42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 claims against Missouri state officials are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Bandlow v. James · filed 1982-06-24

In every case involving a Section 1983 claim against officials of the State of Missouri for actions in violation of the United States Constitution, a three-year period of limitations has been applied. ... Thus, plaintiff’s claims under Sections 1983, 1985 and 1986 against state officials are barred by the three-year period of limitations.

A Missouri prisoner’s § 1983 claim receives the benefit of Missouri’s prisoner-tolling statute, so the limitations period is tolled during imprisonment.

Chandler v. Presiding Judge · filed 1988-02-03

We are persuaded that under Missouri law Chandler was entitled to tolling under section 516.170 while he was a state prisoner. Thus, his section 1983 action is not time-barred under state law.

Because Section 1983 supplies no limitations period, the most appropriate state-law period applies; Missouri’s three-year period for official-capacity acts governed the claim.

Buford v. Tremayne · filed 1984-10-30

Because Congress did not prescribe a specific statute of limitations period for actions brought under § 1983, the controlling limitation period for a § 1983 action is the most appropriate period provided by state law. ... Therefore, we hold that the district court properly applied the three year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims in Arizona are subject to the state's one-year limitations period for liability created by statute.

Rondelli v. County of Pima · filed 1978-07-25

We hold that the applicable statute of limitations in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is A.R.S. § 12-541(3) and that appellees’ motions for summary judgment were correctly granted as to Court Four of appellant’s complaint.

Section 1983 actions in Arizona are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Dunlap v. City of Phoenix · filed 1990-12-27

In Arizona, the limitations period for personal injuries is two years. A.R.S. § 12-542(1) (Supp. 1989). Thus, Dunlap had to file a § 1983 action before June 2, 1982. He did not do so.

Section 1983 claims filed in Arizona are subject to a two-year limitations period under Arizona personal injury law.

Goodson v. McFarland · filed 1992-08-03

Goodson appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The district court dismissed the action because the statute of limitation had expired. Under Arizona law, the limitation period for a personal injury action is two years. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985). Goodson sued in 1988, four years after the injury. His suit is barred.

Section 1983 claims borrow the forum state's most analogous limitations period and tolling rules when consistent with federal law; an imprisoned Arizona plaintiff's confinement does not toll the period when it does not eliminate legal capacity to sue.

Donald Emery Major v. Arizona State Prison, John Moran, H. J. Cardwell, Capt. Houlihan · filed 1981-04-16

Since § 1983 does not itself contain a limitations period, the federal courts look to the state statute of limitations that applies to the most similar state cause of action. ... There is simply no reason to treat a § 1983 claim differently than one based on § 1981 and, therefore, we hold that Arizona’s one-year statute of limitations, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-541(3), is applicable in this case. ... His confinement in the Arizona State Penitentiary did not strip him of his legal capacity to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, his imprisonment cannot be considered a “disability” within the meaning of Arizona’s tolling provision, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-502.

Section 1983 actions use the state personal injury limitations period and applicable state tolling rules; under Arizona’s amended prisoner tolling rule, imprisonment stops tolling when the prisoner discovers or should discover the right to sue.

De Luna v. Farris · filed 1988-03-09

It is well established law that federal courts must apply not only the appropriate state statute of limitations, but also the applicable state rule for tolling that statute of limitations for actions brought under Sec. 1983. ... Under Sec. 12-502 (1984), imprisonment acts as a disability until the date the inmate discovers or should have discovered his right to sue.

For Arizona § 1983 claims, imprisonment does not toll the limitations period for claims that accrued before imprisonment.

Krug v. Vince Imbordino Rufino Dominguez Arthur Hanratty Maricopa County, Az James Martin Garth Smith State · filed 1990-02-15

The statute of limitations is therefore not tolled with respect to the 1979 and 1980 claims which occurred prior to Krug’s 1980 imprisonment, and these claims are barred by the two-year limitations period.

A § 1983 claim in North Carolina uses the state's three-year limitations period for liabilities created by statute unless the statute provides another period.

Cole v. Mary Franklin Carter Cole, Dale Padgett, J. H. Padgett · filed 1980-10-09

Although many state law torts by law enforcement officers do not rise to constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), ... the constitutional question is a subtle one of mixed fact and law. Since the state-law claims based on the same events as the § 1983 claims raise genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment on Count 4 must be reversed. As some dispositions of the state-law claims might render the constitutional question moot, we decline to answer it on the present record and thus also reverse summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, without prejudice to defendants’ ability to raise the question subsequently, if it should then make a difference. ... Should it prove relevant, we note that the statute of limitations for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is taken from North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations for “a liability created by statute, either state or federal, unless some other time is mentioned in the statute creating it.” N.C.Gen. Stat. § 1-52(2) (Supp.1979). ... Plaintiff’s claims under Count 4, therefore, are not time-barred.

Section 1983 claims arising in North Carolina are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Duncan v. Fowler · filed 1983-08-18

The limitations period in North Carolina for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years.

Section 1983 claims arising in North Carolina are governed by the state's three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Adkins v. Herman Bolden, Deputy Rockingham County Sheriff's Department · filed 1986-11-20

A review of the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendations of the magistrate discloses that Adkins' suit is clearly barred, under Wilson v. Garcia, --- U.S. ---, 53 U.S.L.W. 4481 (Apr. 17, 1985), by the three-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions in North Carolina.

In North Carolina, claims under § 1983 have a three-year limitations period.

South Shell Investment v. Town of Wrightsville Beach · filed 1988-12-06

The statute of limitations applicable to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in North Carolina is three years.

Section 1983 actions arising in North Carolina are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

McKoy v. Shelia Heath Dr. Smith · filed 1990-05-15

However, the alleged events occurred in October 1984 and, thus, this action is barred by the North Carolina three-year statute of limitations, N.C.Gen.Stat. Sec. 1-52(5).

Section 1983 actions brought in North Carolina courts are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under N.C.G.S. § 1-52.

Faulkenbury v. TEACHERS'AND STATE EMPLOYEES'RETIREMENT SYSTEM · filed 1993-01-05

The three year statute of limitations as set forth in N.C.G.S. § 1-52 applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions brought in the North Carolina court system.

Section 1983 claims in North Carolina use the state’s three-year personal injury limitations period.

Gentile v. Town of Kure Beach · filed 1988-09-06

The statute of limitations applicable in § 1983 actions is the State’s statute governing personal injury actions. ... North Carolina law provides a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Therefore, plaintiffs claim is barred with respect to the May 1982 “loss of employment.”

Section 1983 claims in North Carolina are governed by the state’s general three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Reagan v. Hampton · filed 1988-12-06

Because (1) this court has chosen the three-year period of limitation for personal injury actions to govern § 1983 actions in North Carolina and (2) Reagan has filed his § 1983 claims within this period, his action is not time barred.

Section 1983 actions in North Carolina borrow the state's three-year limitations period for liabilities created by statute and accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Bireline v. Seagondollar · filed 1977-12-12

There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to suits arising under § 1983. Under those circumstances, it is the rule that the applicable "provision limiting the time in which an action (under § 1983) must be brought, must be borrowed from the analogous state statute of limitations," which in § 1983 actions brought in North Carolina, has been found to be the three-year limitation established by § 1-52(2), 1A General Statutes of North Carolina, for actions founded on "a liability created by statute." Cox v. Stanton (4th Cir. 1975) 529 F.2d 47, 49. ... The plaintiff's action only exists by virtue of § 1983. That statute is the source of her right of action, and it is accordingly proper to apply the limitation fixed for actions based upon "a liability created by statute" to actions brought under § 1983 within North Carolina, as the Court did in Cox. ... While the time limitation itself is borrowed from state law, the federal rule fixes the time of accrual of a right of action. Cox, supra, at p. 50. This federal rule establishes as the time of accrual that point in time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action. Young v. Clinchfield Railroad Company (4th Cir. 1961) 288 F.2d 499, 503. ... The fact that she was unsuccessful in the administrative reconsideration did not create a new cause of action; it only made it apparent that if she were to obtain relief it could only come as a result of a successful lawsuit commenced within three years following May 19, 1970.

North Carolina's fictitious-name pleading statute does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim against later-identified John Doe defendants.

Denny v. Hinton · filed 1986-06-20

Predicting how . state supreme courts will construe their laws is always hazardous business, but the Court feels that the North Carolina Supreme Court would most likely find that section 1-166 was not a tolling statute.

Section 1983 claims in South Carolina are subject to a six-year limitations period.

Gantlin v. Westvaco Corp. · filed 1981-10-19

The complaint in this action was filed by plaintiffs on June 15, 1972. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs seek relief in this action for acts and practices of the defendants which pre-date June 15, 1966, such claims of the plaintiffs are clearly not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they are time barred by the six-year limitations, period contained in South Carolina Code § 10-143(1), now codified at S.C.Code § 15-3-530(1) (1976).

A Section 1983 plaintiff in South Carolina must refile a dismissed claim within the state's three-year limitations period unless the claim states a continuing constitutional violation.

Rothwell v. Campbell · filed 1993-05-28

We note that the dismissal in this case was without prejudice. Unless Rothwell's claims state a continuing constitutional violation, see National Advertising Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1166-68 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3782 (U.S. 1992), he must refile his complaint within South Carolina's three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 has no federal statute of limitations, so courts borrow the Delaware limitations period applicable to an analogous state-law action.

Chrisco v. Shafran · filed 1981-10-27

The parties agree that as there is no federal statute of limitations governing actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court must look to Delaware law to determine the limitation which would be applicable if an action seeking similar relief had been brought under state law.

Section 1983 actions in Delaware are governed by the state’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury damages claims.

Vanaman v. Palmer · filed 1986-01-30

Characterizing all § 1983 claims as conferring a general remedy for injury to personal rights means that such actions are governed by the appropriate state statute of limitations for actions to recover damages for personal injuries. … Because the injuries in this action were allegedly sustained on November 25, 1982, an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in order to be timely had to be filed within two years from that date.

Section 1983 claims borrow the limitations period for an analogous state-law cause of action; in Delaware, the personal-injury period is two years.

Gardner v. Parson · filed 1989-05-03

The statute of limitations for causes of action under section 1983 is derived from the "state law of limitations governing an analogous cause of action." ... In Delaware, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years.

Section 1983 uses the limitations period for the most analogous state-law cause of action; for a claim akin to malicious prosecution and involving personal injury, the court applied Delaware’s two-year period running from favorable termination of the criminal proceeding.

Pagano v. Hadley · filed 1982-12-03

Since there is no federal statute of limitations for a cause of action under Section 1983, the appropriate limitations period is determined by reference to the most analogous cause of action under state law. ... In summary, I conclude that plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is akin to a cause of action for malicious prosecution. That claim is in the nature of a personal injury claim and is therefore subject to the two-year limitations period under 10 Del.C. § 8119. Since one of the elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution is the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, however, I conclude that plaintiff met the filing deadline by submitting his complaint within two years of the date the charges against him were dropped.

All § 1983 actions arising in New Mexico are governed by the state’s three-year limitations period for injury to the person, even if another limitations analogy is possible.

Jackson v. City of Bloomfield · filed 1984-03-30

We will henceforth apply the New Mexico three-year statute for an injury to the person to all section 1983 actions arising in that state, even though such actions may also be analogized to other limitations statutes.

New Mexico’s three-year personal-injury limitations period applies to all Section 1983 claims as a matter of federal law.

Walker v. Maruffi · filed 1987-03-19

New Mexico must follow the United States Supreme Court’s characterization rule, and under that rule, at the present time, the statute of limitations for personal injuries is applicable to all Section 1983 claims as a matter of federal law. ... Accordingly, we hold that the statute of limitations to be applied in this case is the three-year period of Section 37-1-8.

All § 1983 actions filed in Mississippi were governed by the state's one-year limitations period for intentional torts.

Gates v. Spinks · filed 1985-09-26

Most 1983 actions are predicated on intentional rather than negligent acts. Also, as stated above, 1983 was enacted for the purpose of redressing injuries from intentional misconduct. It follows that the 1983 action is more analogous to intentional torts governed by the one-year prescriptive period provided by Miss.Code Ann. 15-1-35 and we conclude that all section 1983 actions filed in Mississippi are governed by that statute.

A Mississippi § 1983 claim was subject to a one-year limitations period running from when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury.

Shelby v. J.D. McAdory Etc. · filed 1986-01-07

Accordingly, this action was time-barred one year from the date when Shelby knew or had reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.

Section 1983 claims arising in Mississippi were governed by the state’s six-year residual statute of limitations under the law applicable to this case.

Hill v. Bank of Falkner (In re Hill) · filed 1990-03-16

For purposes of this proceeding, causes of action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be governed by Mississippi’s six year residual statute of limitations, i.e., § 15-1-49, Miss.Code Ann. (1972).

Section 1983 claims filed in the District of Columbia are governed by the one-year limitations period for intentional personal-injury torts rather than the residual three-year period.

Williams v. District of Columbia · filed 1987-12-15

Because this Court finds that the appropriate statute of limitations is D.C.Code § 12-301(4), which prescribes a one-year period, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is extinguished.

Section 1983 actions in the District of Columbia are subject to the three-year limitations period in D.C. Code § 12-301(8).

Simpson v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department · filed 1992-03-17

Accordingly, these claims would be, under normal circumstances, time-barred by D.C.Code Section 12-301(8)’s three-year statute of limitations, which applies to all actions arising under Section 1983.

Section 1983 claims against the District of Columbia are subject to the three-year limitations period in D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

Holland v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF D. OF COL. · filed 1992-06-18

Plaintiff’s Fifth and Thirteenth Amendment claims lie against the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, like his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, are subject to the three-year limitation imposed by D.C.Code § 12-301(8).

Section 1983 claims in the District of Columbia are subject to the three-year residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Rivers v. Montgomery · filed 1993-11-08

However, in states with multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering section 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions. ... Therefore, the applicable statute in this instance is the District of Columbia’s residual statute of limitations, D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1981) which provides that “rights of action for which a limitation is not otherwise specifically prescribed is three years.”

For § 1983 claims in the District of Columbia, imprisonment tolls the three-year limitations period only while the claimant is in prison; parole does not extend that tolling.

Cannon v. District of Columbia · filed 1990-02-02

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of appellant’s complaint against appellees seeking damages for violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). ... It has long been established in this jurisdiction that in order for the complaining party to toll the running of the statute of limitations on the ground of disability by reason of imprisonment, such party must be in prison.

District of Columbia § 1983 claims are governed by the District's three-year general personal-injury limitations period rather than its special one-year period for enumerated intentional torts.

Hobson v. Brennan · filed 1985-12-16

Under ... that three-year statute should thus govern § 1983 claims in the District of Columbia.

Section 1983 actions filed in federal courts in Connecticut are governed by Connecticut’s three-year limitations period for tort actions under C.G.S. § 52-577.

Weber v. Amendola · filed 1985-11-26

the three-year statute of limitations of C.G.S. § 52-577 applies to all Section 1983 actions brought in federal courts in the District of Connecticut.

Connecticut's three-year general personal-injury limitations period bars § 1983 claims based on incidents occurring more than three years before suit, though those incidents may remain evidence of municipal custom.

Mitchell v. City of Hartford · filed 1986-05-29

Consequently, while evidence of the 1976 and 1979 incidents may still be admissible at trial to show that the Hartford Police Force had a persistent “policy” or “custom” of constitutional abuse, Mitchell’s section 1983 claims based upon the incidents themselves are barred by Connecticut’s three-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 contains no limitations period, so courts borrow the state's personal-injury period; in Connecticut, the applicable period was three years for tort actions.

Wallace v. Town of Stratford Board of Education · filed 1986-07-30

There is no statute of limitations contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the court must apply the most appropriate state statute of limitations. ... This decision does not alter the practice of the District Courts in Connecticut, which have been applying Connecticut's three-year statute of limitations for actions sounding in tort, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-577, to civil rights actions.

A Section 1983 claim based on a warrantless search in Connecticut is subject to the three-year limitations period in Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577.

Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield · filed 1991-03-18

When there is no federal statute of limitations applicable to an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts properly look to state statutes of limitations to determine an appropriate time period. ... A civil rights claim based on a warrantless search is governed by Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577, which provides a three year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Connecticut are governed by the three-year limitations period in C.G.S. § 52-577.

Brown v. Wargo · filed 1992-11-19

Consistent with that Supreme Court decision, the Second Circuit and this court have consistently applied C.G.S. § 52-577 to all § 1983 actions brought in Connecticut, in preference to C.G.S. § 52-584. ... Thus, the applicable statute of limitations period in this case is three years.

A § 1983 action uses the state personal injury limitations period, and Connecticut’s Accidental Failure of Suit Act does not revive a federal due process claim the plaintiff voluntarily withdrew.

Lacroix v. Board of Education of the City of Bridgeport · filed 1988-04-14

The limitations period for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury cases. ... Because the Act does not revitalize claims voluntarily forgone, LaCroix’s suit is not saved by the Act and remains untimely.

Section 1983 claims arising in Alaska are governed by a two-year limitations period.

Denardo v. Patrick Murphy, Alaska Public Employees Association, State of Alaska · filed 1986-01-30

The statute of limitation that applies to De Nardo’s claim is two years whether or not we apply ... retroactively. Since De Nardo’s claim arose from his termination in April 1978 and he did not file this action until June 1982, we find that his claim is barred by the statute of limitation.

Section 1983 claims against Alaska peace officers are subject to a two-year limitations period.

Farmer v. State · filed 1990-03-02

The only one of Farmers’ claims governed by the two year statute was his claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

Section 1983 actions filed in federal court in Utah are governed by Utah’s four-year residual statute of limitations.

Sheets v. Lindsey · filed 1991-05-10

To avoid confusion as to which personal injury statute of limitations applies to a § 1983 action filed in Utah, the four-year limitations provision found in U.C.A. § 78-12-25(2) should govern all § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 actions brought in federal court in Utah are subject to Utah’s express two-year statute of limitations for civil rights claims.

Arnold v. Duchesne County · filed 1993-01-21

It is the opinion of this court that the two-year statute of limitations specifically enacted by the Utah Legislature to govern civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 is applicable to such actions brought in federal court.

Section 1983 claims in Utah are subject to the four-year residual limitations period rather than Utah’s two-year period specifically targeting those claims.

Adamson v. City of Provo, Utah · filed 1993-03-22

Consequently, this court refuses to borrow section 78-12-28(3) and applies the appropriate four-year limitation period in section 78-12-25(3). Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accruing prior to May 29, 1987 are barred by section 78-12-25(3).

All § 1983 claims filed in federal court in Utah were subject to Utah’s four-year residual limitations period.

No. 82-1963 · filed 1984-03-30

Accordingly, we conclude that all section 1983 claims brought in federal court in Utah are subject to the four-year limitations period provided in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-12-25.

Section 1983 civil rights actions in West Virginia have a two-year statute of limitations.

Roberts v. Wood County Commission · filed 1992-01-30

In West Virginia, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 civil rights action is two years.

Section 1983 actions in West Virginia are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Roberts v. Wood County Com'n · filed 1993-05-21

The limitations period applicable to § 1983 actions in West Virginia is two years.

Section 1983 claims filed in West Virginia are personal injury actions subject to the state’s two-year statute of limitations.

Rodgers v. Corporation of Harpers Ferry · filed 1988-07-18

Consistent with that mandate from our nation’s highest court, we hold that all claims filed in West Virginia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are personal injury actions governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in W.Va.Code § 55-2-12(b) (1981).

In West Virginia, § 1983 actions are subject to a two-year limitations period, and state law governs whether that period is tolled.

Tesack v. Waterford Park, Inc. · filed 1988-07-29

The applicable statute of limitations in West Virginia for bringing a § 1983 action is “... within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued ...” West Virginia Code § 55-2-12. The Court must now determine whether under State law the statute of limitations was tolled for any period which would justify the submission of the instant action on October 18, 1984.

Section 1983 claims in Wyoming are subject to the four-year personal injury limitations period; the state’s two-year period for liability under a federal statute does not apply because it is hostile to section 1983 claims.

Brockman v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1 · filed 1993-06-09

The applicable state statute prescribes a four year period for such actions. Wyo.Stat. § 1-3-105 (1977). We hold that the two-year Wyoming statute applicable to actions seeking to impose liability based on a federal statute will not be applied in this case because it is hostile to section 1983 causes of action.

Section 1983 claims arising in Wyoming are subject to the state’s four-year personal injury limitations period.

Wagner v. Campbell County, Wyo. · filed 1988-08-19

This court concludes that the Tenth Circuit would apply the four-year statute and finds nothing inconsistent with that in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938. Accordingly, plaintiff’s section 1983 claims are timely and will be allowed to go to trial.

The defense that a state agency is not a person under § 1983 is nonjurisdictional and cannot be asserted after failure to appeal a final judgment.

Mitchell v. Commission On Adult Entertainment Establishments Of The State Of Delaware · filed 1993-12-29

The Commission's alternative defense that it is not a "person" as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 can fare no better, of course, than its eleventh amendment one. The eleventh amendment is quasi-jurisdictional; the alternative statutory defense is non-jurisdictional and should have been raised in a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). It is well settled that a defense of failure to state a claim cannot be asserted following a failure to appeal a final judgment.

Section 1983 permits defendants to assert self defense and justifiable homicide to the extent those defenses apply to a related state law claim.

Coghlan v. Phillips · filed 1977-03-11

The Mississippi statutory defense of justifiable homicide, as well ás the Mississippi common law defense of self defense, may be asserted in response to and defense of a § 1983 cause of action to the same extent that they are relevant to the pendent Mississippi law claim.

A defendant waives qualified and prosecutorial immunity defenses to a Section 1983 claim by failing to raise them in the answer or summary judgment briefing.

Brown v. Herbert · filed 2014-08-27

The court must therefore agree with Plaintiffs that Defendant’s approach of neither raising the defenses of qualified immunity or prosecutorial immunity as affirmative defenses, or even mentioning them in the briefing responding to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim constitutes a waiver of these defenses.

Section 1983 claims enforcing a right covered by a comprehensive statutory scheme must follow that scheme's procedures.

Williams, Monet v. Wendler, Walter · filed 2008-06-23

When ... Congress enacts a comprehensive scheme for enforcing a statutory right that is identical to a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a civil remedy for violations of federal rights (including constitutional rights) under color of state law, the section 1983 lawsuit must be litigated in accordance with the scheme.

Section 1983 remains available for constitutional claims arising from contaminated drinking water because the Safe Drinking Water Act does not preclude those claims.

Mays v. Rick Snyder · filed 2017-07-28

We find that the SDWA does not preclude § 1983 claims as pled by the Boler and Mays Plaintiffs, and reverse the district court’s dismissal of their Complaints on that basis.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay because the Code’s remedial scheme precludes that remedy.

Periera v. Chapman · filed 1988-11-01

The plaintiff’s attempt to base a section 1983 claim on the violation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), fails as a matter of law and therefore must be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims based on independently existing constitutional rights are not precluded by comprehensive remedies under related federal statutes.

Classic Communications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. · filed 1996-12-03

Since, by Seamons, federal statutory schemes do not preempt independently existing constitutional rights, the remedial schemes available under the Cable Act and the Sherman Act do not preempt the independently existing constitutional rights upon which Classic bases its 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 cannot be used to privately enforce a conciliation agreement under 38 U.S.C. § 4212 because that statute’s administrative enforcement scheme forecloses the remedy.

Brace v. Ohio State University · filed 1994-10-21

This court concludes that this case falls within the first Middlesex exception, and that plaintiff cannot seek to privately enforce an agreement made pursuant to § 4212 by bringing suit under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide an action for claims covered by the Social Security Act’s comprehensive remedial provisions.

Tomlinson v. Social Security Administration · filed 1996-09-30

While the court in that case did say that § 1983 should be broadly construed, it also reiterated the Supreme Court’s directive that a § 1983 action would not lie if “a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for protection of a federal right” provided in the statute would make a § 1983 action “inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored scheme.” ... I conclude that Congress intended to cover claims such as those raised in this case by the remedial provisions of the Social Security Act.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of the PHSA’s COBRA provisions because the PHSA’s private judicial enforcement scheme forecloses that remedy.

Mansfield v. Chicago Park District Group Plan · filed 1996-11-05

With these cases as background, it is apparent that the PHSA’s judicial enforcement provision forecloses Mansfield’s section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 suits cannot enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act because its comprehensive remedial scheme forecloses that remedy.

CONFED. TRIBES AND BANDS OF YAKAMA INDIAN v. Lowry · filed 1997-02-18

There is not an express provision in the IGRA precluding resort to § 1983 as a remedy. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Seminole expressly observed that Congress had created an "intricate" remedial scheme for violations of the IGRA. ___ U.S. at ___-___, 116 S.Ct. at 1132-33. This remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.

A federal statute’s comprehensive enforcement scheme can foreclose a Section 1983 claim to enforce rights under that statute.

Jolliffe v. Mitchell · filed 1997-07-29

Because the injuries to which the Act applies are narrowly drawn and the remedies provided fully cover those injuries, the magistrate judge correctly determined that the FMLA provides a comprehensive enforcement scheme which forecloses a section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for veterans’ retention rights under the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act because Congress supplied a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Bridges v. Kelly · filed 1997-09-26

Congressional intent precludes enforceable § 1983 retention rights, ... and therefore this claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for violations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because that Act’s comprehensive enforcement mechanism precludes it.

National Telecommunication Advisors, Inc. v. City of Chicopee · filed 1998-08-11

In summary, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 1360, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), the court must conclude that the TCA is a comprehensive enforcement mechanism that implicitly precludes the availability of a remedy under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits challenges to systemic Social Security disability procedures and standards because the Act’s review process addresses individual disability determinations.

Surrell v. Willman · filed 1998-09-04

Because the focus of the comprehensive administrative review process contained in relevant portions of the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 421, is on individual disability determinations, I cannot conclude that the Act precludes use of section 1983 to challenge faulty systemic procedures and standards allegedly used by the state defendant across the board.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the Telecommunications Act because that Act’s expedited judicial review mechanism implicitly forecloses the remedy.

Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Penn Forest Township · filed 1999-03-31

By providing such expedited judicial review, Congress implicitly foreclosed the use of § 1983 to enforce the Telecommunications Act.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce Title II of the ADA against individual officials because Title II's remedial scheme forecloses that claim.

Alsbrook v. City Of Maumelle · filed 1999-07-23

We agree with the Conclusions reached in these cases and hold that Title II's detailed remedial scheme bars Alsbrook from maintaining a section 1983 action against the commissioners in their individual capacities for alleged violations of the ADA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights created by the Clean Air Act or the ADA because those statutes have comprehensive remedial schemes.

Save Our Summers v. Washington State Department of Ecology · filed 2000-09-14

The Court finds that this reading is more appropriate than the broad reading previously adopted by the Court. Under this reading of Sea Clammers, the broad sweep of the CAA does not preclude Plaintiffs from bringing suit under the ADA; instead, Sea Clam-mers merely prevent Plaintiffs from bringing suit under § 1983 to enforce rights created by the CAA or the ADA (both comprehensive schemes).

Section 1983 remains available to enforce constitutional rights despite the CWA and SDWA whistleblower remedies because Congress did not intend those remedies to foreclose it.

Charvat v. Eastern Ohio Regional Wastewater Authority · filed 2001-04-09

In sum, the defendants have failed to prove that Congress intended for the whistleblower provisions of the CWA and SDWA to preclude the enforcement of constitutional rights through § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of the Clean Air Act because that Act has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Crotty · filed 2004-08-19

The Clean Air Act’s comprehensive remedial scheme precludes plaintiffs from bringing their Clean Air Act claims and/or under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim to enforce Title II of the ADA because Title II has its own comprehensive remedies.

Pona v. Cecil Whittaker's, Inc. · filed 1998-11-24

While that provision, of course, can, in proper circumstances, be used to vindicate the denial of rights secured by statutes of the United States, we must be mindful of the principle that if the statutory right that a plaintiff seeks to vindicate comes outfitted with its own comprehensive remedial apparatus, a § 1983 action based on a violation of that statutory right will not lie. ... In these circumstances, I think that Congress has, under the applicable legal principles, rather clearly indicated an intention to make the remedies that Title II itself gives the exclusive ones for the enforcement of that subchapter.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of FMLA rights because the FMLA provides the exclusive remedy for those claims.

Hayduk v. City of Johnstown · filed 2008-06-30

The remedial scheme of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inapplicable to claims arising from alleged violations of rights created by the FMLA, and Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 shall therefore be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate claim for violations of Title VII or the ADA because those statutes have comprehensive remedial schemes.

Cole v. Taber · filed 2008-07-09

Title VII and the ADA are independently actionable and have comprehensive remedial schemes. Violating them does not give rise to separate claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under § 722 of the Rehabilitation Act because that provision supplies a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Wasser v. New York State Office of Vocational & Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities · filed 2008-08-27

Accordingly, Wasser may not use § 1983 to seek enforcement of his rights under § 722 of the Rehabilitation Act, and his § 1983 claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce the AHTA because the AHTA shares the FAA’s comprehensive remedial scheme.

Air Transport Ass'n of America v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1994-02-15

And given this court’s conclusion that the AHTA shares the remedial scheme with the FAA, the general FAA cases are persuasive. Thus, if the § 1983 action cannot stand under the general provisions of the FAA, then it cannot stand under the AHTA. There can be no § 1983 claim predicated on the alleged violation of the AHTA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring a PURPA violation claim because PURPA has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Californians for Renewable v. Cpuc · filed 2015-03-06

Because PURPA has a comprehensive remedial scheme, CARE is precluded from alleging a PURPA violation through § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for Bankruptcy Code violations because the Code supplies a comprehensive enforcement mechanism.

Vaca Brava Old San Juan, LLC v. Puerto Rico Treasury Department (In re Vaca Brava Old San Juan, LLC) · filed 2016-10-27

In this case, Plaintiff argues that because the Bankruptcy Code is a law of the United States and the violation of the stay was an action under color of state law, it is entitled to damages pursuant § 1983. We disagree. The Bankruptcy Code provides a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for Code violations. ... For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s request for dismissal of the § 1983 claim is granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy to enforce the Randolph-Sheppard Act because that Act has a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Armstrong v. Mich. Bureau of Servs. for Blind Persons · filed 2020-08-07

The salient problem with this request is that the Act creates precisely the sort of “comprehensive enforcement scheme” that an individual remedy under § 1983 would frustrate.

Section 1983 cannot be used to sue individual school officials for Title IX violations because Title IX limits liability to funding recipients.

Williams v. Board of Regents · filed 2007-02-09

Although this court has never considered whether a plaintiff can use § 1983 to assert a Title IX claim against an individual school official, we conclude that to allow plaintiffs to use § 1983 in this manner would permit an end run around Title IX’s explicit language limiting liability to funding recipients.

Section 1983 cannot be used to sue individual school officials for Title IX violations because Title IX limits liability to funding recipients.

Williams v. Board of Regents · filed 2006-03-09

Although this court has never considered whether a plaintiff can use § 1983 to assert a Title IX claim against an individual school official, we conclude that to allow plaintiffs to use § 1983 in this manner would permit an end run around Title IX’s explicit language limiting liability to funding recipients.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of Title IX rights against state actors because Title IX creates enforceable rights and does not preclude that remedy.

OONA R.-S. BY KATE S. v. Santa Rosa City Schools · filed 1995-05-02

Because Title IX creates an enforceable right and the statute does not reflect Congress’ intent to preclude plaintiffs from enforcing that right by way of section 1983, therefore, the Court finds that a section 1983 action may properly be based on alleged violations of Title IX.

Title IX does not preclude a § 1983 equal protection claim challenging sex discrimination in a school athletic program.

Adams by and Through Adams v. Baker · filed 1996-02-02

Although Congress may specify remedies available for a violation of a federally protected right, Congress cannot thereby substantively limit constitutional rights. Title IX does not simply limit the remedies available for equal protection violations in the context of school athletic programs. Rather, it actually defines equal opportunity, and the definition provided under Title IX is substantively different than the definition of equal protection, as set forth by the controlling case law.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional claim even when Title IX provides a remedy for related sex discrimination.

Seamons v. Snow · filed 1996-05-08

We agree with the Sixth Circuit, and conclude that Brian’s § 1983 action is not barred by Title IX.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on Title IX rights because Title IX displaces that remedy for sexual harassment in federally funded institutions.

Bruneau Ex Rel. Schofield v. South Kortright Central School District · filed 1996-07-25

Accordingly, the Court finds that Congress intended to supplant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based on sexual harassment in federally funded institutions by its enactment of Title IX.

Section 1983 claims against a school district are subsumed by a Title IX claim arising from the same alleged student sexual abuse.

Seneway v. Canon McMillan School District · filed 1997-06-10

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the section 1983 claim against the School District (Count I) is GRANTED, as that claim is subsumed by Plaintiff’s Title IX claim.

Section 1983 allows an independently grounded constitutional claim alongside a Title IX claim arising from the same conduct; Title IX does not preclude that claim.

Alston ex rel. Alston v. Virginia High School League, Inc. · filed 1997-10-16

In the Title IX area, the Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Sixth Circuits both recently distinguished Sea Clammers and held that a Title IX claim does not preclude or “subsume” a § 1983 claim for redress of the same underlying conduct. ... In the absence of Fourth Circuit authority on the preclusion issue, the court adopts the thorough and sound analysis of the Tenth and Sixth Circuit cases cited supra. Accordingly, the court will deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss, as subsumed, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate equal protection claim when that claim is subsumed within a Title IX claim.

Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n · filed 1998-08-06

I will grant defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the Equal Protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because that constitutional claim is subsumed within plaintiffs Title IX claim.

Section 1983 claims may proceed alongside Title IX claims because Title IX’s remedial scheme does not foreclose them.

Doe v. Old Rochester Regional School District · filed 1999-07-06

Weighing the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal, I conclude that the “scheme” of Title IX is not so comprehensive as to foreclose simultaneous claims under § 1983 and that the relevant factors do not establish that Congress intended Title IX to be the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff in the position of Jane Doe.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a school board or district based on the same facts as a Title IX claim, even when the claim invokes equal protection rights.

Norris v. Norwalk Public Schools · filed 2000-11-30

Because her section 1983 claim is based on the same factual predicate as her Title IX claim, and because Bruneau held that Congress, when it enacted Title IX, intended to preclude section 1983 suits against non-individual defendants — even where those claims are based upon constitutional rights — Norris cannot maintain her section 1983 claim against the Norwalk Board of Education and the Norwalk Public Schools District.

Title IX’s remedial scheme precludes § 1983 claims based on Title IX and constitutional claims based on the same facts.

Henkle v. Gregory · filed 2001-02-28

Given our holding that § 1983 actions based on Title IX are subsumed by Title IX, it would be inconsistent and contrary to the above authority to allow Plaintiff to pursue constitutional claims through § 1983 based on the identical facts as the Title IX claims.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional claim resembling a Title IX claim when the plaintiff has not brought a Title IX claim.

DiSalvio v. Lower Merion High School District · filed 2001-06-12

Russell has not demonstrated that the Sea Clammers doctrine applies to a case simply because a constitutional claim resembles one that could have been brought under Title IX but was brought under § 1983 instead.

Title IX does not preempt a § 1983 claim against individual defendants.

Mandsager v. UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO · filed 2003-07-01

We will follow the majority of circuits that have addressed the issue and find that Ms. Mandsager is not precluded from asserting a § 1983 claim against the individual defendants on the grounds that such a claim is preempted by Title IX.

Title IX does not displace a student’s § 1983 claim against a teacher or other nonmanagerial employee for sex discrimination.

Delgado, Nicole v. Stegall, James · filed 2004-05-04

Even without a presumption against repeals by implication, Stegall’s argument would fail because there is no reason to suppose that holding that Title IX wiped out a big piece of section 1983 would serve any of the purposes that animated Congress in passing Title IX. Delgado’s suit against Stegall must therefore be reinstated.

Title IX does not preclude a student’s § 1983 claim against a teacher for sex discrimination when the teacher’s conduct is not a school policy or practice.

Delgado v. James C. Stegall and Western Illinois University · filed 2004-05-04

Stegall is asking us in effect to rule that Congress in Title IX repealed by implication a swatch of section 1983, though there is no possible conflict between these two federal statutes in cases in which relief is sought against a teacher or other non-managerial employee and no hint of such a purpose in the background or history of Title IX. ... Delgado’s suit against Stegall must therefore be reinstated.

Title IX precludes § 1983 claims against school officials arising from a teacher’s alleged abuse when the claims are based on Title IX or the student’s substantive due process right to bodily integrity.

Doe v. D'AGOSTINO · filed 2005-04-25

Consequently, this court finds that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims predicated on Title IX and Minor Plaintiffs substantive due process right to bodily integrity against the members of the Arlington School Committee, Donovan, and Penta are preempted by Title IX.

Title IX bars overlapping § 1983 claims against a school district and officials in their official capacities, but does not bar claims against officials in their individual capacities.

Jones v. Indiana Area School District · filed 2005-10-25

Thus, to the extent that Count II alleges claims against the School District and Ruddock and Kelley in their official capacities, it must be dismissed based on the Sea Clammers doctrine. However, to the extent that Count II alleges claims Ruddock and Kelley in their individual capacities, the Sea Clammers doctrine does not bar the claims.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for racial discrimination covered by Title VI’s comprehensive remedial scheme.

Alexander v. Underhill · filed 2006-02-17

Because Congress enacted a statutory scheme sufficiently comprehensive to remedy racial discrimination committed by an entity receiving federal financial assistance, Plaintiffs cannot pursue a section 1983 remedy for the same conduct.

Title IX does not preclude a § 1983 claim for an independent Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation.

Comm for Equity v. MI High School Athle · filed 2006-08-16

Because we conclude that Lillard remains good law and is unaffected by Rancho Palos Verdes, CFE may seek remedies under § 1983 as well as under Title IX.

Section 1983 remains available to enforce independent constitutional rights alongside Title IX because Title IX does not provide an exclusive remedy.

Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Association · filed 2006-08-16

For the reasons set forth below, we agree with CFE that Title IX does not preclude recovery under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on a Title IX violation because Title IX’s remedial scheme precludes it.

Frechel-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Department of Education · filed 2007-03-22

We agree with the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits that the Sea Clammers doctrine bars § 1983 suits predicated on Title IX violations and, accordingly, dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against DOE, Maldonado, and Morales-Sánchez.

Section 1983 cannot be used against educational institutions or their officials to enforce Title IX rights because Title IX’s remedial scheme precludes those claims.

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee · filed 2007-10-05

We conclude that the remedial scheme of Title IX is sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate Congress's intention to preclude the prosecution of counterpart actions against state actors — entities and individuals alike — under section 1983.

Section 1983 claims for Fourteenth Amendment violations can be subsumed by Title IX claims.

Richard P. v. School District of Erie · filed 2007-11-19

We also conclude that the District Court did not err when it granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court correctly concluded that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims were subsumed by their Title IX claims.

Title IX does not subsume § 1983 equal protection claims against individual school employees because Title IX provides no private right of action against them.

LeVarge Ex Rel. T.L. v. Preston Board of Education · filed 2008-03-11

However, Title IX does not provide a private right of action against individual school employees, and thus does not subsume an Equal Protection claim against Sobanski and Robinson.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate First Amendment retaliation claim for conduct covered by a Title IX retaliation claim.

Dawn L. Ex Rel. ML v. Greater Johnstown School District · filed 2008-03-31

... the Plaintiffs claim for retaliation is limited to a basis within Title IX, not a § 1983 claim based upon a First Amendment violation.

A § 1983 Equal Protection claim based on the same facts as a Title VI claim is subsumed by Title VI’s comprehensive enforcement scheme.

DT v. Somers Central School District · filed 2008-11-24

As Title Vi’s enforcement scheme is sufficiently comprehensive, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim based on the Equal Protection Clause and predicated on the same facts as their Title VI claim is subsumed by the Title VI claim.

Section 1983 permits Equal Protection claims alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools despite Title IX.

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee · filed 2009-01-21

Accordingly, we hold that §1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause remain available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools.

Section 1983 claims are not precluded by a Title IX claim based on the same facts.

G.C. Ex Rel. Counts v. North Clackamas School District · filed 2009-08-21

On January 21, 2009, the Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits and held that section 1983 claims are not precluded by the presence of a Title IX claim based on the same facts. Fitzgerald, 129 S.Ct. at 796-97. Therefore, I reject defendants’ argument to the contrary.

Section 1983 cannot be used to impose individual liability for a Title IX violation when Title IX does not permit it.

Does v. Covington County School Board of Education · filed 2003-01-02

That is, the court finds that a § 1983 action against the individual defendants to enforce rights under Title IX would effectively allow the plaintiffs to gain remedies unavailable under Title IX and to circumvent the congressional intent to foreclose such Title IX actions.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate claim against individuals for violations of Title IX.

Doe v. Town of Stoughton · filed 2013-01-22

While the caselaw on point is not well developed post-Fitzgerald, I conclude Title IX precludes a separate § 1983 statutory claim against individuals.

Section 1983 constitutional claims are not barred by parallel Title IX claims.

Does v. Southeast Delco School District · filed 2017-09-27

I therefore conclude that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are not- barred by Title IX.

A Section 1983 sex discrimination claim is subsumed by a Title IX claim.

Estate of D.B. v. Thousand Islands Cent. Sch. Dist. · filed 2018-08-29

Sex discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subsumed by the Title IX claim.

Title IX does not preclude § 1983 suits to enforce constitutional rights in schools.

Reed v. Southern Illinois University Edwardsville · filed 2019-09-27

As such, the Court finds that, under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, Reed’s § 1983 claim is not pre-empted by Title IX.

Section 1983 cannot be used to pursue Title IX retaliation damages against individuals when Title IX limits that remedy to the educational institution.

Harnois v. University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth · filed 2019-09-30

Harnois’s attempt to re-cast his Title IX claim as a violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is unavailing.

A § 1983 claim based on an alleged Title IX violation is assessed under the same standard as the Title IX claim.

KD v. Robeson · filed 2019-11-01

Further, because Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are based on the alleged Title IX violations, they must be examined under the same standard as Title IX.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a police officer who submits an arrest warrant application containing false information.

Holmes v. Steven C. Kucynda, Marty David Rolfe, James C. Bullock, Jason W. Poole, Cobb County, a Political Subdi · filed 2003-02-13

Thus, a police officer may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for submitting an application for an arrest warrant that contains false information.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an officer who procures an invalid search warrant through material false statements made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth.

Williams v. City of Detroit · filed 1994-02-16

The Sixth Circuit has established that “[a]n action under § 1983 does lie against an officer who obtains an invalid search warrant by making in his affidavit, material false statements either knowingly or in reckless disregard for the truth.” ... It is a question for the jury to decide if defendant Murphy acted with reckless disregard for the truth in obtaining a search warrant for 2638 Buena Vista.

Section 1983 permits an action against an officer who obtains an invalid search warrant through materially false or misleading affidavit statements made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.

Sinick v. County of Summit · filed 2002-04-22

An action under section 1983 lies against an officer who obtains an invalid search warrant by including materially false or misleading statements in her affidavit either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.

Section 1983 damages claims alleging false statements in a warrant affidavit require a substantial preliminary showing that the officer acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth.

Perlman v. City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation, William Devoney and Robert Trusz · filed 1986-09-10

Accordingly, we hold that the court below properly applied the “substantial preliminary showing” requirement to Perl-man’s claim against Officer Trusz, and properly granted summary judgment against Perlman for failing to make a substantial preliminary showing that Trusz made false statements in the warrant affidavit in knowing or reckless disregard of the truth.

In a § 1983 suit challenging a search warrant affidavit, plaintiffs must show a genuine factual dispute over whether the affiant supplied false information deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth to survive summary judgment.

Mason v. Lowndes County Sheriff's Department · filed 2004-07-08

In the context of a § 1983 case, to survive summary judgment the plaintiffs must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the false information contained in the affidavit was provided deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth.

Section 1983 permits liability for material false statements in a warrant affidavit made deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth.

Tobias v. Pletzke · filed 2013-03-20

To hold an officer liable under § 1983 for making material false statements in a warrant, a plaintiff must therefore establish: “(1) a substantial showing that the defendant stated a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth and (2) that the allegedly false or omitted information was material to the finding of probable cause.” Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 517 (citing Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir.1989)).

Section 1983 permits a damages action for a due process violation at a prisoner’s disciplinary hearing despite an administrative reversal, when the prisoner has already served some restrictive confinement.

Mays v. John Mahoney, Hearing Officer for Disciplinary Hearing at the Sing Sing Correctional Facility · filed 1994-04-29

We have today held in Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652 (2 Cir.1994), that reversal on administrative appeal does not preclude a damage action for a due process violation at a prisoner’s disciplinary hearing where the reversal occurs after the prisoner has served at least a portion of the restrictive confinement. Although Walker was a case dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), the same principle applies in a case dismissed by summary judgment. The court in the instant case erred in granting summary judgment based upon the proposition that reversal on administrative appeal cures a due process violation.

A successful administrative appeal does not bar a Section 1983 damages claim for a due process violation at a prison disciplinary hearing when the inmate began serving the punitive sentence.

Walker v. L. Bates, Hearing Officer · filed 1994-04-29

We hold only that Walker’s success in the administrative appeal process does not bar his section 1983 claim and that his complaint states a claim for relief.

A prisoner may seek damages under § 1983 for punitive confinement following a procedurally defective hearing even if an administrative appeal later reverses the disciplinary decision.

Jones v. Coughlin · filed 1995-01-23

Subsequent to the district court's decision, this Court handed down its decision in Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652 (2d Cir.1994) ("Walker "), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3092 (U.S. July 25, 1994), holding that if a prisoner was placed in punitive confinement as a result of a procedurally defective hearing, his eventual success in an administrative appeal does not bar his claim under Sec. 1983 for damages resulting from that confinement. ... The State concedes that Walker is controlling with respect to Jones's claim against Mockry and that Young is controlling with respect to Jones's claim against Selsky, but it asks that we hold this appeal in abeyance pending decisions by the Supreme Court on the certiorari petition filed in Walker and a petition that the State anticipates filing in Young. We decline to do so. ... Accordingly, the judgment dismissing the claims against Mockry and Selsky will be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Section 1983 constitutional claims are not foreclosed by the District of Columbia’s Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act.

Baumann v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-03-27

The CMPA does not foreclose this Court from entertaining claims over which it has original jurisdiction, including constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to have been in state custody to assert a cause of action.

Jenicke v. City of Forest Hill · filed 1994-05-10

A party need not be in custody to assert a cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a hostile environment claim seeking redress for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Nieto v. Kapoor · filed 1999-08-04

Plaintiffs may assert a hostile environment claim while seeking redress for violations of the Equal Protection Clause under § 1983.

Section 1983 sexual harassment claims generally follow Title VII standards for quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment.

Jones v. Clinton · filed 1998-04-01

Before discussing that issue, however, the Court must address plaintiffs argument that the essential elements of a sexual harassment claim under § 1983 do not correspond to those under Title VII- (although she acknowledges there is some overlap) and that her burden of proof is something less than that required under Title VII. The Court rejects this argument.

Section 1983 applies the severe-or-pervasive standard to workplace sexual harassment claims.

Lauderdale v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division · filed 2007-12-21

As demonstrated above, title VII requires that actionable harassment be severe or pervasive. We apply the same standard under § 1983 and reach the same conclusion.

Section 1983 sexual-harassment claims are evaluated under the same standards as Title VII sexual-harassment claims.

Williams v. Herron · filed 2012-08-03

We have previously held that section 1983 sexual-harassment claims are treated the same as sexual-harassment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ... It should be no surprise that we apply the same treatment here, making Title VII sexual-harassment cases relevant to our determination.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private child care provider merely because it contracts with a state agency to care for children in state custody.

LETISHA A., BY MURPHY v. Morgan · filed 1994-06-16

In sum, private defendants are private parties who merely contracted with DCFS to provide certain services. The nature of this relationship is not sufficiently close to convert private defendants into state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a private entity that contracts with prison officials to provide inmate food to be held liable for deprivation of constitutional rights.

Grote v. Sam Lewis, Director of Arizona Prisons Food Service of America · filed 1996-01-17

As a private entity which contracted with prison officials to provide food to inmates, Food Service can be found liable for deprivation of constitutional rights under section 1983.

A private litigant is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 when the plaintiff fails to plead overt or significant action by state officials in the alleged deprivation.

Sarner v. Luce · filed 1997-10-28

Plaintiff failed to plead overt or significant action by the other defendants such that defendant Luce was a state actor.

A private corporation providing jail medical care may be liable under § 1983 when its widespread, longstanding custom leads to a constitutional violation.

Nelson Ex Rel. the Estate of Nelson v. Prison Health Services, Inc. · filed 1997-12-30

The same evidence of “custom” upon which the Court has concluded that the County’s section 1983 liability may be predicated also forms the basis for PHS’s liability under section 1983. Indeed, Dr. Smith’s reports indict PHS as thoroughly, if not more so, than they do the County, as do PHS’s own internal memoranda. The Court therefore concludes that the Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to establish PHS’s liability under section 1983.

A private contractor providing constitutionally required medical care to county inmates can be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations.

Higgins v. Correctional Medical Services of Illinois, Inc. · filed 1998-07-01

Here, CMS is contractually obligated to provide Kane County inmates with the medical care mandated by the Eighth Amendment; therefore, CMS can be held liable for constitutional violations under § 1983.

A private mental health facility is not a state actor under § 1983 merely because its therapist requests police assistance with an emergency detention and city policy directs officers to comply.

James v. Grand Lake M. Health · filed 1998-09-24

For the same reasons, Grand Lake is not a state actor for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 treats Georgia foster parents as state actors where state law makes them state employees, accepts liability for their torts, and grants them immunity for torts within their duties.

Rayburn Ex Rel. Rayburn v. Farnesi · filed 1999-11-02

Section 1983 liability only applies to persons acting under color of state law. ... The State’s decision to waive sovereign immunity and consent to suit for the torts of foster parents, combined with the decision to provide total immunity to foster parents for torts committed during their employment as foster parents, creates a nexus between the State and the regulated activity of foster parents that is sufficient to make the Hogues state actors for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on private parties who were not state actors in connection with an arrest.

Lewis v. Continental Airlines, Inc. · filed 1999-12-14

Thus, the record does not remotely suggest that Defendants were state actors so as to subject them to liability under § 1983.

A volunteer fire company acts under color of law for § 1983 when its governmental functions, public assistance, regulation, and treatment by the state collectively make it a state actor.

Goldstein v. The Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Company · filed 2000-07-12

Inasmuch as Goldstein premises his cause of action against this entity and these individuals upon the First Amendment, we must first determine whether Chestnut Ridge's decisions to suspend and to terminate him were under color of law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... With respect to the first question, we hold that Chestnut Ridge, a volunteer fire department in Maryland, is a state actor.

Section 1983 treats a private operator as a state actor when it cares for patients involuntarily assigned to a secure mental health facility on the state's behalf.

Doe v. Westlake Academy · filed 2000-11-21

At least when it comes to the care of clients who have been involuntarily assigned to the secure lock-down facility of an intensive residential treatment program by way of a centralized intake process, Westlake Academy and Health and Education Services, Inc. were acting on behalf of the Department of Mental Health and, thus, may fairly be considered state actors.

Foster parents are not state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability.

P.G. v. Ramsey County · filed 2001-04-27

Although the Eighth Circuit has not ruled directly on the issue, it is clear that foster parents are not state actors within the meaning of § 1983.

Private defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a joint-action theory without sufficient evidence that they conspired or reached an agreement with a state actor.

Zeppieri v. New Haven Provision Co. · filed 2001-08-31

However, the plaintiffs have offered insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants unlawfully conspired or otherwise reached an agreement with a state actor subject to liability under § 1983.