42 U.S.C. § 1983

States cannot limit their courts’ ability to hear § 1983 claims.

Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson · filed 2020-10-23

A state lacks the power to limit state courts’ ability to hear § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 generally cuts off arresting officers’ liability for harm after a prosecutor files charges unless the plaintiff rebuts the presumption that the prosecutor acted independently.

Smiddy v. Dudley D. Varney, Sidney Nuckles, Raymond Inglin · filed 1987-02-25

In the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption, the presumption was sufficient to require summary judgment for the defendants upon the specific point covered by the remand.

In a § 1983 claim against law enforcement officers for harms from a prosecution, a prosecutor’s decision to file charges is presumed independent, but the plaintiff may rebut that presumption with evidence of officer pressure or misinformation, after which the defendants bear the burden of proving independence.

Guillory v. City of Anaheim · filed 1992-11-19

The defense of prosecutorial independence immunizes law enforcement officers from damages suffered as a result of a prosecutor's independent decision to file a criminal complaint against an individual. The defense is governed by a split burden of proof. The decision to file a complaint is presumed to result from an independent judgment on the part of the prosecutor, but the plaintiff may rebut the presumption by introducing evidence that the decision to prosecute was influenced by pressure or misinformation from law enforcement officials. See Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir.1981). If the plaintiff meets this burden of production, the burden of persuasion reverts to the defense to demonstrate that the decision to prosecute was truly independent. Id. at 267.

Section 1983 generally shields police officers from liability for furnishing information a prosecutor relies on to file charges, unless they purposefully conceal or misrepresent material facts that may influence the decision to prosecute.

Thompson v. Limke · filed 1997-05-27

A police officer is generally shielded from § 1983 liability for furnishing information upon which a state prosecutor relies in determining whether to file criminal charges. ... An exception arises when the chain is broken by an officer who purposefully conceals or misrepresents material facts to the district attorney which may have influenced the decision to prosecute. Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d at 655. Here, Mr. Thompson has not alleged the defendants purposefully concealed or misrepresented material facts to the district attorney; there is, accordingly, no reason to invoke the exception to the general rule of immunity.

An investigating officer is generally shielded from § 1983 damages after a prosecutor independently decides to seek an arrest warrant, but that protection can be rebutted by evidence that the officer supplied information known to be false.

Gray v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2004-06-22

Ordinarily, the filing of a criminal complaint immunizes the investigating officer from liability for alleged damages because there is a presumption that the prosecutor exercised independent judgment in determining that probable cause existed to issue the arrest warrant.

In a § 1983 action, investigators can be liable for injuries following a prosecutor’s decision to file charges if they interfered with the prosecutor’s judgment by withholding relevant information or pressuring the prosecutor.

Harper v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2008-07-14

The presumption of prosecutorial independence protects investigative officers unless the evidence shows that the officers interfered with the prosecutor’s judgment by omitting relevant information or by pressuring the prosecutor to file charges.

A Section 1983 claim remains subject to laches when the plaintiff unreasonably delays filing and the delay prejudices the defendant, even if a tolling rule keeps the claim within the limitations period.

Jabbar-El v. Sullivan · filed 1992-11-30

However, plaintiff is still subject to the common law doctrine of laches. That doctrine bars a claim not brought within a reasonable time of plaintiffs learning the allegedly true facts.

A § 1983 complaint filed within the limitations period may still be subject to dismissal for laches.

Partee v. Cook County Sheriff's Office · filed 1994-09-27

But a § 1983 complaint that is filed within the limitations period may still be subject to dismissal for laches.

Section 1983 injunctive relief may be denied for gross laches when plaintiffs unjustifiably delay filing suit.

Murphy v. Houtchens · filed 1972-05-23

This Court further finds that no relief is justified in this cause due to plaintiffs’ gross laches in instituting this suit. Plaintiffs attempt to enjoin the Democratic caucus set for 1:00 p. m., on May 23, 1972. The irregularities complained of occurred on April 18 and April 27, 1972, yet plaintiffs waited until May 15, 1972, to file suit.

Laches may bar a Section 1983 claim for equitable relief when Eleventh Amendment immunity forecloses a damages remedy.

Cannon v. University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School · filed 1983-07-20

Neither Supreme Court nor Seventh Circuit precedent prohibits application of the doctrine of laches to Cannon's Section 1983 claim against SIU and Illinois. ... In this case, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits the district court from entertaining the legal claim. Because the only relief that can be sought is equitable, laches should apply.

A stay of execution may be denied on laches grounds when a prisoner delays bringing a § 1983 challenge to execution procedures.

Schwab v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections · filed 2007-11-15

Under our precedent, Schwab’s delay in bringing his § 1983 lawsuit mandates denial of a stay on laches grounds.

Section 1983 claims seeking mixed legal and equitable relief are subject to laches as to equitable relief and the statute of limitations as to legal relief.

Agnes E. NILSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the CITY OF MOSS POINT, MISSISSIPPI, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-04-26

Laches may bar the equitable relief sought, although the question of laches is a factual one that cannot be resolved at this stage of the proceeding; the plaintiff is not es-topped on the questions of delay and prejudice. The survival of Nilsen’s claims for legal relief is governed by the Mississippi statute of limitations.

A § 1983 method-of-execution claim may be barred by laches when the inmate unreasonably delays raising it.

Arthur v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2016-11-02

As an alternative and independent ground, we also conclude Arthur’s firing-squad claim is barred by laches. See Williams v. Allen, 496 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding dismissal of § 1983 method-of-execution action based on unreasonable delay); Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 2007) (denying a stay).

A state department is not a suable entity under § 1983.

Pingeon v. DOC · filed 2020-12-29

Because the Department of Corrections is a department of the state, it is not a suable entity under § 1983.

A municipal department is not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 action.

Lim v. Child Protective Services of Tulare County · filed 2020-08-17

Nor could HHSA, as a municipal department of the County, be a proper defendant in this Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim against a detention facility because the facility is not a suable person.

Gallegos v. Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2017-09-22

In other words; suing a detention’ facility is the equivalent of attempting to sue a building for purposes of § 1983.

A county jail mail room, as a subdivision of the department of corrections, is not a suable entity in a § 1983 action.

Miguel Castillo, Also Known as Carlos A. Aguiar v. Cook County Mail Room Department · filed 1993-03-30

It follows that the mail room, as a subdivision of the Department of Corrections, is not subject to suit either.

A district attorney’s office is not a suable entity under Section 1983.

Mayotte v. Her · filed 2019-09-30

As an initial matter, the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office is not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a county detention center or its correctional health department because they are not suable entities.

Hooker v. Wozny · filed 2019-12-13

In addition, Plaintiff cannot proceed on his claims against the Kenosha County Detention Center or the Correctional Health Department because they are not suable entities under § 1983.

A county jail has no legal identity separate from its county and cannot be sued under § 1983.

Phillips v. Austin Police Department · filed 2020-01-10

First, the DLMCJC, as a county jail, has no legal identity separate and apart from Tulsa County and, thus is not a suable entity.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against a county jail medical department because the jail is not a suable entity.

Hooker v. Haynes · filed 2020-02-28

Plaintiff may not proceed on his claims against the Kenosha County Jail medical department, however, because the Jail is not a suable entity.

A county jail is not a suable entity under Section 1983.

Harris v. Phelps County Jail · filed 2020-09-09

Furthermore, plaintiff’s claims against Phelps County Jail are subject to dismissal because a jail is not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A correctional facility building is not a suable entity under Section 1983.

YOUNG v. SEVIER · filed 2020-10-15

Second, all claims against NCCF (New Castle Correctional Facility) are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because, as a building, it is not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against a detention facility or sheriff’s department that is not a separate suable entity.

Stone v. Jefferson County Detention · filed 2020-12-10

As the magistrate judge said, the defendants named in Mr. Stone’s complaint—the Jefferson County Detention Facility and the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department—are not suable entities under § 1983.

Prison disciplinary hearing officers have qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, from § 1983 claims based on their hearing functions.

Ramirez v. Selsky · filed 1993-03-31

The Magistrate Judge rejected Defendant’s contention as to the defense of absolute immunity based upon his performance of judge-like functions under Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). She cited Zavaro v. Coughlin, 970 F.2d 1148, 1153 n. 2 (2d Cir.1992), for the rule that “prison disciplinary hearing officers are protected only by qualified immunity.” Defendant does not object to this recommendation, and the Court summarily adopts it.

A prison disciplinary hearing officer serving under New York’s Inmate Hearing Officer Program does not have absolute immunity from a Section 1983 suit.

Tulloch v. Coughlin III · filed 1995-02-28

Our application of the Cleavinger factors yields the conclusion that absolute immunity is not appropriate for Kihl.

A prison disciplinary hearing officer serving under New York’s Inmate Hearing Officer Program is not absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit.

Tulloch v. Coughlin · filed 1995-02-28

Our application of the Cleavinger factors yields the conclusion that absolute immunity is not appropriate for Kihl.

Prison disciplinary hearing officers have qualified immunity from § 1983 claims, rather than absolute immunity.

Juan v. Rafferty · filed 1984-01-05

Similarly a hearing officer in a prison disciplinary hearing should be entitled only to a qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claims against prison hearings officers cannot proceed for acts undertaken within their authority as hearings officers.

Davis v. Snyder · filed 2002-11-05

First, Davis’s claims against Harris-Spicer may not proceed because Harris-Spicer is entitled to immunity. A prison hearings officer has immunity from civil suits with regard to acts undertaken within her authority as a hearings officer.

Section 1983 claims against Michigan prison hearing officers are barred by absolute immunity for discretionary acts in their hearing officer role, even when an act exceeds their authority.

Williams v. McGinnis · filed 2003-01-31

This court has held that hearing officers in Michigan state prisons are absolutely immune for discretionary actions taken in their capacity as hearing officers. ... Although Williams argues that the defendant hearing officer in this case exceeded her authority by disclosing his identity as a confidential informant without first consulting the warden, judicial immunity is not lost where an action is taken in error or in excess of authority.

A prison officer may be immune from Section 1983 damages claims in his official capacity under the Eleventh Amendment and in his individual capacity under qualified immunity.

Maldonado v. Brock · filed 2020-07-14

Plaintiff’s objections do not refer to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Sgt. Brock is entitled to qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity. A review of the record shows this determination was correct as well.

Section 1983 claims alleging distinct constitutional wrongs must be considered separately.

Cottrell v. Kaysville City · filed 1993-05-18

Ms. Cottrell has stated several different claims under § 1983. It was error to consider them as one claim going only to the allegedly illegal search.

Section 1983 does not give parents a separate cause of action for incidental injury to the parent-child relationship when state action directly injures their child.

Baynard v. Lawson · filed 1999-12-07

Under the circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the child is the party who was directly injured by state action and that § 1983 does not grant the parents a separate cause of action for incidental injury to the parent-child relationship.

A § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs can proceed despite failure to meet Georgia’s medical malpractice affidavit requirement.

Parker v. Brinson · filed 1993-06-10

To the extent this prison inmate’s “tort negligence and medical indifference” action (brought against the warden of the prison, the warden’s predecessor, two deputy wardens and the medical director) sets forth a medical malpractice claim, the trial court did not err in dismissing it (for failure to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1). However, to the extent this action sets forth a civil rights claim under 42 USC § 1983 for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, the trial court erred in dismissing it.

Section 1983 does not provide redress for routine medical malpractice involving state doctors.

Colon v. Ramirez · filed 1996-01-24

Section 1983 was not intended to provide redress for routine medical malpractice cases involving state doctors.

A § 1983 claim for an alleged constitutional violation does not require the affidavit that Illinois law requires for a medical malpractice claim.

Senisais v. Fitzgerald · filed 1996-09-26

Senisais has brought this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights; this is not a claim of medical malpractice. Moreover, Senisais has filed his complaint in federal district court seeking redress for the alleged violation of federal rights. In this court, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern, not the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. As such, Section 2-622 is inapplicable. Thus, any failure to file an affidavit is not sufficient grounds for dismissal.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for claims based only on negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice.

Dedeaux v. MS Dept Corrections · filed 2002-08-28

Claims of negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice are insufficient to give rise to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for negligence or medical malpractice claims.

Taylor v. Texas · filed 2003-10-20

Taylor’s allegations amounted to claims for negligence or medical malpractice, which are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for medical malpractice alone.

Bass v. L. B. Sullivan, Commissioner of the State of Alabama Board of Correction · filed 1977-04-07

Whether it might constitute malpractice is not our concern; Gamble teaches that malpractice will not lie under § 1983, and Bass has his malpractice suit on file in the state court system.

Section 1983 claims do not require an affidavit of merit.

Costa v. COUNTY OF BURLINGTON · filed 2008-07-22

Even if the Court granted Dr. Evans’s Motion, Counts I and II would remain because an affidavit of merit is not required to support a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of rights protected by the Commerce Clause.

Pioneer Military Lending, Inc., Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Earl L. Manning, Commissioner, Division of Finance, Appellan · filed 1993-09-09

This court has subsequently followed Dennis in holding that Commerce Clause plaintiffs have a cause of action under § 1983. ... The judgment dismissing this claim should be reversed, and the trial court should have the opportunity to consider the relief requested.

Section 1983 permits actions for violations of the Commerce Clause.

Marigold Foods, Inc. v. Redalen · filed 1993-10-20

Violations of the Commerce Clause may be the basis of § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 provides relief for Commerce Clause violations.

National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer · filed 1995-09-20

The district court erred in dismissing NSWM's Sec. 1983 claim as it related to the "effective siting" and "formal rulemaking" provisions of the Wisconsin statute; its decision that these provisions violated the Commerce Clause entitled NSWM to Sec. 1983 relief.

Section 1983 encompasses rights arising under the Commerce Clause.

Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards · filed 1995-10-03

The Supreme Court has now resolved the dispute as to whether rights arising under the Commerce Clause are included within the “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” referred to by the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They are included.

Because § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, the applicable limitations period is supplied by state law; here, Iowa’s five-year period for other actions governs.

Barrett v. Wichael · filed 1974-11-01

Because § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, the Court must look to state law to supply one. ... Therefore, this Court adopts the view enunciated by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Glasscoe v. Howell, and holds that the five-year limitations period of § 614.1(4) of the Iowa Code governs this lawsuit.

Section 1983 borrows the most analogous state statute of limitations; here, the court applied the two-year period for Iowa personal-injury actions rather than Chapter 613A’s shortened period.

Rosales v. Lewis · filed 1978-08-14

As section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code contains no express statute of limitations, this Court must look to the most analogous Iowa statute of limitations, with the ultimate goal of applying the same limitations period an Iowa court would apply were a similar action brought there. ... It appears that the federal policy underlying the plaintiff’s claims in this case would best be served by .applying the two year statute of limitations for actions “founded on injuries to the person or reputation, including injuries to relative rights, whether based on contract or tort”. Iowa Code § 614.1(2).

Section 1983 actions in Iowa are governed by the state's general five-year statute of limitations rather than the period for the most analogous common-law tort.

Garmon v. Robert Foust Robert Ervin and Charles Cramer · filed 1982-01-05

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Iowa’s general, five-year statute of limitations, Iowa Code § 614.1 14, governs this section 1983 action.

All § 1983 claims arising in Iowa are governed by Iowa's two-year personal-injury limitations period.

Wycoff v. James Menke, Official of the Iowa State Penitentiary · filed 1985-09-25

As a result, all section 1983 claims that accrue after ... will be governed by the relevant state’s personal injury statute of limitations. In Iowa, this means that all such actions will be governed by a two-year statute of limitations, Iowa Code § 614.1(2).

In Iowa, a § 1983 unlawful-arrest claim filed more than two years after the arrest is barred by the statute of limitations.

Troutman v. Hardin · filed 1992-07-20

We conclude the District Court properly dismissed Troutman's claims of unlawful arrest, because he filed this action more than two years after his arrest occurred.

Section 1983 claims in Iowa are subject to a two-year limitations period, and an arrest-related claim accrues when the arrest occurs.

Davis v. Kevin Ross, Iowa City Police Officer Officer Heick Unknown/unnamed Sued as Iowa City, Ia Chief of Police · filed 1993-06-10

The district court correctly determined that Davis’s action was barred by Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations. ... In any event, his cause of action arose when defendants arrested him on August 11, 1989.

Section 1983 actions in Iowa are subject to the two-year limitations period governing personal injury actions.

Bundy v. Iowa Civil Rights Com'n · filed 1993-06-24

The applicable statute of limitations for actions brought under § 1983 is the period governing personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). In Iowa, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years after accrual. Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(2) (West Supp. 1993). Because all of the allegations that Bundy properly pleaded involved events that occurred more than two years prior to his filings of these suits, his claims are time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Iowa are time-barred under the state's two-year personal-injury limitations period when filed more than two years after the last alleged deprivation.

Penn v. Iowa State Board of Regents · filed 1993-07-09

On the face of the complaint, the last act of .deprivation of due process and equal protection of which Penn complains occurred September 22, 1989, more than two years before Penn filed this action. The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 and section 1985 claims is the two-year Iowa statute of limitations for personal injury. ... The district court therefore properly dismissed Penn’s section 1983 and section 1985 actions as time-barred.

Section 1983 claims in Iowa are subject to the two-year personal-injury limitations period and are time-barred when filed more than two years after the last alleged deprivation.

Penn v. Iowa State Board of Regents · filed 1993-08-04

On the face of the complaint, the last act of deprivation of due process and equal protection of which Penn complains occurred September 22, 1989, more than two years before Penn filed this action. The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 and section 1985 claims is the two-year Iowa statute of limitations for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 264-65, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). The district court therefore properly dismissed Penn's section 1983 and section 1985 actions as time-barred.

A two-year statute of limitations applies to section 1983 claims in Iowa.

Burgs v. Iowa City, Iowa · filed 1993-09-14

Defendants also correctly stated that the statute of limitations barred Burgs's claims about events that occurred more than two years before he filed the instant section 1983 action.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is not tolled while a plaintiff pursues state remedies that no law requires the plaintiff to exhaust.

Berry v. Keller · filed 2005-12-06

Further, regarding his tolling argument, Berry was not entitled to any tolling for that time he spent pursuing relief in state court because nothing in state or federal law required him to exhaust his claims there before pursuing this action.

Section 1983 claims challenging a residency classification accrue when plaintiffs have reason to know of the denial and its asserted basis.

Young v. Crofts · filed 2006-01-10

However, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs’ claims accrued outside of the limitation period because Plaintiffs had reason to know of their claims when Plaintiffs were denied, formally or informally, in-state residency status and gained the impression that the denial was based solely on their status as full-time students.

Section 1983 actions brought in Puerto Rico use Puerto Rico tolling law when it is consistent with federal policy.

Nieves-Vega v. Ortiz-Quinones · filed 2006-04-05

When a § 1983 action is brought in Puerto Rico, federal law borrows from Puerto Rico tolling law so long as the Puerto Rico law is consistent with underlying federal policy.

A § 1983 claim’s limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the claim.

Hurst v. Trader · filed 2007-02-23

Further, the limitations period for purposes of § 1983 claims begins to run “from the time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983 action.” Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991).

Pursuing a state remedy, such as an Article 78 proceeding, does not toll the limitations period for a Section 1983 claim.

Abbas v. Dixon · filed 2007-02-28

We have held, however, that a plaintiff's pursuit of a state remedy, such as an Article 78 proceeding, does not toll the statute of limitations for filing a claim pursuant to section 1983.

Section 1983 claims use federal accrual rules and state tolling rules unless the state rules would defeat the section’s goals.

Abbas v. Dixon · filed 2007-02-28

Although federal law determines when a section 1983 claim accrues, state tolling rules determine whether the limitations period has been tolled, unless state tolling rules would “defeat the goals” of section 1983.

State law governs tolling in § 1983 suits, including whether mandatory grievances toll the limitations period and how that tolling is calculated.

Roberts v. Barreras · filed 2007-04-16

As noted above, however, in a § 1983 suit, state tolling rules, not federal ones, apply.

Section 1983 claims in New York do not require service of a notice of claim and are subject to a three-year limitations period.

Rapoli v. Village of Red Hook · filed 2007-06-05

Although the claim asserted in the complaint pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 did not require service of a notice of claim (see Sangermano v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Nassau County, 290 AD2d 498, 499 [2002]; Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 498 [2001]; Lopez v Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551 [1999]; Matter of Rattner v Planning Commn. of Vil. of Pleasantville, 156 AD2d 521 [1989]), such claim also was time-barred by the three-year limitations period governing such claims (see Levine v McCabe, 357 F Supp 2d 608, 614 [2005]; Perez v County of Nassau, 294 F Supp 2d 386, 389 [2003]).

Section 1983 claims against unidentified defendants are time-barred when the limitations period expires before they are identified, and later naming them does not relate back when the plaintiff did not know their identities.

Sweet v. Wende Correctional Facility · filed 2007-09-13

All that plaintiff can show here is that he did not know the identities of the John Doe defendants when he filed the complaint in 2000. Thus, the limitations period against these defendants ran out in 2000, and an amended complaint identifying them (which plaintiff has never sought leave to file) would not relate back to the filing of the original complaint in 2000.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim begins when the plaintiff knows of the injury; ignorance of a legal cause of action does not delay it.

Adi v. Knot · filed 2008-08-19

The fact that Adi did not know that he had a “legal cause of action” under § 1983 is not relevant in determining the date on which the limitations period began to run.

The one-year Louisiana limitations period for a § 1983 claim is tolled while the plaintiff pursues administrative remedies.

Anderson v. Wilkerson · filed 2008-11-19

The one-year Louisiana prescriptive period was tolled during the pendency of Anderson’s administrative complaint. ... Therefore, Anderson’s § 1983 complaint, filed on May 23, 2005, was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 suits use the forum state's choice-of-law rules to select the applicable personal-injury limitations period.

Malone v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2009-01-21

This must mean respecting the choice-of-law doctrines that states employ to select the appropriate personal-injury statute.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state's choice-of-law rules to select the applicable personal-injury limitations period.

Malone, Norman L. v. Corrections Corp Ame · filed 2009-01-21

Wilson, Owens, and Hardin tell us that the rules for §1983 litigation track those that the state applies to private, personal-injury suits. This must mean respecting the choice-of-law doctrines that states employ to select the appropriate personal-injury statute.

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim is not tolled merely because the plaintiff pursued a state court remedy, where the later federal action raises a different constitutional theory and the plaintiff delayed filing it.

Meyer v. Frank · filed 1977-01-12

The question presented on this appeal is whether in a civil rights action under Sections 1983 and 1985 the applicable three year New York statute of limitations should be tolled during the period plaintiff pursued a remedy in the New York state courts. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that it should not.

Section 1983 damages claims arising in Louisiana are subject to the state’s one-year prescription period for delictual actions; continuing harm alone does not extend that period.

Ready v. STATE, DHHR · filed 1998-03-25

The plaintiffs filed an action against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR), pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for wrongful removal of their child from their custody. ... After a review of the record and the original opinion, we conclude, for the same reasons, that Cody's claims and the plaintiffs' claims have prescribed.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period of the state where the claim arose.

White v. Gusman · filed 2009-09-23

The prescriptive period for a claim brought under § 1983 is provided by the law of the state in which the claim arose.

Tolling does not make a Section 1983 claim timely when the filing delay exceeds the time tolled.

Wolfe v. Roanoke City Jail · filed 2009-12-14

To the extent Wolfe argues he is entitled to tolling of the limitations period for his § 1983 claim, even with the benefit of such tolling his complaint would remain untimely.

Section 1983 actions use the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period and equitable-tolling provisions.

Cabeen v. Thomas · filed 2011-02-01

In a § 1983 action, applied are the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period, Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1998), as well as its equitable-tolling provisions, Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2008).

Section 1983 claims may use a state's relation-back rule when they borrow that state's limitations period.

Palacio v. City of Springfield · filed 2014-06-09

While this is not a diversity case — the more common route to applying Rule 15(c)(1)(A)— relation back is nonetheless available in the context of a section 1983 claim such as this so long as the borrowed limitation period, under state law, is subject to relation back.

Section 1983 incorporates only generally applicable state tolling rules, such as those based on minority, incapacity, and equitable grounds.

Varnell v. Dora Consolidated School District · filed 2014-07-01

Only generally applicable tolling provisions—such as those based on minority, incapacity, and equitable grounds—should be incorporated for use under § 1983.

Where the initial Section 1983 suit was undisputedly timely, its limitations period was tolled during the suit and any additional state administrative proceedings.

Abbott v. Babin · filed 2014-09-29

Because no party argues that Abbott’s October 5, 2012 filing of this suit was outside the applicable statutory period of prescription for a Section 1983 suit, there has been a tolling of the prescriptive period “during the pendency of this action and any additional state administrative proceedings” that may take place.

Section 1983 claims use the state’s tolling statute unless doing so conflicts with federal law or policy.

Johnson v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. · filed 2015-02-06

Having borrowed the state’s statute of limitations for the § 1983 claim, we apply the state’s tolling statute, as long as the result is not inconsistent with federal law or policy.

Section 1983 actions may use state tolling law when it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy.

Broussard v. Ike Brown · filed 2015-04-08

State tolling law is applicable in a § 1983 action if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy.

Section 1983 claims brought in Louisiana have a one-year prescriptive period running from the date of injury or when damage is sustained.

Bach v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners · filed 2016-05-12

Given that § 1983 actions are clearly tort claims, ... in Louisiana they are subject to a prescriptive period of one year that runs from the date of the injury or when damage is sustained.

For a § 1983 claim governed by Louisiana’s limitations period, filing a complaint in a court with subject matter jurisdiction interrupts the period even if the plaintiff has not yet exhausted administrative remedies.

Gonzalez v. Seal · filed 2017-01-31

The question is whether the prescriptive period was tolled by Gonzalez’s filing of his § 1983 complaint in December 2009 even though he had not exhausted his administrative remedies as mandated by the PLRA. ... Thus, the prescriptive period was interrupted because Gonzalez’s complaint was filed in a court with subject matter jurisdiction.

For a § 1983 claim challenging a tenure denial in Ohio, the two-year limitations period begins with the initial denial; internal appeals do not restart it.

McKeny v. Middleton · filed 2017-03-16

The harm complained of by plaintiff is the denial of tenure. As explained above, the court finds under Ricks that this allegedly unlawful action occurred when Dean Middleton denied tenure on April 1, 2012. Although the claims in Ricks arose under Title VII and § 1981, the Court’s holding — as to which point in the tenure review process the actionable conduct occurs— applies as well to § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 suits in Illinois borrow the state’s two-year personal injury limitations period, savings statute, and related service diligence rule.

Bonds v. City Of Chicago · filed 2019-03-27

Federal courts borrow Illinois’ two-year limitations period of for personal injury suits, Illinois’ Savings Statute, and coordinate Illinois tolling rules, including Rule 103(b), in § 1983 suits.

Alleged threats of retaliation do not equitably extend the limitations period for a § 1983 claim.

Vergara v. City of Chicago · filed 2019-09-30

Extending equitable estoppel to this case would permit plaintiffs to avoid the limitations period for § 1983 claims indefinitely by alleging an episode of official intimidation.

Filing a notice of tort claim under Oklahoma’s Governmental Tort Claims Act does not toll the limitations period for a § 1983 action.

Konte v. Oklahoma City City of · filed 2020-01-02

Plaintiff’s compliance with the notice requirement of Oklahoma’s Governmental Tort Claims Act (Act), see, 51 O.S. 2011 § 156, does not toll the running of the statute of limitations in his §1983 action.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s tolling rules unless those rules are inconsistent with federal law.

Young v. Sommers · filed 2020-07-24

West Virginia’s tolling rule is not inconsistent with federal law, and its state law tolling rule must be applied by this court. Applying the discovery rule shows that there is no basis under West Virginia law to toll the statute of limitations in this case.

A Section 1983 claim in California has a two-year limitations period, and statutory prison tolling and equitable tolling for mandatory administrative exhaustion run consecutively.

(PC) Johnson v. Frauenheim · filed 2020-08-20

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim has a two year statute of limitations. ... Whether the statutory tolling and equitable tolling should run consecutively or concurrently is a question that has not been firmly settled. ... Following the logic of Stevenson v. Holland, this Court concludes that the tolling periods apply consecutively.

A § 1983 action based on events in New Jersey is barred when filed after New Jersey's applicable two-year limitation period.

Squire v. John Rush, Warden, Hugo MacHinnie Deputy, Robert Movaney, Doctor Essex County Penitentiary · filed 1969-06-23

This appeal challenges a July 3, 1968, Memorandum and Order of the District Court granting defendants summary judgment in a civil rights action instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 1968 and claiming negligent and intentional failure to give medical treatment for syphilis, causing permanent bodily injuries, while plaintiff was confined in the Essex County (New Jersey) Penitentiary from September 3, 1959, to June 28, 1960. After a thorough consideration of the record, we have concluded that Judge Shaw correctly decided that this action is barred by the two-year limitation period prescribed in N.J.S. 2A:14-2, N.J.S.A. See Hughes v. Smith, 389 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1968).

Section 1983 claims arising in New Jersey are subject to the state’s two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Department · filed 1989-12-18

The statute of limitations for any Section 1983 claim is the state statute which limits actions for personal injuries. ... In light of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s construction of its own state’s statute, New Jersey’s six-year residual statute is not the residual personal injury statute to which the Owens holding must be applied; its two-year residual statute is. We hold that the district court correctly applied the two-year statute.

Section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to the state’s two-year residual personal injury limitations period.

Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Department · filed 1990-01-12

In light of the New Jersey Supreme Court's construction of its own state's statute, New Jersey's six-year residual statute is not the residual personal injury statute to which the Owens holding must be applied; its two-year residual statute is. We hold that the district court correctly applied the two-year statute.

Section 1983 claims use the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations, which is two years in New Jersey.

Lodato v. Township of Evesham · filed 1992-01-22

To ascertain the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the court looks to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. ... Personal injury actions in New Jersey must be brought within two years of accrual of the cause of action.

Section 1983 actions borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations when the federal civil-rights statutes provide none; this action therefore used Kentucky’s one-year slander limitation.

Hines v. Board of Ed. of Covington, Ky. · filed 1980-07-03

Since the Federal Civil Rights Acts fail to provide a statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to them, it has been held that the federal courts should apply the state statute of limitations which is most analogous to the civil rights action. ... This court believes and holds that in implementing the Sixth Circuit approach the two primary factors to be considered in attempting to analogize a federal civil rights claim to a state claim for the purpose of selecting an appropriate statute of limitations are the interest of plaintiff sought to be protected, and the operative facts comprising the claim. ... Under existing law, however, the case at bar, is analogous to the state cause of action for slander. Therefore, the court holds, pursuant to the controlling Sixth Circuit cases sited above, that it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided by KRS 413.140.

Section 1983 civil rights claims arising in Kentucky are subject to a one-year limitations period.

Stepp v. John W. Potter, Judge Laura K. Haller · filed 1989-01-03

The complaint was filed more than one year from the date of the alleged injuries, even allowing for the month's incarceration. This is beyond the one year period allowable in civil rights cases arising in Kentucky. McSurely v. Hutchison, 823 F.2d 1002, 1005 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1107 (1988).

Section 1983 claims filed in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Lufkin v. City of Paducah · filed 1989-10-26

Even if we construe the complaint as possibly asserting a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the statute of limitations is also one year.

Section 1983 actions filed in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Collard v. Kentucky Board Of Nursing · filed 1990-01-17

Accordingly, we conclude that section 1983 actions in Kentucky are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in section 413.140(1)(a).

Section 1983 actions in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Holbert v. West · filed 1990-02-02

Plaintiffs contention that Kentucky's five year "catch all" limitations period applies in § 1983 actions is without merit. The applicable statute of limitations is one year.

Section 1983 actions filed in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Vandiver v. Hardin County Board Of Education · filed 1991-02-12

Relying on Owens, the court in Collard concluded that "section 1983 actions in Kentucky are limited by the one year statute of limitations found in [Ky.Rev.Stat.] section 413.140(1)(a)." Since the Vandivers' suit was filed on April 5, 1989, the district court properly concluded that their due process attack on the defendants' decision in the fall of 1987 not to grant Brian eleventh grade status through the probationary placement option was time-barred.

Section 1983 actions arising in Kentucky are governed by the one-year limitations period in Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 413.140(1)(a).

Sparks v. Kentuckiana Football Officials Ass'n · filed 1991-04-04

The one year statute of limitations contained in Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 413.140(1)(a) is the limitations period that governs civil rights actions arising in Kentucky.

Section 1983 claims brought in Kentucky are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Ashcraft v. Layman Starks, Police Chief, Carrollton City Police Department Carroll County Fiscal Court Charlie · filed 1992-05-12

Further, the complaint is barred by Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims brought in Kentucky have a one-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.

Kerr v. Kaiser · filed 1992-10-23

In Kentucky, section 1983 claims are subject to Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.140(1)(a), the state's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Vandiver v. Hardin County Board of Education, 925 F.2d 927, 930 (6th Cir.1991). The limitations period commences when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury underlying the action.

For a § 1983 claim in Kentucky whose limitations period never began because of imprisonment tolling, the claimant was allowed one year from repeal of the tolling statute to file under the circumstances of this case.

Brown v. Wigginton · filed 1992-12-21

Without attempting to set forth a rule to guide all cases, our conclusion in this case is that plaintiff should have been given one year from the effective date of the repeal to file her complaint. We reach this result primarily because, on the facts here, the tolling statute did not interrupt the statute of limitations but rather kept it from ever starting. Since the statute had never started to run, we think it is reasonable to give the plaintiff the benefit of the full one year. We are also influenced in our decision by the fact that the Kentucky one-year statute is as short as is to be found as a limitations period for section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 civil rights claims brought in Kentucky are subject to Kentucky’s one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Wehner v. Lee · filed 1993-03-04

Although Wehner would like a longer limitations period applied, it is well-settled that Kentucky's one-year statute for bringing personal injury actions is applicable to civil rights claims brought in Kentucky.

In Kentucky, a § 1983 excessive force claim is subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Rogers v. Boone County U.S. Court New York City U.S. Government Mike Merrell, Deputy Edward Prindle, Captain John · filed 1993-03-15

Dismissal was also proper because this claim was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky have a one-year limitations period, and a plausible lack of notice that incarceration tolling was repealed can defeat a limitations dismissal at the pleading stage.

Shackleford v. Decker · filed 1993-03-24

A one year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Kentucky. ... As Shackleford's factual allegations must be accepted as true in reviewing a motion to dismiss, Meador, 902 F.2d at 475, we conclude that Shackleford's argument for equitable tolling is sufficient to defeat the defendants' motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky are subject to the state’s one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Taylor v. City of Louisville · filed 1993-03-31

Joseph Ernest Taylor, a pro se prisoner housed at the Indiana Reformatory in Pendleton, Indiana, moves for counsel on appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... The statute of limitations applicable to Taylor's claims is codified at Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.140(1)(a), which provides that an individual must initiate an action for personal injury within one (1) year after the cause of action accrues.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky are subject to a one-year limitations period, but a claim accruing before Kentucky repealed its incarceration tolling statute may be timely if filed within a reasonable time.

Collins v. Jailer John Bowling Acting Jailer Imojean Bowling · filed 1993-05-07

However, the court did not consider the applicability of Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.310 (repealed July 13, 1990). Prior to its repeal, § 413.310 tolled the limitations period during a plaintiff's incarceration. Since Collins's claim accrued before the tolling statute was repealed, the district court should have considered whether his complaint was filed within a reasonable time, even though it would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 1983 actions in Kentucky have a one-year limitations period, and claims accruing while Kentucky tolled that period during incarceration receive the benefit of the tolling rule.

Newton v. William C. Seabold Joe Stuart Evelyn Green Lana J. Conger Jane Doe, Member Adjustment Committee Jack Re · filed 1993-05-07

Although Kentucky has a one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions, Collard v. Kentucky Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir.1990), at the time Newton's claims accrued, Kentucky law provided that the one-year statute of limitations would be tolled during an individual's incarceration.

Section 1983 actions in Kentucky are subject to the state's one-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Martin v. Wigginton · filed 1993-07-06

In § 1983 actions, the appropriate statute of limitations is the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985). In Kentucky, personal injury actions must be commenced within one year after the date of accrual, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 413.140(1)(a) (Michie 1992), and this one year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions. Collard v. Kentucky Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir.1990).

Section 1983 actions filed in Kentucky have a one-year limitations period under the state’s general personal injury statute.

Hambrick v. Davies · filed 1989-04-26

Therefore, the court holds that the applicable limitations period for § 1983 actions filed in Kentucky continues to be one year, even after the decision in Owens, supra.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky are subject to Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Ndefru v. Eastern Kentucky University · filed 1991-09-26

Kentucky's one year statute of limitations contained in Ky.Rev.Stat. § 413.140(1)(a) applies to civil rights actions that arise out of Kentucky.

Section 1983 borrows the state's personal-injury limitations period, which in Kentucky is one year from accrual.

Bass v. NKC, Inc. · filed 1985-12-16

Thus, the applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is the state’s statute for personal injury actions. In Kentucky personal injury actions must be brought within one year of their accrual.

A Section 1983 claim governed by Kentucky’s one-year personal injury limitations period cannot be dismissed as untimely on summary judgment when the evidence does not establish that the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged injury more than a year before filing.

Hardin v. Irvin H. Roberts, Jr. · filed 1988-07-15

The parties are in agreement that the one-year personal injury limitations period contained in KRS 413.140(1)(a) applies to this section 1983 action by virtue of the rule announced in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The parties further agree that the "time of discovery" rule articulated in Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky.1971) governs the question of when Hardin's cause of action accrued. Our sole inquiry is whether the district court erred in concluding via summary judgment that Hardin either discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, his alleged injury prior to December 4, 1985. ... Under this standard, the district court erred in concluding that Hardin's action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky have a one year limitations period, which imprisonment does not toll.

James v. Parke · filed 1989-01-03

Section 1983 claims arising in Kentucky are subject to a one year statute of limitations. McSurely v. Hutchison, 823 F.2d 1002, 1005 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1107 (1988). The records before us reflect all plaintiffs caused their complaints to be filed beyond this one year period from the date the alleged injuries occurred. The district courts were correct in holding, as we have previously held, that the holding of Higley negates plaintiffs' contentions that their respective imprisonments operated to toll the running of the limitations period.

A § 1983 claim that arose outside prison before incarceration is not excluded from Kentucky’s prison-confinement tolling rule.

Bell v. Ronald Cooper and Louisville Police Department · filed 1989-07-27

We had concluded after oral argument in this case that we would reverse because Higley did not apply to a situation in which the § 1983 action arose outside the prison context and prior to incarceration.

Kentucky’s statute tolling limitations during incarceration applies to a prisoner’s Section 1983 claim.

Long v. Bill Jenkins, Trooper Kentucky State Police Morris Kissabough Fred Browning, Jailer · filed 1989-08-11

Therefore, although plaintiff's alleged medical disability is not an adequate basis in this case to warrant equitable tolling of the one year statute of limitations, his incarceration alone brings into effect Kentucky's statute which tolls the limitations period for prisoners.

Kentucky's tolling statute can extend the limitations period for a Section 1983 suit brought by an incarcerated plaintiff.

Hambrick v. Brian Davies, Col. Tom Swartz Johnny Johnson Dave Tillett Jack Prindle Bruce Grahm Mike Howard · filed 1989-10-02

However, the portion of the judgment holding that the Kentucky tolling statute did not apply to Hambrick's Sec. 1983 suit must be vacated and the case remanded for consideration of Hambrick's remaining claims. ... In light of Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1988 (1989), Hambrick's suit, which accrued on the date of his arrest, was not untimely; thus, the district court's decision in that respect based on Higley, supra, must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Hardin.

Section 1983 claims in Kentucky have a one-year limitations period under state law, while federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Leonard v. Corrections Cabinet · filed 1992-04-03

The applicable statute of limitations period in Kentucky for a federal civil rights claim is one year. ... While state law governs the substantive limitation period, federal law governs when the cause of action accrues, and thus when the statute begins to run.

A Section 1983 action uses the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period, which in Kentucky was one year.

Clark v. Alma Clark, Louise Johnson, Betty Couble, Linda Thomas, Virgil Mullins, Unidentified and Unnamed, George · filed 1986-12-12

According to Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1938 (1985), the statute of limitations for an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is determined by the statute of limitations for personal injury in the state wherein the acts complained of occurred. In Kentucky, the statute of limitations for personal injury is one year.

Nebraska’s four-year general personal-injury limitations period applies to all § 1983 actions filed in the District of Nebraska.

Epp v. Gunter · filed 1988-02-03

However, as the term is understood in light of the federal interests at stake and the need for uniformity, I am convinced that the district of Nebraska should retain its adoption of the four-year personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims filed in Tennessee are governed by Tennessee’s one-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, and judges are absolutely immune from Section 1983 claims for judicial acts within their jurisdiction.

Irvin v. Harry S. Lester, Judge, Tenth Judicial Circuit Court and His Employer · filed 1986-08-14

First, the applicable statute of limitations for this 42 U.S.C. S1983 is enunciated in Tennessee Code Annotated Sec. 28-3-104. The statute of limitations is stated as one (1) year after the cause of action has accrued. ... Second, the district court correctly decided that actions of a judicial officer in a judicial proceeding over which he has jurisdiction is absolutely immune from attack under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3351 (1985); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

Section 1983 claims for personal injuries are subject to Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations when the plaintiff pleads an injury to his person.

Erwin v. Neal · filed 1974-05-10

But the Tennessee statute of limitations expressly applies “for injuries to person”. In our opinion plaintiff has pleaded an injury to his person. ... In our opinion plaintiff could have asserted his cause of action on May 28, 1969. Hodge v. Service Machine Co., 438 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1971). Plaintiff did not file the present suit until June 16, 1970. ... The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the applicable Tennessee one-year statute of limitations.

John T. WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1980-08-11

Construed liberally, the complaint stated a claim for constitutional violations under Section 1983 only. The panel decision correctly held that this claim was barred by the applicable Tennessee one year statute of limitations.

Tennessee § 1983 actions are governed by the state's one-year limitations period.

Eddie D. Grays v. Governor Lamar Alexander Eugene Barksdale, Sheriff William Hughes, Superintendent and Arbor, Record Cl · filed 1986-01-21

It is well settled that the one year time period contained in T.C.A. Sec. 28-3-104 is applicable to $1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims brought in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Hobbs v. Stanley A. Speal Joseph H. Johnson, Jr. Mental Health Center, Incorporated Rosalie Shields Robert · filed 1988-11-15

Plaintiff's suit was filed well beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations. See Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104(a).

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee are subject to the one-year limitations period in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104.

Brown v. Kim Miller Fred Houston, Charles Sivley, Charles Ezell, Mike Carraher, Police Officers, City of Chattano · filed 1989-02-09

For the purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, state statutes of limitations apply to determine the timeliness of the claims asserted under the Act. ... The one year statute of limitations period contained in Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104 applies to civil rights claims arising in Tennessee.

Section 1983 civil rights claims filed in Tennessee are subject to the one-year limitations period in Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104(a).

GRISSON v. HENDERSON COUNTY · filed 1989-02-28

Mitchell Andrew Grissom and Eddie Bryan Woods appeal the summary judgments for defendants in these civil rights actions filed under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 with pendent state claims. ... Plaintiffs' civil rights claims must be filed within the one-year period provided in Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104(a).

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee are subject to a one-year statute of limitations under Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104.

Al-Muhaymin v. Young · filed 1989-03-24

The appropriate statute of limitations for this action is the one year limitation period established by Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104.

Section 1983 claims can be dismissed as time-barred under the applicable Tennessee statute of limitations.

Parmes v. Conrad · filed 1990-05-21

Irma D. Parmes, a pro se Tennessee litigant, appeals the district court's order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to her claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Upon consideration, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants because plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. See Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104; Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir.1986).

A § 1983 claim for withheld interest is time-barred under Tennessee’s one-year limitations period when reasonable diligence would have revealed the injury more than a year before suit.

Warren v. Scott · filed 1992-09-04

We think, however, that when the plaintiff received his share of the funds in January of 1989 — at a time when he was represented by counsel — he should have discovered the fact of his alleged injury by the exercise of reasonable diligence. ... Therefore, we affirm the court’s holding that the statute of limitations bars any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A § 1983 action brought in Tennessee is subject to a one-year limitations period and is time-barred if filed after that period expires.

Christians v. Greer · filed 1993-01-25

Christians's action was filed well beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations. See Tenn.Code.Ann. § 28-3-104. The last date mentioned in her complaint regarding any of the defendants' conduct is June 23, 1988. Christians did not file her § 1983 complaint until May 24, 1991. Her suit is time-barred, as it was not filed until nearly three years after her cause of action accrued.

Section 1983 actions in Tennessee are subject to the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

King v. Emery · filed 1989-03-28

The Sixth Circuit has consistently applied the Tennessee one-year statute of limitations for personal injury in Sec. 1983 actions subsequent to the decision in Wilson v. Garcia.

Section 1983 actions in Tennessee use the state’s general personal injury statute of limitations.

Butts v. Dutton · filed 1989-07-06

The Tennessee general statute of limitations governing personal injury actions is applicable to this Sec. 1983 action.

A § 1983 action arising in Tennessee is governed by the state’s one-year personal-injury limitations period, and incarceration does not toll that period.

Morgan v. Harry Cureton, Sheriff of Campbell County · filed 1986-10-16

A section 1983 action is analogous to an action for personal injury, and in the state of Tennessee, must be brought within one year of the injury's occurrence. ... Furthermore, contrary to appellant's argument of good cause for delay, incarceration does not save the statutory bar under Tennessee state law.

Tennessee Section 1983 claims are treated as personal-injury actions subject to a one-year limitations period, and imprisonment does not toll that period under state law.

Hughley v. Roberts · filed 1986-01-24

Section 28-3-104, Tennessee Code Annotated requires that personal injury actions be filed within a year of their occurrence. ... The disability of imprisonment does not save the statutory bar under Tennessee state law.

A Tennessee Claims Commission filing may toll the limitations period for a § 1983 claim or bring Tennessee’s saving statute into play.

Crawford v. Gary Livesay, Warden · filed 1988-03-17

On July 13, 1987, plaintiff, a Tennessee prisoner, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in the district court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. ... Upon review, we conclude that additional facts are present in this appeal which could potentially prevent the running of the statute of limitations and thereby render plaintiff's filing of his complaint timely. In particular, it is clear to the panel that plaintiff has also sought to recover for his injuries by filing a claim before the Tennessee Claims Commission. Under the proper circumstances such an action will toll the running of the statute of limitations under Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 9-8-402(b) or implicate the operation of Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-1-105, the Tennessee saving statute.

The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim is tolled while the Tennessee Claims Commission determines whether a parallel state filing waived the claim against state employees.

White ex rel. Swafford v. Gerbitz · filed 1988-10-20

Accordingly, inherent in our holding is that the statute of limitations on plaintiff’s federal cause of action is tolled in the interim.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period, which is not equitably tolled by a third party’s denial of access to the courts.

Jennings v. Davis · filed 1989-02-28

Upon consideration, we conclude that the running of the limitations period was not equitably tolled because the alleged wrongful conduct, Jennings' denial of access to the courts was committed by a third party rather than by the defendants. ... The instant suit is governed by a one-year statute of limitations period.

Section 1983 claims filed in Tennessee are subject to a one-year limitations period under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a), and federal law determines when the claim accrues.

Allen v. Kemp · filed 1989-05-25

In Tennessee, the one year statute of limitations contained in Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104(a) applies to civil rights actions. See Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir.1986); Harrison v. Wright, 457 F.2d 793 (6th Cir.1972) (per curiam). Federal law determines when the cause of action accrues.

A plaintiff who files the same claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission waives a § 1983 claim against state employees unless the commission finds their acts outside the scope of employment; the federal limitations period is tolled while the state claim proceeds.

White v. Gerbitz · filed 1988-10-20

Faced with a fact situation substantially similar to that in Leaman and in view of a nearly identical waiver statute, we find the plaintiff waived his federal cause of action when he subsequently filed a similar claim before the Tennessee Claims Commission. ... If the claims commission concluded that the defendants' acts were outside the scope of their employment, the plaintiff would be free to pursue a cause of action in federal court as no waiver would have occurred. ... Accordingly, inherent in our holding is that the statute of limitations on plaintiff's federal cause of action is tolled in the interim.

Section 1983 claims arising in Tennessee have a one-year limitations period and accrue under federal law when the plaintiff knows or should discover through reasonable diligence the injury underlying the claim.

Firsttrust Money Services, Inc. v. McReynolds · filed 1993-12-16

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred. ... The one-year statute of limitations period contained in Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 28-3-104(a) is traditionally the limitations period applied to civil rights claims which arise from Tennessee. ... In Sec. 1983 actions, federal law governs when a cause of action accrues. Collard v. Kentucky Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir.1990). This court has held that a cause of action accrues when "the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action. A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have discovered it through reasonable diligence." Sevier, 742 F.2d at 273.

Because § 1983 provides no limitations period, courts borrow the most analogous state limitations period; Hawaii’s one-year limitation for penalties and newly imposed liabilities does not apply to this § 1983 action.

Sotomura v. County of Hawaii · filed 1975-09-19

Since the federal statutes provide no statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions, the federal courts have adopted the statute of limitations of the state where the action arose, and have used a “resemblance test” to determine which specific state statute of limitations should be applied. ... This court therefore finds that the one year limitation of Section 657-11 should not be applied to this Section 1983 action.

Section 1983 creates a new statutory liability, so Hawaii’s limitations period for liabilities created by statute is the appropriate limitations period for § 1983 actions.

Bill's Crane Service, Inc. v. Quisenberry · filed 1982-08-10

As noted above, a § 1983 action is most accurately characterized as an action created by statute. Further, the section imposes a “new” liability in the sense that it creates a cause of action which did not exist at common law. Thus, although Haw. Rev.Stat. § 657-11 does not mention the possibility of declaratory or injunctive relief, it is the most appropriate statute of limitations to apply.

Section 1983 actions arising in Hawaii were governed by the state’s six-year catch-all limitations period.

Clifford Y.C. Lai and Victoria L. Lai v. City and County of Honolulu, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1984-12-14

Accordingly, we conclude that the applicable limitations statute for section 1983 actions arising in Hawaii is H.R.S. § 657-1(4).

Section 1983 actions in Hawaii are governed by the two-year statute of limitations in HRS § 657-7.

Pele Defense Fund v. Paty · filed 1992-09-28

We hold that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in HRS § 657-7 governs § 1983 actions, ... rather than the six-year statute of limitations set forth in HRS § 657-1 (4).

Section 1983 creates a statutory liability, so Nevada's three-year limitations period for such liabilities applies to § 1983 actions brought in federal court in Nevada.

Mason v. Schaub · filed 1977-11-08

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a statutory liability, we hold that the three year limitation of action provided under N.R.S. 11.190(3)(a) is applicable to actions brought in the federal courts in Nevada under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 actions in Nevada are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

Matylinsky v. Janet Wolder Harold G. Albright Edward J. Hill · filed 1992-10-01

In Nevada, the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 actions is two years.

Section 1983 claims arising in Nevada are subject to the two-year residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Connor v. Angelone · filed 1993-06-02

There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. ... In Nevada, where this case arises, the applicable statute of limitations is the residual statute for personal injury actions, Nev.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 11.190(4)(e). It provides for a two-year limitation.

Section 1983 actions in Nevada are subject to the state's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Reed v. Angelone · filed 1993-06-08

Nevada's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims arising in Nevada are subject to the two-year limitations period in Nevada’s residual statute for personal injury actions.

Perez v. Seevers · filed 1989-03-08

That section, being the residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 cases in Nevada.

Section 1983 actions arising in Nevada are subject to Nevada’s residual two-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Neal v. Sumner · filed 1989-12-06

Nevada's residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e), applies to § 1983 actions arising in Nevada.

Section 1983 claims use the limitations period of the state where they arise; in Nevada, the residual personal injury limitations period is two years.

Faile v. Geary · filed 1992-03-17

Federal courts apply the statute of limitations of the state in which the claim arises for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. ... In Nevada, the residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is Nev.Rev.Stat. § 11.190(4)(e), which provides for a limitations period of two years from the date the cause of action accrues.

Section 1983 claims against public officials in Missouri are governed by a three-year statute of limitations for official acts and are not barred for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies.

Green v. Ten Eyck · filed 1978-03-07

Accordingly, the trial court erred in not applying the three-year limitation period to the plaintiffs’ claim. ... Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ action under § 1983 is not barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.