42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires proof that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws under color of state law.

Powell v. Kopman · filed 1981-04-15

The terms of section 1983 of Title 42 make plain two elements that the plaintiff must prove for recovery, that (i) the defendant deprived him of a right secured by the “Constitution and laws” and (ii) the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right under color of State law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege and prove that the person or entity causing a deprivation of a federal right acted under color of state or territorial law.

Madon v. LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY, ETC. · filed 1981-07-06

The Supreme Court has squarely placed on plaintiffs in civil rights actions the burden of alleging and proving that the person or entity that caused a deprivation of a federal right acted "under color of state or territorial law."

Section 1983 claims require involvement of state action.

Hutchens v. Beckham · filed 1981-09-09

Furthermore, the plaintiff’s section 1983 claim and his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim are subject to dismissal due to the lack of any involvement of state action.

Section 1983 applies to state action, so it does not support a claim challenging federal Army conduct.

Woodard v. John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army · filed 1981-09-15

Woodard also attempts to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since these are prohibitions on state action, Woodard’s reliance is misplaced.

Section 1983 permits a handicapped person to bring a claim alleging arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory classification, provided state action is shown.

Nodleman v. Mexico · filed 1981-12-10

An action brought by a handicapped person charging arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory classification of handicapped persons is cognizable under both § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Where a claim is presented under either § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show, as a threshold matter, that state action is involved.

Section 1983 can reach police assistance in a repossession over a debtor’s objection, or police intimidation that causes the debtor to refrain from legally resisting, because that conduct can constitute state action and a deprivation.

Jack Harris, II v. City of Roseburg, Municipal Corporation, John Miller and Les Bergman · filed 1981-12-28

We conclude that there may be a deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 not only when there has been an actual “taking” of property by a police officer, but also when the officer assists in effectuating a repossession over the objection of a debtor or so intimidates a debtor as to cause him to refrain from exercising his legal right to resist a repossession. While mere acquiescence by the police to “stand by in case of trouble” is insufficient to convert a repossession into state action, police intervention and aid in the repossession does constitute state action. Harris’ deposition raises factual questions which preclude summary judgment on this issue.

Section 1983 requires state involvement, and its under-color-of-state-law requirement is equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement.

Halet ex rel. Halet v. Wend Investment Co. · filed 1982-01-25

To maintain an action under the fourteenth amendment or § 1983, Halet must show state involvement. The under-color-of-state-law requirement of § 1983 is equivalent to the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 provides relief only when the challenged conduct is attributable to the state.

Modaber v. Culpeper Memorial Hospital, Inc. · filed 1982-03-24

The staff privileges decisions of a hospital which receives Hill-Burton Act funds, accepts Medicare and Medicaid patients and reports privileges revocations to state medical licensing authorities do not constitute "state action." As state action is an essential prerequisite to obtaining relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court's decision dismissing plaintiff's claims should be affirmed.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of rights under color of state law and does not apply to defendants acting under color of federal law.

White v. Commissioner · filed 1982-04-13

Section 1343 places original jurisdiction in the district courts when there is a substantive claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985. However . . . these statutes provide a remedy for deprivation of right under color of state law and do not apply when the defendants are acting under color of federal laws.

Section 1983 applies to constitutional deprivations carried out as state action.

Branch v. Hempstead County Memorial Hospital · filed 1982-04-23

That the Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of plaintiff’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4), and that for purposes of this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the actions of the defendants should be considered as “state action.”

Section 1983 requires conduct to be under color of state law, which requires state action; mere state participation or use of state forms or directives is insufficient absent joint participation or a sufficiently close nexus.

Jerry's Sport Center, Inc. v. Novick · filed 1982-07-07

Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) proscribes only that conduct which is “under color of state law”, which has been interpreted as requiring state action. ... Absent a showing that the State’s conduct amounted to joint participation with the plaintiff or that the private action and the State’s conduct had a sufficiently close nexus, mere State participation will not constitute state action. ... The mere use of State forms or directives to a county official is not sufficient to make the plaintiff’s action that of the State.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a constitutional or purely statutory federal-law violation to satisfy the statute’s “state action” requirement.

Murphy v. Villanova University · filed 1982-09-02

However, every claim based on Section 1983, whether grounded in an alleged constitutional or purely statutory violation, must meet that section’s “state action” requirement.

Section 1983 requires an alleged deprivation of a federal right to be committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law.

Jones v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1982-09-07

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that any alleged deprivation of a federal right must have been carried out by a person or entity acting under color of state law. First Federal is a private entity and, thus, the plaintiffs could have no valid § 1983 claim against it.

Section 1983 requires the conduct underlying a claim for relief to constitute state action.

Fischer v. Driscoll · filed 1982-09-14

Thus, before a citizen may obtain relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the conduct complained of must constitute state action, as defined by case law interpreting the Amendment and the statute.

Section 1983 permits a claim for a constitutional deprivation when the alleged conduct is fairly attributable to the state and was committed by a state actor.

Adams v. Bain · filed 1982-12-30

In reviewing a court's action grounded on this rule, we accept as true the allegations of the complaint. As this court has noted, a complaint should not be so dismissed "unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim." Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir.1969). A complaint should not be thus dismissed merely because the court doubts that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail; so long as a plaintiff colorably states facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, the motion to dismiss should not be granted. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see generally, C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1357 (1969 & 1981 Supp.). In the present case, the appellants alternatively allege that they were dismissed by individual state officials, by the VFD, or by state officials acting jointly with the VFD, in retaliation for exercising their first amendment right to address the Board of Supervisors. We believe that these allegations clearly state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action, and assistance by county officers alone does not establish the requisite state action for a claim against tribal officers.

Bruette v. Knope · filed 1983-01-07

Nor does the amended complaint state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The acts of Snow and Herrera on September 3, 1981, although performed with the assistance of deputy sheriffs of Shawano and Menominee Counties, are not imbued with the requisite state action. There are no allegations that the county authorities requested the tribal assistance, that such assistance had ever occurred before, or that the tribe and the state have a long-standing agreement to offer assistance through customary procedures. Indeed, there is no claim that Snow and Herrera were delegated police powers by the state rather than by the tribe, or that they were attempting to enforce state rather than tribal law. The action against them as individuals under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 does not state a claim.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a claim fails when the requisite state action is lacking.

McLaughlin v. McCormick · filed 1983-02-22

A second ground, however, is that requisite state action is lacking.

Section 1983 requires both conduct under color of state law and a deprivation of a federal right; state-connected physicians performing state functions may satisfy the under-color-of-state-law requirement.

Watkins v. Roche · filed 1983-03-17

To state a cause of action under § 1983 two essential elements must be present: (1) the challenged conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities received by the constitution or laws of the United States. ... If defendants are state officials, and their activities state action, the “under color of state law” element of § 1983 will be satisfied. ... A review of the record in this case clearly indicates the presence of state action. ... In this capacity, Dr. Crouch is performing an activity reserved to the State. ... This examination is a state function. ... The fact that he did not work for Regional does not extirpate state action from the case against Dr. Smith. ... The same conclusion, of course, applies to Dr. Crouch. ... Accordingly, state action is present and defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this ground is denied.

Section 1983 requires state action or action under color of law for a claim for relief.

Baker v. Data Dynamics, Inc. · filed 1983-04-15

The failure to allege state action or action under color of law is a deficiency fatal to a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action, and state funding, state-nominated trustees, and statutory recognition of a university as part of the state higher-education system do not by themselves make its employment policies state decisions.

Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1983-05-25

The facts of receipt of revenue from the state, membership of state nominees on the University’s Board of Trustees, and statutory recognition that the University is part of the state’s system of higher education, are not sufficient to make the University’s employment policies state decisions.

An integrated bar association’s official activities constitute state action under § 1983 when they are carried out under authority granted by Commonwealth law.

Schneider v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico · filed 1983-06-16

All of the official positions, actions and activities of the Colegio, its officers and agents, as well as those carried out through the use of its facilities, personnel and resources are taken and/or carried out under color of the authority granted by Law 43 and constitute state action within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A public authority created and wholly regulated by statute and public officials engages in state action for purposes of § 1983.

Gordon v. New York State Dormitory Authority · filed 1983-06-24

In view of the fact that the Authority is a creation of and entirely regulated by statute and by elected or appointed officials, we think state action is present in the Authority’s activities. Moreover, it is to be noted that similar authorities are regularly subjected to suit under the Constitution or § 1983.

A Section 1983 claim requires action under color of state law, and a public defender performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as criminal defense counsel does not meet that requirement.

Stewart v. Deghroony · filed 1983-06-29

However, plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is still deficient since it requires a showing that defendant was acting under color of state law. The Supreme Court has held that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions- as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”

Section 1983 applies only to deprivations of constitutional rights under color of state law.

Anderson v. Hascall · filed 1983-07-20

The Magistrate erroneously concluded that this action is maintainable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 applies only in cases of deprivations of constitutional rights under col- or of ... state ... law.

Section 1983 constitutional claims require state action.

Rosquist v. Jarrat Construction Corp. · filed 1983-09-06

The same state action requirement applies to constitutional actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

National Guard officers act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when exercising state authority to discharge personnel from a state National Guard.

Schultz v. Major General Billy G. Wellman, Brigadier General Carl Black, and Lieutenant Colonel John B. Greene · filed 1983-09-19

We hold that the appellees’ actions in the present case in discharging Schultz from the Kentucky Air National Guard were taken under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983.

State-employed social workers may be liable under Section 1983 when acting in their official capacity.

J.D. Franks and Margaret Franks v. Van Smith, Etc. · filed 1983-10-14

A section 1983 action can also lie against others, such as social workers, where actions by them were taken in their official capacity as state employees.

Section 1983 does not reach deprivations under color of tribal law.

R.J. Williams Company, Richard J. Williams and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority · filed 1983-10-31

First, no action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be maintained in federal court for persons alleging deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.

A union’s refusal to arbitrate a public employee’s grievance is not actionable under § 1983 absent facts attributing the union’s conduct to the State.

Jackson v. Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education · filed 1983-11-29

The district court focused on the failure of Mr. Jackson to set forth any facts suggesting that the state was responsible for the Union or that the Union was acting under color of state law in deciding not to bring Mr. Jackson’s grievance to arbitration. Therefore, the district court concluded that the Union’s action could not be “fairly attributed” to the state. We agree.

A § 1983 claim against federal defendants fails absent state action.

Wyler v. United States · filed 1983-12-22

Plaintiffs' claims, insofar as they are based on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, were properly dismissed for lack of any state action.

A § 1983 claim cannot proceed without state action.

Wyler v. United States · filed 1983-12-22

Plaintiffs’ claims, insofar as they are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were properly dismissed for lack of any state action.

The symbiotic-relationship route to showing state action under § 1983 survived Blum and Rendell-Baker and may require a developed factual record.

Cohen v. Temple University · filed 1984-02-02

On the other hand, I cannot agree with defendant’s position that these cases have eliminated the “symbiotic relationship” approach to state action so that no further examination of the issue is necessary.

Federal prison officials do not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when federal officials alone control the challenged conditions of confinement.

Boudin v. Thomas · filed 1984-04-17

The prison officials were not acting under color of state law for the purposes of Boudin's complaint.

An attorney representing a client in a professional capacity does not act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Goetz v. Windsor Central School District · filed 1984-05-11

The conduct of an attorney acting in his professional capacity while representing his client does not constitute action under color of state law for the purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 authorizes civil actions only against state officials, not federal officials.

Anderson v. Thomas · filed 1984-05-18

The action is incorrectly styled as one arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute which authorizes civil actions only against ... state ... officials.

Section 1983 reaches only conduct taken under color of state law, so a claim against a federal entity fails for lack of state action.

Smith v. North Louisiana Medical Review Association · filed 1984-06-28

We conclude that Smith's section 1983 claim must fall because the NLMRA is a federal, not a state, entity.

Section 1983 reaches only conduct under color of state law, so a claim fails when the defendant entity is federal rather than a state actor.

Smith v. North Louisiana Medical Review Ass'n · filed 1984-06-28

We conclude that Smith's section 1983 claim must fall because the NLMRA is a federal, not a state, entity.

Section 1983 applies only where the defendant deprived the plaintiff of her constitutionally protected rights while acting under color of state law.

Kuzmins v. Employee Transfer Corp. · filed 1984-07-18

Kuzmins’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must fail for lack of state action. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, only apply where the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of her constitutionally protected rights while acting under color of state law.

A defendant is subject to suit under Section 1983 only if the alleged infringement of federal rights is fairly attributable to the State, the same state-action inquiry used in Fourteenth Amendment cases.

Hicks v. Southern Maryland Health Systems Agency · filed 1984-07-30

[t]he ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under Sec. 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights "fairly attributable to the State?"

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state (acted under color of state law).

Alerding v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n · filed 1984-08-20

The first hurdle plaintiffs must clear in order to succeed on their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to demonstrate that the action complained of is fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 does not reach purely federal action, but a state National Guard personnel decision may satisfy the state-action requirement despite being guided by a federal regulation when state involvement is sufficient.

Gant v. Binder · filed 1984-10-12

Defendants are correct that state action is required to bring a case in federal court under 1983, and that 1983 cannot be invoked to right wrongs which have been committed purely under the authority of Federal law. ... In sum, the Court finds sufficient state involvement in the non-retention of Gant to conclude that this case was properly brought under Section 1983.

Section 1983's state-action requirement is satisfied when public officials implement state regulations that themselves allegedly deprive recipients of federal rights.

Lacey Ex Rel. Brookins v. Cohen · filed 1984-11-05

Having so characterized plaintiffs’ cause of action, I conclude that there is state action with respect to the conduct now sought to be enjoined. Beyond peradventure the parties charged with deprivation of plaintiffs’ rights are state actors by virtue of their public offices and their responsibility for implementing the challenged program.

A § 1983 complaint fails when it does not allege that the defendants acted under color of state law.

Harvey v. Three Doctors From India · filed 1984-11-29

Even if her claim is arguably under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff fails to allege that defendants were acting under color of state law, an essential element of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under color of state law and does not provide a remedy against persons acting under color of federal law.

Samuel E. Haley, Jr. v. Michael W. Walker, in Re Samuel E. Haley, Jr. · filed 1984-12-28

Section 1983 creates a remedy to redress a deprivation of a federally protected right by a person acting under color of state law, but is inapplicable to persons acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 requires that the defendant have deprived the plaintiff's rights while acting under color of state law.

Frasier v. Hegeman · filed 1985-03-16

An essential element of a claim under § 1983 is that plaintiffs rights were deprived by defendants acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 has no freestanding intent requirement; the required state of mind comes from the particular constitutional right asserted, so negligence may be actionable only when it constitutes that underlying deprivation.

Hewitt v. City Of Truth Or Consequences · filed 1985-04-04

We pointed out that neither the statutory language nor the relevant Supreme Court decisions impose any intent requirement on a section 1983 claim, and that “the relevant inquiry should focus on what state of mind, if any, is imposed by the particular constitutional provision at issue.” Id. Accordingly, negligent conduct may under appropriate circumstances give rise to a constitutional deprivation remediable under section 1983.

Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement is identical to the Fourteenth Amendment’s state-action requirement, and challenged conduct must be fairly attributable to the state.

Smith v. Duquesne University · filed 1985-05-28

Courts have consistently treated the section 1983 “under color of state law” and the fourteenth amendment’s “state action” requirements as the same thing. ... Therefore, state action analysis under the fourteenth amendment and section 1983 are identical.

Section 1983 requires proof that defendants acted under color of state law even when they are persons within the statute's definition.

Fynes v. Weinberger · filed 1985-07-22

While plaintiff has named as defendants “persons” within the definition of § 1983, plaintiff has made no showing in the case ... that the defendants were acting under color of state law.

In a § 1983 claim based on constitutional rights, state action is both necessary to establish the deprivation and sufficient to satisfy the statute’s under-color-of-law element.

Frazier v. The Board of Trustees of Northwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center · filed 1985-07-22

Viewed in the context of a claim under section 1983, a showing of state action serves a two-fold purpose. State action, while necessary to establish the deprivation of any of these constitutional rights, when present is also sufficient to meet the under-color-of-law element of section 1983 itself.

A § 1983 claim requires at least some state involvement in the challenged conduct because the defendant must have acted under color of state law.

McPartland v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. · filed 1985-08-02

In order to maintain a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 there must be some minimum state involvement with defendant’s actions. In other words, defendant must have been acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 itself imposes no state-of-mind requirement; any required mental state comes from the underlying federal right on which liability is based.

Easton v. City of Boulder, Colorado · filed 1985-10-28

For any such requirement to be applicable in a particular case, it must be necessitated by the character of the alleged violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States upon which Sec. 1983 liability is to be predicated.

A state-appointed guardian with state-created custodial authority who works jointly with state officials is a state actor acting under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes.

Thomas S. v. Morrow · filed 1986-02-19

We conclude that the guardian acted under color of state law and that he is a state actor for purposes of jurisdiction under Sec. 1983.

A state-created procedural scheme is state action that may be challenged under § 1983 when the defendant also satisfies the state-actor element.

NAACP, Frederick County Chapter v. Thompson · filed 1986-10-06

While private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the statute obviously is the product of state action. This is subject to constitutional restraints and properly may be addressed in a § 1983 action, if the second element of the state-action requirement is met as well.

A contract physician’s independent treatment decisions are not attributable to the state for Section 1983 purposes merely because the physician treats state prisoners.

Nash v. Wennar · filed 1986-10-15

Because the alleged deprivations arose out of the treatment methods used by a private physician who is subject to professional ethical obligations which impose duties towards the patient, we do not find the alleged conduct to be “fairly attributable” to the State.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations of federally protected rights by persons acting under color of state law; claims against federal entities are analyzed under Bivens instead.

Larry E. Belton, Sr. v. The Dow Chemical Company Scott B. Wheeler Veterans Administration United States Department of De · filed 1996-11-20

Second, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes a cause of action for deprivations of federally protected rights by persons acting under color of state law. Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 708 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938 (1992). Because Belton makes allegations against federal entities, his claims are properly analyzed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege state action by the defendant.

Gates v. ITT Continental Baking Co. · filed 1984-01-09

The District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to § 1983 as the plaintiff failed to allege any state action on behalf of the defendant.

Section 1983 applies to state actors only.

El v. Husk · filed 2002-08-28

Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for federal jurisdiction but that statute applies to state actors only.

Section 1983 requires an allegation of state action; a claim without one is subject to dismissal.

Lam v. American Express Co. · filed 2003-05-23

With regard to Lam’s third cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq., Lam concedes the impropriety of the pleading, based on the fact that there is no state action alleged in the Complaint, and requests an opportunity to amend the Complaint to correct this inadvertent error and replead on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Lam Mem. at 1 n. 1. The Court dismisses Lam’s § 1983 claim and will allow Lam to replead this cause of action under § 1981 within twenty days of the date of this Decision and Order.

Section 1983 requires credible allegations of state action and a deprivation of constitutional rights to state a claim.

Cramer v. Englert · filed 2004-03-01

Absent credible allegations of state action and a deprivation of constitutional rights, Cramer cannot state a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of rights under color of law by state actors and generally does not cover store security guards.

Guiducci v. Kohl's Department Stores · filed 2004-06-14

Section 1983 applies to the deprivation of rights under the color of law by state actors. It does not apply, except in special circumstances not presented by this case, to store security guards.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that an alleged federal-rights violation is fairly attributable to the state.

Sarin v. Samaritan Health Center · filed 1987-03-11

It is well established that in order to state a claim under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must show that the alleged violation of federal rights is "fairly attributable to the state." ... We find that the alleged connections between Samaritan Health Center and the State of Michigan are even more tenuous than the factors which were found insufficient to establish the state action in Crowder. Therefore, we hold that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law for a claim to proceed.

Doe v. Keane · filed 1987-04-15

Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must similarly fail for failure to allege state action. In pleading a section 1983 claim, plaintiff must allege that defendant acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory.” Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). This requirement demands that courts ascertain whether “the alleged infringement of federal rights [is] ‘fairly attributable to the State.’ ” Rendell-Baker, supra, 457 U.S. at 838, 102 S.Ct. at 2770. Plaintiff does not explicitly or implicitly allege facts from which the inference could properly be drawn that defendants acted under color of state law. Her claims are based on purely private conduct.

Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to qualify as state action for a civil rights claim.

Dixon v. Vera Lloyd Presbyterian Home & Family Services, Inc. · filed 2004-08-27

The affidavit disputes the amount of state funding received by Lloyd Home’s facility, the status of the facility as a juvenile detention center, and the precise import of various intake forms but it does not allege or present evidence that Lloyd Home’s personnel decisions, including its decision to terminate Dixon, constituted state action. ... As nothing in the record, even when read in the light most favorable to Dixon, suggests that Lloyd Home’s personnel decisions constituted state action, we conclude that the district court’s failure formally to convert the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment constituted harmless error.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor for liability under the statute.

Ashby v. Economic Opportunity Commission of Nassau County, Inc. · filed 2004-09-03

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Ms. Ashby’s Section 1983 claims against the EOC and Ms. Davis is GRANTED. Neither the EOC nor Ms. Davis are state actors within the meaning of that statute.

Section 1983 is unavailable when state action is absent.

Jama v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2004-11-10

Because state action is not involved 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is unavailable.

A public defender does not act under color of state law merely through public employment, and a client’s dissatisfaction with appointed counsel’s legal services does not support a § 1983 claim.

Malady v. Baker · filed 1987-01-06

Moreover, a public defender does not act under color of state law merely by virtue of his employment, and no civil rights complaint may lie when a client complains of the legal services rendered him by his appointed counsel.

Section 1983's under-color-of-state-law requirement is identical to the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement.

Robison v. Canterbury Village, Inc. · filed 1987-01-13

The requirement of § 1983 that the action be under color of state law has been interpreted to be identical to the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The hybrid state-federal status of the National Guard does not prevent its adjutant general and subordinate officers from acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Holdiness v. A.M. Stroud, Jr. · filed 1987-01-23

A charge that the Adjutant General deprived a member of the Guard of his constitutional or federal statutory rights, therefore, satisfies the state action requirement of § 1983. ... The district court, therefore, was in error in holding that, as a matter of law, the four federal defendants were not amenable to suit under § 1983 because they were federal employees.

The NCAA’s public-institution membership and funding do not make its sanctions state action under § 1983 without state coercion, significant encouragement, or conduct attributable to the state.

Hawkins v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n · filed 1987-01-30

While it is undisputed that the NCAA does consist of numerous public institutions, which supply at least one-half of the financial support to the association, such membership or funding, even if it were 100%, is insufficient to render the NCAA’s conduct state action. ... this Court finds that the NCAA’s actions in imposing sanctions against Bradley University do not constitute state action.

A complaint against federal officials states no § 1983 claim when it names no state official and alleges no action under color of state law.

Bryant v. Carlson · filed 1987-01-30

Plaintiff also purports to bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but does not name any state official as defendant or allege any action taken under color of state law. The Complaint therefore does not state a cause of action under section 1983.

A public university’s student senate acts under color of state law when the state created and funds it, university trustees approved its constitution, and an administrator has final authority over its funding decisions.

Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn · filed 1987-03-23

In the present case the student senate and ASG are the creation of the state; the constitution was approved by the Board of Trustees; the Board is given by statute the authority to govern the University; ASG occupies offices and receives funding from the state; the funding that is disbursed as “B” funds comes from appropriations of the University; the Vice-Chancellor has the final say as to funding decisions through his power to hear appeals. On the basis of these factors, the court finds the decisions of the student senate are fairly attributable to the state since this University is “fully public.”

The NCAA acts under color of state law only when performing a function traditionally exclusive to the state or when a state or state agency caused, controlled, or directed its conduct.

Karmanos v. Baker · filed 1987-04-20

this court concluded that the NCAA cannot be considered to have acted under color of state law unless (1) it was serving a function which was traditionally and exclusively the state’s perogative; or (2) the state or ... its agencies caused, controlled or directed the NCAA’s actions.

Negligence by correctional officials does not state a Section 1983 claim, and assaults by fellow inmates are not under color of law absent allegations connecting them to state action.

John James Tribell, Jr. v. Warden Otie Jones Steven Norris, Commissioner of Corrections, Defendants · filed 1987-04-28

Plaintiff's complaint against the correctional officials for alleged negligence was properly dismissed for failure to state an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Plaintiff's complaint against three fellow inmates was likewise properly dismissed because it was not alleged that the inmates acted "under color of law" in assaulting plaintiff.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on corrections or parole officials for a released prisoner's later violence against members of the public when the harm is too remote and no special relationship or particular danger links the victims to the state.

Beck v. Kansas University Psychiatry Foundation · filed 1987-05-20

The court finds, however, that even though plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a cause of action under the theory of negligence, the actions of the individual defendants Atkins and McManus, as members of the Department of Corrections, are too remote from the deaths of Marc Beck and Ruth Rybolt to hold these defendants liable under section 1983. The court therefore finds that plaintiffs have not sufficiently established a special relationship between the victims and Boan or between the victims and the state, or a showing that the victims, Marc Beck and Ruth Rybolt, as distinguished from the public at large, faced a special danger.

Section 1983 requires the defendant to have acted under color of state law.

Tate v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation · filed 1987-06-23

The plaintiffs failed to show that the defendant acted under color of state law as required under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ... Therefore, this claim was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 provides no remedy against federal officials acting under color of federal law.

Daly-Murphy v. Michael Winston, E. Carmack Holmes, Arthur S. Kling, Ronald L. Nelson and the Veterans Administr · filed 1987-07-01

There is no valid basis for a claim under section 1983, in that Daly-Murphy’s allegations are against federal officials acting under color of federal law. Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of law of any state or territory or the District of Columbia.

A voluntary athletic association whose membership is overwhelmingly composed of public schools acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Griffin High School v. Illinois High School Association · filed 1987-07-10

Public schools make up 85% of the IHSA’s membership, and although the IHSA is a purely voluntary association, the overwhelmingly public character of the IHSA membership is sufficient to confer state action for the purposes of § 1983.

A § 1983 defendant must have acted under color of state law or in concert with someone who did.

Thrush v. Morrison · filed 1987-07-27

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the conduct complained of must be committed by a person acting under color of state law, ... or in concert with someone acting under color of state law.

A § 1983 complaint fails unless it alleges that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Blankenship v. Phelps · filed 1987-08-05

Plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant acted under color of state law.

For § 1983 purposes, terminating medical-staff privileges is state action when a public-trust hospital’s trustees are public officers acting as a state agency.

Tarabishi v. Mcalester Regional Hospital · filed 1987-08-17

Accordingly, we hold that the actions of the appellee trustees in terminating Tarabishi's staff privileges were actions "fairly attributable to the state."

A full-time state prison nurse does not act under color of state law when independently exercising professional medical judgment unaffected by the employment relationship.

Smith v. Huffman · filed 1987-08-19

Plaintiff has not shown that defendant Handly’s medical judgment cannot be freely exercised due to her employment relationship. ... Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff has not shown that defendant Handly was acting under color of state law when she responded to plaintiff’s medical complaints.

Paid-informant status does not by itself make every act government action for § 1983 purposes; courts must examine whether the challenged conduct is fairly chargeable to the government.

Ghandi v. Police Department of City of Detroit · filed 1987-08-31

Although we of course have no quarrel with this statement of law, we reject plaintiffs' invitation to establish a per se rule that the activities of paid government informants must always be considered government action.

Participation in a joint federal-state program does not by itself establish a conspiracy that makes federal officials state actors under § 1983.

Olson v. Norman · filed 1987-09-15

The intergovernmental nature of a joint state-federal program does not by itself make out a conspiracy.

A § 1983 claim requires proof that the defendant acted under color of state law.

Baker v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1987-12-04

An essential element of a claim brought pursuant to § 1983 is that the alleged wrong was committed by a person (or entity) acting under color of or pursuant to the law of a state. There has been a complete failure of proof as to this essential element of plaintiffs claim, and, therefore, summary judgment should be granted.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement can be satisfied for a railroad employer when it uses state-authorized railroad police for its benefit.

Merola v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. · filed 1988-02-12

Nor may the complaint be dismissed on its face as to Amtrak on this “state action” ground. Under § 88, the law enforcement authority of the state is granted to railroad police only through the efforts and for the benefit of their employer, whose decision to employ them involves a utilization for its benefit of state law enforcement authority sufficient to satisfy the “state action” requirement of § 1983.

Section 1983 applies only to persons acting under state law.

Alan KAWITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1988-03-22

Though the age-discrimination ground, at least, cannot be deemed frivolous, most of the grounds presented by the appeal are frivolous, including claims under the Sixth Amendment, the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, § 2, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (applicable only to persons acting under state law), and a claim of estoppel not presented to the district court.

Section 1983 requires state action; a telephone company’s charges for inmate calls are not state action merely because the state may regulate the company.

Boysaw v. C & P Telephone Company of Virginia · filed 1988-04-07

Boysaw failed to demonstrate that the price charged for phone calls was "fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Phone service is not an activity "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). Further, the possibility that the state may regulate the defendant telephone company, without more, is an insufficient basis to convert private action into state action. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson, 419 U.S. 345; Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir.1984). Because Boysaw failed to demonstrate the state action necessary to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the district court properly dismissed his complaint.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim fails when the challenged exclusion was not the result of state action.

Catrone v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc. · filed 1988-04-11

Because Catrone’s exclusion was not a result of state action, all defendants are entitled as a matter of law to judgment on the § 1983 claims (counts III and IV).

Section 1983 has no independent state-of-mind requirement, so negligence can support a claim when it suffices to violate the underlying right.

Jimmy Rogers Coffey v. North Carolina Department of Correction, Rae McNamara Hazel Keith, Defendants · filed 1988-04-27

As Sec. 1983 does not contain an independent state-of-mind requirement, the district court's conclusion that negligence is not redressable under Sec. 1983 was overbroad.

Section 1983 actions may be brought only against state actors, not the federal government.

Irvin v. United States · filed 1988-04-27

... since section 1983 actions may be brought only against state actors and not the federal government.

Section 1983 does not allow an ineffective-assistance claim against a criminal defense attorney who was neither a state actor nor acting in concert with one.

Dock H. Dillman, Jr. v. Edward Murray Fred E. Jordan Dave Williams I.T. Gilmore Keith H. Waldrop · filed 1988-06-07

Dillman's claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during Dillman's criminal trial was also properly dismissed, as Dillman's attorney was not a state actor nor was he allegedly acting in concert with a state actor. Therefore, he cannot be sued under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a criminal defense attorney for conduct arising from representation absent a conspiracy with state actors.

Bishop v. Richardson · filed 1988-07-21

However, an attorney representing a criminal defendant does not act under state law with respect to matters arising out of the representation, at least in the absence of some conspiracy with state actors.

Section 1983 requires state action; conduct without state action does not support a claim.

Taylor v. Shell Offshore, Inc. · filed 1988-12-05

It is clear that plaintiff has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is no state action involved in this case.

Section 1983 requires state action; an allegation of federal action alone does not support a claim.

Ensor v. Rust Engineering Co. · filed 1989-01-11

Plaintiffs claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed because there is no state, as opposed to federal, action alleged.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the alleged infringement of federal rights was state action or fairly attributable to the state.

Network Communications v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1989-01-18

In any action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff’s initial burden is to demonstrate that the alleged infringement of federal rights is either state action or action that may be “fairly attributable to the state.”

Section 1983 requires state action, so a claim against a federal supervisor for employment discrimination cannot proceed under it.

Elkins v. Jordon · filed 1989-02-23

Upon consideration, we conclude the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's Sec. 1983 claim for lack of state action.

Section 1983 does not treat a political party’s election of its executive committee under party rules as state action, even when its central committee members were elected in a party primary.

Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton County · filed 1989-03-01

Although the plaintiffs were elected in the Republican Party Primary, the conduct at issue involves only an election to the Executive Committee. In such light this Court finds that the conduct on behalf of defendants cannot be considered fairly attributable to the state and thus not “state action” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action to support a claim.

Velez v. St. Mary Hospital (In Re St. Mary Hospital) · filed 1989-03-03

No state action is present here, and thus no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could be mounted by the Plaintiffs.

A gas district wholly controlled by municipalities is a public entity and state actor for purposes of § 1983.

Newton v. Southeast Alabama Gas District · filed 1989-03-13

The court is persuaded that an entity which is wholly controlled by various municipalities, through their governing bodies, is clearly a public entity and, accordingly, a state actor.

Section 1983 does not treat foster parents as state actors for child abuse when the state did not cause or encourage the abuse and foster care is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.

Milburn ex rel. Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services · filed 1989-03-31

Applying those cases to the facts of this case, we are of opinion and come to the conclusion that the Tuckers were not state actors. The State of Maryland was not responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains, that is, the physical child abuse itself. It exercised no coercive power over the Tuckers; neither did it encourage them. The care of foster children is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.

Section 1983 does not permit a civil rights claim based on the employment decisions of a nonprofit legal services corporation because those decisions are not governmental action.

D'Avino v. Trachtenburg · filed 1989-04-03

Finally, we note that the plaintiff may not maintain her civil rights claim against the defendants pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, because the employment-related decisions of a nonprofit legal services corporation do not constitute governmental action (see, Gerena v Puerto Rican Legal Servs., 697 F2d 447; Knauth v North Country Legal Servs., 575 F Supp 897).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege state action.

Ross v. Barnes · filed 1989-04-12

The district court correctly dismissed this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) because Ross failed to allege state action as required by Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege state action.

Shumaker v. Trudy Denslow Paul Denslow John Davis 54a District Court · filed 1989-05-31

Plaintiff alleged no "state action" actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 does not make attorneys state actors merely because they are licensed by a state.

Crawford-El v. Samuel M. Shapiro, Cassandra P. Hicks, Individually and as a Corporation · filed 1989-06-05

Crawford-El alleged that the attorneys were state actors by virtue of being licensed by the state of Maryland, and that they were therefore amenable to suit under Sec. 1983. We agree with the district court's conclusion that the defendants were not state actors and consequently were not amenable to suit under Sec. 1983.

A state’s permission to use foreclosure procedures and sheriff sales to execute a judgment does not, by itself, establish state action for a § 1983 claim.

Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane · filed 1989-06-27

Furthermore, the fact that a state permits the use of foreclosure procedures and subsequent sheriff sales as the execution of a judgment is not sufficient to constitute state action.

Former defense counsel are not state actors within the meaning of Section 1983.

Lawson v. State of Tennessee J.S. Daniel Frank M. Fly Jeffrey Henry Mark Goad · filed 1989-07-26

Claims against the attorneys fail because former defense counsel are not state actors within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

A court-appointed criminal defense attorney is not a state actor under Section 1983 unless he conspires with state officials.

Ward v. Richard D. Warren, Alfred Truitt, Jr., Hamilton Fox · filed 1989-09-19

In addition, Ward's court-appointed trial attorney is not a state actor, and so not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1141 (1982), unless he has subjected himself to liability by virtue of conspiring with state officials.

A physician providing medical care to state prisoners can be a state actor for § 1983 purposes.

Crooks v. Stokes · filed 1989-09-29

Nonetheless, the action should also be stayed as to Dr. Stevens pending a decision from the Ohio Court of Claims because Stevens is considered a state actor for Sec. 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 requires state action attributable to the government that causes the deprivation of protected rights.

Hibbing v. Sofarelli · filed 1990-03-22

In order for liability to exist in the case sub judiee, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that state action, for which the government is actually responsible, be the cause of the denial of the protected rights.

Section 1983 requires state action, which a claim against a United States Postal Service inspector lacks.

Johnson v. Ionia United States Postal Service · filed 1990-08-10

The claim against the United States Postal Service Inspector lacked the requisite state action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires governmental action; a complaint alleging no state involvement cannot state a claim under it.

Martin v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company · filed 1990-08-10

The Appellants have nowhere asserted that state action caused or otherwise was involved in their purported woes. Yet absent the requisite governmental action, there can be no claim for a denial of constitutional due process. ... Nor can there be one for a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, as the Appellants concede.

Section 1983 requires state action; a claim fails when no governmental involvement is alleged.

Martin v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. · filed 1990-08-10

The Appellants have nowhere asserted that state action caused or otherwise was involved in their purported woes. ... Nor can there be one for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the Appellants concede.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement is met when school officials control student council decisions and approve or disapprove students’ candidacies in a school election.

Bull Ex Rel. Bull v. Dardanelle Public School District 15 · filed 1990-09-05

The Court finds that state action exists in this instance. Here, the school officials have the power to overrule any decision by the student council. Two faculty representatives serve as advisors, with authority to approve or overrule the actions of the student council. The teachers approve or disapprove of a student’s candidacy for student council. The student council was not free from the School District's control.

A state bar association and its presidents are not state actors under section 1983 without a sufficiently close nexus to the state.

Perry v. Barnard · filed 1990-10-12

Furthermore, as this court stated in its Memorandum Entry on Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Hart and Emison dated November 17, 1988, even if plaintiff has standing to bring such an action, he has failed to show a sufficiently close nexus to establish the Indiana State Bar Association and Hart and Emison as state actors for purposes of section 1983. Thus, his suit against Hart and Emison for monetary, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, fails.

Section 1983 requires state action, which is absent from a claim against an attorney based on representation in state trial and appellate proceedings.

Phillips v. Stulberg · filed 1990-10-12

There is no state action present in this case as required under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action for an equal protection claim.

Davis v. Stone Container Corporation · filed 1990-11-29

The district court properly found that it lacked jurisdiction over Davis' 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim of an equal protection violation because there was no state action involved in the case.

Section 1983’s state-action requirement goes to the merits of the claim, not subject-matter jurisdiction.

Boyle v. The Governor's Veterans Outreach & Assistance Center · filed 1991-01-31

However, the requirement in section 1983 of state action is not a question of jurisdiction, but rather is integral to the determination of the merits of the claim.

Section 1983 permits a due process challenge when a state judge, acting under state law, deprives a person of liberty.

Grant v. Johnson · filed 1991-02-22

Virginia Grant was deprived of her liberty and personal freedom by operation of the laws of the State of Oregon through the action of Judge Johnson. Therefore, she is entitled to challenge the provisions made by those laws for providing her with due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires allegations of state action to state a claim.

Winslow v. Romer · filed 1991-03-20

The complaint fails to state a claim against Dyer or the firm under § 1983. Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to Winslow, there are no allegations of state action, an essential element of any § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 treats Temple University as a state actor because of its symbiotic relationship with Pennsylvania.

Unger v. National Residents Matching Program · filed 1991-04-26

Temple is a state actor because it enjoys a " 'symbiotic relationship' with the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania]."

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendant is a state actor; a claim without that allegation is defective.

Rogers v. Bucks County Domestic Relations Section · filed 1991-07-12

There is no allegation that it is a state actor as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A city council’s adoption of resolutions constitutes state action for a § 1983 claim.

Thomason v. Jernigan · filed 1991-07-17

As to the federal claims raised by the protestors, the City first says that any state action is not sufficient to support a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The argument lacks merit. This case is based on two resolutions passed by the Ann Arbor City Council. Nothing could more clearly be state action.

Section 1983 does not support a claim arising from execution on property when the plaintiff alleges neither an unconstitutional judgment or attachment procedure nor denial of an opportunity to contest the seizure.

Ruscitti v. Sackheim · filed 1991-08-29

And, state action may occur if the defendants use state legal proceedings so as to allow state officials to attach property on an unconstitutional basis. ... Here, however, Ruscitti does not allege that the judgment underlying the attachment was unconstitutionally obtained or that the statutory attachment proceeding is unconstitutional. Nor does she claim that the state refused her the opportunity to contest the seizure and sale of her property. ... Therefore, the trial court properly entered judgment against her on this claim.

Section 1983 requires state action; a released prisoner’s later assault is too remote from his release to qualify when officials knew of no special danger to the victim.

Browne v. Shasta County, Stephen S. Carlton, Sheriffs Department · filed 1991-08-29

Further, Browne's claim also fails to allege state action. Bradley's action was too remote a consequence of his release from prison to be characterized as state action, especially where the state officials were not aware that Browne, as opposed to the public at large, faced any special danger.

Section 1983 requires a complaint to allege state action to state a claim.

Fulkerson v. State of Ohio · filed 1991-11-21

Moreover, the complaint failed to state a claim in that it did not allege state action, and was barred by the statute of limitations and the immunity of several of the defendants, to list only its most glaring defects.

Section 1983 requires state action; an inmate’s assault on another inmate does not qualify unless the attacker acted in concert with state actors.

Lueker v. Steven J. Davies State of Kansas Joseph E. Muro · filed 1991-12-19

A beating by one inmate of another does not implicate state action unless the inmate acted in concert with state actors as in a conspiracy.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a political party’s candidate selection is not state action merely because state law creates the selection committee and a nonvoting state official chairs it.

Duke v. Smith · filed 1992-01-30

If the actions of the Committee were not taken “under color of state law,” then Plaintiffs have failed to establish a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, challenging the constitutionality of Florida Statute § 103.101. ... The fact that the Florida Statutes mandate the existence of a Presidential Candidate Selection Committee, currently comprised of three Republican leaders, three Democratic leaders and the Secretary of State, does not transform the actual operation of that Committee from internal party ... proceedings to state action.

Section 1983 claims against a store and its security guard require allegations showing state action.

Wagoner v. Stone & Thomas · filed 1992-03-11

After reviewing the record and hearing oral arguments, we are convinced that the district court properly concluded that the Wagoners could not demonstrate "state action" given the allegations in their complaint.

Section 1983 requires state action; a suit cannot proceed under it when no state action is involved.

Hines v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center · filed 1992-06-17

Hines could not maintain her suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because no state action was involved.

Section 1983 requires state action; state regulation of horse racing and tax revenue from racetracks do not alone make the racetracks’ conduct attributable to the state.

Guzowski v. Hartman · filed 1992-07-10

Judge Churchill, in dismissing the 42 U.S.C. section 1983 cause of action in the 1981 complaint, correctly determined that the state’s regulation of the horse racing industry did not include the allocation of stall space and that the state’s regulation of horse racing in Michigan and its. derivation of tax revenues from the racetracks did not support a “close nexus” nor “symbiotic relationship” between the state and the racetracks so that the actions of the racetracks could be fairly treated as the actions of the state.

Section 1983 requires state action; alleged mismanagement of racetrack personnel by a racing secretary does not satisfy that requirement.

Guzowski v. Hartman · filed 1992-08-12

Moreover, assuming arguendo that such allegations of improper management were charged in the complaint, they would not have constituted the required "state action" to support a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 does not permit a claim against private publishers who are not state actors.

John Robert Demos, Jr. v. Time Magazine USA Today the Seattle Times · filed 1992-10-05

These publishers are not state actors; thus, they are not amenable to suit under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendants acted under color of law; reliance on government contracts alone does not establish state action.

Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp. · filed 1992-10-26

To bring a section 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants were acting “under color of law.” In this case, we simply can discern no state action. The fact that defendants rely heavily on government contracts does not, by itself, transform their action into state action.

Section 1983 requires defendants to act under color of state law; state regulation of a private hospital alone does not establish state action.

Purgess v. Sharrock · filed 1992-10-29

Despite his claims to the contrary, Purgess cannot establish that defendants acted “under color of state law.” Even if the state does regulate hospitals, such regulation does not establish the requisite state action.

Section 1983 requires state action; receiving public funds alone does not make a private defendant a state actor.

Tsarelka v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute · filed 1992-11-02

Here, the only claim appellant makes is that the receipt of public funds by Dana-Farber renders it a state actor for purposes of § 1983. It has been clear since 1982, however, that the receipt of state funding, without more, does not convert a private defendant's conduct into state action.

Section 1983 does not reach a private bus company’s termination of a decertified driver when no state rule requires the termination and the company’s conduct is not attributable to the state.

Hill v. New York City Board of Education · filed 1992-11-12

Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence that Amboy’s decision to terminate him after his decertification was an action taken pursuant to a state rule of conduct. No ordinance or regulation of the Board required Amboy to terminate plaintiff after his decertification; the Board simply prohibited Amboy from permitting plaintiff to operate a bus on Board of Education bus routes. Further, plaintiff has not shown that Amboy personnel are state officials, that they acted together with state officials, or that their conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state.

Section 1983 requires state action.

Cabal v. U.S. Dept. of Justice · filed 1992-11-18

Regarding his section 1983 claims, Cabal has not shown state action as required.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to act under color of state law or, if a private party, to engage in conduct sufficiently connected to the state to qualify as state action.

Flagg v. Control Data · filed 1992-11-20

To have a viable claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must assert that the defendant is either one acting under color of state law (a state actor) or is a private citizen whose activity has a close enough nexus to the state to satisfy the state action requirement.

Section 1983 reaches private foster parents only when their actions are fairly attributable to the state.

Lintz v. Skipski · filed 1992-11-25

This Court finds that the Krauses are not state actors for purposes of § 1983. Their actions cannot be fairly attributable to the state.

Section 1983 does not permit claims against defendants who are not state actors.

Pool v. Ashcroft · filed 1992-12-07

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed defendants Wright, Knox, and Ulrich. These defendants are not state actors and cannot be sued under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a private party’s misuse of a state statute as state action.

Knubbe v. Sparrow · filed 1992-12-14

While the procedures established by a statute are the products of state action, a private party’s misuse of a state statute is not state action.

Section 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor.

Norman John Bailey, Jr. v. Tayloe Associates, Incorporated · filed 1992-12-21

Also, Bailey did not sue a state actor as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 liability requires a defendant to be a state actor, and immunity can bar a claim against a defendant.

Stewart v. Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas Co. · filed 1992-12-22

The district court correctly concluded that three of the defendants were immune from prosecution and that the remaining defendants were not state actors for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 requires state action; a defendant's attorney and prior state court proceedings over a lease do not establish it.

Chapman v. Chaparral Mobile Village Associates · filed 1993-01-12

Here, Chapman's contention that the defendant's attorney is a state actor and that previous state court proceedings involving the lease dispute established the requisite state action is without legal basis.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation caused by a state actor; private psychiatrists and their attorneys do not satisfy that requirement by disclosing confidential information.

McInerney v. David Richman, M.D. · filed 1993-02-01

Because the psychiatrists and their attorneys are not "state actors," McInerney fails the second prong of the section 1983 test as well.

Section 1983’s state action requirement is not satisfied merely because a private volunteer fire company provides fire protection in Maryland, where that function has not traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of the state.

Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc. · filed 1993-02-10

This Court does not find that the precedent cited by the plaintiff indicates that, in Maryland generally and Cecil County in particular, fire protection has traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of the State. Thus, defendant’s firefighting activities do not serve to satisfy the “public function” test, and plaintiffs argument that the Fire Company operated as a “state actor” in so performing is without merit.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking to establish state action through a conspiracy between a private defendant and a state judge must plead facts showing agreement and concerted action; conclusory allegations are insufficient.

Washington v. Russell Hall, Judge Doug Friesen, Attorney Ronald M. Shaw · filed 1993-03-01

When a § 1983 plaintiff attempts to assert the necessary state action by implicating state judges in a conspiracy with private defendants, mere conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and concerted action.

Section 1983 requires state action and does not cover claims against federal parole officials who are not state actors.

Noll v. Shoquist · filed 1993-03-04

The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Noll's claims brought under section 1983 because the defendants are not state actors.

A private litigant does not act under color of state law for § 1983 merely by resorting to a state court; more is required to make the litigant a joint actor with the judge.

Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico for the District of Arecibo · filed 1993-03-09

It is obvious, nonetheless, that something more than mere resort to a state court is required to transform the moving party into "a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge."

Section 1983 does not permit suit against North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services or its attorneys because they are not state actors.

Solomon v. Naef · filed 1993-05-06

Regarding the merits of Solomon's appeal, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the basis that NCPLS and its attorneys are not state actors amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.