42 U.S.C. § 1983

Private parties do not become state actors under § 1983 merely by bringing a suit in state court.

Giorgio v. State of Tenn., Dept. of Human Services of Nashville and Jefferson County · filed 1996-08-07

The Carters were not state actors, as bringing a suit in state court does not transform private action into state action.

Section 1983 reaches a high school athletic association that depends on the public school system for its existence because the association is a state actor.

Robbins Ex Rel. Robbins v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 1996-08-08

The IHSAA is an organization whose very existence is entirely dependent upon the absolute cooperation and support of the public school system of the State of Indiana and is subject to constitutional scrutiny as a state actor and as being involved in state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; a privately owned regulated utility is not a state actor merely because it provides utility service.

Mayer v. Entergy New Orleans, Inc. (In re Mayer) · filed 1996-08-12

Even assuming, arguendo, that Entergy has deprived Debtor of federally created rights, Debtor has not stated a claim against Entergy under § 1983 as Entergy is a private actor not a state actor as required by § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches a private telephone company’s conduct when state involvement in the challenged policy is sufficient to make that conduct state action.

Boston Phoenix, Inc. v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1996-08-12

For these reasons, this Court holds that sufficient state action is present in this case to implicate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Section 1983 reaches a municipal authority that is a state actor subject to constitutional requirements.

Chicago Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority · filed 1996-08-23

Thus, we can conclude that indeed defendant is a state actor that is subject to the requirements of the United States constitution.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant was a state actor; a genuine factual dispute on that issue prevents summary judgment.

Craft v. Vanderbilt University · filed 1996-08-26

In order for Defendants to be liable for violating Plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants were state actors. Based on the following analysis, the Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether or not Defendants were state actors for the purpose of Plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1983 requires state action; a complaint lacking state action cannot proceed.

Levy v. Jewish Community Center of Northern Virginia · filed 1996-09-30

Appellant appeals from the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint for want of state action. Our review of the record discloses no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order.

A § 1983 complaint requires state action and may be dismissed when state action is lacking.

Levy v. Ctr · filed 1996-09-30

Appellant appeals from the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint for want of state action. Our review of the record discloses no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order.

Section 1983 requires state action for a claim to proceed.

Levy v. Fresh Fields Market, Incorporated · filed 1996-10-23

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint for want of state action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.

Section 1983 requires a violation of constitutional or statutory rights by a state actor.

Olson v. Loy · filed 1996-10-23

Furthermore, Olson’s claim based on § 1983 must fail. A claim made pursuant to § 1983 must be based upon the violation of an underlying Constitutional or statutoiy violation by a state actor.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is not met merely because governments regulate a cable provider or municipalities grant it a franchise.

Glendora v. Marshall · filed 1996-11-12

Contrary to Glen-dora’s allegation, neither the State of New York nor the Federal Government have undertaken to provide cable television as a governmental service by regulating that industry nor have the municipal franchisors undertaken the same as a governmental function by virtue of granting the provider a franchise.

Section 1983 does not reach private doctors who independently perform psychiatric evaluations for the state without a collaborative relationship with it.

Collyer v. Darling · filed 1997-01-06

In effect, both doctors had the obligation to independently determine whether Collyer was mentally fit to effectively function as an employee. Given the absence of a contract or any evidence that Dr. Rizk and Dr. Lindl did not act independently in their task, it is clear they are not state actors.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of constitutional rights by a state actor to state a claim.

Wolf v. Fliss · filed 1997-01-09

As noted previously, Mr. Wolf's complaint fails to allege that he was deprived of his constitutional rights by a state actor as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A state university’s collection and distribution of mandatory student fees supplies the state action required for Section 1983 claims challenging the recipient group’s bylaws and campus expenditures.

Carroll v. Blinken · filed 1997-01-15

It was SUNY’s collection and distribution of mandatory student fees that provided the state action necessary to appellants’ Section 1983 claims regarding the NYPIRG by-law and expenditure of funds on the Albany campus.

Section 1983 requires a state actor to support a claim; the claim cannot proceed after the only state actors are dismissed.

Steffens v. Steffens · filed 1997-01-27

Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars the relief sought against Judges Kuenhold and Childress, who must be dismissed. In their absence, no state actor remains to support plaintiffs’ claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private utility’s firing decision does not qualify when the state played no role in it.

Luyon v. Gte, Incorporated · filed 1997-02-11

Therefore, with respect to Luyon's claims under § 1983 and state law, we AFFIRM for the reasons stated by the district court in its Order dated May 31, 1996. ... The statute affords no shield against purely private conduct, no matter how unfair that conduct may be. ... GTE's uncontested fact statement portrays the state as having had no role in Luyon's firing and thus rules out anything but a "metaphysical doubt" that GTE engaged in state action. See Johnson v. Univ. of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir.1995). Accordingly, GTE is GRANTED summary judgment against Luyon's section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a claim may fail when state action is lacking.

Reaves v. Peace · filed 1997-02-21

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds of absolute immunity, derivative immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, lack of state action, and plaintiffs' failure to exhaust state remedies. ... Our review persuades us that the rulings of the district court were correct. We therefore affirm the judgment on the reasoning set forth in the district court's extensive and careful memorandum opinion.

A private insurer does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely because its settlement agreement was part of the judicial process.

Brunswick v. Safeco Insurance Company, No. 336241 (Feb. 26, 1997) · filed 1997-02-26

Here, no state action exists which would bring the defendant's acts under § 1983, assuming that the refusal to pay attorneys' fees would constitute a violation of the plaintiff's right to property. The fact that the settlement agreement was part of the judicial process does not transform the private party defendant into a state actor.

Section 1983 provides no relief against private defendants who are not state actors.

Parmelee v. Bruggeman · filed 1997-03-03

No set of facts would entitle Parmelee to relief from these defendants under his vague constitutional claims, as they are not state actors.

Section 1983 permits relief against state actors, but not private persons who are not state actors or federal officials.

ZACHAY v. Metzger · filed 1997-03-12

Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 suit against Metzger because he is not a state actor. Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 suit against McArdle because he is a federal official. Section 1983 only entitles plaintiffs to relief against state actors, not federal actors.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a claim fails when the defendants are not state actors.

Jenkins v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. · filed 1997-03-24

Defendants correctly note, however, that Section 1983 gives rise to liability only for violations Of civil rights “under the color of’ state law. Therefore, state action is a prerequisite for maintaining a cause of action for a violation of civil rights. Because Plaintiff has completely failed to show that Defendants are state actors, his claims fail as a matter of law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; private parties acting in accordance with a court order do not meet that requirement.

Alexander v. Engeln · filed 1997-03-26

To prove a claim under section 1983, Alexander must show that the party charged with the deprivation is a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. ... All of these claims regard, at most, private parties acting in accordance with a court order. The defendants are not state actors.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against defendants who are not state actors.

Saunders v. Morris · filed 1997-04-02

Steven F. Saunders appeals the district court's orders dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint and dismissing the Defendants that are private actors. ... We also affirm the district court order dismissing the Defendants that are not state actors on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state; a private employer with no alleged state-action nexus is not liable under it.

Steele v. SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Inc. · filed 1997-04-15

Thus, there is no section 1983 cause of action unless the alleged deprivation of rights was the result of conduct fairly attributable to the state.

Private lawyers are not state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Atlas v. Stolberg · filed 1997-04-23

With respect to appellant’s claim that the attorneys are liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, it is well settled that private lawyers are not state actors for purposes of section 1983 liability.

The New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority is a state actor for purposes of a § 1983 suit.

Marilyn Manson, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority · filed 1997-05-07

Additionally, the NJSEA is a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federally protected right by someone acting under color of state law; allegations of a hospital’s governmental ties and sterilization policy can sufficiently plead state action to survive a motion to dismiss.

Lake v. Arnold · filed 1997-05-15

In order to state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by one acting under color of state law. ... If, as we must, we accept each of these allegations as true, we cannot say that the plaintiffs have failed to allege that defendants were state actors sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 requires allegations of state action, or facts supporting an inference of state action, to state a claim.

Lowry v. Cabletron · filed 1997-05-28

However, although it is unclear whether plaintiff has brought a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as part of Count VII of the complaint, the court grants defendant's motion to dismiss such claim on the grounds that plaintiff fails to allege state action and that the facts do not give rise to an inference of same.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private physician peer reviewers when the connection between the state and their challenged actions is too tenuous to make them state actors.

Rogers v. Columbia/HCA of Central Louisiana, Inc. · filed 1997-06-09

In Count Five Rogers seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations by the defendants; to wit, the taking of his property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... We find the link in this case between the state and the defendants to be tenuous. Count Five is thus without merit.

Private trial and appellate counsel are not state actors under § 1983.

Davis v. State of Mississippi · filed 1997-06-20

Davis’ trial and appellate counsel are private parties and therefore are not state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against private parties must allege an agreement with state actors to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Gale v. Edward Perovic, Madge Attwood, and Kenwood Condominium Association · filed 1997-06-24

While Gale's complaint does charge the defendants with conspiracy, it is devoid of any hint--either in the defendants named or the facts alleged--that defendants entered into any agreement with any state 1 judges for the express purpose of depriving him of his constitutional rights, thereby becoming "willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents." Leahy v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508, 912 F.2d 917, 921 (7th Cir.1990) (internal quotations omitted).

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s challenged conduct to be attributable to the state; state involvement in unrelated activity does not satisfy that requirement.

Sanders v. Prentice-Hall Corp. System · filed 1997-07-10

In the Complaint sub judice, Plaintiffs allegations are insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain a claim under § 1983. Nowhere does Plaintiff aver that the state was so involved in the decision-making processes of Defendants that it could reasonably be said that such decisions were the state’s and not the private actor’s.

Section 1983 does not treat a prison chaplain as a state actor when the chaplain performs inherently ecclesiastical duties, even if the chaplain is a full-time state employee.

Nick P. Montano v. Hedgepeth · filed 1997-07-23

In sum, we conclude that a prison chaplain, even if a full-time state employee, is not a state actor when he engages in inherently ecclesiastical functions (that is, when he performs spiritual duties as a leader in his church).

Section 1983 requires a sufficiently close nexus between the state and a regulated entity’s challenged action to treat that action as state action; substantial state regulation alone is insufficient.

Jemzura v. Public Service Commission · filed 1997-07-28

Under § 1983, color of law exists only where there is “a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” ... Contrary to plaintiffs conclusory assertions to this effect, however, the fact that NYSEG is a public utility subject to considerable state regulation does not by itself support a finding of state action.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc. · filed 1997-07-29

The section 1983 claim fails because Buck is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

First Ebenezer Baptist Church v. CONS. EDISON CO. OF NY, INC. · filed 1997-08-05

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim also fails due to the absence of state action in this case. A plaintiff alleging a violation of Section 1983 must show that the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against private individuals who are not state actors.

Wesgate v. Leorna · filed 1997-08-27

First, Wesgate's claims against Reid Leorna and his family are not cognizable under section 1983 because Reid Leorna and his family members are not state actors.

Section 1983 permits a claim challenging the constitutionality of a state prejudgment attachment procedure used by a private creditor, but does not permit a claim based solely on misuse or abuse of that procedure.

Hawara v. MTC Distributing · filed 1997-09-15

To the extent that the Hawaras challenged the constitutionality of the California prejudgment attachment procedure MTC used to get a court order after an ex parte hearing, the district court erred by determining that the Hawaras failed to state a claim under § 1983. ... The Hawaras failed to state a claim under § 1983 to the extent that they alleged misuse or abuse of the statute.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the challenged conduct was state action; conduct by private parties without a demonstrated link to state officials cannot support a claim.

Ferran v. Town of Grafton · filed 1997-10-06

Thus, after carefully reviewing the record, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence of “state action” that could form the basis of their § 1983 claims under the Due Process Clause, and in any event, the minor damage that occurred could not form the basis of a constitutional “injury.”

Section 1983 does not subject a police equipment supplier to liability as a state actor merely for supplying police equipment.

Garcia v. City of Fullerton · filed 1997-11-12

The district court's conclusion that Safariland was not a state actor subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is correct. Safariland is only a purveyor of police equipment; this is not a function which can fairly be attributed to the state.

Section 1983 does not permit an equal protection claim against the NCAA based on its eligibility decisions because the NCAA is not a state actor.

Hall v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1997-11-21

Since the NCAA is not a state actor, it is not subject to constitutional restraints and cannot be sued under § 1983 for alleged equal protection violations.

Section 1983 does not treat a private medical school’s employment action as state action merely because the school is affiliated with a public university, receives public support, or is subject to public oversight when those ties are unconnected to the challenged action.

Tavoloni v. Mount Sinai Medical Center · filed 1997-11-24

But these circumstances, whether viewed individually or collectively, do not yield the conclusion that Mount Sinai’s actions with respect to Dr. Tavoloni “may be fairly treated as [those] of the State itself.”

Section 1983 requires state action, and independent student editors’ publication decisions are not attributable to school officials merely because the publications operate at a public school with school funding and faculty advisers.

Yeo v. Town of Lexington · filed 1997-12-09

Because the record establishes that the editorial judgment exercised was the independent judgment of the student editors of both publications, we resolve the question of state action against Yeo.

A § 1983 sexual harassment claim establishes state action when the alleged harasser supervises the plaintiff or exercises state authority over the plaintiff.

Brasko v. City of Caney · filed 1997-12-09

To establish state action to support a § 1983 claim of sexual harassment, the defendant must be the plaintiff's supervisor or exercise state authority over the plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not attribute independent student editors' publication decisions to school officials merely because the publications operate in public schools with government funding and faculty advisers.

Yeo v. Town Of Lexington · filed 1997-12-09

It is not enough to create state action that the decisions took place in a public school setting, that there was some governmental funding of the publication, that teachers were acting as advisors, and that the state actors made an educational judgment to respect the autonomy of the students' editorial judgment.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor to state a federal claim.

Faulkner v. Bay Area Hospital South Coast Radiologists Pc · filed 1997-12-17

We agree with the district court that Faulkner failed to establish that the defendants were state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Faulkner, therefore, failed to state a federal claim.

Section 1983 requires state action; whether a private hospital’s disciplinary action meets that requirement depends on a factual nexus between the challenged action and government involvement.

Glenn R. Black, M.D. v. Barberton Citizens Hospital · filed 1998-01-23

While Dr. Black has alleged that the City exerts control over the hospital, without factual findings regarding involvement of this kind, we cannot determine whether, as a matter of law, a nexus exists between the challenged action, the hospital’s disciplinary action against plaintiff, and the governmental involvement of the City of Bar-berton, which we required in Crowder. We, thus, remand the case to the District Court to determine whether there exists the state action required to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or to state a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and, accordingly, whether this case may properly remain in federal court.

Section 1983 treats an authority created and controlled by the government as a state actor even if it can sue and be sued.

Bennett v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority · filed 1998-02-02

An authority is a state actor when the government creates and controls it even if the authority, like the MBTA, can sue and be sued.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against a private employer cannot proceed without it.

Rimpson v. Bliss & Laughlin Steel · filed 1998-02-20

A § 1983 claim, however, is only available if state action is present.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is satisfied by the University of Pittsburgh’s activities, allowing the claim against it to proceed.

Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1975-12-12

It was, of course, decided in Bra-den that Pitt’s activities were clothed with the necessary “state action” for the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Chief Judge Sorg’s decision on this issue in Braden is dispositive of the “state action” issue in the matter sub judice. The court concludes that defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II will be denied.

A private contractor that is not a state actor cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Wilcher v. City Of Wilmington · filed 1998-03-17

The firefighters sought injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and damages for "invasion of privacy" under the state's tort law. ... The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity and in favor of the SODAT defendants on the ground that SODAT was not a state actor. ... Third, they appeal the district court's determinations regarding qualified immunity and state action. ... We will reject all the plaintiffs' grounds for appeal except for the fifth one.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have been a state actor when the alleged violation occurred.

Hahn v. City of Kenner · filed 1998-04-13

Mayor Congemi did not even become Mayor until almost seven months after Hahn was arrested, and thus was not a state actor until this time, long after most of the alleged violations had occurred.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s involvement in the challenged deprivation to be fairly attributable to the state; joint sponsorship of an event alone does not establish that involvement.

DeBauche v. Virginia Commonwealth University · filed 1998-04-13

Joint “sponsorship” of the debate, here, publicizing and airing it, is not equivalent to joint involvement in the decision to exclude certain individuals from the debate.

State regulation and authorization of a private party’s conduct do not, by themselves, make that party a state actor for a § 1983 claim.

Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp. · filed 1998-05-01

First, plaintiffs’ allegations of state action are insufficient. State regulation and the CCC’s authorization of casino activities does not transform the casinos into state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action; an alleged civil wrong without state action does not support a claim.

Reed v. Mims · filed 1998-05-13

We affirm the trial court's dismissal of count III, which attempts to state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's claim is for an alleged civil wrong where there is no state action at all. There is no basis for a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against defendants who are neither state actors nor acting under color of state law.

Banks v. Bank of Commerce · filed 1998-05-20

Because defendants are neither state actors nor acting under color of state law, they are not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private hospital’s internal decision about medical privileges does not satisfy that requirement without sufficient state involvement.

Black v. Barberton Citizens Hospital · filed 1998-06-02

Plaintiff Black fails to show “state action” sufficient to support § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not treat a private person as a state actor merely because police respond to that person's calls, including earlier calls.

Bewley v. City of Duncan · filed 1998-06-04

Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Lapine's actions did not constitute state action simply because the officers responded to his call, or for that matter, had in the past responded to his calls.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s challenged conduct to be attributable to the state; state funding alone is insufficient.

Pol-Sella v. SER Jobs for Progress National, Inc. · filed 1998-06-30

Therefore, plaintiff must in some way establish that her dismissal is fairly attributable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. As stated previously, the fact that SER Jobs may receive funding from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is not, per se, sufficient to establish state action.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law; a private university’s housing decisions do not qualify when the university is not a state actor and the decisions cannot be attributed to the state.

Hack v. President and Fellows of Yale College · filed 1998-07-31

Therefore, having found that: 1) Yale is not a state actor; and 2) Yale’s housing policy decisions may not be treated as state action, the court concludes that Yale did not act under color of state within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action for a claim against private defendants.

Shah v. Univ TX System · filed 1998-08-10

Shah’s § 1983 claim against the remaining private defendants fails for lack of state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on defendants who are not state actors and lack authority to act under color of state law.

Richardson v. Bakery, Confectionary & Tobacco Workers Local No. 26 · filed 1998-08-13

Defendants are not subject to liability under section 1983 because they are not state actors and have no authority to act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor, and a genuine factual dispute about that status can preclude summary judgment.

Craft v. Vanderbilt University · filed 1998-08-19

In order for Defendants to be liable for violating Plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants were state actors. Based on the following analysis, the Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether or not Defendants were state actors for the purpose of Plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private repossession agent is not liable when police assistance is not significant to the repossession.

Sherry v. Associates Commercial Corp. · filed 1998-09-29

State action is a prerequisite to liability under § 1983. Because I conclude that the police officers’ aid was not significant since it contributed nothing to the remedy of self-help repossession which Abbey Recovery was free to pursue in the officers’ absence, plaintiffs’ claim that Abbey Recovery deprived them of their constitutional right to due process cannot survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires state action; private counsel does not act under color of state law merely by representing a client.

Williams v. Fulton County Jail · filed 1983-12-13

Williams’ claim against Bergin is not a federal matter, for state action is an essential element of a Section 1983 suit. ... Private counsel like Bergin do not act under color of state law.

State regulation of a private landlord, without more, does not make the landlord a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Lake County Trust Co. v. Wine · filed 1998-12-23

In the alternative, the Niebauer Class argues that the regulations placed on the mobile home industry by the State create a symbiotic relationship between Williamsburg and the State, and therefore, Williamsburg is a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Again, we disagree. ... As the Niebauer Class has done nothing more than allege the existence of a regulatory scheme, they have failed to laise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this argument as well.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege state action as a basis for the claim.

Stewart v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad · filed 1999-01-05

In addition, plaintiff has failed to allege any state action that could be the basis of his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims ... .

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s challenged conduct to be attributable to the state; an employment termination uninfluenced by the state does not qualify.

Durso v. Kentucky Ass'n of Counties, Inc. · filed 1999-01-22

In summary, the Court finds that defendants’ decision to terminate plaintiff was made in the course of its day-to-day functioning, and the decision was not influenced or dictated by the state in any way. Hence, because Durso’s termination cannot be attributed to the state, his § 1983 claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 applies to state actors, not federal agencies.

Richardson v. Veterans Affairs · filed 1999-02-04

This statute applies only to state actors, and not to federal agencies.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private university’s receipt of federal funds alone does not make its conduct state action.

Student Government Ass'n of Wilberforce University v. Wilberforce University · filed 1983-12-28

In the instant proceeding, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not available to the Plaintiffs as a vehicle for prosecuting the present action against the University and other Defendants because, as the pleadings reveal, the University is a private as opposed to state school and the mere receipt of federal funds "is insufficient to transform the acts of this otherwise private institution into the state action upon which a § 1983 action is dependent.

Section 1983 requires allegations of state action to state a claim against a defendant.

Engles v. Thomas M. Madden Co. · filed 1999-02-12

We agree with the district court that plaintiffs present no allegations of state action with respect to defendants Madden, American International, and National Union, and thus fail to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege deprivation of a statutory or constitutional right by a state actor or a party who conspired with a state actor.

Lincoln v. Brown & Williams Co · filed 1999-04-16

Lincoln’s complaint fails to allege the deprivation of a statutory or constitutional right by a state actor or by a party ... who conspired with a state actor.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against a bank fails when the bank is not a state agency.

Reisner v. Stoller · filed 1999-05-21

A civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is also not stated here because Albank (known as Heritage Savings Bank at the time) was not a state agency.

State-mandated peer review and state-law immunity do not, by themselves, make a private hospital’s conduct state action under § 1983.

Croy v. A.O. Fox Memorial Hospital · filed 1999-05-28

New York’s peer review process, see N.Y.Pub. Health Law §§ 2805—j - 2805-m; N.Y.Educ.Law § 6527, and the certain immunities provided by New York law for conduct undertaken in connection with the peer review process, see N.Y.Educ.Law § 6527(5), are insufficient to convert the Hospital’s conduct in this matter into state action.

A § 1983 claim against a private employer must allege facts supporting state action.

Miller v. Walker Division of Butler Manufacturing Co. · filed 1984-01-16

Inasmuch as the Plaintiff has not alleged any facts, which if taken as true, would support a finding that the Plaintiff’s allegedly sexually discriminatory discharge by the Defendant, a private employer, was accomplished by “state/governmental action”, the Court hereby ORDERS that the conclusory allegations contained in H 8 of the Plaintiff’s complaint be stricken from the complaint in this action.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is met when a legislature enacts the challenged statute, even if the legislature is immune from liability.

May v. Cooperman · filed 1984-01-25

Second, the state action requirement has been met. The State defendants’ action in sending out copies of the statute and inaction in controlling the local board may amount to state action, even if they seem rather insignificant. In addition, it is clear that the legislature’s passage of the statute constituted state action, whether or not the legislature is immune from liability for that action.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim fails when none is involved.

Hill v. Meta Group · filed 1999-08-16

Clearly there was no state action involved in this case.

For most purposes, § 1983 uses the same state-action inquiry as the Fourteenth Amendment.

Klavan v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center · filed 1999-08-16

For most purposes, including our purpose here, the "state action" inquiry is identical under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a private facility’s board and consultants when they are not state actors.

Alexander v. Pathfinder, Inc. · filed 1999-08-31

Similarly, the Pathfinder board and Sheri Simon and Marilyn Martin, consultants to Pathfinder, are not state actors and may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; government funding does not make this private legal services corporation a state actor.

Costa Del Moral v. Servicios Legales De Puerto Rico · filed 1999-09-01

Additionally, plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of law, that is, that at the time the defendant perpetrated the violation, defendant was a “state actor.” ... In the present case, it is undisputed that Servicios Legales is a private non-profit corporation organized under the laws of Puerto Rico to provide free legal assistance to individuals meeting eligibility guidelines. ... It receives funds from the government of Puerto Rico and from the Legal Services Corporation, a non-profit corporation established by the federal government to provide legal assistance in civil matters to persons financially unable to afford such assistance. ... Plaintiffs jurisdictional invocation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this case is so clearly unwarranted by law that the Court must consider whether this misrepresentation merits sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.

Section 1983 requires state action; incorporation under state law alone does not make a corporation’s conduct state action.

Tufano v. One Toms Point Lane Corp. · filed 1999-09-13

Notwithstanding the only plausible nexus, that Defendant One Toms Point Lane Corporation is incorporated under the laws of New York State, there is no “state action” involved and therefore this claim must also fail.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against private defendants whose conduct is independently motivated rather than attributable to the state.

DeBauche v. Trani · filed 1999-09-15

Because the allegations of DeBauche's amended complaint make it quite clear that the actions attributable to Wilder, WRVA, and WNVT amounted to their independently-motivated, private actions, rather than "state action," DeBauche fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the private defendants for which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to be a state actor; a claim against a private neighborhood association cannot proceed under it.

Trinity Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Asheville · filed 1999-09-28

Trinity’s claim for declaratory judgment against Carrier is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Carrier is not a state actor and therefore there is no jurisdiction.

Section 1983 requires state action; disputed facts about an athletic association’s ties to public schools can leave that issue for trial.

Alston v. Virginia High School League, Inc. · filed 1999-10-13

Whether this asserted involvement in the VHSL’s actions is sufficient to constitute state action is a question of fact for the jury.

A § 1983 claim against a private defendant requires state action or an alleged conspiracy with a state actor.

Adelman v. Pharmaceuti · filed 1999-10-20

However, because Novartis is not a state actor, and Ms. Adelman has not alleged that Novartis conspired with a state actor, she has failed to demonstrate a nonfrivolous issue for appeal of her § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not reach a private university’s academic dismissal decision when the decision does not qualify as governmental action.

Missert v. Trustees of Boston University · filed 1999-10-20

Under any of these tests, BU’s decision to terminate does not qualify as governmental action.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be government action rather than private conduct.

Reil v. Clinton County, New York · filed 1999-11-19

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the behavior complained of must be considered an action of the government and not a private actor.

A § 1983 due process claim against the NCAA cannot succeed because the NCAA is not a state actor.

Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1999-12-01

In any case, the NCAA is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires definite allegations of state action by the defendant; an unsupported claim of coordination with a state agency is insufficient.

Gyadu v. Hartford Insurance Company, Defendantappellee · filed 1999-12-10

Gyadu also argues that the district court erred in determining that there was no “state action” by defendant, as is necessary for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. ... Because Gyadu has failed to make any definite allegations of state action, federal jurisdiction cannot be grounded on this federal question.

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against a private attorney when the claim does not involve state action.

Cook v. Grisham · filed 1999-12-14

In addition, Heck notwithstanding, Cook’s claim against Ford, a private attorney, does not involve state action and is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing corporate trustees individually to allege that each trustee’s own conduct constituted state action; the corporation’s state action alone is insufficient.

Murphy v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1999-12-06

The allegation that NYRA’s conduct constituted state action cannot be bootstrapped into an allegation that each Board Defendants’ conduct constituted state action.

A state-operated hospital’s peer-review conduct is state action for purposes of § 1983.

Brown v. Medical College of Ohio · filed 1999-12-28

Although a hospital peer review does not ordinarily constitute state action for purposes of § 1983, ... the fact that MCO is a state agency creates state action in this case.

Section 1983 requires conduct attributable to the state; a private employer’s firing does not meet that requirement merely because the employer has governmental connections.

Thorn v. County of Monroe · filed 1984-02-10

Shortly, there is no State action on the part of Pleasant Valley for purposes of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires allegations that the defendant acted as a state actor; a private party’s success in state court does not alone satisfy that requirement.

Franco v. County of Marin · filed 1984-02-21

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against Cappe must be dismissed because the allegations of the complaint do not establish that Cappe was a state actor.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private athletic association whose relationship with the state makes it a state actor.

Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 2000-01-21

While satisfaction of the state compulsion test is reason enough to conclude that the MHSAA is a state actor, the Court is even more convinced by application of the symbiotic relationship test.

An agency relationship with a public entity does not, by itself, make a private actor’s conduct state action under § 1983.

Patrick v. Floyd Medical Center · filed 2000-01-26

The fact that HAFC may be liable for the acts of FHM under an agency theory does not automatically transform FHM’s action into state action.

A private social worker does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely because police respond to her call and detain or transport someone.

Brown v. O'BANNON · filed 2000-02-17

The Tenth Circuit has explicitly rejected this theory of state action, finding in Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1465-66 (10th Cir.1996), that a social worker/therapist employed by a nonpublic organization does not become a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983 liability simply because a state police officer responds to her call by transporting or detaining that person. Under Pino, Plaintiffs claim that Strongwater was a state actor subject to liability under § 1983 for violating her constitutional rights fails as a matter of law.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is satisfied when a town takes the challenged action.

Vertical Broadcasting, Inc. v. Town of Southampton · filed 2000-02-22

The state action requirement is satisfied in this case because, with respect to the denial of the zoning change, the actions complained of were taken by the Town.

Section 1983 treats a municipal board member’s action or failure to act in an official capacity as state action.

Gibbs-Alfano v. Ossining Boat & Canoe Club, Inc. · filed 2000-03-10

Action or failure to act by a member of a municipal board in his official capacity is, of course, state action.

Section 1983 requires state action attributable to the defendant; a private law firm representing a party in a custody matter did not meet that requirement.

Gatlin v. Hartley, Nicholson · filed 2000-03-20

In a through Memorandum and Order, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s ... federal claims for lack of any “state action” attributable to Defendant as required under § 1983. ... We conclude that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint substantially for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum and Order.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to use a state judge’s action as the state action supporting a civil rights suit against private parties challenging that court’s judgment.

Dockery v. Cullen & Dykman · filed 2000-03-30

Plaintiff claims that the action of the state judge constitutes the state action that allows the bringing of this federal action, presumably pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but this is incorrect.

A court-appointed attorney who is not a state actor is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Shanafelt v. Off TX Atty Gen · filed 2000-04-14

The remaining defendant, Shanafelt’s court-appointed attorney, Gregory Brewer, is not a state actor and is not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 treats Amtrak as a state actor when it exercises its police power.

DeSilvis v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 2000-05-09

... Amtrak is also a state actor for purposes of liability under section 1983 in utilizing its police power pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 545(j).

Section 1983 requires state action, and its state action doctrine does not override the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar.

Avoyelles Publishing Co. v. Ieyoub · filed 2000-05-12

Section 1983 applies only to state actors. ... Section 1983 state action doctrine does not trump a jurisdictional doctrine such, as Rooker-Feldman.

A licensed physician does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by using a state involuntary commitment procedure.

Scott v. Hern · filed 2000-06-06

Contrary to Scott’s suggestion, the use of a state procedure does not become state action simply because the person using the procedure is a licensed professional such as a physician.

A private adoption agency's state license alone does not make its conduct state action under § 1983.

White v. Adoption of Baby Boy D. · filed 2000-06-13

However, he cites no legal authority that actions of a private adoption agency licensed by the state constitute "state action" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Indeed, we know of none. ... Further, no state action within the meaning of these federal statutes occurred.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a defendant who is not a state actor.

Borninski v. Lewis · filed 2000-06-14

... lawsuit and that Shehan was not liable under § 1983 because he was not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires a sufficient connection between the state and a private defendant’s conduct; mere cooperation with a city does not make the defendant a state actor.

Loveberry v. Amos · filed 2000-06-21

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, the evidence of mere cooperation between the city and the defendant falls short of what is needed to prove that Wallace was a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983.

A private physician does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by using a state procedure.

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado, Inc. , Amicus Curiae · filed 2000-07-06

Contrary to Scott’s suggestion, the use of a state procedure does not become state action simply because the person using the procedure is a licensed professional such as a physician.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private party participated in joint action with the state or its agents to establish state action.

Ellett v. Big Red Keno · filed 2000-07-21

We further conclude that Ellett failed to establish the requisite degree of state action to implicate 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1997) (§ 1983 plaintiff must produce evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude private party is willing participant in joint action with state or its agents), and we find that any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985 conspiracy claim was insufficiently supported, see Larson by Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (elements of § 1985(3) action); Nelson v. City of McGehee, 876 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1989) (§ 1983 plaintiff must show defendants reached agreement to violate his federally protected rights).

Private conduct can satisfy Section 1983's state-action requirement when a public-private partnership and government control sufficiently link the conduct to the state.

PEOPLE FOR ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMAL v. Giuliani · filed 2000-07-25

The contractual agreement between the City and the CowParade Organizers, coupled with the significant regulation and control over the event that was exercised by the City, created a sufficient link between the public and private entities, placing the CowParade activities under the umbrella of state action sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against private defendants who are not state actors.

McDonald v. Griffin · filed 2000-07-26

The remaining defendants are not state actors and are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff challenging a private party’s use of attachment proceedings to allege a constitutional defect in the procedures actually used.

Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia · filed 2000-08-14

While Rivera makes plain that some applications of Rule 56.4 are constitutionally deficient, the Gonzálezes cannot state a § 1983 claim by citing those deficiencies. Instead, they must allege constitutional deficiencies in the ex parte procedures used to attach their property.

Section 1983 requires state action; court appointment and payment from state funds alone do not make a guardian or psychologist a state actor.

Elmasri v. England · filed 2000-08-16

Nor can Dr. Favaro and Donna England be deemed state actors. Neither their appointment by a New York State court, nor the fact that they were paid by state funds, are sufficient to render them state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action; a government employee’s status alone does not turn personal conduct into state action.

Holland v. Sebunya · filed 2000-08-17

In order to satisfy the second of these requirements and show state action, Holland must demonstrate more than Sebunya’s status as a state official. The employment status of a State or city official is not enough to transform personal pursuits into state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; adding a claim against defendants who are not state actors is futile when the plaintiffs allege no state action.

Canfield v. American Eurocopter · filed 2000-08-21

Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to add claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Because plaintiffs asserted no state action and because defendants are not state actors, the district court concluded that the additional claims were futile and denied the motion to amend. The district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1983 does not treat a private casino as a state actor merely because the state regulates it and authorizes its activities.

Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp. · filed 2000-11-02

State regulation and the CCC's authorization of casino activities do not transform the casinos into state actors.

Section 1983 requires involvement by a state actor; a foundation that is not a state actor cannot be liable under it.

Chiles v. Allmand · filed 2000-11-15

Based upon our review of the record and the briefs, the Foundation was not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private certifying board that is not a state actor.

Cohn v. National Board of Trial Advocacy John Does 1-20, Members of the Review Standards Committee · filed 2000-11-17

In addition, the court was correct to conclude NBTA, as a private entity, is not a state actor for § 1983 purposes or a person that can be sued for alleged constitutional violations.

Section 1983’s state actor requirement is satisfied by the University of Pittsburgh.

Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 2000-11-29

The University meets the state actor requirement for defendants in § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 treats a private hospital as a state actor when it holds a medically cleared child pending a child welfare agency’s decision.

Kia P. v. McIntyre · filed 2000-12-05

Between Mora P.’s medical clearance on April 6 or 7 and her discharge to her mother’s care on April 8, Mora was being held by the Hospital solely pending action by the CWA. The Hospital defendants were therefore behaving as state actors and may be held accountable under § 1983 for events occurring during that period.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant’s conduct to have a sufficiently close nexus to the state to count as state action.

Darby v. California, Department of Social Service · filed 2001-01-10

The evidence offered by the plaintiffs in this case does not indicate a sufficiently close nexus between the state and Watson to convert her action into that of the state.

Section 1983 does not treat a private firm as a state actor solely because it receives government revenue.

Ashanti v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Corp. · filed 2001-01-24

The fact that a private firm receives revenues from the government does not by itself provide a basis for holding that the firm is a state actor.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private purchaser who is not a state actor.

Brown v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 2001-01-26

Anderson is not a state actor subject to liability under § 1983, Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 289 (6th Cir.1998), or a federal agent subject to liability under Bivens.

Section 1983 permits a state-action claim against a private actor when the actor and the state have a symbiotic relationship, even if the state did not participate in the challenged conduct.

Crissman v. Dover Downs Ent. Inc. · filed 2001-01-29

When such a relationship of interdependence exists, aS 1983 plaintiff need not show state participation in the challenged activity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on counsel to an unsecured creditors committee acting in that capacity because counsel is not a state actor.

Picciotto v. Schreiber · filed 2001-01-31

This claim, too, must fail, as Schreiber, in his capacity as counsel to the unsecured creditors committee, was not a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires a private party’s challenged conduct to qualify as state action before the party can be held liable.

Massey v. Board of Trustees of the Ogden Area Community Action Committee · filed 2001-02-13

A review of all the evidence indicates that Massey cannot meet either test. There is no link between Massey’s termination and the state.

Section 1983 does not treat foster parents as state actors merely because a state extends governmental tort liability and immunity rules to them.

Rayburn v. Farnesi · filed 2001-02-16

Likewise, the act of extending governmental tort liability and immunity rules to foster parents does not transform the Hogues into State actors.

Section 1983 requires more than ownership by a state actor to treat a related entity as a state actor; the complaint must allege state involvement in that entity’s affairs.

Connor v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center · filed 2001-03-05

With respect to the remaining two Halifax defendants (Halifax Hospital Medical Center and Halifax Health Care Systems, Inc.), the complaint alleges that they are owned by Halifax Medical Center Foundation, Inc. However, absent an additional allegation of “insinuation” by the state-actor parent into the affairs of these entities, the Court cannot conclude that they are state actors.

A private school may face liability under § 1983 when its conduct is attributable to the state through a public function, government involvement, a symbiotic relationship, or entwinement.

Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute · filed 2001-03-05

To conclude that a private school engaged in state action, the Court must find at least one of the following: (1) that the school performed an exclusively and traditionally public function; (2) that the school’s action was created, coerced or encouraged by the government; (3) that the school had a symbiotic relationship with the government; or (4) that there is an “entwinement” between the school and the state agencies with which it interacts. ... On the current record, the Court cannot say that it clearly appears that Plaintiffs cannot recover on any of these viable theories.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private actor to proceed when a genuine factual issue exists over whether the challenged action is fairly attributable to the state.

Gonzalez v. City of New York · filed 2001-03-28

Hence, at a minimum, an issue of fact exists as to whether the decision to terminate the plaintiffs can be fairly attributed to the state. Consequently, the non-Union Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground of lack of state action is denied.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against private defendants who are not state actors.

New Holland Village Condominium v. DeStaso Enterprises Ltd. · filed 2001-04-18

DeStaso Enterprises and Vincent DeS-taso are not state actors. The claims against them are purely pendent to plaintiffs’ purported federal claims.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim against federal employees alone cannot proceed under it.

Edwards v. Municipal · filed 2001-04-26

As a preliminary matter, we note that this action could not be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there is no state action, all of the defendants are federal employees.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private citizen who is not acting under color of state law.

Patel v. Heidelberger · filed 2001-04-26

The district court correctly noted that Patel may not bring a § 1983 claim against a private citizen who is not acting under the color of state law.

Section 1983 does not treat a private agency as a state actor merely because it accepts public funding or government referrals.

Downey v. Coalition Against Rape and Abuse, Inc. · filed 2001-05-02

However, simply because an agency accepts public funding or accepts referrals from the government does not transform that entity into a state actor.

Section 1983 claims fail when the challenged conduct is not state action.

Young v. Halle Housing Associates, L.P. · filed 2001-05-07

As a matter of law, the facts adduced by plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the challenged policy is the product of state action. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ first four causes of action brought pursuant to § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 liability requires the defendant to be a state actor.

Williams v. Moyer · filed 2001-05-08

Moreover, he has not shown that the remaining defendants were state actors who would be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private entity’s symbiotic relationship with a state can establish state action under § 1983 without proof that the state participated in the challenged act.

Crissman v. Dover Downs Ent., Inc · filed 2001-06-05

When such a relationship of interdependence exists, aS 1983 plaintiff need not show state participation in the challenged activity.

Section 1983 requires private health care providers to be state actors before they can be liable under the section.

Swenski v. Starr · filed 2001-06-26

On appeal, Swenski challenges the district court’s determination that the private defendants were not state actors for purposes of § 1983 and that Dr. Luna, a state employee, was entitled to qualified immunity. ... Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by that court in its memorandum opinion issued February 1, 2000, and entered February 3, 2000.

Section 1983 does not reach a private entity’s conduct merely because a statute authorizes it.

Tancredi v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 2001-07-09

Action by a private entity pursuant to statutory authorization retains its private character and is not actionable under Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor.

Khaimov v. Zeretsky · filed 2001-07-10

After de novo review of the record, we conclude dismissal was proper because no federal statutory right was at issue, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; none of the named defendants was a state actor within the meaning of § 1983, see Gentry v. City of Lee's Summit, 10 F.3d 1340, 1342 (8th Cir. 1993); and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over any arguably perceivable state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Section 1983 requires state action; a private hospital’s peer review does not qualify when its decisions are not fairly attributable to the state.

North Colorado Medical Center, Inc. v. Nicholas · filed 2001-08-06

Because Nicholas has not shown that either of the requirements for state action under the Lugar test have been satisfied in this case, we conclude that NCMC's peer review process did not constitute state action for the purpose of section 1983.

A lawyer representing a client is not a state actor within the meaning of § 1983.

Newsome v. Merz · filed 2001-08-21

As a lawyer representing a client, Turner was not a state actor within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 has no rigid formula for determining state action; the inquiry depends on the facts and circumstances.

Inland Mediation Board v. City of Pomona · filed 2001-08-23

Moreover, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ proposition that there is no rigid formula for measuring state action for purposes of determining liability under § 1983. Rather, such determination must be made only after the “process of sifting facts and weighing circumstances” has run its course.

Section 1983 requires state action; enforcing a right to child support under state law does not, by itself, make a private party a state actor.

Raffaele v. Marrama · filed 2001-09-20

Christine Marrama’s actions were taken solely to enforce state law rights to child support. Enforcing rights under state law does not make a party a state actor. ... Therefore, because Christine Marrama is not a state actor, and because Raffaele does not even allege that Jacqueline Marrama is a state actor, his § 1983 claims against them will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires state action; releasing redacted personnel files without deliberate indifference did not meet that requirement under the state-created-danger theory.

Kallstrom v. City of Columbus · filed 2001-09-27

In this case, the Court finds the City’s release of redacted personnel files pursuant to a valid public records request does not “shock the conscience” or amount to deliberate indifference on the part of defendant. ... For these reasons, the state-created-danger theory does not apply. Therefore, there is no state action as required under § 1983.

A private contractor performing delegated prison functions may be a state actor under § 1983.

Flint ex rel. Flint v. Kentucky Department of Corrections · filed 2001-10-26

Just as the physician in West, Defendant Montgomery, through Correctional Industries, performed functions typically attributed to the State: housing and providing security for individuals who had been convicted of a crime and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The Commonwealth of Kentucky delegated its responsibilities to Defendant Montgomery, just as the State delegated its responsibilities for medical care to the physician in West. Defendant Montgomery is, therefore, a state actor for purpose of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an entity sued for violating the Fourteenth Amendment to be a state actor.

Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 2001-12-21

To be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourteenth Amendment, an entity such as Defendant must be considered a “state actor.”

A private doctor who did not become a state actor cannot be sued under § 1983.

Styles v. McGinnis · filed 2001-12-26

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Gosling on the grounds that his conduct was not that of a state actor for § 1983 pin-poses, and we VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Styles’s claims against defendants Steve Colvin and Joe Colvin.

Section 1983 permits a suit against a private entity that acts as a state actor by regulating speech in a public forum.

Lee v. Katz · filed 2002-01-10

We conclude that, in regulating speech on the Commons, the OAC is a State actor. Thus, the plaintiffs' §§ 1983 action is viable.