42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits claims against private medical professionals when their investigation of suspected child abuse is sufficiently connected to the state to constitute state action.

Billups v. Penn State Milton S. Hershey Medical Center · filed 2012-11-20

Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the examinations of L.B. were not conducted for the purpose of treating her injuries but, rather, for the purpose of determining whether her injuries were the result of criminal activity. At this juncture, these allegations support a finding of state action and are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires state action; the RNC’s enforcement of its delegate-reduction rule did not qualify because it neither performed a traditional state function nor acted jointly with Florida in enforcing the rule.

Emmanuelli v. Priebus · filed 2012-12-11

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding the RNC was not a state actor for purposes of Appellants’ statutory and constitutional claims. ... In sum, because Appellants have not shown RNC is a state actor, the district court did not err in dismissing their complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

A section 1983 property deprivation claim requires state action, which may arise when a police officer actively aids a private repossession or intimidates the debtor from objecting.

Murray v. Poani · filed 2012-12-14

Thus, a section 1983 claim requires a showing of (1) a deprivation, (2) a property interest, and (3) state action. ... The critical question is whether Officer Poani was simply keeping the peace (as he is clearly entitled to do as a police officer) or affirmatively aiding the repossessor or intimidating plaintiffs from exercising their legal right to object to the repossession.

A private entity is liable under § 1983 only if its actions are fairly attributable to the state.

Thornton v. Comerica Bank · filed 2013-01-07

In order for a private entity to be subject to suit under section 1983, the entity’s actions must be fairly attributable to the state. ... Thornton failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that actions taken by Comerica had a sufficient nexus to the state. Thus, summary judgment was properly granted on his § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for a conspiracy among private parties unless a state actor is involved.

Uresti v. Reyes · filed 2013-01-09

As Reyes is not a state actor, to the extent she is alleged to have conspired with these private parties to obtain Uresti’s school records, liability under § 1983 does not exist.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private person who is not a state actor.

Quezada v. Marshall · filed 2013-01-15

Mr. Quezada’s ex-wife is not a state actor and therefore not a proper defendant in a suit brought under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants are state actors.

Coulter v. Ramsden · filed 2013-01-16

The plaintiff in a section 1983 action must allege that the defendants are state actors.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against former defense attorneys or a public defender association when they are not state actors.

Allen v. Pennsylvania Common Pleas · filed 2013-01-30

The District Court concluded that: ... (5) Allen’s claims against his former attorneys and the Montgomery County Public Defender Association fail because those defendants are not state actors, see Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981); ... Our review confirms that there is no arguable basis to challenge the District Court’s decision for the reasons stated by the District Court.

A medical provider who is not a state actor cannot be liable under § 1983; one acting on behalf of the state is immune from an official capacity claim.

Jones v. Hashagen · filed 2013-01-31

We need not decide the issue, however, because we conclude, as the District Court did, that if Dempsey is a “state actor” on behalf of SCI-Dallas, he is immune from suit in his official capacity, and if he is not, then he ... cannot be subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; FHFA’s conservatorship does not make Freddie Mac a government actor subject to a claim.

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Shamoon · filed 2013-02-04

It is well-established that Plaintiffs cannot maintain their § 1983 and constitutional claims against Freddie Mac absent state action. ... Accordingly, this Court holds that Freddie Mac is not a government actor that can be held liable for the constitutional violations Plaintiffs allege and thus grants Freddie Mac’s and FHFA’s motion, and dismisses Plaintiffs’ Counter-Complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against defense counsel who is not a state actor.

Brenner v. Hickenlooper · filed 2013-02-11

Third, Brenner may not sue his defense counsel, Thomas LaCroix, under § 1983 because LaCroix is a not a state actor and thus not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation that a private defendant was a state actor.

Morris v. Kesselring · filed 2013-02-20

We agree with the District Court‘s finding that the second amended complaint ―is bereft of any plausible allegations that these defendants were ‗state actors‘ for purposes of § 1983 or that their blocking access to a private driveway defendants owned constituted civil rights violations.‖ See Morris, 2011 WL 6130603, at *3.

Section 1983 cannot support a claim for future harm based on a former sheriff’s personal animus once that animus no longer carries state action.

Nadeau v. Nye · filed 2013-03-14

Further, given that Nye was defeated in the most recent election for Henry County Sheriff, any claim for future harm is .moot, as any personal animus Nye may harbor toward Nadeau no longer has the imprimatur of state action.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private party may qualify as a state actor when its conduct has a sufficiently close nexus to the state.

Simmons v. AAA East Central Century III Office · filed 2013-03-15

A § 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of must be “committed by a person acting under color of state law”; and (2) this conduct must “deprive[] a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a Fourteenth Amendment claim to allege that a defendant was a state actor.

Sanzaro v. Ardiente Homeowners Associatio · filed 2013-03-20

The district court properly dismissed the Sanzaros’ Fourteenth Amendment claim because the Sanzaros failed to allege that any defendant is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not permit an action against defendants who are not state actors.

Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Township of Richmond · filed 2013-03-28

But it is clear that the plaintiffs cannot maintain a § 1983 action against these defendants because they are not state actors.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against defendants who are not state actors.

Johnson v. Trans Union, LLC · filed 2013-04-08

Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s attempts to amend his complaint on grounds of futility: Johnson could not have recovered under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the defendants are not state actors, see Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 815-16 (7th Cir.2009), and the additional state-law claims would also be preempted by the FCRA, see Purcell, 659 F.3d at 624-25; Ross, 625 F.3d at 814-17.

Section 1983 does not permit a state-actor claim against the private operators and employees of a federal prison.

Eltayib v. Cornell Companies, Inc. · filed 2013-04-09

Cornell, GEO, and their employees are not subject to suit as state actors under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires sufficient allegations that a private defendant acted with state officials to support a claim against that defendant.

McGee v. Dunn · filed 2013-04-16

Again, this court finds that the complaint does not contain sufficient allegations for this Court to find that defendant Galindo’s conduct amounted to state action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a court-appointed attorney is not a proper defendant merely because of her appointment.

Santos v. Secretary Depart Human · filed 2013-04-24

Second, the District Court properly dismissed the claims against Johnson because she is not a state actor and is thus not a proper defendant under § 1983.

Section 1983 covers a private security company that accepts delegated state authority to control access to a courthouse.

Fareed v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. · filed 2013-04-29

Whether it acts at the direction of the City or the court itself, there can be no question that when a private security company accepts the delegation of the state’s authority to control admittance to the courts, that company is a state actor and therefore becomes subject to the regulation of its conduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to act under color of state law; a bank’s refusal to accept an offer to purchase property does not satisfy that requirement.

Bond v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-05-21

Bond’s § 1988 claim is a nonstarter because Chase is not a state actor and did not act under color of state law when it refused to accept his offer to purchase the property.

Section 1983 requires defendants to have acted under color of state law.

Walker Ex Rel. Estate of Walker v. Stern · filed 2013-05-23

As for Walker’s remaining constitutional claims against Otero, Stern, and Kline & Specter, we agree with the District Court that none of those defendants are “state actors” as required to sustain an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private manufacturer a state actor merely because it sells breath test machines and training materials to a city.

O'Boyle v. Bradshaw · filed 2013-07-01

The ability to manufacture and sell breath test machines and training materials is not a power traditionally associated with State sovereignty but delegated to Defendant CMI. Moreover, the contractual arrangements underlying Defendant CMI’s provision of the breath test machines to Defendant City do not establish state action.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Maxberry v. Sallie Mae Education Loans · filed 2013-07-25

We affirm the prejudicial dismissal of Maxberry’s claims pursuant to § 1983, Title IX, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. While we need not restate the analysis found in the Report and Recommendation, we note that these claims are valid only against a state actor or entity receiving federal assistance, and that Sallie Mae, as a publicly traded corporation, cannot satisfy these requirements.

Section 1983 applies only to state actors; constitutional claims against federal employees instead sound in Bivens.

Greene v. Impson · filed 2013-07-30

However, § 1983 also applies only to state actors. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Officials are federal employees, his complaint sounds in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), where the Supreme Court “recognized for the first time an implied private right of damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001).

A hospital that contracts with the state to provide medical care to inmates acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter · filed 2013-07-30

A hospital is a state actor for purposes of § 1983 when it contracts with the state to provide adequate medical care to the state’s incarcerated citizens.

A library is not a state actor for § 1983 purposes when the city appoints fewer than half its directors and lacks pervasive control over its board.

Richardson v. Hartford Public Library · filed 2013-09-02

Under the standard set forth in Lebrón and Horvath, the Library does not qualify as a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a bank that is not a state actor.

Rhoads v. State of Maryland Judiciary · filed 2013-10-15

Turning to Rhoads’ claims against Bank of America, to the extent that he is asserting any constitutional claims, the District Court properly dismissed these claims because Bank of America is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; advice to a private person does not establish it without coercion or significant encouragement.

Harke v. Hoffman · filed 2013-10-23

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harke’s claims for the seizure and deprivation of his personal property because Harke failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ advice to Harke’s fiancé amounted to state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private facilities or their employees merely for participating in Illinois’s involuntary commitment process.

de Vryer v. Maryville Academy · filed 2013-10-25

Private facilities and their employees do not engage in state action by virtue of their participation in this process.

Section 1983 provides a civil action against a person acting under color of state law who deprives someone of rights secured by the Constitution or federal laws.

Brown v. Hatch · filed 2013-10-30

A plaintiff seeking redress under § 1983 must allege a deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not apply to federal agency defendants because they are not state actors.

Vazquez v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2013-11-21

Since the named defendants are not state actors, § 1983 is inapplicable.

An officer’s mere presence at a repossession does not establish state action under § 1983 without evidence of active assistance or intimidation.

Dolan v. Cassella · filed 2013-11-22

No evidence was adduced at summary judgment showing that any named defendant “t[ook] an active role that either affirmatively assisted in the repossession over [Dolan’s] objection or intentionally intimidated [Dolan] so as to prevent him from exercising his legal right to object to the repossession,” id. at 303, and so Dolan has failed to show state action.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a defendant with no alleged state action is not liable.

Davis v. Baltimore Hebrew Congregation · filed 2013-11-27

There is no allegation that BHC is a state actor or acts in any way under color of state law. Indeed, the Plaintiff concedes in his Opposition that BHC is not liable under § 1983. Therefore, summary judgment is granted in favor of the Defendant as to Count II.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant who is not a state actor.

Carter v. Jenkins · filed 2013-12-05

Because Carter’s ex-wife is not a state actor, she has no liability under § 1983.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 for acting with state officials, but a bare allegation of conspiracy does not plausibly establish state action.

Jerry Chambers, Sr. v. Philadelphia Media Network Inc · filed 2014-01-02

While it is true that a private actor can be liable under § 1983 if that person “has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials,” Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), Chambers has pleaded only that the defendants were “Conspiring With the Prosecution.” That allegation, without more, is patently insufficient to assert the necessary “plausible grounds to infer an agreement” between any of the defendants and a state actor.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against a private defendant fails without allegations or proof of it.

Agoh v. Hyatt Corp. · filed 2014-01-13

The Court further agrees that as a matter of law Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Hyatt under § 1983 because he fails to allege, no less prove, any state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant who is not a state actor.

Carter v. Jenkins · filed 2014-01-20

Because Carter’s ex-wife is not a state actor, she has no liability under § 1983.

A private citizen’s cooperation with police supports a § 1983 claim only if the alleged facts show that the citizen’s conduct became state action.

William M. Kelly, III v. Broward Sheriff's Office Department of Detention's · filed 2014-01-23

And while it is true that a private citizen may collude with state actors to such an extent that his action becomes state action, neither the minimal facts alleged in the complaint nor the more descriptive allegations included in Kelly’s objections sufficiently state a claim that Martin’s cooperation with police constituted state action.

Private foster care agencies are state actors for purposes of § 1983 claims.

S.W. ex rel. Marquis-Abrams v. City of New York · filed 2014-01-28

Without expressing any opinion on the Phelan court’s misgivings as to the validity of Perez, this Court agrees with its result: until the Second Circuit holds otherwise, the law in this circuit is that private foster care agencies, including the agency defendants here, are state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action; vague, speculative allegations of a conspiracy with state officials do not establish it.

Grenadier v. Heckman · filed 2014-01-31

With the exception of defendant Herring, none of the defendants is alleged to be a state official, and the plaintiffs vague and speculative assertions of a purported conspiracy among the defendants do not give rise to a state action for purposes of § l983.

University police officers exercising municipal police authority in their patrol area are state actors for Section 1983 purposes.

Fleck v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania · filed 2014-02-05

Penn’s police officers therefore are state actors for Section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against Pennsylvania foster parents absent facts showing a close nexus between the State and the challenged conduct.

Breeland v. Wapples · filed 2014-02-21

But even if Breeland intended these allegations to refer to some additional link between the Wapples and Mentor, and even if we were to attempt to make sense of Breeland’s allegation that Mentor “is a [p]rivately state owned/operated agency,” there would still be no reason to disturb the District Court’s decision because there is no indication that Breeland can allege facts demonstrating that there was “‘such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’” Leshko, 423 F.3d at 339 (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)).

Section 1983 does not permit claims against public defenders performing their traditional role as counsel because they are not state actors.

Gause v. Haile · filed 2014-03-21

Nor did Gause’s complaint state a claim against Public Defenders Stewart and Adamo, for they were not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor or to act under color of state law.

Stirling v. Stirling · filed 2014-04-29

But in this case Ms. Stirling has sued only her ex-husband and his new wife, neither of whom are state actors, and so her § 1983 claim must fail just as the district court held.

Section 1983 makes state action an element of a claim rather than a limit on subject matter jurisdiction.

Babchuk v. Indiana University Health, Inc. · filed 2014-04-30

Plaintiffs are correct that whether there is state action is an element of their § 1983 claim rather than a limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction over their claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private parties to allege that they acted as state actors or reached an understanding with officials to deny a federal right.

Leon Edward Pugh, Jr. v. Balish · filed 2014-05-07

As for Pugh’s § 1983 claims against the restaurant defendants, he has failed to allege how these defendants are state actors, or how they reached an understanding with officials to deny him a federal right.

An appointed attorney is not a state actor for § 1983 liability, and legal malpractice claims cannot be brought under the section.

Jackson v. Smith · filed 2014-05-07

The district court correctly found that Kelly was not a state actor and that claims of legal malpractice may not be brought in a § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 requires alleged conduct by a state actor.

Capers v. Wayne County Probate · filed 2014-05-12

The district court correctly held that appellant alleged no conduct by a state actor within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Private hospital staff do not act under color of state law for § 1983 when they independently decide to involuntarily hospitalize and medicate a patient under a state-regulated commitment scheme.

McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier · filed 2014-05-16

We conclude under the governing precedent of this Circuit that McGugan has failed to allege state action on the part of Defendants and that she has consequently failed to state a claim against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a deputy summoned after an eviction confrontation has occurred does not, by responding, make the alleged deprivation attributable to the state.

Fournier v. Cuddeford · filed 2014-05-19

Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Cuddeford’s conduct constituted state action because Cuddeford was summoned to a scene not of his making after the confrontation had already occurred.

A § 1983 complaint must allege facts supporting a claim against a defendant acting under color of state law.

Embriz v. Eighth District Electronic Pension Fund · filed 2014-05-22

Mr. Embriz cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but he does not name state actors as defendants or provide factual allegations to support a § 1983 claim.

Under § 1983, a private doctor’s search may be attributed to the state when a jury could find that police officers induced it through false information, encouragement, and physical assistance.

George v. Edholm · filed 2014-05-28

We hold only that Edholm’s actions could be attributed to the state, based on our holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Freeman and Johnson provided false information, encouragement, and active physical assistance to Edholm.

Section 1983 does not reach claims against non-state actors.

Lavergne v. Mac Sanford · filed 2014-06-03

There is no federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against non-state actors.

Section 1983 does not treat a private entity or its personnel as state actors solely because the entity is licensed and regulated by the state.

Byng v. Delta Recovery Services LLC · filed 2014-06-04

The fact that an entity like Delta is licensed by New York agencies and regulated by New York law cannot alone transform it or its personnel into state actors.

Section 1983 permits claims against private parties only when their conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

Guerrero v. Bensalem Racing Ass'n · filed 2014-06-04

As private parties, the Parx Defendants can only be liable for a civil rights violation under Section 1983 if their conduct can be “fairly attributable to the State.”

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor; a claim against an attorney who is not a state actor fails to state a claim.

Catanzaro v. Fischer · filed 2014-06-20

Furthermore, the action was plainly meritless for the reasons given by the District Court, including that the suit against Collins was time- barred and barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and it failed to state a claim for relief because Collins is not a state actor for section 1983 purposes and because Catanzaro failed to plead any facts raising a plausible inference of a conspiracy.

Section 1983 requires facts showing state action to hold private individuals liable, such as conspiracy or joint action with a state actor.

Cortez v. County of Alameda · filed 2014-06-24

Plaintiffs also allege violations of § 1983 by individual members of the homeowners association but allege no facts to support a conspiracy or any other theory of state action on the part of the homeowner association defendants.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against private parties who are not state actors.

Mikhail v. Kahn · filed 2014-07-09

Defendants Jolie Kahn and her lawyers, Alan Fellheimer and Dorothy Phillips (now deceased), are not state actors and cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; private conduct alone cannot support a claim.

Brokers' Choice of America v. NBC Universal, Inc. · filed 2014-07-09

We reiterate: state, not private, action is an irreducible minimum in a §1983 action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private defendants for recording a property lien when the complaint alleges no facts showing state action.

Costanza v. Ass'n · filed 2014-07-14

Because the plaintiff offers no facts from which the Court can infer state action on the part of these private defendants, he has not stated a claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a state officer whose enforcement action is attributable to the state.

Bostic v. Schaefer · filed 2014-07-28

Schaefer’s action in denying Bostic and London’s application for a marriage license is clearly attributable to the state. The district court could therefore entertain a § 1983 claim against Schaefer without ascertaining whether he committed any action with respect to Schall and Townley.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; state regulation alone does not make a private utility a state actor.

Rhett v. Evans · filed 2014-08-12

Accordingly, because PSE&G did not function as a state actor in these circumstances, Rhett cannot establish a claim under § 1983.

Public defenders are not state actors subject to § 1983 liability for their work as defense counsel.

Keeling v. Attorney General Pennsylvania · filed 2014-08-12

This claim is misplaced, because public defenders are not state actors and thus are not subject to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted under color of state law; a claim against a private apartment complex fails without facts showing state action.

Williams v. Candletree Apartments · filed 2014-08-13

Absent any allegations of state action or that defendants are state actors, plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against appointed counsel performing a lawyer’s traditional functions because they are not state actors.

Sherard v. Berks County · filed 2014-08-21

Appointed counsel, defendants Deming and Dautrich, were not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Considering the allegations and taking all inferences in favor of Sherard, those two defendants simply were not state actors when they performed “a lawyer’s traditional functions” as appointed counsel.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for merely private conduct.

Schneller v. Philadelphia Newspapers Inc · filed 2014-08-25

As the District Court explained, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for “merely private conduct.”

Section 1983 requires a fact-specific inquiry into state action, and a county agricultural society’s status cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss when discovery may clarify its relationship with the state.

Minges v. Butler County Agricultural Society · filed 2014-09-17

The context-specific nature of the state- action question suggests we should not so hastily declare that county agricultural societies cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence of state action by the defendant.

Harvey v. Caesars Entertainment Operating Co. · filed 2014-09-24

Harvey’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed for failure to provide evidence of any state action on behalf of Defendants.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private ambulance organization for personnel decisions that cannot fairly be attributed to the state.

Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps · filed 2014-09-29

We agree with the district court that the defendants’ challenged conduct did not constitute state action under either theory pressed by the plaintiff on appeal.

Section 1983 does not cover a private health care provider’s peer review and revocation of practice privileges when the provider is not a state actor.

Hamid Safari v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan · filed 2014-09-30

As a result, defendants were not state actors when they conducted peer review and revoked plaintiffs’ privileges to practice medicine at defendants’ facilities.

Section 1983 applies only to state action.

Breland v. Samuels · filed 2014-10-14

Plaintiff has mistakenly invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis of jurisdiction since, by its terms, that statute applies only to state action.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Jarvis v. Village Gun Shop · filed 2014-10-15

The Court holds that Village Gun Shop is not a state actor for the purposes of this section 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; the court found no support for treating the casino and its security guard as state actors.

Houck v. Ferrari · filed 2014-10-22

Plaintiffs do not appear to abandon their argument that the Borgata and Gable can be considered state actors, and, presumably, can be held to violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court finds this position to be unsupportable.

Section 1983 does not reach private conduct by a state employee unless the employee uses power granted by the state in the challenged act.

Weil v. White · filed 2014-10-24

Greenberg’s actions were motivated by private concerns; he was not abusing a power granted by the state, and accordingly was not a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private party agreed with a state actor to inflict an unconstitutional injury for liability under a joint action theory.

Brinn v. Syosset Public Library · filed 2014-10-29

Based upon the foregoing, there is no evidence that the Library and Morris Duffy had an implicit or express agreement to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury upon plaintiff and, therefore, plaintiff cannot establish state action as to the law firm.

Section 1983 permits suits only against persons acting under color of state law.

Sanchez v. USAA Insurance · filed 2014-10-31

Section 1983 authorizes suits only against persons acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law.

Sister Michael Marie v. American Red Cross · filed 2014-11-14

Therefore, because the Sisters have failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the Red Cross and Mary McCord acted under the color of state law, the district court properly dismissed the § 1983 claims against them.

Section 1983 requires a real connection between an official’s conduct and state authority; an elected official’s use of a civil protection order available to anyone is not state action without that connection.

O'Connor v. Williams · filed 2014-11-17

O’Connor has failed to show a “real nexus” between Rep. Williams’ conduct in seeking, obtaining and enforcing the civil protection order and her “badge” of state authority as an elected official. Assuming that Rep. Williams had a retaliatory motive to seek the protection order, there is no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there was no state action.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a state actor.

Ordelli v. Mark Farrell and Associates · filed 2014-12-03

We reject Ordelli’s contentions that the district judge was biased against her, and that the district court could have exercised jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Ordelli did not sue any state actors.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional or federal-law violation by a person acting under color of state law.

Cordell v. Unisys Corp. · filed 2014-12-11

“[I]n order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that .such violation was committed by a person under the color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires allegations suggesting state action.

Wright v. Jewish Child Care Ass'n · filed 2014-12-23

To the extent that plaintiff also seeks to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Cmplt. ¶ 4, this claim fails because Wright has made no allegations suggesting the involvement of state action.

Section 1983 does not treat a private bank as a state actor merely because it uses state courts to recover property.

Hammer v. Bank of America · filed 2015-01-05

The use of the state courts by Bank of America to seize its property did not transform it into a state actor.

Section 1983 requires state action; claims against private defendants who are not state actors fail.

Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Village of · filed 2015-01-06

Two of the remaining three defendants--Verizon New York, Inc., and the East End Eruv Association, Inc.--are plainly not state actors. ... So all claims against these defendants must be dismissed for lack of state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private association and a private utility company are not state actors.

Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Village of Westhampton Beach · filed 2015-01-06

Two of the remaining three defendants—Verizon New York, Inc., and the East End Eruv Association, Inc.—are plainly not state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private broadcaster cannot be sued under it without facts supporting state action or a conspiracy with a state actor.

Lavergne v. Date Line NBC · filed 2015-01-15

In his analysis, the MJ concluded that Lavergne’s civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Defendant NBC was not a state actor but rather a private broadcasting corporation which was in no way “clothed with the authority of state law.” ... After considering the parties’ arguments as briefed on appeal, and after reviewing the record, the applicable law, and the district court’s judgment and reasoning adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and adopt its analysis in full.

Whether conduct constitutes state action under Section 1983 is a matter of federal law.

Neroni v. Coccoma · filed 2015-01-30

We note that the question of whether particular conduct constitutes state action under Section 1983 is a matter of federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law when the alleged violation occurred; a former mayor who had left office before the plaintiff’s termination was not a state actor at that time.

Howell v. Town of Ball · filed 2015-03-03

Mayor Hebron resigned the office of mayor on or about February 5, 2011. ... Thus, he was no longer a state actor at the time of Plaintiffs termination on June 1, 2011. Assuming Plaintiff had successfully demonstrated the prima facie elements of his First Amendment retaliation claim, summary judgment would still be appropriate as to Mayor Hebron because Plaintiff alleges no facts which would support a judgment in his favor for a First Amendment violation under .42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law.

Harrison v. New York · filed 2015-03-20

Thus, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws, and (2) that the deprivation was “committed by a person acting under the color of state law.”

Section 1983 permits claims against private actors when their challenged conduct has a sufficiently close nexus with state actors.

Bryant v. Steele · filed 2015-03-21

Accordingly, the Court denies that part of the motion by Drs. Ihenacho and Khan to dismiss the Section 1983 claims against them.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against private parties whose conduct does not occur under color of state law.

Lewis v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n · filed 2015-03-25

Accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court dismissed with prejudice (1) Lewis’ claims alleging due process violations under § 1983 as to defendants’ actions concerning the HELOC and mortgage because Lewis alleged only a private misuse of state law and defendants were not state actors; (2) Lewis’ assertions under the FDCPA that were barred by the statute of limitations; (3) Lewis’ remaining FDCPA assertions against Chase because Lewis failed to sufficiently allege that Chase was a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA and because amendment, which Lewis had not requested, would be futile; and (4) Lewis’ FDCPA assertions against the Castle defendants under §§ 1692e and 1692f because Lewis failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. ... Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the same reasons as thoroughly delineated in the district court’s March 24, 2014, order accepting the magistrate judge’s December 12, 2013, recommendation.

Section 1983 requires a private party to have acted under color of state law to be liable for an unconstitutional deprivation of rights.

Jones Creek Investors, LLC v. Columbia County · filed 2015-03-31

Because JCI has failed to show that CSXT was acting under color of state law when it replaced its culvert, the Court’s analysis begins and ends with the state action inquiry.

Section 1983 requires state action, so private companies that train drug-sniffing dogs are not liable when that training is not an exclusively state-reserved function.

Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels, Inc. · filed 2015-04-22

Thus, because VLK could not have engaged in state action by training the dog, Miller does not have a plausible claim against the companies under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the State, and a claim fails when the defendant did not act under color of state law.

Stefanoni v. Darien Little League, Inc. · filed 2015-04-27

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy with respect to “merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” ... To state a Section 1983 claim, the Complaint must indicate that the relevant action causing the constitutional deprivation was “fairly attributable to the State.” ... Mr. Stefanoni’s Section 1983 claim must be dismissed because he has not plausibly alleged that the Defendants acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.

Scheib v. Jayme Butcher · filed 2015-05-08

We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case. As the District Court explained, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.”

Section 1983 permits a claim only against defendants acting under color of state law.

Smolian v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. · filed 2015-05-13

Even though the three-year limitations period applicable to the causes of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see CPLR 214 [5]; Wilson v Garcia, 471 US 261, 279 [1985]; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, 480 [1986]) had yet to expire when the plaintiff interposed them against Paul and JPS, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against those defendants pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, since they are not state actors, and neither of them acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the challenged conduct involved state action.

Forziano v. Independent Group Home Living Program, Inc. · filed 2015-05-26

It is well-settled that a plaintiff pressing a claim for violation of his rights under Section 1983 is required to show state action.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right by a state actor; an attorney performing traditional legal functions is not a state actor solely because the attorney is an officer of the court.

Butler v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2015-06-09

As the District Court explained, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). It is well established that “[a]ttorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.” Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999). This rule is fatal to Butler’s federal claims against Attorney Stein.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private bank that is not a state actor.

Mbaku v. Bank of America, National Ass'n · filed 2015-06-15

Second, the bank is not a state actor subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a constitutional claim against a private attorney who is not a state actor merely because the attorney represents a public official.

King v. McKenna · filed 2015-06-29

Based solely upon the facts presented in the Complaint, and accepting all of them as true, the Court finds Defendant Paradee not to have been a state actor.

Section 1983 requires allegations supporting an inference that the defendants were state actors.

Carter v. Homeward Residential, Inc. · filed 2015-07-23

In neither case did the complaint allege anything that might support an inference that the defendants were state actors, suable therefore under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on public defenders and legal staff who are not state actors.

Sanders v. Magic Metro Tactical Team · filed 2015-07-31

The district court properly dismissed Sanders’s claims against the public defenders and legal staff because these defendants are not state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to protect constitutional liberty interests to allege state action.

Angelique Lockett and Lanetra Lockett v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc., and Cathy McGee · filed 2015-08-17

We first observe that, to the extent that Lanetra seeks to protect her constitutional liberty interests, she has not alleged state action to support such a claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against a government corporation established by special law to further government objectives and permanently controlled by government appointees.

Sprauve v. West Indian Company Limited · filed 2015-08-25

Because WICO was established as a government corporation pursuant to a special Act of the Virgin Islands Legislature to further government objectives, and WICO is permanently and completely controlled by government appointees, it is part of the government for purposes of the constitutional claims and section 1983 claims brought by Sprauve and Smith.

Section 1983 does not cover a private mortgage lender’s foreclosure by advertisement without state action.

Letvin v. Lew · filed 2015-09-09

Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim is thus not cognizable under § 1983 for lack of state action, and the District Court rightly dismissed it.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private entity only when its conduct can be treated as state action.

Amistad Christiana Church v. Life is Beautiful, LLC · filed 2015-09-18

By that same logic, I conclude that Life is Beautiful is not a state actor and thus cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; a private actor may qualify only when its conduct has a sufficiently close connection to the state.

Stoner v. Young Concert Artists, Inc. · filed 2015-09-21

Stoner’s constitutional claims—whether brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)—fail because YCA was not a state or federal actor and the complaint asserts only conclusory allegations of conspiracy.

Section 1983 requires state action; ordinary office treatment by a private physician does not satisfy that requirement without facts connecting the physician to the state.

McQueen v. White · filed 2015-09-29

Appellant's complaint does not allege that appellee is an employee of the state or of a state agency, nor does the complaint allege that appellee was operating pursuant to a contractual agreement with the state or a state agency. Rather, the complaint simply alleges that appellant "went to the office of [appellee]" with complaints of "serious back and other pain," and that appellee treated him with pain medication. Such allegations "cannot constitute state action for purposes of Section 1983."

A natural gas company acts under color of state law for § 1983 when it exercises a statutory survey-entry right tied to eminent domain.

Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc. · filed 2015-09-30

Thus, when a natural gas company exercises the right, even for its own self-interest, it becomes a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action or conduct under color of law; a private certification board does not become a state actor by requiring physicians to maintain unrestricted medical licenses.

Hessein v. The American Board of Anesthes · filed 2015-10-07

We agree with the District Court that the Board is not a state actor, and that the requirement that Hessein have an unrestricted medical license in order to keep his Board certifications does not implicate state action.

A private defendant is not liable under § 1983 when the evidence raises no genuine dispute that the defendant acted jointly with state officials or conspired with them.

Michael v. Boutwell · filed 2015-10-07

These facts simply cannot create a genuine issue of material fact that Boutwell (or his business) was a state actor with regard to any ABC activity taken against Rooster’s.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants who are not state actors.

Schneider v. Sutter Amador Hospital · filed 2015-10-29

The district court properly dismissed Schneider’s claims against the remaining defendants because they are not state actors subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; an independent private entity conducting a private election is not a state actor.

Akina v. Hawaii · filed 2015-10-29

But, because Nai Aupuni’s election is a private election, Nai Aupuni is not a “state actor” for much the same reason.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party as a state actor merely because state law authorizes its conduct.

Jarvis v. Village Gun Shop, Inc. · filed 2015-10-30

Although the activities undertaken by the Gun Shop were authorized by state law, mere compliance with the ... strictures of state law cannot transmogrify private action into state action.

A private toll-road operator acts under color of state law and is subject to suit under Section 1983 when collecting unpaid tolls and associated fees, penalties, and costs.

Brown v. Transurban USA, Inc. · filed 2015-11-02

For these reasons, the Court finds that Transurban acts under color of state law when collecting unpaid tolls and associated administrative fees, penalties, and costs, and therefore, it is subject to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional deprivation by a person acting under color of state law.

American Humanist Ass'n v. Baxter County · filed 2015-11-12

When a plaintiff brings a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging the deprivation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff “must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” ... Under these undisputed facts, the only reasonable conclusion is, at a minimum, that Baxter County has provided “significant encouragement, either overt or covert,” in the creche’s display on the courthouse property, that the Chamber of Commerce and the owner of the creche have each “operate[d] as a willful participant in joint activity with” the Baxter County government in displaying the creche on the courthouse property, and that the display of the creche on the courthouse property is not only “entwined with [Baxter County] governmental policies” but enthusiastically so entwined. Defendants’ argument that there is.no state action fails.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold an individual liable to establish that a state actor deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.

William Himchak, III v. Attorney General Pennsylvania · filed 2015-11-13

Upon review, we add that Himchak’s complaint was also deficient insofar as he failed to allege that the attorneys at Mid Penn Legal Services were state actors. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to hold an individual liable under § 1983 must establish that []he was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.”).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a person who, under color of state law, deprives someone of a federal right.

Benzemann v. Citibank N.A. · filed 2015-11-16

Benzemann’s Section 1983 and due process claims fail both prongs of this state-action test. First, Benzemann has not established that his alleged constitutional deprivation was caused by a privilege or right granted by the state. ... Nor can the Houslanger Defendants fairly be said to be state actors. ... Because the sending of restraining notices is not traditionally under the exclusive authority of the state, Benzemann’s argument that the Houslanger Defendants qualify as state actors fails. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed both the Section 1983 and the due process claims against the Houslanger Defendants.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party who jointly acts with the state or its agents.

Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu Jonathan Hu S. Gage, Los Angeles County Deputy, Badge No. 406857, Sued Individually · filed 2003-07-10

Although generally inapplicable to private parties, a § 1983 claim can lie against a private party when, as relevant here, “ ‘he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’ ” ... Accordingly, the § 1983 claim against Mei Hu and Jonathan Hu was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations carried out under state action.

Steinbach v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2004-10-13

In Scott the Court erroneously converted the action from one under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which deals only with state action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a constitutional deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Hines v. Stauffer · filed 2015-12-07

The Court correctly dismissed Hines’ claims against his defense attorneys because they are not state actors. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (holding that to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of a constitutional right was committed by a person acting under color of state law).

A private service plaza operator does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when public authorities are not pervasively entwined in its operations or involved in the challenged decision.

P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, Inc. · filed 2015-12-10

The record in this case does not suggest any pervasive entwinement. There was no personnel overlap between the Authorities and Host, and no specific involvement of the Authorities in Host’s decision to remove the brochures.

Section 1983 does not cover involuntary hospitalization and medication by private health care providers when their conduct cannot fairly be attributed to the state.

Andersen v. North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System's Zucker Hillside Hospital · filed 2016-01-22

As this Court recently held in a case with nearly identical facts, “the forcible medication and hospitalization of [a plaintiff] by private health care providers can[not] fairly be attributed to the state” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to seek relief for deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.

Dophin v. Bank of America Mortgage · filed 2016-02-01

To pursue a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Dophin has made no effort to establish that BANA is a state actor, which is fatal to her constitutional claims.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private lender to allege that the lender is a state actor.

Carpenter v. PNC Bank, National Association · filed 2016-02-03

The first jurisdictional problem with the complaint is that, by relying only on the federal civil rights statutes, she needed to allege that PNC is a state actor (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or it conspired with others to deny her equal protection (id. § 1985), or it refused to stop such a conspiracy (id. § 1986). Because she has not, the complaint does not engage federal-question jurisdiction.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor or to have acted in concert with a state actor.

Wolff v. State University of New York · filed 2016-02-06

For a defendant to be liable under § 1983, she must be a state actor or must have acted in concert with a state actor.

Section 1983 requires plausible allegations that a private defendant’s challenged conduct was attributable to the state.

Dawkins v. Biondi Education Center · filed 2016-02-10

Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead that Defendants were acting under color of state law in terminating his employment, his § 1983 claim cannot survive.

Section 1983 does not make a private demolition contractor a state actor merely because it performs demolition for a city.

Win & Son, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2016-02-11

Likewise, although only the City had the right to condemn Plaintiffs’ property, USAEM did not become a state actor simply because it performed the demolition on behalf of the City.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of federal rights that is fairly attributable to the state.

McCormack v. American Equity Investment · filed 2016-02-17

Cao’s action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is meritless because he has not alleged any deprivation of his rights under the Constitution or federal law that is “fairly attributable to the State.”

Section 1983 requires state action; foster parents whose continued custody resulted only from tribal action are not state actors under the section.

Pitre v. Shenandoah · filed 2016-02-18

But under the alleged facts, Shenandoah and Dooley cannot plausibly be considered state actors for purposes of § 1983, since only tribal, not state, action occurred.

Section 1983 does not treat collusion between private entities as state action.

Brown v. Hill · filed 2016-03-28

At most, the Plaintiff alleges that Green Door conspired with S.O.M.E., and collusion between private entities is not state action for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private party whose conduct is not fairly attributable to the state.

Cox v. Duke Energy, Inc. · filed 2016-03-31

The Duke Defendants were not state actors for the purposes of § 1983 because they were not responsible for the state’s actions in ordering Mr. Fleming to land, arresting him, and charging him with breach of the peace.

Section 1983 does not subject private political parties to federal constitutional claims when they are not state actors.

Durham v. Haslam · filed 2016-04-01

Moreover, the political parties are private organizations, not state actors, and, therefore, are not subject to federal constitutional claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a city’s threatened enforcement of a permit holder’s speech restrictions under its own policy as state action.

McMahon v. City of Panama City Beach · filed 2016-04-12

Finally, the City’s threatened enforcement would be undertaken pursuant to a policy it created—a policy of unquestioningly enforcing permit-tees’ speech restrictions. The City’s threats thus resulted in state action sufficient to chill McMahon’s distribution of literature at Thunder Beach.

A § 1983 claim against a private entity requires adequate allegations of state action.

Azkour v. Bowery Residents' Committee, Inc. · filed 2016-04-18

And the district court properly dismissed and denied leave to amend Azkour’s claims under § 1983 because Azkour failed to adequately plead state action.

Section 1983 permits civil rights claims against defendants who act under color of state law.

Tillman v. Newline Cinema · filed 2010-04-13

Several of those claims obviously were doomed to fail (the complaint included, for example, civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, though none of the defendants were state actors).

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a public defender who is not a state actor.

Hunt v. Smith · filed 2010-07-06

The court did not err in denying Hunt more time to serve one defendant who was sued for his actions as Hunt’s public defender. See Gentry v. City of Lee’s Summit, 10 F.3d 1340, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1993) (public defender not a state actor under § 1983).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of state law violated federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Schutt v. Melmark, Inc. · filed 2016-05-09

Under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her federal constitutional or statutory rights were violated by a person acting “under the color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires state action; a public official’s private defamation suit does not become state action merely because his position motivated the suit.

Lampros v. Baker · filed 2016-05-17

The question is not whether Lampros would have brought suit but for his holding a public position, but whether his suit was, or purported to be, an exercise of his official responsibilities. As in Gritchen, Lampros sought a private goal via a private action, and his suit therefore did not constitute state action.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against private attorneys whose role is limited to representing a public board because they are not state actors.

Dyer v. Maryland State Board of Education · filed 2016-05-20

But Plaintiffs claims as against the Carney Kelehan Defendants fail for an even more basic reason: these Defendants are neither state officials nor even state actors, and so they cannot be sued under § 1983, nor can they be held liable under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a guardian who must act in the ward’s best interests and is not a state actor.

Terry v. County of Suffolk · filed 2016-06-07

Moreover, Terry could not sue Smith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Smith was required by Mental Hygiene Law to act in the best interests of Alice Zahnd and is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires state action; private conduct does not qualify without a traditionally exclusive public function or a close nexus to the state.

Smith v. Heritage Ranch Owners Assn · filed 2016-07-12

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Smith’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The conduct of Heritage Ranch Owners Association and its security guards was private and not state action.

Liability under § 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state.

Jordan v. Keys · filed 2016-07-15

His claims against defendant Houck failed to allege Houck’s conduct was attributable to the state, which is a requirement for liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law, and the court may resolve that requirement on the merits when the claim is non-frivolous.

Donnelly v. Kutztown Area Transport Service, Inc. · filed 2016-07-29

Contrary to decisions that may suggest otherwise, this is a merits-based inquiry that does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction as long as the state-action argument is non-frivolous.

Section 1983 claims against a private attorney require facts sufficient to show that the attorney is a state actor.

Rein v. Northwest Mortgage Group, Inc. · filed 2016-08-05

The district court properly dismissed the § 1983 claims against defendant attorney Sakae Samuel Sakai because plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Sakai is a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional right by someone acting under color of state law; receiving public funds alone does not make a private organization a state actor.

Sabri v. Whittier Alliance · filed 2016-08-19

To establish a § 1983 claim, appellants must also show that they have been deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law. ... The receipt of public funds did not convert the private actions by the Whittier Alliance into state action.

Section 1983 requires facts sufficient to show state action.

Clark v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2016-09-21

The district court properly dismissed Clark’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because Clark failed to allege facts sufficient to show the requisite state action.

A private nursing center does not become a state actor under Section 1983 merely by complying with federal and state laws and regulations.

Momot v. Dziarcak · filed 2016-09-22

The Court finds that DSNC is not a state actor under any of these tests. Plaintiff has not alleged in his Amended Complaint or in his brief that DSNC in any way acted subject to the compulsion of the government, acted in concert with the government, or assumed a traditional government role; instead Plaintiffs arguments show that DSNC served as a private actor directed to private interests, many of them religious, and simply acted to obey federal and state laws and regulations.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a claim against a private hospital needs facts connecting its challenged conduct to state action.

Lofthus v. Long Beach Veterans Hospital · filed 2016-10-11

To state a civil rights claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived Plaintiff of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. ... Plaintiff does not allege that these entities took action under color of state law.