42 U.S.C. § 1983

A department head’s authority to make personnel decisions does not establish municipal liability under § 1983 without authority to set municipal policy.

Jeanne Robinson David J. Marc v. George G. Balog Robert Guston, Bureau Head Leonard H. Addison, Bureau Head Mayor and Ci · filed 1998-11-12

The fact that Balog had the power to choose whom to hire, promote, discharge, and transfer within the department he directed simply cannot establish that he had the broader authority to craft municipal policy.

A county is not liable under § 1983 for an official’s decisions when those decisions are subject to meaningful review and the official lacks final policymaking authority.

Buzzi v. Gomez · filed 1999-02-12

Since Alvarez’s actions were not unrestricted and were subject to review by the Board or other sources which instituted policy having the force of law, his decisions were not “final.” Thus, the County cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the decisions of Alvarez.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 merely because an official makes a final discretionary decision about an operational matter; the official must have authority to establish municipal policy.

Mikels v. City of Durham · filed 1999-06-29

It suffices to say that even if Brown's decision were taken as "final" action concerning the discipline of Acker, it could only be considered an episodic exercise of discretion in an operational detail of municipal government, and not an exercise of delegated authority to establish and directly implement overall City policy respecting employee discipline.

For § 1983 municipal liability, courts determine who has final policymaking authority by considering state and local law and customs with the force of law.

Danette Hope Gros Edith D Sikes v. The City of Grand Prairie, Texas, the City of Grand Prairie, Texas Harry L Crum Richa · filed 1999-07-14

It was thus incumbent upon the district court to consider state and local positive law as well as evidence of the City’s customs and usages in determining which City officials or bodies had final policymaking authority over the policies at issue in this case.

Section 1983 does not make a school board liable for administrators’ decisions when those decisions are subject to meaningful review, even if a student must file an appeal to obtain it.

Denno v. School Board of Volusia County · filed 1999-07-26

The fact that Denno had to file an appeal with the area assistant superintendent before his suspension could be reviewed does not make the school administrators final policymakers.

Section 1983 does not make a school board liable for administrators’ decisions when those decisions are subject to meaningful administrative review.

Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia Cty. · filed 1999-07-26

Therefore, given the availability of this review, we agree with the district court that the Pine Ridge High School administrators were not final policymakers so as to make the Board liable under Monell.

An official whose decision is subject to meaningful administrative review is not a final policymaker for purposes of local government liability under § 1983, even when review requires an appeal.

Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia Cty. · filed 1999-07-26

The fact that Denno had to file an appeal with the area assistant superintendent before his suspension could be reviewed does not make the school administrators final policymakers.

In a § 1983 municipal liability claim, whether an official was delegated final policymaking authority is a legal question determined under state law.

Gros v. City of Grand Prairi · filed 1999-08-03

Based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Jett and our interpretation of that decision on remand, it was error for the district court to analyze whether Chief Crum had been delegated final policymaking authority as a question of fact for the jury. Instead, the district court should have determined whether any such delegation had occurred as a matter of state law.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when an official policy or custom causes a deprivation of constitutional rights; a single act can suffice if the officer has final policymaking authority in that area.

Rucci v. Thoubboron · filed 1999-10-05

A single act of a municipal officer is sufficient to establish municipal liability if that individual officer is possessed of “final policy-making authority with respect to the area in which the action is taken.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with final policymaking authority causes an injury through that official's act.

Todd v. Kelley · filed 2000-03-10

We, therefore, hold that Mayor Kelley had final policymaking authority with respect to the firing of Officer Todd, and, therefore, in firing Todd, could subject the City of Millbrook to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for conduct attributable to an official with final policymaking authority in the area at issue.

Jeffes v. Barnes · filed 2000-03-28

We conclude that Sheriff Barnes was, as a matter of law, the County’s final policymaking official with respect to the conduct of his staff members toward fellow officers who exercise their First Amendment rights to speak publicly or to inform government investigators of their co-workers’ wrongdoing.

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable only when its policy or custom causes the injury; an official’s act does not establish municipal policy if final policymaking authority rests elsewhere.

Jodie S. Abbott, David M. Balmes, Deborah J. Combs v. Village of Winthrop Harbor · filed 2000-04-05

In order to find a municipality liable under § 1983, the plaintiffs must prove that a municipal policy or custom caused their injury. ... Thus, consistent with these authorities, we find that the final policy-making authority to authorize the connection of a telephone line to the 911 system rested with the ETSB and not the police chief.

A municipal official lacks final policymaking authority for a § 1983 claim when the official’s decisions are subject to meaningful administrative review.

Sendelbach v. Lockwood · filed 2000-05-12

This court’s post-Praprdtnik decisions have consistently recognized and given effect to the principle that a municipal official does not have final policymaking authority over a particular subject matter when that official’s decisions are subject to meaningful administrative review.

A school district may be liable under § 1983 for a principal’s suspension decision when the principal has final policymaking authority over that decision.

Smith Ex Rel. Lanham v. Greene County School District · filed 2000-06-21

As this letter indicates that Defendant Goodwin was authorized to function without any formal system of review, the Court concludes that the school district did delegate to Goodwin final policymaking authority with respect to out-of-school suspensions of ten days or less.

For § 1983 municipal liability, an official does not become a final policymaker merely because review of the official’s decision requires an appeal.

Linda Denno, as Parent, Legal Guardian and Next Friend for Wayne Denno v. School Board of Volusia County, Florida Dennis · filed 2000-07-20

The fact that Denno had to file an appeal with the area assistant superintendent before his suspension could be reviewed does not make the school administrators final policymakers.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with final policymaking authority orders the alleged unconstitutional action.

Roberts v. City of Geneva · filed 2000-09-07

Accordingly, the court finds that summary judgment is due to be denied on Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against the City on the theory that a final policymaking official of the City ordered the alleged unconstitutional actions.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an employee’s recommendation when the employee lacks final policymaking authority and the recommendation does not represent official policy.

Gainer v. City of Winter Haven, Fla. · filed 2000-11-08

Since Sheffield did not have final policymaking authority, Sheffield’s recommendation to Cheatham, regarding the terminations of Plaintiffs, did not represent official policy as a result of which Defendant can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a school board liable for subordinate officials’ decisions when the board retains final policymaking authority over those decisions.

Riddick v. Portsmouth School Bd · filed 2000-12-15

Because the Board retained the final "say-so" on personnel matters, Judge Smith correctly concluded that the Board cannot be subjected to municipal liability based on the decisions of the superintendent and principal.

Under § 1983, a school board is not liable for subordinate officials’ personnel decisions when it retains final policymaking authority over those decisions.

Riddick v. School Board Of The City Of Portsmouth · filed 2000-12-15

Because the Board retained the final "say-so" on personnel matters, Judge Smith correctly concluded that the Board cannot be subjected to municipal liability based on the decisions of the superintendent and principal.

For § 1983 liability under Monell, an Alabama sheriff is the final decision maker for jail policy.

Sandy Skurstenis v. Jones · filed 2000-12-28

Thus, for purposes of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the sheriff is the final decision maker with respect to jail policy.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an employee’s actions on a final-policymaker theory when the employee lacks final policymaking authority.

School District of Wisc9onsin Dells v. Z.S. · filed 2001-09-10

Because Hazelkorn does not have final policymak-ing authority, plaintiff cannot be held liable for his actions under § 1983.

Under § 1983, a Mississippi constable is not a final county policymaker whose actions alone establish county liability.

Ward v. Benton County MS · filed 2001-09-17

In Rhode v. Denson, 776 F.2d 107, 108-110 (5th Cir. 1985), we concluded that a Texas constable was not a final policymaker for the county in question. Ward has pointed to no difference between the laws governing constables in Texas and Mississippi which would make the reasoning of Rhode inapplicable to this case.

A county may be liable under § 1983 when its policymakers’ decisions cause the alleged injury.

Duvall v. County Of Kitsap · filed 2001-10-11

However, even under the more stringent Monell standard, Duvall is entitled to survive summary judgment. He has, for present purposes, established that he was denied his requested accommodation based upon decisions of the County's policymakers.

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a promotion decision on the theory that an official made final policy when that official lacked final authority over promotions.

Medina v. City of East Chicago, Indiana · filed 2001-12-03

As borne out by the testimony of Alcala, any promotion, demotion or termination is presided over by the Safety Board. ... Therefore, the Plaintiff Officers attempt to impose municipal liability based upon the contention that either Alcala or Pastrick was a final decision maker must fail as it relates to their claims for not being promoted.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability without a general policy or custom when a final municipal policymaker makes the challenged decision.

Jamieson v. Poughkeepsie City School District · filed 2002-03-20

Plaintiff need not establish an official policy or custom of the District if the trier of fact finds there has been a decision by a municipal policymaker who possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a school board with final policymaking authority deliberately terminates an employee without a required hearing; that single decision establishes the municipality’s responsibility for the injury.

Coggin v. Longview Independent School District · filed 2002-04-17

Applying the foregoing Supreme Court decisions and reasoning to the present case, we conclude that liability attaches to the LISD for its deprivation of Coggin’s property right without a hearing as required under due process. The school board was the body responsible for establishing final policy and making the final decision with respect to the termination of its employee for cause.

Section 1983 permits a municipal liability claim based on a single act by an official with final policymaking authority.

Greenawalt v. Sun City West Fire District · filed 2003-01-21

Also, as explained above, a single act by a municipal officer with final policy making authority suffices to bring a municipal liability claim under § 1983. Thus, a liberal reading of Plaintiffs Complaint shows an inference that Defendant, the final policy maker on hiring, acted under color of law to terminate Plaintiff in violation of his Federal rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single decision by an official with final policymaking authority in the relevant area.

Cooper v. Town of Bar Nunn · filed 2003-04-14

However, a single decision or act by a government official with final policymaking authority may create liability for the municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Thus, Anderson has final policymaking authority on behalf of Bar Nunn with respect to Department disciplinary matters, and every one of his decisions and actions in that province constitute the policy of Bar Nunn for purposes of municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an employment decision made by a final policymaking authority, but not through vicarious liability for another employee’s acts.

Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca · filed 2003-05-13

Where, as here, an action against a municipality is premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “direct liability is appropriate only when an injury is inflicted by lawmakers or those whose edicts and acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” ... Thus, the City Council was the final policymaker for purposes of Tharling’s termination.

Under § 1983, a code enforcement officer who issues citations but does not set municipal policy lacks final policymaking authority for municipal liability.

Rasche, Roger v. Village of Beecher · filed 2003-07-16

Under this formulation, Riechers certainly was not the person with final policymaking authority; she occupied a position quite analogous to a police officer making an arrest. Although Trustee Lane stated that Riechers was responsible for determining what signs were proper, it is clear that Riechers did not set the zoning policy, enact the zoning ordinance or even determine what area of town required her concentrated scrutiny. She simply had the authority to issue tickets and citations.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single employee decision only if the employee had final policymaking authority; authority to make the final decision alone does not establish that status.

Pane v. City of Danbury · filed 2004-03-02

She provides no evidentiary foundation for this factual claim and no legal authority or argument for the proposition that the authority to make a final decision on releasing a personnel file amounts to “final policymaking authority” within the meaning of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, supra, 123. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly determined, on the basis of the record before it at the time of its ruling, that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the city was entitled to judgment on count three as a matter of law.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a decision by an official with final policymaking authority; a county cannot obtain summary judgment when the record does not rule out that authority.

Lipton v. County of Orange, NY · filed 2004-04-14

On the basis of the present record, we cannot conclude that Catletti was not a final policymaker whose actions would create § 1983 liability for the County, which precludes summary judgment for defendants.

An appeal process does not automatically prevent a municipal decisionmaker from having final authority for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis · filed 1986-08-19

The existence of an appeal process does not automatically divest a decisionmaker of final authority for purposes of attributing municipal liability, however.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for allegedly unconstitutional personnel decisions by officials whose decisions are subject to meaningful review by the city’s final policymaker.

Dempsey v. City of Baldwin City, Kan. · filed 2004-08-17

As a result, the court finds that the purposes of § 1983 would not be served by treating Hayes’ (and Paine’s, Butell’s, and McKenna’s) actions and allegedly retaliatory motives as if they were a reflection of the City’s policies.

A § 1983 municipal liability claim based on an official’s decisions must identify someone with final policy making authority.

Gomez v. Housing Authority of the City of El Paso · filed 2004-08-19

Because Appellants failed to show that Armstrong, her supervisors, or members of the eligibility department had final policy making authority, they have failed to plead a jurisdictional requisite.

For § 1983 municipal liability, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing as a matter of law that an official’s conduct represents official policy.

Hurdle v. Board of Education · filed 2004-10-27

In Jejfes, we ruled that plaintiff bears the burden of establishing as a matter of law that the conduct of a given official represents official pohcy. 208 F.3d at 57-58. After careful review of the record, we conclude that Hurdle failed to meet that burden here. Romandetto was not a final policymaker under New York law.

A municipality incurs § 1983 liability for an official’s decisions only when the official has final policymaking authority; discretion over individual decisions is insufficient.

Miller v. Calhoun County · filed 2005-05-27

In particular, Miller does not differentiate between policymaking and "mere authority to exercise discretion." Feliciano, 988 F.2d at 655. Only the former confers § 1983 liability on a municipality.

Section 1983 treats an isolated decision as municipal policy only when the decisionmaker had final policymaking authority over that action.

Chavez v. Brownsville Independent School District · filed 2005-06-15

For an isolated decision to constitute a policy for the purposes of § 1983, we require a plaintiff to show that “the decision was made by an authorized policymaker in whom final authority rested regarding the action ordered.”

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for policy decisions made by an official with final policymaking authority.

Banks v. District of Columbia · filed 2005-07-08

Since Ms. Knisley is the Director of the Dept, of Mental Health, she is a final policy-maker. Thus, the District is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Ms. Knisley’s policy decisions.

Section 1983 requires an employer defendant to be responsible through an agent with final and unreviewable authority for the action depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Marra v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 2005-12-09

Under section 1983, a defendant employer is liable only if an agent of the defendant with final and unreviewable authority was responsible for the action that deprived plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 allows liability for a government official’s single decision when the official has final policymaking authority; authority to make employment decisions alone does not suffice.

Gelin v. Hsing Auth New Orlea · filed 2006-07-18

Lamberg may have wielded decisionmaking authority; her position alone, however, did not bestow any final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with final policymaking authority acts as the municipality’s policy.

Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood · filed 2006-07-20

However, summary judgment is not warranted insofar as Pomykacz’s § 1983 claims are based on the theory that Mayor Fox’s actions in initiating the criminal charges against Pomykacz constituted an act of official government policy.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a final policymaker’s single act only when the official acts in a policymaking capacity.

Doe v. City of Waterbury · filed 2006-09-28

When a plaintiffs theory of municipal liability is based on a single action committed by a final policymaker, it follows that the municipality can only be liable when the final policymaker is acting in his policymaking capacity, not in his personal capacity.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s decisions as final policy when those decisions are subject to meaningful review.

Calvert v. Hicks · filed 2007-01-18

Plaintiff thus fails to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Defendants’ decisions were subject to meaningful review. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground is granted.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an employee’s actions when the employee lacks final policymaking authority over the challenged decision.

Diversified Educational Training & Manufacturing Co. v. City of Wichita · filed 2007-02-09

Therefore, the court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Gilbert was a final policy maker. Accordingly, the court finds that her actions are not enough to impose municipal liability on the City.

A municipality may face liability under § 1983 for a removal decision made by an official with final policymaking authority over that decision.

Stomel v. City of Camden · filed 2007-07-25

Consistent with that framework, Stomel's § 1983 action against the City cannot succeed unless Milan possessed "final policymaking authority" over the removal of public defenders. ... In conclusion, we have no doubt in these circumstances that Milan was the policy-maker for the City in respect of Stomel's removal as municipal public defender before a replacement had been authorized to assume the office.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on an official’s decisions requires final policymaking authority; decisions subject to review by higher municipal bodies do not qualify.

Gates v. Towery · filed 2007-08-24

Moreover, Cline’s decisions are still subject to review by the City Council and the Police Board so Cline did not have the “final authority” necessary to be a final policymaker under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat an officer’s operational discretion as municipal policy unless the officer has final policymaking authority.

Wilson v. City of Norwich · filed 2007-09-05

Accordingly, Wilson has failed to establish that Daigle was a final policymaker for Norwich concerning the liquor law enforcement program or the claimed child pornography effort.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for acts of final policymakers even when those acts violate the municipality’s own written policies.

Simmons v. Uintah Health Care Special Service District · filed 2007-11-06

Actions taken by a municipality’s final policymakers, even in contravention of their own written policies, are fairly attributable to the municipality and can give rise to liability.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for unconstitutional acts of an official with final policymaking authority.

Sharp v. City of Palatka · filed 2007-12-20

The Court notes that it finds City Manager Allen Bush to be a city policymaker with final decision making authority, such that he can subject the City of Palatka to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an official’s termination decision when the official lacks final policymaking authority because the decision is subject to meaningful administrative review.

Maschmeier v. Scott · filed 2008-03-17

Because Scott was not the final policymaker in regard to Maschmeier’s termination, Maschmeier’s § 1983 claims must fail.

For municipal liability under § 1983, an official whose disciplinary decisions are subject to review by a higher authority is not the final policymaker.

Kasak v. Village of Bedford Park · filed 2008-06-05

The Village ordinances make clear that the final authority with respect to an employee’s disciplinary action rests with the Village Board, not the police chief.

Section 1983 permits official-capacity and public-entity liability when a final policymaker’s decision violates constitutional rights.

Pucci v. Nineteenth District Court · filed 2008-07-10

If his decision was animated by an illegal motive, he is liable in his individual capacity and his official capacity as the final policymaker for the district court, and the district court shares that liability.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an official’s decision merely because the official had final discretion; the official must have final policymaking authority over that decision.

Bolton v. City of Dallas, Tex. · filed 2008-08-21

Benavides was therefore not the final policymaker with respect to his decision to terminate Bolton and municipal liability cannot attach to that decision.

A § 1983 claim seeking to hold a municipality liable for an official’s decision requires evidence under state or local law that the official had final policymaking authority for that decision.

Argyropoulos v. City of Alton · filed 2008-08-26

Thus, Argyropoulos needed to establish, by reference to applicable state or local law, that Sullivan was the final policymaker with respect to police department employment decisions; she failed to provide evidence to this effect, and it is not the court’s task to do so on her behalf.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for an official’s conduct that advances a purely personal agenda outside the official’s policymaking authority.

Roe v. City of Waterbury · filed 2008-09-11

An official acts wholly outside his official policymaking capacity when he misuses his power to advance a purely personal agenda. Here, Giordano acted neither pursuant to nor within the authority delegated to him when he committed the acts of sexual abuse.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable for an official’s conduct to show that the official had final policymaking authority over the relevant matter.

Cruz v. Liberatore · filed 2008-10-14

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that a claimed official is the “final policymaker” — not merely a “policymaker” — with respect to the relevant conduct.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages from a municipality to prove that the employee whose conduct caused the injury had final policymaking authority.

Fulton County v. Legacy Investment Group, LLC · filed 2009-03-20

To recover damages under 42 USC § 1983, Legacy was required to prove that the county employee who issued the debarment notice had final policymaking authority for Fulton County with regard to land disturbance permit applications.

A person’s status as a final policymaker for purposes of § 1983 is determined by state or local law.

Campion, Barrow & Associates, Inc. v. City of Springfield · filed 2009-03-24

A person’s status as a final policymaker for the purposes of § 1983 is a question of state or local law.

Section 1983 treats a municipal official as a final policymaker according to state or local law.

Campion Barrow & Associates, I v. City of Springfield Illinois · filed 2009-03-24

A person’s status as a final policymaker for the purposes of § 1983 is a question of state or local law.

A county board may be liable under § 1983 for a county commissioner's decision if he was a final policymaker and violated the plaintiff's rights.

Underwood v. BOARD, COUNTY COM'RS, COUNTY OF JEFF. · filed 2009-04-14

If Phillips can sustain his burden of proving that Dale is a policymaker under this theory of recovery, then the Board may be liable if the jury finds that Dale violated Phillips’ rights. Accordingly, the Board’s Motion [Doc. No. 36] on Phillips’ § 1983 claim is DENIED.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when a final policymaker’s action or inaction causes a deprivation of rights.

Capozzi v. City of Olean, NY · filed 1995-11-28

As such, as Gibbons had final decision making authority over the notification and holding of a hearing regarding the decision to direct Capozzi to vacate his home, the court concludes that Gibbons was the policy-making official for the City of Olean for the actions taken in this ease. The court further finds that questions of fact remain, and that, therefore, it is a jury question as to whether Gibbons’ actions or inactions caused a deprivation of Capozzi’s rights in such a manner as to hold the City of Olean liable under § 1983 for Capozzi’s due process claims.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a police chief’s disciplinary decision when the chief has final policymaking authority; review by a separate personnel board does not itself shift that authority to the board.

Morro v. City of Birmingham · filed 1996-04-12

Assuming arguendo (1) that the City is not estopped by its implicit concession that the Chief had the City’s final policymaking power as to the subject at hand; and (2) that the issue of the Chiefs authority was not finally adjudicated against the City by the dismissal with prejudice of its most recent appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the Monell question is still answered in favor of Morro by the evidence. ... The Personnel Board of Jefferson County is not an actor, but a reactor. The actor was Chief Deutcsh. The existence of the Personnel Board as a means of review only provided Morro an expanded opportunity to obtain “due process.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking municipal liability for police misconduct to prove that the municipality’s final policymakers were deliberately indifferent to constitutional violations and that their indifference caused the violations.

Gonsalves v. City of New Bedford · filed 1996-08-01

I find, however, that the New Bedford City Council (the “City Council”) and the Mayor of New Bedford were the final policymakers for the matters at issue in this case. Therefore, to establish municipal liability, the plaintiff must prove that these policymakers were deliberately indifferent to the commission of constitutional violations by employees of the New Bedford Police Department and that their deliberate indifference caused the constitutional violations proven in Phase One.

A city is not liable under § 1983 for a disciplinary decision subject to meaningful personnel board review, whether the board affirms or reverses it.

Vincent v. City of Talladega, Ala. · filed 1997-09-23

If there is a review board with the power to take another look at the decision, the employee can forget suing the city under § 1983. Whether the review board agrees or disagrees with the discipline meted out makes no difference.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability only when a municipal official with final policymaking authority subjects the government to a constitutional violation.

Hardy v. Town of Greenwich · filed 2009-06-26

The identity of the final policymaker is critical in this case because “only those municipal officials who have ‘final policymaking authority’ may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability.”

Section 1983 permits a school board to be held liable when its final policymaker violates a person's constitutional rights.

Besler v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF W. WINDSOR · filed 2010-05-17

First, we find that, for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Board President was acting as a final policymaker while presiding over the public comment period of the Board meeting and therefore the Board could be held liable for a violation of Besler's First Amendment rights.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a police chief’s transfer decision when custom or usage makes the chief the final policymaker for transfers.

Medina v. Dc Government · filed 2010-06-18

Therefore, based on the evidence presented, the Court concludes that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence that a well-established custom and usage made the Chief of Police the final decision maker of transfer decisions so that his decision may serve as the premise of municipal liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single unconstitutional decision made by an official body with final policymaking authority.

Singletary v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-10-07

Applying that principle, a decision by the Board, which was the District’s final decisionmaker with respect to parole and parole policy, was an act of official government policy to which section 1983 applies.

A city is not liable under § 1983 for an official’s decision merely because the official had discretion to act; the official must have final policymaking authority.

Milestone v. City of Monroe · filed 2011-11-21

Because neither Derrickson nor the Board were exercising final policymaking authority when they imposed and approved the expulsion order, the City cannot be liable under § 1983 for their actions.

A municipal official’s single decision can subject a municipality to § 1983 liability only if the official has final policymaking authority under state law.

Brook Bernini v. City of St. Paul · filed 2012-01-13

In such a circumstance, “only those municipal officials who have ‘final policymaking authority’ may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability.”

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single officer’s act when the officer has final policymaking authority over the relevant subject matter.

Reeves v. Horace Graham, Miami-Dade County · filed 2014-01-06

Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “may be premised upon a single illegal act by a municipal officer only when the challenged act may fairly be said to represent official policy, such as when that municipal officer possesses final policymaking authority over ... the relevant subject matter.” ... Reeves failed to establish that Graham had the requisite policymaking authority.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 on a final policymaker theory when the official who imposed the challenged discipline was constrained by a board with final authority.

Ores v. Village of Dolton · filed 2015-12-23

In this case, Chief Jones was not a final policymaker because his actions were constrained by the Board, as explained earlier in the Opinion.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for an official’s decision when the official exercises final policymaking authority and prevents meaningful administrative review.

Willingham v. City of Valparaiso Florida · filed 2016-01-20

In this case, the City of Valparaiso is responsible for a million dollar judgment because Mayor Arnold singularly controlled, made, and implemented all decisions by the City as to Plaintiff Willingham, and then prevented meaningful administrative review. Thus, Mayor Arnold exercised final policymaking authority over his decision to terminate Willingham, and the manner in which he did so violated Willingham’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a city liable for a mayor’s actions when the city council has final policymaking authority over those decisions.

Advanced Technology BuildIng Solutions, L.L.C. v. City of Jackson · filed 2016-03-15

Thus, assuming arguendo that ATBS and Hewitt’s factual allegations are true, because the city ... council has final policymaking authority over funding, the city cannot be held liable for the mayor’s actions.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires action by a final policymaker; the mayor was not the final policymaker for funding decisions because the city council retained final authority.

Adv Technol Bldg Solutions LLC v. City of J · filed 2016-04-15

Thus, in multiple cases, we have affirmed that officials are not final policymakers when a supervisory board has the authority to accept or reject their decisions.

Section 1983 permits a public entity to be liable for retaliation only when the challenged actions represent its official policy.

Leal v. Corpus Christi-Nueces County Public Health District · filed 2016-05-11

Turning to this appeal’s sole issue, the Health District can only be liable under § 1983 for the retaliatory actions of Rodriguez if those actions represent the District’s official policy in the area of retaliation—in this case, personnel or employee matters.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires a final policymaker; a police chief who writes department policies does not qualify without delegated authority.

Riggins v. City of Indianola · filed 2016-07-25

In the absence of a delegation, however, the Court cannot label O’Bannon a policymaker within the meaning of § 1983.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for an official’s actions when the official has final policymaking authority over those decisions.

Hodges v. Van Buren County Tennessee · filed 2017-01-04

Accordingly, the Court finds that Superintendent Oakes is a final policymaker such that his actions can subject Defendant Van Buren County to municipal liability.

Section 1983 requires the trial judge to identify the final municipal policymaker before a jury may impose liability on a municipality for that policymaker’s decision.

Soltesz v. Rushmore Plaza Civic Center · filed 2017-02-07

The district court must identify the final policymaker as a matter of law before the claims reach the jury.

Section 1983 permits claims against county judges acting as municipal policymakers but does not permit a claim against a sheriff who lacks authority over the challenged bail policy.

ODonnell v. Harris County, Texas, e · filed 2018-02-14

In other words, they sue the County Judges as municipal officers in their capacity as policymakers. Section 1983 affords them an appropriate basis to do so. ... Accordingly, the County Sheriff cannot be sued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable merely because its employees made employment decisions; the alleged injury must be tied to a municipal policy or custom or an official with final policymaking authority.

Butler-Burns v. City Colleges of Chicago · filed 2018-03-26

But neither Howard nor Tomino was a member of the Board and there is no evidence that Howard and Tomino set policy for hiring and firing employees. Although Plaintiff has submitted evidence that they were involved in or otherwise made employment decisions, that alone is insufficient to establish that they are policymakers.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a termination decision made by an official with final policymaking authority; the plaintiff need not prove a general policy against the conduct at issue.

Lambert v. Town of Sylva · filed 2018-05-01

But plaintiff did not need to prove that the Town had a policy that Town employees could not run for political office. Plaintiff’s claim was based on his allegation and evidence that Chief Woodard was the official with final policy-making authority as to hiring or firing in the police department, and that the Town Manager also concurred in the allegedly unconstitutional firing.

Section 1983 permits claims against a county based on its judges’ bail policies, but a sheriff required to carry out bail orders is not a municipal policymaker.

ODonnell v. Harris County, Texas, e · filed 2018-06-01

In other words, they sue the County Judges as municipal officers in their capacity as county policymakers. Section 1983 affords them an appropriate basis to do so. ... Accordingly, the County Sheriff does not qualify as a municipal policymaker under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with delegated final policymaking authority makes an unconstitutional employment decision.

Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, NC · filed 2018-07-26

We conclude that Bralley’s actions may fairly be imputed to the Town, as she acted with final policymaking authority when she fired Plaintiffs in violation of their First Amendment rights.

A school board's statutory policymaking authority does not foreclose Section 1983 municipal liability based on authority delegated to school officials or a local custom.

Estate v. Fairfield City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. · filed 2018-09-21

The Court reaches the same conclusion in this case. Therefore, the School Defendants Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in so far as ...it is based on the argument that the actions of Defendants Otten, Butts and Madden cannot serve as the basis for municipal liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an official’s decision when that official has final policymaking authority over the action.

Bruce v. Cole · filed 2018-10-29

If Defendant Cole has final policymaking authority in this particular area, then he is the relevant final policymaker for § 1983 purposes and his decisions pursuant to this authority constitute the official policy of Defendant Christian County. ... Therefore, Defendant Cole had final policymaking authority in the area of dismissing deputy sheriffs at the time he dismissed Plaintiff.

Section 1983 treats a sheriff’s dismissal of a deputy as county policy when the sheriff has final policymaking authority over that decision.

Curtis v. Christian County, Missouri · filed 2018-10-29

If Defendant Cole has final policymaking authority in this particular area, then he is the relevant final policymaker for § 1983 purposes and his decisions pursuant to this authority constitute the official policy of Defendant Christian County. ... Therefore, Defendant Cole had final policymaking authority in the area of dismissing deputy sheriffs at the time he dismissed Plaintiff.

Section 1983 treats a sheriff’s decision to dismiss a deputy as county policy when the sheriff has final policymaking authority over those dismissals.

Klossing v. Cole · filed 2018-10-29

If Defendant Cole has final policymaking authority in this particular area, then he is the relevant final policymaker for § 1983 purposes and his decisions pursuant to this authority constitute the official policy of Defendant Christian County. ... Therefore, Defendant Cole had final policymaking authority in the area of dismissing deputy sheriffs at the time he dismissed Plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for conduct attributable to officials with final policymaking authority.

Sweet Sage Café, LLC v. Town of N. Redington Beach · filed 2019-03-29

The Court finds that, for the conduct complained of, the relevant policymaker for the Town is the Town Attorney in conjunction with the five-member Commission.

A local government may be liable under Section 1983 for an official’s decision when the official has final policymaking authority over it; meaningful administrative review can defeat that authority.

Johnson v. Montgomery County Community Punishment and Corrections Authority (CONSENT) · filed 2019-07-31

On the basis of the foregoing, at this pleading stage of these proceedings and for the sole purpose of resolving the motion to dismiss now before the court, the undersigned finds that Defendant Brown was a final policymaker for the MCCPCA for purposes of the September 22, 2017, reprimand and the January 10, 2018, suspension. However, due to the Administrative Law Judge’s review of the November 2017 disciplinary measures, the court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Section 1981 retaliation claim against the MCCPCA – to the extent that claim is premised on the disciplinary measures of November of 2017 only – is granted because the disciplinary measure was subject to meaningful administrative review.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a constitutional injury caused by a person with final policymaking authority.

Molloy v. Acero Charter Schools, Inc. · filed 2019-10-10

Those allegations suffice at the pleading stage to state a Monell claim against Acero under a “final policymaker” theory.

Section 1983 permits liability against an official with final policymaking authority for a decision made in that role.

Curry Robinson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI · filed 2017-06-19

The Magistrate Judge first rejected the defendants’ lack of personal involvement argument, correctly noting, among other things, that Robinson had alleged in his amended complaint that Secretary Wetzel and Superintendent Cameron were liable as policymakers, and that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be imposed on an official with final policymaking authority, see McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367-68 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[E]ven one decision by a school superintendent, if s/he were a final policymaker, would render his or her decision district policy” and subject him or her to liability under § 1983).

Section 1983 makes a municipality liable for a constitutional violation caused by an official acting as its final policymaker.

Thompson v. DC · filed 2020-07-31

We hold that the district court erred in denying Thompson’s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment against Thompson on the ground that the District was not itself liable for King’s constitutional tort. King was acting as a final policymaker on behalf of the District when he took the series of personnel actions that led to Thompson’s constructive termination without due process. As such, the District is liable for King’s wrongdoing.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires final policymaking authority in the relevant area; general rules of professional conduct do not establish that authority.

Avenmarg v. Humboldt County · filed 2020-08-04

Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on general rules of professional conduct governing all attorneys licensed in the state of California does not meet the requisite level of specificity to establish that Defendant Blanck is an official with final policymaking authority.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an official’s individual decisions unless state law gives that official final municipal policymaking authority in the relevant area.

Agosto v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2020-12-04

Even assuming Ureña’s discipline, evaluations, and harassing behavior were final decisions, those acts did not set final municipal policy because Ureña lacked policymaking authority under state law.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a state court custody determination in federal court based on alleged constitutional defects in the state proceeding.

Roman-Nose v. New Mexico Department of Human Services · filed 1992-06-19

For example, to the extent that Plaintiff’s allegations can be construed as seeking redress for constitutional infirmities in the proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such an action cannot be maintained in federal court.

Section 1983 does not authorize federal district court review of a state court judgment when relief depends on finding that judgment wrong.

Brooks-Jones v. Hones · filed 1996-02-08

Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a decision that the state court was wrong, the § 1983 claim cannot, in substance, be viewed as anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state court judgment.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to challenge the correctness of a state court ruling.

Bryant v. Rubalcaba · filed 1996-05-31

Although the district court erred in considering information outside of the pleadings in ruling on the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) claim, the error was harmless because appellant may not challenge the correctness of a state court ruling in a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to obtain review of a state-court decision or attack an underlying conviction.

Gandy v. Salinas · filed 2001-06-13

The court also properly concluded that Gandy had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as Gandy was attempting only to obtain review of a state-court decision or to attack his underlying conviction, neither of which is allowed under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge the fact or length of custody, including an extension of probation.

Harris v. Hasse · filed 2014-02-21

Probation is a form of custody, Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1224 (7th Cir.1977), and § 1983 cannot be used to attack the fact or length of custody, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir.2003).

Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a parole warrant that presently restrains a person's liberty; that challenge must proceed in habeas corpus.

Field v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority · filed 2020-03-16

The warrant presently acts as a restraint on Plaintiffs liberty and therefore must be tested in habeas.

Section 1983 does not permit a prisoner to challenge custody for damages or release until that custody has been set aside.

Menefee v. Washington County Circuit Court · filed 2020-12-04

Thus, a prisoner may not challenge his custody under § 1983, whether he seeks monetary damages or injunctive release, until that term of custody has been set aside.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek relief for deprivations of his own rights, but not for deprivations suffered by other inmates.

Barnes v. Collier · filed 2020-04-22

Additionally, to the extent Barnes is attempting to assert his claims against the Connally Unit Defendants on behalf of other inmates still housed in the Connally Unit and subject to the complained–of conditions, the Court finds he lacks standing to do so. Persons claiming a deprivation of constitutional rights are required to show a deprivation of their personal rights, as opposed to the rights of others.

Section 1983 does not allow a prisoner to assert the constitutional rights of other inmates when he was not a party to their case.

Friend v. Walter B. Chapleau, Warden Jack Lewis, Commissioner Lacefield, Officer · filed 1995-10-13

Friend is not a party to the case of Wagner v. Collins. Because Friend is not a party to Wagner, he lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of other inmates.

Section 1983 does not give an inmate standing to assert another inmate’s claim based on fear of violence following a single assault on that inmate.

White v. Tim Baltz Ray Hobbs A.L. Lockhart Randall Morgan Larry Norris R.P. Wright · filed 1992-06-26

We conclude that White does not have standing to assert another inmate's claim based on fear of violence following a single assault to that inmate.

A Section 1983 plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the validity of an arrest warrant issued for a nonparty family member.

Zieman v. City of Detroit, Albert M. Bursey, Estate of Melvin Richards, James Buriss, and Gerald Newkirk, Jointly · filed 1996-03-26

We note, in all events, that plaintiff lacks standing, both in this appeal and in the proceedings below, to challenge the legal validity of her mother's arrest warrant.

Section 1983 claimants cannot assert violations of another person’s personal rights as their own claims.

Keys Youth Services, Inc. v. City of Olathe, Kan. · filed 1999-06-23

But Keys only alleges constitutional violations under the umbrella of its own Section 1983 claim, and it cannot raise the personal rights of others under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a civil rights claim only when the plaintiff has standing to assert the rights at issue.

American Federation Of Railroad Police, Inc. (Afrp) v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) · filed 1987-10-28

Accordingly, there is no reasonable basis for expecting AFRP to press the rights of the homeless with the necessary vigor, and we conclude that AFRP lacks standing to assert those rights.

A Section 1983 plaintiff lacks standing to assert the deprivation of another person’s constitutional rights.

Farias v. Lewis · filed 2007-08-22

Because constitutional rights are personal in nature, Farias lacks standing to allege the deprivation of his wife’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to sue for the deprivation of another person’s civil rights.

Tate v. Yenoir · filed 1982-04-05

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one may not sue for the deprivation of another’s civil rights.

A plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim for injuries suffered by her spouse, but may pursue a claim for interference with her own mail.

Kizer v. Indiana Department of Corrections and Terry Dunlap, 1 · filed 1997-06-24

Also, most of Kizer's complaint was doomed to dismissal even if counsel had been appointed; Kizer's lack of standing could not have been cured by discovery or a response to the motion for summary judgment. As for the one claim which she did have standing to present--interference with "our mail"--the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appointment of counsel.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to seek relief for an alleged violation of another person’s rights.

Torres v. Ball · filed 2019-09-18

However, to the extent that Plaintiff complains that his fiancee was also illegally stopped and searched, he lacks standing to seek relief on her behalf.

A § 1983 claim must rest on a violation of the plaintiff’s own rights, rather than another person’s rights.

Lynn (ID 64377) v. Cline · filed 2020-11-04

It is well-settled that a § 1983 claim must be based on the violation of Plaintiff’s personal rights and not the rights of someone else. ... Plaintiff has not shown that the Court’s dismissal of these claims warrants reconsideration.

In a Section 1983 action for illegal detention or arrest, the jury decides whether the officer’s conduct was reasonable.

Neill v. City of Concord, California Timothy Runyon · filed 1992-06-26

In a section 1983 action for illegal detention or arrest, the reasonableness of the officer's conduct is a question of fact reserved for the jury.

Section 1983 permits a jury to determine compensatory damages, including lost wages and benefits through trial.

Gansert v. Colorado · filed 2004-12-10

Accordingly, in the instant case plaintiffs claims for compensatory damages under § 1983, including any claim for lost wages and benefits through the time of trial, will be submitted to the jury.

A jury may decide a § 1983 excessive force claim when material facts are disputed and qualified immunity is not at issue.

Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City · filed 2013-06-12

But the court’s resolution of an excessive force claim as a matter of law, where there is no genuine issue of material fact, does not mean a jury cannot decide the question where there are disputed issues of material fact. This flows from the nature of a § 1983 excessive force claim.

In a Section 1983 employment discrimination claim, an employer relying on after-acquired evidence must prove by a preponderance of evidence that it would have made the same employment decision without racial bias.

Washington v. Lake County, Illinois · filed 1992-07-10

After the dust settled, the only claims remaining were a Title VII and a Section 1983 claim against Lake County (the former for racial discrimination and the latter for denial of due process), and a Section 1983 claim against Frossard in his individual capacity based upon racial discrimination. ... In situations involving "after-acquired" evidence, the employer must show by a preponderance of evidence that, if acting in a race-neutral manner, it would have made the same employment decision had it known of the after-acquired evidence.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights established by the IDEA.

M.Z. Ex Rel. Yiling Zhang v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District · filed 2011-01-19

The district court properly dismissed Zhang’s section 1983 claims insofar as they related to the alleged denial of rights established by the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for an IDEA-based claim without an independent constitutional violation.

Millay Ex Rel. YRM v. Surry School Dept. · filed 2010-04-21

Regarding the § 1983 claim, Fitzgerald is distinguishable since, unlike Title IX, the IDEA provides an “unusually elaborate,” “carefully tailored,” and “restrictive” enforcement scheme. ... Since Ms. Millay has not alleged “a constitutional violation above and beyond a violation of any of these three statutes,” her claim is not viable.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain remedies beyond those available under the IDEA when the claim rests on an IDEA violation.

Diaz-Fonseca v. Commonwealth of PR · filed 2006-06-16

We hold that where the underlying claim is one of violation of the IDEA, plaintiffs may not use § 1983 -- or any other federal statute for that matter -- in an attempt to evade the limited remedial structure of the IDEA.

Section 1983 permits a damages action to enforce rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

W.B. v. Matula · filed 1995-10-17

In sum, we conclude that plaintiffs have a right of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, damages are available as a remedy, further recourse to administrative proceedings would be futile, and any exhaustion requirement is excused.

Section 1983 permits parents and disabled children to seek monetary damages for violations of IDEA rights.

W.B. v. Matula · filed 1995-10-17

Certainly the plain language of Sec. 1983 authorizes actions at law or equity, and our prior holding in Diamond compels the conclusion that, as a matter of law, an aggrieved parent or disabled child is not barred from seeking monetary damages in such an action.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages for proven violations of the IDEA.

Walker v. District of Columbia · filed 1997-07-23

The Court concludes that if plaintiffs prove their case at trial compensatory damages are available under Section 1983 for violations of the IDEA.

Section 1983 permits damages for proven educational and emotional injuries caused by violations of IDEA procedural rights.

McLaughlin v. City of Lowell · filed 1998-04-03

Since the Supreme Court found these two types of damages cognizable for the procedural violations in Carey, there is no reason, given Congressional intent not to limit the remedial scope of §1983 under the IDEA, that these types of damages should not be equally available, if proven, to Heidi McLaughlin.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for IDEA violations because IDEA has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. School Board of Manassas · filed 1998-04-13

Because IDEA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme for violations of its own requirements, we hold that parties may not sue under section 1983 for an IDEA violation.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based on an IDEA violation.

Yancey v. New Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners · filed 1998-10-21

Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law because an IDEA violation cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 allows claims for compensatory damages based on IDEA violations because the IDEA does not preclude them.

Cappillino v. Hyde Park Central School District · filed 1999-03-26

I therefore conclude that nothing in the IDEA precludes a claim for damages ... under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, indeed, that the IDEA expressly contemplates such claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate claim for a routine statutory violation of the IDEA.

Andrew S. Ex Rel. Margaret S. v. School Committee · filed 1999-08-05

Garden variety statutory violations of the IDEA cannot form the basis for a section 1983 action for at least four reasons.

A constitutional procedural due process claim under § 1983 based on IDEA procedures requires a constitutional violation outside the IDEA’s scope.

Engwiller v. Pine Plains Central School District · filed 2000-08-16

It is well settled, however, that a plaintiff asserting a constitutionally based § 1983 claim for procedural violations of the IDEA must establish a constitutional violation “outside the scope of the IDEA.”

Section 1983 permits a claim for relief based on violations of the IDEA.

Zearley v. Ackerman · filed 2000-09-27

Plaintiffs’ claim for relief under section 1983 may therefore be based upon violations of IDEA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to remedy IDEA violations because the IDEA provides a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Padilla v. School District No. 1 · filed 2000-12-05

Based on these cases, it appears the Supreme Court considers Smith to be alive and well insofar as it asserts that § 1983 may not be used to remedy IDEA violations.

Section 1983 permits a court to grant injunctive relief for an IDEA violation even if IDEA administrative remedies have not been exhausted.

Cosgrove v. Board of Education of the Niskayuna Central School District · filed 2001-07-03

As stated, the Court has authority to remedy the instant problem under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even if IDEA exhaustion was not fulfilled.

Section 1983 permits an action against a state agency for an IDEA violation under the IDEA’s waiver of state immunity.

J.R. Ex Rel. R. v. Waterbury Board of Education · filed 2001-07-20

Consequently, a § 1983 action is allowed against a state or an agency of the state under the plain language of the IDEA.

Section 1983 permits a claim for a statutory violation of IDEA without requiring an independent constitutional violation.

Goleta Union Elementary School District v. Ordway · filed 2001-10-12

The Court finds that the plaintiffs may recover under Section 1983 for statutory violations of IDEA.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for IDEA violations; those claims must be brought under the IDEA.

L.C. v. Utah State Board of Education · filed 2002-02-28

Such claims must be brought pursuant to the provisions of the IDEA itself and will be addressed in a separate section below. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim based on violation of the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on IDEA allegations without facts establishing a constitutional violation outside the IDEA.

Natalie P. ex rel. Aurora P. v. Clark County School District · filed 2002-05-16

Similarly, Appellants’ Section 1983 claim was properly dismissed, as Appellants did not allege any facts which would establish that a constitutional violation outside the parameters of the IDEA have occurred.

A school district’s own failure to provide a free appropriate public education under IDEA can support a § 1983 claim without the deliberate indifference and causation showing required for a failure to train claim.

O.F. Ex Rel. N.S. v. Chester Upland School District · filed 2002-09-10

O.F.’s denial of FAPE claim is similarly an allegation that CUSD’s inaction itself violated federal law, as it is charged with providing her FAPE under IDEA. There is no reason for the Court to import the “deliberate indifference” standard of culpability or question whether CUSD was the cause of O.F.’s alleged denial of FAPE.

Section 1983 permits an action for money damages to enforce rights granted by the IDEA.

B.H. v. Southington Board of Education · filed 2003-07-25

A plaintiff may enforce the rights granted by the IDEA by way of an action seeking money damages pursuant to Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a claim based on an IDEA violation alone.

Smith Ex Rel. Duck v. Isle of Wight CountY School Board · filed 2003-09-23

Joshua’s claims in Count III fail because he has not alleged a constitutional violation, and § 1983 claims cannot be based on a violation of the IDEA.

A § 1983 claim tied to an IDEA dispute fails where the complaint alleges no constitutional violation and the record provides no evidence of one.

Cone Ex Rel. Cone v. Randolph County Schools · filed 2004-02-06

Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint does’ not suggest that they are raising a constitutional violation with- their § 1983 claim, but even if they were, summary judgment would be appropriate because there is no evidence before the court suggesting purposeful discrimination or that RCS acted without a rational basis. Thus summary judgment must be granted in favor of Defendant on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide an additional damages action for an IDEA violation when the plaintiff has received the relief available under the IDEA.

J.S. Ex Rel. Duck v. Isle of Wight County School Board · filed 2005-03-30

Having obtained exactly what he was entitled to receive under the IDEA, J.S. cannot reasonably main- tain that a deficiency in the statute’s remedial scheme justifies an enforcement action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide money damages for violations of the IDEA when the IDEA does not provide that remedy.

Long v. Dawson Springs Independent School District · filed 2006-08-25

However, it appears that our court has not allowed plaintiffs to seek money damages for violations of the IDEA under § 1983. That is appropriate, as § 1983 does not permit us to recognize rights that are not specifically provided for in federal law.

Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of federal rights but does not itself create federal rights, and a comprehensive federal enforcement scheme can preclude a claim under it.

Blanchard v. Morton School · filed 2007-12-03

We now join the First, Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits and hold that the comprehensive enforcement scheme of the IDEA evidences Congress’ intent to preclude a § 1983 claim for the violation of rights under the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not provide a damages claim for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

Blanchard v. Morton School District · filed 2007-12-26

We also affirm the court’s dismissal of Blanchard’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 does not provide monetary damages for IDEA violations when plaintiffs received procedural safeguards and administrative review.

Streck v. Board of Education · filed 2008-05-30

Plaintiffs fail to allege a denial of procedural safeguards or administrative remedies: they were afforded a hearing before an impartial hearing officer and review by a state review officer (“SRO”). Therefore, plaintiffs may not rely on § 1983 to pursue monetary damages for violations of the IDEA.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of rights created by the IDEA or Section 504 because each has a comprehensive remedial scheme.

P.P. Ex Rel. Michael P. v. West Chester Area School District · filed 2008-05-29

Last year, the Third Circuit held that because both the IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act have sufficiently comprehensive remedial schemes, § 1983 is not available to remedy violations of the rights created by those statutes. ... As there is no genuine issue of material fact, and because the District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this court must grant summary judgment for the District on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of rights secured by federal law.

Sean R. Ex Rel. Dwight R. v. Board of Education · filed 1992-07-31

As plaintiffs sufficiently allege a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the IDEA, defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III is denied.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an individual for a violation of the IDEA even though the IDEA does not impose direct individual liability.

Colon v. Colonial Intermediate Unit 20 · filed 2006-08-04

Although, individual liability cannot be imposed directly under IDEA, it can be imposed indirectly if suit is brought under section 1983 for a violation of IDEA.

Section 1983 may provide damages for IDEA violations when Congress has not clearly barred that remedy.

Butler v. South Glens Falls Central School District · filed 2000-07-27

Therefore, in light of the fact that the Second Circuit has not yet decided this precise issue and Congress has not clearly precluded the type of claim which the plaintiff asserts, it would be unwise to bar his § 1983 claim as a matter of law.