42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires conduct causing the deprivation of a federal right to be fairly attributable to the state.

Ewing v. Dennis Auto Plaza and City of Olathe Police Department · filed 1993-05-06

"It is axiomatic that, in order to maintain a civil rights action, the 'conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to the state.' " Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Ass'n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1163 (10th Cir.1986) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). We agree with the district court that Mr. Ewing failed to allege this essential element of his claim against Defendant-appellee Dennis Auto Plaza.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private party is liable only if it conspires with state actors to violate constitutional rights.

Luckett v. Rosenthal · filed 1993-05-21

A private party is liable under section 1983 only if that party has conspired with state actors to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires state action and provides no remedy against private citizens who are not state actors.

Vernon v. Marriott Hotel of Albuquerque · filed 1993-05-27

Plaintiff fails to perceive that no remedy under § 1983 exists in federal court against private citizens. Plaintiff recognizes in his brief that none of the defendants are state actors. Without state action, the § 1983 claim must necessarily be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor; a homeowners’ association that is not a state actor cannot be liable under it.

Rehfuss v. Northpoint Homeowner's Association · filed 1993-06-15

Even if Rehfuss could articulate some violation of a protected right, it is clear that Northpointe is not a state actor, and therefore, no jurisdiction exists. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988) (defendant must be state actor for plaintiff to state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1047-48 (defendant not acting under color of state law; no liability under section 1983).

Section 1983's state-action requirement is not satisfied by claims against private actors without factual allegations supporting conspiracy or joint participation with state officials.

Olson v. Coleman · filed 1993-06-22

The court explained further that the “state action” requirement of § 1983 had not been met because Olson failed to allege any factual basis to support conspiracy or joint participation between the private actors and state officials. Upon review of the record, we find no basis for reversing the district court.

A private hospital does not become a state actor subject to § 1983 solely because it receives Medicare and Medicaid funds and is subject to state regulation.

Wheat v. Mass · filed 1993-06-29

Ochsner is not a state actor, and cannot be considered as such solely because it receives medicare and medicaid funds and is subject to state regulation.

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Danese v. Knox · filed 1993-07-06

The Port Authority is a state actor for the purposes of § 1983.

A claim under section 1983 requires allegations that the defendants were state actors and deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Howard v. Frank Roesch David Bigeleisen California State Bar Lucy Kelly McCabe Judge S.F. Superior Court Jerry Ha · filed 1993-07-13

The district court also properly dismissed Howard's claims against Bigeleisen and Hauser for failure to allege that Bigeleisen and Hauser they were state actors for purposes of section 1983 and for failure to allege deprivation of a federally protected right.

For a § 1983 claim, authenticated time records disputing an officer’s denial that he was on duty require the court on summary judgment to assume that he was on duty and that the state-action requirement was satisfied.

Dobiecki v. Palacios · filed 1993-07-15

On the motion for summary judgment, however, plaintiffs reliance on the authenticated time records creates a factual dispute as to whether Palacios was on duty at the time of the arrest. On defendants’ motions for summary judgment, it must be assumed that Palacios was on duty and, therefore, that the state action requirement was satisfied.

North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services and its attorneys are not state actors amenable to suit under Section 1983.

Rocky James BRYANT v. NORTH CAROLINA PRISONER LEGAL SERVICES · filed 1993-08-02

In No. 93-6563, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint because NCPLS and its attorneys are not state actors amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a complaint must be dismissed when state action is not alleged and is found lacking.

Sampson v. Village Discount Outlet, Inc. · filed 1993-08-11

State action is an essential jurisdictional predicate under § 1983, and accordingly, if state action is not alleged and is found lacking, the complaint must be dismissed.

A claim under Section 1983 is deficient if the plaintiff fails to allege that the challenged actions were taken under color of state law.

McNeil v. Aguilos · filed 1993-09-16

Any claim that plaintiff has brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is deficient because she has failed to allege that the actions complained of were under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires that the challenged conduct be fairly attributable to the state or taken under color of state law.

Corethers v. Atlas Bonding Company · filed 1993-10-07

Corethers's action may not survive in federal court, because he has not shown that the defendants' conduct is fairly attributable to the state or that their actions were taken under "color of state law."

Section 1983 does not reach a city prosecutor's private conduct outside his prosecutorial responsibilities, and a municipal claim requires facts supporting a policy, custom or practice that could have caused the injury.

Bilder v. City of Akron Thomas Dicaudo · filed 1993-10-06

Thus, although DiCaudo is a public employee, he acted as a private individual and was not exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law. Inasmuch as DiCaudo was not acting under color of state law, plaintiff cannot state a claim against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... In order to establish a claim for relief under § 1983 against the City of Akron, plaintiff must allege some policy, custom or practice attributable to the city, that could have caused his alleged injury. ... Plaintiff offers only the conclusory allegation that the City of Akron negligently hired and trained Thomas DiCaudo. He offers no fact or facts tending to support his allegation.

Section 1983 requires a private attorney’s alleged conspiracy to involve a state actor, and a guardian ad litem whose limited role is to independently represent a minor’s interests is not a state actor.

Snyder v. Talbot · filed 1993-10-15

Based on this restrictive and independent role, the GAL is likewise not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. ... Based on this Court’s finding that the GAL is not a state actor, as well as the absence of any allegation of conspiracy or agreement reached between Defendant and the state court judge, the Complaint fails to allege any set of facts that would entitle Plaintiff to relief under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a private consumer reporting agency does not act under color of state law merely by complying with the FCRA.

Wiggins v. Equifax Services, Inc. · filed 1993-10-21

It is, of course, well established that state action is an essential element of an action under section 1983. ... In this case, there is no allegation, nor could there be, that ESI acted under color of state law. ... The FCRA is regulatory in nature and does not vest the reporting agencies with state or governmental powers.

A claim under § 1983 requires allegations that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Morgan v. Carolyn Harden, Store Director of the Division Fred Meyer, Inc., Kk & K, Inc. · filed 1993-10-25

He had no 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action because he failed to allege the essential element that the defendants acted under color of state law. The facts he did allege cannot be construed to supply the deficiency.

For purposes of Section 1983, a presidential candidate selection committee acts under color of state law when the state creates it and empowers it to exclude candidates from a presidential primary ballot.

Duke v. Cleland · filed 1993-10-29

The Committee is a creature of state law and its actions are attributable to the state. ... When as here the state empowers its officials to exclude presidential aspirants from the presidential primary ballot, the power exercised is directly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not reach purely private conduct without allegations of state action.

Pillis v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1993-11-17

As stated, a valid claim under this section requires a showing of state action and a claim for violation of this section proscribing deprivation of rights under color of state law is not stated, in absence of allegations of any action under color of state law.

A court clerk's ministerial acceptance and filing of settlement documents does not supply the state action required for a Section 1983 conspiracy claim.

Gaskell v. Weir · filed 1993-11-22

In performing the ministerial act of accepting and filing the settlement documents, the court clerk, S.L. Weir, did not provide "significant assistance" to the alleged conspiracy. To hold otherwise would import "state action" into private acts where the state actor plays nothing more than a ministerial role.

Privately retained counsel do not act under color of state law when defending a lawsuit and therefore cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for that conduct.

Sweet v. John Daly Glen E. Tucker Robert G. Clark Jean Stone Mark Connely Rodell Fick · filed 1993-11-24

Conduct of privately retained counsel in defending a lawsuit does not constitute state action. Sinclair v. Spatocco, 452 F.2d 1213, 1213 (9th Cir.1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886 (1972); See also Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam). Hence, it was not error for the district court to dismiss Sweet's first cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action, which the Postmaster General's acts do not constitute.

Arditi v. Anthony M. Frank, Postmaster General · filed 1993-12-02

The district court correctly found that the Postmaster General's acts cannot constitute "state action" in order for a claim to be established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

For a guardianship decision authorizing involuntary sterilization, authority derived from state law constitutes action under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Michigan Protection & Advocacy Service v. Kirkendall · filed 1993-12-09

It must be noted that, for purposes of this case, there is at least one critical difference between a guardian and a parent; that is, because the authority of a guardian derives from state law, a guardian necessarily acts under color of state law whereas a parent may not. Thus, the actions of a guatdian may be held to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where the actions of a parent might not.

A § 1983 claim against a volunteer fire company requires a finding that the company acted under state law; a jury finding against state action defeats the claim.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun · filed 1994-01-07

After remand, the two governing issues (without a favorable finding on which plaintiff could not maintain her federal claims) were separated for trial, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). ... At the end of the trial, a special verdict form was submitted to the jury, asking for its findings, yes or no, on the questions of whether the plaintiff was an employee of the fire company and whether it acted under state.law. After a little more than two hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants on both issues submitted..

Section 1983 does not impose liability on attorneys merely for representing clients in private litigation, even when the attorneys are court-appointed.

Ortman v. State of Mich. · filed 1994-01-18

Simply providing legal representation in private litigation does not constitute state action for purposes of liability under Sec. 1983, even if the attorneys were court-appointed.

Section 1983 treats a state-created presidential candidate selection committee’s reconsideration of ballot access as state action when state law gives the committee authority to decide which candidates appear on the ballot.

Duke v. Smith · filed 1994-02-03

Rather, because the Florida legislature has given the Committee power to "declare [during the reconsideration process] who is fit to run, and who, by extension is fit to govern," Duke II at 1404, we are bound by the new precedent in this Circuit and hold that the procedures outlined in Sec. 103.101(2)(c) constitute state action.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is satisfied when a state-created committee exercises statutory authority to make final decisions about access to a presidential primary ballot.

Duke v. Smith · filed 1994-02-03

Having satisfied the first prong of the § 1983 analysis by finding state action, we now turn to the second prong to determine whether the Plaintiffs suffered a deprivation of any constitutional right, privilege or immunity through the Committee’s application of the reconsideration procedure outlined by § 103.101(2)(e).

Section 1983 requires state action; private conduct alone does not support a claim.

Wollman v. Poinsett Hutterian Brethren, Inc. · filed 1994-02-25

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to allege an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment acts as a shield only against state action, but provides no protection against private conduct “no matter how unfair that conduct may be.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an attorney merely because he is an officer of the court; the attorney must be a state actor.

Sigler v. George W. Twyford Thomas M. Tyack Jay Sanford · filed 1994-03-04

The complaint was also properly dismissed as to the attorney, as he is not a state actor subject to liability under Sec. 1983, in spite of Sigler's argument that he is an officer of the court.

Allegations that a private security guard processed an arrest at a police department may establish the state action needed for a § 1983 claim.

McFadden v. Grand Union · filed 1994-03-04

Plaintiff has responded to the second question raised by the February 18 memorandum order, alleging that the security guard hired by the Grand Union (now dropped from the federal litigation) both arrested plaintiff for misconduct at the store, and also processed plaintiffs arrest at the Ramapo Police Department “only minutes later,” thereby potentially establishing state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Absent police personnel or departmental involvement, no state action necessary to support a federal claim would exist.

Section 1983 requires evidence of state action when a plaintiff challenges a private racetrack’s refusal to grant racing privileges; an unsupported claim that other tracks followed the refusal does not suffice.

Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp. · filed 1994-03-14

We find not only that he has failed to make any colorable support for his claim of universal state exclusion but that, indeed, the uncontested facts are to the contrary.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; court-appointed defense counsel performing traditional lawyer functions is not a state actor.

Bombliss v. County of Lee · filed 1994-04-06

With respect to Bombliss' court-appointed counsel, Carol P. Linkowski, we find that she is not a state actor for purposes of Sec. 1983; she was performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). Because Sec. 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor, all of Bombliss' claims against Linkowski for legal malpractice must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person as a state actor merely because the person acts under a court order authorized by state law.

Goetz v. Tordoff · filed 1994-04-13

Action on the part of a private person pursuant to a court order made with the authority of a state statute is not sufficient to characterize the person as a state actor.

Allegations that city officials authorized private destruction of property and sent an officer to supervise it sufficiently plead state action under § 1983.

Lynda Loie Paxton Stephen R. Blanchard, Esq. v. Oxnard Police Dept. · filed 1994-04-22

Appellants have sufficiently alleged state action to survive a motion to dismiss. Paxton and Blanchard allege that prior to October 24, Gillig or Gillig's staff reviewed the CC & R's and informed members of the Association that the signs could be removed. They also allege that Gillig told Officer Devorik that the Association had the right to enter Appellant-Paxton's yard and destroy Paxton's sign. Devorik thereafter dispatched Officer Schmalhofer to Paxton's house to supervise the destruction. At the scene, Schmalhofer told a resident of Paxton's property that the Association had the right to paint over the sign. See Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir.1983) (police participation in an unlawful eviction gave rise to state action under Sec. 1983).

Section 1983 requires state action for a claim that a defendant deprived a plaintiff of equal protection of the laws.

Wiggins v. Hitchens · filed 1994-05-13

However, section 1983 requires that the action taken to deprive plaintiff of equal protection of the laws involve some state action. No state action is alleged in this case. Plaintiff Wiggins’ 1983 claim is without merit.

Section 1983 does not reach a private accreditor’s withdrawal of a medical residency program’s accreditation when the decision is not fairly attributable to the state.

McKeesport Hospital v. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education · filed 1994-05-17

We conclude on the undisputed facts of this ease that the ACGME’s withdrawal of the program’s accreditation was not state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim arising solely from federal agency conduct cannot proceed under it.

Carpenter v. Department of Energy and Office of Personnel Management · filed 1994-05-20

A damages claim for invasion of privacy likewise cannot be maintained under Meyer, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4142-43, and Carpenter did not and could not allege any state action to bring his claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a showing of state action connected to the defendants’ conduct.

In re Broughton · filed 1994-05-24

Because Appellants failed to show any state action in connection with the actions of the Defendants, their claim under Sec. 1983 was properly dismissed.

Under § 1983, a volunteer fire department’s private ownership of its property can preclude the symbiotic relationship with the state needed to treat it as a state actor.

Goldstein v. The Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Company · filed 1994-05-31

Specifically, we hold first, on the authority of that case, that on the comparable evidentiary record we review in this one, no symbiotic relationship between Chestnut and the State of Maryland can be found as a matter of law. See Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 215. Here as in Haavistola, this volunteer fire department does not lease public property from the state, but owns it privately. As Haavistola pointed out, see id, this precludes finding the requisite symbiotic relationship to make Chestnut a state actor.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action but imposes no state-of-mind requirement beyond that required for the underlying constitutional violation.

Farmer v. Brennan · filed 1994-06-06

Section 1983, which merely provides a cause of action, “contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right.”

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor to support a civil rights claim.

Shrader v. NATIONAL ASS'N OF SECURITIES DEALERS · filed 1994-06-09

Likewise, the plaintiff's claims for civil rights relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would fail since no defendant is a state actor that would entitle the plaintiff to prosecute a claim for civil rights relief.

Section 1983 requires an allegation of state action to state a claim against private defendants.

Tinsley v. Moore Business Forms, Inc. Douglas Amyx, Individually Vernon Sanders, Individually · filed 1994-06-09

Specifically, Tinsley fails to state a cause of action under Sec. 1983 because he has not alleged any state action by the private-actor Defendants.

Section 1983 does not treat private attorneys as state actors merely because they litigate for clients in state court.

Jenkins v. Security Sav. Bank of Michigan · filed 1994-06-20

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for substantially the same reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum Opinion. ... Under well-settled law, an attorney does not become a state actor merely because he is litigating on behalf of a client in a state forum.

Section 1983 does not subject private defendants to suit when they are not state actors.

McDermott v. Robert Troll Lynch Lynch & Lynch Company · filed 1994-06-22

Nor did the court have diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332 as it appears all parties reside in Ohio, Schlomann, 720 F.2d at 21, and a civil rights claim was not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343 as the plaintiff does not adequately identify a denial of a constitutional right, id., and the private defendants clearly are not state actors that could subject them to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private party’s contract with a state agency alone does not establish a sufficient nexus to the state.

Fletcher v. State of Fla. · filed 1994-07-01

Actions of private parties under contract with a state agency do not provide a sufficient nexus for state action. Plaintiffs do not allege that the state coerced or significantly encouraged these private parties to separate the plaintiffs from each other, only that these and other defendants engaged in activities to show plaintiff Melinda Fletcher in a bad light.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private citizen who is not a state actor.

Rux v. Sarvis · filed 1994-08-08

Private citizens are not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 as "state actors."

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against private actors without it must be dismissed.

Whitehead v. AM International, Inc. · filed 1994-08-09

Any claim made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is stricken. State action is an essential jurisdictional predicate under § 1983, and lack thereof warrants dismissal of the claim.

Section 1983 permits a state-action claim based on a state statute that empowers private parties to engage in conduct violating constitutional rights; the state cannot avoid liability merely because private parties carry out the conduct.

Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School District · filed 1994-09-02

If this empowerment in all other respects oversteps the bounds of the Establishment Clause, the state may not escape liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by claiming that the school-prayer statute merely authorizes private parties to take these actions.

Section 1983 does not treat a private firm as a state actor merely because it sells a product to a prison.

Jackson v. Quartet Sales Fu Ming Electric Wire and Cable Company William Wayne Melvin Leonard · filed 1994-09-14

There is no indication that Quartet Sales was anything other than a private firm, and it did not become a state actor merely by selling the stinger to the prison.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private university insufficiently intertwined with the state does not meet that requirement.

J. Doe v. Harvard University · filed 1994-10-12

Doe's claims pursuant to Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act and those pursuant to the IDEA were both properly dismissed. This court has previously held that Harvard "is not a public institution, and is not sufficiently intertwined with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as to meet the 'state action' requirement for a Sec. 1983 cause of action." Rice v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 337 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982).

Section 1983 requires evidence of state action to sustain a claim.

Monroe v. AMI Hospitals of Texas, Inc. · filed 1994-10-31

Monroe also states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his constitutionally protected due process rights. Because there is no evidence of state action, this court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.

Retained counsel does not act under color of state law merely by representing a client, so that conduct does not support a § 1983 claim.

Tobin Don Lemmons, Also Known as Everett Melson v. Law Firm of Morris and Morris Fred v. Monochello and Denise Graham · filed 1994-11-01

The conduct of retained counsel does not rise to the level of state action within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action for a sexual harassment claim; a coworker’s harassment is not actionable without supervisory authority or another use of state authority.

NOLAND v. McADOO · filed 1994-11-02

Because plaintiff did not make such allegations here, however, the district court correctly determined that McAdoo's allegedly harassing conduct was not actionable until January 1990, when he became county assessor and, therefore, plaintiff's boss.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state; a privately retained attorney is not a state actor for this purpose.

Morris v. Harris Russo, Doctor, Individually and Severally · filed 1994-11-10

Although Morris contends that her privately retained attorney is considered a state actor, private attorneys are not considered state actors for the purposes of Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege state action.

Woods v. Mutual of Omaha · filed 1994-11-22

Woods failed to allege any state action as is required for suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a plaintiff who does not allege state action has not established a violation.

Bivins v. Jeffers Vet Supply · filed 1994-11-23

Plaintiff clearly has not established a violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as plaintiff has not alleged state action.

Section 1983 requires an allegation of state action to support a claim.

Thomas L. Driskill, Regina M. Driskill v. Charles Coward, Owner, Vend-A-Wash, Inc. Pauline Sufferidge · filed 1994-12-21

Driskill has alleged no state action as is required for filing under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not cover federal action, including a private party’s use of a federal district court to obtain an injunction.

Texaco Refining and Marketing Inc., a Delaware Corporation v. Davis · filed 1994-12-29

Even if Texaco could have been considered as acting under color of state law had it employed Oregon's state courts to obtain specific performance, here Texaco used the enforcement mechanisms of a federal district court. Because federal action is not actionable under section 1983, Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 n. 2 (1963); Dale-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir.1987), the district court properly dismissed Davis's section 1983 counterclaim.

Section 1983 does not treat a private festival organizer as a state actor merely because it obtains a permit to hold the event on public property.

United Auto Workers, Local 5285 v. Gaston Festivals, Incorporated · filed 1995-01-10

The possession of a permit to perform on public property what are ordinarily private functions does not convert the permit holder into a state actor.

Section 1983 requires state action; naked assertions of a conspiracy between defendants and a state prosecutor do not establish it.

Tyson v. Ernest Hinnant Richard W. Stroble · filed 1995-01-17

We note that Tyson's failure to make more than naked assertions of conspiracy between Defendants and the state prosecutor precludes a finding of the requisite state action under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 treats a private airport advertising contractor’s refusal to display an advertisement as state action when the city retains discretion to approve or reject advertisements.

Air Line Pilots Association, International and James F. Ritter v. Department of Aviation of the City of Chicago, City of · filed 1995-01-27

Even if we believed that this ultimate refusal to display the diorama was TMI’s alone, we would nevertheless find that the suppression of ALPA’s diorama constituted the requisite state action. The admitted discretion that the City enjoys in accepting and refusing various advertisements renders this particular refusal an act of the state.

Section 1983 requires state action; private entities are not subject to suit without allegations that they acted with official power.

Jones v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc. · filed 1995-02-01

The defendants are also correct in that Count II fails to allege any state action sufficient to sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendant network and broadcast corporations are purely private entities. There are no allegations in the Second Amended Verified Complaint that the defendants have been clothed with official power, and private actors are not, without more, subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state.

Burks v. Stein · filed 1995-02-16

Burks cannot maintain his Sec. 1983 action as he has not shown that the defendant's conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Private physicians and a private hospital do not act under color of state law under § 1983 merely by involuntarily committing a patient pursuant to a state statute that leaves the decision to private discretion.

Rick R. Ellison v. A.J. Garbarino, M.D. William M. Hogan, M.D. Stewart Bramson, M.D. Bruce Green, M.D. Peninsula Psychia · filed 1995-02-24

In light of the above, we find that plaintiff failed to meet his burden in regard to the three state action tests. First, the Tennessee statute does not compel or encourage private individuals to pursue involuntary commitment. Rather, the statute completely leaves this to the private individual’s discretion.

Section 1983 requires state action; public funding and regulation of a private nonprofit do not make its personnel decisions state action when the government does not control the organization or dictate those decisions.

Nichols v. Metropolitan Center For Independent Living, Inc. · filed 1995-03-14

Here, as in Rendell-Baker, the government does not control or dictate MCIL's personnel decisions, as confirmed by the State agency's response to Nichols's post-termination complaint. ... Thus, MCIL is not a state actor and Nichols's termination was not the result of state action.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is not satisfied by private foundations whose functions and ties to a public university do not make their employment decisions attributable to the state.

Davenport v. Casteen · filed 1995-03-16

The court also finds that Davenport’s termination implicates no property or liberty interests because he was employed and discharged by private foundations that lacked the essential purposes or nexus to satisfy the state action requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and also because Casteen and Copeland lacked the authority and the coercive power to terminate Davenport.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant acted under color of state law; a claim against a savings and loan fails when the plaintiff does not allege it is a state actor.

Semien v. First Fed S & L · filed 1995-03-30

Semien has not asserted that the savings and loan is a state actor, nor has he asserted any basis for diversity jurisdiction. ... Semien's claim has no basis in law or in fact, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing it as frivolous.

A volunteer fire company appointed and funded by a municipality to perform its fire protection duty is a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Mark v. Borough of Hatboro · filed 1995-03-31

It is apparent, then, that the Borough and Enterprise are intertwined to a great extent, that Enterprise depends in large part on the municipality for funding, and that through the granting of benefits and the appointing of Enterprise as a “duly appointed fire company,” the Borough actively encourages it to perform a municipal duty. In the circumstances, we hold that Enterprise is a state actor for purposes of this case.

Section 1983 has no independent state-of-mind requirement; the intent required for a claim depends on the underlying constitutional or statutory right.

Pink v. L.T. Lester P.J. Gurney · filed 1995-04-19

It is well-settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for the deprivation of federal constitutional and statutory rights under color of state law, contains no independent state-of-mind requirement. ... Rather, the requisite intent in a given case turns upon the standard necessary to establish a violation of the underlying constitutional or statutory right.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is not satisfied by a private tobacco manufacturer’s failure to label its products merely because Ohio labels tobacco products that the state produces.

Consumers of Ohio J. Casmere Shaba-Stubbs v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation · filed 1995-04-19

However, these allegations are not sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 has no independent state-of-mind requirement; the underlying constitutional right determines whether negligent conduct can support a claim.

Shaheed v. Winston · filed 1995-05-05

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the basis for the plaintiffs’ cause of action in this case, does not include an independent state-of-mind requirement. ... Thus, the Court must look to the underlying constitutional right to determine whether allegations of negligent deprivations will suffice to state a claim in any particular § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a means to review state agency action that is merely arbitrary and capricious.

Cornett v. Sheldon · filed 1995-08-08

A § 1983 action is not an appropriate means to review state agency action that is merely arbitrary and capricious.

State regulation alone does not make a private entity a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Barber v. Dale County Mental Health Center · filed 1995-08-23

That an entity is subject to state regulation does not make that entity a state actor for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against state actors, not federal actors.

Madden v. Runyon · filed 1995-08-30

Section 1983, however, only creates a cause of action against state, not federal, actors.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against private parties who are neither state actors nor acting under color of law.

Charles R. Williams Rhonda Barksdale Williams v. County of Riverside Victor Miceli, Judge Diane S. Brewer Ray O. Womack · filed 1995-09-15

Because these defendants were neither state actors nor acting under color of law, they are not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat private individuals’ efforts to incorporate a village as state action.

LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher · filed 1995-09-21

Accordingly, the district court did not err in instructing the jury that the individuals’ acts to have the Village incorporated did not constitute state action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking liability for a constitutional violation to show that the violation resulted from state action.

Leeds v. Meltz · filed 1995-09-28

To establish liability for constitutional violations under § 1983 it is essential that the plaintiff show that his rights were violated as a result of state action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a defendant that is not a state actor cannot be liable under it.

Smith v. Foote's Dixie Dandy, Inc. · filed 1995-09-29

Finding that the defendant is no state actor within the meaning of § 1983, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires state action; private initiative petitioners do not act under color of state law merely because a state court recognizes their ability to seek signatures on private property.

Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Casey · filed 1995-10-10

The defendants in this case are not state actors by virtue of the Oregon Court of Appeals' decision in Cargill, since Cargill is limited to its facts, allows Fred Meyer to limit solicitation of ballot signatures in front of his stores, and specifically states that Fred Meyer itself opened its properties by extending a broad invitation to the public. Oregon is not providing significant aid to the defendants; it is Fred Meyer and not the State of Oregon that created a public forum where defendants in this case solicited signatures. Fred Meyer has not alleged the requisite state action and thus has not stated a cognizable Sec. 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private party that is not alleged to have conspired with state officials or used state procedures does not satisfy that requirement.

Wilson v. "Hardcopy," · filed 1995-10-23

However, Wilson does not claim that the defendants conspired with state officials or made use of state procedures. Thus, Wilson has not satisfied the state action requirement, so his complaint fails to state a claim under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege state action or deprivation under color of state law.

Lawrence Aug Pulchin and Christina F. Pulchin v. Kenneth Kubsch, M.D. And John Blackburn · filed 1995-11-03

In order to state a claim under Sec. 1983, plaintiffs must allege state action or that the alleged deprivations were carried out under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; Crane v. Logli, 992 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 245 (1993). Plaintiffs do not do so.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a news organization that accompanies police during a search when its conduct is separate from the police activity and it does not act under color of state law.

Parker v. Clarke · filed 1995-11-06

In the Court's view, then, the conduct of the police and of the media personnel in this case were entirely separate and distinct, and cannot be characterized as joint activity. Because the Court concludes as a matter of law that KSDK did not act under color of state law, KSDK will be granted summary judgment as to Counts III and VII of the second amended complaint.

A § 1983 complaint against a private attorney must allege state action.

Nowicki v. Ullsvik · filed 1995-11-07

The district court properly found that Nowicki's original complaint failed to allege the requisite state action to support his Sec. 1983 claims against Krek.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant as a state actor based on conclusory allegations that she conspired with a court to deprive another of property.

Prophet v. Mary Lou Prophet and Tippecanoe County Superior Court · filed 1995-12-22

Hence, plaintiff's conclusory allegations that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his property fail to show that Mary is a state actor for purposes of a Sec. 1983 claim.

Section 1983 treats a private lessee’s restriction as state action when the lessee enforces a government policy compelled by its lease.

Hampton International Communications, Inc. v. Las Vegas Convention & Visitors Authority · filed 1996-01-17

Although the Defendant did not actually prohibit the Plaintiff from handbilling on Convention Center premises, it was by the LVCVA’s express authority as set forth in its lease and as proprietor of the Convention Center that tradeshow promoters acted. Interface and CES enforced the “no unauthorized handbilling” policy as required by the lease and with the authority granted by that lease. It is this close nexus between compelled government policy and the putative unconstitutional interference with speech that evidences state action.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not support claims against federal defendants for their federal conduct.

Schutterle v. United States · filed 1996-01-19

Section 1983 claims are unavailable against the named federal defendants6 in this suit due to that section's state action requirement.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not provide a claim against federal defendants acting solely in a federal capacity.

No. 95-2105 · filed 1996-01-19

Section 1983 claims are unavailable against the named federal defendants 6 in this suit due to that section's state action requirement.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against an attorney who is not a state actor.

Turner v. Mikula · filed 1996-01-24

In all other respects Appellant's claims against his attorney are not cognizable because the attorney was not a state actor.

Section 1983 treats a voluntary interscholastic athletic association with public schools among its members as a state actor.

Dennin Ex Rel. Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc. · filed 1996-01-26

Actions of voluntary interscholastic athletic associations, of which public schools comprise part of the membership, constitute state action.

Section 1983 does not treat a private bail bondsman as acting under color of state law merely because a state statute recognizes the bondsman’s power to arrest.

Hunt v. Steve Dement Bail Bonds, Inc. · filed 1996-02-12

This Court does not believe that Article 345(A) itself transforms a private bondsman’s actions into conduct that is chargeable to the state of Louisiana.

Section 1983 requires a defendant’s conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; a private corporation’s conduct does not qualify without a public function, state compulsion, or a sufficiently close nexus with the state.

Cotten v. General Motors Fisher-Body Division, Payroll Deduction U.S. Savings Bond · filed 1996-02-15

In order to be subject to suit under § 1983, a defendant's conduct must be fairly attributable to the state. ... Nothing in the record suggests that General Motors performs a public function, is compelled by the state to perform its business, or enjoys a close nexus with the state. Thus, any act or omission on the part of General Motors is not fairly attributable to the state, and Cotten cannot make the required showing to state a claim for relief pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a state-action claim when officers affirmatively aid a private repossession; officers who only keep the peace do not become state actors on that basis.

Marcus v. McCollum · filed 2004-12-30

These circuits are in agreement as to the law: officers are not state actors during a private repossession if they act only to keep the peace, but they cross the line if they affirmatively intervene to aid the repossessor. ... Plaintiffs have raised sufficient evidence of state action to defeat the summary judgment motion.

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital as a state actor merely because it serves the public and treats patients pursuant to federal and state law.

Connolly v. H.D. Goodall Hospital, Inc. · filed 2005-01-14

Merely because the Hospital serves the public and treats patients pursuant to federal and state law does not give rise to a public function for section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for Thirteenth Amendment violations only when the challenged conduct is by a state actor.

Bhagwanani v. Howard University · filed 2005-01-17

There is a private cause of action for violations of the Thirteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that avenue is confined to conduct by state actors.

Section 1983 permits a suit only against a state actor.

Wasko v. Moore · filed 2005-02-01

First, the defendant is not a state actor and, therefore, a suit under § 1983 cannot be maintained against him.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor.

Butler v. Rapides Foundation · filed 2005-02-07

First, Butler failed to establish the prima facie case regarding his state law intentional racial or age discrimination claims against Atchison personally, under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:332 & 51:2231 (West 1997), or his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because neither Defendant is a state actor.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state; a private animal control contractor’s employment decision does not qualify without a tie to state action.

Robbins v. Cloutier · filed 2005-02-07

To constitute state action, any defendant’s action must be fairly attributable to the state. ... Robbins’ allegations are insufficient to tie his employment to any state action.

Section 1983 requires a showing of state action.

Klimas v. Department of Treasury · filed 2005-02-11

Further, Klimas has not shown state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a school administration’s endorsement of student editors’ independent decision does not make the editors state actors.

Douglass Ex Rel. Douglass v. Londonderry School Board · filed 2005-02-14

Nor does the fact that the school’s administration may have endorsed the editors’ decision (indeed, fully agreed with and supported it), turn the student editors into state actors for purposes of this suit.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Bonner v. Union Pacific · filed 2005-02-14

The district court also properly granted summary judgment on Bonner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging his civil rights were violated when a Union Pacific investigator viewed a videotape confiscated during Bonner’s arrest, because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Agent Woolstenhulme is a state actor.

Section 1983 requires state action.

Wellings-Crispin v. Compitello · filed 2005-02-16

As to the civil rights claim, it is well established that an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be based on some state action.

Section 1983 permits claims against private physicians serving inmate populations as government contractors when their actions qualify as state action.

Johnson v. Karnes · filed 2005-02-25

Accordingly, we hold that Dr. Spagna’s actions relating to Johnson’s care qualify as state action for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor for a claim to proceed.

Moore v. Capital Region Workforce Development Board · filed 2005-02-28

However, there is no indication that CRWDB is a state actor as required for a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows claims against private parties who act jointly with state officials and does not require exhaustion of state remedies before filing.

Cramer v. Vitale · filed 2005-03-01

To require Plaintiff to exhaust state judicial remedies before proceeding on a 1983 claim is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in both Patsy and Williamson.

Section 1983 permits claims against state actors who deprive a person of constitutional rights, but police involvement in a private repossession is attributable to the state only when sufficiently enmeshed in the repossession.

Meyers v. Redwood City · filed 2005-03-09

The critical question in this case is whether the officers, who were plainly acting under color of state law, unlawfully facilitated Bruno’s efforts to repossess Meyers’s Lexus, thereby unreasonably seizing her car or depriving her of property without due process of law. Indeed, for purpose of this decision only, we may assume that Meyers suffered both the deprivation of her car without due process of law and the unreasonable seizure of her car. However, on this record, we conclude that the officers were not so enmeshed in effectuating the repossession that the deprivation and seizure of Meyers’s car is attributable to the state.

Section 1983 requires proof of state action; student editors exercising independent editorial judgment do not satisfy that element.

Douglass v. Londonderry School · filed 2005-03-17

Accordingly, defendants are entitled to judgment on plaintiff's § 1983 claims given his failure to establish state action, an essential element, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 1983 imposes liability only on state actors or those acting under color of state law.

Heghmann v. Rye, N H , et al. · filed 2005-03-18

He is also presumed at this point to understand the basic legal principle that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 attaches liability only to state actors, or those acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires state action; private parties do not become state actors merely because a state court adjudicated their dispute.

Schiavo Ex Rel. Schindler v. Schiavo · filed 2005-03-22

In order to succeed on either claim, however, Plaintiffs must establish that the Defendants were state actors. Plaintiffs’ claims fail because neither Defendant Schiavo nor Defendant Hospice are state actors. Moreover, the fact that the claims were adjudicated by a state court judge does not provide the requisite state action for purposes of the statute or the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a hospital that is not a state actor cannot be liable under it for its billing and collection practices.

Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hospital · filed 2005-03-29

Because, as Plaintiffs’ counsel well knows (having conceded at oral argument that this count should be dismissed, Tr. 45:6-8), there is no constitutional right to free health care and because the NYP Defendants are not state actors, ... this count is dismissed.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; a complaint that alleges no facts connecting the defendants’ actions to the state fails to state a claim.

Fiamengo v. Wadsworth · filed 2005-04-15

The court found that Berger was protected by absolute judicial immunity, id at *3, that Fiamengo had failed to “state that the actions of any defendant occurred as a result of a state-created right or rule of conduct or allege any facts that would suggest that the actions were even remotely attributable to the state or any state actor,” id, and that, in any event, Fiamengo had failed properly to invoke the court’s jurisdiction because all of the parties were citizens of Connecticut and because Fiamengo sought damages of $20,000, neither of which was sufficient to confer diversity jurisdiction, id at *4. ... Reviewing the district court’s dismissal de novo, Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001), we affirm for substantially the reasons stated in its Ruling and Order.

Section 1983 does not treat a guardian as acting under color of state law merely because a court supervises the guardianship.

Cummings v. Guardianship Services · filed 2005-04-18

Mere supervision by a superior court is not sufficient for a finding that an appointed guardian was acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private attorney whose actions are not attributable to the state.

Fiamengo v. Duffy · filed 2005-04-19

The District Court dismissed Fiamengo’s complaint in a ruling and order dated May 6, 2004, finding ... (3) that because Duffy is a private actor, and his actions are not attributable to the state, he cannot be held hable under § 1983. Because we find no error in the District Court’s analysis, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Fiamengo’s complaint and deny Fiamengo’s “motion for default judgment for [defendants’] failure to appear and failure to plead.”

Section 1983 requires state action and does not provide a claim for a Fifth Amendment due process violation based on federal action.

Edwards v. United States, Department of Energy · filed 2005-05-16

The Court found that the Plaintiffs' equal protection claim was actually a due process claim under the 5th Amendment, which is applicable only to the federal government. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot bring an equal protection claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant was a state actor or acted under color of state law.

Perry v. Gold & Laine, P.C. · filed 2005-05-25

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts any claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such claims are dismissed, because Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendant in this case is a state actor or that any Defendant here acted under color of state law.

A defendant who is not a state actor cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Foster v. JLG INDUSTRIES · filed 2005-06-06

To reiterate, Defendants are not state actors; therefore, Defendants cannot be held liable under §§ 1983 or 1985.

Section 1983 requires state action; private counsel is not subject to liability without it.

Horton v. Martin · filed 2005-06-07

George is not a state actor subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 enforces constitutional rights, requires state action, and a claim under it rises or falls with the underlying constitutional claims.

Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State · filed 2005-06-20

Section 1983 is a vehicle for enforcing constitutional rights, which presupposes state action ( see Tancredi v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 316 F3d 308 [2d Cir 2003] [no state action where a state-chartered mutual life insurance company reorganizes into a domestic stock life insurer under provisions of the Insurance Law]). Even if there were state action, plaintiffs' section 1983 claim rises or falls with its constitutional claims.

Section 1983 requires a state actor; claims against private attorneys fail when the plaintiff does not name one.

Sanders v. Cleannet of Southern California, Inc. · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly dismissed Sander’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against attorneys Krupp and Sepikas because Sanders failed to name a state actor.

A § 1983 claim against opposing counsel fails without proof that counsel was a state actor.

Schreiner v. Hulbert · filed 2005-06-22

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Schreiner’s claims against McCanna because Schreiner failed to prove McCanna was a state actor.

A § 1983 plaintiff must present sufficient evidence that the defendant may fairly be treated as a state actor.

Hager v. Ese · filed 2005-06-30

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the deprivation of a constitutional right as a result of a government policy; and (2) that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). Appellants have not presented this Court, or the District Court, with sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to either of these two requirements.

A private nursing home cannot be sued under § 1983 unless it qualifies as a state actor.

Mitchell v. Home · filed 2005-07-12

As a matter of law, plaintiff has failed to state a claim—under any of the three tests—that Victoria Home, a private not-for-profit corporation, was a state actor for purposes of the Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not treat a private school bus contractor as a state actor merely because it provides transportation that a school district must furnish.

Hamlin Ex Rel. Hamlin v. City of Peekskill Board of Education · filed 2005-07-13

The mere fact that a private party fulfills the school district’s obligation to provide transportation to school children does not convert the conduct of these parties into state action.

State regulation or funding of a county agricultural society alone does not establish the nexus required for state action under § 1983.

Farmer v. Pike County Agricultural Society · filed 2005-07-27

That the State of Ohio regulates or funds the county agricultural societies is insufficient to establish that nexus.

Section 1983 requires an alleged constitutional violation by a state actor to bring a civil rights action.

Haynes v. Sacred Heart Hospital · filed 2005-08-30

Because Haynes did not allege a constitutional violation by a state actor, he fails to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites to bring an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors, not federal agents or private persons acting for the federal government.

Zhu v. Federal Housing Finance Board · filed 2005-09-22

Section 1983 creates a cause of action only against state actors, not federal agents or private persons who act at the behest of the federal government.

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital as a state actor merely because it receives government funding and tax-exempt status.

Grant v. Trinity Health-Michigan · filed 2005-09-30

It is well-established, however, that private hospitals, even those receiving federal and state funding and tax-exempt status, are not state actors under § 1983.

A § 1983 claim must allege state action.

Beam v. Downey · filed 2005-10-12

In her § 1983 claim, Beam failed to allege state action.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; a private entity’s employees do not satisfy that requirement merely because a deputy is present.

Rowley v. Tchefuncta Club Estates, Inc. · filed 2005-10-25

To the extent that TCE’s employees may have violated Rowley’s constitutional rights, Rowley cannot establish state action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted as a state actor.

Plante v. Bechard · filed 2005-12-15

Additionally, to the extent that Plante has attempted to assert claims against Jeffrey Pelletier for assault, he has not alleged that Pelletier is a state actor liable under § 1983.

A section 1983 claim based on constitutional rights requires an alleged violation by a state actor.

Johnson v. Wilson · filed 2005-12-20

Johnson failed to allege any violation of his constitutional rights by a state actor and, thus, failed to state a cognizable section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a state actor committed the alleged constitutional violation; the state-actor element is satisfied when state action is undisputed.

Hart v. City of Little Rock · filed 2005-12-22

A § 1983 plaintiff must prove the "(1) violation of a constitutional right, (2) committed by a state actor, (3) who acted with the requisite culpability and causation to violate the constitutional right." ... Additionally, we conclude element two is satisfied because there is no dispute the alleged constitutional violation was precipitated by state action.

Section 1983 requires a basis for treating the defendant as a state actor; exclusion from privately owned premises alone does not establish one.

Weiss v. Violet Realty, Inc. · filed 2005-12-23

We affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendants on Weiss’s § 1983 claim. The uncontroverted evidence shows that VRI purchased the premises in 1995, and we note that Weiss’s dispute with defendants affects only his access to the buildings owned by VRI, and not to the city-owned property near defendants’ premises. There is thus no genuine issue of material fact that the premises from which defendants have excluded Weiss are privately owned, not leased from the City of Buffalo, and Weiss has provided this Court no other basis for concluding that defendants in this case are state actors.

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital as a state actor merely because the state licenses it.

Kottmyer v. Maas · filed 2006-01-18

More importantly, however, our precedent indicates that the mere fact that a hospital is licensed by the state is insufficient to transform it into a state actor for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; allegations that private building owners allowed police to enter do not establish it without concerted behavior, extensive cooperation, or a conspiracy with the state.

Perkins v. Sebring Associates the Excelsior II · filed 2006-02-13

They did not allege that Defendants/Appellees, who are not state actors, engaged in concerted behavior, extensive cooperation, or a conspiracy with the state.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private party does not become a state actor merely by using court process to collect a debt.

King v. Epstein · filed 2006-02-14

State action is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and we must therefore dismiss the Kings’ section 1983 claim in its absence.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because she misuses a state court and agency to further a fraud.

Webb v. Webb · filed 2006-02-16

Moreover, the fact that Ms. Webb unlawfully used a Mississippi court and Alabama DHR to further the alleged fraud against Mr. Webb is not enough to find joint activity between Ms. Webb and the States.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law; a utility’s regulation alone does not establish state action.

Alexander v. Washington Gas Light Co. · filed 2006-02-23

While Plaintiff states that WGL is also a “gas utility regulated by the appropriate Public Service Commission [in Maryland, DC, and Virginia],” and describes Defendants Bonora and Teague as acting on behalf of WGL, Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to establish that these Defendants were acting as “state actors” under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against undisputedly private actors fail when the required connection to state officials is absent.

Gould v. Faver · filed 2006-03-09

The district court also correctly dismissed plaintiff's section 1983 claim against the remaining defendants, all of whom are undisputedly private actors.

Section 1983 requires a state actor as defendant, even when the plaintiff alleges imminent danger.

Nagy v. Spence · filed 2006-03-27

Contrary to Mr. Nagy’s contentions, the state-actor requirement for a § 1983 action is not set aside even if there is “ongoing [i]mminent [d]anger” to the plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove state action.

Hughes v. Region VII Area Agency on Aging · filed 2006-03-28

It is beyond dispute that the plaintiff must prove state action in order to succeed on a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983's state actor requirement can be satisfied by allegations that a private union representative acted in concert with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Peres v. Oceanside Union Free School District · filed 2006-03-31

In sum, the Court finds that the Complaint satisfies the state actor requirement for a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 applies to private parties only when their conduct amounts to state action.

Mitchell v. Langley · filed 2006-03-31

Nevertheless, § 1983 does not apply to private parties unless their conduct amounts to “state action,” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).

Section 1983 claims require a state actor to deprive someone of a right protected by the Constitution or other laws.

Cunningham v. Washington County · filed 1994-10-13

Jeanne Hermens is not a party to this action. She has no role in this litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is based upon a claim that a state actor has deprived Cunningham of a protected right under the United States Constitution or other laws.

For section 1983's state-action requirement, Puerto Rico counts as a state, and alleged conduct by the University of Puerto Rico and its officials satisfies that requirement.

Aponte-Torres v. University of Puerto Rico · filed 2006-04-14

That precondition is easily satisfied here: Puerto Rico is considered equivalent to a state for section 1983 purposes, Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 421 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005), and the amended complaint alleges actions attributed to U.P.R. and its functionaries. Since the case law establishes that U.P.R. is an arm of the Commonwealth, see Pinto v. Universidad de P.R., 895 F.2d 18, 18 (1st Cir. 1990), the amended complaint adequately alleges state action.

A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant is a state actor.

Norris v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. · filed 2006-05-03

Norris’s civil rights claims are without merit because she fails to show that any of the defendants are state actors or that a conspiracy to violate her rights was premised on a racial animus.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; a government lease and general financial benefits do not suffice without a connection to that conduct.

Green v. Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa · filed 2006-05-05

There was simply insufficient involvement with Polk County, as a matter of law, to fairly attribute RACI’s action to exclude the jockeys from Prairie Meadows to Polk County. The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of RACI on the jockeys’ constitutional claim.

Defense attorneys performing traditional defense functions do not act under color of state law for § 1983, whether privately retained, court-appointed, or public defenders.

DeAngelo v. Brady · filed 2006-06-19

It is well established that defense attorneys, no matter whether they are privately retained, court-appointed, or employed as public defenders, do not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat attorneys performing traditional criminal defense functions as state actors.

Maxwell v. Saleh · filed 2006-06-21

Thus, we need not address Maxwell’s contentions that his § 1983 complaint was timely because, even if the complaint is timely, Saleh is not a state actor for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 reaches student discipline by a private university when it administers a state college on the state's behalf.

Powe v. Miles · filed 1968-12-23

We hold that regulation of demonstrations by and discipline of the students in the New York State College of Ceramics at Alfred University by the President and the Dean of Students constitutes state action, for the seemingly simple but entirely sufficient reason that the State has willed it that way.

Section 1983 reaches a public bar’s discriminatory service policy when pervasive state liquor regulation and repeated license renewal despite known discrimination make the bar’s conduct state action.

Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc. · filed 1970-06-25

We believe that the present case is distinguishable from those licensing cases where courts have shied away from finding state action, because here we are not dealing merely with a bare state licensor-licensee relationship. In addition we are faced with a pervasive regulation by the state of the activities of the defendant, a commercial enterprise engaged in voluntarily serving the public except for women. Furthermore, the state has continued annually to renew defendant’s license over the years despite its open discrimination against women, without making any effort in the exercise of the broad authority granted it, to remedy the discrimination or revoke the license which defendant must have in order to practice it. These circumstances convince us that the state’s participation here is significant, as distinguished from situations where the licensor-licensee relationship is not accompanied by any extensive state regulation and the licensee is not a commercial establishment or has not offered its facilities or services to the public generally.