42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to withdrawals from a prison trust account under an allegedly unlawful restitution order.

Blacher v. State of California · filed 2020-12-16

To the extent petitioner claims RJD officials are unlawfully withdrawing funds from his ... Prison trust account pursuant to an unlawful restitution order, he must bring said claim, if at all, in ... a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to seek relief for conditions of confinement, but a request for release from custody belongs in habeas corpus.

Noble 234085 v. Jackson · filed 2021-01-21

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a state-created concealed weapons licensing board as a legal entity.

Pencak v. Concealed Weapon Licensing Board for St. Clair · filed 1994-12-16

Based on the foregoing, the Concealed Weapons Licensing Board for the County of St. Clear is a state, rather than county, department. Therefore, it is a proper legal entity against which a suit may lie.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police informant for acts outside the informant agreement that he undertakes on his own, because he is not acting under color of state law.

Hiser v. City Of Bowling Green · filed 1994-12-20

Stealing a check from Hiser and then killing her were actions outside of the informant agreement. Because Woodworth was acting on his own, rather than under color of state law, he is not a state actor and cannot be held liable under section 1983.

Police participation in a private repossession can constitute state action under § 1983 when officers actively assist in taking the property.

McFarland v. Bob Saks Toyota, Inc. · filed 2006-11-07

Regardless of whether the outcome of such a process might prove justified in a subsequent Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” inquiry — where, for example, it turns out that the party whose property is repossessed lacks any sort of valid interest in the property in question— there can be no doubt that the participation of the police in such a process qualifies as “state action” within the reach of § 1983.

A § 1983 substantive due process claim based on regulatory deprivation of property requires the plaintiff to pursue state inverse condemnation proceedings before proceeding in federal court.

Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal · filed 1996-04-11

This court concludes therefore that the plaintiff was required to pursue inverse condemnation proceedings at the state level before proceeding to federal court with its § 1983 action based upon a claim of substantive due process.

Section 1983 substantive due process claims based on arbitrary or capricious land-use action arise when the government applies that action to the landowner’s property.

New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County · filed 1994-12-21

Substantive due process claims under § 1983 arise the moment a governmental body acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner and applies that arbitrary action to a landowner’s property.

A municipality may be estopped from arguing that a § 1983 claim is unripe for failure to pursue a local appeal when its conduct prevented that appeal.

Town of Orangetown v. Magee · filed 1995-05-08

The Town is equitably estopped from asserting that the defendants’ claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is not ripe for review on the ground that the defendants failed to appeal the revocation of their building permit to the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but a zoning-related procedural due process claim must be ripe for federal adjudication.

Bergstrom v. Town of Barrington · filed 1997-04-30

A plaintiff is not reguired to exhaust her administrative remedies to bring a § 1983 claim, but at a minimum, such claims must be ripe for federal court adjudication before their merits can be resolved. ... Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff has not obtained a final decision by the relevant decisionmaker and dismisses the plaintiff's procedural due process claim without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of ripeness.

A § 1983 claim challenging agency action is unripe when the agency has taken no final action that could amount to a deprivation of civil rights.

Ford v. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission · filed 1998-11-19

Thus, we must now decide whether a litigant must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before filing a civil rights action under either the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-123-101 to 108 (Supp. 1997) or the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... As in Williamson, the Commission has not yet taken any final action that could arguably amount to a deprivation of Ford’s civil rights. Thus, Ford’s claims under either the Arkansas Civil Rights Act or the Federal Civil Rights Act are not yet ripe for judicial review.

Section 1983 does not change the ripeness requirements for a federal regulatory taking claim.

Eberle v. Dane County Board of Adjustment · filed 1999-07-07

The fact that a federal regulatory taking claim is predicated upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 also does not affect the ripeness analysis.

A § 1983 claim based on delay in deciding a state post-conviction motion becomes ripe when the motion is decided or the court’s deadline for federal review of its merits expires.

Pool v. Wyrick · filed 1983-04-06

Thus, because the merits of the appellant's claim for post-conviction relief will be considered at the latest by the end of that ninety-day period, Pool's section 1983 claim concerning the delay in the resolution of his Rule 27.26 motion will then be ripe for adjudication.

Section 1983 authorizes a federal civil action for a constitutional deprivation caused under color of state law, subject to ripeness requirements.

Henley v. Herring · filed 1986-01-14

The case was ripe when the district court ruled.

A § 1983 challenge to a medical board investigation is not ripe before the board decides whether to file charges.

Lee-Bloem v. State · filed 2008-12-04

As in Broadcast Equities, the Board’s decision to investigate appellant and conduct peer reviews pursuant to the Medical Practice Act was not a “final” decision. ... Consequently, we conclude that the court did not err in dismissing appellant’s claim on the grounds that her 42 U.S.C. ... § 1983 claim was not ripe.

A § 1983 claim challenging a municipal land-use decision is ripe when the municipality reaches a definitive position that inflicts an actual, concrete injury.

Glacial Aggregates LLC v. Town of Yorkshire · filed 2010-04-30

Thus, we conclude that defendant had “ ‘arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflict[ed] an actual, concrete injury’ ” on plaintiff (id.), and thus that the cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 was indeed ripe for judicial review.

Section 1983 claims seeking compensation for a taking are premature when an inverse condemnation remedy is available under state law.

Barton v. City of Midwest City · filed 2011-03-01

The last three counts ask for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996), for violation of constitutional rights. ... Plaintiffs' Section 1988 claims must also be dismissed as premature because of the state law remedy under inverse condemnation. ... The dismissal of the civil rights claims is affirmed on the ground that such claims are premature.

Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, but a property deprivation claim requires a final decision before it is ripe.

Bowers v. The City of Flint · filed 2003-04-09

In other words, a due process challenge brought under § 1983 to an allegedly unconstitutional procedure is not subject to a finality requirement, while a claim alleging harm or deprivation of property “is substantive and, so, a final judgment (but not exhaustion) is required.”

Section 1983 claims based on a taking are not ripe until the related inverse condemnation claim has been unsuccessfully resolved.

G & a LAND, LLC v. City of Brighton · filed 2010-04-29

Here, the trial court dismissed the claim, concluding the relief Landowners seek under § 1983 is coextensive with the relief they seek under their inverse condemnation claim. This was not an appropriate ground for dismissal. Nevertheless, because the inverse condemnation has not been resolved unsue-cessfully to Landowners, their § 1988 claim is not ripe, and we may uphold the trial court's ruling on that ground.

Section 1983 permits a federal taking claim only after the property owner seeks compensation through the state procedure and is denied.

Ambrose v. City of Brownsville, Texas & the City of Brownsville Public Utility Board · filed 2016-04-28

As a result, Ambrose’s claims under section 1983 are unripe because he has failed to bring a claim under article I, section 17, which deprives the trial court of subject-matter to hear it.

Section 1983 equal protection and procedural due process claims arising from land use decisions are subject to the finality requirement when they are intertwined with takings claims.

Stones Trail, LLC v. Town of Weston · filed 2017-07-18

The plaintiff next claims that the concept of ripeness for review does not apply to § 1983 claims for violations of equal protection and procedural due process. We disagree.

Section 1983 land-use claims are unripe until zoning authorities have reached a final, definitive position on how the regulations apply to the property.

THE HANSEN FOUNDATION, INC. v. CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY · filed 2020-12-03

The Court finds that Defendant is correct, and the City has not in fact issued a final, definitive decision that would render Plaintiffs’ remaining claims ripe. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to their § 1983, Fourteenth Amendment, and NJCRA claims will be denied, and Defendant’s cross-motion regarding those claims will be granted.

A § 1983 retaliation claim survives a defendant’s death under New York law.

Graham v. Henderson · filed 2004-07-19

Because no court has held that § 1983 retaliation claims do not survive the death of the defendant in New York and further, because no court has held that only § 1983 “personal injury” claims survive the death of the defendant, plaintiffs § 1983 retaliation claim survives the death of defendants Decker and Ciaschi.

A § 1983 claim survives the plaintiff’s death under New York law and may be pursued on behalf of the plaintiff’s estate.

Chobot v. Powers · filed 1996-11-26

Although there is no express provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 for the survival of a § 1983 claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, state law may be incorporated when necessary to furnish suitable remedies for § 1983 claims, provided the state law is not inconsistent with federal policy. ... Thus, Chobot’s pending civil rights action against Defendants survived Chobot’s death and now may be asserted, if at all, on behalf of Chobot’s estate.

Section 1983 claims arising in Illinois survive the plaintiff’s death under Illinois’s personal-injury survival rule, applied through § 1988.

Anderson v. Gilberto Romero and Arthur Douglas · filed 1994-12-21

Section 1983 does not mention survival, but 42 U.S.C. § 1988 directs us in such absences to look to state law unless it is inconsistent with federal policy. We held in Bennett v. Tucker, supra, that Illinois’s rule for personal injury suits — the rule that such suits survive the plaintiffs death unless they are suits for defamation, 755 ILCS 5/27-6— was appropriate for suits under section 1983, which the Supreme Court had analogized to personal injury actions for purposes of choosing the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 permits recovery for a decedent’s pain and suffering in a survival action despite California’s statute excluding those damages.

Garcia v. Whitehead · filed 1997-04-04

Accordingly, the Court holds that California’s survivorship statute is inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983 because it excludes damages for pain and suffering of the decedent.

State law governs whether a § 1983 claim survives the injured person’s death.

Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink · filed 1997-09-23

The question whether a § 1983 claim survives the tort victim’s death (like many background questions in federal statutes) follows state law.

Section 1983 permits application of Oklahoma’s rule abating a malicious prosecution claim when the defendant dies because that rule does not undermine the statute’s compensatory goal.

Pietrowski v. Town of Dibble · filed 1998-01-21

We conclude that Oklahoma’s abatement statute does not so undermine the overall goal of compensating victims as to be inconsistent with § 1983.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim governed by Oklahoma law abates when the defendant dies because Oklahoma’s abatement statute is consistent with § 1983.

Pietrowski v. Town of Dibble, Shown on Petition as the Town Council of Dibble, Ok Ronnie Jackson, and McClain Cou · filed 1998-01-21

We conclude that Oklahoma's abatement statute does not so undermine the overall goal of compensating victims as to be inconsistent with § 1983.

Section 1983 claims survive a plaintiff’s death according to state law, provided that law is consistent with federal law.

Medina v. Pacheco · filed 1998-09-14

Survival of § 1983 actions after a plaintiff’s death is governed by state law, as long as the state law is “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Section 1983 allows survivors to assert a person’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim on that person’s behalf when state law authorizes a survival action.

Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 1998-09-24

In § 1983 actions, however, the survivors of an individual killed as a result of an officer’s excessive use of force may assert a Fourth Amendment claim on that individual’s behalf if the relevant state’s law authorizes a survival action.

A Section 1983 action survives the plaintiff’s death under applicable New York law and may be pursued by the plaintiff’s personal representative.

Johnson v. Robert Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York County Leroy Frazier, Chief, Special Prosecution Bureau · filed 1998-11-16

As an initial matter, we note that Johnson’s death has not rendered his Section 1983 action moot. Under New York law, which we must apply in these circumstances, Johnson’s Section 1983 action survives his death and may be asserted by his personal representative.

Survivors may bring a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of a person killed by an officer’s excessive force if state law authorizes them to bring a survival action.

Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department · filed 1998-11-24

In § 1983 actions, however, the survivors of an individual killed as a result of an officer's excessive use of force may assert a Fourth Amendment claim on that individual's behalf if the relevant state's law authorizes a survival action.

Section 1983 does not determine whether a civil rights action survives the death of the person whose rights were allegedly violated.

Archer v. Preisser · filed 1983-12-29

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not address the question of the survival of an action where the individual whose civil rights have allegedly been denied has died.

In a § 1983 action where the alleged civil rights violation did not cause the plaintiff’s death, California’s survival law bars the estate from recovering damages for the decedent’s pain, suffering, or disfigurement.

County of Los Angeles v. the Superior Court · filed 1999-08-12

Applying the test the United States Supreme Court articulated in Robertson v. Wegmann, supra, 436 U.S. 584, we hold only that by precluding an estate from recovering damages for the deceased plaintiff’s pain, suffering, or disfigurement, which our Legislature determined to be damages particularly personal to the deceased plaintiff, California survival law is not inconsistent with or preempted by federal law.

Section 1983 does not specify whether a decedent’s constitutional claims survive death; the court looks to the most closely analogous state law to decide survivability.

Ramirez v. City of Chicago · filed 1999-12-23

Section 1983 is silent on the question whether a decedent’s constitutional claims survive his death, so I am to look to the most closely analogous state law to determine survivability.

An estate administrator has standing under § 1983 to pursue a survival action seeking damages for the decedent's own injuries.

Yellow Horse v. Pennington County · filed 2000-09-05

The relief sought is not compensation for decedent's next of kin for their pecuniary injury, but only damages for injuries to Yellow Horse. Accordingly, we find Alan, as administrator of Yellow Horse's estate, had standing to assert a claim under section 1983.

In Puerto Rico, an heir may bring a § 1983 action in a representative capacity only if the deceased suffered before death.

Gonzalez-Rodriguez v. Alvarado · filed 2001-03-14

Applying the state’s legal reasoning to the case at hand, the Court concludes that Puerto Rican law permits an heir to bring a § 1983 action in his representative capacity only when there is a showing that the deceased has suffered prior to his death.

In Puerto Rico, an heir may bring a § 1983 action in a representative capacity only if the decedent suffered before death.

Vargas v. Gonzalez · filed 2001-03-20

Applying the state’s legal reasoning to the case at hand, the Court concludes that Puerto Rican law permits an heir to bring a § 1983 action in his representative capacity only when there is a showing that the deceased has suffered prior to his death.

A § 1983 claim survives the victim’s death when § 1988 permits use of a state survival statute, allowing the estate representative to sue.

Jones v. McElroy · filed 1977-03-30

This provision has been held to fill the gap in § 1983 caused by the death of a victim by authorizing adoption of state survival statutes. ... It is therefore clear that plaintiff may sue in her representative capacity to redress deprivations of decedent’s civil rights and that, in so doing, she stands in decedent’s place and has standing to assert this action.

A deceased person’s § 1983 claim may be pursued by the representative of the decedent’s estate.

Reindl v. City of Leavenworth · filed 2005-03-22

Plaintiff Kim Reindl is the appropriate party to bring any claims based on the deprivation of Mr. Reindl’s rights, while any claims brought by Plaintiff Mary Joan Reindl must be based on the violation of her individual rights. Plaintiff Kim Reindl is the proper party to seek recovery under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows survivors to pursue a decedent’s excessive force claim on the decedent’s behalf when state law authorizes the action.

Foster v. CITY OF PRESNO · filed 2005-07-12

The survivors of an individual who is killed as a result of the application of excessive force may assert a Fourth Amendment claim on that individual’s behalf if the relevant state’s law authorizes a survival action. ... Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that either Valles or Irwin Foster were financially dependent on Foster, neither of them has standing to assert claims on behalf of Foster.

Section 1983 allows a decedent’s constitutional claims to proceed through a state survival action without the state’s financial-dependency requirement when lifting it furthers § 1983’s goals.

Rentz Ex Rel. Estate of Rentz v. Spokane County · filed 2006-06-27

The financial dependency requirement applies to both wrongful death and survival actions. It appears the defendants do not dispute the propriety of lifting that requirement for the purpose of allowing the survival action to proceed in the instant case to vindicate any violation of decedent’s constitutional rights. This court agrees that is appropriate and in furtherance of the goals of § 1983.

A § 1983 claim arising from a death caused by an alleged civil rights violation may survive when state law would otherwise extinguish it, and the decedent’s personal representative may pursue it.

Leanna Jaco, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Carl D. Storer, Deceased v. Bloechle · filed 1984-07-24

To afford effect to the expressions and directions of the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann, where, as here, the survival statutes of the forum state are hostile to promoting deterrence, protection and vindication against § 1983 civil rights infringements perpetrated under color of law, the federal court must implement the congressional intent by allowing survival. ... Accordingly, this court concludes that the decedent’s civil rights claim, a personal cause of action, may be pursued in the name of the decedent’s personal representative, as defined by the law of the forum jurisdiction, in this case Ohio.

Section 1983 provides no survival rule; the court held that the decedent’s administrator could not recover under it from the municipalities.

Blair v. City of Rainbow City · filed 1989-03-10

Our case of Carter v. City of Birmingham is consistent with the case of Robertson v. Wegmann , 436 U.S. 584 , 98 S.Ct. 1991 , 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978), which held that federal civil rights laws are deficient in not providing for survival. Thus, the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the two municipalities was correct.

Section 1983 permits a decedent’s personal representative to pursue the decedent’s civil rights claim.

Tracy v. Bittles · filed 1993-04-23

Here, this court holds for the reasons succinctly explained in Bell and Jaco that the decedent’s civil rights claim, a personal cause of action, may be pursued in the name of the decedent’s personal representative.

Section 1983 claims survive the injured person's death according to state survivorship law.

Duchesne v. Sugarman · filed 1978-10-24

The survival of a section 1983 cause of action after the death of the original plaintiff is determined by state survivorship laws, Brooks v. Flagg Bros. Inc., 533 F.2d 764, 768, n. 7 (2d Cir. 1977).

A § 1983 procedural due process claim survives the plaintiff’s death under South Carolina law because it is an injury to the person outside the state’s exceptions to survival.

Burt v. Abel · filed 1979-02-22

Since South Carolina law provides for general survival of all causes of action, including “injuries to the person” — (South Carolina Code § 15-5-90 (1976)) — except as specifically exempted by state law, Dean v. Shirer, supra, this court has decided that the right to procedural due process, as more than a federalized law of defamation, is an injury to the person which survives to the personal representative.

A § 1983 claim survives when the alleged deprivation caused the injured person’s death, even if state law would otherwise abate the claim.

O'CONNOR v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers · filed 1981-10-15

After Robertson and Carlson, then, state law governs the survivability of § 1983 actions, but a federal rule of survival supercedes any state law requiring abatement in an action where the acts of the defendants caused the death of the injured party.

Section 1983 leaves survivorship to state law; here, only the estate’s administratrix could assert the decedent’s claim.

Carolyn N. Hess, Administratrix of the Estate of David Milano, Deceased v. Bob Eddy · filed 1982-10-21

Similarly, Congress did not provide rules of survivor-ship for section 1983 actions. Therefore, the district court acted properly in applying Alabama law to determine that the decedent’s right of action survived his death and that the only party who could properly assert this claim would be the administratrix of his estate.

A § 1983 claim survives the plaintiff’s death when the analogous state personal injury claim survives.

McSwain ex rel. Estate of McSwain v. Schrubbe · filed 2010-05-13

First, we note that McSwain’s § 1983 claim is analogous to a Wisconsin tort action for “injuries to the person,” and because those claims survive, see Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), so too would McSwain’s § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits damages for pain and suffering in a survival action when the alleged rights violation caused death, despite an Arizona law barring those damages.

Braillard v. Maricopa County, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office · filed 2010-05-27

Here, applying § 14-3110 to bar damages for Deborah‟s pain and suffering similarly would defeat the remedial and deterrent functions of § 1983.

In a § 1983 survival action in California, damages for the decedent’s pain and suffering are unavailable under the state survival statute.

CONTRERAS EX REL. CONTRERAS v. County of Glenn · filed 2010-07-16

This Court finds the Court’s reasoning in Venerable to be persuasive, and declines to permit a survival action for damages for Decedent’s pain and suffering. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations in the FAC alleging Decedent’s pain and suffexing (¶ 29, ¶ 35, and ¶ 39), as damages for Decedent’s pain and suffering are not recoverable.

A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 survival claim must establish standing under state law; claiming to be the decedent’s sole surviving heir does not itself establish that the plaintiff is the personal representative or successor in interest.

Hayes v. County of San Diego · filed 2011-03-22

While claiming she is the decedent’s “sole surviving heir,” Appellant fails to allege that she is her father’s personal representative or successor in interest.

Section 1983 permits recovery for a decedent’s pain and suffering in a survival action despite California’s prohibition on those damages.

Cotton v. City of Eureka · filed 2012-03-16

At bottom, the Court finds that application of California’s prohibition on the recovery of damages for pain and suffering in survival actions is inconsistent with § 1983.

Section 1983 permits noneconomic damages in a survival action when a state restriction would undermine its purposes of compensation and deterrence.

Ostling v. City of Bainbridge Island · filed 2012-05-24

These policies compel the Court to hold that the restriction of non-economic damages in Washington’s survival statute undermines the purpose of § 1983 and must therefore be disregarded.

Section 1983 permits an estate to recover damages for the decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering when a violation of federal law caused the death, despite California’s contrary survival statute.

Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2014-05-19

Consistent with Berry, Bell, and McFadden, we hold that California’s prohibition against pre-death pain and suffering damages limits recovery too severely to be consistent with § 1983’s deterrence policy. Section 377.34 therefore does not apply to § 1983 claims where the decedent’s death was caused by the violation of federal law.

Section 1983 has no federal rule for survival after a party’s death; state survival law supplies the rule through § 1988.

Holmes v. City of Wilmington · filed 2015-02-04

Federal law does not provide for “the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or the defendant.” ... While defendants contend that the survival statute clearly applies, the court is unconvinced, and, in the absence of persuasive authority, will not dismiss the claim at this juncture.

Section 1983 does not itself provide for the survival of civil rights actions.

Jackson v. City of Cleveland · filed 2016-11-10

By its clear language, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for the survival of civil rights actions.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim does not survive the injured plaintiff’s death when Kentucky’s survival statute excludes recovery for the personal injury.

Roberts v. Girder · filed 2017-02-17

Malicious prosecution is among those causes of action excluded by the statute, thus Count IV for malicious prosecution under § 1983 cannot survive.

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is treated as a personal injury claim and survives the plaintiff's death under Tennessee law.

Estate of Sanders v. Jones · filed 2019-01-24

Applying the Sixth Circuit's reasoning to Plaintiff's case, Sanders' action for malicious prosecution under § 1983, which under Crabbs is characterized as a personal injury claim, survives the death of the Plaintiff.

Section 1983 allows an estate administrator to pursue a deceased person's claim for violation of his constitutional rights.

Walker v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2019-02-28

But the court denies Dr. Mohiuddin's Motion to Dismiss the § 1983 claim that plaintiff Shermaine Walker asserts against him in her capacity as the Administrator of Mr. Davis's estate.

Section 1983 permits a survivor to bring a decedent’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim when state law authorizes survival and the survivor meets that law’s requirements.

Cavanaugh v. County of San Diego · filed 2019-10-10

In actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the survivors of an individual killed as a ... result of an officer’s excessive use of force may assert a Fourth Amendment claim on that ... individual’s behalf if the relevant state’s law authorizes a survival action.

A plaintiff who is not the decedent’s personal representative lacks standing to bring a § 1983 survival action under Arizona law.

Valdez v. Phoenix, City of · filed 2019-10-22

Because Plaintiff is not currently Francisco’s personal representative, the Court finds that she does not have standing to pursue a survival action under § 1983.

The forum state's survival law determines whether a Section 1983 claim continues after a defendant dies.

Ball v. McCoullough · filed 2019-11-05

The exception to the general rule provides that the survival of claims under a federal civil rights statute (such as the statute at issue here, 42 U.S.C. § 1983) is dependent on the law of the forum state.

Because § 1983 does not address survival after a party’s death, state law determines whether a § 1983 claim survives.

Gary, Keith v. Young, Anna · filed 2020-04-15

Because § 1983 says nothing about the issue of survival of a claim after the death of a party, federal courts look to state law to determine whether § 1983 claims survive the death of a party.

Section 1983 claims survive a plaintiff’s death when applicable state law preserves the claims and is consistent with federal law.

Stephens v. Dillard · filed 2020-06-25

Survival of § 1983 actions after a plaintiff's death is governed by state law, as long as the state law is “not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Front pay on a § 1983 claim is an equitable remedy that the district court may award in its discretion.

Ballard v. Muskogee Regional Medical Center · filed 2001-01-29

An award of front pay for claims under § 1983 is an equitable remedy; thus, the district court has discretion to decide whether such an award is appropriate.

Section 1983 allows reinstatement and front pay as equitable remedies to make a wrongfully discharged plaintiff whole.

Hunter v. Town of Mocksville · filed 2016-08-12

Reinstatement and front pay fulfill the make-whole goal of § 1983 by accounting for losses past the time of judgment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation to allege the harm suffered.

Sawyer v. Ron Angelo, Director · filed 1994-12-22

This allegation, however, does not state a Sec. 1983 claim because Sawyer does not allege any harm.

Section 1983 requires actionable harm for a First Amendment retaliation claim; delayed access to a $1,000 bond does not meet that threshold.

Venable v. Leos · filed 2000-09-28

In his single allegation of harm, that his access to his $1,000 bond was delayed, Venable has not crossed the threshold of actionable harm required under § 1983 on his claim for First Amendment retaliation.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who is present and fails to take reasonable measures to protect a suspect from another officer’s excessive force.

Hale v. Townley · filed 1995-02-06

The district court correctly held that an officer who is present at the scene and does not take reasonable measures to protect a suspect from another officer's use of excessive force may be liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an officer for failing to prevent another officer’s use of force when the officer had no realistic opportunity to intercede.

Joyner v. Taft · filed 1995-02-10

Just as no jury could reasonably find that Connors had a realistic opportunity to intercede before O’Neill was beaten, no jury could reasonably find that Taft had a realistic opportunity to intercede before plaintiff was pushed down the stairs.

An officer present at the scene may be liable under Section 1983 for failing to take reasonable measures to protect a suspect from another officer’s excessive force.

Hale v. Carl Townley, Billy J. Hale v. Carl Townley · filed 1995-03-23

The district court correctly held that an officer who is present at the scene and does not take reasonable measures to protect a suspect from another officer’s use of excessive force may be liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a bystanding officer's failure to intervene in an assault only when the officer knew of a specific risk of harm and had time and opportunity to intervene.

Melvin Albiso Aurelio Jr. Casem v. Sherman Block County of Los Angeles Dwayne Benson Scott Johnson Ten Unknown Named L.A · filed 1995-05-01

While an officer may be liable for wilfully refusing to act in the face of ongoing assaults by fellow officers (or others) upon a custodial detainee, United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 888-90 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 928 (1994), the bystanding officer's duty to protect is operative only when the officer is aware of a specific risk of harm to the plaintiff and has time and opportunity to intervene.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows a fellow officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Randall v. Prince George's County, Maryland · filed 2002-08-14

Therefore, if a bystanding officer (1) is confronted with a fellow officer’s illegal act, (2) possesses the power to prevent it, and (3) chooses not to act, he may be deemed an accomplice and treated accordingly.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows a fellow officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Randall v. Prince George's County · filed 2002-08-14

Therefore, an officer may be liable under § 1983, on a theory of bystander liability, if he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights n24; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a bystander officer who knows another officer is violating someone’s rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

North Carolina Ex Rel. Hailey v. Westmoreland · filed 2003-06-18

A police officer who is a bystander to another officer’s unconstitutional actions may himself be held hable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “if he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (8) chooses not to act.”

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows another officer is violating constitutional rights, has an opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Chavez v. McIntyre · filed 2006-02-28

Under the allegations of the Complaint, certain of the defendants knew that officers were using excessive force or carrying out an unreasonable seizure, they had the opportunity to intercede, and they chose not to act. The court finds that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized a cause of action for bystander liability under § 1983, and that the plaintiff has stated a claim under this theory.

Section 1983 does not impose bystander liability on officers who had no opportunity to prevent the alleged constitutional violation.

Mazloum v. District of Columbia · filed 2006-06-27

They had no opportunity to prevent events that, by plaintiffs own account, had already occurred before their arrival, and thus cannot be held liable for the alleged arrest or use of excessive force on a theory of bystander liability.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff asserting bystander liability against a law officer to prove that the officer witnessed an illegal act, could prevent it, and chose not to act.

Ruttenberg v. Jones · filed 2009-03-11

First, to prove “bystander” liability, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that a defendant “(1) is confronted with a fellow officer’s illegal act, (2) possesses the power to prevent it, and (3) chooses not to act.”

Section 1983 permits liability for a bystander officer who knew of a constitutional violation and had a realistic opportunity to intervene.

Lewis v. Downey · filed 2009-09-04

Even as a bystander, however, Ayala can be held liable under § 1983 if Lewis can show that Ayala (1) had reason to know that a fellow officer was using excessive force or committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.

Section 1983 requires evidence that an officer had a reasonable opportunity to realize excessive force and intervene to support bystander liability.

Vasquez v. Ball · filed 2010-07-23

Because Vasquez failed to come forward with evidence to rebut qualified immunity or substantiate her § 1983 claim, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer Chacon.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who knows another officer is violating a constitutional right, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and fails to act.

Matthews v. District of Columbia · filed 2010-08-09

Under that theory, “an officer is held liable for a constitutional violation if he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional right; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” ... Hence, plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims against the individual officers can proceed on a bystander liability theory.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability only when an officer knows a fellow officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Smith v. Ray · filed 2011-02-02

Under the theory of bystander liability, an officer may be liable only if he or she: “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual‟s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.”

Officers actively restraining a potentially dangerous suspect are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 bystander liability claims when existing law gave them no fair notice that they had to intervene in another officer’s alleged excessive force.

Deshotels v. Norsworthy · filed 2011-11-10

Nothing in Hale provided police officers “fair notice” that officers actively engaged in restraining a large, potentially dangerous suspect are required to intervene and prevent another officer’s use of excessive force. ... Accordingly, the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law and they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 bystander liability requires an officer to be present when another officer violates a person’s constitutional rights.

Whitley v. Hanna · filed 2013-08-08

We observe at the outset that Whitley has failed to state a claim against Bullock because she has not alleged that he was in Ariaz’s presence when Ariaz was sexually abusing Whitley. As a result, Bullock is not within the scope of a bystander liability claim.

Section 1983 bystander liability requires an officer to acquiesce in another officer’s constitutional violation.

Whitley v. Hanna · filed 2013-08-28

Turning to Hanna, although Whitley has alleged that Hanna was in Ariaz’s presence (unbeknownst to Ariaz) the morning of July 17, she nevertheless has failed to state a claim because she has not alleged that Hanna acquiesced in Ariaz’s conduct.

A § 1983 complaint sufficiently pleads bystander liability when it alleges that officers allowed an unreasonable seizure to be committed, even without naming the theory.

Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, MD · filed 2014-02-21

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s post-trial determination that Appellants’ complaint, specifically paragraphs 35 and 36, sufficiently states a cause of action for bystander liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows a fellow officer is violating a constitutional right, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Lytes v. Smith · filed 2014-03-28

To make out a § 1983 claim of bystander liability against an officer, Plaintiff must show that the officer “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional right; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” Randall v. Prince George’s County, Md., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir.2002). As explained above, there was no constitutional violation in this case. Plaintiffs bystander liability claim must fail.

Section 1983 does not allow a bystander who was not the object of police action to recover for emotional injuries from witnessing that action.

Khansari v. City of Houston · filed 2014-04-09

A civil rights claim must be based upon a violation of a plaintiffs personal rights secured by the Constitution, and a bystander who is not the object of police action cannot recover for resulting emotional injuries under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability for a detention officer who fails to intervene in the use of excessive force against a pretrial detainee.

Kitchen Ex Rel. the Estate of Kitchen v. Dallas County · filed 2014-07-17

Based on the close relationship described in Petta, 143 F.3d at 912-14, “between Fourteenth Amendment and either Fourth or Eighth Amendment excessive force standards,” 35 we therefore conclude that the theory of bystander liability is likewise applicable to claims for use of excessive force against pretrial detainees.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows another officer is violating a constitutional right, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Gudger v. District of Columbia · filed 2014-11-10

An officer is held responsible for a constitutional violation under the bystander theory of liability “if he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional right; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.”

Section 1983 permits a bystander claim against an officer who knows another officer is committing a constitutional violation, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Reidie Jackson, TDCJ 1164177 v. Captain Vaughn · filed 2014-12-12

Establishing bystander liability requires a showing that an officer knows another officer is committing a constitutional violation, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act. ... Taking Jackson’s plead facts as true, as we must, his pleadings sufficiently allege a section 1983 excessive force claim and a bystander claim.

Section 1983 permits liability for an officer who knows another officer is violating a person’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Moore v. District of Columbia · filed 2015-02-05

Even if the defendant officer was not the person directly committing a constitutional violation, that officer may nonetheless be held responsible when the officer: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional right; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability only when an officer had time and opportunity to intervene.

Covarrubias v. Wallace · filed 2015-05-11

Given that the facts alleged by Covarrubias show that the incident underlying this suit unfolded so quickly that officers in another area could not have reached him in time to intervene, he has not raised a nonfrivolous claim under the theory of bystander liability.

Section 1983 bystander liability requires facts showing that an officer knew a fellow officer was violating someone’s constitutional rights; close proximity alone is insufficient.

Wiggins v. Quesenberry · filed 2016-12-06

However, “close proximity’ is not the legal standard. Instead, Plaintiff must assert facts to show that Defendant Quesenberry was on notice that Defendant Ramirez was violating Plaintiffs constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows another officer is using excessive force, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Hamilton v. Turner · filed 2017-01-12

At the time of the incident, it was clearly established in the Fifth Circuit that an officer could be liable as a bystander in a case involving excessive force if he knew a constitutional violation was taking place and had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm.

Section 1983 bystander liability can apply to an officer who participates in an incident without personally committing a constitutional violation.

Compton v. O'Bryan · filed 2018-02-09

But bystander liability is not limited to an officer who idly stands watch, wholly separated from the victim: it also applies to an officer who actively participates in a larger incident yet whose conduct otherwise falls short of a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 bystander liability requires an officer to know another officer is violating a constitutional right, have a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and choose not to act.

Jackson v. Vaughn · filed 2018-03-29

Establishing bystander liability requires a showing that an officer knows another officer is committing a constitutional violation, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Section 1983 permits a bystander liability claim against an officer whose presence and failure to act support an inference that the officer could have prevented another officer’s constitutional violation.

Roberts v. Whitt · filed 2018-05-24

The Court finds that the complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for bystander liability against each individual Defendant.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows another officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Brown v. Wilkinson County Sheriff Dept., et · filed 2018-11-21

Because Brown has offered insufficient summary judgment evidence that any officer participated in the incident, or that Ashford knew of any officer’s participation, his bystander liability claim against Ashford fails.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows a fellow officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Whitten v. Gunter · filed 2018-12-17

“To succeed on a theory of bystander liability,” Whitten had to show that Cook and Lawson “(1) knew that a fellow officer was violating [his] constitutional rights; (2) had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chose not to act.” Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, 743 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir. 2014) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Neither Cook nor Lawson were in the cell or could even see into the cell when Gunter released his dog on Whitten. Therefore, there was no evidence that they could have intervened to stop Gunter from engaging his dog on Whitten.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer encounters another officer’s illegal act, has the power to prevent it, and chooses not to act.

Altony Brooks v. Captain Jacumin · filed 2019-05-10

Because they had not operated the taser, they could be held liable, if at all, only under a theory of bystander liability, which permits relief against an officer who “(1) is confronted with a fellow officer’s illegal act, (2) possesses the power to prevent it, and (3) chooses not to act,” Randall v. Prince George’s Cty., 302 F.3d 188, 203 (4th Cir. 2002); accord Brooks, 2017 WL 3307648, at *2.

Section 1983 bystander liability requires facts showing that an officer knew of a fellow officer’s constitutional violation, had a reasonable opportunity to prevent it, and chose not to act; an allegation of presence and failure to intervene alone is insufficient.

Causer v. Ard · filed 2019-08-15

The Court agrees with Deputy Winburn; pleading that he was on the scene and that he “failed to intervene” constitutes only a bare bones recitation of the elements of a claim for bystander liability.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows another officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Collins v. Dotson · filed 2019-11-07

Specifically, an officer may be liable if “the officer ‘(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.’” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2002) and citing other supporting cases). ... Considering the fact that they were not holding Collins and did not perceive the blows until the attack was almost over, a reasonable jury could not conclude that either Mathers or Vences could have physically intervened in time to prevent the injury.

An officer cannot be held liable under § 1983 for failing to prevent another officer’s constitutional violation without evidence that the officer knew of the violation, had a reasonable opportunity to prevent it, and chose not to act.

Jenkins v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-01-30

We agree with Officer Davis that he was entitled to summary judgment in his favor on Mrs. Jenkins’s § 1983 claim because Mrs. Jenkins has not borne her burden of coming forward with evidence that Officer Davis knew that the unnamed female officer was conducting the claimed unlawful pat-down on Mrs. Jenkins; had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the pat-down; and made a decision not to act.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows a fellow officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Jackson v. Castevens · filed 2020-03-04

An officer may be liable under the theory of bystander liability if he or she: “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” ... Here, even if the fact-finder were to credit Jackson’s allegation that Castevens said to him, “a lesson was about to be taught,” that does not establish that either Bowers or McGuire knew what Castevens was going to do, or that they had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and prevent the harm.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows another officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Wilson v. Frame · filed 2020-03-23

Based on language contained within the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has demonstrated that all Defendants either knew of the allegedly excessive force or had the opportunity to prevent it, as required to establish a bystander liability claim.

Section 1983 permits a bystander liability claim against an officer who knows a fellow officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Meade v. Mynes · filed 2020-07-06

To establish a theory of bystander liability, the plaintiff must allege that the officer “(1) knew that a fellow officer was violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chose not to act.” ... It can be inferred from these factual allegations, accepted as true and viewed in light most favorable to Plaintiff, that Defendants were aware of the alleged constitutional violation and could have taken action to prevent it. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED.

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows another officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Brooks v. Taylor County · filed 2020-10-21

An officer may be liable under a theory of bystander liability under Section 1983 if he “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.”

Section 1983 permits bystander liability when an officer knows a fellow officer is violating someone’s constitutional rights, has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm, and chooses not to act.

Dixon v. Fisher · filed 2020-11-13

Additionally, an officer may be liable under § 1983 on a theory of bystander liability, if he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.

A volunteer first aid squad’s municipal funding, response to a police request, and treatment of a detainee do not, without a closer state connection, make it a state actor under § 1983.

Groman v. Township of Manalapan · filed 1995-02-16

Given the relationship between the first aid squad and the Township here, we find no symbiotic relationship, joint participation, or other connection sufficient to demonstrate the first aid squad was acting under color of state law. Neither the squad's receipt of public funds, nor the police's request for the first aid squad, nor Groman's status as a person in custody at the time of the squad's second response is enough to create state action on the part of the first aid squad.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; public funding, police requests for assistance, and responding to a person in custody did not make this volunteer first aid squad a state actor.

Gorman v. Manalapan · filed 1995-02-16

Given the relationship between the first aid squad and the Township here, we find no symbiotic relationship, joint participation, or other connection sufficient to demonstrate the first aid squad was acting under color of state law. Neither the squad's receipt of public funds, nor the police's request for the first aid squad, nor Groman's status as a person in custody at the time of the squad's second response is enough to create state action on the part of the first aid squad.

Section 1983 reaches a volunteer fire company granted sovereign firefighting powers when its adverse employment action responds to communications directly related to that public function.

Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co. · filed 1997-11-13

The factor that I now find decisively tips the balance in favor of finding that Chestnut is a state actor is the existence of two Maryland statutes which confer inherently sovereign powers upon volunteer firefighters. ... Clearly, these alleged communications directly related to the public function which Chestnut Ridge performs. Accordingly, adverse employment actions taken in reaction to them fall within the purview of section 1983.

Section 1983 permits suit against a volunteer fire company performing the governmental function of fire protection because it is a state actor.

Gibson v. Hurleyville Fire Co. No. 1 · filed 1998-04-16

Because the Fire Company is performing a governmental function it is a state actor. Fire protection is a public function which amounts to state action even if the fire protection unit is composed of voluntary or unpaid members.

Section 1983 treats a volunteer fire company as a state actor when it performs a delegated governmental firefighting function and is closely intertwined with the municipality that controls and supports it.

Eggert v. Tuckerton Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1 · filed 1996-09-04

Consideration of the foregoing factors compels the Court to find TVFC a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A state’s grant of a charter to a private club does not by itself make the club’s conduct action under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Welch v. Board of Directors of Wildwood Golf Club · filed 1995-02-16

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ second argument, that the state’s grant of a charter constitutes state action, also must be rejected. In granting charters, the Commonwealth is simply exercising its police powers to regulate.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a utility's termination of service may satisfy that requirement when the pleadings show a sufficiently close nexus with state officials; electric service is property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Condosta v. Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc. · filed 1975-09-09

One of the requisite elements of a § 1983 cause of action is that the defendants acted under color of state law. ... On these bases, we find that the pleadings allege a “sufficiently close nexus” between the PSB and the action of VEC that VEC's action may, at this stage of the proceedings, be “fairly treated as that of the State itself.” ... Moving on to a consideration of VEC’s second theory, the Court concludes that electric service does constitute “property” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a utility to allege that it acted under color of state law.

MacKay Jr. v. City of Virginia Beach, Virginia Power · filed 1989-08-17

In an order filed December 14, 1988, the district court granted Virginia Power's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because Mackay had not alleged that Virginia Power had acted under color of state law as required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 or that its acts involved interstate commerce as required by federal antitrust law. ... The district court properly granted Virginia Power's and the City's motions to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

A jury may find state action under § 1983 when an officer aids a private utility disconnection or intimidates the occupant into refraining from exercising a legal right to resist it.

Jones v. Gutschenritter · filed 1990-07-31

We believe that it was for the jury to determine whether the close proximity of Officer Thompson to Larsen when he disconnected Jones' electrical services could have engendered fear or intimidation, that the jury could have concluded that Officer Thompson was not simply present and standing by, but rather was lending police intervention and aid in the disconnection of Jones' electrical services, and that Thompson's action constituted state action.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of law; a private utility’s filing of a tariff with a state regulator does not alone make its refusal of service state action.

Haggard v. PSI Energy, Inc. · filed 1991-10-22

We hold the mere filing of § 3.2 of PSI's retail tariff neither clothed PSI with State authority nor brought it under the aegis of the state. We hold that Haggard has failed to show a sufficiently close nexus between the State and PSI's refusal to provide Haggard electrical service such that PSI's denial of service may be fairly treated as State action.

Section 1983 can reach a public utility that acts under color of state law when refusing to supply water.

Wilson v. Hyrniewicz, No. Cv 90-0441967s (Oct. 29, 1991) · filed 1991-10-29

There has been a sufficient showing that the defendant acted under color of state law in refusing to supply water to the plaintiff without just cause.

Section 1983 permits a due-process claim against a privately owned, publicly regulated utility when its challenged conduct qualifies as state action; on the pleaded facts, the court held the utility’s shutoff allegations met that threshold.

Hattell v. Public Service Company of Colorado · filed 1972-11-07

As did Judge Theis in Stanford v. Gas Service Company, we agree with the Eighth Circuit, and we hold that the charges here made involve state action, and that we have jurisdiction of the basic dispute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Section 1983 permits a damages or declaratory action against a private utility when its challenged conduct is sufficiently attributable to state law through pervasive state regulation and supervision.

Salisbury v. Southern New England Telephone Co. · filed 1973-11-07

Under these circumstances and at this stage of the proceedings, it seems clear that the operations of the defendant company are fully circumscribed and supervised by the State of Connecticut and its regulatory agency, including in general the specific activity complained of in the present lawsuit. There has been a sufficient showing that the defendant utility company acted under col- or of state law in terminating plaintiff’s telephone service without notice or just cause.

Section 1983 affords no relief for this challenge because the District of Columbia is not a “State or Territory” within the statute and the private utility’s grooming regulation was not state action.

Brown v. D. C. Transit System, Inc. · filed 1975-02-28

Moreover, since the District of Columbia is not a “State or Territory” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Plaintiffs “are entitled to no relief under that statute,” citing District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973). ... A utility’s grooming regulation governing its employees does not have the nexus with the state necessary for its classification as “state action” subject to due process restraints where, as here, there has been no involvement whatever of an agency of government, federal or “state.” ... We are satisfied that the district judge correctly concluded that Plaintiffs were entitled to no relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 or 2000e-2.

A private employer’s status as a public utility regulated by a state public service commission does not by itself supply the state action required to state a claim under § 1983.

Hughes v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1984-07-26

Even if we assume that Hughes’ remaining three claims for relief are based on the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he has failed to allege state action which is a prerequisite to a cognizable claim for relief under those statutory provisions. Each of these three claims is grounded on the allegation that Mountain Bell is “a quasi-public employer by virtue of its regulation by the State of Colorado’s Public Service Commission.” We hold that these allegations are not sufficient to show the necessary state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; a privately owned utility’s termination of service is not attributable to the state merely because the utility is regulated, may have monopoly power, or serves the public interest.

Boudette v. Arizona Public Service Co. · filed 1988-05-09

In summary, plaintiff has failed to show that there is a sufficiently close nexus between A.P.S.’s action and the state so that the action of A.P.S. may be fairly attributable to the state of Arizona. Although A.P. S. is a regulated public utility with potential monopoly power, neither of these factors are enough to support direct involvement with the state. Further, the fact that A.P.S. serves the “public interest” does not rise to the level of a public function. Finally, because A.P.S. is a privately owned company and no evidence of financial integration with the state exists, there is no symbiotic relationship. For these reasons, plaintiff’s action must fail and defendant’s motion to dismiss must be granted.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor; a private utility company does not qualify merely because it provides electricity.

Gatterman v. Rhodes · filed 1990-02-28

Finally, Virginia Power is a private company and is not a "debt collector," state actor, or government agency as required by the Fair Debt Collections Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, or 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a.

Section 1983 permits a federal forum for a constitutional claim against a utility that acts under color of state law when extensive state involvement makes the utility an agent of the state.

Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 1972-10-30

Plaintiff asserts that federal jurisdiction obtains under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which, to be successfully invoked, requires a finding that “state action” be present. On the facts of this case, such a finding cannot be avoided. ... Where the state has so involved itself with a private concern, the concern can be said to act for the state. ... Thus, the utility is licensed to and does act as an agent of the state. ... Defendant’s motion, pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction, therefore, is denied.

Section 1983 does not apply to claims against a public utility when regulation alone does not make the utility a state instrumentality.

Cody v. Union Electric, a Missouri Corporation · filed 1975-07-17

That decision does compel dismissal of that part of plaintiffs’ claim founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A heavily regulated utility is not a state actor for Section 1983 purposes without additional facts connecting its conduct to the state.

Sager v. Hunter Corp. · filed 1987-04-24

Of course, section 1983 requires state action in order to satisfy the “color of state law” requirement. ... it has been clear that even a heavily regulated utility, without more, does not rise to the level of a state actor.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a public utility based solely on extensive state regulation, because that regulation alone does not make the utility’s conduct state action.

Mathis v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. · filed 1989-12-20

That fact, without more, is insufficient to infuse its conduct with state action. ... The complaint therefore raised no colorable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a regulated utility is not a state actor when disciplining employees if the state does not regulate that activity.

Amos v. U.S. West Communications, Network Services, Operation Services · filed 1993-02-17

Section 1983 is inapplicable to this case, as it only applies to deprivations of rights under color of state law. While Defendant is a regulated utility, it is not considered a state actor in situations that are not closely related to subjects that the state regulates. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974). Because employee discipline is not a subject that the state regulates, Defendant is not a state actor for purposes of this suit.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right.

David v. Mosley · filed 1996-02-16

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts which show (1) a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person while acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law; a claim against defendants with no evidence they are state actors cannot survive summary judgment.

Thomas v. Allied Signal, Inc. Garrett Fluid Systems, Inc. · filed 1996-02-20

Insofar as plaintiff appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in light of the absence of any evidence that defendants are state actors.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff bringing a Fourteenth Amendment claim to establish that the defendants were state actors.

Thomas v. Allied-Signal, Inc. Gary Freburger · filed 1996-02-20

Because Thomas failed to establish that defendants were state actors, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Thomas's Fourteenth Amendment claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a private school's alleged failure to provide an adequate education does not make the school, its trustees, or its principal state actors.

Nobles v. Alabama Christian Academy · filed 1996-03-11

The Defendants, ACA, the Board of Trustees of ACA, and Roberta Atkinson, principal of ACA, are not state actors as required for a federal claim to be made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 can reach a private defense lawyer who conspires with state actors to deprive a client of effective assistance of counsel, but the claim requires evidence of the conspiracy.

Ascherman v. Grimm · filed 1996-03-22

Because Grimm was not a state actor under the holding of Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), Ascherman's attempt to recast the malpractice claim in constitutional terms is unavailing. Grimm could be held liable under § 1983 if he conspired with state actors to deprive Ascherman of effective assistance of counsel, but no evidence in the record supports Ascherman's assertion that all of the defendants conspired against him.

Section 1983 requires the challenged acts to be performed by a state actor; a non-state actor cannot be liable under it.

Wilcher v. City of Wilmington · filed 1996-03-30

Moreover, the Court concluded that SODAT was a non-state actor, and therefore was immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to be intertwined with the State in the challenged action; an ongoing relationship with the State on other matters is insufficient.

Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc. · filed 1996-04-09

To proceed successfully with such a claim, Harper must demonstrate more than an ongoing relationship between the State and Healthsource on various matters. Harper must demonstrate that the two were intertwined with regard to the challenged action.

A nonprofit corporation that conducts a county fair as the county’s agent and is ultimately controlled by the county may be treated as the county and sued under § 1983.

Clark v. County of Placer · filed 1996-04-19

While the matter is not without doubt, the court concludes that for purposes of determining state action, PCFA is the county and subject to suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant sued for a Fourth Amendment violation to be a state actor.

Lary E. Grimes v. General Motors Corporation Service Reporting Co. · filed 1996-04-25

The defendants were not state actors who may be liable for a Fourth Amendment violation.

Section 1983 requires action under color of law; a private fire company is not a state actor for an employment decision absent sufficient government involvement in that decision.

Cornett v. Mason Volunteer Fire Co. · filed 1996-05-08

The strictures of due process, however, bind state actors only, and section 1983 likewise applies only to actions occurring under color of law. ... Because none of the appellees is a state actor, we need not address the merits of Cornett's substantive and procedural due process claims.

Section 1983 does not treat a private bank as a state actor merely because it pursues foreclosure under state law.

Denson v. Merchants & Farmers Bank · filed 1996-06-28

Merely pursuing foreclosure proceedings under state law does not make Merchants & Farmers Bank a state actor.

A private corporation that contracts with a state to operate and manage state prisons acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

Gallien v. Correction Corp Amer · filed 1996-07-09

Though CCA is a private corporation, state action exists because CCA has contracted with the State of Texas to operate and manage state prison facilities.

Section 1983 treats a presidential candidate selection committee’s exclusion of a candidate under authority granted by Georgia law as state action.

Duke v. Cleland · filed 1996-07-11

In this lawsuit, Duke and the voters brought their cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore our initial inquiry concerns: (1) whether the person engaged in the conduct complained of was acting under color of state law; and (2) whether the alleged conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities guaranteed under the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... We follow Duke II in holding that the Committee's decision to exclude Duke from Georgia's presidential primary ballot pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193 constituted state action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against private conduct without state action or a state actor.

Yaba v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft · filed 1996-07-19

Because § 1983 does not provide a cause of action against private action, the plaintiffs claim against Roosevelt is futile.

Section 1983 requires state action; a privately owned utility does not become a state actor merely because it is regulated, has monopoly status, or provides essential public services.

Mayer v. BellSouth Telecommunications (In Re Mayer) · filed 1996-07-30

Even assuming, arguendo, that BellSouth has deprived Debtor of federally created rights, Debtor has not stated a claim against BellSouth under § 1983 as BellSouth is a private actor not a state actor as required by § 1983. Further, BellSouth’s status as a regulated utility is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim, as the Supreme Court has found that the mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State.

Section 1983 requires state action in the challenged conduct; a private prison operator’s decision to fire its own employee is not state action merely because incarceration is a government function.

George v. Pacific-Csc Work Furlough · filed 1996-07-31

This assumption misses the point, however. The relevant inquiry is "whether [Pacific's] role as an employer was state action" in George's case. Gorenc, 869 F.2d at 505. We conclude it was not.

Private defendants who are not state actors are not subject to suit under § 1983.

Lee v. Myers · filed 1996-08-06

In addition, the district court properly dismissed the claims against the Insight for Inmates defendants because those defendants are not state actors so as to be subject to suit under § 1983.