42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 permits a damages claim for violations of the IDEA because the IDEA does not foreclose that remedy.

M.H. Ex Rel. H. v. Bristol Board of Education · filed 2001-08-29

The court concludes that the plaintiff may bring a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the defendants’ alleged violations of the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for IDEA-created rights because the IDEA's remedial scheme precludes such a claim.

Aj Ex Rel. Clj v. Board of Educ. · filed 2010-01-08

The Supreme Court has recently clarified that when a statute provides for a private cause of action, courts should ordinarily infer that Congress intended to preclude an action under § 1983. ... Plaintiffs have failed to make this showing. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for IDEA violations when the plaintiff is not seeking an injunction to enforce a favorable administrative ruling.

DB Ex Rel. HB v. GLOUCESTER TP. SCHOOL DIST. · filed 2010-11-17

This Court will not expand the limited exception of A.W. Because Plaintiff is not seeking an injunction to enforce a favorable ruling by an administrative court, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for IDEA violations when the requested injunction does not enforce a favorable administrative ruling.

D.B. & L.B. v. Gloucester Township School District · filed 2010-11-17

This Court will not expand the limited exception of AW. Because Plaintiff is not seeking an injunction to enforce a favorable ruling by an administrative court, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Claim for Relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to recover for violations of the IDEA.

Singletary v. Department of Health & Human Services · filed 2012-03-01

However, suits pursuant to section 1983 are not permitted for recovery of violations of the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy when the claim is functionally an IDEA procedural claim; relief is limited to IDEA remedies.

C.O. v. Portland Public Schools · filed 2012-05-14

In this context, whether Oman may bring a claim under section 1983 turns on whether the gravamen of her claim for relief is under the IDEA. If it is, she is limited to the remedies available under the IDEA.

Section 1983 permits a claim for violations of the IDEA.

J.P.M. v. Palm Beach County School Board · filed 2012-07-09

The School Board’s argument that a § 1983 claim may not be brought for violations of the IDEA is rejected.

A § 1983 claim for IDEA damages requires an IDEA violation, persistently egregious circumstances, a District custom or practice, and inadequate ordinary IDEA remedies.

T.M. v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-08-21

Even assuming plaintiffs can meet the first two parts-(1) DCPS violated the IDEA and (2) special circumstances caused the violations to be persistently egregious-they have not alleged any facts to support the third and fourth parts: (3) the violations were in keeping with a District custom or practice and (4) normal IDEA remedies, such as compensatory education, are inadequate to remedy the harm.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights conferred by the IDEA because the IDEA provides the sole remedy for those statutory violations.

K.A. Ex Rel. F.A. v. Fulton County School District · filed 2013-12-20

We join the First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, and hold that section 1983 actions for denial of rights conferred by the IDEA are barred because the IDEA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme ... provides the sole remedy for statutory violations.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against the California Department of Education for alleged IDEA violations.

G.M. Ex Rel. Marchese v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District · filed 2014-12-24

G. M.’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the California Department of Education for alleged IDEA violations is barred by Blanchard v. Morton School District, 509 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1983 IDEA damages claims require proof of the IDEA violation, exceptional circumstances, a moving force custom or practice, and inadequate IDEA remedies.

J.P.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Palm Beach County School Board · filed 2013-01-30

Where damages are available under § 1983, courts have typically required plaintiffs to show that: (1) the school district violated the IDEA; (2) exceptional circumstances exist such that the district’s conduct that caused the IDEA violation was persistently egregious and prevented or frustrated the plaintiff from securing equitable relief under the IDEA; (3) the district has a custom or practice that is the moving force behind the alleged IDEA violations; and (4) normal remedies offered under the IDEA, including compensatory education, are inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for the harm he or she allegedly suffered. ... There being no evidence whatsoever to support a § 1983 IDEA claim, summary judgment is appropriate as to Count IV.

Section 1983 does not provide money damages for IDEA violations when the plaintiff received IDEA administrative review.

Avaras v. Clarkstown Central School District · filed 2019-05-20

Plaintiff does not claim that she was denied access to the administrative review process. Nor does she point to authoritative case law that challenges the binding authority of the Second Circuit, precluding Plaintiffs from getting money damages for IDEA violations where they were afforded the administrative review process.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for IDEA violations alone when the plaintiff alleges no constitutional violation.

Day v. Cedar Rapids Community School District · filed 2020-05-05

As such, her § 1983 claim is dismissed as a matter of law. See A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools, 486 F.3d 791, 802-06 (3d Cir. 2007) (concluding Congress did not intend § 1983 to be available to remedy violations of the IDEA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).

Section 1983 cannot be used to remedy IDEA violations.

Donahue v. Kansas Board of Education · filed 2020-09-14

To the extent Ms. Donahue was seeking relief under § 1983 for IDEA violations, the district court correctly determined that “§ 1983 is not a proper avenue for IDEA violations.”

Section 1983 permits a claim for an IDEA violation when the plaintiff pleads a specific IDEA violation, persistently egregious conduct that frustrates equitable relief, a municipal custom or practice causing the violation, and inadequate IDEA remedies.

B.D. v. District of Columbia · filed 2020-09-28

Indeed, to state a claim under § 1983 for an IDEA violation under this heightened standard, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to establish: (1) “DCPS violated one or more specific provisions of the IDEA”; (2) “exceptional circumstances exist, such that the conduct of DCPS that caused the IDEA violations was persistently egregious and prevented or frustrated [plaintiffs] from securing equitable relief under the IDEA”; (3) “the District of Columbia has a custom or practice that is the moving force behind the alleged IDEA violations”; and (4) “the normal remedies offered under the IDEA . . . are inadequate to compensate” for the alleged harms.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for a violation of constitutional rights even without proof of actual damages.

King v. MacRi · filed 1992-08-11

Indeed, “punitive damages may, in an appropriate case, be awarded for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even in the absence of actual damages.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages without compensatory damages only if the jury first finds a constitutional violation by the defendant against whom punitive damages are imposed.

Peden v. Suwannee County School Board · filed 1993-11-18

The real proposition for which the above cited cases stand could be summarized as follows: in a section 1983 action, a jury may properly awarded punitive damages even though it awards no compensatory damages, but only where the jury first finds that a constitutional violation was committed by the party against whom the punitives are imposed.

A state employee may bring a Section 1983 claim against her supervisors; the employment relationship alone does not bar the claim.

L.W. v. Dee Grubbs, Thomas Nelson Marlin Hutton Richard Hill James Nanson · filed 1992-09-03

Under Collins, we cannot dismiss L.W.’s claim against Defendants merely because she was an employee supervised by them.

The State of New York is not a person subject to a damages suit under Section 1983.

Nicholson v. State · filed 2008-12-15

With respect to the claimants’ cause of action alleging that defendant violated Antwone’s civil rights, it is well-settled that no cause of action for damages against the State of New York exists for an alleged violation of an individual’s rights under the United States Constitution since the State is not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 {see Matter of Gable Transp., Inc. v State of New York, 29 AD3d 1125 [3d Dept 2006]; Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 498 [2d Dept 2001]; Zagarella v State of New York, 149 AD2d 503 [2d Dept 1989]; Davis v State of New York, 124 AD2d 420, 423 [3d Dept 1986]).

A state employee is not exempt from suit as a person under § 1983 merely because the employee acted with state authority.

Montin v. Y. Moore · filed 2017-01-19

Defendant Mario Scalora asserts he is not a “person” who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he is a state employee. ... Therefore this argument has no merit.

A bail forfeiture can estop a plaintiff from pursuing false arrest and malicious prosecution claims under § 1983.

Davis v. O'DOnnell · filed 1992-09-24

In light of his bail forfeiture, Davis is now estopped from pursuing his claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for deprivation of rights, but a claim may be barred by collateral estoppel when the issue was resolved in prior administrative proceedings.

Decintio v. Westchester County Medical Center County of Westchester, Defendants · filed 1987-06-08

We hold that DeCintio is precluded from relitigating the retaliatory discrimination issue in a federal action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Collateral estoppel can bar § 1983 claims when the plaintiff unsuccessfully raised the underlying issues in a state criminal appeal.

Ventimiglia v. St. Louis County · filed 2004-06-17

We agree with the district court that all of Ventimiglia’s claims -- other than his claim against Officer Angela Candler -- are barred by collateral estoppel because he unsuccessfully raised the issues underlying these claims during his state criminal appeal.

Section 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims can be barred by collateral estoppel based on a preliminary hearing.

Smith v. Buttry · filed 2004-09-07

Although the trial court declined to rule on the collateral estoppel effect of the preliminary hearing, that hearing is a binding collateral estoppel to Appellant’s claims of false arrest and false imprisonment.

Equitable estoppel can bar a limitations defense to a Section 1983 claim when police misrepresentations and stonewalling dissuade a plaintiff from filing, even if the plaintiff believes she has a claim.

ESTATE OF AMARO v. City of Oakland · filed 2011-07-28

Therefore, we answer the district court’s certified ques- tion in the affirmative: the doctrine of equitable estoppel does apply where a plaintiff believes she has a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim but is dissuaded from bringing the claim by affirmative misrepresentations and stonewalling by the police.

A § 1983 claim may be barred by collateral estoppel when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior state criminal proceeding.

Conley v. Whitener · filed 1985-09-27

Applying this test to the facts of the present case, the Court concludes that plaintiff is barred from litigating in this § 1983 action the claim against defendant McCune, and the claims of false arrest and beatings incident to the confession against defendants Whitener and Askew.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the same issue in earlier state proceedings.

Simpson v. Rowan · filed 2005-02-28

We agree with the district court that he is estopped from litigating the same issue in a § 1983 lawsuit.

A § 1983 claim may be barred by collateral estoppel when the same issue was decided in a prior action and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it.

Shell v. Brun · filed 2005-03-31

It is well-settled that collateral estoppel may bar a plaintiff from bringing an action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Federal equitable estoppel principles govern whether a defendant may assert a statute of limitations defense to a Section 1983 claim.

Vistamar, Inc. v. Fagundo-Fagundo · filed 2005-12-02

In § 1983 claims, federal equitable estoppel principles apply.

In a § 1983 action, state administrative findings do not preclude relitigation when the findings are not final or the agency’s final order did not decide an identical issue.

Goodwin v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois and Randy Kornegay and Kip Mecum, in Their Individ · filed 2006-03-31

Although the issue of whether the evidence “supported and sustained the charges of the Employer” is similar to the issues addressed in the McDonnell Douglas pretext argument and the hearing officer’s findings of fact, they are not identical, as required for collateral estoppel to apply. Therefore, collateral estoppel stemming from either stage of the Merit Board proceedings is inappropriate, and Goodwin’s argument fails.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when a state court has finally decided the same issues.

Gately v. Warden · filed 1997-02-18

The doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied to section 1983 actions, ... and courts generally have held that an issue decided in a state court habeas proceeding may have preclusive effect when the identical issue is later raised in an action for civil damages. ... The court finds that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from raising the issues alleged in his complaint in the present forum.

In § 1983 cases, state collateral estoppel law governs, and an administrative decision does not preclude issues addressed only in dicta.

Thampi v. Collier County Board of Commissioners · filed 2007-03-05

In § 1983 cases, the court applies the state’s law of collateral estoppel. ... Since the First Amendment discussion by the hearing officer was essentially dicta, the Court cannot find that the issues sought to be estopped are identical to necessary and material issues involved in the administrative hearing. Therefore, the Court will not give the administrative hearing decision preclusive effect, and Summary Judgment on this basis is denied.

A prior state suppression ruling does not collaterally estop a § 1983 search-and-seizure damages claim when federal habeas review is unavailable.

McCurry v. Marvin Allen, Steven Jacobsmeyer, and Unknown Police Officers, St. Louis Police Department, St. Louis, · filed 1979-10-01

When appellant filed his § 1983 action seeking damages for the violation of his civil rights, the search and seizure aspect of his claim was, as we acknowledge, essentially the same claim that was litigated at the suppression hearing. Unlike the district court, however, we do not believe that this requires the conclusion that appellant’s § 1983 claim is barred by collateral estoppel.

Section 1983 claims are subject to collateral estoppel when state law would preclude relitigation of an issue fully and fairly decided in state court.

Rev. Vincent LaRocca v. Gold · filed 1981-10-14

Its requirement has been interpreted to apply to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978). ... Thus we must conclude that the decision of this issue by the New York courts in Lane precludes LaRocca from relitigating it here.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when the same issue was litigated to final judgment in a prior state proceeding.

Kelly v. Warminster Township Board of Supervisors · filed 1981-03-18

The federal action amounts to no more than a rephrasing of the challenge made in the first action that there was a denial of due process because the body which fired him was administratively investigator, prosecutor and judge. This issue was litigated to final judgment in the state court, and now is precluded by collateral estoppel.

A Section 1983 plaintiff may be barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating an issue decided against him in an earlier criminal case.

Chanley v. Gillis · filed 2012-01-12

We review de novo the district court’s application of collateral estoppel to dismiss Chanley’s section 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim. ... Because the district court in the criminal case already rejected Chanley’s arguments regarding the warrant, Chanley is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue here.

Collateral estoppel is available in Section 1983 actions, but requires that the prior case actually decided the same issue.

Williams v. Henderson · filed 2015-09-25

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is available in actions under § 1983.

A plaintiff seeking to overcome a limitations defense to a § 1983 claim through equitable estoppel must show actual and reasonable reliance on the defendant’s conduct.

Franklin v. Warmington · filed 2017-09-21

Our case law has been consistent: applying equitable estoppel requires that a plaintiffs reliance on a defendant’s conduct be “both actual and reasonable.”

Section 1983 claims may be barred by collateral estoppel when an essential issue was litigated and decided in a prior state proceeding.

Rogers v. Morgan · filed 2019-04-02

Generally, collateral estoppel applies to Section 1983 claims previously decided in state court proceedings.

A Section 1983 plaintiff may be barred from relitigating a Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim lost at a criminal suppression hearing.

Halliburton v. Hockaday · filed 2019-05-28

A section 1983 plaintiff can be collaterally estopped from relitigating a Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claim that he lost at a criminal suppression hearing.

Federal equitable estoppel law governs Section 1983 claims even when the limitations period is borrowed from state law.

Appel v. LaSalle County State's Attorney Felony Enforcement Unit · filed 2019-09-04

Thus, federal law on equitable estoppel applies to Plaintiffs’ federal claims, including Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims.

A prior criminal proceeding may preclude relitigation of an issue in a Section 1983 suit when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it.

Picatti v. Miner · filed 2019-09-10

Accordingly, a prior criminal proceeding may bar a plaintiff from relitigating the same issue in a subsequent civil action, including suits brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

Collateral estoppel generally applies in § 1983 actions when a state criminal trial has decided the same issue against the plaintiff.

Smith v. Marchewka · filed 1981-08-13

It seems to be the situation here that the unlawful search and seizure relied upon by the plaintiff has been decided in the State courts and there can be no § 1983 action in the federal court based on that same issue.

Collateral estoppel can bar a Section 1983 claim when the issue was fully and fairly litigated in an earlier proceeding.

Arroyo v. The Department of Education of The City of New York · filed 2020-08-06

Collateral estoppel applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Arroyo’s due process claims are barred by collateral estoppel based on the § 3020-a hearing and the Article 75 proceeding in state court.

Section 1983 does not give a plaintiff a right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil rights action.

Mosby v. R. Anthony, Sgt. · filed 1992-10-29

Mosby had no constitutional or statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in this § 1983 case.

A section 1983 proceeding carries no right to effective assistance of counsel.

Harris v. Krupp · filed 1997-03-31

Because there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in a section 1983 proceeding, see Cole v. Nebraska State Bd. of Parole, 997 F.2d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 1993), and because Harris did not move to amend his complaint, we find Harris's remaining arguments meritless.

A plaintiff in a Section 1983 civil-rights action cannot obtain relief based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Annan-Yartey v. Kona · filed 2002-03-18

Because Annan-Yartey was proceeding in a civil-rights action, we reject his contention regarding his trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.

Section 1983 is not a vehicle for asserting ineffective assistance of counsel claims; those claims belong in a habeas petition after exhaustion of state remedies.

Stoudemire v. Robertson · filed 2019-08-15

But as the Magistrate Judge already noted in the Report, even if Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are liberally construed as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this § 1983 action is not the proper vehicle for asserting them. ... Such claims are properly brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus after exhaustion of state remedies, and Plaintiff does not indicate he has availed himself of the available state appellate process.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel; that claim must be pursued through direct appeal, post-conviction, or habeas proceedings.

Christensen v. Nguyen · filed 2020-10-19

Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are not recognized under § 1983, despite the statute’s “literal applicability” to the Sixth Amendment, because specific appellate and habeas statutes apply.

A New York Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear a civil rights action brought under § 1983.

Huzar v. State · filed 1992-11-05

The first cause of action, to the extent that it can be read as stating any cause of action, duplicates the third, and this court does not have jurisdiction to hear the fourth cause of action which is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983.

Ohio courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims against state employees even when the plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

Martin v. Roeder · filed 1992-11-30

“As plaintiffs action centers on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for monetary damages against a state employee or officer, the Ohio Court of Claims has exclusive and original subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.” We disagree with the trial court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action. ... Therefore, the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the within matter.

State district courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims under § 1983.

Charchenko v. City of Stillwater · filed 1993-04-21

It is well settled that state district courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims arising under § 1983.

Section 1983 tax claims can fall within a state tax court's subject matter jurisdiction.

Bielski v. Zorn · filed 1994-01-20

The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Landowners 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in Delaware Family Court when the underlying federal question arises in a case already within that court’s jurisdiction.

Morgan v. Powell · filed 1994-09-20

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violations of rights conferred by the United States Constitution and by federal statutes. Family Court may hear a § 1983 claim, as long as the underlying federal question arises in a case over which the Court already has jurisdiction.

Section 1983 claims asserting federal constitutional rights may be heard in Ohio common pleas courts without first being filed in the Court of Claims.

Kellon v. Cleveland Marshall College of Law · filed 1995-05-01

However, the Conley court went on to hold that R.C. 2743.02 does not apply to claims brought under federal law, and that Ohio common pleas courts have jurisdiction to hear federal claims brought pursuant to Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code: ... Since this court must accept all the allegations of the appellant’s complaint as true, and further must bear in mind that the Civil Rules require only notice pleading, York, supra, and since the appellant’s complaint raises federal constitutional claims, it must be concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the federal claims set forth in the complaint.

Ohio courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims against state officers or employees in their official capacities.

Turner v. Alexander · filed 1995-12-21

Finally, it is well settled that the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction to hear claims brought under Section 1983 against state officers or employees in their official capacities.

State courts may hear Section 1983 claims, allowing a prior state judgment to preclude a later federal Section 1983 action.

Antonio Grey and Martain Thompkins v. Keith Morris, Ed Ketzler, Mark Temnyk, and Pat Mitchell · filed 1996-08-29

Because state courts may hear constitutional claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988) (federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 actions), the district court properly determined that res judicata bars the plaintiffs from pursuing their subsequent federal action.

Section 1983 claims may be pursued in state court because federal jurisdiction over them is not exclusive.

Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, Inc. v. Splinter · filed 1996-11-01

Applying these four factors,, it is well settled that jurisdiction for claims brought under section 1983 is not exclusive in federal court, since such claims may be pursued in state court.

State courts may hear § 1983 claims and provide relief equivalent to that available in federal court.

Kerns v. Dukes · filed 1998-03-27

The jurisdiction of the courts of Delaware encompasses the Property Owners’ § 1983 claims as brought, and such courts may provide relief equivalent to that available in federal court, should the claims be sustained.

Section 1983 claims may be brought in state court because federal jurisdiction over them is concurrent.

Home Builders Ass'n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison · filed 1998-07-01

Federal jurisdiction over § 1983 actions is concurrent, not exclusive. State actions may be brought under § 1983.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983 actions.

Bauers v. City of Lincoln · filed 1998-11-20

The trial court was a proper forum for the plaintiffs to present their constitutional claims regarding their pensions, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the states have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to entertain such actions.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

Kristensen v. Strinden · filed 1983-12-21

We therefore conclude that our State courts are vested with concurrent jurisdiction to entertain suits brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not confer jurisdiction on Tennessee chancery courts to enjoin threatened criminal prosecutions; their jurisdiction remains governed by state law.

Tennessee Downs, Inc. v. Gibbons · filed 1999-07-30

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not bestow jurisdiction in Tennessee courts of equity to enjoin threatened criminal proceedings and that the jurisdiction of chancery courts in this regard remains as fixed by existing state law.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under § 1983.

Sutton v. Sutton · filed 1999-10-13

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An action under § 1983 may be heard in Connecticut Superior Court.

Phoebe G. v. Solnit · filed 1999-12-22

Of course, the Superior Court has jurisdiction to entertain an action alleging the violation of the plaintiffs state constitutional rights as well as an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State courts have jurisdiction over civil rights actions brought under § 1983.

Mandela v. Rose · filed 2000-04-28

State courts have jurisdiction over civil rights actions filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims.

Abdul-Akbar v. Mckelvie · filed 2001-01-29

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over S 1983 cases.

Section 1983 claims may be pursued in state court.

Wong-Opasi v. Haynes · filed 2001-03-16

Relying principally on Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990), the district court held that Wong-Opasi was not entitled to relief because she could pursue her federal civil rights claims in state court. We agree with that conclusion, but further find that Wong-Opasi’s request for injunctive relief was barred by the Younger abstention doctrine.

Section 1983 does not give tribal courts jurisdiction to hear claims brought under it.

Nevada v. Hicks · filed 2001-06-25

Surely the simpler way to avoid the removal problem is to conclude (as other indications suggest anyway) that tribal courts cannot entertain § 1983 suits.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought under Section 1983.

Smith v. United States · filed 2001-11-26

Jurisdiction over plaintiffs action is further limited because this Court does not have jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the presumed authority for plaintiffs action.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983 civil rights actions.

DiCiantis v. Wall · filed 2002-04-25

It is undisputed that the Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought under Section 1983.

Smith v. United States · filed 2002-06-05

Furthermore, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over the civil rights violations alleged by Mr. Smith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).

Section 1983 actions may be brought in Ohio courts of common pleas.

Wilson v. Hardy, Unpublished Decision (8-28-2002) · filed 2002-08-28

Furthermore, federal 1983 actions are properly brought in the court of common pleas.

A claim under § 1983 may be brought in state court.

Jackson v. State · filed 2002-10-30

A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be brought in state court.

Section 1983 claims may be brought in state court.

Koziara v. City of Casselberry · filed 2002-12-10

Also, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be brought in state court.

Section 1983 actions may be heard in state common pleas courts, which have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction.

Helfrich v. City of Pataskala, Unpublished Decision (2-19-2003) · filed 2003-02-19

State common pleas courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over actions brought under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not itself provide a right to sue in state court, though state courts may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over its claims.

Brewer v. BD. OF TRUSTEES OF UNIV. OF ILL. · filed 2003-06-17

Neither Title VII nor section 1983 provides that plaintiffs may sue in state court. Those two statutes, by their terms, provide a right of action in federal court. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3), 1988 (2000). Because of "the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction that lies at the core of our federal system," state courts can exercise concurrent jurisdiction over claims under Title VII and section 1983.

Section 1983 does not itself provide a right to sue in state court.

Brewer v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 2003-06-17

Neither Title VII nor section 1983 provides that plaintiffs may sue in state court. Those two statutes, by their terms, provide a right of action in federal court.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983 claims.

Redevelopment Agency of San Bernardino v. Alvarez · filed 2003-10-21

Although a § 1983 claim is a federal claim, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal court to adjudicate claims arising under that statute.

Section 1983 does not provide a money-mandating claim within the Court of Federal Claims’ Tucker Act jurisdiction.

Clark v. United States · filed 2004-10-26

FOIA claims are not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims because FOIA does not mandate money damages. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). For this reason, we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of Clark’s FOIA claim. We also affirm the dismissal of Clark’s § 1983 and Uniform Commercial Code claims under the same reasoning.

State courts may hear § 1983 actions, but must follow controlling federal law and precedent.

Kellogg v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services · filed 2005-01-07

Although the states have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain § 1983 actions, as a result of the Supremacy Clause found in U.S. Const, art. VI, federal law is controlling, and state courts are required to follow federal precedent when hearing actions brought under § 1983.

State district courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims.

Kyle v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1986-03-25

It therefore follows ...that Ms. Kyle properly sought relief in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, and that the exception of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was improperly sustained as to Ms. Kyle’s Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims are outside the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Salman v. United States · filed 2005-08-31

Inasmuch as plaintiff's allegation might refer to the civil rights violations proscribed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), this court has no jurisdiction over section 1983 claims.

Tribal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 claims alleging deprivation of federal rights.

MacArthur v. San Juan County · filed 2005-10-12

Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the Navajo Nation District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 of any of these plaintiffs’ claims arising from the alleged deprivation of a right guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Section 1983 does not require a state court to hear damages claims against correctional employees when the state also excludes similar state-law claims.

Woodward v. State · filed 2005-11-17

Since the New York courts, unlike those in Florida, do not entertain similar state-law claims, Correction Law § 24 does not violate the Supremacy Clause.

Section 1983 creates a claim for relief but does not itself grant federal courts jurisdiction to hear it.

Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc. · filed 2002-03-30

Plaintiff concedes that Section 1983 creates a claim for relief but does not grant a federal court jurisdiction to hear the claim. ... This leaves the 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) (redress right secured by the constitution) claim before the Court for purposes of determining jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not provide a money-mandating basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

McCullough v. United States · filed 2006-09-29

Plaintiff also identifies the following statutes as providing a basis for jurisdiction: 18 U.S.C. § 242 (concerning deprivation of rights under color of law) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for deprivation of rights). ... This court also lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim for deprivation of rights under color of law because such a claim does not mandate the payment of money to plaintiff.

Illinois state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to hear Section 1983 claims.

Alberty v. Daniel · filed 1974-12-19

We conclude that the courts of the State of Illinois have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal courts to hear claims founded upon alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Claims under Section 1983 fall outside the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Lowe v. United States · filed 2007-04-16

Accordingly, the United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and may not adjudicate Plaintiffs claims arising thereunder.

The Court of Federal Claims cannot adjudicate § 1983 claims; jurisdiction over those claims lies in federal district court.

Fullard v. United States · filed 2007-08-31

Accordingly, the court assumes that plaintiffs suit is grounded on the Civil Rights Act, despite plaintiffs reference to the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act is “conferred exclusively on the United States District Courts.” ... Thus, this court cannot adjudicate plaintiffs Civil Rights Act claims.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a civil rights action in state trial court.

Costa v. Fall River Housing Authority · filed 2008-02-27

A plaintiff may bring an action in a State trial court for alleged violation of the civil rights provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

State courts must entertain a section 1983 claim when the parties and controversy are properly before them, absent a valid excuse for refusing it.

Thomas v. Allen · filed 1992-09-23

We express no opinion, of course, on whether Thomas is entitled to recover on his section 1983 claim. We hold only that the district court must entertain the claim.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of federal civil rights but does not itself grant federal district courts jurisdiction.

Griffin v. Abbott · filed 1975-06-09

42 U.S.C. § 1983 gives a cause of action for deprivation of federal civil rights, but it does not grant jurisdiction to federal district courts.

State courts of general jurisdiction that hear analogous suits cannot exclude a class of §1983 claims because the state disfavors them.

Haywood v. Drown · filed 2009-05-26

We therefore hold that, having made the decision to create courts of general jurisdiction that regularly sit to entertain analogous suits, New York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal claims that it considers at odds with its local policy.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.

Shell v. Schwartz · filed 2009-12-17

He claimed to have suffered an economic injury from the denial of state and federal rights, and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2503 n.1 (1980).

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over § 1983 claims; federal district courts have jurisdiction over them.

Hernandez v. United States · filed 2010-06-22

Next, plaintiff avers that his cause of action arises under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986, and is properly before the court. The court does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act, as jurisdiction over such claims resides exclusively in the federal district courts.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over Section 1983 civil rights actions.

Boyer v. Jeremiah · filed 2010-10-08

It is undisputed that the Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .

Section 1983 claims cannot be heard in the Court of Federal Claims because that court lacks jurisdiction over them.

Duncan v. United States · filed 2011-04-12

In her December 3, 2010 response to defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It would be pointless to direct plaintiff to amend her complaint to include these allegations because the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over such claims.

Section 1983 does not confine claims to a single Texas court; Texas district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear them.

Johnson v. Gerald and Vicki Cornelius · filed 2011-09-28

Johnson did seek a statutory remedy, § 1983, for his alleged injury, but the statute does not lodge in a single Texas court the exclusive power to adjudicate such a complaint arising in Texas. Rather, the district courts of this state possess subject matter jurisdiction to try § 1983 cases.

Section 1983 civil rights actions cannot be heard in the Court of Federal Claims.

White v. United States · filed 2011-12-08

It is well-settled that this Court does not have jurisdiction over civil rights actions, including those brought under § 1983 and Title VII.

Section 1983 civil rights claims cannot be heard in the Court of Federal Claims.

Kurt v. United States · filed 2012-02-07

Nor does the court possess jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims can be litigated in state court.

Ken Demsey v. Demsey · filed 2012-04-18

Section 1983 claims can be litigated in state court proceedings.

Section 1983 does not provide jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

Cox v. United States · filed 2012-06-22

... and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Civil action for deprivation of rights”). However, the Court of Federal Claims is not a district court. ... Thus, these statutes and regulations do not provide for jurisdiction in this court.

Section 1983 does not provide a money-mandating basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

Allen v. United States · filed 2013-03-08

see also Jefferson v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 81, 89 (2012) (Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986 not money mandating); ... Congress has vested the district courts with the exclusive right to hear these claims, and ... The Court of Federal Claims is without authority to hear the plaintiff’s claims based on these statutes.

Section 1983 actions cannot be barred from state court by a state law directing claims against correction officers to the Court of Claims.

Carrington v. Moore · filed 2013-03-28

Supreme Court found that it lacked jurisdiction based upon Correction Law § 24, which requires that actions alleging negligence by state correction officers be commenced in the Court of Claims; however, it has been established that this provision may not be applied to bar actions brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (see Haywood v Drown, 556 US 729, 736 [2009]).

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims under Section 1983.

Hover v. United States · filed 2013-11-14

Plaintiff’s claims generally arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the court lacks jurisdiction to consider claims under that statute.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.

Trevino v. United States · filed 2014-03-07

Third, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over Ms. Treviño’s tort claims or her § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims cannot be heard by the Court of Federal Claims.

Treviño v. United States · filed 2014-03-07

Third, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over Ms. Treviño’s tort claims or her § 1983 claims.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims under Section 1983.

Lawrence Battelle, Inc. v. United States · filed 2014-08-05

The government argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. LBI agrees with the government that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Those claims will be dismissed.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims.

Ilaw v. United States · filed 2015-06-04

Moreover, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over actions arising under sections of the Civil Rights Acts, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

A Section 1983 claim against police officers must allege illegal or unauthorized conduct to establish the trial court’s jurisdiction.

Hays v. Chief Campos · filed 2015-08-31

Finally, the pleadings affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over appellant’s Section 1983 claim because nothing in appellant’s petition even hints at an illegal or unauthorized course of conduct.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.

Strong v. Town of Smyrna Delaware · filed 2015-09-23

First, the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the parties and Strong’s state tort and § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims are outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.

Caldwell v. United States · filed 2016-03-25

Moreover, regarding plaintiff's contention that "[t]he plaintiff alleges other provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. g 2000a, might also be relevant, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over actions arising under sections of the Civil RightsActs, including 42 U.S.C. SS 1981 , 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988.

Section 1983 claims are outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the Ohio Court of Claims.

Sheppard v. Ohio Bd. of Regents · filed 2016-05-24

“It is well-established that the Court of Claims lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over alleged violations of constitutional rights and claims arising under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code (‘§1983’).” Guillory v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 07AP-861 & 07AP-928, 2008-Ohio-2299, ¶ 12. Consequently, these claims shall be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 claims fall outside the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction and must be brought in district court.

Hephzibah v. United States · filed 2016-08-25

Our court, however, "does not have jurisdiction to consider civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, or 1985 because jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts."

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.

Scott v. Reif · filed 2016-09-02

The circuit court also had concurrent jurisdiction over counts seven and eight, alleging § 1983 violations, Dep’t of Treasury v. Campbell, 411 N.W.2d 722, 723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam) (holding that “[s]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims”); see also Hess v. West Bloomfield Twp., 486 N.W.2d 628, 630–31 (Mich. 1992) (noting that the plaintiff raised both a § 1983 claim and a mandamus claim in his complaint in the circuit court), and count ten, alleging a RICO Act violation, see Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims).

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims arising under Section 1983.

Townsend v. United States · filed 2016-12-01

lt is well established that this Court may not consider claims arising under section 1983.

The Court of Federal Claims cannot hear claims arising under Section 1983.

Townsend v. United States · filed 2016-12-01

It is well established that this Court may not consider claims arising under section 1983.

State and federal courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 actions.

Sprague v. Cortés · filed 2016-12-09

Because, absent two narrow exceptions not applicable here, federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over actions arising under § 1983, ... and thus Pennsylvania courts generally may entertain actions brought under § 1983, there is no reason Castille, Zappa-la, and Sprague could not have brought their federal claims in state court.

Claims under Section 1983 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts, so the Court of Federal Claims cannot hear them.

Martinez v. United States · filed 2017-02-16

Additionally, the court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Martinez's civil rights claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "because jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts." Hardin v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 667, 671 (2015) (quoting Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005), appeal dismissed, 146 Fed. Appx. 491 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims under Section 1983.

Shelden v. United States · filed 2017-02-24

Mr. Shelden attempts to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Comp!. ii 116, but "jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts," Hardin v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 667, 671 (2015) (quoting Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005), appeal dismissed, 146 Fed. Appx. 491 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

State courts of general jurisdiction may hear Section 1983 claims challenging attorney disciplinary rules.

Eugster v. Washington State Bar Association · filed 2017-05-02

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Therefore, we hold that the superior court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over Eugster's complaint or amended complaint.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims under § 1983.

Maxberry v. United States · filed 2017-05-08

Mr. Maxberry attempts to invoke 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986, Comp!. at 4, 5, 11, 13, but "jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts," Hardin v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 667, 671 (2015) (quoting Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005), appeal dismissed, 146 Fed. Appx. 491 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

Section 1983 claims fall within district court jurisdiction and cannot be heard by the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act.

Maldonado v. United States · filed 2017-09-08

In short, Mr. Maldonado's§ 1983 claims are outside the jurisdiction granted this court by the Tucker Act.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over § 1983 civil rights claims.

Jarvis v. United States · filed 2017-10-18

This Court has long recognized that civil rights claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 may only be brought in a United States district court See Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005) (stating that the United States Court of 17 ederal Claims “does not have jurisdiction to consider civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 198l, 1983, or 1985 because jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts”).

Section 1983 civil rights actions cannot be heard in the Court of Federal Claims.

Vincent v. United States · filed 2017-12-13

Further, actions for civil rights violations brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) cannot be heard by this court . .!:h.&, Marlin v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005) (citations omitted).

Section 1983 does not provide a money-mandating basis for jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

Maxberry v. United States · filed 2018-01-12

The Claims Court also lacks jurisdiction over claims based on the Civil Rights Act, Speedy Trial Act, and Defense of Marriage Act, because they are not money-mandating; ... The court therefore properly dismissed Maxberry’s constitu- tional and statutory claims for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims under § 1983.

Nickens v. United States · filed 2018-02-27

This court also lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because jurisdiction over such claims "is conferred exclusively on the United States District Courts." Lowe v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 262, 266 (2007).

Section 1983 claims cannot be heard in the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Ward-Malone v. United States · filed 2018-05-16

Nor do we have jurisdiction over violations of the 4th, 8th, or 14th Amendments, see Dupre v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 706, (1981) (Fourth Amendment); Trany v. United States, 503 F. 3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (Eighth Amendment); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Fourteenth Amendment), or over claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Hover v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 295, 296 (2013), aff'd, 556 F. App'x 918, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Section 1983 does not give the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over claims alleging deprivation of civil rights under color of law.

Bennett v. United States · filed 2018-07-30

To the extent plaintiff is generally trying to allege a violation of her civil rights, the United States Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging a deprivation of civil rights under color of law.

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear Section 1983 actions.

Lewis v. English · filed 2018-10-12

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.

Section 1983 claims are outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.

Torres v. United States · filed 2018-10-30

In his response to the government's motion, Mr. Torres also cites the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Resp. to Mot. at 6, 10, 12. But claims based on those provisions are also not within our jurisdiction.

Section 1983 does not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims, even for claims against the United States.

Darling v. United States · filed 2018-11-30

Nevertheless, Section 1983 and its related statutes do not confer jurisdiction on this court, even in claims against the United States.

Section 1983 does not apply to actions of the federal government or confer jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims.

Augusta v. United States · filed 2018-12-20

2Section 1983 does not apply to actions of the federal government, see Hardin v. United States, No. 15-585C, 2015 WL 6437379, at *4 & n.5 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 22, 2015), and does not confer jurisdiction on our court, see Khalil v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 390, 392 (2017).

Section 1983 civil rights claims cannot be heard by the Court of Federal Claims.

Tucker v. United States · filed 2019-04-15

To the extent plaintiff is trying to allege a general violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C, § 1983, the United States Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging a deprivation of civil rights under color of laW.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over § 1983 civil-rights claims.

Ramirez v. United States · filed 2019-06-19

Fmther, to the extent that Mr. Ramirez is alleging one or more violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over such claims.

Section 1983 claims may be heard in state court, so a claim that could have been raised in an earlier New Jersey action may be barred by the entire controversy doctrine.

WHEELER v. MARIO · filed 2019-07-25

Here, New Jersey had concurrent jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 claims cannot be heard in the Court of Federal Claims.

Langan v. United States · filed 2019-08-16

It is well-settled that only federal district courts may consider claims based upon violations of Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims, even for claims against the United States.

Sepehry-Fard v. United States · filed 2019-08-30

But Section 1983 and its related statutes do not confer jurisdiction on this court, even when claims are stated against the United States.

The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over Section 1983 civil rights claims.

Rajapakse v. United States · filed 2019-09-16

As for civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), ECF No. 8 at 4-5, this court has no jurisdiction over such claims.

Section 1983 claims alleging deprivation of civil rights under color of law cannot be heard in the Court of Federal Claims.

Gilliard v. United States · filed 2019-10-28

To the extent plaintiffs are trying to allege a general violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging a deprivation of civil rights under color of law.

Section 1983 claims alleging a deprivation of civil rights under color of law cannot be heard in the Court of Federal Claims.

Crosby v. United States · filed 2019-12-20

To the extent plaintiff is trying to allege a general violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging a deprivation of civil rights under color of law.

Section 1983 does not provide a money-mandating basis for Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

Fanelli v. United States · filed 2020-01-13

civil rights statutes, id. at 1-2 (referring to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986); ... The court cannot exercise jurisdiction based on the above sources because they are not money mandating; in other words, they do not permit the payment of money damages in the event of their violation.

Indiana state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over constitutional claims brought under Section 1983.

Andrade v. City of Hammond · filed 2020-03-06

Furthermore, Indiana courts have concurrent jurisdiction over constitutional claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims are outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.

Langan v. United States · filed 2020-05-06

Mr. Langan further identified 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a substantive cause of action, but the Claims Court does not possess jurisdiction to hear claims for violations of this statute.

Section 1983 claims for damages or equitable relief may be heard by New York Supreme Courts.

Corbett v. City of New York · filed 2020-06-04

And Corbett’s brief assertion that a state court cannot remedy a § 1983 claim is clearly meritless as well. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 739–41 (2009) (explaining that as courts of general jurisdiction, the New York Supreme Courts may properly hear both suits for damages under § 1983 and suits for declaratory and injunctive relief).

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.

Stuart v. Dr. Catherine S. Ryan · filed 2020-06-10

Finally, there was nothing preventing Stuart from raising her judicial-taking claim regarding the estate property in state court because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.

Pennsylvania common pleas courts have subject matter jurisdiction over Section 1983 civil rights actions seeking money damages.

Hammond v. R.M. Krak, D.M.D. · filed 2020-04-22

Because Hammond’s Complaint contained a “tort action[] for money damages . . . premised on . . . a civil action for deprivation of civil rights under [Section 1983][,]” the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to sustain Defendants’ Preliminary Objections and dismiss the Complaint.

Section 1983 claims are outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.

Arunachalam v. United States · filed 2020-09-09

The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over civil rights claims, whether brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, or any of the constitutional amendments.

Section 1983 is not a money-mandating source of law for Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

Gulley v. United States · filed 2020-10-19

In particular, the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (both of which Mr. Gulley cites in his Complaint) are not money mandating sources of law.