42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 creates a private right of action against government officers who violate federal constitutional or statutory rights while acting under color of state law.

Perrin v. Gentner · filed 2001-12-13

42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private right of action against government officers who, acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a private attorney does not become a state actor merely by holding a state license to practice law.

Gambino v. Rubenfeld · filed 2002-01-05

The defendant is not a “state actor” simply because the State of New York has granted him a license to practice law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private union to allege facts showing that the union acted jointly with state actors.

Bliss v. Rochester City School District · filed 2002-03-28

To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs are therefore required to allege facts which demonstrate that RTA was “a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” ... Even viewing the allegations of the complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, they fail to allege sufficient facts that give rise to the inference that RTA acted in concert with or “obtained significant aid” from any state actor, like RCSD.

Section 1983 requires evidence of joint participation or agreement to hold a private party liable for conspiring with a state official to violate constitutional rights.

Good v. Board of County Commissioners of Shawnee County · filed 2002-04-17

To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the state under § 1983, the plaintiff must show a joint participation, agreement, or “meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights. ... After a thorough review of the evidence before the court, the court has determined that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence of a conspiracy between Gordy and Hamilton to produce the “bogus notes.”

Section 1983 treats officers’ active assistance in a private repossession as state action when their participation helps bring about the repossession.

Brees v. Courtesy Ford, Inc. · filed 2002-08-28

In our view, Brees raised sufficient evidence of state action to defeat the summary judgment motion, as this evidence amounts to at least as much state officer participation in the repossession as occurred in Harris and Howerton.

Section 1983 claims against private defendants require allegations sufficient to establish state action.

Montue v. National Concrete Cutting · filed 2002-10-15

We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Montue adequately alleged that the private defendants’ conduct constituted state action. We therefore remand to permit Montue leave to amend to allege a sufficient basis for state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private removal of property does not support a claim without active participation by law enforcement.

Breiner v. Litwhiler · filed 2003-02-21

Absent active participation of law enforcement authorities, there is no state action involved in the removal of the property, and thus no viable § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not treat a private physician’s civil commitment as state action under the public function test.

Doe v. Harrison · filed 2003-03-24

This Court agrees that civil commitment does not satisfy the stringent requirements necessary to be a “public function” that converts private action into state action for purposes of section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 requires state action; state authorization and approval of a private entity’s conduct do not, without state direction, make that conduct state action.

Tancredi v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 2003-04-08

Under established Supreme Court precedent, the fact that state law authorized the challenged action by an otherwise private entity or that the state granted approval without “put[ting] its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it” did not convert otherwise private action into state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private attorneys absent action under color of state law or a sufficiently alleged conspiracy with a state actor.

Naves v. Conway · filed 2003-07-10

Finally, the district court determined that Conway, Daniel, and Harper were private attorneys who were not acting “under color of state law” and that Naves failed to sufficiently allege that a conspiracy existed between the attorneys and Judge Mowery as a state actor. ... Therefore, this court AFFIRMS the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motions to dismiss for substantially the same reasons set out in the dismissal orders.

Section 1983’s state action requirement may be satisfied when a private contractor acts under a government directive in the challenged conduct.

Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority · filed 2003-09-09

However, in cases (like this one) where the state contractually requires the private actor to take particular actions -- e.g., to reject proposed advertisements under certain specifically delineated circumstances -- then it can be said at the summary judgment stage that in acting in accordance with the governmental directive the private actor is merely a surrogate for the state, and the tie between them is sufficiently strong for the nexus/joint action test to be satisfied.

Section 1983 may reach a private person when the circumstances permit a jury to find that the person acted jointly with police to make an arrest, even without evidence of an overt agreement.

Morfin v. City Of East Chicago · filed 2003-11-18

Similarly, in this case, although there is no evidence of an overt agreement between Kevin Pastrick and Officer Kovats to arrest Mr. Morfin, Kevin Pastrick's presence at the scene, his urgent insistence concerning Mr. Morfin's arrest and the sequence of events leading to Mr. Morfin's arrest would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Kevin Pastrick and Officer Kovats had reached a meeting of the minds that Mr. Morfin should be arrested or had acted jointly in doing so. Consequently, the district court erred in entering summary judgment for Kevin Pastrick on Mr. Morfin's Fourth Amendment claim.

Private prison employees performing the traditional state function of operating a prison may be considered state actors for § 1983 liability.

Green v. Cook · filed 2003-12-03

Since the defendants employed by the CCA “were performing the ‘traditional state function’ of operating a prison,” their conduct is fairly attributable to the state such that they may be considered state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital as a state actor merely because state law licenses and regulates its receipt of involuntary commitment patients.

Harvey v. Harvey · filed 1992-01-07

At most, the Georgia statute functions as a licensing provision enabling the hospital to receive mental patients; licensing and regulation are not enough to transform private hospitals into state actors for section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private hospital that independently decides to hold a patient for psychiatric observation when the plaintiff fails to show that the hospital acted under color of state law.

Turturro v. Continental Airlines · filed 2004-08-16

In summary, the Hospital Defendants have come forward with evidence that they did not act under color of law and were not a state actor relative to Ms. Turturro. Plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Hospital Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a private employer merely because it is an employer.

Frazier v. Career Systems Development Corp. · filed 2005-01-18

The district court did not err in concluding that Frazier failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Career Systems is a private employer.

Section 1983 covers private landlords whose actions are clothed with and exercised under the authority of state law.

Barber v. Rader · filed 1972-08-28

The landlords in this case possessed certain powers by virtue of these state statutes and made possible only by the authority of state law; their actions were clothed with the authority of state law and were “state actions” taken “under the color of state law” for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is satisfied where state involvement in a federally subsidized landlord’s eviction activity is sufficient to constitute state action.

Thelma Joy, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Holland Daniels, Chairman · filed 1973-06-11

Accordingly, we hold there is sufficient state involvement to constitute “state action” for pui’poses of the fourteenth amendment. We also hold that the facts are sufficient to satisfy the “under color of” law clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; merely filing an unlawful detainer action does not attribute a private landlord’s conduct to the state.

Avington v. A.J.S. Associates, Dba, Foothill Villa Apartments Ronald Levine Construction Corp Patricia Tyler · filed 1993-05-06

However, in order to state a claim under section 1983, Avington must show that the defendants acted under the color of state law. ... The mere filing of the unlawful detainer action cannot be attributed to the state.

Section 1983 requires state action; federal mortgage insurance and ordinary access to state eviction courts do not by themselves make a private landlord a state actor, although a tenant’s interest in avoiding eviction is protected.

McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc. · filed 1970-09-22

We are not persuaded with respect to the second ground. A tenant’s interest in not being evicted is a good deal more “personal” than a landlord’s interest in resisting rent controls, the situation to which the two cited decisions were addressed. Indeed, we decided that such an interest is within the protection of the Civil Rights Act implicitly in Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2 Cir. 1968), and explicitly in Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 864-865 (1970). But the district court was correct in holding that the complaint failed to allege state action as the Civil Rights Act requires. Receipt of federal benefits in the form of mortgage insurance under the National Housing Act does not make the defendant an agency of the State of New York so as to require it to accord the procedural due process which the Fourteenth Amendment demands of a state. Neither, despite some language in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), can state action be found in New York providing defendant with the same right to secure the eviction of a tenant by a proceeding in its courts that it gives to all landlords; the one thing now almost universally agreed is that such a rationale for that landmark decision would be altogether too far-reaching.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional deprivations carried out under color of state law, including by private landlords sufficiently intertwined with the state.

McQueen v. Druker · filed 1970-10-05

Having shown these circumstances, plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and within the jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

A private landlord’s lockout that state law does not authorize is not state action for a § 1983 claim.

Bender v. North Meridian Mobile Home Park · filed 1994-04-07

Since § 89-7-51(2) does not allow for the actions taken by the landlord, there is no state action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for challenging lost prison time credits when restoring them would necessarily speed release; that challenge must be brought in habeas.

Bibbs v. Williams · filed 2020-03-05

To the extent that plaintiff challenges specific RVRs that resulted in the loss of time credits, he must challenge those RVRs in a habeas petition.

Section 1983 does not permit damages for lost good conduct credits unless the prisoner obtains a favorable termination of the challenge to that loss.

Harris v. Henderson · filed 2020-02-18

Here, there is no indication that the disciplinary decision which resulted in the original loss of good conduct credits has been expunged or invalidated, or that Plaintiff has successfully filed a mandamus challenge to Dennison’s refusal to restore the lost credits. In the absence of such a favorable termination to his challenge of the loss of credits at the state level, no claim for damages lies under §1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge discipline that affects only eligibility for discretionary parole when success would not necessarily shorten confinement.

Marshall v. Milyard · filed 2011-01-31

Consequently, invalidation of Mr. Marshall’s COPD conviction and restoration of his good-time credits would afford him only speedier consideration for discretionary parole, rather than ensure speedier release. Thus, the district court adopted an incorrect ground for barring Mr. Marshall’s § 1983 retaliation claim under Heck.

A § 1983 claim arising from prison discipline is barred only to the extent that success would imply the invalidity of a disciplinary conviction affecting the duration of confinement.

Cunningham v. O'Leary · filed 2002-06-26

And because just two of the allegedly false disciplinary convictions resulted in the loss of good-time credits, Mr. Cunningham’s retaliation claim would be precluded only to the extent it would imply the invalidity of these convictions.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a prison disciplinary decision that remains in force and can be reviewed through habeas proceedings unless the prisoner first prevails in those proceedings.

Montgomery v. Rondle Anderson, Warden, Indiana State Prison · filed 2001-08-31

Montgomery can achieve review of the board’s decision by concentrating on his credit-earning class, so Edwards blocks use of § 1983 unless Montgomery prevails in the § 2254 proceedings.

A prisoner cannot use § 1983 to challenge a disciplinary conviction that cost good-time credits until he obtains habeas relief.

Clarke v. Stalder · filed 1997-09-09

Clarke's claim is clearly barred by Preiser and Heck. Clarke claims he was found guilty of violating an unconstitutional rule and, therefore, that his conviction was illegal. He has not obtained habeas relief. This is precisely the type of claim that is remediable via a habeas proceeding and that is barred by Preiser and Heck when it is brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 claims that would necessarily invalidate a prison disciplinary ruling lengthening an inmate’s sentence do not accrue until the ruling is invalidated by the state or a federal habeas court.

Sheldon v. Hundley · filed 1996-05-07

Under Heck, when an inmate's success on a § 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the result of a disciplinary proceeding that lengthens the inmate's prison sentence, the § 1983 claim does not arise until the state or a federal habeas court has invalidated the disciplinary result.

A § 1983 damages suit challenging prison discipline that affected good-time credits cannot proceed while the disciplinary order stands, even after the prisoner leaves custody.

McClendon v. Clarence E. Trigg, Superintendent · filed 1996-03-06

McClendon’s estate is free to take over his § 1983 suit. ... But that suit is not going anywhere while the disciplinary board’s order stands, even though McClendon is no longer in custody.

Section 1983 damages for an allegedly unconstitutional prison disciplinary finding that delayed release require the prisoner first to challenge that finding through habeas.

Mercer v. Jordan · filed 1995-12-22

Moreover, under Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), Mercer must challenge this finding under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 as a prerequisite to claiming damages for constitutional deprivations under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cognizable claim for improperly denied good-time credits when Heck v. Humphrey bars the claim.

McCullough v. TX Dept Criminal Jus · filed 1995-10-16

McCullough's claim is not cognizable under § 1983; the district court properly dismissed the complaint.

A § 1983 claim that would necessarily invalidate a disciplinary loss of good-time credits cannot proceed until the disciplinary decision is removed or the claim is pleaded independently of it.

Smith v. Straughn · filed 1995-04-03

Thus, Smith's Eighth Amendment claim as pleaded here cannot proceed until such time as Smith has either successfully removed the disciplinary from his record or until Smith pleads an Eighth Amendment claim that is not entangled with the disciplinary.

A prisoner may seek damages under Section 1983 even when a claim for additional good-time credits must be pursued in habeas corpus.

Martucci v. Phylis Taylor Jack Carter Lonnie Dietrich Ricky Bell · filed 1995-06-15

Generally, claims for damages properly may proceed under Sec. 1983 even though a claim for additional good-time credits cannot.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim to good-time credits that challenges the duration of confinement; the federal remedy is habeas corpus.

Jennings v. George Lombardi Vernon Heath Dora Schriro · filed 1995-11-30

Jennings’ claim for good-time credits challenges the duration of his confinement, and thus his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge prison disciplinary procedures when the challenge is not barred by Heck because it does not call into question the lawfulness of continued confinement.

Reynaldo Nevarez-Leyva, Jr. v. B. Farris B. Streeter K. Gabaldon T.D. Simpson W. Vaughn R. Talbot · filed 1996-01-25

Because Nevarez-Leyva's due process challenge to prison disciplinary procedures is not barred by Heck, his claim must be examined to determine if he had a liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge prison disciplinary procedures when success would necessarily invalidate a disciplinary conviction that cost good-time credits, unless that conviction has already been invalidated.

Amin v. Pruett · filed 1996-06-12

Thus, Heck implicitly directs the district court to determine whether a decision in favor of the prisoner will, of necessity, vitiate the action taken by the state in depriving the prisoner of good-time credits (or other benefits affecting the duration of a sentence). If so, the claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

A § 1983 damages claim that directly challenges the validity of a prison disciplinary proceeding fails unless the disciplinary finding has first been invalidated.

Williams v. Keith Langston, Adrienne Johnson, L. Clarizio, and R. Farkas · filed 1997-03-04

The dismissal of these claims is mandated by Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). ... Williams has made no such showing, and, because his claim directly challenges the validity of the disciplinary proceeding (for example, his appellate brief states emphatically that he would not have been found guilty but for the defective procedures employed), his complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for challenging the revocation of good-time credits; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy.

White v. White · filed 1997-06-19

To the extent that White challenges the revocation of good-time credits, which resulted from the disciplinary proceedings, his exclusive remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a challenge to revoked good-time credits when success would necessarily imply that the revocation was invalid; habeas corpus is the proper vehicle.

Pierce v. Freeman · filed 1997-08-15

Since affording relief under the circumstances alleged by Pierce would nec- essarily imply that the revocation of Pierce's credits was invalid, habeas corpus is unmistakably the appropriate vehicle for Pierce's claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek restoration of revoked good time credits through claims challenging the disciplinary result until the underlying conviction or sentence has been declared invalid.

Janke v. Price · filed 1997-09-02

Accordingly, Mr. Janke’s claims that seek restoration of his good time credits are not cognizable under § 1983 until he has established that the conviction or sentence has been declared invalid.

Section 1983 cannot be used to restore good-time credits when success would automatically accelerate release; the claim must proceed through habeas corpus.

Reynosa v. Wood · filed 1997-12-24

As to any claim for restoration of good-time credits, resolution of the factual and legal assertions of that claim would automatically entitle Plaintiff to accelerated release and, consequently, that claim must be pursued through a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring good-time credits when the claim challenges the length of a prisoner's confinement; the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

Hutchins v. Smith · filed 1998-02-19

Section 1983, however, is not the proper vehicle for bringing such claims. Because these claims attack the validity or lawfulness of the length of Hutchins's confinement, he must challenge these sanctions by seeking a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 relief for the removal of good-time credits requires a prior finding in another forum that the removal was invalid.

Warburton v. Underwood · filed 1998-03-20

Specifically, the relief sought here, concerning the Time Allowance Committee’s decision to remove his good time credits, is not available through a § 1983 suit until he has obtained a finding in another forum that the removal of good time was invalid.

Section 1983 does not permit retrospective relief that would imply the invalidity of revoked good-time credits.

Herbert Whitlock, Stanley Wrice, and Bennie Lopez v. Adrienne Johnson, Melvin Allen, and George Detella · filed 1998-08-05

This retrospective order exceeded the scope of relief available to the inmate class under § 1983. Section 1983 does not authorize actions that “imply the invalidity of the deprivation of [an inmate’s] good-time credits.”

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to seek a declaration that a disciplinary rule is facially unconstitutional before the disciplinary conviction is invalidated when success would necessarily imply the invalidity of lost good-time credits.

Clarke v. Stalder · filed 1998-09-01

Accordingly, because Clarke has not had his "conviction" reversed, expunged or otherwise declared invalid, 3 his claim that the "no threats of legal redress" portion of Rule 3 is facially unconstitutional is not yet cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging the loss of good time credits are subject to the Heck rule because success would imply the invalidity of continued imprisonment.

Dayutis v. Brodeur, et al. · filed 1999-06-23

The Heck rule applies with equal force to a § 1983 claim challenging the disciplinary procedures used to deprive an inmate of good time credits, as a decision in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued imprisonment.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison disciplinary proceedings are barred when the plaintiff fails to satisfy Heck’s requirements.

Randall v. Brown · filed 1999-12-16

Randall has failed to meet the requirements of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), and thus his complaint against the disciplinary officers, Jeffery Hayes and James Gilhaus, is barred.

Section 1983 does not provide relief restoring lost good-time credits.

Figgs v. Vrazel · filed 1999-12-16

To the extent that Figgs seeks restoration of lost good-time credits, the district court properly dismissed his claims because such relief is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s claim for damages and restoration of good-time credits when the claim necessarily implies that the disciplinary punishment was invalid.

Marshall v. Pedro Cortez and Timothy Keith · filed 2000-09-13

Appellant's claim for money damages and restoration of good time credit, necessarily implies the invalidity of the punishment imposed at the disciplinary hearing and is therefore not actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to recover damages for lost good-time credits unless the disciplinary action has been invalidated.

Cagle v. Anderson · filed 2001-02-16

To the extent that Cagle sought damages as a result of his loss of good-time credits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this claim because Cagle has not shown that the disciplinary action has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by an authorized state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 does not provide relief to remedy the effects of a disciplinary ruling that cost an inmate good-time credits until that ruling is set aside.

Farver v. Schwartz · filed 2001-07-02

Farver cannot seek restoration of his good-time credits or pursue other relief to remedy the effect of the urine-test disciplinary until it is set aside.

Section 1983 cannot be used to restore a prisoner's lost good-time credits.

Hogan v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2002-01-04

To the extent Hogan is seeking the restoration of the good-time credits, his claim cannot be brought in a civil rights suit.

Section 1983 permits an excessive force claim arising from an incident that also led to disciplinary convictions when success on the claim would not necessarily invalidate those convictions.

West v. Fuchs · filed 2002-04-18

The district court ultimately declined to consider West’s claim under Heck, reasoning that a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of various disciplinary convictions he received for his conduct during the August 12 incident. On appeal West argues that the district court erred in concluding that his excessive force claim was Heck-barred. West is correct, see Robinson v. Doe, 272 F.3d 921, 923 (7th Cir.2001), but that success takes him only so far.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek restoration of good-time credits; that relief must be pursued through habeas corpus.

Halpin v. Simmons · filed 2002-04-24

The district court dismissed this claim, holding “his challenge to the execution of his sentence should be pursued under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” (Slip op. at 5.) We affirm the dismissal of this claim for the reason stated by the district court.

Section 1983 damages for a prison disciplinary proceeding that cost a prisoner good-time credits are premature unless the disciplinary result has been invalidated.

Thomas v. State of Kansas · filed 2002-05-07

Second, Thomas’ request for damages based on the disciplinary proceeding is premature under Heck v. Humphrey because he has not shown that the results of the disciplinary proceeding have been invalidated. ... Upon careful consideration of the record, the briefs, the district court’s order, and applicable law, we conclude that the district court correctly disposed of the issues raised in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit damages or declaratory relief for a challenge to prison disciplinary procedures that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or the duration of confinement until the relevant conviction has been reversed.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 2002-08-12

Furthermore, if a prisoner is challenging the validity of the procedures used in a prison disciplinary proceeding to deprive him of good-time credits and a favorable judgment would imply the invalidity of the conviction or the duration of confinement, his claims for damages and declaratory relief are similarly not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action until the relevant conviction has been reversed.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner’s challenge to the revocation of good time credits.

Eiland v. Hines · filed 2002-08-19

The district court properly dismissed Eiland’s action because he challenges the revocation of good time credits and such an action is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison disciplinary proceedings are subject to the Heck bar.

Williams v. Rocha · filed 2002-09-16

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Williams’ claim that he was denied due process when prison officials subjected him to an erroneous disciplinary report because this claim is precluded by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Section 1983 does not allow a damages claim that would invalidate a prison disciplinary ruling resulting in lost good-time credits unless that ruling has already been invalidated.

Dorsey v. Gary L. Johnson and Joe Missildine · filed 2002-10-09

The employees’ first ground for summary judgment is dispositive: Dorsey’s claims (for monetary damages) cannot be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... But in 1994, the Court decided that a claim for damages that would render a “conviction” invalid when the conviction has not been otherwise invalidated is not cognizable under section 1983. ... “Conviction” includes a ruling in a disciplinary proceeding that results in loss of good-time credits.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s due process claim challenging disciplinary hearing procedures rather than the result of the proceedings.

Ellis v. Bolin · filed 2000-04-04

After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude the District Court erred in dismissing Ellis’s denial-of-due-process claim, because Ellis did not challenge the result of his disciplinary proceedings but rather the fact that he was not allowed to ... attend them.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge a disciplinary proceeding that cost him good-time credits unless the misconduct conviction has been reversed.

Lee-Bey v. Gundy · filed 2003-10-31

Thus, Lee-Bey cannot challenge a misconduct proceeding resulting in a loss of good-time credits in a § 1983 action because his major misconduct conviction has not been reversed.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring forfeited good and honor time credits; that claim must proceed through habeas corpus after available state remedies are exhausted.

Crafton v. Luttrell · filed 1974-06-25

Therefore, the court is without jurisdiction in this proceeding to consider the allegations pertaining to forfeiture of good and honor time, for this is a habeas corpus matter in which available state remedies must first be exhausted.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to seek damages and declaratory relief for the improper loss of statutory good time.

Murphy v. Wheaton · filed 1974-09-20

The court has also held, however, that an action under section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the improper taking of statutory good time may appropriately be brought for damages and declaratory relief. ... Thus, the plaintiff may maintain the present action for damages based upon the allegedly improper taking of statutory good time.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge a loss of good time credits.

Gabe Sims v. Herman C. Davis, Sgt. W. Norvell, Neil Gay, and John Bishop · filed 1986-08-19

We note that, while the district court did not specifically address the claimed loss of good time credit, this too was rightfully dismissed. A section 1983 action is not the proper vehicle to bring this type of complaint.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek reinstatement of revoked good time credits; habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for that relief.

Domegan v. Fair · filed 1985-02-27

I rule that respondents’ contentions with respect to these two issues are merit-less. The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held not only that the federal habeas corpus statute provides a remedy for the unconstitutional revocation of a prisoner’s good time credits, but also that this statute constitutes an inmate’s exclusive means of relief from such a deprivation of liberty. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). Because the relief which Mr. Domegan seeks is the reinstatement of his good time credits, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is proper.

A prisoner’s § 1983 due process claim challenging a disciplinary hearing is barred when the hearing resulted in loss of good-time credits.

Griffin v. Selsky · filed 2004-07-22

Accordingly, as explained in Judge Sira-gusa’s prior Decision and Order, plaintiffs due process claim under § 1983 is barred under Edwards.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek restoration of good time credits; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies.

Stewart v. LeMaster · filed 2005-05-19

The district court dismissed Stewart’s complaint without prejudice, concluding that an action seeking the restoration of good time credits must be brought under the habeas corpus statutes with exhaustion of state remedies required. ... Having reviewed the record, Stewart’s appellate brief, and the applicable law, we conclude that the dismissal of Stewart’s § 1983 complaint was proper.

Section 1983 claims challenging prison disciplinary convictions are subject to Heck’s favorable-termination rule; the prisoner must show the conviction was overturned or declared invalid.

Wheeler v. Spivey · filed 2005-06-21

Wheeler has not provided evidence in support of his allegation that his disciplinary conviction has been overturned or declared invalid, and we have held Heck applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings.

Section 1983 claims challenging a prison disciplinary conviction can be barred by Heck when the prisoner seeks to expunge that conviction from her record.

Charles v. Cockrell · filed 2006-10-05

Charles’s case is distinguishable from Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754 (2004), insofar as she asked the district court to expunge the extortion disciplinary conviction from her record.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s procedural challenge to a disciplinary hearing when success would necessarily imply that the loss of good-time credits was invalid.

Cervantes v. Pratt · filed 2007-03-16

Where a prisoner’s claim of unfair procedures in a disciplinary hearing necessarily implies the invalidity of the deprivation of good-time credits, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek reinstatement of revoked good-time credits; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Lusero v. Welt · filed 2007-03-27

To the extent M r. Lusero seeks reinstatement of revoked good-time credits, his claim fails as a procedural matter. A petition for habeas corpus— not a § 1983 suit— is the proper avenue for seeking such relief.

Section 1983 does not provide for restoration of an inmate’s good-time credits; the inmate must seek that relief in habeas.

Aaron v. Nolen · filed 2007-07-09

... and he must seek restoration of his good-time credits in a habeas proceeding, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

A prisoner seeking relief for the loss of good-time credit resulting from a disciplinary conviction must proceed through habeas rather than § 1983.

Carl Davis, Jr. v. Norris · filed 2007-07-27

Finally, as to Davis’s allegation that his conviction resulted in a loss of good-time credit, Davis must seek relief in a habeas proceeding.

A prisoner's Section 1983 challenge to disciplinary proceedings may be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey.

Richbourg v. Horton · filed 2008-01-15

The district court properly dismissed Richbourg’s challenge to the disciplinary proceedings brought against him pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Section 1983 does not permit a challenge to prison discipline when success would invalidate a loss of good-time credits and shorten confinement.

Razzoli v. Director, Bureau of Prisons · filed 2008-09-22

Any such challenge to due process in the course of the disciplinary hearing and resulting loss of good time credit will not lie under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide relief restoring a prisoner’s good-time credits.

Brown v. Fauver · filed 1987-05-18

In sum, Brown incorrectly sought restoration of good-time credits — a form of relief not available under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring a prisoner's good-time credits.

Brown v. Fauver · filed 1987-06-18

In sum, Brown incorrectly sought restoration of good-time credits--a form of relief not available under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring prisoners’ good time credits; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey · filed 1973-05-16

For it is now clear that to the extent these prisoners seek the restoration of good time credits, their remedy is by way of habeas corpus rather than by § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring prison good time credits; that claim must proceed through habeas corpus after exhaustion of available state remedies.

Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Department of Correctional Services · filed 1974-01-14

Accordingly, insofar as the October 15, 1971 complaint seeks the restoration of good time, it is treated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which must be denied for the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust his available State remedies.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the loss of a prisoner’s own good-time credits when the claim concerns the duration of confinement, even if the prisoner disavows restoration of the credits.

William M. Keenan, Jr. v. Larry D. Bennett, Commissioner, Alabama Board of Corrections · filed 1980-03-10

We conclude that Keenan’s complaint must be treated as an application for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissed for failure of exhaustion of state remedies. ... Attempts to plead under § 1983 profit nothing.

Section 1983 bars an excessive-force claim that would undermine a prisoner's disciplinary conviction while that conviction remains in force.

Hadnot v. Butler · filed 2009-06-15

Hadnot has not shown that his disciplinary conviction has been overturned. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997). Further, Hadnot’s suit is barred by Heck due to the nature of his claims and allegations.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring good time credits that would shorten a prisoner’s sentence; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Bailey v. Kentucky Department of Corrections · filed 2019-08-16

This is a claim Bailey must make in a habeas, not 42 U.S.C. § 1983, proceeding.

Section 1983 is not a vehicle for challenging prison disciplinary proceedings that result in the loss of good time credits.

Ingram v. Key · filed 2019-10-17

Once again, an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle to challenge prison disciplinary proceedings resulting in the loss of good time credits.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for restoring good time credits; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Bishop v. Johnson · filed 2019-12-05

Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks the restoration of his good time credits as part of his request for relief, he has a single federal remedy available to him; a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ... Section 1983 provides him with no avenue to this relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a due process challenge to the loss of good-time credits from a prison disciplinary finding; the prisoner must seek habeas relief.

(PC) Brownlee v. Baughman · filed 2020-03-09

A due process claim challenging the loss of good-time credits as a result of an adverse prison disciplinary finding is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be raised by way of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner’s challenge to the loss of good time credits when success would necessarily imply that the revocation was invalid.

Adams v. Annucci · filed 2020-03-27

Additionally, under Edwards, procedural due process claims are not cognizable under § 1983 when the “claimed procedural defect . . . if established, would necessarily imply the invalidity of [a] punishment,” such as the revocation of good time credits.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim implying that an inmate’s good-time credits should be restored until they have been restored through other means.

Bishop v. Doe · filed 2020-06-03

While loss of good time credits implicates a liberty interest, claims that imply that an inmate’s good time credits should be restored cannot be pursued in a § 1983 action until the good time is restored through other means.

A § 1983 retaliation claim based on allegedly false disciplinary charges may be Heck-barred when success would invalidate the disciplinary conviction.

(PC) Herrick v. Liddell · filed 2020-07-29

For these reasons, plaintiff’s claim that defendant Liddell filed the false disciplinary charges in retaliation for plaintiff’s complaints regarding the condition of the cell appears to be Heck barred. ... For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff’s other claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to challenge the loss of good-time credits in a civil rights action.

Smith v. Gibson · filed 2020-09-30

The Proposed Findings and Recommendations state that Mr. Smith’s official capacity claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, Mr. Smith’s retaliatory discipline claim against Warden Gibson is barred by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), Mr. Smith’s due process claim against Officer Minors fails because Mr. Smith cannot challenge his loss of good time credit in this civil rights action, and Mr. Smith’s claim against Officer Davis fails because Mr. Smith has no protected liberty interest in the grievance procedure (Id.). ... Thus, the Court agrees with the Proposed Findings and Recommendations and adopts them as its findings in their entirety (Dkt. No. 4).

Section 1983 does not permit a claim implying that an inmate’s good-time credits should be restored until those credits have been restored through other means.

Austin v. Baldwin · filed 2020-10-13

While loss of good time credits implicates a liberty interest, claims that imply that an inmate’s good time credits should be restored cannot be pursued in a § 1983 action until the good time is restored through other means.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge prisoner discipline that revoked good conduct sentence credit unless the credit has been restored.

(PC) Owens v. Achterberg · filed 2020-11-04

Plaintiff is reminded that any challenge to prisoner disciplinary proceedings which resulted in the revocation of good conduct sentence credit must be brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus and not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action unless the revoked sentence credit has been restored.

Section 1983 does not provide reinstatement of lost good-time credits; a state prisoner seeking that relief must proceed in habeas corpus.

Bradford v. Bracamonte · filed 2020-12-04

As a result, even if Plaintiff were to establish a violation of his federal constitutional rights and a violation of § 1983, he would not be entitled to reinstatement of any credits lost.

A prisoner may challenge disciplinary sanctions affecting confinement conditions under § 1983 only if he abandons any challenge to sanctions affecting the length of confinement.

Townsend v. Castillo · filed 2020-12-15

Accordingly, Townsend cannot proceed with his due process claim unless he abandons any challenge to the loss of good-time credits.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for claims seeking release from confinement or restoration of good time credits; those claims must proceed through habeas corpus.

Pennington v. Watson · filed 2021-01-13

These claims do not support a claim for relief under § 1983.

A court may decline to construe a habeas petition as a Section 1983 complaint when civil filing fees and potential strikes could disadvantage the prisoner.

Torres v. Murphy · filed 2020-11-24

In an appropriate case, a habeas petition may be construed as a Section 1983 complaint. ... In view of these potential pitfalls for petitioner if the petition were construed as a civil rights complaint, the case will is DISMISSED without prejudice to petitioner filing a civil rights action if he wishes to do so in light of the above.

A court may decline to convert a habeas petition into a § 1983 complaint when the proper defendant is unclear or conversion could disadvantage the prisoner.

Plummer v. Warden · filed 2020-07-02

Additionally, the Court declines to recharacterize the petition as a § 1983 complaint. ... In this case, the petition is not amenable to conversion on its face because it is not clear that Plummer has named the proper defendant or whether recharacterization would disadvantage Plummer.

A court may decline to construe a habeas petition as a § 1983 complaint when the proper defendant is unclear or conversion may disadvantage the prisoner.

Barrett v. Baker · filed 2019-09-12

When a habeas petition is amenable to conversion on its face, federal courts may construe the petition to plead causes of action under § 1983. ... In this case, the petition is not amenable to conversion on its face because it is not clear that Petitioner has named the proper defendant or whether recharacterization would disadvantage Petitioner.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to challenge state parole procedures, and a court may read a pro se § 2254 petition as a § 1983 complaint.

Bowling v. Director, Virginia Dept. of Corrections · filed 2019-04-02

In response, Appellant invites the court to read his complaint as asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has held that prisoners may challenge the constitutionality of state parole procedures pursuant to § 1983. ... In line with that principle, this court has previously read § 2254 petitions as § 1983 complaints. ... We accept Appellant’s invitation and choose to do so here.

A pro se habeas petition that can fairly be read to state a civil rights claim should be treated as a § 1983 complaint.

Simmons v. Hedgpeth · filed 2010-04-15

Accordingly, Simmons’ habeas petition is to be treated as a § 1983 complaint.

A court may dismiss monetary or injunctive claims in a habeas petition instead of construing them as Section 1983 claims when identical Section 1983 actions are already pending.

Eddy v. Samuel Lewis Grant Woods, Attorney General · filed 1995-04-07

Because the district court found that Eddy had a number of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions pending in the district court that raised claims identical to those in his habeas petition, the district court properly dismissed the claims asking for monetary or injunctive relief, rather than construing them as section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a court to treat a prisoner’s habeas petition seeking release from administrative segregation as a civil rights complaint.

Booker v. Cambra · filed 2001-02-21

The district court did not abuse its discretion by construing Booker’s habeas petition as a section 1983 complaint.

A § 1983 claim that necessarily challenges the imposition of a death sentence and seeks a stay of execution is treated as a habeas claim subject to the requirements for second or successive petitions.

Spivey v. State Board of Pardons · filed 2002-01-24

Because Spivey’s § 1983 claim was the “functional equivalent” of a second habeas petition, and because he did not first apply with this Court for permission to file a second or successive petition as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Spivey’s claim.

Section 1983 provides the cause of action for seeking relief for constitutional violations by state actors.

Baker v. Campbell County Board of Education · filed 2005-10-28

Although referenced in Baker’s amended complaint, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution affords him no relief because it is necessary for a plaintiff to cite and utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring a cause of action under that constitutional provision.

Section 1983 provides a claim for monetary damages based on alleged constitutional violations, even when the complaint does not expressly invoke it.

L.A.M. Recovery, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs · filed 2006-06-05

Insofar as LAM’s complaint seeks monetary damages for alleged constitutional violations, we construe it as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for constitutional claims, rather than a separate claim for violating the section itself.

Johnson v. Prospect Mtn. JMA School · filed 2014-06-09

Accordingly, the court treats all of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims as having been brought through the vehicle of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights and requires a plaintiff to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.

Jones v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections · filed 2016-02-01

Jones challenges the Georgia statute pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “is not itself a source of substantive rights” and requires Jones to “identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.”

A state prison habeas petition may be construed as a § 1983 claim when its facts show protected activity, an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness, and adverse action substantially based on the protected activity.

Longoria v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections · filed 2016-05-27

A K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-1501 petition may be construed as raising a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim when the petitioner argues facts that show (1) the petitioner was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) the defendant's actions caused the petitioner to suffer an injury sufficient to chill a person of ordinary firmness from pursuing the activity; and (3) the defendant's adverse action was substantially based on the petitioner's exercise of a constitutionally protected right.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to pursue a prison disciplinary claim that does not affect the length of confinement by amending a habeas petition into a civil rights complaint with the court’s permission.

Holt v. Kelley · filed 2019-08-19

Given this precedent, the Court will allow Mr. Holt to file an amended complaint alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to convert this action into one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, subject to the following directions.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for declaratory and injunctive relief when a petition challenges a state court order rather than the conditions or legality of custody.

Winburn v. Lindsey · filed 2019-09-16

Properly read, the complaint is not a habeas action but a civil rights action seeking to enjoin the state trial court for deprivation of Winburn’s First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Court reconstrues Winburn’s habeas petition as a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a separate civil rights action for an allegedly unlawful police arrest, and a court may decline to construe a habeas petition as a § 1983 complaint.

Naresh v. Klinger · filed 2019-12-03

This Court has already dismissed Kumar’s habeas petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and declines to construe the filing as a § 1983 complaint.

Section 1983 provides a way to enforce rights secured by the Constitution, so a pleading alleging deprivation of those rights may be construed as a § 1983 complaint.

Gardner v. State of WA · filed 2020-03-05

Therefore, it was proper for this Court to construe his initial submission as a complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A court may decline to construe a habeas claim as a § 1983 claim when the petition states no grounds supporting it.

Clark v. Jaime · filed 2020-03-10

Although the Court has discretion under limited circumstances to construe claim two as presenting a § 1983 claim, see id. at 935-36, the Court declines to do so based on Petitioner’s failure to present any grounds in the Petition supporting this claim.

A court may decline to reclassify a habeas petition as a § 1983 action because of the different filing fees and consequences of filing a civil rights suit.

Hewlett v. Goode · filed 2020-10-19

Instead, the court will dismiss Hewlett’s petition without prejudice to his ability to pursue his claims in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not waive a county’s governmental immunity from suit in Texas state court.

Harris County v. Going · filed 1995-04-13

We find the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict on Going’s § 1983 cause of action. Because there is no waiver of governmental immunity for the § 1983 suit, we overrule Going’s cross-point one.

Governmental immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim against a county.

Luzelma Campos, Betty Jo Gonzalez, and Misty Valero v. Nueces County · filed 2005-04-14

Consequently, the trial court could not have properly dismissed appellants’ section 1983 claims based on immunity.

Governmental immunity does not bar a Section 1983 claim against a county.

Campos v. Nueces County · filed 2005-05-26

Consequently, the trial court could not have properly dismissed appellants’ section 1983 claims based on immunity.

Governmental immunity does not bar viable Section 1983 claims against a city for federal constitutional violations.

City of New Braunfels, Texas v. Carowest Land, Ltd. · filed 2014-04-30

Similar to Carowest’s takings claim, governmental immunity would not bar viable Section 1983 claims against the City predicated on federal constitutional violations.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is met when zoning officials find a zoning violation and deny a variance application.

DeBlasio v. Zoning Board of Adjustment · filed 1995-05-01

DeBlasio’s violation of due process claims do not ran afoul of the “person acting under color of state law” requirement. Clearly, in finding the zoning ordinance violation and in denying the application for a variance, the defendants were acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits claims against persons acting under color of state law and requires a policymaker, official policy, and causation for municipal liability.

Doe v. USA · filed 2016-07-27

To summarize our earlier statements of the fundamentals, Section 1983 liability arises when a “person” acting “under color of” state law deprives another of federal rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[L]ocal government units” like Williamson County are “included among those persons to whom [Section] 1983 applies.” See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To establish liability against a governmental entity, though, a plaintiff must also show the existence of (1) a policy maker; (2) an official policy; and (3) causation, or a violation of rights whose “moving force” is the policy. Id. at 690–95. ... Summary judgment for Williamson County was proper.

Section 1983 permits claims against private providers acting as state actors and a county whose policy plausibly causes a constitutional violation.

Jett v. Anderson County, TN · filed 2020-08-26

Liberally construing the complaint in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court can plausibly infer that Defendants Ridgeview Mental Health Services and James Landry, as state actors, have deliberately disregarded Plaintiff’s need for mental health treatment because he is a TDOC prisoner in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment pursuant to a custom or policy of Defendant Anderson County.

Section 1983 claims against other defendants fail when they depend on a failed claim against the alleged primary actor.

Wiseman v. County of Washoe · filed 2002-08-12

Since the § 1983 claims against Washoe County and the Vistar defendants depend on the claim against Ma-cIntyre, there is no basis to disturb the judgment in favor of these appellees.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law, and municipal liability cannot be established where no constitutional violation occurred.

Standridge v. City of Seaside · filed 1982-08-26

In order to state a cause of action under Section 1983, plaintiffs must allege (1) that defendants deprived decedent of a federal right and (2) that defendants acted under color of state law. ... Thus, plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under 1983. ... Thus, municipal liability under Section 1983 cannot be established where no constitutional violations are found to have occurred.

A county and its police department have no § 1983 liability when the individual officers committed no constitutional violation.

Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers · filed 1985-05-10

The absence of any liability on the part of the County and its Police Department necessarily follows from our conclusion that there was no violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights by the individual officers.

A municipality cannot be liable for Section 1983 damages based on an officer’s conduct when the factfinder concludes that the officer inflicted no constitutional injury.

City of Los Angeles v. Heller · filed 1986-04-21

If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have ... the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.

Defendants whose § 1983 liability depends on directly involved officers cannot be liable when the jury finds those officers committed no constitutional violation.

Hannah v. City Of Overland · filed 1986-07-31

In view of the jury verdict in favor of defendants Coffell and Crump, which necessarily meant that Hannah's constitutional rights were not violated, there can be no liability on the part of the other defendants who were granted directed verdicts since their liability was predicated on the underlying liability of Crump and Coffell.

A city cannot be liable under § 1983 when its police officer inflicted no constitutional injury.

Dodd v. City Of Norwich · filed 1987-08-31

Thus, since Larson did not violate Dodd's fourth amendment rights, the city cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A police chief and municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for an officer’s use of force when the officer caused no constitutional deprivation.

Ford v. David Childers, Roger Jones and City of Taylorville, Illinois, Defendants · filed 1988-08-22

That is to say, if Officer Childers acted reasonably under the circumstances (thus not causing a constitutional deprivation of Ford’s rights), we must also hold that the police chief and the City of Taylorville cannot be held liable under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Keller v. Truska · filed 1988-08-26

As the Court has already ruled that plaintiffs' constitutional rights were not violated, there can be no resulting municipal liability. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims against the City of Fredericktown must also fail.

A municipality and its employees cannot be liable under § 1983 when the individual officer inflicted no constitutional injury.

Estate of Jackson v. City of Rochester · filed 1989-01-31

If Gonzalez did not inflict a constitutional injury, the City and its employees in the RPD cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a city for police conduct when the plaintiff suffered no constitutional injury.

Britt v. Little Rock Police Department · filed 1989-08-29

Still, the city is not liable under 1983 to those who are not Constitutionally injured.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a city for an arrest that caused no constitutional violation.

Radich v. Goode · filed 1989-10-06

However, since we conclude that no constitutional violation occurred because Officer Mieklejohn had probable cause to arrest appellants, the city cannot be liable.

Section 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation by officers before a city or individual supervisors can be liable for their use of excessive force.

Reynolds ex rel. Estate of Reeves v. City of Little Rock · filed 1990-01-12

The necessary predicate for liability of the City and individual supervisors, however, is a finding that the LRPD officers who shot Reeves used excessive force under the circumstances.

A municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 for an officer’s act when the act caused no constitutional injury and the claim against the municipality depends only on responsibility for that act.

Rodriguez v. City of Passaic · filed 1990-02-21

If Kicha’s action inflicted no constitutional injury and the City and the Department were sued only because for whatever reason they were thought to be legally responsible for her action, the City and the Department cannot be liable.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an agent’s conduct when the agent caused no constitutional injury.

Simmons v. CHEMUNG CTY. DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES · filed 1991-04-01

In light of the above ruling finding probable cause for defendants' conduct, that portion of plaintiffs' claim against the County which rests upon allegations of malicious prosecution must be dismissed. As the Supreme Court recently stated, if the agent "inflicted no constitutional injury on [the plaintiffs], it is inconceivable that [the principal] could be liable" to them under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county for its agent’s conduct when the agent inflicted no constitutional injury.

Simmons v. Chemung County Department of Social Services · filed 1991-04-01

In light of the above ruling finding probable cause for defendants’ conduct, that portion of plaintiffs’ claim against the County which rests upon allegations of malicious prosecution must be dismissed. As the Supreme Court recently stated, if the agent “inflicted no constitutional injury on [the plaintiffs], it is inconceivable that [the principal] could be liable” to them under § 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation by a state actor.

Pittsley v. Sergeant Philip Warish · filed 1991-04-17

In order to have a viable § 1983 claim against a municipality, a state actor must first commit an underlying constitutional violation.

Under § 1983, dismissal of an officer on qualified immunity grounds does not bar municipal liability for the same constitutional deprivation.

Doe v. Sullivan County · filed 1992-02-10

Thus, the dismissal of a claim against an officer asserting qualified immunity in no way logically entails that the plaintiff suffered no constitutional deprivation, nor, correspondingly, that a municipality (which, of course, is not entitled to qualified immunity) may not be liable for that deprivation.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for failing to train police officers without evidence that the failure caused the constitutional deprivation.

Fernandez v. Leonard · filed 1992-04-29

Plaintiffs sought to establish § 1983 liability against Brookline on the theory that Mr. Fernandez’s death resulted from its “failure to provide hostage training to the members of its police force.” ... Plaintiffs adduced no meaningful evidence of causation, while the town presented evidence tending to preclude such a finding.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal or supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise absent an underlying constitutional violation.

Fagan v. City of Vineland · filed 1992-07-30

Absent a constitutional violation arising from the chase, then, no liability can attach for failure to train or supervise.

Section 1983 municipal liability for failure to train requires an underlying constitutional violation by a municipal employee.

Dismukes v. Hackathorn · filed 1992-08-13

In order for municipal liability to- attach, however, there must first be an underlying violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by a municipal employee.

Section 1983 liability of a city or individual supervisor for an officer’s use of force requires an underlying constitutional violation by the officer.

Turner v. White · filed 1992-12-02

We have not been shown any reason, however, for setting aside the jury verdict that Officer White did not violate Keith Turner’s constitutional rights, and therefore we need not address any allegations of error with respect to plaintiff’s claims against the supervisory defendants and the City. ... The necessary predicate for liability of the City and individual supervisors ... is a finding that the [police] officers who shot [plaintiff] used excessive force under the circumstances.... Where there is no underlying constitutional violation, the presence or absence of policies which permit the use of excessive force ‘... is quite beside the point.’

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability when the officer whose conduct is at issue did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Plaka v. Drinski · filed 1993-01-15

Since this Court holds that Drinski acted reasonably under the circumstances, it follows that Newton County, as his employer, cannot be held liable to Plakas, as its liability was dependent upon the unreasonableness of Drinski’s actions. Because Drinski did not violate Plakas’ constitutional rights, there is no basis for liability against Newton County.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for officers’ conduct when the officers committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Hinton v. City of Elwood · filed 1993-06-29

A municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers. ... Our finding that Myer and White’s conduct did not violate Hinton’s Fourth Amendment rights, therefore, precludes the imposition of any liability against the City of Elwood.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a sheriff or county for inadequate training or policies when no underlying constitutional deprivation occurred.

Linder v. Richmond County, Ga. · filed 1994-02-11

It surely cannot be said that the Sheriffs or the County’s alleged inadequate training or policies caused Mr. Linder to suffer a constitutional deprivation if there was, in fact, no underlying constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not permit municipal liability under Monell when the individual officers inflicted no constitutional injury.

Grant v. City of Los Angeles Larry Maillet W.F. Casey Rudy Vidal Harold Moberly Brian O'Hara Douglas Roller John · filed 1994-02-15

Once the court determines that no constitutional violation occurred, the City can not be liable under Monell. A finding that officers inflicted no constitutional injury on a plaintiff in a Section 1983 action is not only conclusive as to the officers, but also as to the city and its police commission.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employee’s conduct under a municipal custom or policy only when there is an underlying constitutional violation.

Andrade v. City of Burlingame · filed 1994-03-23

A municipality may be held responsible for constitutional violations inflicted by its employees if such actions are taken pursuant to the municipality’s customs or policies. However, in order to impose liability on a municipality under this theory there must be some underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 imposes no municipal liability when there is no underlying deprivation of constitutional rights.

Spears v. City of Louisville · filed 1994-06-14

Because there was no deprivation of constitutional rights here, there is no basis for liability under Sec. 1983, municipal or otherwise.

Section 1983 claims against a municipality or supervisor for failure to train or supervise, or for an unlawful policy, fail absent an underlying constitutional violation.

Jackson v. Liberty County · filed 1994-07-26

The plaintiffs also claim that Sheriff Stewart and Liberty County are liable for 1) a failure to supervise or train Deputy Fen-ton, and 2) a custom or policy allowing deputies to employ excessive, abusive, and harassing tactics. Because the plaintiffs have not established an underlying Constitutional violation, these claims necessarily fail.

A city cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an officer’s claimed constitutional violations when the officer violated no constitutional right.

Artes-Roy v. Aspen · filed 1994-07-28

Plaintiff has failed to establish that Lyman violated her First or Fourth Amendment rights; therefore, the City cannot be held liable under § 1983 for those claimed violations.