42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for Fourteenth Amendment age discrimination claims covered by the comprehensive remedial schemes of the ADEA or the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.

Steshenko v. Gayrard · filed 2014-05-20

Based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Middlesex and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ahlmeyer, the Court finds that the ADA’s remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to foreclose Section 1983 claims alleging age discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.

Section 1983 provides no claim based on an underlying violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.

Kampschroer v. Anoka County · filed 2014-11-03

The Court finds the reasoning in these cases to be persuasive, arid therefore dismisses Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims based on an underlying DPPA violation.

Section 1983 does not provide a parallel claim for military status discrimination when an identical claim can be pursued under USERRA’s remedial scheme.

Violetto v. Village of Tinley Park · filed 2015-09-09

With regard to his failure-to-promote claim, because .USER-RA establishes a statutory regime under which Violetto could pursue a private right of action for injunctive relief, damages, lost pay, benefits, and attorney’s fees- and costs, and because the factual claims underpinning both causes of action are identical, Violetto’s § 1983 claim is precluded by his USERRA claim.

Section 1983 constitutional claims are not barred by the remedial schemes of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

Holmes v. Godinez · filed 2015-10-08

Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 constitutional claims are not barred by the remedial statutory schemes of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to enforce the Veterans Memorial Preservation and Recognition Act to show that the Act can support a § 1983 claim.

Monumental Task Committee, Inc. v. Foxx · filed 2016-01-26

Plaintiffs also have not demonstrated that the VMPRA can form the basis of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to expand who may sue or be sued under the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Tri-Corp Housing Incorporated v. Bauman · filed 2016-06-13

The Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, by contrast, specify in detail who may be sued for damages, and using §1983 to override the limits of those statutory lists is unwarranted.

Section 1983 permits First Amendment retaliation claims concerning speech about age discrimination despite the ADEA’s retaliation provision.

Stilwell v. City of Williams · filed 2016-08-05

The question we must answer is whether the retaliation provision of the ADEA precludes a plaintiff such as Stilwell from bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We hold that it does not.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring a USERRA claim against an individual state actor when USERRA does not permit claims against individuals.

Cresci v. Mohawk Valley Community College · filed 2017-06-02

Nor can a plaintiff avoid USERRA’s limitation in this respect by casting a claim based on USERRA and aimed at an individual state actor as one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce federal regulations when the underlying statute confers no individual right.

Grant v. City of Roanoke · filed 2017-07-18

Given the court’s conclusion that the provisions of the HOME Act do not confer individual rights enforceable by the plaintiff, he cannot maintain a § 1983 action to enforce the HUD regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act.

Section 1983 remains available for constitutional claims because the Safe Drinking Water Act does not preclude that remedy.

Boler v. Earley · filed 2017-07-28

We find that the SDWA does not preclude § 1983 claims as pled by the Boler and Mays Plaintiffs, and reverse the district court’s dismissal of their Complaints on that basis.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce EMTALA rights because EMTALA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme provides the exclusive remedy.

Trahan v. Clayton Dublier & Rice · filed 2018-07-30

Thus, we conclude that the EMTALA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme demonstrates Congress’ intent that the EMTALA be the exclusive means for remedying discrimination in emergency medical treatment.

Section 1983 does not provide damages for a RLUIPA violation when RLUIPA’s express cause of action does not allow them.

Cavin v. Mich. Dep't of Corr. · filed 2019-06-17

Put another way, the reality that RLUIPA doesn’t allow for damages indicates that Congress didn’t intend § 1983 to provide a backdoor to achieving a different result.

Section 1983 cannot be used to recover damages for a RLUIPA violation when RLUIPA does not provide that remedy.

Board 766060 v. Weston · filed 2019-08-22

Further, a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get damages that RLUIPA does not provide.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional claim to proceed alongside claims under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Rainwater v. Board of Regents for the University of Oklahoma · filed 2020-01-27

The Court finds Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims on the basis that parallel proceedings are precluded.

Section 1983 cannot be used to recover damages for a RLUIPA violation when RLUIPA does not provide them.

Evans 367619 v. Horton · filed 2020-11-13

Moreover, a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get damages that RLUIPA does not provide.

Section 1983 claims joined with an Illinois administrative appeal remain independent original actions with full scope for presenting evidence.

Garcia, Jose v. Village of Mount · filed 2004-02-23

But Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1983 claims are original actions independent of the ad- ministrative review proceeding and are therefore plenary in scope.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for reviewing whether a state or local administrative decision was arbitrary or capricious.

Medicare & Medicaid Guide P 40,091 Fsk Drug Corp. v. Cesar A. Perales, Commissioner of the New York Department of Social · filed 1992-03-19

A section 1983 action is not an appropriate vehicle to consider whether a state or local administrative determination was arbitrary or capricious.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain federal appellate review of a state court civil decision.

Dodson v. Hollman · filed 1992-03-23

In asking that we compel production of the transcripts, Dodson effectively is seeking federal appellate review of a state court decision. " '[F]ederal courts do not review state court civil proceedings under the guise of the Civil Rights Act.' " ... Where Dodson is seeking relief that is barred as a matter of law, his complaint was properly dismissed.

Section 1983 cannot be used to obtain federal district court review of a final state court decision by recasting a claim already decided by the state court.

Jones v. James Crosby, Harry K. Singletary · filed 1998-03-23

Jones cannot utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recast his claim and thereby obtain collateral review in federal court of the state court decision.

A section 1983 claim challenging administrative action is an independent original action with plenary scope, even when the administrative action has an adjudicative component.

Bd. of Ed. of Rich Township HS Dist. No. 227 v. Brown · filed 1999-12-30

A section 1983 action is not a review proceeding even when it challenges administrative action that has an adjudicative component. ... Such a claim is an original action independent of the administrative review proceeding and is therefore plenary in its scope.

Section 1983 claims for constitutional violations by an administrative agency are not preempted by Illinois’s Administrative Review Law and may be joined with an administrative review action.

Stykel v. City of Freeport · filed 2001-01-22

We are persuaded that causes of action for civil rights violations by an administrative agency and other constitutional challenges are not preempted by the Review Law and may be joined with an action for administrative review. ... For this reason, we reverse the trial court’s ruling dismissing counts IX through XII, the section 1983 causes of action.

Section 1983 permits a due process claim to proceed despite procedural defects in a related state administrative appeal.

M.Y. Taxicab, Inc. v. Shoenberger · filed 2002-12-24

However, insofar as Taxicab’s complaint is not simply an appeal of an administrative finding, but an accusation that the named parties violated its constitutional right to due process, the claim is sustainable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and this court has jurisdiction to hear it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Section 1983 claims may proceed in circuit court despite the Illinois Administrative Review Law because the administrative agency cannot hear federal civil rights claims.

Hofrichter v. The City of Chicago Heights · filed 2016-10-18

Because we agree with Hofrichter that the Administrative Review Law does not bar a cause of action under sections 1983 and 1985, we need not address the initial question of whether the Administrative Review Law applies at all.

Section 1983 claims may proceed in circuit court even when Illinois’s Administrative Review Law applies, because the administrative board cannot decide federal civil rights claims.

Hofrichter v. City of Chicago Heights · filed 2017-01-13

In any event, even assuming that the Administrative Review Law is applicable to Hofrichter’s claim, we conclude that he is nevertheless entitled to pursue a claim for relief under sections 1983 and 1985.

Section 1983 does not authorize a federal district court to review state-court rulings through an access-to-the-courts claim.

Taylor 377991 v. Smith · filed 2019-08-21

This Court has no authority in this § 1983 action to review Plaintiff’s state-court claims.

A quasi-judicial California agency decision bars a Section 1983 challenge to that decision when the plaintiff has not sought state judicial review.

Richardson v. Bacerra · filed 2020-01-06

The PAB’s ruling was an adjudicatory, quasi-judicial one, and Plaintiff has failed to allege or even suggest that he exhausted his judicial remedies. Nor has he attempted to otherwise explain why he should be exempt from the exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim is GRANTED.

Section 1983 liability cannot rest on litigation activity protected by the Noerr- Pennington doctrine.

Frederick T. Boulware, Jr., M.D. v. State Of Nevada · filed 1992-03-27

In Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.1984), we held that the First Amendment rationale of the Noerr- Pennington doctrine extends beyond antitrust suits to civil rights actions as well. Thus, activity protected by Noerr- Pennington cannot form the basis of section 1983 liability.

Section 1983 generally does not provide damages against private parties for advocating legislation that violates constitutional rights, absent bribery or other criminal misconduct.

Bonollo Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Town of Franklin · filed 1995-05-26

Even taking Bonollo at its word, however, the claim still fails. As the Court of Appeals of this Circuit stated in Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506 (1st Cir.1987), “[responsibility for ascertaining the constitutionality of enacted legislation will ordinarily rest with the legislating body. Absent factors such as bribe-taking or other criminal misconduct, considerations of free speech normally militate against finding the basis for § 1983 damages in the advocacy of programs and legislation, even if the programs or statutes are themselves unconstitutional.”

Noerr-Pennington immunity extends to claims under Section 1983.

Nursing Registry, Inc. v. Eastern North Carolina Regional Emergency Medical Services Consortium, Inc. · filed 1997-03-07

The second basis for dismissing Plaintiffs § 1983 claim against the nongovernmental defendants is that Noerr-Pen-nington immunity extends to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 claims may be subject to Noerr-Pennington immunity for petitioning the government.

Nickum v. Village of Saybrook · filed 1997-07-28

This allusion to First Amendment protection, coupled with other circuits’ willingness to extend Noerr-Pennington immunity to claims in the § 1983 context, leads this Court to the conclusion that Noerr-Pennington can be utilized against claims arising under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose individual liability for conduct protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander · filed 1998-09-08

Having found that Alexander individually is immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, he also is immune from individual liability under § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on government entities or officials for activity protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity.

Manistee Town Center v. City of Glendale · filed 2000-09-11

Nor do we interpret § 1983 to subject government entities or officials to liability for activity that is protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity.

Section 1983 retaliation claims against a municipality and its officials cannot rest on lobbying or litigation protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity.

Smita Sanghvi Tarun Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, and Suzan Smith Paul Heid Algrid Leiga Diann Ring Karen Rosenthal Glen · filed 2003-05-05

The district court correctly applied Manistee in granting summary judgment in favor of the City on the Sanghvis’ retaliation claims. The City and its officials opposed the expansion of the Sanghvis’ facility by lobbying other public officials, including state legislators and members of the County Board of Supervisors and by filing suit against the Sanghvis and the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board (which had allowed the Sangh-vis’ facility to operate with a septic tank during the initial years of its expansion). These petitioning activities fall within the protective ambit of Noerr-Pennington.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for protected petitioning of a public entity unless the petitioning falls within the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity.

Schneck v. Saucon Valley School District · filed 2004-10-18

Thus, because the School District’s appeals of the Arbitrator’s award clearly constitute petitioning of a distinct public entity authorized by state law to resolve the issue at stake, its protected actions may not form a basis for § 1983 liability, unless they fall within the “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for legitimate petitioning of government protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Knology Inc v. Insight · filed 2004-12-29

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine allows businesses to combine and lobby to influence the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of government or administrative agencies without antitrust or § 1983 liability, because the First Amendment’s right of petition protects such activities.

Section 1983 does not impose damages liability for genuine petitioning of government authorities to take official action, subject to the narrow sham exception.

Knology, Inc. v. Insight Communications Company, L.P. Insight Kentucky Partners Ii, L.P. · filed 2004-12-29

The doctrine immunizes parties from liability under antitrust laws or § 1983 for actions taken when petitioning authorities to take official action, even where the petitioning activity has the intent or effect of depriving another of property interests, except under “very limited circumstances.”

Section 1983 claims based on petitioning public officials are subject to Noerr-Pennington immunity.

Empress LLC v. Cityand County of San Francisco · filed 2005-08-17

As such, no matter what Shaw’s motives were, his petitioning activity as alleged in the Patels’ complaint is immunized under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Section 1983 claims may be barred by Noerr-Pennington protection when the challenged petitioning is not a sham.

Stahelin v. Forest Preserve District · filed 2007-10-10

This doctrine has been extended to section 1983 actions. See Tarpley v. Keistler, 188 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 1999). ... Thus, Morton was protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to petition the District, and the doctrine reciprocally protects the District, which had a right to act on the petition of its constituent.

Noerr-Pennington immunity bars § 1983 claims arising from protected petitioning activity.

Swallow v. Torngren · filed 2020-01-07

The Lunardis are immune from suit under § 1983 and RICO for their protected petitioning activity.

Section 1983 claims based on protected litigation activity are subject to Noerr-Pennington immunity unless a sham exception applies.

Wilson v. Leigh Law Group, P.C, (LLG) · filed 2020-07-14

Lastly, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides immunity where, as here, claims are brought under Sections 1983, 1985 and 1986.

Section 1983 claims based on petitioning government officials are subject to Noerr-Pennington immunity, even when the petition includes an allegedly false report.

Borges v. County of Mendocino · filed 2020-12-13

Here, even if Anzilotti made a false report to CDFW about water diversion, that report is petitioning activity protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Section 1983 permits a method-of-execution challenge, but a court may dismiss it for unreasonable delay under laches and the strong presumption against untimely equitable relief.

Arthur v. Allen · filed 2007-09-17

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Arthur’s § 1983 action due to laches, especially given the strong presumption against the grant of equitable relief.

A court may deny a stay of execution sought in a § 1983 action when the request is made too late for equitable relief.

Hicks v. Taft · filed 2005-12-15

Without adopting or rejecting the conclusion in Dennis that there is a failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, we nevertheless find that the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion in weighing the criteria for the granting of a stay or a restraining order and denying the relief requested, primarily because the motion was untimely.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a method of execution without pursuing habeas relief when the claim does not challenge the fact or duration of the sentence.

Fierro v. Gomez · filed 1992-04-18

Since plaintiffs’ claim does not, and could not, challenge the fact or duration of sentence, it need not be brought as a habeas claim.

Section 1983 permits an inmate sentenced to death to challenge the method of execution.

Fierro v. Gomez · filed 1996-02-21

In sum, a challenge to the method by which an inmate sentenced to death will be executed may be brought pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a death row inmate to challenge the method of execution when the challenge does not contest the validity or duration of the sentence.

Fierro v. Gomez · filed 1996-02-21

We therefore follow our sister circuits and hold that a challenge to a method of execution may be brought as a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a death row inmate to challenge the method of execution without challenging the validity of the death sentence.

Booker v. Murphy · filed 1997-02-06

The Court is thus persuaded that the Plaintiffs’ challenge in this case to the manner in which their sentence of death will be carried out, that is, by lethal gas, is properly cognizable under section 1983.

Section 1983 allows a condemned prisoner to challenge an allegedly unnecessary cut-down procedure used to gain venous access for lethal injection.

Nelson v. Campbell · filed 2004-05-24

Merely labeling something as part of an execution procedure is insufficient to insulate it from a § 1983 attack.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to the particular chemicals used in an execution, but a challenge to lethal injection generally falls outside its scope.

Reid v. Johnson · filed 2004-09-03

While this Court acknowledges that it is difficult to analyze the particular chemical mixture without reference to the other elements of the protocol mentioned above, permitting the inclusion of those factors would be tantamount to a challenge to lethal injection generally and place the case outside the boundaries of § 1983 and into the compass of § 2254.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a state's specific lethal injection protocol when the challenge does not contest the validity of the death sentence.

Ross Ex Rel. Ross v. Rell · filed 2005-01-10

Therefore, the action properly may be construed as a section 1983 claim and not a petition for habeas corpus relief.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge an execution protocol as a condition of confinement when the claim does not challenge the legality of the sentence.

Beardslee v. Woodford · filed 2005-01-14

Thus, Beardlee’s claim is more properly considered as a “conditions of confinement” challenge, which is cognizable under § 1983, than as a challenge that would implicate the legality of his sentence, and thus be appropriate for federal habeas review.

A § 1983 challenge to an execution’s anesthesia protocol is dismissed when the plaintiff fails to allege or show a specific, acceptable alternative protocol.

Boyd v. Beck · filed 2005-11-29

Because Boyd fails to allege or show a specific, acceptable alternative protocol, that aspect of his section 1983 action is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for challenging a state's general lethal injection procedures; such a challenge must be brought in habeas corpus.

Rutherford v. James v. Crosby, Jr. · filed 2006-01-30

The first ground on which the district court dismissed Rutherford’s § 1983 complaint is that under our prior precedent a claim attacking the general procedures or protocols a state uses to carry out executions by lethal injection must be brought in a habeas corpus proceeding, and Rutherford had not obtained from this Court an order permitting him to file a second or successive petition. ... That decision of the district court is correct as a matter of circuit law.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to an execution procedure when success would not necessarily prevent the State from carrying out the sentence.

Hill v. McDonough · filed 2006-06-12

In the case before us we conclude that Hill’s §1983 action is controlled by the holding in Nelson. Here, as in Nelson, Hill’s action if successful would not necessarily prevent the State from executing him by lethal injection.

A § 1983 method-of-execution suit seeking a stay may be untimely when the plaintiff waits without a satisfactory explanation until a stay is needed to develop the case.

Reese v. Livingston · filed 2006-06-27

As we read Hill, a plaintiff cannot wait until a stay must be granted to enable it to develop facts and take the case to trial –– not when there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay. We find this suit with its request for equitable relief to be untimely.

A method-of-execution challenge under § 1983 may be filed after direct review becomes final, and waiting until days before execution can make the suit dilatory.

Brown v. Livingston · filed 2006-07-19

Whatever significance the Court of Criminal Appeals’s holding may have with regard to state court proceedings, it is clear from our precedent that he could have proceeded with a section 1983 civil complaint in federal court at any time after his direct appeal became final in 1999. The Court of Criminal Appeals’s holding with regard to ripeness is irrelevant to Brown’s ability to proceed in federal district court on his section 1983 claim. Moreover, regardless of whether there is a conflict between the precedent of this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals, this panel is bound by our precedent, which requires us to find the instant suit dilatory.

Section 1983 permits an inmate to challenge a lethal injection drug protocol without challenging the death sentence itself.

Walker v. Johnson · filed 2006-09-11

Thus, Plaintiffs case is properly before the Court under § 1983 and is ripe for summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits a method-of-execution challenge when the requested injunction would still allow the state to carry out the execution.

Summers v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2006-10-25

The parties do not dispute that the Texas statutes do not mandate the use of the two drugs Summers challenges, and accordingly a permanent injunction in Summers’s favor would not prevent the State from executing him. Summers’s claim, therefore, is properly brought as a § 1983 cause of action.

Section 1983 is the vehicle for a manner-of-execution challenge.

In Re: Dickson · filed 2007-04-26

It is ORDERED that the instant manner-of-execution challenge be TRANSFERRED back to the Northern District of Texas to be decided pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits challenges to the procedures used in an execution, including medical procedures and lethal-injection chemicals, but does not provide a vehicle to contest the death sentence or capital punishment generally.

Emmett v. Johnson · filed 2007-06-01

The permissible scope of a constitutional challenge to execution procedures brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is narrow. A civil rights action is not an appropriate vehicle to contest either an inmate’s sentence of death or the constitutionality of the death penalty generally. In this case, Plaintiff does neither. The United States Supreme Court has held that the boundaries of civil rights litigation in this context are wide enough to encompass medical procedures incident to the execution process, and the chemical formula used in carrying out the lethal injection. ... It would therefore appear that those aspects of Plaintiffs claim that fall within the ambit of the Eighth Amendment are properly before the Court.

A § 1983 method-of-execution action may be dismissed on equitable grounds when the inmate unnecessarily delays filing it.

Williams v. Allen · filed 2007-08-21

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Williams’s § 1983 action due to his unnecessary delay, especially given the strong presumption against the grant of equitable relief.

A death-sentenced inmate may not wait until execution is imminent to bring a § 1983 action seeking to enjoin the state’s execution method.

Berry v. Epps · filed 2007-10-26

Well-established fifth circuit precedent is clear: death-sentenced inmates may not wait until execution is imminent before filing an action to enjoin a State’s method of carrying it out.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to litigate a method-of-execution challenge after that claim is denied without prejudice in a post-conviction proceeding.

Brown v. United States · filed 2008-09-29

Statute of limitations and laches questions aside, see Henyard v. Secretary, 543 F.3d 644, 646-48 (11th Cir.2008), the Court agrees with Brown and the Government that this claim can be denied without prejudice to Brown’s right to litigate it through a § 1983 proceeding.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for challenging lethal injection procedures.

Tompkins v. Secretary, Department of Corrections · filed 2009-02-09

A § 1983 lawsuit, not a habeas proceeding, is the proper way to challenge lethal injection procedures.

Section 1983 is a proper way to bring a challenge to a state's method of execution.

Williams v. Hobbs · filed 2011-10-07

The district court properly analyzed his claims under § 1983, as we have done in other instances.

Section 1983 does not provide relief for a challenge to the execution of a prison sentence that must be brought through habeas corpus.

Tillman v. Bigelow · filed 2012-07-11

As the district court correctly noted, Tillman’s claims essentially challenge the execution of his sentence and must be brought, if at all, in a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Section 1983 provides a way to challenge lethal injection procedures when the claim does not attack the validity of the conviction or sentence.

McNabb v. Commissioner Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2013-08-28

A claim is properly raised under § 1983 when “an inmate challenges the circumstances of his confinement but not the validity of his conviction and/or sentence.”

Section 1983 provides the vehicle for challenging a method of execution.

Hall v. Thomas · filed 2013-09-30

Both sides overlook the fact that this claim for relief is not cognizable in a habeas petition, but instead must be pursued in the context of a § 1983 civil rights cause of action.

Section 1983 provides an avenue for a prisoner to challenge a state's lethal-injection protocol.

Frazier v. Jenkins · filed 2014-10-27

At oral argument, Frazier’s counsel notified our panel that Frazier is a party to an ongoing action, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging Ohio’s lethal-injection regime. ... We think that that litigation is the proper avenue for Frazier to bring this constitutional challenge.

Section 1983 is not the exclusive avenue for a method-of-execution claim when success on the claim would bar the prisoner’s execution.

Adams v. Bradshaw · filed 2016-03-15

Lastly, notwithstanding the warden’s assertion that a method-of-execution challenge can only be brought in a § 1983 action under Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006), Adams can bring this claim in a § 2254 proceeding.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a particular lethal injection protocol when the claim leaves open a constitutionally acceptable alternative.

Adams v. Bradshaw · filed 2016-06-13

As in Frazier, Adams’s constitutional challenge to Ohio’s protocol can be explored within his ongoing § 1983 action.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to challenge a planned method of execution in state court when the challenge would leave the state free to carry out the sentence.

Crawford v. Earnest Lee · filed 2016-12-15

The United States Supreme Court has held that method-of-execution claims may be brought pursuant to Section 1983. Section 1983 claims are cognizable in state court. Crawford may proceed with his Section 1983 claim in state court.

A death-row inmate’s § 1983 method-of-execution claim seeking an injunction may be dismissed on equitable grounds if the inmate unreasonably delays filing it.

Arthur v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2017-05-25

Even if res judicata does not apply, Arthur’s § 1983 complaint seeks only in-junctive relief. Alternatively, and as an independent ground, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit error in concluding that Arthur unreasonably delayed in bringing both his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claim's only nine days before his execution but sixteen months after Brooks’s execution in Alabama and five months after Smith’s execution in Alabama.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for challenging a particular lethal-injection procedure.

In re Raymond Tibbetts · filed 2017-07-24

However, a challenge to a particular procedure, as Tibbetts’s current habeas claims highlighting Ohio’s use of midazolam appear to be, is properly brought in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a death-row inmate’s method-of-execution claim seeking injunctive relief.

In re Campbell · filed 2017-10-26

The proper method for Campbell to bring these claims is in a § 1983 action under Baze—as he has done in the district court.

Section 1983 permits a method-of-execution claim that challenges only the manner and means of execution, without calling into question the validity of the execution itself.

Harris v. Dretke · filed 2004-06-24

In its place, Nelson institutes a more probing standard that seeks to determine whether the complaint crosses the line between (1) method-of-execution claims that call into question only the manner and means of execution (and thus may be brought under § 1983) and (2) claims that call into question the validity of the execution itself (and thus sound only in habeas).

Section 1983 permits a method-of-execution claim when the prisoner alleges that an alternative method makes the challenged protocol wholly unnecessary to carrying out the execution.

Aldrich v. Johnson · filed 2004-10-11

Nelson’s holding clearly requires that a capital defendant, in order to assert a §1983 method-of-execution claim, must allege that, because there are alternative methods of execution, the challenged protocol is wholly unnecessary to proceeding with the ... execution.

Section 1983 is the proper vehicle for a prisoner’s challenge to the application of a lethal injection protocol.

Bays v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Inst. · filed 2020-03-30

Bays’s claims challenging the application of lethal injection as causing an unconstitutional amount of severe pain and suffering are method-of-execution claims properly brought under § 1983, not habeas.

Section 1983 provides the vehicle for method of execution claims.

Conway, III v. Houk · filed 2020-06-19

It is now firmly established that method of execution claims must be brought in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and not in habeas corpus.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce their right to notice and a hearing before termination of benefits under the Medicaid Act.

Haymons v. Williams · filed 1992-04-30

The right asserted by plaintiffs in the present case— notice and the opportunity for á hearing before the termination of Medicaid benefits — is more clearly a right under Section 1983 than the right asserted by the health care providers in Wilder.

Section 1983 permits a private action to enforce the Medicaid equal access provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

Arkansas Medical Society, Inc. v. Reynolds · filed 1992-08-18

As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects defendant’s jurisdictional challenge. ... No cases are cited to this Court which foreclose a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), and, indeed, other courts have entertained § 1983 actions based upon the Medicaid provisions at issue in this case.

Section 1983 provides a private remedy for the Title XIX rights addressed here except the asserted right to apply for Medicaid without delay.

Wellington v. District of Columbia · filed 1994-03-31

Section 1983 provides a private remedy for all of the Title XIX provisions except those in plaintiffs’ third claim.

Section 1983 lets home care Medicaid recipients enforce the beneficiary-protecting duties in 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(A), (B), (C), and (E), and 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(a), (c), (d), and (f)(2).

Wood v. Tompkins · filed 1994-10-18

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm that 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1396n(c)(2)(A), (B), (C), and (E), and 42 C.F.R. Secs. 441.302(a), (c), (d), and (f)(2) each confer a Sec. 1983 private right of action upon home care Medicaid recipients.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to sue to enforce their claimed right to necessary transportation to medical providers under federal Medicaid law.

Harris v. James · filed 1995-04-26

The court’s only function is to determine whether federal law, as enacted by congress and implemented by the Secretary of HHS, requires such transportation and, if so, whether the State has failed to meet that requirement. By denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, this court holds that the Plaintiffs have a right to have those issues determined in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce the freedom-of-choice provision when it creates binding obligations for states.

Cramer v. Chiles · filed 1999-01-08

The Court rejects the defendant’s contention that the Eleventh Circuit’s recent opinion in ... holds that “42 U.S.C. § 1396, et seq., did not- create a private right of action enforceable under § 1983.” ... Plaintiffs are plainly intended beneficiaries of 42 U.S.C. § 1396n. The freedom of choice provision creates binding obligations on any state that elects to provide supports and services in homes pursuant to the Home and Community-Based Waiver.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients to enforce their federal right under the Medicaid Act’s reasonable standards provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).

William T. Ex Rel. Gigi T. v. Taylor · filed 2000-03-01

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs may attempt to enforce their federal right under § 1396a(a)(17), pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim alleging that a state's routine Medicaid eligibility practice effectively replaces its written plan and conflicts with federal law.

Mertz Ex Rel. Mertz v. Houstoun · filed 2001-07-30

Plaintiff appended to her complaint the DPW Adjudication from which it appears that as a matter of practice or policy defendant penalizes the transfer of assets in determining eligibility in a manner which allegedly conflicts with federal Medicaid law. This is sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 over which the court ... has subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 1983 permits suits to enforce rights under federal Medicaid statutes when the particular provision satisfies the Wilder test.

Markva v. Haveman · filed 2001-10-11

This Court, therefore, rejects the defendants’ argument, to the extent that it has been advanced, that there is a blanket prohibition of such suits under § 1983. The law of the Sixth Circuit requires, however, an examination of each of the statutes upon which plaintiffs rely under the Wilder test to determine whether plaintiffs may advance a private cause of action based thereon under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for alleged noncompliance with the Medicaid Act’s screening and treatment provisions.

Westside Mothers v. Haveman · filed 2002-05-15

Plaintiffs have a cause of action under § 1983 for alleged noncompliance with the screening and treatment provisions of the Medicaid Act.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce their right to continued coverage until they are found ineligible.

Rabin v. Wilson-Coker · filed 2003-05-29

Therefore, the right to continued coverage in the absence of a finding of ineligibility is enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits eligible children to enforce their Medicaid Act rights to EPSDT services.

Rosie D. v. Romney · filed 2006-01-26

Plaintiffs have properly invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce rights conferred on them by the Medicaid Act.

Section 1983 lets Medicaid beneficiaries enforce the free-choice-of-provider right in § 1396a(a)(23).

Planned Parenthood o v. Commissione · filed 2012-10-23

We agree with the district court that § 1396a(a)(23) unambiguously creates private rights “presumptively enforceable by § 1983.” Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 284.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce the Medicaid Act’s EPSDT and reasonable promptness provisions.

O.B. v. Norwood · filed 2016-03-21

Plaintiffs correctly assert that the Seventh Circuit and Illinois district courts “have specifically held these provisions create federal rights under § 1983 that Medicaid beneficiaries can enforce.”

Section 1983 lets eligible Medicaid Disability Waiver recipients enforce their right to reasonably prompt medical assistance.

Murphy ex rel. Murphy v. Minnesota Department of Human Services · filed 2017-05-18

Plaintiffs, current Disability Waiver recipients, may privately enforce their right to reasonably prompt medical assistance via § 1983 in this case.

Section 1983 allows Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce the individual right conferred by the Medicaid Act’s free-choice provision.

Planned Parenthood S. Atl. v. Baker · filed 2018-08-28

Accordingly, the Court holds, in accordance with the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, that § 1396a(a)(23)(A) confers a private right of action enforceable through § 1983 on Medicaid patients such as Ms. Edwards.

Section 1983 lets Medicaid recipients enforce the free-choice-of-provider provision because it confers an individual right and the Medicaid Act does not foreclose that remedy.

Planned Parenthood v. Baker · filed 2019-10-29

Because South Carolina has not rebutted the presumption that a private right of action exists, we join the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in finding that the free-choice-of-provider provision creates a private right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows children to enforce rights under Medicaid’s EPSDT provision when their allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

S.J. v. Tidball · filed 2020-09-10

The Eighth Circuit noted that the EPDST provision intended to benefit children who are entitled to services under that provision are enforceable by Plaintiffs. Here, the Court is not ruling as to the merits of the claims but finds Plaintiffs have pled enough to survive a motion to dismiss based on their allegations and the case law argued by the parties.

Section 1983 permits compensatory damages against an official in his individual capacity when qualified immunity does not apply and the plaintiff proves the claim.

Francisco Aviles-Martinez and Miguel A. Flores-Colon v. Guillermo Jimenez Monroig, Etc. · filed 1992-04-30

As we explained above, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to Flores. Thus, Flores can obtain compensatory damages against Jimenez in his individual capacity, assuming, of course, that a jury finds in Flores’s favor.

Section 1983 does not allow damages against a state or state officials sued in their official capacities.

Adams v. Connecticut · filed 2019-07-29

The State of Connecticut was terminated as a defendant as the Plaintiff cannot recover damages against the state or state officials in their official capacities under § 1983.

A private contractor providing medical care in a prison under contract acts under color of state law and is treated as a government entity for Section 1983 claims.

NORRIS v. PLUMMER LONG · filed 2021-01-15

Because Wexford acts under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function, i.e., providing medical care to correctional facilities, it is treated as a government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 treats a private prison medical contractor as a government entity when it performs a government function, and liability requires a constitutional deprivation caused by its policy or custom.

HENDRICKS v. WEXFORD OF INDIANA, LLC · filed 2019-12-12

Because Wexford acts under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function, i.e. providing medical care to correctional facilities, Wexford is treated as a government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims. ... Therefore, to prove a deliberate indifference claim against Wexford, Mr. Hendricks must establish that he suffered a constitutional deprivation as the result of an express policy or custom of Wexford.

A private therapist who reports suspected child abuse and provides information to police, without acting jointly with them to violate rights, is not a state actor subject to § 1983.

Lowe v. Aldridge · filed 1992-04-27

For all of the foregoing reasons, Aldridge was not a state actor for section 1983 purposes, nor can she be considered to have acted in concert with state actors.

A private hospital performs a public function and acts under color of state law for § 1983 purposes when it involuntarily commits patients under New York’s statutory scheme.

Rubenstein v. Benedictine Hospital · filed 1992-04-07

In light of the foregoing, this Court holds that the Hospital here is performing a public function when involuntarily committing persons.

Section 1983 does not permit suit against private individuals merely because they rely on state law.

Clostermann v. Arlene Finlayson and Duncan Finlayson · filed 1992-06-18

Section 1983 does not countenance the suit of private individuals who rely on state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a viable federal civil rights claim against private doctors and health care providers acting as private actors.

Bent v. Massachusetts General Hospital · filed 1993-07-20

Because the defendants are all private actors, plaintiff has failed to state any viable federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Under Section 1983, allegations of involuntary confinement and restraint by a private hospital warrant discovery into the State’s role before dismissal for lack of state action.

Palaimo v. Lutz · filed 1993-11-15

The court cannot ascertain, at this juncture, whether the Hospital’s actions as alleged in this case are “fairly attributable” to the State; at the very least, the parties must conduct discovery in order to resolve this issue. ... Nevertheless, the court finds that as the factual scenario in the present case, although technically falling short of actual involuntary commitment, involves allegations of involuntary confinement and restraint, the court must deny the Hospital’s motion to dismiss in favor of allowing discovery to proceed.

Section 1983 requires a pleaded deprivation of a federal right by someone acting under color of state law; allegations of government ties and a government-connected board policy can sufficiently plead state action by a private hospital and its doctors.

Lake v. Arnold · filed 1997-05-02

In order to state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by one acting under color of state law. ... If, as we must, we accept each of these allegations as true, we cannot say that the plaintiffs have faded to allege that defendants were state actors sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits liability for a prison medical services contractor when its customs or policies cause an inmate to be denied medical care.

Moore v. Long · filed 1997-08-29

We also conclude CMS may share potential liability, as Moore&s evidence created a question as to whether CMS&s customs or policies in distributing and processing MSRs led to Moore&s inability to obtain medical care.

Section 1983 does not treat a private hospital or emergency physician as a state actor merely for providing a prisoner with emergency care when neither has assumed the state’s duty to provide that care.

Sykes Ex Rel. Estate of Purnell v. McPhillips · filed 2006-01-26

In the context of EMTALA’s mandate that the Hospital must provide emergency services, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Hospital impliedly contracted to assume the state function of providing emergency medical care to prisoners. Dr. Jagoda’s non-contractual provision of medical services outside of the prison context, in an emergency room, is not sufficient conduct to support a finding of state actor status.

Private medical providers sued under § 1983 for inmate care are not entitled to qualified or absolute immunity.

Walker-El v. Naphcare Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2006-06-01

As private entities, the remaining Defendants, namely, Dr. Robert Barnes, Nurse Charlene Gandy, Naphcare, Nurse Margaret Colbert, and Dr. Ben C. Wouters, are not entitled to immunity, whether qualified or absolute.

For a § 1983 claim against a private medical provider serving prisoners, the state action inquiry focuses on the provider’s function in fulfilling the state’s duty to provide inmate health care.

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service · filed 2009-08-18

However, in applying West, our focus must be on the particular function of the medical care provider in the fulfillment of the state’s obligation to provide health care to incarcerated persons.

A private psychiatrist who evaluates a detainee performs a public function and acts under color of state law for § 1983.

Carl v. Muskegon County · filed 2014-08-15

In making this determination, Dr. Jawor acted under color of state law because she performed a public function by evaluating an individual in the state’s custody.

Section 1983 permits a civil suit against a doctor under contract with the state to provide medical care to prisoners.

Green v. Rubenstein · filed 2009-03-18

The Supreme Court has held that a doctor who is under contract with the state to provide medical services to inmates at a state prison is subject to civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A corporation providing medical care to state prisoners can face § 1983 liability, and repeated treatment delays affecting one prisoner can support an inference of a corporate custom.

Oyenik v. Corizon Health Inc. · filed 2017-06-19

Oyenik is suing Corizon, a corporation contracted by the State of Arizona to provide medical treatment to state prisoners. Such a function is “fairly attributable to the State” and can therefore give rise to § 1983 liability. ... There is no case law indicating that a custom cannot be inferred from a pattern of behavior toward a single individual, and a reasonable jury may conclude that such delay tactics amount to a Corizon custom or practice of deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs.

A private company providing prison medical care must satisfy Monell’s policy or custom requirements to be liable under § 1983.

JACKSON v. CORIZON MEDICAL STAFF · filed 2019-09-05

To survive summary judgment on a § 1983 claim against private health companies providing services, like Corizon, a plaintiff inmate must satisfy the requirements of Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

Section 1983 does not cover an outside medical provider whose only connection to the prison system is an incidental, transitory treatment relationship.

Diaz v. Baldwin · filed 2019-09-17

Based on these allegations, the Court cannot find that either Berkes or The Carle Foundation had more than an incidental and transitory relationship with the state’s penal system.

A private contractor providing medical care to inmates may be liable under § 1983 because it performs a function traditionally reserved to the state.

Moretto v. Secretary, DOC · filed 2019-09-19

Although a private entity, Wexford may be held liable under § 1983 because it was tasked with providing medical care to inmates at DeSoto, which is a “function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state.”

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private doctor who treats a prisoner without acting under color of state law.

RACKEMANN v. ROBINSON · filed 2019-09-27

For the reasons that follow, the Court holds that Dr. Dave is not a state actor and therefore not liable under § 1983.

Private medical professionals who provide care to county jail inmates act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.

Blaine v. Louisville Metro. Gov't · filed 2019-04-16

“The principle is well settled that private medical professionals who provide healthcare services to inmates at a county jail qualify as government officials acting under the color of state law for the purposes of § 1983.”

Section 1983 permits a Monell claim against a private prison medical provider when the complaint sufficiently alleges that its policy or practice caused a constitutional injury.

Woodley v. Baldwin · filed 2019-11-14

At this early stage of the litigation, and taking into consideration the existence of plaintiff’s medical records and Wexford’s Collegial Review, the court finds plaintiff has sufficiently stated a Monell claim against Wexford to allow the complaint to go forward.

A private company providing prison medical care is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

RAMOS v. PRIME CARE MEDICAL · filed 2019-12-13

Here, Ramos has not identified any policy or custom of Prime Care Medical or Correct Care Solutions that caused him to be deprived of proper care for his broken foot.

A private company contracted to provide prison medical care acts under color of state law and is treated as a government entity for Section 1983 claims.

LOVE v. RICHEY · filed 2020-02-04

Because Wexford acts under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function, i.e., providing medical care to correctional facilities, Wexford is treated as a government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison’s contracted medical provider when the provider’s policy, practice, or custom causes the plaintiff’s injury; employing the alleged wrongdoer alone is insufficient.

Shade v. Stanish · filed 2020-02-21

Under § 1983, a private corporation contracted by a prison to provide healthcare for inmates cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory; rather, a plaintiff must allege that the entity had a policy, practice, or custom which caused injury to the plaintiff.

A private prison health care provider is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

JACKSON v. NORTHAMPTON COUNTY PRISON · filed 2020-04-10

He makes no allegations that Prime Care had a policy or custom to be deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of inmates or that such a policy caused his injury.

Section 1983 claims against an outside medical provider fail when the prisoner does not establish that the provider acted under color of state law.

Woods v. Obaisi · filed 2020-07-30

Woods presents no other ground for finding that Ranzer acted under color of state law, thereby forfeiting any such argument. ... His § 1983 claims against Ranzer therefore fail.

A private prison medical provider can be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

GERHOLT v. WETZEL · filed 2020-08-31

Gerholt has not alleged that Well Path maintains a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.

A private medical provider may be sued under §1983 when the alleged constitutional deprivation is fairly attributable to the state; the provider’s relationship with the state may require factual development.

Whitcomb v. Bertram · filed 2020-09-29

Whether a private actor can be sued under §1983 is a fact-intensive inquiry, see id. at 822–28, and the plaintiff would not likely have information about the relationship between the doctors (and the hospital for which they work) and WCI—at least not at the pleading stage. Therefore, the court will move to the next step of analyzing whether the plaintiff states a claim against the doctor defendants.

A plaintiff may be granted leave to replead a § 1983 claim when defendants have failed to provide requested discovery about their customs, policies, and procedures.

Santos v. City of New York · filed 2007-03-13

We further modify to vacate the dismissal of the eighth cause of action under 42 USC § 1983, and grant plaintiff leave to replead that cause in light of defendants’ failure to provide requested discovery regarding their customs, policies and procedures.

A court may decide an immunity defense to a Section 1983 claim before permitting discovery.

Moore v. Busby · filed 2004-03-03

And, the district court properly decided the threshold question of immunity prior to permitting discovery.

A § 1983 plaintiff must allege the rudimentary facts supporting the claim with some specificity before obtaining discovery.

Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio · filed 1992-05-07

We have held that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a civil rights plaintiff must point, with at least some minimal specificity, to the rudimentary facts supporting his claim. Mere conclusory allegations, standing alone, are not enough; and it is only after stating a valid claim that a plaintiff can insist upon a right to discovery.

A prisoner’s unsupported allegation of retaliatory classification does not entitle him to broad discovery in a § 1983 suit.

Fritz Whittington, Daniel K. Johnson v. James A. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections · filed 1988-04-21

But a carte blanche cannot be given prisoners simply to make such a claim and then make a blind search of all prison records to see if something cannot be found.

Prisoners bringing section 1983 actions without counsel may use interrogatories, requests for admissions, and document requests on the same terms as other litigants.

Wiggins v. Sargent · filed 1985-01-28

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at least to the extent that they provide for interrogatories to parties, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents, are available to prisoners proceeding without counsel in section 1983 actions on the same terms and conditions as to all other litigants.

Section 1983 liability does not require the defendant to owe the plaintiff a duty of care under tort law.

Lockhart-Bembery v. Town of Wayland Police Department · filed 2006-07-11

One of the fundamental differences between the test for negligence and the test for liability under § 1983 is that the former requires the jury to find that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff while the latter does not.

Section 1983 does not furnish a basis for recovery on a state tort claim alone.

Ludolph v. Wright · filed 1992-05-28

To the extent Plaintiff seeks recovery for the allegedly slanderous statements made by Defendants to his employer, neither § 1983 nor Bivens furnishes a basis for recovery based on state tort law.

Section 1983 does not make state tort claims actionable without allegations of a specific federal or constitutional violation.

Parker v. State of Md. · filed 1994-03-04

He fails to allege any specific violations of federal or constitutional law. Absent such allegations, his state tort claims are not actionable under Sec. 1983.

A Section 1983 claim for deprivation of constitutional rights by Virgin Islands officials does not require compliance with the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act’s procedural requirements.

Molloy v. Monsanto · filed 1994-06-09

Defendant Krigger maintains, in addition, that this claim should be dismissed because plaintiffs have failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 33, §§ 3408-3409 (1993 Supp.). This contention is without merit. See Moorhead v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 19 V.I. 453 (D.V.I. 1983). As this Court held in Moorhead, "where, as a result of the actions of territorial officials, there has been a 'deprivation' of substantive constitutional rights within the meaning of § 1983, compliance with the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a federal action." Id. at 458 (footnote omitted).

Section 1983 cannot be used as a substitute for state tort law.

Rosen v. Prince George's Bd. of Educ. · filed 1996-03-21

Section 1983 may not be used as a substitute for state tort law.

Section 1983 may not be used as a substitute for state tort law.

Rosen v. Prince George's Bd · filed 1996-03-21

Section 1983 may not be used as a substitute for state tort law.

The Georgia Tort Claims Act does not bar a § 1983 civil rights counterclaim even when it bars state-law claims.

Department of Human Resources v. Money · filed 1996-06-25

Because the Georgia Tort Claims Act does not bar Money’s 42 USC § 1983 counterclaim against DHR for violations of his civil rights, our opinion in Division 1 does not fully dispose of the counterclaim.

Section 1983 excessive force claims arising from a police arrest are not barred by available state tort remedies.

Swinehart v. City of Ottawa · filed 1997-08-15

We hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of excessive use of force by police officers during an arrest are not barred by state tort remedies.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a workplace injury caused only by prison officials’ breach of a duty of care, without a constitutional violation.

Thaxton v. Rose · filed 1983-06-03

Stripped of its Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiff’s complaint sounds in tort. Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the duty of care which they owed plaintiff. Without minimizing the serious nature of the alleged injury, this Court finds that this complaint does not state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a state-law tort claim.

Henry v. Cobbs · filed 1999-08-30

Section 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for Henry’s newly-raised state-law tort claim.

Section 1983 does not encompass state law tort claims that allege no constitutional wrong.

Downie v. City of Middleburg Hts. · filed 1999-09-30

The counts at issue, however, do not allege constitutional wrongs and thus cannot fall under § 1983.