursuant to § 1983, any such claims must fail because the Store Defendants are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by a state actor; state regulation alone does not make a private utility a state actor.

Zapata v. PECO · filed 2018-02-21

To assert a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that [he] was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” ... Accordingly, Zapata cannot establish a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a claim cannot proceed when the complaint gives no plausible indication of state action.

Looney v. Purely, Inc. · filed 2018-02-21

The undersigned also finds that a more carefully drafted complaint could not plausibly state a § 1983 claim against any of the Defendants because there is absolutely no indication any of the Defendants would be considered “state actors” subject to liability under that statute.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor.

Rroku v. Cole · filed 2018-02-28

As no defendant is a state actor, the § 1983 claim is construed as a Bivens claim.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against private defendants who are not state actors.

Pease v. Cook · filed 2018-03-19

To the extent Ms. Pease asserts this claim against Mr. Cook and Ms. Gillette, it will be dismissed because those Defendants are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; filing a lawsuit and obtaining favorable rulings does not make a private party a state actor.

Cook v. H.S.B.C. Bank USA. N.A · filed 2018-03-19

But it is axiomatic that simply filing a lawsuit and obtaining favorable rulings from a judge does not convert private parties into state actors.

A § 1983 claim requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Price v. Carroll · filed 2018-03-23

Price’s assertion that he never alleged that Odom was a state actor confirms the correctness of this aspect of the district court’s ruling.

Section 1983 requires plausible allegations that a defendant acted under color of state law; private employment alone does not establish state actor status.

Turner v. Ware. · filed 2018-04-18

Defendants Mike Ware, Cavkil Bromfield, are alleged to be owner of, or employed by, a private security firm and no plausible facts are alleged to indicate that they are state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor.

Coward v. Wellmont Health System · filed 2018-05-03

Constitutional torts — whether asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or the self-executing provisions of the United States and Virginia Constitutions — can only be asserted against state actors. ... In this case, Coward does not allege that any of the defendants were state actors.

Section 1983 reaches a private party only when it engages in state action or acts under color of state law.

Masson v. Aramark Inc. · filed 2018-05-15

Aramark Campus LLC is a private actor, and section 1983 does not reach the actions of private parties except when the private party is engaged in state action or acting under color of state law, neither of which Masson alleges here.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a state actor deprived them of rights secured by federal law.

Picozzi v. Guy Peiagelee & Sons · filed 2018-05-17

Moreover, to the extent Picozzi is asserting civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nothing in the Complaint suggests that the Defendants are state actors and that they deprived Picozzi "of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Parratt v. Taylor , 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) ; see also West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).

Section 1983 does not treat a private nursing home as a state actor merely because it follows a state probate court order.

Fairley v. PM Management - San Antonio AL · filed 2018-05-29

Juliette’s claim under § 1983 is premised upon Lakeside being a state actor because it follows an—allegedly incorrect—order of a state probate court. This factor does not amount to Lakeside being a state actor for purposes of § 1983 claims, and the district court appropriately dismissed the claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege state action.

Al McZeal v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank N.A. · filed 2018-05-30

McZeal failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he failed to allege state action.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted as a state actor.

Alston v. Nat'l Conference of Bar Exam'rs · filed 2018-06-07

Alston raises due process and equal protection claims pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, but fails to present any allegations that would render Defendant NCBE a state actor, which is a threshold requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private security guards to plausibly allege that their conduct was state action.

Rabieh v. Paragon Sys. Inc. · filed 2018-06-11

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege state action under either of the theories he asserts, his claims against the Employee Defendants under § 1983 will be DISMISSED.

Section 1983’s state-action element is met at the pleading stage when plaintiffs allege that a public hospital acted under color of state law.

Blaine v. N. Brevard Cnty. Hosp. Dist. · filed 2018-07-02

PMC does not challenge the second element of state action, and the Court finds that this element is met as Plaintiffs allege PMC is a public hospital acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires state action for a First Amendment claim; a private entity acting on its own cannot violate that right.

Pope v. Carl · filed 2018-07-17

Pope could not have levied such constitutional allegations against SHP, for the “First and Fourteenth Amendment protections, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are triggered only in the presence of state action.”

Section 1983 can reach a private entity’s conduct when that conduct is fairly attributable to the state, and factual disputes about state action can prevent dismissal.

Millspaugh v. Bulverde Spring Branch Emergency Services · filed 2018-07-18

We conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the section 1983 claim because the record shows that fact issues exist with regard to state action.

Section 1983 does not support claims against Pinkerton or its employees because Pinkerton is not a state actor.

Elizabeth Tveter and Holly Tveter v. Derry Cooperative School District SAU #10, et al. · filed 2018-07-20

The First Circuit has held that Pinkerton is not a state actor for the purposes of § 1983. ... Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to state viable constitutional claims against either Pinkerton or any of its employees.

Section 1983 permits claims against private corporations and individuals only if they are state actors.

Daugherty v. Safelink Wireless · filed 2018-07-30

However, private corporations and individuals may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private company’s compliance with state regulations alone does not make it a state actor.

Overton v. Uber Techs., Inc. · filed 2018-08-08

Plaintiffs do not allege that Uber deprived their rights "under color of state law," as required to allege a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private party may qualify by conspiring with a state official.

Kornafel v. Del Chevrolet · filed 2018-08-15

We further agree that to the extent Kornafel’s complaint could be broadly construed to raise constitutional claims, any such claim was not viable, because the only defendants named in the complaint were Del Chevrolet and Jack Del Vecchio, neither of whom is a state official.

Section 1983 does not treat court-appointed lawyers as state actors when they perform traditional defense counsel functions in a criminal case.

Royal Robinson v. Corbett · filed 2018-08-20

Court-appointed lawyers are not state actors for § 1983 purposes when they are performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel in a criminal proceeding.

Private child-care organizations can qualify as state actors under § 1983 when they work with state employees to carry out the state’s child-custody duties.

Brent v. Wayne Cty. Dep't of Human Servs. · filed 2018-08-23

Given that a number of plaintiffs’ allegations concern conduct the child-care organizations and DHS employees undertook together, plaintiffs have pleaded sufficiently that Methodist and the Children’s Center are state actors to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a reporter or newspaper without a basis to treat them as state actors.

Hersh v. Rellahan · filed 2018-09-07

Nothing in the Complaint, however, sets forth a basis for concluding that Rellahan and the Daily News could be considered state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state; a defendant who is not a state actor cannot be sued under it.

Gordon v. Langino · filed 2018-09-11

Gordon has not identified any error in the district court’s determination that he may not raise a claim against the defendants under §§ 1983 and 1985 because they are not state actors. ... Nonetheless, the district court did not err in finding that the defendants were not state actors.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is sufficiently alleged when state officials’ contracting practices foreseeably allow private agencies to turn away applicants.

Dumont v. Lyon · filed 2018-09-14

In either case, the result is the same and state action has been sufficiently alleged here.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private entity when its ties to the state plausibly show that it acted under color of state law.

Popat v. Levy · filed 2018-09-17

Again, the Court concludes only that Plaintiff has set forth sufficient factual allegations that raise a plausible inference that Kaleida, though a private entity, acted "under color of state law," and thus, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim may proceed against Kaleida.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Haggerty v. Keolis Transit North America · filed 2018-09-19

The district court properly dismissed Haggerty’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because defendants are not state actors.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on attorneys performing traditional legal functions solely because they are officers of the court.

Phinisee v. Friewald · filed 2018-09-25

Accordingly, none of the attorneys whom Phinisee sued are state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 can reach a private physician’s forensic examinations when the physician’s role in a government investigation creates a sufficiently close nexus to the state.

Gokor v. Schlievert · filed 2018-09-30

In this case, however, Gokor has sufficiently and plausibly alleged "a sufficiently close nexus" between the State's handling of child-abuse investigations and Dr. Schlievert's forensic examinations as to make those examinations "attributable to the State."

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private prison pest control contractors who do not act under color of state law.

Buchanan v. Pfister · filed 2018-10-01

The Court finds that Critter Ridder and Funk cannot be sued under the Civil Rights Act because they are not state actors. In order to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must have both (a) acted under color of state law and (b) violated a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by someone acting under color of state law.

Jones v. Boston Center for Addictive Behaviors · filed 2018-10-26

A plaintiff, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show not only that “some person deprived [him] of a federal right,” but also that “such person ‘acted under color of state or territorial law.’” Grapentine v. Pawtucket Credit Union, 755 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 2014). As the Boston Center is a private facility (owned by Lahey Clinic), there is no state action and the Federal Civil Rights Act does not apply.

A Section 1983 claim may survive summary judgment when the evidence supports attributing a private party's conduct to the government under the nexus test.

Jackson v. Curry Cnty. · filed 2018-11-01

As set forth herein, the Court finds that, under the analysis set forth in Gallagher of the nexus test, there is sufficient evidence of state action to overcome Curry County Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion.

Section 1983 does not permit constitutional claims against a criminal defense attorney performing traditional counsel functions because the attorney is not a state actor.

In re Keyes · filed 2018-11-02

Keyes, however, cannot maintain her constitutional claims against Groder because he is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private residential care facility when its care of children in state custody makes it a state actor.

Woods v. Maryville Academy · filed 2018-11-19

The Court can reasonably infer a close nexus between the two entities such that Maryville’s actions may be fairly treated as the State’s.

Section 1983 treats operators of charter schools as state actors.

Patrick v. Success Acad. Charter Sch., Inc. · filed 2018-12-14

As operators of charter schools, the Success Academy Defendants are state actors for purposes of Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; allegations of private misconduct alone do not establish state action.

Dixit v. Singh · filed 2018-12-18

Those allegations fail to establish that Tanya, the Singhs, or Golden were state actors.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private parties to plead state action involving those parties and state actors.

Waad v. Farmers Ins. Exchange · filed 2019-01-30

Plaintiffs failed to plead state action between private and state actors, a basic element of any § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a claim against a private party who is not a state actor fails.

Lazarre v. Belizaire · filed 2019-01-31

To the extent Plaintiff complains of the violation of his civil rights, the complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Defendant is a private party and not a state actor.

A private party’s use of a state pooling order process does not make it a state actor under § 1983 without significant assistance from state officials.

Kerns v. Chesapeake Exploration · filed 2019-02-04

Chesapeake’s “mere use” of the state’s pooling order process “without the ‘overt, significant assistance of state officials’” does not transform it into a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a bail bondsman who acts without assistance or direction from a public official and is therefore not a state actor.

Vance v. Lightner · filed 2019-02-05

Accordingly, Lightner was not a state actor for purposes of Section 1983 and the action against him should be dismissed.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions is not a state actor subject to § 1983 liability.

Bressi v. Gembic · filed 2019-02-08

Next, Kay is not a state actor against whom Bressi can bring § 1983 claims under these circumstances.

A § 1983 claim alleging that private parties conspired with judges requires specific facts showing agreement and concerted action; a judge’s acceptance of a party’s arguments does not suffice.

Jiricko v. Frankenburg Jensen Law Firm · filed 2019-02-22

The mere fact that a judge agreed with one party’s legal arguments is not collusion. Since Jiricko failed to offer the required specific factual allegations, he failed to state a § 1983 claim against the Frankenburg Defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private entity whose challenged conduct is not fairly attributable to the state.

La. Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans v. City of Natchitoches · filed 2019-02-28

There is simply no evidence before the court that HDBA was a state actor. Accordingly, as it is a private entity which did not engage in state action, the claims against it lack merit and must be dismissed.

A § 1983 claim against private attorneys requires a showing that they acted as state actors.

Bush v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2019-03-13

Moreover, and notably, Bush failed to show how his private attorneys could be considered state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 ordinarily does not make private citizens liable for their presence during the execution of a search warrant because they are not state actors.

Advanced Bldg. & Fabrication, Inc. v. Cal. Highway Patrol · filed 2019-03-13

In fact, his liability under § 1983 is premised on this very distinction: private citizens (like reporters) are not ordinarily liable under § 1983 for their presence during the execution of a search warrant because they are not state actors.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against a private university that is not a state actor.

Doe v. Univ. of Dayton · filed 2019-03-15

As a preliminary matter, we note that Doe concedes that Dayton, a private university, is not a state actor. Dayton is therefore not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 305 (2001), and whether the procedures employed in Doe’s hearing would constitute due process of law is not before us.

Section 1983 requires state action; state regulation alone does not make a private party a state actor.

Brino v. JFK Medical Center Limited Partnership · filed 2019-03-21

Both Bivens and § 1983 claims have governmental action as one of their elements, see Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, ... Quite simply, the “mere fact that a State regulates a private party is not sufficient to make that party a State actor.”

A physician who examines a child for suspected abuse and reports her medical opinion is not a state actor under § 1983 when the evidence does not show state control or joint participation in that conduct.

A.L. v. Eichman · filed 2019-03-26

The evidence of record fails to establish that Dr. Eichman was acting under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; thus, Plaintiffs' constitutional claims fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants to show that the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., Inc. · filed 2019-03-28

As the defendants in this matter are not public officials, but rather private individuals or organizations, plaintiffs have to show that the "allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State." Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50, 119 S.Ct. 977.

An attorney representing a plaintiff, whether public or private, is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Fishinghawk v. Kissinger · filed 2019-04-03

Finally, defendant Jackson, as Mr. Fishinghawk’s attorney, whether public or private, was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 and thus was not subject to suit under that statute.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not reach conduct by private entities acting without it.

Phan v. Colorado Legal Services · filed 2019-04-16

Section 1983 requires state action, and Phan has not alleged any—Patterson & Slag, P.C., Bachus & Schanker, LLC, Luke Medical Center, and Concentra are all private, non-state entities and thus Phan’s § 1983 claims against them are legally frivolous.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private party solely because the state regulates or funds it.

Ward v. Lutheran Medical Center · filed 2019-04-23

State regulation and government funding are not enough for liability.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant who uses a state actor to bring about unconstitutional action to share a common and unconstitutional goal with that actor.

Uppole v. Graham · filed 2019-04-23

It is insufficient under § 1983 to allege that a private defendant used a state actor like a police officer to bring about unconstitutional action, such as by filing a false report with law enforcement—both the private and state actor must have shared “a common and unconstitutional goal.”

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a private defendant acted as a state actor or conspired with state actors.

Deem v. DiMella-Deem · filed 2019-05-02

Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that DiMella-Deem and Eichen were state actors, or that they conspired with state actors, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for civil rights violations against DiMella-Deem and Eichen.

Section 1983 does not make private criminal defense counsel liable absent circumstances showing concerted action with the state.

Cardell Hill v. The City of New York · filed 2019-05-21

As Defendants LAS, Ahmed, and Lacey are private parties who do not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these defendants under § 1983, and the Court dismisses these defendants with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on a private party that does not act under color of state law.

Bey v. Magnolia Bakery Corp. · filed 2019-05-21

Private parties are not generally liable under the statute. ... Second, Defendant is a private party who does not work for any state or other government body, and Plaintiff does not allege otherwise.

Section 1983 does not treat a private corporation as a state actor merely because it is incorporated under state law.

Favourite v. 55 Halley St., Inc. · filed 2019-05-23

Although 55 Halley St. Inc. is incorporated by the laws of the state of New York, such conduct is insufficient to deem it a state actor under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private therapy provider does not become one merely because the state pays for its services and it collaborates with a public school.

M. J. G. v. Philadelphia School District · filed 2019-05-30

Because Carson Valley is not a state actor, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a civil rights claim against a private corporation that is not a state actor.

Spice v. General Motors Fort Wayne Assembly · filed 2019-07-03

This claim is not cognizable since “there is no right of action against Defendant for violating Plaintiff’s civil rights because it is a private entity and not a state actor.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a plaintiff cannot use it to seek redress from defendants who are not state actors.

Harley v. Streamlicensing Networks LLC · filed 2019-07-03

But because the defendants are not state actors, she cannot seek redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 the statute under which constitutional claims are generally brought.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant was a state actor or that the challenged conduct was fairly attributable to the state.

Fareed v. Blackmon · filed 2019-07-10

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege that the Defendant was a state actor or explain how his alleged actions are fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 permits claims only against defendants acting under color of state law.

Malcolm v. Ass'n of Supervisors & Adm'rs of Rochester · filed 2019-07-11

ASAR, Cliby and Rowe are not state actors and therefore cannot be held liable under § 1983 or the NYS Constitution, as Cliby and Rowe are private citizens and ASAR is an unincorporated association.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on a private corporation unless its conduct is attributable to the state.

Dipp-Paz v. Facebook · filed 2019-07-12

Facebook is a private corporation, and Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that Facebook’s actions are attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; claims against private parties without alleged state action and against federal actors fail.

Wiley v. Vea · filed 2019-07-17

Even liberally construed, the Complaint fails to allege any facts to show that any of these private parties met one of the four tests identifying state action, or is otherwise a state actor. And the remaining Defendants, the VA, the VHVD, and Dahlberg are federal, not state, actors. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against any of these Defendants, such claims fail.

Section 1983 does not support constitutional claims against defendants who are not state actors.

Smalls v. Riviera Towers Corp · filed 2019-08-02

We agree with the District Court that: (1) there is no private right of action under the criminal statutes named by Smalls, see Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1981) (per curiam); (2) the defendants in question are not “state actors” for purposes of constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2010); (3) her claims of conspiracy were vague and conclusory, see id. at 177-78; and (4) her claims are also time-barred, see Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that in federal suits in New Jersey, § 1983 claim is governed by New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations).

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; an attorney does not become one merely by participating in court proceedings.

Sowell v. Southbury-Middlebury Youth and Family Services, Inc. · filed 2019-08-05

Although plaintiffs claim that the law firm defendants exercised the authority of the court system when they obtained the protective order against them, an attorney’s participation in the court system does not transform an attorney into a state actor for purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires plausible allegations of state action; unfavorable judicial rulings alone do not show that private counsel conspired with a judge.

Lucero v. Koncilja · filed 2019-08-06

But these allegations do not suggest a nexus or shared conspiratorial objective between the firm and the state court judge. Nor is there any inference that they agreed or even acted in concert to violate Mr. Lucero’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. We therefore agree with the district court that Mr. Lucero failed to plausibly allege state action.

Section 1983 requires the defendant’s conduct to be attributable to the state.

Robinson v. Eatherton · filed 2019-08-06

Second, Plaintiff cannot pursue relief against Lorilea Frank in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he fails to allege that Frank is a state actor or that her conduct is attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private party’s conduct must have a sufficient connection to the state and the alleged deprivation.

Doe v. North Homes, Inc. · filed 2019-08-09

It is well-established that only state actors may be held liable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat pursuing an unlawful detainer case, by itself, as state action.

Cruz v. Kharazi · filed 2019-08-12

Pursuing an unlawful detainer case, on its own, does not constitute state action for purposes of § 1983, See Damian v. N. Neon Operations, LLC, No. C 11-06416 DMR, 2012 WL 1438705, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2012), and prosecuting an unlawful detainer act is “indisputably” protected activity within the meaning of the Anti-SLAPP statute.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private defendants to plead facts showing that their conduct is attributable to the state.

Koso v. St. Josephs Senior Housing Village · filed 2019-08-14

However, Plaintiff has not adequately pled state action. ... Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against Defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant was a state actor.

Barbero v. Wilhoit Property Management, Inc. · filed 2019-08-15

Count 10 fails because Plaintiff does not allege she suffered a constitutional deprivation nor does she allege Defendant Wilhoit is a state actor. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires sufficient facts showing that private defendants acted as state actors before they can be held liable.

Ashbaugh v. Wagner · filed 2019-08-16

In addition, Plaintiff fails to assert sufficient facts to determine whether any of the defendants, a private corporation and two of its employees, is subject to liability under § 1983 as a state actor.

Section 1983 does not make a private creditor’s misuse of state court collection procedures state action when the conduct cannot be attributed to the State.

Bugg v. Midland Funding, LLC · filed 2019-08-19

Assuming Midland did invoke state law collection procedures without the grounds to do so or that Midland misrepresented the grounds, Midland’s actions can in no way be attributed to a State rule or State decision.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted as a state actor.

Genao v. Harriet Tubman P.S. 154 · filed 2019-08-19

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining § 1983 claims against Guanilo because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that Guanilo has acted as a state actor when violating his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private university does not become a state actor by investigating and disciplining a student under its Title IX policies.

Doe v. University of Denver · filed 2019-08-20

The same reasoning applies to a university disciplining its students. Because plaintiff cannot establish a genuine factual dispute as to whether DU is a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s due process claim.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against a private hospital or its employees when the alleged facts do not make them state actors.

Mehmood v. Guerra · filed 2019-08-26

Based on the facts alleged here, the hospital and its employees are private parties not subject to suit under § 1983 or Bivens.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s challenged conduct to qualify as state action under the compulsion, joint action, or public function test.

D.W.M v. St. Mary School · filed 2019-08-27

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the allegations in the Fifth Amended Complaint are insufficient to support that there has been state action under any of the three tests. Accordingly, the School Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is granted.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private company’s receipt of government tax credits to pay employees does not make its conduct state action.

Khalid v. Microsoft Corporation · filed 2019-09-04

Moreover, merely receiving tax credits does not intertwine Microsoft and the public sector to the point where Microsoft’s actions are effectively the government’s.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is sufficiently pleaded when a prisoner alleges that the prison’s head doctor denied prescribed treatment.

Moy v. DeParlos · filed 2019-09-05

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Moy, the court concludes that Moy adequately alleges that Dr. Keenan is a state actor. The motion to dismiss Dr. Keenan on state action grounds will be denied.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under color of state law caused a deprivation of federal rights.

Fairchild v. Fairchild · filed 2019-09-10

To establish entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must not only allege a constitutional violation but must establish that it was “caused by a person acting under the color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against an inmate fails when the complaint alleges no connection between his conduct and the state.

Salaam v. Williams · filed 2019-09-16

Plaintiff has not alleged any nexus between the State of New York and the alleged wrongdoing by defendant Williams, nor has he alleged any facts which plausibly suggest that defendant Williams violated his constitutional rights, or any of his rights under Federal law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Aikens v. Mecklenburg County · filed 2019-09-17

Plaintiff fails to state any facts whatsoever that would demonstrate that these private parties were state actors and violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; private charities, retailers, and medical providers are not state actors merely by virtue of those roles.

CHARLES v. HOPE CAFFAE/COFFEE SHOP · filed 2019-09-18

None of the named Defendants appears to be a “state actor” subject to liability under § 1983. Rather, all Defendants appear to be private charities, retailers or medical providers.

Section 1983 claims are unavailable against federal defendants because the section requires state action.

Mattox v. Memphis Police Department · filed 2019-09-19

Section 1983 claims are unavailable against federal defendants due to that section’s state action requirement.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private corporation to allege facts showing that the corporation acted under color of state law.

Iyonsi v. Wal-Mart Incorporated · filed 2019-09-23

Even liberally construed, the Complaint fails to allege any facts to show that Wal-Mart met any of the four tests identifying state action, or is otherwise a state actor. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims for violation of constitutional rights, such claims fail.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a guardian ad litem who is not a state actor.

Campbell v. Bennett · filed 2019-09-23

Although the public function test and nexus/joint function test can be used to determine whether a private party qualifies as a state actor, it has been established that guardian ad litem are not state actors. ... Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant, Bennett, because Bennett is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; isolated medical assistance with a warranted search does not suffice.

Shaw v. Gordon · filed 2019-09-24

At most, Shaw alleges that they performed a transitory and isolated medical function that assisted Antoniak and Maduscha in executing a search warrant. This is not enough for liability to attach under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private defense attorney absent facts showing concerted action with a state representative.

Cantero v. Russo · filed 2019-09-24

As Defendant Carle is a private party who does not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against this defendant under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private defendant to allege facts showing that the defendant’s conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Best v. DiTech Holdings Corporation · filed 2019-09-26

Specifically, Plaintiff again fails to allege facts to establish that DiTech’s relevant conduct may be fairly attributable to the state as required to sustain a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against a private company fails when no state action is alleged.

Bumpass v. Verizon Wireless · filed 2019-09-27

However, Ms. Bumpass sues only Verizon; she makes no allegation of state action. As a result, the Court dismisses with prejudice her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Sprole v. State of New York · filed 2019-09-27

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that show R. Sprole, Martin, Jagel, Alderman, and Kirby are state actors, and all five Defendants attest that they are not state actors. ... Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against R. Sprole, Martin, Jagel, Alderman, and Kirby must therefore be dismissed for this reason as well.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant’s challenged conduct is attributable to the government.

Escalera v. Samaritan Village Men's Shelter · filed 2019-09-27

Plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against the Samaritan Village Homeless Shelter and shelter counsel Nelson Brown, but he does not assert facts suggesting that the actions of either of these defendants — a private homeless shelter and a shelter employee — are attributable to the government. For this reason, Plaintiff does not state a claim under § 1983 against these Defendants.

Section 1983 does not cover attorneys performing traditional defense counsel functions because they are not state actors.

Whitehead v. Schmid · filed 2005-09-12

Even if Whitehead ... had identified an attorney, this claim would fail under § 1983 because attorneys performing traditional defense counsel functions are not “state actors.”

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law; a bare assertion that it received federal funds is insufficient.

Rose v. Emergency Medical Training Processional, LLC · filed 2019-09-30

This threadbare assertion fails to sufficiently allege an essential element of a § 1983 claim—that Defendants were state actors—and offers the Court no basis for finding that the Defendants’ actions can be “fairly attributable” to the state.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor.

Micks-Harm v. Nichols · filed 2019-09-30

Defendant IPC is not a state actor and therefore any § 1983 claim against it must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law.

Starker v. Adamovych · filed 2019-09-30

Moreover, his § 1983 claim against her fails for the additional and more salient reason that Adamovych is not a state actor.

Private defendants can satisfy § 1983’s state action requirement when the complaint sufficiently alleges that they enforced a state law authorizing the challenged agency shop arrangement.

LaSpina v. SEIU Pennsylvania State Council · filed 2019-09-30

Therefore, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Local 668 and SPL were state actors and her claims against them under §1983 will not be dismissed on this basis pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 requires state action; conclusory allegations that a private attorney conspired with a judge do not establish it.

Lucero v. Gordon · filed 2019-10-01

“To state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . , the challenged conduct must constitute state action.” ... Because Mr. Lucero failed to plausibly allege state action, the district court correctly dismissed the claim.

Section 1983 requires plausible facts showing that a private defendant’s conduct is attributable to the state.

C. P. v. Doe · filed 2019-10-01

The Plaintiff has made no allegation that these Defendants have a sufficiently close relationship with state actors such that the Court could conclude that they were engaged in governmental action. As such, the Plaintiff has no basis to assert a § 1983 claim in this case against Defendants MHI and John Doe.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private retailers that are not state actors.

CHARLES v. GREEN STREET COFFEE CO. · filed 2019-10-04

As alleged, Green Street Coffee and Saxbys are private retailers and are therefore not “state actors” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that the defendant is a state actor; a party committee’s internal candidate screening does not qualify when it performs no public electoral function.

Jacobson v. Kings County Democratic County Committee · filed 2019-10-08

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the party charged with the deprivation of a federal right “be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” ... We, like the district court, conclude that Jacobson has not alleged facts to show that the KCDCC or the JSC is a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s alleged conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; statements about working closely with county officials do not suffice.

Evans v. Richardson · filed 2019-10-09

Assuming Defendant Jefferson made the statements alleged in Plaintiff’s Objections, these statements do not rise to the level of conduct contemplated by the Supreme Court in Lugar to allow suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties who did not act under color of state law.

GRAY v. HAGNER · filed 2019-10-10

As far as the Court can discern, both Lori Batten and McDonald’s are private parties who should not be subject to liability under § 1983.