42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; private attorneys are not state actors for this purpose.

Cudejko v. Goldstein · filed 2001-10-26

Private attorneys are not considered to be state actors for purposes of § 1983.

A private supplier’s sale of cigarettes to prison stores does not, by itself, make it a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

Richard v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2001-12-03

Third, Brown & Williamson is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. Although private entities who act in concert with a state actor may be subject to suit under § 1983, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), Brown & Williamson’s actions in supplying cigarettes to MDOC prison stores for sale to the inmate population are not such a sufficiently close connection with the state as to render Brown & Williamson a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A merchant is not a state actor under § 1983 when the arresting officer independently investigates the suspected crime instead of relying solely on the merchant’s accusation.

Morris v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc, Dillard Department Stores, Inc Liberty Mutual Insurance Co R.W. Brown · filed 2001-12-26

Under White, Hernandez, and Bartholomew, therefore, Dillard’s is not a state actor for the purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not treat private parties as state actors merely because they obtain an injunction or call the sheriff to enforce it.

Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, Inc. The Offices of Dr. Manohar Lal, M.D. Dr. Lal Summit County Sheriff Dr · filed 2002-03-28

Although Gottfried appears to argue that they are state actors because they somehow actively enforced the injunction by calling the Sheriff, we conclude otherwise. The state court injunction specifically stated that the Sheriff of Summit County has such an obligation-the fact that the Medical Planning defendants placed a phone call when picketers appeared does not render them state actors. Moreover, we do not find the fact that the Medical Planning defendants initiated state court proceedings to obtain an injunction to be state action.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private attorney who is not acting under color of state law.

Miller v. Melnick · filed 2002-05-03

Private attorneys are not considered to be state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private litigant as a state actor merely because the litigant obtains an immediately enforceable protection order.

Judy Lynn Tahfs, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. William N. Proctor Miranda K. Proctor, Defendants-Appellees/cross · filed 2003-01-14

The mere fact that the Proctors were able to secure an immediately enforceable PPO does not render them state actors.

Section 1983 treats private contractors providing services traditionally charged to the state as municipalities, so their liability requires an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Wall v. Dion · filed 2003-04-04

Following the majority view that equates private contractors with municipalities when providing services traditionally charged to the state, Wall’s claims against these movants will only be successful if they were responsible for an unconstitutional municipal custom or policy.

A private party and the party’s lawyers can be state actors under § 1983 when they use state procedures and officials to seize property.

Doyle v. Schultz · filed 2003-04-22

As such, the Appellants were state actors because: (1) Schultz requested the writ of fi fa, which set into motion the procedures directly involving state officials that led to the constructive seizure of the Doyles’ home, and (2) as Schultz’s attorneys, Landry and Newman Mathis may be considered state actors because they employed the state to execute the writ of fi fa, a state-provided procedure.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a foster parent when allegations that state agents colluded in her conduct support treating her as a state actor at the pleading stage.

Howard v. Malac · filed 2003-07-01

When all intendments are taken in the Plaintiffs’ favor, therefore, their allegations indicate both that Malac infringed their substantive due process rights and that she can be considered a state actor. Accordingly, Malac’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Private prison-management corporations and their employees may be sued under § 1983 by prisoners who suffer constitutional injuries.

Rosborough v. Management & Training Corp. · filed 2003-11-07

We agree with the Sixth Circuit and with those district courts that have found that private prison-management corporations and their employees may be sued under § 1983 by a prisoner who has suffered a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 does not treat private parties as state actors merely because they give police information on which the police act.

Andresen v. Diorio · filed 2003-11-12

Yet it is settled that the fact that private parties give the police information on which official action is then taken does not by itself convert the private parties into state actors.

Section 1983 generally does not permit claims against private attorneys, but they may be liable if they conspire with government officials.

Serton v. Sollie · filed 2003-12-02

“[P]rivate attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally are not subject to suit under section 1983.” ... Private attorneys may, however, be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they conspire with governmental officials. ... Serton does not argue on appeal that Jacob conspired with a government official.

A private corporation acting under color of state law as a jail contractor is treated like a municipality for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Woodward, Harriett G v. Correctional Medical · filed 2004-05-17

CMS has admitted that it was acting under color of state law as a contractor performing the public function of running a jail. Therefore, it is treated the same as a municipality for purposes of § 1983.

A private party’s mere use of state legal procedures does not make that party a state actor through joint participation under Section 1983.

Dahlberg v. Becker · filed 1984-11-09

Further, the mere invocation by defendants of New York's legal procedures does not constitute joint participation so as to satisfy the statutory requirement under Sec. 1983 that there be a state actor.

Section 1983 does not reach a private attorney’s conduct in a divorce proceeding unless joint action with a state official makes that conduct attributable to the state.

Taylor v. Diznoff · filed 1986-04-25

This rule is subject to the exception that joint action with a state official may convert the private party’s conduct into the sort actionable under section 1983. ... Plaintiff cannot take advantage of this exception. Her pleadings, construed liberally or otherwise, reveal a disagreement only with her husband’s attorney’s manner of gathering information in preparing for a divorce hearing.

Section 1983 does not treat a private security officer as a state actor when the officer lacks full police powers and must call police for assistance.

Johnson v. Larabida Children's Hospital · filed 2004-06-22

Stephens was no substitute for the police and, therefore, not a state actor.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private attorney acting as counsel only if the attorney conspired with a state actor to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Plaisance v. Reese · filed 2004-09-13

Judge McConduit, therefore, is not a state, actor when acting in his capacity as an attorney and is subject to suit under § 1983 only if he conspired with a state actor to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not treat a private festival organizer as a state actor merely because it uses public property and receives police assistance.

Villegas v. City of Gilroy · filed 2005-04-05

Accordingly, this Court holds that GGFA is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party when the state effectively transfers authority to that party.

Wilson, Mark v. McRae's Inc · filed 2005-07-01

Private entities may be treated as state actors when the state effectively transfers authority to them.

Section 1983 does not treat a merchant as a state actor when the evidence does not support an inference that police delegated their authority to it.

Wilson v. McRae Inc., Doing Business as Carson Pirie Scott & Co. · filed 2005-07-01

Neither of these propositions would allow a reasonable trier of fact to infer that Carson Pirie Scott is exercising state power delegated by the Chicago Police.

A public trust hospital that is a political subdivision is a governmental entity subject to liability under § 1983.

Beedle v. Wilson · filed 2005-09-02

Just as action taken by such entities constitutes state action under § 1983, so too does such action taken by public trust hospitals. The Hospital is, therefore, a governmental entity subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat foster parents in Pennsylvania as state actors for purposes of liability.

Leshko v. Servis · filed 2005-09-09

We thus hold that foster parents in Pennsylvania are not state actors for purposes of liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private party a state actor merely for calling police or providing information that may lead to an arrest, unless the party improperly influenced or controlled the officers.

Fisk v. Letterman · filed 2005-11-17

Moreover, a private party who calls police officers for assistance or provides them with information that may lead to an arrest of an individual does not become a state actor rendering that party liable under § 1983 to the person detained, unless the police officers were improperly influenced or controlled by the private party.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private actor without facts establishing a basis for liability.

Scott v. Jackson County · filed 2005-12-06

Further, plaintiff alleges no facts to support her § 1983 claims against Dr. Motschenbacher, as he is a private actor.

A conclusory allegation that public defenders conspired with state officials does not establish that they acted under color of state law for a § 1983 claim, even at the pleading stage.

Tapp v. Champagne · filed 2006-01-26

To the extent Tapp attempts to avoid Polk’s bite by alleging that the public defenders in his case conspired with judges and district attorneys to pursue his malicious prosecution, see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 919-20, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984), this conspiracy allegation is wholly conclusory and, as such, insufficient even at the pleadings stage to establish that the public defenders were acting under color of state law, see Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir.2002); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1993).

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a bail bondsman who arrests a principal independently, without law enforcement assistance, to further private financial interests.

Weaver v. James Bonding Co., Inc. · filed 2006-08-01

Simply put, James Bonding is a private actor which cannot be held liable under § 1983 for bail bonding functions performed unilaterally, without assistance or cooperation from law enforcement agents, and in furtherance of its own private financial and contractual interests.

Section 1983 liability for a private attorney cannot rest on purely conclusory allegations of a conspiracy to violate civil rights.

Jarrow v. Jordan · filed 2006-08-28

We also affirm the dismissal of Jarrow’s § 1983 claims against private attorney Michael Vitt; Jarrow’s allegations of a conspiracy among the defendants to violate his civil rights are purely conclusional and therefore insufficient to establish § 1983 liability for a private actor.

A municipal license does not, by itself, make a private business or its assignees and employees state actors under § 1983.

Williams v. Town of White Hall, Alabama · filed 2006-09-29

The fact that the town has issued Sellers Day Care a license to operate the Gaming Center does not make Sellers Day Care, or its assignees or employees, state actors for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; on this record, a private physician who treated a referred detainee outside the jail was not a state actor.

Mandeville v. Merr. County DOC · filed 2006-11-15

Therefore, a plaintiff may maintain a § 1983 claim only against a person who deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right while acting under color of state law. ... Therefore^ based on the record presented here and the legal grounds presented by Dr. Trice in favor of his position as a private rather than a state actor. Dr. Trice is entitled to summary judgment.

Guardians ad litem representing minors are not state actors for purposes of § 1983 because their loyalty is to the minor.

Hennelly v. Oliva · filed 2007-05-21

But the court correctly noted that we have held the guardians ad litem are not state actors for purposes of § 1983, because they give their “undivided loyalty to the minor, not the state.”

Providing care, education, and support to developmentally disabled people in Pennsylvania is not a traditionally and exclusively governmental function that makes a private provider a state actor under § 1983.

Schneider v. ARC of Montgomery County · filed 2007-07-25

In summary, the history of Pennsylvania’s provision of care, education, and other services to the developmentally disabled shows that, while Pennsylvania’s administration and funding of such services has grown with time, providing “care, education, and support” to developmentally disabled individuals has never been, and is not now, a traditional and exclusive government function.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against appointed defense counsel for conduct in a criminal defense because counsel is not acting under color of state law.

Maddox v. Hoch · filed 2007-08-07

For substantially the same reasons as provided by the magistrate judge, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of M r. M addox’s § 1983 complaint on the grounds that his appointed counsel was not a state actor.

Section 1983 does not treat a reporter as a state actor merely for receiving and publishing information from a government official.

Anderson v. Suiters · filed 2007-08-28

Without more, a reporter does not become a state actor, however, simply because she has received and published information from a governmental official, as the media defendants did here.

Section 1983 does not treat public defenders as acting under color of state law when they represent clients in their traditional adversarial role.

Bugoni v. Greer · filed 2007-12-28

The public defenders did not act under color of state law when they represented Bugoni, see Miranda v. Clark County, Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (public defender representing client in lawyer’s traditional adversarial role is not a state actor), and Bugoni has not alleged facts to support a conclusion that the mental health professionals’ decisions were a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (decisions of mental health care professionals are “presumptively valid”); see also Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir.1992) (plaintiff must prove that the mental health professional’s decision reflected a conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence).

Section 1983 does not treat a private employer’s action as state action under a coercion theory when the state did not order that action.

German v. Fox · filed 2008-01-23

Even assuming that German could prove that Shaffer directed Fox to reprimand or to fire German, German’s termination cannot be fairly attributed to the state where the state did not order such a result.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties unless their conduct is sufficiently connected to the government to be treated as state action.

Garcia v. Dykstra · filed 2008-01-24

Thus, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the state was “so intimately involved in the challenged private conduct” that their actions could be classified as state action for the purposes of § 1983. See Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim as to the private defendants.

A private physician who contracts with the State to treat inmates acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes when performing those duties.

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo. · filed 2008-02-29

Moreover, under the public functions test' — the test at issue in the instant case — a private doctor who contracts with the State to provide medical care to inmates also acts under color of state law for the purposes of Section 1983 when undertaking his duties to treat inmates.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a public defender service for its representation of a person in parole revocation proceedings because it is not acting under color of law.

Stoddard v. District of Columbia Public Defender Services · filed 2008-03-03

Because under the circumstances presented, PDS is not a state actor subject to liability under § 1983, the Court will grant defendant’s motion and dismiss the case.

A hospital claiming that its private status bars liability under § 1983 must establish that status.

Drisdom v. Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Center · filed 2008-07-11

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Medical Center’s contention involves an issue “of law appearing on the face of the record that [plaintiff] could not have countered had it been raised in the court of first instance” and thus may be raised for the first time on appeal (Matter of Allegany County Dept. of Social Servs. v Thomas T., 273 AD2d 916, 918 [2000]; see Oram v Capone, 206 AD2d 839 [1994]), we conclude that the Medical Center failed to meet its burden of establishing that it is a private hospital that cannot be held liable pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

A private festival association is not a state actor under § 1983 merely because it holds an event in a public park under a city permit and pays for city police security.

Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n · filed 2008-09-03

Applying similar principles here, we conclude that GGFA is not a state actor. First, running festivals is not a traditional municipal function. Second, just as in Gaston, the City of Gilroy required a permit, showing that the City retained control of the park and provided security services.

Section 1983 applies the municipal policy or custom requirement to a private contractor that provides medical care to prisoners.

Sauve v. Lamberti · filed 2008-12-01

A private entity contracting with a county to provide medical services for prisoners performs a traditional state function and thus the Monell requirement applies to it as well.

A public defender’s state employment alone does not make the defender a state actor under § 1983; a claimant must allege conduct beyond traditional legal representation that exercises official authority.

Repoli Jr. v. William Cuoco, Esq. · filed 2009-02-18

Rather, to satisfy the “color of state law” element, Repoli was required to allege that Appellees were not merely performing lawyers’ traditional functions, see id. at 325, but instead were attempting to exercise some sort of official authority over him.

Section 1983 generally does not treat a defense attorney as a state actor, but an attorney who willfully participates in joint action with the state or its agents acts under color of state law.

Fisher v. Roan Confer, Jr. · filed 2009-02-19

As the District Court noted, Fisher’s defense attorney is not a state actor for § 1983 purposes, Polk County, 454 U.S. 312, but, if a private defense attorney “is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents,” that person is acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983, Dennis, 449 U.S. 27-28.

Section 1983 does not cover a private hospital’s termination of an employee when the hospital’s relationship with the county is insufficient to make that action attributable to the state.

Albright v. Longview Police Department · filed 1989-10-02

Hence, there is not a sufficient nexus between the county and Good Shepherd to justify a finding that Good Shepherd acted under the color of state law for the purposes of Albright’s § 1983 claims.

Private parties may be sued under § 1983 as state actors when the complaint sufficiently alleges that they accepted a de facto delegation of municipal power.

Schulz v. Milne · filed 1994-04-22

The court also concludes that plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state claims against Board and Milne under § 1983 as state actors.

Section 1983 can impose liability for retaliation against protected speech even when a private actor ultimately carries it out.

Pendleton v. St. Louis County · filed 1999-06-02

Our cases have held, however, that retaliation against protected speech can result in section 1983 liability even if it ultimately is carried out by a private actor.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private hospital acted under color of state law; alleged Hill-Burton funding alone does not establish state action.

Straznicky v. Desert Springs Hospital · filed 2009-07-01

As Straznicky has not alleged any facts, or cited to any decision, suggesting that the actions of a private hospital become state actions upon receipt of Hill-Burton financial assistance, the court will dismiss his § 1983 claim with prejudice.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on private citizens.

Yapi v. Kondratyeva · filed 2009-07-10

Moreover, any potential 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Kondratyeva, Averbourgh and Berliner fail, because they are private citizens generally not subject to § 1983 liability.

A private actor may be liable under Section 1983 for conspiring with state actors to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Bisby v. Garza · filed 2009-08-28

In order to hold the ACA liable on Bisby’s Section 1983 claim on a conspiracy theory, the ACA must have engaged ... in a conspiracy with state actors to violate his constitutional rights.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 when its conduct has a sufficiently close nexus to the State or it acts jointly with state officials to deprive someone of civil rights.

Bhatia v. Yale School of Medicine · filed 2009-09-30

Here, liberally construing Bhatia’s pro se complaint, he failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that there was a “nexus” between the State and the Appellees, or that the Appellees jointly engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive him of his civil rights, and the complaint therefore did not state a plausible claim that the Appellees were liable under § 1983.

Foster parents are not state actors for purposes of a Section 1983 claim.

Hafez v. Madison · filed 2009-10-05

But, as the district court concluded correctly, foster parents are not state actors for section 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 permits claims against people who represent the state in some capacity; private citizens acting solely as private individuals are not proper defendants.

Kirby v. Dallas County Adult Probation Department · filed 2009-12-28

Thus, Kirby has no claim against these private-citizen defendants under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against private actors who do not act under color of state law.

Peterec-Tolino v. The State of New York · filed 2010-02-08

Appellant’s § 1983 claims against Jeffrey S. Eisenberg and against Eisenberg and Associates were properly dismissed because these defendants are private actors who cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against private actors who conspire or act in concert with state actors to deprive a person of civil rights.

Steel v. City of San Diego · filed 2010-06-30

Non-state actors, however, may be held liable under Section 1983 when they have conspired or acted in concert with state actors to deprive a person of his civil rights.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private university’s challenged conduct is attributable to the state; offering higher education alone does not make it a state actor.

Becker v. CITY UNIVERSITY OF SEATTLE · filed 2010-07-08

The Third Circuit treats § 1983’s “under color of law” provision identically to the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement. ... Becker’s Second Amended Complaint fails each test.

A private business that contracts for police services is not a state actor under § 1983 when officers independently decide how to handle the challenged conduct.

Cahill v. Live Nation · filed 2011-06-27

Applying the “joint action” test here, the Court finds that Defendant Live Nation was not a state actor given the fact that there is no evidence that the judgment of the Hanover Police Department in general much less that of the two individual officers involved with Lindsay Cahill was replaced by the judgment of Defendant Live Nation.

A private litigant's alleged conspiracy with a judge must have factual support to make the litigant a state actor under § 1983.

Modelist v. Miller · filed 2011-08-30

As far as the defendants who are not judges, he provides no facts whatsoever to support a claim that they “corruptly conspired” with a judge, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980); Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Grp., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 2003), as necessary to make them state actors for §1983 purposes.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties whose conduct does not qualify as state action under the compulsion, joint action, or nexus tests.

Giulio v. BV CENTERCAL, LLC · filed 2011-09-06

Defendants were not state actors under the compulsion, joint action, or nexus test. Therefore, they are not liable for the alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private defense lawyer acting as counsel because the lawyer does not act under color of state law.

Brodie v. Worthington · filed 2012-01-24

Judge Kennedy dismissed Brodie’s claims against Bruce A. Johnson, Jr., a private lawyer who defended Brodie in his criminal trial, on the grounds that Johnson was neither a federal officer nor a state actor and therefore not amenable to suit under Bivens or section 1983. See Order of September 21, 2011 [Dkt. # 109]. This ruling was correct.

Section 1983 generally does not permit suits against private attorneys, including court-appointed attorneys, because they are not state actors.

LaPrince Black v. Cox · filed 2012-04-02

“[P]rivate attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors, and generally are not subject to suit under section 1983.”

Section 1983 does not cover a claim against a private citizen when the plaintiff fails to show that it is cognizable under the statute rather than as a state tort claim.

Mosley v. Anderson · filed 2012-12-19

To the extent that he seeks to allege claims against Trimble, a private citizen, he has not shown that those claims are cognizable under § 1983 and are not tort claims arising under state law.

Section 1983 requires a private defendant to be a state actor; conclusory allegations of conspiracy do not establish state action.

Davis v. Self · filed 2013-02-25

Plaintiff, therefore, fails to establish that Blackstock, Davis, and Austin are state actors under section 1983.

Employees of a prison contractor are treated as state agents in a Section 1983 suit.

Withers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2013-02-27

In a suit under section 1983 the contractor’s employees are deemed agents of the state.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party whose cooperation or joint activity with a state official makes that party a state actor.

Bracken v. Okura · filed 2013-06-24

As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Kyo-ya Defendants were acting as state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not cover public defenders performing traditional defense functions because they are not acting under color of state law.

Jerry Chambers, Sr. v. Hughes · filed 2013-07-29

Public defenders are not state actors for § 1983 purposes because they are not acting under the color of state law when performing the traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted jointly with the state in the challenged conduct; giving false information to an officer alone is insufficient.

Brivik v. Law · filed 2013-10-16

But he points to nothing in his complaint to indicate that the co-investors and Officer Law acted together to falsify facts leading to Brivik’s arrest. Rather, he argues only that the co-investors “knowingly and deliberately falsified information during their meetings with Claudia Law.” This is insufficient to show that the co-investors were state actors under § 1983.

A private company that contracts with a state corrections department to provide jobs for prisoners can plausibly be a state actor under § 1983.

Bratchett v. Braxton Environmental Services Corp. · filed 2014-04-25

It is true, as the court also noted, that Bratchett has to show that a private company and its owner are state actors for purposes of § 1983. But Bratchett alleges that the company contracted with the state Department of Corrections to provide jobs for prisoners, plausibly making the company’s actions “fairly attributable to the state.” Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir.2009).

Public defenders performing their professional duties as counsel are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983.

Swift v. Swift · filed 2014-05-21

The public defenders were not state actors and could not be sued under § 1983 for performing their professional duties in representing Swift. ... For the same reasons provided by the district court, we affirm.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private citizen who conspires with a state actor to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Alexan v. Burke · filed 2014-08-04

There are two circumstances in which a private citizen can be held liable under Section 1983: (1) when the citizen conspires with a state actor to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights; and, (2) when the citizen becomes a public officer pro tem. ... Therefore, Plaintiffs Section 1983 claim against Uniat and Wood does not clearly require dismissal, and the Court retains federal question jurisdiction over the claim alleged in Count III.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private party to allege facts showing that the party acted with a state actor to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right.

Lavergne v. Busted in Acadiana · filed 2014-10-27

Even if Busted in Acadiana was an entity capable of being sued, or even if Lavergne could have identified the proper defendant related to this private website, he has not shown that the defendant was a state actor for § 1983 purposes.

A private citizen can be liable under Section 1983 only if the plaintiff alleges and proves that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state actors.

Lavergne v. Faulk · filed 2014-11-03

For a private citizen, such as Faulk, to be held liable under Section 1983, “the plaintiff must allege and prove that the citizen conspired with or acted in concert with state actors.”

A private university’s internal rulemaking and student discipline do not, by themselves, make it a state actor under § 1983.

Klunder v. Brown University · filed 2015-02-03

Brown University is not subject to federal jurisdiction under § 1983 because neither its ability to enact internal statutes and regulations in furtherance of its function as a private educational institution nor its ability to discipline students for violations of its internal policies constitute state action.

A private attorney’s use of state foreclosure procedures can satisfy § 1983’s state action requirement when it leads to a sheriff’s seizure of property.

The Bank of New York Mellon v. Whitney Blaine Smith, Et Ux. · filed 2015-02-11

As in Keys and Doyle v. Landry, 67 Fed.App’x 241, the two-pronged test in Lugar was met. Prong one is satisfied because Dean Morris utilized a state foreclosure statute. The second prong is satisfied by the actual seizure of the Smith home by the Grant Parish Sheriff on November 26, 2004. We agree with Smith, that on November 26, 2004, the section 1983 claim “ripened.”

A private defendant satisfies § 1983’s state-action requirement when the pleaded facts plausibly show a conspiracy with a judge to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Land and Bay Gauging, L.L.C. v. Shor · filed 2015-08-21

These allegations, taken together with the allegations that Allison made ex parte contact with Judge Martinez, supports the reasonable inference that Allison conspired with Judge Martinez to deprive Black and his related entities of their constitutional rights and thereby satisfies § 1983’s state-action requirement.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private attorneys merely for misusing state executory process.

The Bank of New York Mellon v. Whitney Blaine Smith, Et Ux. · filed 2015-10-14

At most, Ms. Smith has shown Dean Morris misused the executory process provisions. Such allegations are insufficient to support an action against private attorneys under the parameters set forth in Lugar v. Edmonston Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).

Private security officers lack the state authority required for a § 1983 claim under the public function test when they have received no state or municipal grant of police powers.

Mendonca v. City of Providence · filed 2016-03-15

And Mendonca has presented no other evidence that RISD officers operated under another state or municipal grant of authority. Unlike in Klunder, Mendonca has not established a threshold element for his § 1983 claims against Wall and LaPierre, entitling RISD to summary judgment on Counts II and Y.

A private attorney does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by representing a school district.

Brady v. Somersworth School Dist. · filed 2016-06-13

Instead, the allegations in the complaint show that Kincaid acted as counsel for the school district and was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a violation by a state actor; a public defender representing a client before an ISP panel does not qualify.

Smart v. Administrative Office of the Courts State of New Jersey · filed 2017-01-04

To pursue a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that his constitutional rights were violated “by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). Smart’s public defender, who apparently represented Smart before the ISP panel, does not qualify as a state actor.

A private defendant is not a state actor for a § 1983 conspiracy claim without evidence of an agreement with state actors.

McGee v. Dunn · filed 2017-01-05

We agree with the District Court that there is no evidence to show Dunn and the Officer Defendants had a “meeting of the minds” to conspire against the Plaintiff. ... Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s determination that Dunn was not a “state actor” for the purposes of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims against private actors require factual allegations showing a meeting of the minds with a state actor; alleging that they worked in conjunction is insufficient.

Weathers v. Shaeffer · filed 2017-06-14

Wisecarver and Shepard are private actors employed at UNMC. Plaintiff alleges that Shaeffer worked “in conjunction” with Wisecarver and Shepard to submit his DNA to “either the State DNA Data Base, the Combined DNA Index System (CODÍS), or the State DNA Sample Bank.” This is not a sufficient allegation that Defendants reached a meeting of the minds with any state actor.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on a private entity unless it acts under color of state law.

Adefeyinti v. Experian Information Solution, Inc. · filed 2018-07-27

Plaintiff alleged no facts suggesting that his rights were violated by a state actor. Rather, he brings this lawsuit against a private entity, but private entities generally are not subject to section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not make a private clinic liable for its employees’ conduct merely because it employs them; the clinic must itself act under color of state law.

Hunter v. S.D. Dept. of Soc. Servs. · filed 2019-03-25

Summary judgment is granted for Avera Clinic on all claims because Avera Clinic is not a state actor and cannot be held to be a state actor based merely on respondeat superior principles.

Section 1983 generally does not permit a claim against a private person unless the alleged infringement of federal rights is fairly attributable to the state.

Jones v. Bowles · filed 2019-06-05

Section 1983 typically cannot be used to bring an action against a private citizen, like the plaintiff’s neighbor, the defendant in this action. Only if the alleged infringement of federal rights is fairly attributable to the state may private persons be held to be state actors.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law; a private attorney is not a state actor solely by representing a criminal defendant.

Peterkin v. Cicchiello · filed 2019-07-15

As Attorney Cicchiello and his associate are private attorneys, there is no legal basis for a section 1983 claim against them.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender for performing traditional lawyer functions because the defender is not a state actor.

Stapleton v. Mathew · filed 2019-08-07

Public defenders performing traditional lawyer functions are not state actors and cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private jail medical contractor for its policy or custom, but not solely for its employees’ conduct.

Gleaves v. Rudd Medical Services · filed 2019-08-08

However, “[l]ike a municipality, a government contractor cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, but [only] for a policy or custom of that private contractor.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 1983 can reach a private party that willfully participates in joint activity with the state; a claim needs factual allegations of that joint activity.

Corley v. Vance · filed 2019-08-15

However, Plaintiff does not supply any factual allegations concerning joint activity between Blackberry and any state actor. And although a private individual can be held liable under § 1983 for “operat[ing] as a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents,” Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 188 (2d Cir. 2009), courts have been clear that “merely supplying information to [law enforcement] does not make the supplier of information a state actor,” Luciano v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 359 (DC), 2009 WL 1953431, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2009). Absent factual allegations of joint activity, Plaintiff’s claim as to Blackberry fails.

Court-appointed counsel performing a lawyer’s traditional functions is not a state actor under § 1983 absent facts showing a conspiracy with a state official.

Paulin v. City of Beacon · filed 2019-09-10

It is well-established that public defenders and court-appointed lawyers are not state actors for purposes of § 1983 claims. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead that Horner conspired with a state actor, and his § 1983 claim against Horner is dismissed.

Section 1983 permits claims against people acting under color of state law, but not private actors.

McPeters v. Weiland · filed 2019-09-26

Section 1983 actions may not be brought against private actors, only against those acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing private attorneys to show that they acted under color of state law.

FLEMING v. SECRETARY OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES · filed 2019-10-10

Because Attorneys Warren and Killino are private actors and Ms. Fleming, Mr. Garcia, and Mr. Hancock fail to demonstrate how Attorneys Warren and Killino could possibly be considered state actors under section 1983, Attorneys Warren and Killino are not alleged to be in a position where they could deprive Ms. Fleming, Mr. Garcia, and Mr. Hancock of the Due Process Clause’s safeguards.

Section 1983 does not treat a public defender performing traditional counsel functions in a criminal case as a state actor.

Johnson v. Prue · filed 2019-10-30

Accordingly, Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a cause of action as Defendant Prue is not a state actor within the meaning of Section 1983.

Private attorneys acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors and cannot be held liable under § 1983 for that conduct.

DE FEO V EYRE · filed 2019-10-31

DeFeo cannot maintain his constitutional claim against attorney Eyre, because “[p]rivate attorneys . . . acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors, and therefore, cannot be held liable under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender performing traditional duties as counsel because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

GARRIS v. POLL · filed 2019-12-16

Here, Garris cannot maintain a constitutional claim against Poll because Poll is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

A private citizen does not become a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 by reporting a crime, even falsely.

Oliver v. Murphy · filed 2019-12-26

Reporting a crime, even falsely, does not transform a private citizen into a state actor. ... Sulivan, therefore, is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 through joint action or conspiracy with state officials, but the complaint must allege facts showing that cooperation.

Webber v. Deck · filed 2020-01-06

Webber has not provided any factual allegations, much less detailed allegations, about joint action or a conspiracy between No Labels and the defendant police officers.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a private attorney representing a criminal defendant because the attorney is not acting under color of state law.

Taylor v. Miles · filed 2020-01-08

Taylor may not sue his attorney under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach private conduct unless the private actor acted under color of state law.

McGee v. State of Oregon Circuit Court · filed 2020-01-13

“[T]Jhe under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct[.]” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). ... None of those circumstances are alleged here. Accordingly, plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted against this defendant.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against private attorneys who do not act under color of state law.

Merchant v. New York State · filed 2020-01-17

Because Attorneys Christopher Renfroe and Ikieska Shabazz a/k/a I.S. Whitaker are private parties who do not work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against them under § 1983.

A court-appointed guardian or conservator is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Hieshetter v. Amann · filed 2020-01-22

Assuming that the court did appoint Brittan Amann as plaintiff’s conservator and guardian, plaintiff’s claim fails because neither of these positions are state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 generally does not permit claims against private actors.

(PC) Kinsey v. Decker · filed 2020-02-05

Finally, the court notes that private actors generally cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires facts showing that a private defendant acted under color of state law; merely watching a judge award someone a judgment does not suffice.

Hettinga v. Garcia · filed 2020-02-05

Importantly, to the extent Plaintiff purports to state a federal civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against her daughter for allegedly colluding with a judge of the California Superior Court by “sitting in the audience watching him award her” a judgment, that conclusory allegation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because that allegation falls far short of alleging that Plaintiff’s daughter is a state actor. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must satisfactorily allege that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s federal civil rights and “acted under color of state law.”

Section 1983 requires facts showing that each defendant acted under color of state law; allegations that private parties made false statements to police do not, by themselves, establish state action.

Yourman v. Meyers · filed 2020-03-06

These allegations, by themselves, are insufficient to suggest that any of the defendants acted as a state actor. They are also insufficient to state a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution against any defendant.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law; a conclusory allegation connecting a private facility to the state is insufficient.

DANIELS v. N.H.S. NORTH WESTERN HUMAN SERVICES · filed 2020-03-10

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants were acting “under color” of state law. ... Having failed to meet the threshold “state actor” requirement, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants must fail.

A public defender representing a client in civil commitment proceedings does not act under color of state law and cannot be held liable under § 1983 for that representation.

Risdal v. Cherokee City Chief of Police · filed 2020-03-24

Applying Dodson here, I find that Adams cannot be held liable under § 1983 for any alleged constitutional violation because he was not a state actor while representing Risdal in civil commitment proceedings.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim against public defenders performing traditional advocacy because they do not act under color of state law.

Sherman v. State of Washington · filed 2020-03-25

Indeed, when publicly-appointed counsel are performing as advocates, i.e., meeting with clients, investigating possible defenses, presenting evidence at trial and arguing to the jury, they do not act under color of state law for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 purposes.

A public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions is not a state actor under § 1983.

Dunn v. Collopy · filed 2020-03-27

Because Dunn’s claims are all based on allegations regarding the functions of counsel in his criminal case, Defendant Collopy is not a state actor and the complaint against him fails to state a § 1983 claim for relief.

A private residential care provider may be a state actor under § 1983 when allegations plausibly show that it performs public functions delegated by the state through referral contracts.

D.W. v. Hillyer · filed 2020-04-27

Unlike in Doe, the Court finds the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint state a facially plausible claim that Great Circle and its employees were performing public functions delegated to them by the State by virtue of their referral contracts.

Section 1983 treats a private contractor providing constitutionally required food services to a state prison as a state actor.

Gilmore v. Trinity Services Group, Inc. · filed 2020-04-27

Although § 1983 actions generally cannot be asserted against private actors, the actions of private parties can constitute state action when the party’s conduct “is fairly attributable to the state.” ... That threshold is easily crossed ... in the case at bar.

A § 1983 claim against a private entity based on conspiracy requires facts plausibly showing that it joined state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights.

Neal v. State Employees Credit Union · filed 2020-05-08

Here, plaintiff has not alleged facts giving rise to a plausible inference that defendant, or defendant’s employees, conspired with state actors to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not treat private attorneys as state actors merely because they participate in litigation on a client’s behalf.

NEMETH v. THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY OCCUPIED BY MICHELLE M. SMITH · filed 2020-05-19

Law Firm Defendants’ mere participation in the litigation process did not transform them into state actors, and thus, Plaintiff’s claims against them are dismissed.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private attorneys acting in their traditional role because they are not state actors.

HUMPHREY v. PENNSYLVANIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA · filed 2020-05-26

The § 1983 claims against Humphrey’s attorneys must also be dismissed. Private attorneys are not “state actors” subject to liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private physician for terminating a collaborative practice agreement when that decision is not attributable to the state.

Gorenc v. Klaassen · filed 2020-05-28

The court concludes plaintiffs have failed to allege plausibly that defendant, a private party, should be deemed a state actor for the § 1983 claim.

A private party who plausibly conspires with state actors to deprive someone of constitutional rights may be treated as a state actor under § 1983.

James v. Smith · filed 2020-06-17

Accordingly, James has plausibly pleaded that all TCH Defendants, except for Doctors Louis and Robertson, are state actors for purposes of her § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 excludes purely private conduct from liability.

Bollfrass v. Phoenix, City of · filed 2020-06-23

Because § 1983 excludes from its reach purely private conduct, Count One against Ms. Magaard is dismissed.

Section 1983 subjects a private jail medical contractor performing a traditional state function to the same liability rules as a municipality.

Herriges v. County of Macomb · filed 2020-06-29

Correct Care itself contracted with Macomb County to provide medical services to jail inmates, a traditional state function. Therefore, it is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the same way a municipality is subject to liability.

A private company may act under color of state law for a § 1983 claim when it willingly participates in joint activity with state officials and has a close nexus to the alleged deprivation.

Cooper v. Hutcheson · filed 2020-07-13

But the Court concludes that, at this stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts from which the Court could reasonably conclude that Securus was a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Adickes, 398 U.S. at 151.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of law; private conduct can qualify only when the private party is treated as a state actor.

Braxton v. Simon · filed 2020-07-15

None of the named Defendants or the actions allegedly taken by them were taken under color of law.

Section 1983 excludes private conduct; a defendant must act under color of state law.

(PS) Conerly v. Permanente · filed 2020-07-27

“‘§ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrong.’” ... Here it appears from the vague and conclusory allegations found in the complaint that several of the defendants named in the complaint are private parties not acting under color of state law.

Public defenders acting as defense counsel are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Remy v. Caroche · filed 2020-07-27

As a threshold matter, the Defendants are public defenders and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that public defenders cannot be held liable under § 1983 “because they are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.”

A private contractor providing medical care to inmates is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom causes the constitutional violation.

Calvin v. Jones · filed 2020-07-31

Because Corizon’s liability under § 1983 would be based on its functional equivalence to the government entity responsible for providing medical care and services to FDOC inmates, Calvin must plead that an official policy or a custom or practice of Corizon was the moving force behind the alleged federal constitutional violation.

A private physician who treats an inmate on a limited referral, without a state contract or a role in the prison medical system, is not a state actor under § 1983.

Phillips v. Tangilag · filed 2020-09-01

Here, if the Court were to deem Dr. Jefferson a state actor, it would extend the holdings of Carl and West. Every private physician would be subject to § 1983 liability after any contact with an inmate and that is not the purpose of either Carl or West. Therefore, this Court finds Dr. Jefferson was not a state actor.

A labor union can be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state actors only when specific facts show that the union itself joined the conspiracy.

AUSTINO v. CITY OF VINELAND · filed 2020-09-02

Even if, as alleged, one of the PBA’s officers somehow conspired with another defendant to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights, it does not mean that the union itself as an entity conspired against him.

A private security company and its guard do not become state actors under Section 1983’s public function test merely by providing security at a county justice court building.

Sudduth v. Lowndes County, Mississippi · filed 2020-09-21

Ultimately, considering the well-settled narrow scope of the “public function test,” the Court finds that neither Coleman nor North Atlantic were state actors. Therefore, they cannot be held liable under Section 1983.

A private entity does not become a state actor under § 1983 merely by contracting to provide services to a state and holding a state license.

Howell v. Father Maloney's Boys' Haven · filed 2020-10-01

A contract for services between the Haven and the Commonwealth, together with a state license to operate the home, does not a state actor create.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a public defender performing traditional defense counsel functions because the defender is not acting under color of state law.

Derrick v. Midland County · filed 2020-10-06

Because defendant Duke is not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983, he will be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not reach private individuals acting on their own without conspiring with state actors.

Benfield v. Welsh · filed 2020-10-29

Benfield cannot make this showing because, based on the allegations in her complaint, it seems the defendants are private individuals who acted on their own accord and were not in conspiracy with state actors. Thus, they are not subject to § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to have acted under color of state law; private medical facilities cannot be sued under it solely for providing medical care.

Steels v. Beacon Medical Health System · filed 2020-11-03

Upon review, Mr. Steels is suing two private medical facilities, but private parties cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because that statute only applies to government actors.

Section 1983 requires the alleged deprivation to have been committed by someone acting under color of state law.

Neal v. Synergy Rehab · filed 2020-11-09

Plaintiff, therefore, fails to satisfy the requirement that the allegedly unconstitutional acts were committed by a person acting under color of state law and fails to state a § 1983 claim against Defendants.

A private contractor does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely because it contracts with a corrections department.

Rindahl v. Noem · filed 2020-11-16

GTL cannot be deemed a state actor merely by virtue of its contract with the SDDOC.

Section 1983 generally does not impose liability on a private citizen unless the person conspires with a state actor or acts as a temporary government official.

Zawacki v. Ricco · filed 2020-11-18

While it is true that Ricco interacted with the police and that Zawacki’s parole officer used Ricco’s statement in her revocation report, nothing in Zawacki’s complaint suggests that either the police or the parole officer conspired with Ricco to get Zawacki’s parole revoked. He also does not allege that Ricco was acting as a temporary government official. Accordingly, Ricco cannot be held liable under §1983, and Zawacki fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A private treatment provider may be liable under § 1983 when its close cooperation with state corrections officials plausibly makes it a state actor.

Lopez v. Stanford · filed 2020-11-24

Based on these allegations of close cooperation between DOCCS and RevCore, RevCore is not entitled to dismissal on the ground that it cannot be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private party only when its conduct is fairly attributable to the state.

McCullough v. Lithia Kia of Anchorage · filed 2020-12-16

A private party can be subject to suit under § 1983 for violating a plaintiff's civil rights only in narrow circumstances. ... While organized as a legal entity, Lithia Kia of Anchorage does not act with the virtue or authority of state law, and therefore, is not a state actor.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; representing a parent in a family court paternity case does not, by itself, make a private attorney a state actor.

Lapina v. State of Hawaii · filed 2021-01-19

The record in this case clearly establishes that Smith and Brower each represented Plaintiff in a family court paternity case. See, e.g., Smith Decl. at ¶ 8. Because that is not traditionally an exclusive state function, Plaintiff has not, and cannot, establish that either Smith or Brower was a state actor under the public function test.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid providers to enforce the public notice requirement in 42 C.F.R. § 447.205.

Methodist Hosp. v. IND. FAMILY & SOCIAL SERVICES · filed 1994-07-08

Accordingly, the public notice regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 447.205 is enforceable by Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits eligible children to sue a state official to enforce Medicaid’s EPSDT requirements.

New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning v. Giullani · filed 2000-11-03

As the court has indicated in the foregoing discussion, plaintiffs have properly asserted a 42 USC § 1983 claim against State defendant Perales.

Section 1983 claims brought under the Oregon Tort Claims Act are subject to the notice requirements of ORS 30.275.

Sanok v. Grimes · filed 1987-12-09

The reasoning in Nelson applies equally to the issue of whether the notice requirements of ORS 30.275 apply to plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims, and we accordingly hold that they do apply.

Section 1983 permits a provider to enforce federal requirements for approval of Medicaid state plan amendments.

California Hospital Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly · filed 2011-03-04

Under the court’s decision in CARHC, plaintiff may press this action via Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach actions of the federal government, and the United States has not waived sovereign immunity from suits under it.

Petrenko v. United States · filed 1994-07-14

The United States has yet to waive its immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach the United States itself because it is not a state actor.

PSKET v. UNITED STATES of America · filed 1994-11-10

Furthermore, the United States itself is not a state actor and therefore does not come within the provisions of sections 1983 or 1985.

Section 1983 does not permit a suit against the United States government.

Blessinger v. United States · filed 1997-07-17

The United States government can not be sued under! 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit damages suits against the United States.

Jackson v. Grainger · filed 1999-08-26

Thus, it is clear that the United States cannot be sued in any court for damages sought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against the United States.

Monarch Insurance Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia · filed 1973-01-22

By its terms, however, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) is inapplicable in suits against the United States.

Section 1983 does not authorize a claim against the United States.

Hoffman v. District of Columbia · filed 2009-08-17

Thus, the plaintiffs cannot maintain their §§ 1981 and 1983 claims against the United States and the court dismisses these claims insofar as they are asserted against the United States.

Section 1983 does not authorize a claim against the United States.

Hoffman v. Lanier · filed 2009-08-17

Thus, the plaintiffs cannot maintain their §§ 1981 and 1983 claims against the United States and the court dismisses these claims insofar as they are asserted against the United States.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against the United States itself.

Wilkie v. United States · filed 2020-02-11

Here, Plaintiff cannot state a Bivens or a § 1983 cause of action against the United States itself.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue over a disciplinary due process violation even after release from restrictive confinement through an Article 78 proceeding.

Grillo v. Coughlin · filed 1994-07-22

It has long been the rule in this circuit that a Sec. 1983 action will lie even if the prisoner is released from restrictive confinement pursuant to an Article 78 proceeding.

Section 1983 is not a vehicle for a state prisoner to obtain release from confinement.

Allen v. Cunningham · filed 1995-03-27

Construing Mr. Allen's complaint liberally, we find that to the extent he asserts a claim for equitable relief in the form of release from confinement, a Sec. 1983 claim is an inappropriate vehicle for seeking such relief.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for release from prison; a prisoner seeking release must pursue habeas corpus.

Voth v. Barbara Roberts, Governor, State of Oregon · filed 1995-05-19

To the extent that Voth contends that he is entitled to be released from prison, his exclusive remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

Section 1983 does not provide a prisoner a remedy of release from imprisonment; the prisoner must seek that relief through habeas corpus after exhausting state court remedies.

Hodges v. State of Tennessee Christine J. Bradley Ricky Bell Ned McWherter Charles W. Burson Charles Traughber Ray · filed 1996-08-28

Finally, although several circuits have held that a prisoner may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the retroactive application of amendments to the state's parole procedures when the prisoner does not claim that if he were to prevail on his claim he would be entitled to release from imprisonment, see e.g., Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71 (5th Cir.1995); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.1977), Hodges's complaint seeks as relief only release from prison. Such relief must be sought by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after exhausting state court remedies. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973).

Section 1983 does not provide release from confinement; that relief is available through a habeas petition.

Shelton v. Reddy · filed 2000-07-11

Disagreement with a diagnosis is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983, see Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997), and release from confinement is only available through a habeas petition, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973).