42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims require the defendant to be a state actor.

Jeffreys v. Teamsters Union Local 1150 · filed 2002-01-29

We also agree with the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must fail because the defendant is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires facts supporting a finding that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Hom v. Reubins · filed 2002-01-31

With respect to these allegations, however, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support a finding that Reubins engaged in state action as required under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action for a plaintiff to bring a First Amendment claim against a defendant.

Demarest v. Athol/Orange Community Television, Inc. · filed 2002-02-28

AOTV must be a state actor if the plaintiffs are to be permitted to assert their § 1983 claims under the First Amendment.

Section 1983 permits suits against state actors acting under color of state law, but not against the federal government or federal employees acting under federal law.

Hightower v. United States · filed 2002-04-26

Although plaintiff purports to invoke Section 1983 and the New York Constitution as bases for his constitutional claims, his constitutional claims are properly construed as Bivens claims because Section 1983 and the New York State Constitution only permit suits against state actors acting under color of state law, and not against the federal government or federal employees acting under federal law.

Section 1983 does not reach merely private conduct, even if that conduct is discriminatory or wrongful.

Brewer v. Brewer · filed 2002-05-14

The District Court also properly dismissed Brewer’s § 1983 claims against Margaret Brewer, Eric Brewer, Robert Greenfield, and Sharyn Witlin because none of these defendants are state actors, and “ § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (quotations omitted).

A § 1983 plaintiff suing a private hospital manager must plead facts supporting state action; an allegation that the hospital is public or municipal was necessary to the theory asserted here.

Bradley v. Health Midwest, Inc. · filed 2002-05-23

Nonetheless, the court concludes that plaintiffs complaint is deficient because it fails to allege that OPRMC is a public or municipal hospital.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against private parties who are neither state actors nor alleged to have acted in concert with state actors.

Hofmann v. Fermilab Nal/Ura · filed 2002-05-30

Second, Hofmann’s civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against URA, various attorney defendants, and all other private parties are dismissed for failure to state a claim because such lawsuits cannot be maintained against non-state actors, and she does not allege that the named attorneys or Seyfarth were state actors, or were acting in concert with state actors.

Section 1983 generally requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private individual may qualify as a state actor when a sufficient nexus connects the challenged conduct to state involvement.

Denson v. Wheeler · filed 2002-06-07

Generally, private individuals like Wheeler are not subject to § 1983 liability because they are not acting under color of state law. If there is a sufficient nexus between the private actor’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct and state involvement, however, the private actor may be deemed a state actor for § 1983 purposes.

A state common pleas judge is a state actor for § 1983 liability, rather than an actor of the local government.

American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. v. Ashbrook · filed 2002-06-11

The Court notes that, as mentioned previously, Judge DeWeese, as a Common Pleas Judge, is a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability, not an actor of the local governmental entity.

Failure to allege state action in a § 1983 claim is a nonjurisdictional defect.

Dellefave v. Access Temporaries, Inc. · filed 2002-06-17

While DelleFave is correct that both of his federal claims were defective, those defects were not jurisdictional. ... (failure to allege state action is not a jurisdictional defect in a § 1983 claim).

Section 1983 requires a sufficiently close connection between a private store and public authorities to treat the store’s conduct as state action.

Hanuman v. Groves · filed 2002-06-25

Because the connection between Wal-Mart and the police department was not strong enough to transform Wal-Mart’s conduct into state action, we conclude summary judgment was appropriate on the Hanumans’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits claims against a regional educational service center and its officers when their close entwinement with the state makes their conduct state action.

St. Ledger v. Area Cooperative Educational Services · filed 2002-07-25

In light of ACES’ close and substantial “entwinement” with the State, the Court concludes that ACES and the individual defendants, Peter Young and Cheryl Sa-loom, were engaged in “state action” when they allegedly violated St. Ledger’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires the conduct underlying a constitutional claim to be state action.

Allocco v. City of Coral Gables · filed 2002-08-23

As a threshold to liability under § 1983 for an alleged constitutional violation, a plaintiff must show that the conduct at issue resulted from state action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a manufacturer that is not a state actor, and negligence alone does not give rise to a claim.

Bradshaw v. Unknown Lieutenant · filed 2002-08-27

Bradshaw’s claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the manufacturer is not a state actor and because negligence does not give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 requires state action; claims against private parties fail when their conduct is not attributable to the state.

Elsman v. Standard Federal Bank · filed 2002-09-05

Elsmaris due process and § 1983 arguments are without merit because these defendants are not state actors.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party when its conduct is sufficiently connected to the state; allegations of significant state encouragement can suffice to plead that connection.

Piampiano v. Central Maine Power Co. · filed 2002-09-24

To find that the defendant was a state actor with respect to the plaintiffs claims, a factfinder must conclude either that it “performed an exclusively and traditionally public function;” the action that is the subject of the claim was created, coerced or encouraged by the state government; the defendant had a “symbiotic relationship with the government;” or there was an “entwinement” between the defendant and the state agency with which it interacts. ... However, he has presented sufficient factual allegations on this point to allow him to avoid dismissal of this claim at this early stage of the proceedings.

Section 1983 requires state action; a corporation that became private before the alleged conduct does not satisfy that requirement merely because it was formerly a government instrumentality.

Soler v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co. · filed 2002-09-30

It is well known in this jurisdiction that the PRTC is no longer an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and that it has been a private corporation since way before the alleged acts of this case occurred. Therefore, the state action element, which is crucial for a civil rights action under Section 1983, is absent in this case.

A private attorney who is not a state actor cannot be held liable under § 1983 for denying access to the courts.

McNeal v. Nock · filed 2002-10-04

His claim against his attorney, Martinez, for denial of access to the courts likewise fails because, as the magistrate judge determined, Martinez, a private citizen, is not a requisite state actor for § 1983 purposes.

A bar does not become a state actor under §1983 merely by operating under a state-issued liquor license.

Lopez v. Howth, Inc. · filed 2002-10-23

A bar is not considered a state actor within the meaning of §1983 merely because it “operat[es] under a state-issued liquor license.”

Section 1983’s state action requirement is not satisfied by a private employer’s receipt of public funds alone.

Howard v. Food Lion, Inc. · filed 2002-10-23

The receipt of public funds alone does not constitute state action sufficient to satisfy § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants who are not state actors.

Massey v. Bank of Edmondson County · filed 2002-10-31

The district court properly dismissed these claims because they were lacking in merit and because the relevant defendants were not state actors who might be liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a defendant acted under color of state law; allegations against private parties who are not state actors are insufficient.

Gutierrez v. Ornelas · filed 2002-11-08

However, such error was harmless because Gutierrez did not allege sufficient facts to assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Ornelas and Prestia because they are private parties and not state actors.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a defendant engaged in state action.

Hall v. Raytheon Missile Systems Co. · filed 2002-11-21

The district court properly dismissed Hall’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because he failed to allege that any of the defendants engaged in state action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a state actor violated a right secured by federal law.

McCallup v. Arender · filed 2002-12-03

To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation by a state actor of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 permits claims against an Ohio community school's management companies and principal as state actors when the school is a public school under state law.

Riester v. Riverside Community School · filed 2002-12-18

The Court finds that WHLS, White Hat, and Defendant Lambert (collectively “Defendants”), are indeed state actors as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Plaintiffs Complaint is adequate to sustain such a claim.

Section 1983 requires state action; routine regulatory approval of a private insurer’s reorganization does not make the insurer a state actor.

Stephen Tancredi and Ronald Speidel v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York Stock Company and Metlife, Inc., · filed 2003-01-21

The Superintendent’s review to ensure that the changes met the minimum legal requirements of § 7312 before granting regulatory approval did not constitute such involvement in the reorganization decision that these private defendants could be considered state actors.

Section 1983 treats a review board’s conduct as state action when city officials are pervasively entwined in the board’s structure and decisions.

Tool Box v. Ogden City Corp. · filed 2003-01-22

Very closely resembling the Brent-wood facts, the Review Board’s decision to deny Tool Box’s application constitutes state action through Justice Souter’s felicitous expression, “entwinement.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a person who is not a state actor.

Rakowski v. Merritt · filed 2003-02-05

Mr. Rakowski appears to allege defamation by Paula Merritt, but he cannot bring this claim under § 1983 because Ms. Merritt is not a state actor.

Section 1983 claims fail for want of state action.

Dluhos v. Strasberg · filed 2003-02-20

After dismissing all constitutional and § 1983 claims against the defendants for want of state action, the district court dismissed the various state law claims against all parties for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. ... As to the remaining claims, this Court will affirm the dismissal of the constitutional claims against all parties — including, inter alia, Appellee Network Solutions, Inc. — for want of state action and for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, as well as the state law claims against all parties. We adopt the reasoning of the district court in this regard.

Section 1983 requires a sufficient nexus between a private defendant and the government to establish state action.

Todd ex rel. Todd v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. · filed 2003-03-04

Rather, state action is invoked when the court finds a sufficient nexus between the alleged private wrongdoer and the government, subjecting the wrongdoer to the limitations of the Constitution. ... Likewise, the Court GRANTS the motion picture defendants and the movie theater operators’ collective motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not reach a private college’s enforcement of academic and disciplinary policies when those actions are not sufficiently connected to the state.

Curto v. Smith · filed 2003-03-12

The Cornell Defendants may not, therefore, fairly be characterized as state actors for the purposes of § 1983 with respect to actions taken pursuant to such policies.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be attributable to the state; a private party’s unauthorized trespass does not satisfy that requirement.

Whipps Land & Cattle Co. v. Level 3 Communications, LLC · filed 2003-03-14

The district court correctly concluded that Whipps did not satisfy the “state action” requirement of § 1983 and that Whipps was not entitled to relief under § 1983 or § 1988.

Section 1983 applies to private parties only when their actions may fairly be attributed to the State.

Nobrega v. Merchants Bank · filed 2003-04-08

First, Nobrega’s claim fails as a matter of law because liability under Section 1983 only applies to actions taken by government entities or employees, or by private entities or individuals when such actions may fairly be said to have been taken at the behest of the State.

A § 1983 complaint against private utility managers must sufficiently allege state action.

Spickler v. Lee · filed 2003-04-09

We agree, substantially for the reasons recited by the district court, that the complaint did not make a sufficient allegation of state action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a claim against defendants who are not state actors must be dismissed.

Jeung v. McKrow · filed 2003-04-09

The Court also finds that none of the defendants are state actors within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore count II of the amended complaint which is based on that statute must be dismissed.

Appointed counsel is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Jones v. Collin County Texas · filed 2003-04-22

Furthermore, Jones’ appointed counsel is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Lack of state action causes a § 1983 claim to fail, but does not deprive the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Miles v. Mirrorball, Inc. · filed 2003-05-22

But we and several other courts have held that under the approach established in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-83, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), lack of state action does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim; it simply means that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

A defendant who is not a state actor is not liable under § 1983.

Price v. State of Oklahoma · filed 2003-05-29

In dismissing Price’s complaint, the district court concluded that ... defendants Glass, Silva, Iski, Bouckadakis, and Neal are not state actors and therefore not liable under § 1983. ... We conclude there is no merit to the appeal, and thus for substantially the same reasons stated in the district court’s Order of December 2, 2002, we AFFIRM.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a defendant that is not a state actor.

Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Incorporated · filed 2003-05-30

As stated above, Count I is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Coburg is not a state actor.

A utility company is not a state actor under § 1983 when the record does not support an allegation that it conspired with or was coerced by city officials to suspend service.

Gardner v. McGroarty · filed 2003-06-09

The utility company defendants, however, are not state actors.

Section 1983 liability requires allegations that a private entity substantially cooperated with state officials or engaged in activity inextricably intertwined with them.

Johnson v. California Court of Appeal · filed 2003-06-19

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s claims against the Stanford University Board of Trustees, because his allegations did not establish any “substantial cooperation or inextricably intertwined activity” between the Board and any state officials sufficient to subject Stanford to section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private attorney who is not a state actor.

Baker v. Smith · filed 2003-07-31

The district court properly granted Smith’s motion for summary judgment because, as a private attorney, Smith is not a state actor subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights by state actors.

Bermudez-Vazquez v. Centennial De Puerto Rico · filed 2003-08-04

Section 1983 is designed to provide claimants with a mechanism to redress violations of constitutional rights by state actors. Defendant is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Shuang Long Shi v. Arrow Truck Sales · filed 2003-08-11

The district court ruled that ... [3] subject matter jurisdiction based on a federal question was lacking because [a] under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, neither Arrow nor Volvo was a state actor, and [b] under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, plaintiff failed to set forth facts sufficient to support the claim. We affirm for substantially the reasons set forth by the district court in its Order dated September 25, 2002.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Brooks v. Ross · filed 2003-08-18

Brooks cannot maintain his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Ross was not a state actor.

A § 1983 complaint fails to state a claim when it provides no information about the defendants’ identity or relationship to the state.

Willis v. Construction Co. · filed 2003-08-19

Willis’s complaint does not provide any information concerning the identity of the defendants or their relationship to the state. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed against a defendant who is not a state actor.

Naething v. Covington · filed 2003-08-20

For the reasons articulated by the district court, we agree that the claims against AGLA are barred by the statute of limitations and that because AGLA is not a state actor, a claim under § 1983 can not stand.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant was a state actor.

Tjoelker v. Sonoma County · filed 2003-08-20

The claims against the remaining defendants were properly dismissed because Tjoelker failed to demonstrate that they were state actors for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make an attorney a state actor merely because the attorney represents a client and is an officer of the court.

Hampton v. Epstein · filed 2003-09-12

Neither of Hampton’s attorneys are subject to suit under § 1983. A lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor.

Moore v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 8 · filed 2003-09-19

First, the district court correctly concluded that none of the defendants is a “state actor” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a private employer that is not a state actor.

Dixon v. Coburg Dairy · filed 2003-10-03

As stated above, Count I is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Coburg is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show deprivation of a federal right by a state actor.

Hines v. Helms · filed 2003-10-17

Any action brought pursuant to § 1983 requires the plaintiff to show a federal-rights deprivation by a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to have acted under color of state law, including through a conspiracy with state actors.

Barton v. City of Bristol · filed 2003-11-24

Accordingly, because the Union Defendants are not state actors and because Plaintiff fails to establish that they acted under the color of state law or acted in conspiracy with state actors, summary judgment is granted to Defendants Local # 754 and Dekow on all § 1983 claims.

Whether a defendant is a state actor for purposes of § 1983 can be a factual question that prevents dismissal.

Gill v. Delaware Park, LLC · filed 2003-12-02

As the determination of whether a particular party was a state actor for purposes of § 1983 is a question of fact, the court declines to dismiss on that basis.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the State; private management of a city-owned arena does not alone make the manager a state actor.

HippoPress, LLC v. SMG · filed 2003-12-08

Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires action that is fairly attributable to the State. ... We affirm that part of the trial court’s order ruling that state action did not exist for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege state action to state a claim.

Jahhar v. AT & T Communications, Inc. · filed 2003-12-09

After careful review of the record, ... we agree that Jahhar failed to state a claim because he did not allege any state action, ... (“Only state actors can be held liable under Section 1983."), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1017 (2002).

Section 1983 does not treat a private person as a state actor solely because the person receives state funds.

Norman v. Campbell · filed 2003-12-19

Norman posits that Dr. Campbell and Michael Reese Hospital received state funding for clinical research and thus were state actors liable to him under § 1983 for violating his civil rights, but a private person’s receipt of state funds, without more, does not make that person a state actor.

A § 1983 claim against a private company requires alleged facts supporting its liability as a state actor.

Gantt v. Security, USA, Inc. · filed 2004-01-23

Not only has Gantt failed to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983 in her complaint, but she has also failed to assert any facts in the complaint giving rise to Security USA’s liability as a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to be attributable to the state; filing an eviction proceeding alone does not make a landlord a state actor.

Hill v. Langer · filed 2004-01-26

There is clear precedent in this circuit for the proposition that filing an eviction proceeding is not, in and of itself, a state action.

Section 1983 reaches a privately managed housing project when continuing government involvement makes its discriminatory practices attributable to the state.

Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. · filed 1968-09-24

The fact that Haven Plaza Apartments has been constructed on a designated urban renewal site, is financed by an FHA-insured mortgage, that the managing corporation, Tompkins Square, is the recipient of certain tax exemptions granted by the City as well as certain rent supplement subsidies and other forms of financial assistance from City, State and Federal authorities (Dano Affid. of April 9, 1968 at 2), and that the daily operations are ultimately supervised by both the New York City Housing and Development Administration and the Federal Housing Administration (hereinafter referred to as the “FHA”), pursuant to Tompkins Square’s Disposition Agreement with the City of New York and Regulatory Agreement with the FHA (id. at 3), indicates that there exists sufficient and continuing government participation and involvement in the project'so as to bring any discriminatory operational practices within the gambit of constitutional prohibition.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove state action as an element of the claim.

Massey v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF OGDEN AREA · filed 2004-02-12

Hence, section 1983 claims require the plaintiff to prove two elements, one of which is state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; a secured creditor’s repossession under the Texas self-help provision does not supply it.

Calderon v. United Furniture Company · filed 1974-12-30

In each case we found the statutes to be free from Federal due process scrutiny in a civil rights action ... for lack of requisite state action. ... As the Texas statute involved in this appeal is identical to those of Mississippi and Alabama, we hold so again today.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is met when the N.C.A.A. declares student-athletes ineligible for intercollegiate hockey.

Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1975-03-21

This court has held in the past that the actions of the N.C.A.A., declaring student-athletes ineligible to participate in intercollegiate hockey, constituted state action sufficient to meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... With respect to the issue of state action, therefore, nothing has come to this court’s attention which would warrant abandonment of its conclusion set forth in Buckton.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant’s improper use of a constitutional state statute or rule as state action.

Yanaki v. Iomed, Inc. · filed 2004-03-11

The inappropriate use by private litigants of a constitutional statute or rule does not constitute state action for the purposes of § 1983.

A library may be a state actor under § 1983 when a town appoints half its governing board and provides nearly all its funding.

Horvath v. Westport Library Association · filed 2004-03-11

The additional fact that only a little more than a tenth of the Library's funding comes from sources other than the Town convinces us that the Town maintains sufficient control over the Library to qualify it as a state actor for the purposes of Horvath's claim.

A hospital’s receipt of Hill-Burton Act funds satisfies § 1983’s state-action requirement under binding Fourth Circuit precedent.

Large v. Reynolds · filed 1976-05-20

Plaintiff alleges state action based upon receipt by defendant hospital of funds under the Hill-Burton Act. ... The court finds state action on this basis, although such a finding seems tenuous in light of the recent Supreme Court Decision in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974).

Section 1983 requires state action; a transfer that does not involve state action cannot support a claim.

Breiner v. Litwhiler · filed 2004-03-23

The district court also correctly held that the plaintiffs had not shown that the transfer of the firetruck and equipment to West Penn No. 1 involved state action; as a result their section 1983 claim on that issue was fatally flawed.

Section 1983 requires state action for a First Amendment claim.

Stevenson v. State of NH · filed 2004-03-30

Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights plainly fails for lack of state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; state authority to arrest a principal does not alone make bail bondsmen state actors.

Green v. Abony Bail Bond · filed 2004-03-30

Following Jaffe, this Court finds that the Defendants were not state actors for purposes of § 1983 when they attempted to effect the arrest of Mr. Green. Although their authority to arrest the Plaintiff derived from the State of Florida, the Amended Complaint is bereft of allegations indicating that they received instructions, directions, aid, comfort, succor, or anything else from the State in pursuing their principal.

A § 1983 claim alleging a First Amendment violation fails without state action.

Stevenson v. Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. · filed 2004-03-30

Plaintiffs claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights plainly fails for lack of state action.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is satisfied when the defendant is an instrumentality of the state.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority · filed 1982-10-15

We accept at the outset that the Authority, being an instrumentality of the State of New Jersey, furnishes the necessary state action for a § 1983 suit and that the First Amendment protects the plaintiffs’ solicitation efforts.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties whose conduct is not attributable to the state.

Garrett v. Fisher Titus Hospital · filed 2004-05-24

Fisher-Titus, Hatfield and Joiner persuasively contend that they are not state actors, and therefore, cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; governmental regulation of a private union alone does not make its activities state action.

Driscoll v. International Union Of Operating Engineers, Local 139 · filed 1973-09-11

We conclude that the district court correctly concluded that defendants are not engaged in governmental action to invoke the operation of either 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 24 or 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a private university’s disciplinary actions only when they are sufficiently connected to the state.

Margarita Berrios v. Inter American University, Victor Villalba v. Inter American University · filed 1976-05-20

The facts and circumstances fell well short of showing that either the University or the challenged disciplinary proceedings were so closely associated with the Commonwealth as to warrant judicial scrutiny under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a showing that the state affirmatively supported the challenged conduct; state financial assistance alone is insufficient.

Cannon v. University of Chicago · filed 1977-08-09

But, even assuming financial aid and assistance by the State in whatever amounts, such aid and assistance is insufficient for jurisdiction under § 1983 unless it can be shown that the State has "affirmatively supported" the particular conduct challenged here.

Section 1983 requires state action by a defendant.

Wilkins v. Rogers · filed 1978-08-02

Wilkins' claims against Rogers, Gressette, Smith, Jones and Waring must fail because those individuals have not acted with the requisite degree of state action necessary under § 1983.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is satisfied when a private racing association expels a trainer for an alleged violation of a state racing rule with state racing officials participating in the decision.

Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., Kenneth Marshall and John Knight, Presiding Judge · filed 1979-11-26

Having concluded that the requisite state action for a section 1983 suit was present, and that Fitzgerald has met the essential requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Section 1983 requires a union's challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the state; a union's refusal to pursue arbitration does not meet that requirement without facts connecting its decision to the state.

Jackson v. Temple University · filed 1983-12-13

The district court focused on the failure of Mr. Jackson to set forth any facts suggesting that the state was responsible for the Union or that the Union was acting under color of state law in deciding not to bring Mr. Jackson's grievance to arbitration. Therefore, the district court concluded that the Union's action could not be "fairly attributed" to the state. We agree.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state; a private college’s disciplinary and security activities do not meet that requirement without sufficient state involvement.

Stone v. Dartmouth College · filed 1988-03-01

Therefore, inasmuch as state action is a prerequisite to liability under section 1983, the Court is without jurisdiction, and plaintiffs’ federal claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not reach a private insurer’s benefit decisions merely because the state licenses and regulates it, absent state coercion or significant encouragement of those decisions.

Koller v. Aetna Life Insurance · filed 1988-03-01

That sort of involvement is simply too attenuated to implicate § 1983, as there is nothing to suggest that the state coerced or significantly encouraged defendants to make the benefit decisions they did.

Section 1983 does not treat foster parents as state actors when the state neither caused nor encouraged the alleged abuse and foster care is not exclusively a state function.

Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department Of Social Services · filed 1989-04-21

Applying those cases to the facts of this case, we are of opinion and come to the conclusion that the Tuckers were not state actors. The State of Maryland was not responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains, that is, the physical child abuse itself. It exercised no coercive power over the Tuckers; neither did it encourage them. The care of foster children is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to plead a deprivation of a protected interest attributable to state law or a state actor.

Steen v. Renaissance Mfg. Company · filed 1993-05-05

Not until Steen appealed to this court did she allege that the defendants had violated her rights under Title VII; 28 U.S.C. § 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; or 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). ... Moreover, Steen has not pled or shown the denial of a protected interest which resulted from the operation of state law or from the conduct of any state actor, in order to be entitled to pursue a claim under the other statutes set forth above.

Section 1983 requires a wrong committed by a state actor.

Wasko v. Silverberg · filed 2004-06-16

A violation of either the Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983 requires wrongs committed by a state actor.

A private party does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by petitioning for involuntary commitment under Pennsylvania’s Mental Health Procedures Act.

Benn v. Universal Health System, Inc. · filed 2004-06-17

Our analysis leads to the same result. We thus hold that the Horsham defendants were not state actors.

Section 1983 treats an athletic association as a state actor when its membership is predominated by institutions created by the same sovereign.

Brewer v. Purvis · filed 1993-03-10

Thus, an athletic association whose membership is predominated by institutions created by the same sovereign is a state actor.

Section 1983's state action requirement covers an athletic association so closely entwined with public schools and the state that its conduct is attributable to the state.

Communities For Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc. · filed 2004-07-27

An entity or individual charged under § 1983 with a Fourteenth Amendment violation must be a "state actor." ... We therefore conclude that MHSAA is so entwined with the public schools and the state of Michigan, and that there is "such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action," Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 295, 121 S.Ct. 924 (quotation marks omitted), that MHSAA should be considered a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private law firm and lender are not liable without facts supporting their participation with state officials.

Kafele v. Frank & Wooldridge Co. · filed 2004-08-17

Second, Kafele’s claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for violations of the Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments failed to state a claim for relief because neither the law firm defendants nor Travelers is a state actor subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against defendants who are not state actors under the recognized state action tests.

D.T.B. v. Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct · filed 2004-09-14

The District Court also correctly held that O’Callaghan failed to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1985 against Lofas, the Stepfamily Foundation, or the American Boychoir School. None of these defendants is a state actor under any of the recognized state action tests, and O’Callaghan’s § 1985 claim failed because it did not allege: (i) that there was a conspiracy directed at O’Callaghan and D.T.B. as members of a protected class and (ii) that the conspiracy was purposeful or intentional.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; private defendants who are not state actors cannot be liable under it.

Britt v. Fox · filed 2004-09-17

However, he has not raised a viable civil rights claim because the named defendants are not state actors who may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims against a private defendant fail when the defendant is not a state actor.

Soto v. Island Finance, Inc. · filed 2004-09-30

Island Finance seeks to dismiss the second and third causes of action brought by Cordero pursuant to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, for violations of Cordero’s right under the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments. The motion to dismiss was unopposed. Given that, for purposes of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, defendant Island Finance is not a state actor, this Court must grant defendants motion to dismiss the second and third causes of action in this complaint.

Section 1983 treats an athletic association as a state actor when the state implicitly delegates to it the power to regulate and organize interscholastic athletics.

Alerding v. Ohio High School Athletic Association · filed 1985-12-17

OHSAA is a state actor for purposes of Sec. 1983 because Ohio has implicitly delegated to OHSAA its power to regulate and organize interscholastic athletic activities.

Section 1983 treats an athletic association as a state actor when the state implicitly delegates to it the power to regulate and organize interscholastic athletics.

Alerding v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 1985-12-17

OHSAA is a state actor for purposes of § 1983 because Ohio has implicitly delegated to OHSAA its power to regulate and organize interscholastic athletic activities.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private organization and a private citizen do not qualify here.

Dupree v. Mfume · filed 2004-11-09

Neither the NAACP, a private organization, nor Mfume, a private citizen, is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital as a state actor merely because it receives public funding and has tax-exempt status.

Burton v. William Beaumont Hospital · filed 2004-12-03

This Court and other courts have held that a private hospital is not transformed into a state actor by virtue of receiving federal and state funding and tax-exempt status.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against private parties whose reliance on a sheriff to carry out a court-ordered property sale did not make them state actors.

Tornheim v. Eason · filed 2004-12-10

They participated in a purely private transaction — the sale of a privately-owned house. They cannot be sued for violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in connection with their effecting of that sale; no action lies against them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Jadali v. Alamance Regional Medical Center · filed 2004-12-16

Further, it is a requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the defendant be a state actor.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a federal right under color of state law, and private newspaper conduct without state action does not satisfy that requirement.

America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1972-08-29

In order to prevail under Count III, it is .incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show that defendants have deprived them of a right secured by the “constitution or laws of the United States” and that such right was deprived “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State.” Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382, 1388-1389 (N.D.Ind. 1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971) . This court need not consider whether plaintiffs have been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution since it is patently obvious that they have failed to show defendants acted “under color of state law.” ... This court has concluded, in harmony with numerous other courts, that the actions of the defendant newspapers here did not constitute “state action” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 complaint against a private newspaper and related private defendants fails when it does not allege that they acted under color of state law.

Giles-El v. Peter Siedman, David J. Burnett, Dorothy Neaton, and the Ypsilanti Press · filed 1986-04-21

The district court's determination that the Ypsilanti Press and two related defendants (Siedman and Neaton) are not alleged to have acted under color of state law is plainly correct on the face of the complaint.

Section 1983 requires the conduct causing the alleged deprivation to be taken under color of state law; newspaper publishers and their employees do not meet that requirement absent facts showing state action.

Cotton v. Kathy Isaacson, Kansan Publication Co., Inc. · filed 1991-04-15

Although a remedy for constitutional violations is provided by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988), that statute requires that the action causing the alleged deprivation be taken under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Construing Cotton's pro se complaint liberally, as we must, we find nothing to indicate that defendants here were acting under color of state law within the meaning of section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation under color of state law; a private newspaper with no connection to state government or state authority does not meet that requirement.

Voth v. Oregonian Newspaper of Oregon · filed 1992-10-05

To state a claim under section 1983, Voth must (1) allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) show that the alleged deprivation was carried out under color of state law. ... Second, the newspaper does not act under color of state law. The Oregonian is a private corporation. It does not have any connection with any state government nor is it cloaked with the authority of the state.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a deprivation of rights by a privately owned newspaper that is not acting under color of state law.

Cyntje v. Daily News Publishing Co. · filed 1982-11-18

Nor can relief be afforded on the theory that the injury which allegedly results from a newspaper’s refusal to publish a submitted advertisement amounts to a deprivation of rights “under color” of state law as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Chicago Tribune Company, 435 F.2d 470, 478 (7th Cir. 1970). A privately owned newspaper is not of course an arm of the government nor does it operate under a government conferred license or privilege.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a private newspaper absent state involvement.

Tosta v. Hooks · filed 1983-08-02

... on behalf of the “newspaper” since absent a showing of state involvement, plaintiff has no cause of action against the newspaper under § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the 14th Amendment.

A private newspaper’s publication decisions are not state action and therefore cannot support a § 1983 claim.

Wellman v. Williamson Daily News, Inc. · filed 1984-04-13

Plaintiff, Larry Wellman, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Williamson Daily News, Inc., its president and publisher, Louis P. Harvath, III, and its editor, Wally Warden. ... Manifestly, the publication of a newspaper does not involve “state action”.

Section 1983 requires facts showing government action; the banks’ non-judicial foreclosure did not satisfy that requirement.

Nieves v. World Savings Bank, Fsb · filed 2009-12-08

The district court properly dismissed the action because Nieves failed to allege facts demonstrating that the defendants’ conduct constituted government action sufficient to support a claim under section 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private banks or their employees merely for agreeing to open a noninterest-bearing inmate account, because that act is not under color of state law.

Mitchell v. Kirk · filed 1994-04-07

In addition, the district court properly dismissed the banks and the bank employees because in merely agreeing to open a noninterest-bearing inmate account, these private parties were not acting under color of state law for purposes of Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law that deprives a person of a constitutional right; a bank’s private setoff, without state process or significant state involvement, does not satisfy that requirement.

Barbara Fletcher, Etc. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank · filed 1974-05-09

We conclude that bank set off is a private self-help remedy. Rhode Island’s involvement therewith is too slight to constitute state action. ... As all the arguments considered together or individually analyzed are insufficient to raise a colorable claim under § 1983, the court correctly dismissed on the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 requires state action, and a private bank's self-help procedures under the Uniform Commercial Code do not satisfy that requirement.

Sciolino v. Marine Midland Bank-Western · filed 1979-01-04

At oral argument, plaintiff attempted to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To support this claim, plaintiff alleged that Marine’s self-help procedures under the Uniform Commercial Code constituted state action. This argument is clearly refuted by the case law in this Circuit.

Section 1983 does not reach a private bank’s setoff when neither judicial proceedings nor state officials’ enforcement is involved, because the conduct is not under color of state law.

Dannhausen v. First Nat. Bank of Sturgeon Bay · filed 1982-03-18

In the setoff of plaintiffs’ debts against their bank accounts, there was neither judicial proceedings of any sort nor involvement by state officials at an enforcement level. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 action for the Bank’s use of a setoff must be dismissed.

A Section 1983 claim against a private bank fails when the bank did not act under color of state law and the plaintiff alleges available state remedies without alleging that they are inadequate.

Pyle v. Pennyrile Citizens Bank, Inc. · filed 1987-03-20

Because plaintiff has failed to allege inadequate state remedies, the section 1983 claim must be dismissed. ... Moreover, the Bank and its officers were not acting under color of state law. For these reasons the section 1983 action must fail.

A private bank does not act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes merely because it is regulated or participated in events leading to a customer’s criminal prosecution.

Parker v. First Union National Bank William O. Warren, Assistant Vice President · filed 1987-04-10

A bank does not act under color of state law for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. ... Parker cannot assert a Sec. 1983 claim against the bank.

Private bank defendants can be state actors under § 1983 when the State substantially participates in and must approve the challenged conduct.

Lovell v. Peoples Heritage Savings Bank · filed 1991-10-15

Because of the State’s pervasive and substantial involvement with the very aspect of the conversion challenged here, it is fair to deem the private bank defendants in this case government actors for their conduct regarding the challenged conversion plan, ... and the conversion must be considered state action subject to the restrictions of the Constitution.

Section 1983 requires state action; a bank employee’s threat to have a debtor jailed for violating state criminal statutes does not establish it.

Lally v. Crawford County Trust & Savings Bank, Denison, Iowa Jimmie Thomas · filed 1988-12-22

In the case at bar, Lally’s § 1983 claim was based on the allegation that Thomas acted under color of state law when he threatened to have Lally put in jail for violating state criminal statutes. We hold that the district court properly dismissed Lally’s § 1983 claim for lack of state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a farm credit bank merely for bringing a state foreclosure proceeding or using state tribunals, because those acts do not establish state action.

Walker v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis · filed 1989-11-27

As we further noted, neither the mere institution of a foreclosure proceeding nor the use of a state’s tribunals establish state action; by the same token, the FCB is, itself, not a state actor, and thus is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. ... It is clear that the original complaint could not possibly have established liability against the FCB on the basis of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private business's state licenses, without a state connection to the challenged conduct, are insufficient.

Holmes v. Elks Club, Inc. · filed 1975-02-20

Assuming both these factual averments to be true, the Court is of the opinion that the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Without meaning to belabor the obvious, a necessary predicate for a claim under § 1983 is conduct by some person acting or purporting to act under the authority of state law or state enforced custom. ... The mere fact that the defendant holds state licenses which permit it to conduct its business is immaterial, unless the state is otherwise connected with the challenged conduct, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 1974, 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477. ... For the foregoing reasons, the amended complaint, even when taken as amended by the plaintiffs’ proposed amendment, does not reveal that action under color of state law required to support a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a private company's application for a state permit is not state action merely because the company is subject to state regulation.

Kettlewell v. Hot-Mix, Inc. · filed 1978-04-27

We hold that in our case Hot-Mix was not acting as a state agency or under color of state law when it applied to the T.A.C.B. for a construction permit and had no duty to give notice to the plaintiffs. Approval of the construction application by the T.A. C.B., where the Board did not put its weight on the application by ordering the plant to be built, does not convert the application initiated by the company and approved by the Board into State action.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of civil rights under color of state law and does not cover tax withholding by federal officials and a private employer.

Beerbower v. United States · filed 1986-03-14

Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, which requires violation of civil rights under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable merely because the state licenses or regulates it; the challenged conduct must be attributable to the state.

Sally Kerans and Lewis Kerans, Cross-Appellees v. Porter Paint Company, Inc., Cross-Appellant · filed 1989-01-24

To hold a private individual liable for unconstitutional acts, a plaintiff must establish that the conduct complained of can be attributed to the state. Kerans alleges that Porter Paint was acting under "color of state law" because they were licensed by the State of Ohio. However, it is a well recognized principle that "state action" cannot be shown by mere state regulation. See e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). "A complaining party must demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the challenged action and the regulatory scheme alleged to be the the impetus behind the private action." Crowder v. Conlan, 740 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir.1984). No such nexus exists in this case.

Section 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement is not met when a private employer terminates an employee for violating state licensing rules based on its own business concerns.

Shinholster v. Akron Auto. Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1989-04-11

This court cannot find the necessary state action under the facts of this case. ... However, plaintiff’s termination was the result of the private action of AAA in managing its own employees and the fact that it was based on a violation of BMY rules does not convert it into public action.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private company’s employment dismissals are outside its reach when they cannot fairly be attributed to the state.

Rodriguez-Garcia v. Esteban Davila, Etc. · filed 1990-05-22

Consequently, we hold that the dismissals of appellants were not taken under color of state law for the purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private employer that did not act under color of state law.

Lawson v. Getty Terminals Corp. · filed 1994-11-02

Plaintiff concedes that Getty is a private employer and did not act under color of state law in discharging Lawson from employment. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing that portion of plaintiff's complaint that states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is granted.

Section 1983's state-action requirement can be satisfied when a private business discriminates pursuant to a state-enforced custom under Mississippi Code § 2046.5.

Adickes v. SH Kress & Company · filed 1966-02-26

Therefore, if plaintiff can show that defendant discriminated against her pursuant to a custom enforced by the State under Mississippi Code, § 2046.5, of refusing service to whites in the company of Negroes, she will satisfy the state action requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private employer cannot be sued under § 1983 without allegations that its conduct was under color of state law.

Clark v. Wright & Lopez, Inc. · filed 1976-10-21

There is no allegation that any conduct of the defendant was done under the color of state law, so as to amount to a violation of such individual’s right to due process of law, Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires state action for a Fourteenth Amendment claim against an otherwise private employer, and allegations of a sufficiently close state-employer nexus may satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Robinson v. Samuel Price, Etc. · filed 1977-06-09

The plaintiff’s main allegations, however, are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and their jurisdictional counterpart 28 U.S.C. § 1343. ... The inquiry which must be made in this case, therefore, is whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the plaintiff’s employer so that the actions of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself. ... We feel that there is such a nexus alleged in this case.

Section 1983 reaches conduct taken under color of state law, so purely private companies do not fall within it.

Lamb v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc., Gilbert Buick, Inc., Crawford and Company, Inc. · filed 1978-11-09

By its terms, section 1983 requires that the defendant have acted under color of state law. The defendants named in the complaint are three private companies, none of whom could have acted under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against a private company's employee solely in that employee's capacity as the company's agent.

Baker v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1980-09-15

Although denominated as a dismissal against Purser “individually,” the court notes that there would be no section 1983 claim against Purser in his capacity as an employee and agent of J. C. Penney, and the court will treat the dismissal as dismissing all claims against Purser in any capacity except those stated against him under section 1983.

A § 1983 complaint must allege action under color of law and cannot proceed against a private employer when no such facts are pleaded.

Flowers v. TRW Inc. · filed 1987-11-17

Furthermore, plaintiff has set forth no facts in the complaint to support an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 since there are no allegations of conspiracy or action under the “color” of law.

Under section 1983, government financial support and a government official holding only one of twenty-one board votes do not make a private employer’s termination decision an action under color of law through government coercion or control.

Watts-Means v. Prince George's Family Crisis Center, (Two Cases). Sonja Watts-Means v. Prince George's Family Cris · filed 1993-09-15

That the County provided financial support to the Center is not sufficient to render the Center’s termination of Watts-Means an action that was coerced by the County. ... And even if the board was responsible for the termination decision itself, the County, through its voting board member, could not have controlled or coerced this decision because it had only one of twenty-one total votes on the board.

Government funding and extensive state regulation alone do not make a private employer’s termination decision action under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Dow v. Terramara, Inc. · filed 1993-10-06

Terramara receives most of its funding from governmental sources and is subject to extensive state regulation. State regulation, however, does not make Terramara and the other defendants state actors unless the regulation compelled or influenced the decision to terminate Dow. ... The court finds Dow has failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Terramara’s termination of her employment was not made “under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law and does not support a claim against a private employer or supervisor when no such action is alleged.

Brown v. Bronx Cross County Medical Group · filed 1993-10-14

Plaintiff does not allege that either defendant acted under state authority or color of state law, and nothing in the complaint or in either party’s brief indicates that defendant BCCMG is anything but a private corporation. Hence, § 1983 has no bearing on this case. Plaintiffs § 1983 cause of action is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private employer without state action or involvement in the alleged conduct.

Plaisance v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1994-05-20

Plaintiff has brought this employment discrimination action against defendant, a private insurance company. Plaintiff has suggested absolutely no state action or involvement in the alleged acts of discrimination. Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim either under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires that a private employer’s challenged termination be fairly attributable to the State.

Nichols v. Metropolitan Center for Independent Living, Inc. · filed 1995-03-14

Nichols also argues that the district court erred in dismissing her claims under § 1983 and the Minnesota Constitution. Both of these claims require proof that the termination of Nichols’s employment was “fairly attributable to the State,” that is, in this context, that “the party charged with the deprivation [was] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”

Private actors may be liable under § 1983 if they conspire with a state actor to violate civil rights.

Smedley v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. Dasilva Donuts Inc. Dasilva Donuts Inc., Doing Business as Dunkin' Donuts, Inc · filed 1997-01-29

While private actors may be liable under § 1983 if they conspire with a state actor to violate civil rights, Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-32 (1980), plaintiff makes no claim which could be construed as even a conclusory allegation that defendants conspired with police to discriminate against him.

A private attorney is not a state actor under § 1983 merely because the attorney is an officer of the court, and a guardian ad litem is not a state actor under the section.

Basolo v. Miller · filed 1997-04-25

We have examined the briefs and the record and agree with the district court’s legal analysis in all respects. See Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983) (a private attorney is not a state actor under § 1983 even though he is an officer of the court); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 155 (10th Cir. 1986) (a guardian ad litem is not a state actor under § 1983); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic , 113 S. Ct. 753, 758 (1993) ( failure to assert a race based animus bars an action under § 1985). These cases are unassailable impediments to Mr. Basolo’s ability to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires sufficient allegations of state action or conspiracy with a state judge to state a claim against a private attorney.

Larker Mar Financial Corp. v. Fullerton Alana Center · filed 1997-06-05

We reject Larker Mar's assertion that the federal complaint adequately stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it alleged that Fullerton Alano's attorney conspired with a state judge to have Larker Mar's state action dismissed.

A private person acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when acting with or in concert with state officials to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Stephens v. Kerrigan · filed 1997-08-12

Only if Kerrigan acted "with the help of or in concert with state officials" to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights will plaintiffs have demonstrated the state action requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment that underlies a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not treat a private attorney as a state actor merely because the attorney is an officer of the court.

Dickerson v. Leavitt Rentals · filed 1998-02-11

It is well-established law that a private attorney, though an “officer of the court,” is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat private hospitals and physicians as state actors merely because they are licensed and regulated when they make involuntary commitment decisions.

[ Doe ] v. Rosenberg · filed 1998-05-07

Licensing and regulations are insufficient to transform the Hospital Defendants into state actors for § 1983 purposes.

A private contractor’s conduct must have a sufficiently close nexus to the state to support liability under § 1983.

Malesevic v. Tecom Fleet Services, Inc. · filed 1998-09-23

Because the plaintiff has failed to show the required nexus such that the conduct of Tecom may be fairly treated as that of the City of Gary, the Section 1983 claim against Te-com must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires state involvement in the specific conduct challenged; a private hospital’s public funding, regulation, and local monopoly alone do not establish state action.

Loh-Seng Yo, M.D. v. Cibola General Hospital · filed 1983-05-12

In this case, plaintiff bases his allegation of state action solely on receipt of governmental funds, extensive governmental regulation, and a localized geographic monopoly enjoyed by the hospital. However, he makes no allegation that these facts involved the state in any significant manner in the specific conduct of which he complains. Accordingly plaintiff has failed to establish state action sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this court.

Section 1983 permits claims against private medical workers when a police officer’s coercion makes their actions attributable to the state.

Ruppel v. Ramseyer · filed 1999-01-19

This court concludes that Plaintiff- has sufficiently alleged that Ram-seyer exercised coercive power so that the actions of Peterson and Tedrick may be deemed those of the state. Accordingly, Counts-X, XI, XX and XXI cannot be dismissed on this basis.

Section 1983 does not treat an attorney as a state actor solely because the attorney uses state subpoena laws.

Richard J. Angelico, M.D. v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, Inc. · filed 1999-07-16

We hold, therefore, that an attorney does not become a state actor simply by employing the state's subpoena laws.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional-rights claim against a corporation that acts as a city agency.

Jersawitz v. PEOPLE TV · filed 1999-10-21

People TV is an agency of the City for purposes of guaranteeing constitutional rights, and a claim pursuant to § 1983 is the appropriate way to attempt to secure those rights.

Section 1983 does not treat a private contractor’s employee as a state actor for employment-related conduct merely because the contractor provides services to a public entity.

Carlucci v. Kalsched · filed 2000-01-04

While Amsterdam can be considered a “state actor” for the purposes of the services it provides to Taylor Care, that conclusion does not make Kalsched a state actor for the purposes of the alleged retaliatory employment actions concerning Carlucci.

A § 1983 claim against a private university requires facts supporting a recognized theory of state action.

Commodari v. Long Island University · filed 2000-03-31

Similarly, nowhere in Dr. Commodari’s Amended Complaint or in his many submissions to this court has Dr. Commodari ever alleged facts that would support a recognized theory of “state action” against LIU. Accordingly, plaintiffs § 1983 claim against LIU is dismissed.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private attorney acted as a state actor; representing a city during an alleged conspiracy does not, by itself, satisfy that requirement.

Florida Country Clubs, Inc. v. Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. · filed 2000-05-23

The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and finds that the allegations against Carlton Fields, examples of which were previously stated by the Court, allege nothing more than the fact that Carlton Fields acted as an attorney for the City of Winter Springs, at some point during the alleged conspiracy committed against Plaintiffs. ... Nothing in the Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, however, satisfies the requirements for pleading a section 1983 violation by a private actor. Therefore, this Court dismisses Count I of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.

Section 1983 does not treat a private institution as a state actor merely because it receives public financial assistance.

Keady v. Nike, Inc. · filed 2000-09-21

As to St. John’s, this allegation is insufficient to give rise to federal jurisdiction under Section 1983, because mere financial assistance from a public authority to a private institution does not constitute state action.

Section 1983 permits suit against a private athletic association when pervasive entwinement of public school officials makes its regulatory activity state action.

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. · filed 2001-02-20

We hold that the association's regulatory activity may and should be treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association, there being no offsetting reason to see the association's acts in any other way. ... Pleas for special treatment are hard to sell, although saying that does not, of course, imply anything about the merits of Brentwood's complaint; the issue here is merely whether Brentwood properly names the Association as a § 1983 defendant, not whether it should win on its claim.

Section 1983 treats private physicians as acting under color of state law when they jointly participate with state officials in an involuntary hospitalization.

Tewksbury v. Dowling · filed 2001-09-17

Likewise, in this case, although Defendants are private physicians employed by a private hospital, they jointly participated with state officials. ... Under these authorities, the Court finds that Defendants acted under the color of state law when they involuntarily hospitalized Tewksbury.

A private contractor performing state prison functions can be a state actor for purposes of Section 1983.

Flint ex rel. Flint v. Kentucky Department of Corrections · filed 2001-10-26

The central question to be answered in determining whether a private party is a “state actor” is whether their actions are “fairly attributable to the state.” ... Defendant Montgomery is, therefore, a state actor for purpose of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a private action to enforce the Medicaid Act’s reasonable promptness requirement.

Rancourt v. Concannon · filed 2001-11-28

The luminously clear and structurally precise analytical rationale crafted in those two cases by Judge Cyr for the Court in resolving such issues fits perfectly to the facts of this case, and that analysis, here applied, dictates the same result that it did in those cases: that the private right here challenged exists and that Plaintiffs have standing to sue the State to seek the relief they seek in enforcement of the “reasonable promptness” requirement.