42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not provide release from incarceration; a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement must seek habeas corpus relief.

Cole v. Lashbrook · filed 2018-02-22

Release from incarceration, however, is not available under § 1983. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus—not a § 1983 action for damages—is the sole federal remedy for challenging the fact or duration of a prisoner’s incarceration.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy of release from confinement; a request for release must be brought through habeas corpus.

Martin v. Mejias · filed 2019-07-31

Assuming Martin’s allegation that his confinement is by order of the Department of Correction is true, Martin’s request for release must be asserted in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. It is not cognizable in a section 1983 action.

Section 1983 cannot be used to seek release from confinement; that relief must be pursued through habeas after exhausting state remedies.

Parkins v. Detective Alison Nguyen · filed 2019-08-01

Specifically, we agree that Parkins’s claims for damages arising from his arrest and prosecution were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and we find that he could not seek his release from confinement in this section 1983 action, see Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (attack on validity of confinement is properly pursued only through habeas action after exhaustion of state remedies).

Section 1983 does not provide release from confinement as a remedy.

Lewis v. Dickerson · filed 2019-10-18

Finally, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion seeking release from confinement because such relief is not available in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from imprisonment; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Moore v. Vokins · filed 2020-01-14

Therefore, any claim seeking release from imprisonment is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from confinement as a remedy.

Nicholas v. Jefferson Co. Sheriff · filed 2020-01-16

Release from confinement is not an available remedy under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a state prisoner a means to seek earlier release from confinement.

Jones v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections · filed 2020-01-21

To the extent Plaintiff requests equitable relief in the form of earlier release from confinement, a § 1983 cause of action is not the appropriate means for seeking such relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate release from confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Henson v. Corizon Health LLC · filed 2020-05-11

As noted in the Court’s original Order, Plaintiff’s request for immediate release is not cognizable under § 1983; he must seek such relief in a habeas corpus action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from probation as a remedy.

Fry v. Lamb · filed 2020-05-20

Plaintiffs request for release from probation is not an available remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from prison to a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Perry 231579 v. Washington · filed 2020-06-30

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their confinement and seeking release; they must seek habeas corpus relief.

Green 189440 v. Horton · filed 2020-07-15

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from confinement; a prisoner seeking release must use habeas corpus.

Barron v. Tate · filed 2020-07-20

She cannot obtain release through this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from prison as a remedy.

JOHNSON v. WHITE · filed 2020-07-21

Instead, he seeks release from prison; a remedy which is not available in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy ordering a prisoner's release from prison.

MCCLURE v. WHITE · filed 2020-07-21

Instead, he seeks release from prison; a remedy which is not available in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner seeking release from confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Calhoun 379175 v. Barr · filed 2020-08-12

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to the fact or duration of confinement seeking release; that claim belongs in habeas corpus.

Blackburn v. Noble · filed 2020-08-17

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from civil commitment; a person seeking release must pursue habeas corpus relief.

Journey v. Norfolk Regional Center · filed 2020-08-28

In filing an amended complaint, Journey is advised that he may not seek release from the NRC in this § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a prisoner challenging the fact or duration of confinement or seeking release.

Young 753683 v. Whitmer · filed 2020-09-09

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide release from confinement; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Journey v. Norfolk Regional Center · filed 2020-11-02

First, as the court explained in its Memorandum and Order on initial review of Journey’s Complaint, Journey cannot seek release from his confinement in this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but rather must seek such relief through a habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 does not provide release from imprisonment; that relief must be sought through habeas corpus.

Simmons-Bey v. Raleigh Housing Authority · filed 2020-11-20

To the extent plaintiff seeks release from imprisonment, the court lacks authority to grants such relief in this civil rights action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from prison.

(PC) Ivory v. C.D.C.R. · filed 2020-12-08

Moreover, as the magistrate judge correctly explained, Plaintiff may not obtain release from prison through a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from prison.

(PC) Carroll v. Covello · filed 2020-12-29

In other words, plaintiff cannot obtain release from prison by filing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide release from detention as a remedy; a prisoner seeking release must pursue habeas corpus.

Perry v. Clark · filed 2021-01-12

Thus, because the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks cannot be granted in this § 1983 action, the Court must dismiss this claim.

Section 1983 does not make an Alabama county liable for injuries arising from a sheriff’s management of the county jail because the sheriff acts for the state in operating it.

Turquitt v. Jefferson County · filed 1998-03-25

We took this case on an interlocutory appeal to decide whether an Alabama county can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries befalling a county jail inmate arising from the sheriffs management of the jail. For the reasons outlined below, we hold that it cannot.

Section 1983 permits a Georgia county to be held liable for its sheriff’s acts because Georgia law closely connects the sheriff and county.

Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Cannon · filed 1994-09-13

Thus, Georgia counties and sheriffs appear inextricably intertwined, and the acts of the sheriff are therefore the acts of the county.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for a sheriff’s personnel decisions when the sheriff acts as the ultimate repository of county authority.

Welch v. Laney · filed 1995-07-07

This court has held a county liable under Sec. 1983 for the personnel decisions of a sheriff where the sheriff acted as the "ultimate repository of county authority." Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir.1989). The Cullman County Commission could likewise be liable for the acts of Sheriff Laney if Laney acted as the "ultimate repository of county authority."

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a district attorney’s use of peremptory challenges while prosecuting a state criminal case because the prosecutor acts for the state.

Esteves v. Brock · filed 1997-02-28

We hold that in exercising peremptory challenges in the course of a judicial proceeding instituted to enforce state law, a district attorney is not acting as a county official for whose actions the county bears responsibility.

Section 1983 permits county liability only for acts over which the county has final policymaking authority.

Worrell v. Bedsole · filed 1997-04-03

A county may only be held liable for acts for which the county has "final policymaking authority."

Section 1983 liability for a sheriff or county commissioners court requires personal involvement in the deprivation of rights or a causal connection between the deprivation and a jail policy or breach of an affirmative duty imposed by state law.

Nugent v. Myers · filed 1998-06-08

To be liable under section 1983, a sheriff or the county’s commissioners court7 must be either personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of ... constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between the constitutional deprivation and a jail policy or the breach of an affirmative duty imposed by state law.

A county is liable under § 1983 for a sheriff’s firing decision only if the decision represents official county policy.

Knight v. Vernon · filed 2000-07-28

Rockingham County may be held liable under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 if Sheriff Vernon's action in firing Ms. Knight represented official county policy. ... Because Sheriff Vernon, and not Rockingham County, had exclusive responsibility for discharging Ms. Knight, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the county on the § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits county liability for a sheriff’s department’s jail administration when the department acts for the county.

Streit v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2001-01-12

We therefore affirm the district court’s holding that the LASD, when functioning as the administrator of the local jail, is a County actor, and that the County may therefore be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a North Carolina county liable for a sheriff’s training and supervision of deputies because the sheriff has final policymaking authority over those personnel decisions.

Olvera v. Edmundson · filed 2001-07-17

Because training and supervision constitutes “personnel decisions” for purposes of determining who possesses policy-making authority, the County is entitled to dismissal.

A county is liable under § 1983 when a sheriff with final authority over employee discharges makes a discharge decision that violates an employee’s First Amendment rights.

Shepard v. Wapello County · filed 2003-12-31

Consequently the retaliatory discharge in violation of Shepard’s rights under the First Amendment was, in light of the jury’s answer to the special interrogatory, the policy of Wapello County subjecting it to § 1983 liability for the decision.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a sheriff’s actions solely on a theory of joint or vicarious liability.

Roger Whitmore's Automotive Services, Inc. v. Lake County · filed 2005-09-22

At the time Roger filed his suit, under clearly established law, Lake County was not a proper party defendant under the apparent theory of joint or vicarious liability that Roger pleaded.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a sheriff’s use of deputies when the sheriff is not a final policymaker for the county in that function.

Brown v. Dorsey · filed 2005-11-14

But, as noted above, the County has no control over the sheriffs department personnel, including its deputies and jailors. Therefore, the County cannot be held liable under § 1983 for Dorsey’s use of those personnel in connection with his heinous plot to kill Derwin Brown.

Section 1983 permits a Georgia county to be held liable for its sheriff’s actions because the sheriff acts for the county.

HAMILTON BY HAMILTON v. Cannon · filed 1994-09-13

The determination as to whether a county may be held liable for the actions of its sheriff depends upon the breadth of the authority granted to the county by the state legislature. ... Thus, Georgia counties and sheriffs appear inextricably intertwined, and the acts of the sheriff are therefore the acts of the county.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable solely because it employs officers who caused a constitutional injury.

Moore v. Miami-Dade County · filed 2007-07-18

As Defendants correctly point out, Moore is alleging liability based solely on the fact that the county employs officers Newry and Corbin, which is clearly a claim of respondeat superior liability. It is well established that the County cannot be liable under section 1983 merely because its agents or employees have caused a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 permits liability against a county or its employees in their official capacities only when a county policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

Reese v. Monroe County Sheriff's Department · filed 2009-05-01

Under Monell, the county, or its employees in their official capacities, could only be liable if the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from a policy or custom of the county.

Section 1983 does not make a county board of commissioners liable for jail officials’ conduct when the board has no statutory duty to hire, train, supervise, or discipline the sheriff or deputies.

In Re Estate of Crowell v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Cleveland · filed 2010-01-26

Also, the board of county commissioners is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the board has no statutory duty to hire, train, supervise, or discipline county sheriffs or deputies.

Section 1983 permits liability against a county when a jail staffing decision by its final policymaker causes a constitutional violation.

Bryson v. OKL. CTY. EX REL. OKL. CTY. DETENTION CET. · filed 2011-06-30

Even the determination to staff the night shift at a particular level, if shown to be the "moving force" resulting in a violation of Bryson's constitutional rights, would be sufficient to impose liability on the County, assuming the sheriff made that decision and that the sheriff was the final County policy-maker with respect to that decision.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for an employee’s conduct solely under respondeat superior.

Molette v. The State of Georgia · filed 2012-03-27

The district court also dismissed properly Molette’s claim against Newton County based on respondeat superior because it is well-established that “[a] county’s liability under § 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.” See Grech, 335 F.3d at 1329.

Section 1983 claims against county actors require facts showing a basis for holding them liable for state judges’ actions.

Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2014-01-10

The district court properly dismissed the claims against the County of Los Angeles and County Counsel Andrea Ordin, because Appellants failed to plead facts demonstrating that these County actors are liable for the actions of California state court judges.

California sheriffs enforcing the Vehicle Code act as county officials for § 1983 purposes, as they do when investigating crime.

Sandoval v. County of Sonoma · filed 2015-02-17

Defendants also assert that they are immune from suit because county sheriffs act as state, rather than county, officials when enforcing the California Vehicle Code. ... There is no material difference between the criminal investigations at issue in Brewster and the California Vehicle Code enforcement actions alleged to be unconstitutional in this suit. The district court correctly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not make a Georgia county liable for a sheriff’s deputy’s arrest when the county lacks control over the sheriff’s law enforcement functions.

Carter v. Butts County · filed 2015-06-02

Because Butts County “does not, and cannot, direct the Sheriff [or his deputies] how to arrest a criminal,” it cannot be held liable in this case.

A California county may be sued under § 1983 for a sheriff’s investigative conduct because the sheriff acts as a county official when investigating criminal activity.

Bresaz v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2015-09-30

Plaintiffs have properly pleaded the County as a Defendant in the Second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the County -with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 makes a county liable only when a county policy it controls causes a constitutional violation.

Kicklighter v. McIntosh County Board of Commissioners · filed 2016-02-19

However, a county is liable under § 1983 only when a county policy causes a constitutional violation and the county has control over the policy. ... In this case, as previously indicated, McIntosh County had no control over who Defendant Goodrich hired and fired. Thus, Defendant McIntosh County Board cannot be liable under Plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county only when its policy or custom causes a deprivation of federal rights.

Joshua Luttrell, Andrew Davis, Moises Roman, Joe Rodriguez And on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. El P · filed 2018-07-26

In the absence of any pleadings alleging that the County had a custom or policy that deprived Appellants of their constitutional rights, we conclude that Appellants have not pled a valid 1983 claim against the County.

Section 1983 does not make an Illinois county liable for jail policies controlled solely by its independently elected sheriff.

Dunn v. County Of Will · filed 2019-05-02

Therefore, the County has no control over the policies promulgated and maintained at the ADF, and as such, cannot be held liable for their results.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a county only when a county policy, training, or custom causes the deprivation of a constitutional right.

May v. Dona Ana County Jail · filed 2019-09-27

Doña Ana County may be held liable based only on violation of a constitutionally protected right stemming from Doña Ana County’s policy, training, or custom.

Section 1983 does not make a South Carolina county liable for a sheriff’s termination of a deputy, because sheriffs and deputies are state employees.

Fields v. Richland County Sheriff's Department · filed 2020-02-10

Given there is no actionable claim against Richland County under § 1983 regarding Fields’s termination, the Court concludes Fields has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an Alabama county for failing to fund jail maintenance when that failure causes a deprivation of federal rights.

Martin v. Sheriff of Walker County · filed 2020-05-13

Therefore, Walker County can incur liability under § 1983 for not appropriating the funds that the sheriff needs for maintenance of the jail.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a sheriff’s law enforcement acts when the county lacks authority to control the sheriff.

Almond v. Clark · filed 2020-06-08

County liability under § 1983 is limited: “local governments can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of those whom the local government has no authority to control.” ... For the County to be liable for the acts of the sheriff and deputy sheriffs, then, Plaintiffs must show that the County had authority to control those individuals. Plaintiffs have not done so.

Section 1983 permits county liability only for acts within the county’s final policymaking authority.

LEWIS v. PETERKIN · filed 2020-09-24

A county may only be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts for which it has final “policymaking” authority.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for acts at a county jail when the county lacks control over the jail’s daily operations.

Daniel v. Howell · filed 2020-11-30

Because Daniel fails to allege this necessary element of control, her § 1983 claims against the Commission are due to be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 claims against state military officials are subject to the Feres doctrine’s incident-to-service test.

Newton v. Lee · filed 2012-04-24

The “incident to service” test applies to § 1983 claims against state military officials.

Feres immunity does not bar a § 1983 claim for an injury unrelated to activity incident to military service.

Jackson v. Tate · filed 2011-06-02

We therefore hold that Jackson’s alleged injury does not arise out of an activity incident to his service and his complaint is not barred by the Feres doctrine.

A Section 1983 claim challenging a military personnel decision may be nonjusticiable under the doctrine of intramilitary immunity.

Figueroa v. Maguire · filed 2007-02-27

As for the petitioner’s purported civil rights cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, under the facts presented, such claim is nonjusticiable under the doctrine of intramilitary immunity (see Lovell v Heng, 890 F2d 63 [1989]; cf. Chappell v Wallace, supra; Feres v United States, 340 US 135 [1950]; Jones v Beame, 45 NY2d 402, 408-409 [1978]; Nyberg v State Military Dept., 65 P3d 1241, 1249 [Wyo 2003]).

Section 1983 damages claims against a servicemember’s military superiors for injuries incident to service are barred by intramilitary immunity.

Chandler v. Roche · filed 2002-08-19

The court concludes that the in-tramilitary immunity bars the damages claims against the plaintiffs superiors pursuant to the Constitution and Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages actions for injuries arising from activity incident to National Guard service.

Wigginton v. Centracchio · filed 2000-03-23

Thus, Wright v. Park precludes § 1983 damage actions that "arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service," including National Guard service.

Section 1983 claims for injuries incident to military service are barred by the Feres doctrine.

Day v. Massachusetts Air National Guard · filed 1998-02-12

Plaintiffs large number of claims — including negligent supervision and enlistment, assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and state and federal civil rights claims — do not save him from the reach of Feres.

Section 1983 claims against National Guard officers are barred when the challenged conduct is incident to military service.

Burkins v. United States · filed 1994-10-04

Therefore, since the actions of Tom and Patrick would be considered “incident to military service” precluding suit under the FTCA due to the Feres doctrine, see supra, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims likewise should be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims for injuries related to military service are barred by the Feres doctrine.

Tracy v. National Guard Chief · filed 1996-02-07

Carl E. Tracy appeals a district court judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint filed under the authority enunciated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390-97 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Plaintiff's claims clearly are barred under the doctrine enunciated in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).

Section 1983 bars a National Guard member’s damages claim against superior state military officers for alleged constitutional violations arising from a military order.

Jorden v. National Guard Bureau · filed 1986-10-23

We thus believe that the Supreme Court was laying down a general rule barring damages actions by military personnel against superior officers for constitutional violations, rather than authorizing a fact-specific inquiry. ... Under the circumstances, Chappell clearly bars a Sec. 1983 damages action.

The Feres doctrine bars § 1983 damages claims against state military officers for injuries arising from military service.

Mervin John v. Secretary Army · filed 2012-06-05

Further, the Feres doctrine bars suits for damages against state and federal officers for constitutional violations, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), respectively.

Section 1983 damages actions for injuries incident to military service are barred by the Feres test.

Aikens v. William Ingram, Jr. · filed 2016-01-29

We join our sister circuits in extending the Feres “incident to service” test to § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 damages claims for injuries sustained incident to military service are subject to the Feres bar.

Aikens v. William Ingram, Jr. · filed 2016-02-01

We thus join our sister circuits in applying the Feres test to § 1983 suits for damages based on injuries sustained incident to service.

Section 1983 can hold a public employer liable for employment discrimination even when its individual agents are not held liable.

Polacco v. The Curators Of The University Of Missouri · filed 1994-10-11

When the sum of the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of employment discrimination, as it was here, we are unwilling to second-guess the factfinder's judgment that the employer, but not its individual agents, should be held liable under Title VII or, in the case of a public employer, Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer solely because it employed the alleged wrongdoer; liability requires an alleged intentional policy behind the conduct.

Mattox v. Bailey · filed 1996-05-29

Even if this were not so, plaintiff’s complaint does not set forth a valid § 1983 claim against DOC because DOC’s alleged liability is premised wholly on the fact that it was Bailey’s employer. The complaint is devoid of any allegations that Bailey’s actions were the result of an intentional and deliberate policy adopted or ratified by DOC’s governing body.

Section 1983 permits direct liability against a public employer for a supervisor’s sexual harassment only if the employer’s own actions caused the constitutional violation.

Harper v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center · filed 1998-02-11

Where an employee alleges an equal protection claim based on sexual harassment by a co-worker or supervisor, the employer itself, as opposed to the offending co-worker or supervisor, may be subject to direct liability only if its own actions caused the alleged violation.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable for its employees’ acts solely under a respondeat superior theory.

Szucs v. Committee of Interns and Residents · filed 1999-02-08

It is well established that an employer is not liable for the acts of its employees under the tort theory of respondeat superior in suits brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability against a public entity.

Woodson v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1999-06-26

Section 1983 does not permit respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 sexual harassment claims against an employer are analyzed under standards developed in similar Title VII litigation.

Whitaker v. Mercer County · filed 1999-08-23

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the plaintiffs sexual harassment claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are to be analyzed under the standards developed in similar Title VII litigation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an employer under respondeat superior without evidence of a policy or custom supporting liability.

Eugene Terrance, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Everett L. Terrance v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hosp · filed 2002-04-08

Finally, the Michigan Department of Mental Health’s role as operator of NRPH and NRPH’s role as health care provider does not subject either to liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior in the absence of some evidence of a policy or custom that would subject these employers to § 1983 liability under the facts of the case now before us.

Section 1983 permits direct liability against a public entity when its authorized agents carry out the entity’s own decision to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Roberson v. Pinnacol Assurance · filed 2004-05-12

Ms. Roberson has alleged facts indicating that Pinnacol itself directly violated her constitutional rights through the acts of its authorized agents who carried out Pinnacol’s decision to terminate or refuse to pay her benefits. ... Although we express no opinion regarding the ultimate success of Ms. Roberson’s claims, the court must reinstate her § 1983 claims against Pinnacol.

An employer cannot be held liable under § 1983 based on an employee’s conduct when the employee is not liable.

Collins v. Al-Shami · filed 2017-03-20

Dr. Al-Shami is not liable, so — even if the theory of respondeat superior were available — neither is his employer.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation liable solely because it employed the person who acted; liability requires the corporation's direct involvement through an order, custom, or policy.

Quinones v. Maier & Berkele, Inc. · filed 1989-07-14

The evidence in this case fails to show that the action Jansen took against appellants was effected pursuant to either “a direct order from [Maier & Berkele] or a custom or policy instituted by [it]. Since there is no showing of direct involvement by [Maier & Berkele, it] cannot be liable under § 1983.”

A government employer is liable under Section 1983 for an employee’s acts when its policy or custom causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Friend v. Adams County Sheriff · filed 2019-09-27

A government employer is liable for its employee’s acts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when that employer has a policy or custom that causes a plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 does not make an employer liable merely for employing the person who caused an injury; the employer's own policy must have caused it.

Jones v. Strow · filed 2019-10-29

Wexford is only potentially liable if its own policy caused Plaintiff injury. ... Wexford is not liable merely because it employed Defendant Strow. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 does not make an employer or principal liable solely because an employee or agent violated the Constitution.

Williams v. Deputy Warden McKay · filed 2020-03-06

Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent violated the Constitution.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against an employer when its employee committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Lowrey v. Tilden · filed 2020-03-19

Summary judgment was properly entered for Wexford as well: Dr. Tilden committed no underlying constitutional violation, so Wexford (his employer) cannot be held liable for damages.

Section 1983 permits direct employer liability for deliberate indifference when systemic and gross deficiencies effectively deny inmates adequate medical care.

Sue Williams, Linda Wood, and Claude Wood, as the Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Rachel A. Wood v. Indiana · filed 2020-04-08

Our holding against Corizon was that the designated evidence, which was and is available against Corizon, met that standard. Id. Accordingly, we clarify our holding to be that the Estate’s theory against Corizon is for direct liability under § 1983, not liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable solely because it employs staff who allegedly violated a person's constitutional rights.

Tidwell v. Carter · filed 2020-07-13

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and Wexford cannot be held liable solely because it employs Dr. Marthakis or the two nurses involved in Tidwell’s care.

Section 1983 does not permit an employer to be sued solely because its employees violated someone’s civil rights.

Barrett v. Armor Correctional Health Services Inc · filed 2020-08-31

Because Armor cannot be sued under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, the court will dismiss it from this case.

Section 1983 does not make a company liable merely because it employs someone who allegedly violated a constitutional right.

Carson v. Hyatt · filed 2020-10-20

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and companies are not liable merely because they employ someone.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a condition of confinement when success would not alter the sentence or undo the conviction.

Leamer v. Fauver · filed 2002-04-19

Conversely, when the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an action under § 1983 is appropriate.

Section 1983 covers prison conditions claims, but conclusory claims lacking even minimal factual support are properly dismissed.

Travis v. North Carolina Department of Corrections Franklin E. Freeman, Jr. Michael Easley · filed 1994-10-24

We note, however, that Appellant also included two claims concerning the conditions of his confinement in his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 petition. Appellant made conclusory allegations that the prison is overcrowded and that he is deprived of meaningful access to courts. The district court failed to separately consider these claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988). ... Accordingly, because Appellant did not allege even a minimal level of factual support for these claims, they were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights complaint for claims of mistreatment in prison, which belong outside a habeas petition.

Vereen v. John Sullivan, Warden · filed 1995-02-23

His claims regarding mistreatment in prison should be brought in a civil rights complaint. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam).

Section 1983 is the route for a state prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement rather than the fact of confinement.

Kelubai v. Wright · filed 1995-05-02

In contrast, a state prisoner "challenging the conditions rather than the fact of confinement" must attempt to obtain relief under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a prisoner’s claim that prison officials denied meaningful access to law libraries, rather than a habeas remedy.

Veal v. Cooper · filed 1996-08-26

Veal’s third claim — that prison officials have denied him meaningful access to prison law libraries — is not properly brought as a habeas action. Rather, such a prison conditions claim comprises a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ... and should be filed (subject to usual filing requirements and fees) as a civil action.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for challenging unconstitutional prison conditions and procedures.

Turner v. Johnson · filed 1999-03-15

Generally, suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are the proper vehicle to attack unconstitutional conditions of confinement and prison procedures.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for prisoners challenging their conditions of confinement.

Pischke v. Litscher · filed 1999-05-21

These “petitions for habeas corpus” really then are challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the conditions in which the inmates are being held or will be held in the private prisons to which they have been or will be transferred.

Section 1983 provides a way for prisoners to challenge the conditions of their confinement, including conditions in private prisons.

Pischke v. Litscher · filed 1999-06-22

These "petitions for habeas corpus" really then are challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the conditions in which the inmates are being held or will be held in the private prisons to which they have been or will be transferred.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement without challenging the fact or duration of confinement.

Spruill v. Rosemeyer · filed 2002-05-28

The appellant challenges only the conditions of his confinement, not the fact or duration thereof, and such a challenge could not have been brought by means of a habeas corpus action. The judgment of the District Court is therefore REVERSED and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Section 1983 provides a federal legal remedy for inmates challenging alleged due process violations in their prison placement.

Perotti v. Ishee, Unpublished Decision (10-10-2002) · filed 2002-10-10

Petitioners herein assert a violation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . They are entitled to file federal litigation seeking the same relief sought by the petitioners in that case. They have a legal remedy.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a challenge to prison conditions rather than the validity of confinement.

Machado v. Pendleton · filed 2003-08-18

However, as the district court correctly concluded, this is a challenge to the conditions of Machado’s confinement and thus it must be brought as a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than via a habeas corpus petition.

Section 1983 does not permit due process claims that call into question the validity of prison disciplinary punishment.

Coleman v. Hardy · filed 2003-10-20

Because Coleman’s claims that he was denied due process during the disciplinary proceedings call into question the validity of the punishment Coleman received, those claims are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit claims for damages or removal of a prison disciplinary violation from an inmate’s record when those claims challenge the validity of the disciplinary finding.

Bridges v. Lee · filed 2005-01-03

Moreover, even if a protected liberty interest was implicated during Bridges’ disciplinary proceedings, his claims for damages and removal of the violation from his prison record based on a violation of his due process rights are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A prisoner seeking expungement of false prison-record information under § 1983 must allege that prison officials refused a request to remove it.

Farinaro v. Coughlin · filed 1986-08-06

Finally, the Court ruled that as a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing an action to enforce this right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prisoner must allege that he requested that the information be expunged and that prison officials refused. ... He also alleges that he has filed a grievance requesting that the information be expunged, but that prison officials refused. Defendants’ summary judgment as to this claim is thus denied.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to disciplinary segregation that affects the conditions or severity of custody rather than its duration.

Jacobs v. Bertrand · filed 2005-04-28

Because only the condition of Jacobs’s confinement or the severity of his custody is at issue (see Montgomery, 262 F.3d at 643), Jacobs’s claim must be brought under § 1983.

Claims of inadequate medical care during incarceration and denial of access to a law library should be raised in a § 1983 action rather than in a criminal appeal.

United States v. Hicks · filed 2002-01-22

Hicks also asserts that her constitutional rights were violated when she received inadquate medical care while incarcerated and was denied access to a law library. Such claims are not properly raised in this appeal and should be raised in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights action for a prisoner's inadequate-medical-care claim.

Farrell v. Franklin · filed 2006-12-28

The court correctly ruled that the inadequate- medical-care claim should be raised in a civil-rights action, not an application for habeas relief.

A § 1983 plaintiff who shows no injury from challenged prison placement and is no longer housed at the facility may not recover on that claim.

Johnson v. Talley · filed 2007-06-15

Accordingly, he may not recover on this claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 is the required civil rights vehicle for prison challenges that must be brought outside habeas.

Sherratt v. Friel · filed 2008-02-04

Some of these challenges might properly be raised in a habeas petition, while others must be raised in a § 1983 civil rights complaint.

Section 1983 permits a state prisoner to bring constitutional claims challenging prison visitation rules applied under color of state law.

Wilson v. Nevada Department of Prisons · filed 1981-04-17

The plaintiff’s contentions that prison officials, by their policy limiting the visitation of inmates in the CMU to immediate family members and two non-family members, are violating, under color of state law, his rights to freedom of association, due process and equal protection of the law are cognizable by the Court.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a state prisoner’s challenge to restrictions on telephone and recreational privileges as conditions of confinement.

Jones-Bay v. Wright · filed 1995-11-16

Since Jones-Bay's deprivation is more closely related to the conditions of his confinement rather than his "freedom" within the MCC, he should have labelled his suit as a claim for relief under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner's challenge to conditions of confinement rather than a change in the level of custody.

Isby v. Herbert Newkirk, 2 · filed 1996-12-12

Moreover, Isby's claims are more closely related to conditions within the MCC, rather than his "freedom" within the MCC. We conclude he should have brought as a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s claim that an inadequate prison law library denied constitutional access to the courts.

United States v. Gutierrez · filed 1997-07-08

This claim pertains to the constitutionality of Gutierrez’s treatment in prison, and thus should be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and not on direct appeal.

Section 1983 provides a way to bring prison conditions claims that are unrelated to a challenge to a criminal conviction.

Dandar v. Krysevig · filed 2010-03-23

Dandar’s requests for injunctive relief challenge conditions of his confinement and are unrelated to his challenge to his criminal conviction. These claims can be properly raised in a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after he has exhausted his administrative remedies.

Section 1983 claims that would invalidate prison discipline resulting in lost good-time credits are barred unless the discipline has been successfully challenged; independent Eighth Amendment claims are not barred on that basis.

Cincoski v. Richard · filed 2011-06-09

We affirm the dismissal without prejudice of the claims in which Cincoski sought restoration of good-time credits he lost because of his disciplinary convictions, or declaratory relief or damages based on those convictions. ... We also conclude, however, that Cincoski presented claims under the Eighth Amendment in which he did not challenge the disciplinary proceedings, and these claims were not barred by Heck.

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for prisoners’ claims alleging denial of mail and phone privileges and beatings.

Rochester v. McCall · filed 2011-08-11

Finally, Rochester’s claims of denial of mail and phone privileges and beatings sound under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner's challenge to disciplinary procedures that affect only the conditions of confinement.

Requena v. Roberts · filed 2014-04-07

His petition, which alleges the denial of an opportunity to submit documentary evidence at the hearing that led to his discipline, challenges the process affecting only the conditions of his confinement. It is therefore properly characterized as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a way to bring prison conditions claims that do not challenge the legality or duration of confinement.

Cooper v. NHSP Warden · filed 2014-04-21

Rather, it describes what is, in substance, a claim assertable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to conditions of confinement and a claim that is not likely viable in any event.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner’s procedural due process claim about a disciplinary hearing when success would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the resulting sanctions.

Harris v. Ricci · filed 2014-12-30

Because Harris’s claim did not imply the invalidity of his resulting sanctions, the Court did not err in failing to dismiss his claim pursuant to Balisok.

Section 1983 is the proper civil action for a prisoner’s claim about conditions of confinement that does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.

Goodman v. Warden · filed 2017-05-01

Claims involving no attack on the validity of a prisoner’s conviction or sentence are raised properly in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action not in a federal habeas proceeding.

Section 1983 is the appropriate vehicle for claims challenging prison conditions, including sanitation, access to legal resources, and health care.

Bloomfield v. Zeigler · filed 2019-05-31

Here, the district court dismissed several of Bloomfield’s claims on procedural grounds without reaching their merits; it concluded that § 1983, rather than § 2254, provided the appropriate vehicle for advancing those claims. ... Notably, Bloomfield provides neither argument nor authority that might indicate these claims implicate the validity of his conviction or sentence. ... And we see no indication that they do. Accordingly, because Bloomfield fails to demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling,” we decline to grant Bloomfield a COA to pursue these claims on appeal.

A court may treat a prisoner’s mislabeled habeas pleading as a § 1983 civil rights action.

Grandinetti v. Thomas · filed 2019-07-29

Although Grandinetti labels his pleading as seeking habeas corpus relief, the Court construes it as a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate mental health care.

Enzler v. Guyer · filed 2019-09-16

Nevertheless, the Court is not able to discern any factual or legal objection directed towards Judge Johnston’s determination that Enzler has raised an Eighth Amendment claim which must be brought under section 1983. ... IT IS ORDERED that Judge Johnston’s Findings and Recommendation (Doc. 9) is ADOPTED in full.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for a state prisoner challenging conditions of confinement.

Rodriguez v. Montgomery · filed 2019-09-17

If Petitioner wishes to challenge the conditions of his confinement as alleged in his initial filing and in his motion for stay, he must file a new civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which will be given a new case number.

Section 1983 provides the civil rights action for prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement.

Mr. Tauno August Koivisto, III v. Warden · filed 2019-11-15

Prisoners wishing to challenge the conditions of their confinement must file a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 covers a prisoner’s First and Eighth Amendment claims about prison conditions that do not challenge the fact or duration of confinement.

Daker v. Warden · filed 2020-02-14

However, Daker’s First and Eighth Amendment claims were cognizable under § 1983 and, therefore, not cognizable under the mutually exclusive remedy of § 2254.

Section 1983 is the civil rights avenue for a prisoner’s constitutional claim about conditions of confinement when success would not accelerate release.

Sanchez v. Davis · filed 2020-02-28

A constitutional claim that, if successful, would not entitle the prisoner to accelerated release—but rather addresses the conditions of confinement—must be brought in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is not subject to adjudication in a habeas proceeding.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a state prisoner's civil rights claims about prison conditions that do not affect the execution of the sentence.

Knox v. Sharp · filed 2020-03-30

To the extent Petitioner is complaining about his medications, injuries resulting from a stabbing, program participation, legal research assistance, free speech, equal protection, and his placement in the disciplinary unit or H-Unit, these claims are not appropriate for a habeas corpus action. Instead, such claims must be presented in a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement.

Koivisto v. Chief Medical Officer · filed 2020-04-02

Prisoners wishing to challenge the conditions of their confinement must file a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for a state prisoner’s constitutional challenge to prison conditions, but not to the fact or length of custody.

Lewis v. Hon. Janis L. Sammartino · filed 2020-04-06

On the other hand, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a prisoner's retaliation claim concerning conditions of confinement.

Sweed v. Davis · filed 2020-04-08

The Court does not reach these arguments, however, because claims of improper retaliation by correctional officers and officials concern conditions of confinement, which must be challenged in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement.

Koivisto v. The Great People of the State of California · filed 2020-04-24

Prisoners wishing to challenge the conditions of their confinement must file a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement.

Koivisto v. Los Angeles District Court System · filed 2020-04-30

Prisoners wishing to challenge the conditions of their confinement must file a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for a state prisoner challenging the conditions of prison life.

Torres v. Larios · filed 2020-05-04

If Petitioner wishes to challenge the conditions of his prison life, he must file a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which will be given a separate case number.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for a state prisoner challenging the conditions of confinement.

REXROAT v. HOLCOMB · filed 2020-05-15

Finally, to the extent that Mr. Rexroat may be understood to challenge the conditions of his confinement, such a challenge must be brought in a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a habeas petition.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for challenges to prison conditions and procedures.

Shrader v. Director, TDCJ-CID · filed 2020-06-09

The Magistrate Judge noted that a petition for habeas corpus allows a petitioner to challenge the fact of his confinement, while challenges to conditions of confinement and prison procedures are appropriately brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... For the reasons described above, Shrader’s objections (Docket No. 11) are OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation (Docket No. 9) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prison conditions claim seeking relief other than release from custody.

Resch 304507 v. Rewerts · filed 2020-06-19

A claim seeking relief other than release is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement.

Dodd v. Warden · filed 2020-06-30

If Mr. Dodd wishes to challenge the conditions of his confinement, he must assert those claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than in a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for a challenge to prison conditions when success would not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence.

Upshaw v. Robertson · filed 2020-07-06

Where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence, a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is proper and habeas jurisdiction is absent.

Section 1983 provides a way to challenge prison conditions, but a request for release from custody must be brought through habeas corpus.

Allen 227969 v. Brown · filed 2020-07-07

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 is a proper way to challenge unconstitutional prison conditions, but release from custody must be sought through habeas corpus.

Sosby 576425 v. Brown · filed 2020-07-07

Petitioner’s claims regarding the constitutionality of his continued custody in light of the danger posed by COVID-19 are principally claims regarding the conditions of his confinement. Such claims should be raised by a complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is a proper vehicle for constitutional challenges to prison conditions, but a request for release from custody must be brought through habeas corpus.

Brooks 153447 v. Horton · filed 2020-07-22

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s conditions-of-confinement claim seeking relief other than release.

Dixon 200732 v. Brown · filed 2020-07-30

A claim seeking relief other than release is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prison conditions claim seeking relief other than release from custody.

Tibbs 172432 v. Brown · filed 2020-08-10

A claim seeking relief other than release is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prison conditions claim seeking relief other than release from custody.

Folden 893284 v. Winn · filed 2020-08-12

A claim seeking relief other than release is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prison conditions claim seeking relief other than release from custody.

Philpot 152262 v. Rewerts · filed 2020-08-19

A claim seeking relief other than release is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a way to seek relief for unconstitutional prison conditions short of release from custody.

Dye 149800 v. Rewerts · filed 2020-08-20

A claim seeking relief other than release is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights remedy for claims challenging unconstitutional prison procedures or conditions of confinement.

Darnell v. Waybourn · filed 2020-09-01

A civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the appropriate vehicle for attacking unconstitutional prison procedures or conditions of confinement.

Section 1983 is a vehicle for seeking relief from prison conditions other than release from custody.

Wilkes 143351 v. Rewerts · filed 2020-09-02

A claim seeking relief other than release is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement, but it does not provide a way to obtain release from prison.

(PC) Carroll v. Covello · filed 2020-09-08

Petitioner cannot obtain release from prison by filing a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 is not the proper vehicle for a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement seeking release from custody.

Board 766060 v. Washington · filed 2020-09-09

A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights remedy for a state prisoner challenging conditions of confinement, but not the fact or length of custody.

Carroll v. Diaz · filed 2020-09-14

A civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.”

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action to challenge prison conditions, with monetary damages and appropriate injunctive relief available.

(PC)Wells v. Newsom · filed 2020-10-16

In contrast, civil rights actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenge the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement, not the fact or duration of that confinement, and available remedies include monetary damages and appropriate injunctive relief.

Section 1983 provides a civil rights action for a state prisoner challenging the conditions of confinement.

Hawes v. Unknown · filed 2020-11-16

To the extent Petitioner seeks to challenge the conditions of his confinement, he must do so, if at all, in a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits prisoners to bring civil rights actions challenging retaliatory transfers and conditions of confinement.

Johnson v. Ransom · filed 2020-11-17

If Johnson seeks to challenge his retaliatory transfer and conditions of confinement at SCI-Dallas, he may do so by filing civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims about prison conditions seeking relief other than release from custody; a claim seeking release belongs in habeas corpus.

Smith 365581 v. Jackson · filed 2020-12-09

A claim seeking relief other than release is properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.