42 U.S.C. § 1983

A state law tort claim alone does not support a § 1983 action without factual allegations giving rise to a constitutional violation.

Morris v. Linebarger · filed 2001-04-12

Morris may have a state law tort action against Linebarger, but such a claim is not the basis for a § 1983 action which requires allegations of facts giving rise to a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 claims do not require prior compliance with California’s Government Claims Act.

Ford v. Cohn · filed 2002-08-05

The plaintiffs correctly argue that they were not required to comply with California’s Government Claims Act in order to pursue their § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a state law tort without a constitutional deprivation.

Stalter v. State · filed 2002-08-09

Finally, as the Baker Court noted, a state law tort claim alone cannot be the basis of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for state-law tort claims against private media defendants.

Johnson v. Lufkin Daily News · filed 2002-09-17

Johnson’s state-law tort claims against the private media defendants are not cognizable in a § 1983 suit.

Section 1983 provides no remedy for a prisoner's tort claims against prison officials.

Thomas v. Rochell · filed 2002-09-18

A prisoner has no remedy under § 1983 to pursue tort claims against prison officials.

Section 1983 damages claims concerning state taxes are barred from federal district court by comity when the taxpayer has a plain, adequate, and complete state court remedy.

Heuser v. San Juan County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2006-01-10

Moreover, although 28 U.S.C. § 1341 on its face does not proscribe jurisdiction with regard to claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principle of comity prohibits federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over § 1983 damage claims where the taxpayer has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy in state court to correct any violations of their federal rights.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to the Indiana Tort Claims Act.

Cantrell v. Morris · filed 2006-06-21

Specifically, the ITCA does not apply to claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow a state-law claim to be litigated in federal court merely because the defendant is a state actor and the plaintiff calls the claimed interest a property interest.

Goros, Louis v. Cook County · filed 2007-06-11

The reason Moor was important is that §1983 and §1331 in combination do not allow state-law claims to be litigated in federal court just because the defendant is a state actor and the plaintiff takes care to assert that state law creates a “property interest.”

Section 1983 claims for federal constitutional violations are not barred by Indiana’s restriction on judicial review of corrections agency actions.

Smith v. Indiana Department of Correction · filed 2007-08-10

Our supreme court has recognized that the Indiana Tort Claims Act does not apply to claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which confers a private action for damages for federal constitutional violations. Id. Likewise, Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-2-5(6) would not apply to such federal claims.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a state-law professional-misconduct claim against private attorneys.

Flores v. Matthews & Branscomb · filed 2007-08-22

In that regard, a state-law claim against the defendant attorneys for professional misconduct is not a basis for § 1983 relief.

A § 1983 damages claim that would call a state conviction into question must be dismissed as a matter of comity while the prisoner’s direct criminal appeal is pending.

Crane v. Gasparini · filed 1989-09-12

For these reasons, this Court believes that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim would call into question the validity of plaintiff’s state court conviction presently before the Illinois Appellate Court. The Court finds the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Hanson and Crump controlling to the extent that, as a matter of comity, plaintiff’s claim for damages must be dismissed during the pendency of plaintiff’s direct criminal appeal in the state court.

Section 1983 does not encompass state tort claims without a deprivation of a federally protected right.

Smith v. Dominick Spina, Individually and as Director of the Police Department of the City of Newark, N. J. · filed 1973-04-24

We have no hesitancy in concluding, therefore, that appellant’s counsel proceeded under fundamental misapprehensions that § 1983 subsumed these state tort causes of action.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of a state constitution.

Johnson-Bey v. Indiana Department of Corrections · filed 2009-10-20

The Plaintiffs’ claim that the Defendants’ actions violated provisions of the Indiana Constitution states no claim upon which relief can be granted under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a garden variety slip-and-fall injury.

Flowers v. CITY OF NEW YORK (DOCS) · filed 2009-10-22

Any claim against the City for the slip and fall that resulted in plaintiffs ankle injury — a garden variety tort — is not cognizable under Section 1983 and must be litigated in state court, Young v. County of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899, 902 (2d Cir.1998).

Section 1983 cannot be used to vindicate rights created by state law, including state-law assault and battery claims.

Sanders v. City of Dothan · filed 2009-11-30

Not only is this heading inconsistent with the text of Count II itself, which seeks damages under only Alabama state law, but it also contravenes the well-settled rule that plaintiffs may not use § 1983 to vindicate state-law causes of action like assault and battery.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a violation of state tort law alone.

Bala v. Stenehjem · filed 2009-11-30

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a remedy for a violation of state tort law.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for state law claims.

Preston v. City of Pleasant Hill · filed 2011-06-21

A plaintiff may not bring a state claim under the aegis of § 1983, so if Count II states a plausible claim, our jurisdiction is predicated on § 1367(a), not § 1331.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a claim that prison officials misapplied a state-law exemption from a medical co-payment.

Peter Poole, III v. Issacs · filed 2012-12-28

But that is just a state-law question that cannot be pursued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on entitlement to a state-law exemption from a prison medical co-payment.

Peter Poole, III v. Issacs · filed 2013-01-02

But that is just a state-law question that cannot be pursued under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state spousal-privilege law.

Payne v. Benton County · filed 2013-07-15

Finally, to the extent that Payne is raising a state-law claim concerning the spousal privilege, it is not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of state law.

Feldon Bush, Sr. v. Rendell · filed 2013-08-14

We decline to address Allen’s argument that his transfer violated Pennsylvania law because that claim is not cognizable in an action under § 1983.

The Indiana Tort Claims Act does not bar § 1983 claims based on alleged federal constitutional violations.

Wilson-El v. Esteb · filed 2014-09-29

“Specifically, the ITCA does not apply to claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. Accordingly, the Defendants’ reliance on ITCA is not a reason for dismissing the claims based on purported federal ... constitutional violations.

Section 1983 claims premised on torts are evaluated by reference to analogous state torts.

DeJesus v. City of New York · filed 2014-10-28

In § 1983 actions premised on tort claims, courts are to look to the analogous state torts.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a tort alone.

Bailey v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail · filed 2015-01-21

that his complaint alleged a tort claim not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). ... Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.

Kansas Tort Claims Act immunity does not apply to § 1983 claims.

Stead v. Unified School District No. 259 · filed 2015-03-13

The KTCA does not provide immunity from plaintiff’s defamation and false light claims, see Polson, 635 F.Supp. at 1153 (holding that though the KTCA shields from liability a government employee’s decision to terminate a subordinate, its protections do not extend to defamatory statements to third parties about the basis for termination), breach of good faith and fair dealing claim, see Pizza Mgmt., Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 737 F.Supp. 1154, 1167 (D.Kan.1990) (holding that breach of good faith and fair dealing is a contract action, not a tort), intentional interference with business expectancy claim, see Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Republic, Kan., 582 F.3d 1155, 1171 (10th Cir.2009) (noting that KTCA does not bar claims against government officials for intentional torts) and her § 1983 claims, see Kjorlie v. Lundin, No. 91-4040-DES, 1993 WL 142823, at *10 n. 11 (D.Kan. Apr. 9, 1993) (holding that the KTCA does not apply to § 1983 claims).

Section 1983 requires personal participation and does not provide a cause of action for state common-law negligence against state officials.

Sherman v. Klenke · filed 2016-06-23

But the personal-participation requirement exists only for claims raised under § 1983, and a state common-law negligence claim cannot properly be raised against state officials under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a violation of state law alone.

Rustin Smith v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 2018-04-12

Thus, the sole claim at trial was brought pursuant to § 1983. A “claim for violation of state law is not cognizable under § 1983.” Cornejo v. Cnty. of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 855 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990)). Thus, the court was correct to refuse the instruction to the extent that it asserted a state law violation.

Section 1983 remedies violations of federal rights, not tort claims for which adequate state law remedies are available.

Kessing v. Western Virginia Regional Jail · filed 2019-10-15

Section 1983 actions were intended to vindicate federal rights and is not an appropriate remedy by which to raise tort claims for which there are adequate state law remedies.

Section 1983 provides the basis for a damages claim concerning confinement in a state detention center when the complaint names no federal officials.

Curtis v. Nix · filed 2019-10-21

However, Plaintiff’s claims for damages allegedly arise from the conditions of his confinement in a state detention center in South Carolina, and no federal officials are named in the Complaint. This court has, therefore, considered this claim as a claim only pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against state officials based on alleged violations of state law.

Ohioans Against Corporate Bailouts v. LaRose · filed 2019-10-23

Accordingly, a claimant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which this suit is brought, may not obtain injunctive relief against state officials based on alleged violations of state law.

Section 1983 does not cover questions of state law.

Baker v. Crossroads · filed 2019-11-22

This proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not cover questions of state law.

Section 1983 claims do not require compliance with the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.

German v. Rhoades · filed 2019-12-09

In addition, compliance with the OGTCA is not required to bring § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for medical malpractice or other claims based only on state law.

McNeil v. Richland Correctional Medical · filed 2020-03-05

State law claims are not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not independently provide a cause of action for state law tort claims.

Jordan v. Flippin · filed 2020-03-06

Jordan’s state law tort claims against defendant Flippin are not independently actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a federal claim for violations based solely on state law.

McBride v. Davis-Director TDCJ-CID · filed 2020-03-25

To the extent plaintiff raises state law claims against the defendants, the claims are based in state law and do not raise cognizable federal claims for purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a personal injury tort based only on state law.

Robledo v. State of Ohio · filed 2020-04-27

Personal injury torts are state law claims not cognizable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Moten v. Dzurenda · filed 2020-07-20

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.

Section 1983 damages claims challenging state tax assessments are barred from federal court by comity when the state provides a procedurally adequate remedy.

The Legion of Christ, Incorporated v. Town of Mount Pleasant · filed 2020-07-27

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has access to procedurally adequate remedies in New York State court, the TIA and the principle of comity preclude this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 claims are not subject to dismissal under the Texas Tort Claims Act’s election-of-remedies provision.

Enriquez v. Morsy · filed 2020-08-18

A claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not constitute a suit brought “under this chapter.”

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for bringing state law claims.

REED v. LONG · filed 2020-10-27

But § 1983 is not a vehicle for bringing state law claims.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for bringing state law claims.

REED v. LONG · filed 2020-12-10

But § 1983 is not a vehicle for bringing state law claims.

Section 1983 provides a way to sue for violations of federal law or the Constitution, but not for state law tort claims.

Sims v. Mc Dilda · filed 2021-01-11

Of course, § 1983 only provides a mechanism for suing individuals for violations of federal laws and the United States Constitution, not state law tort claims. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is now attempting to bring these as claims under § 1983, they must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not reach private self-help repossessions merely because state statutes authorize them, absent sufficient state involvement.

Kirksey v. Theilig · filed 1972-11-30

In the context of these cases, it is our judgment that authorization of self-help repossessions is not enough to sufficiently involve the state in the acts of the defendants here for their acts to be action “under color of” state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and private self-help repossession authorized by state law does not meet that requirement without significant state involvement.

Adams v. Southern California First National Bank · filed 1973-10-04

We find that the State of California is not so significantly involved in the self-help repossession procedures undertaken by the creditors in these cases to permit this court to find the state action or conduct taken under color of state law required to establish a federal cause of action.

Section 1983 does not reach a privately conducted self-help repossession merely because state law authorizes the practice; the court found no state action or action under color of state law.

Johnson v. Associates Finance, Inc. · filed 1973-11-15

That section is the jurisdictional counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, upon which the plaintiff relies in Counts 3 and 4 to give her a claim for relief on the theory that the repossession complained of amounts to a denial “under color of state law” of her constitutional right to due process of law because it was accomplished without notice or-a pre-seizure hearing. ... Thus, state power, in a sense, was withdrawn and private decision-making substituted therefor by § 9-503 and § 9-504. Under these circumstances, this court can perceive no state action in this case.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a deprivation carried out under color of state law, and a state's mere enactment of private self-help remedies does not by itself make the private conduct state action.

Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. The Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis · filed 1973-12-06

It is our view that the State of Minnesota by the mere passage of the Article 9 “se'lf-help” remedies has not so significantly involved itself in the procedures followed by appellee bank as to constitute an act under color of state law giving rise to a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for private self-help repossession merely because state commercial-code provisions authorize it; the statute requires action under color of state law.

Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc. · filed 1974-04-25

[T]he State of Minnesota by the mere passage of the Article 9 “self-help” remedies has not so significantly involved itself in the procedures followed by appellee bank as to constitute an act under color of state law giving rise to a § 1983 action. ... We adhere to that view in the present cases.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for a private creditor’s self-help repossession and sale merely because state law authorizes the conduct or requires a state-issued certificate of ownership.

Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank · filed 1974-05-13

The appellant first contends the State of Missouri’s enactment of §§ 9-503 and 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which authorized the actions taken by the secured party here, amounted to such significant state involvement as to constitute action taken under color of state law. ... On the basis of this prior authority, we must reject this contention. ... The appellant also contends that the repossession and sale were conducted under color of law because the State of Missouri must issue a certificate of ownership for the automobile to allow its transfer by the secured party to the purchaser at the sale after repossession. We disagree.

Section 1983 does not reach a creditor’s private repossession under a permissive statute that merely codifies a preexisting contractual or common-law right without significant state involvement.

Turner v. Impala Motors · filed 1974-09-20

It is clear that in this case the state did not exert any control or compulsion over the creditor’s decision to repossess. The private activity was not commanded by the simply permissive statute. While mere existence of the statute might seem to suggest encouragement, we conclude that the effect of the statute is only to reduce a creditor’s risk in making repossessions.

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, and a private repossession under Kentucky's self-help statute did not satisfy that requirement.

Gary v. Henry Darnell, T/d/b/a Hank Darnell Motors · filed 1974-10-23

We follow this court’s decision in Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, decided September 20, 1974, and hold that the act of repossession pursuant to § 9-503 was not made under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a merchant's self-help authority under a shoplifting statute does not satisfy that requirement.

Battle v. Dayton-Hudson Corporation · filed 1975-08-22

In order to proceed under § 1983, it must be shown that the actions of the defendants were “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.” ... The court here finds the self-help and licensing rationale persuasive in its application to M.S.A. § 629.366. An examination of § 629.366 reveals that it too is only a self-help provision designed to help the merchant protect his property and provide him with immunity for certain actions. It only permits detention of a suspect for a limited purpose and does not grant the merchant the authority to “arrest”. ... The court concludes that defendants here were not acting under “color of state law” when the alleged deprivation of rights occurred and thus the court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter based on the 1983 claim.

A creditor's repossession of a truck without a prior judicial hearing is not action under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.

Bennett v. Ford Motor Credit Co. · filed 1988-05-05

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant illegally repossessed the plaintiff's truck without a prior judicial hearing. The district court entered an opinion holding that the defendant did not act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741, 742 (6th Cir.1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir.1974). We agree with the conclusions of the district court for the reasons stated in its opinion.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private repossessor whose conspiracy with police makes the repossession state action.

Lisa A. Johnson, D.D.S. v. B.H. Liquidation Corporation City of Hayward South West Leasing, Inc. · filed 1992-04-21

Such police involvement in repossession can constitute a conspiracy and make the private repossessor liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a conspiracy with police to treat a private company’s repossession as state action; police presence or independent assistance alone does not make the company liable.

Lisa A. Johnson, D.D.S., and Lisa A. Johnson v. B.H. Liquidation Corporation Southwest Leasing and Rental, Inc. · filed 1994-02-10

Johnson's opposition fails to establish a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of a conspiracy between the police officers and Southwest and therefore as to any state action by Southwest. At most, the evidence indicates that the police were present at Johnson's residence during the repossession and perhaps acted independently to assist the tow truck operator who was employed only as an independent contractor by Southwest. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 n. 66 (1978) (there is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability under section 1983). Accordingly, because Southwest's repossession of Johnson's automobile did not constitute state action for purposes of section 1983 liability, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for Southwest.

Section 1983 does not let creditors bypass a state insurance liquidation priority scheme by suing receivers as representatives of the estate.

Arlans Agency, Inc., in No. 93-2395, in No. 94-1079 v. Dykema Gossett, in No. 93-2395, in No. 94-1079 · filed 1995-01-19

As far as claims against them as representatives of the estate are concerned, however, Congress did not intend Sec. 1983 to enable creditors to circumvent state statutory schemes for liquidating insolvent insurance companies, thereby jumping to the head of the distribution line in liquidation proceedings.

A private party does not satisfy Section 1983’s state-policy requirement by acting unlawfully under a constitutional state statute.

William Burl Roudybush and Ruth J. Roudybush v. Ralph W. Zabel, Zabel Ltd. And First National Bank in Lenox · filed 1987-04-01

State policy is not implicated when an injured party claims that a private party has violated a constitutional post-judgment procedural statute in the course of depriving the injured party of his property. To the contrary, the state, by enacting the statute, has expressly condemned a deprivation by such means.

A private creditor’s use of state foreclosure law, without more, does not state a Section 1983 claim.

Kolb v. Naylor · filed 1987-03-27

However, use of state law to foreclose is not sufficient to allege a claim under § 1983.

A private creditor acts under color of state law when it invokes a fully complied-with state garnishment procedure that is itself challenged as unconstitutional.

Jackson v. Galan · filed 1986-03-27

She does not allege abuse or misuse of the Louisiana codal scheme. Instead, she avers that the State procedure, fully complied with by the defendants, has resulted in an unconstitutional deprivation of her property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. That complaint is perfectly suited to a § 1983 cause of action.

A private creditor’s mere use of state procedures to enforce a judgment does not constitute joint participation with state officials under Section 1983 when the creditor does not challenge the constitutionality of the procedure.

Steele v. Stephan · filed 1986-03-27

The court finds that because the plaintiff in this case has not alleged any constitutional attack on any Kansas statute, and because he alleges that the enforcement of judgment was not performed in accordance with the requirements of Kansas law, the court finds he fails to present a valid cause of action under § 1983.

A guilty plea is not a complete defense to a § 1983 action challenging the search that produced evidence for the conviction.

Collins v. Bruns · filed 2006-07-13

The district court also erred in concluding Collins’s guilty plea was a complete defense to his section 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a policymaker when the official established or enforced policies and practices that directly caused a constitutional violation.

Nifas v. Belles · filed 2020-11-19

To establish a claim against a policymaker under §1983 a plaintiff must allege and prove that the official established or enforced policies and practices directly causing the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an individual policymaker without a policy, practice or custom established or maintained by that person that directly caused constitutional harm.

Carter v. Phelps · filed 2020-02-20

Nor does the record support a finding of § 1983 liability based upon Defendant's position as a policymaker. ... Plaintiff has not identified a policy, practice or custom established or maintained by Defendant that ... directly caused Plaintiff constitutional harm.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a district attorney’s actions concerning arrests when the attorney lacks final policymaking authority over arrests.

Walker v. Stroman · filed 2019-09-30

Thus, Reyna’s prosecutorial goals and strategies are irrelevant to whether he was the final policymaker in the area of ordering and making arrests, because he had no authority to dictate policy in that area. Accordingly, the County cannot be held liable for Reyna’s individual actions.

Consulting a final policymaker does not itself give an employee final policymaking authority for purposes of § 1983 entity liability.

Fox v. Rice · filed 2011-02-24

However, conferring or consulting with one who has final policymaking authority does not mean Willis himself was bestowed with final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 does not make a school district liable on a final policymaker theory when an official permits a search but does not authorize the challenged strip search.

Thomas v. Clayton County Board of Education · filed 1999-09-29

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Robert’s authorization to Morgan did not constitute an express statement of policy authorizing a strip search and hence the Clayton County School District is not liable as a result of her decision as a final policymaker.

Section 1983 permits liability against a local government body for a single unconstitutional decision by the body when it has final policymaking authority over that decision.

Denton v. Morgan · filed 1996-09-18

Thus, this Court holds that, as a matter of law, the boards were the ultimate repository of the power to terminate Plaintiffs and, in exercising that power, they assumed liability for any attendant violation of Denton’s and Savage’s constitutional rights.

A municipal official’s authority to make a particular decision does not alone make that official a final policymaker whose decision creates Section 1983 municipal liability.

Bey v. Saginaw County · filed 1986-12-17

The mere fact that an official has authority to make particular decisions in a given area does not necessarily mean that the official has final policymaking authority with respect to that area or those decisions.

A single constitutional deprivation can constitute municipal policy under § 1983 when it results from a deliberate choice by an official with final policymaking authority over the subject.

Walker v. City of Chicago · filed 1986-10-16

Accordingly, this Court rules that plaintiff properly pled the second § 1983 requirement, that the constitutional deprivation was caused by a government official acting in accordance with a municipal policy. Therefore, plaintiff stated a § 1983 cause of action.

A deliberate course of action chosen by officials with final policymaking authority can state a cognizable Section 1983 municipal-liability claim, even if based on a single decision.

Maze v. City of Fond Du Lac · filed 1986-09-24

Maze claims that their chosen course of action caused the unconstitutional taking of his property. Thus, the Amended Complaint, together with evidence in the record, shows that the plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim for municipal liability under section 1983.

A governmental entity is liable under Section 1983 when an official acting within the scope of final policymaking authority inflicts a constitutional injury, even without a generally stated policy.

Pangilinan v. Castro · filed 1986-01-24

The unconstitutional actions of Castro are also the unconstitutional actions of the Commonwealth. Where the "execution of a government's policy... by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy... inflicts the injury," the government is liable under § 1983 for the resulting damages.

Municipal liability under Section 1983 attaches to a single deliberate choice among alternatives by an official with final policymaking authority over the subject matter.

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1986-03-25

We hold that municipal liability under §1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in ... .

A municipality is liable under Section 1983 for a single decision only when an official with final policymaking authority deliberately chooses the challenged course of action.

DiFranco v. City of Chicago · filed 1986-07-22

Specifically, municipal liability under § 1983 can attach “where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.”

A city may be liable under Section 1983 when municipal policy or custom delegates final policymaking authority to an official and that official acts unconstitutionally pursuant to the delegated authority.

Williams v. Butler · filed 1986-09-26

Consequently, we hold that where, pursuant to municipal policy or custom, an official is delegated final policy-making authority, and acts unconstitutionally pursuant to that authority, the official's conduct may fairly be said to be that of the city, and the city may be held liable under Sec. 1983.

A municipal official’s discretionary decision does not create Section 1983 municipal liability when the official lacks final policymaking authority over that subject.

Brockhoff v. Leary · filed 1986-11-18

Leary and Mitchell had discretion within the guidelines of § 2-324 in making promotion decisions, but they did not have responsibility “for establishing final government policy” respecting promotion activity for the City. Their exercise of discretion in not promoting plaintiff can not be said to represent the official policy of the City.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when it effectively delegates final policymaking authority to employees whose decisions then constitute municipal policy.

Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School District · filed 1986-12-24

Where there was an effective delegation of power to make final employment policy to the principal and superintendent, Colorado law notwithstanding, their decisions constitute the district’s final employment policy and as such give rise to municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a final policymaker’s decision only when the decision is a deliberate choice consciously made among alternatives; merely exercising delegated discretion is insufficient.

Krisko v. Oswald · filed 1987-01-14

Where a municipality has delegated the power to establish final policy to a municipal official, that official’s decisions represent municipal policy and can give rise to municipal liability, but only when the official’s decision can be termed “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action” and the course was “consciously chosen from among various alternatives”. ... Moreover, where the official has discretion to act, the exercise of that discretion, without more, cannot give rise to municipal liability.

A single constitutional deprivation can satisfy Section 1983’s municipal-policy requirement when it implements a deliberately chosen command by an official with final policymaking authority over the subject.

O'DONNELL v. Village of Downers Grove · filed 1987-03-23

Section 1983 liability may attach to a single incident of constitutional deprivation where a municipal officer implements a mandated course of action that was deliberately chosen from various alternatives by officers responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. ... The ... Monell ... “policy” requirement is satisfied when enforcement of a direct command given by a municipal policymaker results in a constitutional deprivation.

A municipal official's individual vote is not official municipal policy for § 1983 purposes when state law gives final policymaking authority only to the governing body acting by majority.

Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo · filed 1987-10-30

Under California law, Mankins did not have final authority to establish the County’s official policy regarding participation in decision-making by an official with a conflict of interest. The Board of Supervisors may only establish official policy by a majority of the supervisors.

Section 1983 permits public entity liability for a single unconstitutional act sanctioned or ordered by officials with final policymaking authority.

Suarez v. Illinois Valley Community College · filed 1988-06-09

When government officials with final policymaking authority sanction or order an unconstitutional act, the act is one “for which the municipality itself is actually responsible.”

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a single act by an official with final policymaking authority over the action.

McNamara v. City of Chicago · filed 1988-07-29

Where the final policymaking official acts in the area in which he is authorized to act, municipal liability attaches.

Section 1983 does not make a county liable for a state judge’s bond schedule when the judge is not a county official with final policymaking authority for the county.

Woods v. City of Michigan City · filed 1988-09-06

Under that law, the court must conclude that Judge Keppen, although the policymaker with the final policymaking authority for bond schedules causing Mr. Woods’ detention, is not a county official for purposes of § 1983 to attribute liability to LaPorte County.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for an unconstitutional act taken by an official to whom it delegated final policymaking authority over the relevant subject.

Williams v. Butler · filed 1988-12-21

But by delegating final policymaking authority to Butler the City exposed itself to liability for any unconstitutional actions taken by him pursuant to that authority.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for a sheriff’s decision when the county has delegated final policymaking authority over that decision to the sheriff.

Stephen D. Zook, Cross-Appellee v. Joseph T. Brown, William v. Mosher and Champaign County, Cross-Appellants · filed 1989-01-17

It is clear that the Merit Commission delegated to Sheriff Brown the rule-making and disciplinary authority at issue here. The Commission’s delegation was in turn approved by the County Board. All of this leads to the conclusion that Sheriff Brown was “responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.”

A municipality is liable under § 1983 when its mayor, acting as the final policymaker for municipal employment, unconstitutionally discharges employees.

Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez · filed 1989-01-24

The Municipality of Moca was liable as a matter of law for an unconstitutional discharge of its municipal employees by the Mayor.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when an official with final policymaking authority under state law directs the challenged action.

Kosta v. Connolly · filed 1989-03-15

This language makes clear that Mayor Connolly possessed final authority with respect to the issuance of citations to plaintiffs. Thus, Monell does not shield the Borough from liability.

A municipality and an official with final policymaking authority may be liable under § 1983 when they actively participate in an unconstitutional decision.

Thompson v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago · filed 1989-03-21

17. In this case, defendants Board and Byrd exercised their statutory “final policy-making authority” and actively participated in both the decision to transfer Thompson and the decision to deny her “selected status.” Because the conduct of the Board and Byrd was more than a “mere failure to take corrective action,” the Board and Byrd, in his official capacity, are liable to Thompson under Section 1983.

Section 1983 makes a county liable for a constitutional injury caused by an official’s decision when the county has delegated final policymaking authority over that decision to the official.

Rose Marie Starrett v. Wadley · filed 1989-05-22

Because the County had delegated to Wadley the power to establish final policy concerning hiring and firing personnel within his department, the County is liable for Wadley's conduct in that regard.

Section 1983 permits municipal damages liability when a final policymaker ratifies an unconstitutional action as municipal policy.

Melton v. City Of Oklahoma City · filed 1989-06-21

We now hold that the firing was done pursuant to a "municipal policy" which was ratified by the "final policymaking authority" as identified by state statute and local ordinance. Consequently, Oklahoma City is liable in damages to Mr. Melton under section 1983 for the violation of his First Amendment rights and liberty interest without due process of law.

Whether a municipality is liable under § 1983 based on the actions of a final policymaker is a question of law for the court.

Melton v. City of Oklahoma City · filed 1989-06-21

In applying these principles to the present case, we start by noting that, as an issue of law, this court can examine and determine the liability of Oklahoma City under the standard and considerations outlined in Praprotnik.

A municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an official’s conduct when the official lacks final policymaking authority.

Washington v. Lake County, Ill. · filed 1989-07-05

Since, Lt. Frossard is not a municipal official with “final policy making authority” his conduct cannot subject the County to potential § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 imposes municipal liability for personnel decisions only when the responsible official has final policymaking authority; decisions subject to civil service commission review are not final.

Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis · filed 1989-07-28

As a general rule, decisions of the mayor and aldermen which specifically address and adversely affect individual employees are not "final" for purposes of Sec. 1983 because those decisions are subject to review by the Commission.

Section 1983 permits liability against a school board for a counselor’s conduct only if the board delegated final policymaking authority over the challenged policy to the counselor.

Arnold v. Board Of Education Of Escambia County · filed 1989-08-10

In this case, the complaint alleges that the school board delegated to Rose final decisionmaking authority regarding counseling. This allegation is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6). However, to impose liability on the school board, the appellants must establish in district court that the school board delegated to Rose final policymaking authority as to whether the board's policy would be to favor or disfavor abortion.

A municipality is liable under § 1983 for an official’s act only if the official had final policymaking authority over that act; effective city council review can leave that authority with the council.

Worsham v. The City of Pasadena · filed 1989-08-31

The City Council, not the two officials, was the repository of final policymaking authority; the prospect of liability under Monell was therefore foreclosed.

A city is not liable under § 1983 when the official who caused a constitutional violation lacked final policymaking authority and the final policymaker did not violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Wulf v. The City of Wichita, Gene Denton, and Richard Lamunyon · filed 1989-10-31

We hold that the district court erred in concluding that LaMunyon was an official policymaker whose actions can bind the City. Because we have held that Denton, who was the official policymaker, did not violate Wulf’s constitutional rights when he decided to terminate him, we find no liability on the part of the City.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional acts by an official to whom it delegated final policymaking authority over the relevant subject.

Mandel v. John Doe (Name Unknown, an Escambia County Prison Employee), Escambia County, Florida · filed 1989-12-12

Because Hatfield had been delegated the final policymaking authority with respect to medical affairs at the prison, his acts of deliberate indifference can be attributed to the County so as to establish municipal liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a county for an employee’s discrimination absent evidence that the deprivation resulted from a county custom or policy adopted by a final policymaker.

Maddox v. County of San Mateo · filed 1990-03-26

The court sees no evidence in the record of the County participating in any affirmative decision to discriminate. Therefore, finding that the requirements of Monell and Pembaur are not satisfied, we hereby GRANT summary judgment in favor of the County on plaintiff’s claim for violation of § 1983.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its final policymaker establishes a policy that causes the plaintiff’s injury, and allegations to that effect can survive a motion to dismiss.

Biondolillo v. City of Sunrise · filed 1990-05-04

The plaintiff, therefore, has alleged that a policy exists that could hold the City liable, and that such a policy was established by such high ranking members of the City’s government as would lead to the City’s liability.

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 for an official’s single decision only if the official has final policymaking authority under state law in the relevant area.

Gilmore v. O'Brien · filed 1990-06-21

Second, an official must have "final policymaking authority" in order to subject the municipality to liability. ... Although DiJulio, as a King County deputy prosecutor, had authority to give advice to local police, he had no authority to order the Kirkland Police to do anything.

A city cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an isolated unconstitutional act absent a municipal policy authorized by a final policymaker.

Auriemma v. City of Chicago · filed 1990-08-31

In the absence of a showing that a municipal policy was authorized by a final policymaker, the City cannot be held liable for an isolated incident of unconstitutional misconduct.

Section 1983 permits county liability when a sheriff who is the final policymaker for county law enforcement abuses that authority to deprive a person of rights, if the other requirements for liability are met.

Mary Turner, A/K/A Mary Turner Hind, a Feme Sole v. Upton County, Texas · filed 1990-09-11

When the official representing the ultimate repository of law enforcement power in the county makes a deliberate decision to abuse that power to the detriment of its citizens, county liability under section 1983 must attach, provided that the other prerequisites for finding liability under that section are satisfied.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable solely for an official’s actions when that official lacks final policymaking authority.

Payung v. Williamson · filed 1990-09-26

Accordingly, because Williamson was not a “final policy-maker” of the City of Cochran, Defendant City cannot be held liable based solely upon Williamson’s actions in terminating Plaintiff as fire chief.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a decision by an official with final policymaking authority, including authority delegated by a municipal policymaker; a factual dispute over that delegation precludes summary judgment.

Blum v. Waukesha County · filed 1990-10-25

The question of whether or not Caldwell was a policymaker when she obtained the capias for Blum’s arrest is a mixed question of law and fact. The record in this case, however, does not permit this court to determine either (1) if Wisconsin law provides that Caldwell was a policymaker when she decided to obtain a capias for Blum’s arrest or (2) if a Waukesha policymaker delegated to Caldwell the authority to be Waukesha’s final decisionmaker for deciding when to obtain a capias. This second determination is a question of material fact, and therefore summary judgment cannot be granted at this time.

Section 1983 does not make a municipality liable for an official’s conduct unless the conduct implements municipal policy or is attributable to an official with final policymaking authority.

Raben-Pastal v. City of Coconut Creek · filed 1990-12-06

Thus, unless it can be demonstrated that the guiding principles established in Praprotnik apply to action taken by a municipal official or employee, the municipality cannot be held liable for the conduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioners have failed to show that Cowley possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the alleged constitutional violation. Under the provisions of the South Florida Building Code, Cowley does not have final policy-making authority over the action alleged to have caused the constitutional violation nor was he carrying out an official policy of the city when he denied petitioner's request to lift the stop-work orders.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a city based on the acts or omissions of an official with final policymaking authority.

Fisher v. City of Cincinnati · filed 1990-12-13

Plaintiff has adequately alleged a § 1983 claim against the City by virtue of the acts and omissions of Scott Johnson, who possessed final policymaking authority.

A § 1983 plaintiff who alleges injury from an unconstitutional municipal policy may sue the municipality and officials who acted under that policy without alleging that the officials had final policymaking authority.

Ceko v. Martin · filed 1990-12-27

Since Ceko alleges that his injury resulted from an unconstitutional municipal policy, he may sue the municipal entity as well as the municipal officials who acted pursuant to that municipal policy — i.e., Holton and Martin. ... Consequently, Ceko is not required to allege that Holton and Martin possessed final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a police chief’s decision when the chief has final policymaking authority over that decision.

Lester v. CITY OF ROSEDALE, MISS. · filed 1991-02-14

As for plaintiff’s claim of excessive force under the fourth and fourteenth amendments against the City of Rosedale and Arbuckle in his official capacity, the court finds that Arbuckle, as chief of police of the city, enjoyed sufficient policymaking authority to create municipal liability on these facts.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a constitutional injury caused by an employee’s abuse of discretion when the employee lacked final policymaking authority and the municipality did not authorize, customarily permit, or ratify the act.

Krmencik v. Town of Plattekill · filed 1991-03-04

When an alleged infringement of a constitutionally protected right is traced to an abuse of discretion by a municipal employee, no municipal liability exists under § 1983.

A city may be liable under § 1983 for an action by its final policymaker or for a persistent and widespread practice that constitutes municipal policy.

Robert Wade Wetzel, Jr. v. Lawrence Hoffman, City of Sunrise, a Florida Municipal Corporation · filed 1991-04-11

However, a city can be liable under § 1983 on the basis of the two theories which are asserted by Wetzel in this case. ... First, Sunrise could be liable if a particular retaliatory action against Wetzel were taken by a city official who was the final policymaker for the city in matters encompassing that action. ... Second, Wetzel has contended that there was a persistent and widespread practice with respect to the alleged retaliatory actions sufficient to demonstrate a custom or policy of the city. The law is well established that such a showing can constitute the basis of municipal liability.

A municipality is not liable under Section 1983 for officials’ unconstitutional acts when those officials lack final policymaking authority over the action at issue.

Sturgess v. Negley · filed 1991-04-24

This series of decisions has provided us with standards for municipal liability under Section 1983 to which a majority of the Supreme Court has agreed. ... Thus, Negley and Clower did not possess “final policymaking authority” for the Town of Fenwick Island as to terminations. As a result, even if Negley and Clower did actually violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by terminating them without providing procedural due process, their actions are not chargeable to the municipality.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for its sheriff’s operation of a county jail when the sheriff has final policymaking authority for the county over the jail.

Dotson v. Chester · filed 1991-07-11

County liability for the Sheriff's operation of the County Jail depends on whether the Sheriff had final policymaking authority for the County over the County Jail.

A city is liable under § 1983 for a police policy only if it has final policymaking authority over the officers’ conduct.

Crigler v. City of St. Louis, Mo. · filed 1991-07-15

The division of authority between the City and the Board of Police Commissioners set forth in Mo.Rev.Stat. § 84.010 indicates that neither the City nor its agents possess the authority to make official policy concerning the actions of the Board of Police Commissioners or individual police officers. Therefore, the City cannot, as a matter of law, be liable under section 1983 as an official policy maker responsible for approving or condoning the actions of the police officers who allegedly beat the plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability based on acts of final policymakers, including their decisions and ratification of others’ decisions.

Kamenesh v. City of Miami · filed 1991-07-15

While reserving final ruling for trial, it appears from the record that — at the very least — the decisions of the two police chiefs involved and the direct and indirect ratification of those decisions by two different city managers concerning the incidents complained of constitute acts by “final policymakers” as established by Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) and its progeny. Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendants on the lack of municipal liability would be inappropriate.

A city or county is liable under § 1983 only for an unconstitutional municipal policy initiated by an official with final policymaking authority for that municipality; a state judge’s bond directive does not qualify as such a policy.

Woods v. City of Michigan City · filed 1991-08-15

No municipal liability attaches in this case because the judge under Indiana law is not such an official vis a vis the city and county. The city and county cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless Woods proved the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy initiated by a final policymaker for the municipalities.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single employee act only if the employee has final policymaking authority; a department head whose layoff decisions are governed and reviewable under city law lacks that authority.

City of Houston v. Leach · filed 1991-09-26

Ford’s single act of terminating Leach subjects the city to liability only if Ford was a final policymaking authority. ... Hence, we find there is no evidence to support the jury’s finding that Leach’s termination was the result of a City policy, practice, or custom and we sustain appellants’ seventh point of error.

Section 1983 permits an equal protection claim against a public entity when its final policymaker ratifies a subordinate's challenged employment decision.

Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority · filed 1992-02-03

So far as it can be shown that King exercised his authority by ratifying the decision, appellant's equal protection claim will survive under Praprotnik.

A public entity may be liable under § 1983 when its final policymaker ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional employment decision, even if the employee did not pursue an appeal to that same policymaker.

Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority · filed 1992-02-03

If King, as final policymaker and the ultimate arbiter of employment appeals, did in fact ratify the action against appellant, appellees cannot now be heard to complain that appellant failed to avail herself of a process leading back to the same final decisionmaker.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when its final policymaker knows of, approves, and adopts a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct and motive.

Butcher v. City of McAlester · filed 1992-02-12

In addition to evidence of direct actions by Green, the record also supports ratification by Green of Sander’s actions. Ratification requires that Green knew of and approved Sanders’ actions and adopted Sanders’ unconstitutional motive.

Section 1983 makes a county liable for an unconstitutional employment decision by an official with final policymaking authority over that decision.

Paxton v. Bearden · filed 1992-02-18

As Doyle was a final policymaker with respect to employment decisions involving deputy clerks like Paxton, the county, through its Board members in their official capacities, is liable for Paxton’s unconstitutional discharge.

Section 1983 does not require a verdict against the final policymaker before a municipality can be held liable for its own policy or custom.

Rhodes v. Raoul Linn, and City of El Monte · filed 1992-04-01

The Chief was dismissed on procedural grounds, and there is no requirement that the jury must hold the policymaker liable in order for it to hold the municipality liable.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an act of a final policymaker because that act is attributable to the municipality.

Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County · filed 1992-05-14

Thus, where the final policymaker acts, the municipality acts and can therefore be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose official-capacity liability for a subordinate’s discretionary personnel transfers when the subordinate lacks final policymaking authority and the policymaker merely fails to rescind them.

Fiorenzo v. Nolan · filed 1992-06-04

As we have found, the delegation of discretion to Chief Nolan to make low-level transfers within the Department and Sheriff Elrod's failure to rescind the plaintiffs' transfers are insufficient to demonstrate that Chief Nolan was delegated final policymaking authority to set employment policy in the Sheriff's Police Department.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a police chief’s isolated action when the chief lacks final policymaking authority over that conduct and remains subject to the police commission’s review.

Coming Up, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco · filed 1993-08-06

Even if the Chief has some policy-making role for the policy at issue, the evidence demonstrates that the Commission is the final authority on policy. The Chiefs decisions are reviewable. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Chief of Police is not the final policymaker with respect to the policy at issue here' and that the City’s motion, therefore, must be granted.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a police chief’s isolated act when the police commission retains final policymaking authority over the conduct and can review the chief’s decisions.

Coming Up, Inc. v. City of San Francisco · filed 1993-08-06

Even if the Chief has some policymaking role for the policy at issue, the evidence demonstrates that the Commission is the final authority on policy. The Chiefs decisions are reviewable. The City Charter provides that the Chief serves at the Commission’s pleasure and is immediately responsible to the Commission. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Chief of Police is not the final policymaker with respect to the policy at issue here and that the City’s motion, therefore, must be granted.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a single decision by a city manager with final policymaking authority over personnel who directs police officers to obtain an employee's resignation.

Hargray v. City of Hallandale · filed 1993-08-30

Municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. ... Intindola, the City Manager, had policy making authority with respect to personnel matters and directed the police officers to obtain Hargray’s resignation, therefore, the Court finds that the City Manager’s actions are attributable to the City.

Municipal liability under § 1983 based on an official’s policymaking authority requires unreviewable authority to set policy; a police chief whose policies require city council approval is not a final policymaker.

Ingram v. Lee · filed 1993-09-02

Although the chief of police and the city manager draft the written procedures and policies of the department, these procedures and policies are subject to final approval by the city council. Accordingly, it is the city council that retains final policy-making authority over the Homerville Police Department. ... The decision in Manor Healthcare makes it clear that for municipal liability to attach, the officer must have unreviewable authority to set policy.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on an Alabama county for its sheriff’s general law enforcement actions because the county has no law enforcement authority and the sheriff therefore does not act as its final policymaker in that area.

Swint v. City Of Wadley · filed 1993-11-03

We hold that Sheriff Morgan is not the final repository of Chambers County's general law enforcement authority, because it has none. Therefore, the County Commission is not liable for the Sheriff's law enforcement actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and it is entitled to summary judgment on the Sec. 1983 claims.

Under § 1983, a county may be liable for a policy adopted through delegated policymaking authority even if its commissioners did not directly formulate or order the challenged conduct.

Whitfield v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF EAGLE CTY. · filed 1993-11-09

No evidence presented indicates that the Commissioners compiled the indicators or instructed officers that a match constituted sufficient grounds to stop a motorist. This, however, does not preclude a finding of county liability, because authority to create county policy may be delegated. [13] Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). The application for funds to support the drug interdiction program names Officer Roybal as program director and Sheriff Johnson as financial officer, evidence that the Board delegated implementation of the interdiction program to them. There is also evidence that Sheriff Johnson and Officer Roybal instructed other officers that it was permissible to stop motorists based solely on their match to the indicators. Thus a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the practice challenged by the plaintiffs was a county policy.

Under § 1983, a county may be liable for an unconstitutional policy adopted through delegated policymaking authority.

Whitfield v. Board of County Commissioners · filed 1993-11-09

No evidence presented indicates that the Commissioners compiled the indicators or instructed officers that a match constituted sufficient grounds to stop a motorist. This, however, does not preclude a finding of county liability, because authority to create county policy may be delegated.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for a curfew imposed by a county official who had final policymaking authority over that decision.

Smith v. Avino · filed 1994-10-20

Under these circumstances, the Court must conclude that Avino acted with final policy-making authority in imposing and continuing the Curfew. ... Avino and the County thus can be held liable under section 1983.

Section 1983 municipal liability requires final policymaking authority; discretion over particular personnel decisions alone does not make an employee a final policymaker.

McGautha v. Jackson County, Missouri, Collections Department · filed 1994-11-14

Authority as to specific personnel decisions does not necessarily rise to the level of final policy making authority.

Section 1983 permits a county to be held liable for the policymaking actions of a sheriff who has final authority over the relevant county function.

Flood v. Hardy · filed 1994-11-21

In North Carolina, where the Sheriff is given exclusive control over the supervision of his employees, including deputies and jailers, the Sheriff may bind the county by his actions.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a single discretionary hiring decision by an official who lacks final policy-making authority.

Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, Iowa · filed 1995-01-09

Davis’s authority to make the specific personnel decision did not clothe her with policy-making authority. ... The City cannot be held liable for the single employment decision of Davis not to promote Mummelthie.

Section 1983 municipal liability cannot rest on a department’s general awareness of misconduct without showing that an official with final policymaking authority knew of it.

Thompson v. City of Norton · filed 1995-07-14

That statement does not prove a final policymaker's state of mind; even assuming that the department was, at some level, aware of Wright's history of misconduct, that general awareness does not demonstrate that someone with "final policymaking authority" knew of that history.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability when officials with final policymaking authority over the challenged action act pursuant to city policy.

Dertz v. City of Chicago · filed 1995-09-29

As individuals with final policymaking authority who are acting pursuant to official city policy, the actions of these two defendants subject the City to § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 can impose municipal liability for an official’s decision when the official has final policymaking authority, determined by meaningful policy constraints, meaningful review, and the scope of the official’s authority.

Randle v. City of Aurora · filed 1995-10-26

Guided by the general principles outlined above, we can identify three elements that help determine whether an individual is a “final policymaker”: (1) whether the official is meaningfully constrained “by policies not of that official’s own making;” (2) whether the official’s decision are final — i.e., are they subject to any meaningful review; and (3) whether the policy decision purportedly made by the official is within the realm of the official’s grant of authority.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for an official’s decision only if the official has authority to establish municipal policy; authority to make a final administrative decision alone does not suffice.

Radic v. Chicago Transit Authority · filed 1996-01-04

The fundamental flaw in Radic’s theory is its failure accurately to distinguish between authority to make administratively final decisions and authority to establish official municipal policy.

Section 1983 permits an official’s actions to subject a government to liability only if the official has final policymaking authority.

Brooks v. George County, MS · filed 1996-03-14

Only those officials who have "final policymaking authority" may by their actions subject the government to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits an official’s actions to subject a local government to liability only when the official has final policymaking authority for the relevant activity.

Brooks v. George County, Mississippi, George County, Mississippi, Cross-Appellee, Wilbur Ward and Earl Koskela · filed 1996-05-16

Only those officials who have “final policymaking authority” may by their actions subject the government to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

An official’s actions can subject a local government to liability under § 1983 only if the official has final policymaking authority for those actions.

Brooks v. George County, MS · filed 1996-06-03

Only those officials who have "final policymaking authority" may by their actions subject the government to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 treats a decision by an official with final policymaking authority in a given area as municipal policy.

Singer v. Denver School District No. 1 · filed 1997-04-09

If an official who possesses final policymaking authority in a certain area makes a decision, that decision constitutes municipal policy for § 1983 purposes and will be understood as an act which the municipality officially sanctioned.

A county is not liable under § 1983 for a prosecutor’s decision to keep charges pending when the county lacks final policymaking authority over decisions to end prosecutions.

DAmour v. Burke · filed 1997-04-18

Because Rockingham County is not a final policymaking authority with respect to decisions to terminate prosecutions, the court grants summary judgment in favor of the county to the extent that the plaintiff § 1983 claim seeks recovery for permitting the charges against him to remain pending.

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a supervisor’s acts if the supervisor had final policymaking authority over the challenged employment decisions, and allegations of such authority can defeat a motion to dismiss.

Martinez v. Gonzalez · filed 1997-11-05

While it may ultimately be decided Mr. Hooper is not a final policymaker, it is premature at this stage to say that, under the facts alleged, his actions could in no way bind the municipality.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for conduct by officials who lack final policymaking authority.

Floyd v. Waiters · filed 1998-01-20

Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err by finding and concluding that Waiters, Tinker, and Nicholson had no final policymaking authority; section 1983 liability cannot be based on this theory.

A county may be liable under § 1983 for a constitutional violation committed by an official to whom it delegated final policymaking authority.

Swanson v. Van Otterloo · filed 1998-01-31

By delegating this type of final policymaking authority to Van Otterloo, Plymouth County “exposed itself to liability for any unconstitutional actions” Van Otterloo may have taken pursuant to that authority.

Section 1983 treats a decision by a body or official with final policymaking authority as official government policy for purposes of local government liability.

Denton v. Morgan · filed 1998-03-23

By making this argument, the Defendants fail to acknowledge a second recognized avenue for establishing § 1983 liability, namely, that decisions by final policy-making bodies or officials constitute official government policy.

Section 1983 does not impose municipal liability for a school employment decision based solely on discrimination by administrators who lack final decision-making authority.

Glover v. Williamsburg Local School District Board of Education · filed 1998-05-18

In the present case, Principal McEvoy evaluated Glover, and Superintendent Campbell made the nonrenewal recommendation to the Board, but neither had final decision-making authority for purposes of § 1983. Proving that either McEvoy or Campbell intended to discriminate against Glover would therefore be insufficient by itself to establish municipal liability.

Section 1983 allows county liability for a sheriff’s decision to fill deputy positions because Texas law gives the sheriff final policymaking authority over that decision.

Brady v. Fort Bend County · filed 1998-07-02

Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether the sheriff is the County's final policymaker with respect to the specific action at issue here--filling available employment positions in the sheriff's department. With respect to this specific act, Texas law unequivocally vests the sheriff with final policymaking authority.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a jail director’s decisions when the director has final policymaking authority over the matters at issue.

Ware v. Jackson County, MO · filed 1998-07-27

Accordingly, we hold that Megerman was a final policymaker for purposes of determining § 1983 municipal liability with respect to the decisions at issue in the instant case and that the district court did not err in so instructing the jury.

Section 1983 permits municipal liability for a jail director’s disciplinary decisions when the director has final policymaking authority over those decisions.

Ware v. Jackson County, Missouri · filed 1998-09-11

Accordingly, we hold that Megerman was a final policymaker for purposes of determining § 1983 municipal liability with respect to the decisions at issue in the instant case and that the district court did not err in so instructing the jury.

Section 1983 municipal liability based on an official’s actions requires proof that the official had final policymaking authority over the policy area that caused the alleged deprivation.

Jeffes v. Barnes · filed 1998-09-16

Accordingly, plaintiffs must demonstrate that Sheriff Barnes was acting as the final policymaker, and not merely exercising his discretion, in that aspect of municipal policy that caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.