42 U.S.C. § 1983

A Section 1983 deliberate indifference claim against a private prison medical contractor requires a constitutional deprivation caused by the contractor’s express policy or custom.

NAYLOR v. WEXFORD HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC. · filed 2020-09-16

Therefore, to state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim against Wexford, Mr. Naylor must allege that he suffered a constitutional deprivation as the result of an express policy or custom of Wexford.

A private entity performing a traditional public function may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Escalera 144195 v. Corizon Health Incorporated · filed 2020-09-18

To prevail on a claim against Corizon, as a private entity serving a traditional public function, Plaintiff must meet the test articulated in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978). ... Accordingly, there are disputed issues of material fact whether Defendant had a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability, but a corporation may be liable for its own policies even without a finding of individual liability.

Flournoy v. Obaisi · filed 2020-09-18

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability. ... A corporation may be liable absent individual liability where the institutional policies themselves show deliberate indifference to inmates’ medical needs.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical contractor when its own unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom caused the violation.

Mays v. Shah · filed 2020-09-21

While Wexford is a private corporation, under Seventh Circuit law, a private company that has contracted to provide essential government services, such as health care for prisoners, can be held liable if the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom of the corporation itself.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a corporate entity to show that the entity caused a constitutional violation through its own policy or custom.

Harper v. Professional Probation Services Inc. · filed 2020-09-25

When suing a corporate entity under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the entity itself committed or caused the constitutional violation. ... At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient basis to conclude that PPS’s “policy or custom” caused their injuries.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison medical contractor when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Clevenger v. Centurion · filed 2020-09-28

Rather, to demonstrate that Centurion bears any liability, Plaintiff must identify a policy or custom of the entity and show that his particular injury was incurred due to the execution of that policy. ... Therefore, accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim against Centurion for the denial of medical care, and the Court will allow the case to PROCEED as to this Defendant.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison health provider to show that a company policy or well-settled custom was the moving force behind the alleged deprivation of rights.

Lee v. Corizen Mental Health Provider · filed 2020-09-28

Instead, to prevail on a § 1983 claim against Corizon, Lee “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights.

A private corporation’s practice must be widespread to qualify as a custom for § 1983 liability.

Cosner v. Thistlethwaite · filed 2020-09-29

Without allegations that the challenged practice was widespread, the practice cannot be cast as a “custom” for § 1983 purposes.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation acting under color of state law when its own policy or practice causes a constitutional injury.

Youngblood v. Illinois Department of Corrections · filed 2020-09-30

A private corporation acting under the color of state law, like Wexford, can be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations based on the Monell theory of municipal liability.

Section 1983 permits liability against a corporation providing prison medical care only when its policy or practice causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Black v. Wexford Health Source Inc. · filed 2020-09-30

As a corporation, Wexford can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires proof that a private prison medical contractor’s policy or failure to adopt a necessary policy caused a constitutional deprivation.

WATSON v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION · filed 2020-09-30

Because there is no evidence that Wexford's lack of head injury policy "caused the constitutional deprivation," Glisson, 849 F.3d at 379, Wexford's motion for summary judgment is granted.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation providing prison medical care when its own unconstitutional policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

HARMAN v. TALBOT · filed 2020-09-30

Thus, to hold a private corporation liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged "constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself." Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014). ... Because Mr. Harman did not suffer any constitutional deprivation, Wexford and Corizon cannot be held liable for maintaining an unconstitutional policy or practice.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison contractor liable solely for its employees’ constitutional violations; liability requires a policy or custom causally linked to the injury.

Swopes v. New Mexico Department of Corrections · filed 2020-09-30

However, a private corporation cannot be held vicariously liable for its employee’s alleged constitutional violations under § 1983. ... To establish liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show: 1) the existence of a ... policy or custom[;] and 2) a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged.” ... Plaintiff has not alleged that any policy by Centurion caused the medical indifference.

A Section 1983 claim against a private prison operator requires allegations that its policy or custom caused the constitutional violation; an employee’s conduct alone does not establish the operator’s liability.

Mass v. Core Civic Inc. · filed 2020-09-30

Plaintiff, however, fails to state a claim against Core Civic at this time because he does not make any allegation from which the Court can reasonably infer that Core Civic had a “policy or custom” that was the moving force behind the asserted constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation when its own policy, custom, or practice causes a constitutional violation.

Navarro v. Wexford Health Source Inc. · filed 2020-09-30

As a private corporation, Wexford cannot be held liable under Section 1983, unless a constitutional violation occurred as a result of a policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference by the corporation itself.

Section 1983 treats a private prison medical contractor as the functional equivalent of a government entity and requires an official policy or custom to cause the alleged constitutional violation for the contractor to be liable.

Lofton v. Espino · filed 2020-10-05

Because Centurion’s liability under § 1983 would be based on its functional equivalence to the government entity responsible for providing medical care and services to FDOC inmates, Lofton must plead that an official policy or a custom or practice of Centurion was the moving force behind the alleged federal constitutional violation.

Section 1983 municipal liability principles extend to private companies that contract to provide services on behalf of government entities.

Young v. Glanz · filed 2020-10-06

The municipal liability principles in Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), extend to private companies that contract to provide services on behalf of governmental entities.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison operator when the alleged deprivation of rights results from the operator’s policy or custom.

Payne v. Harris · filed 2020-10-06

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Payne again must show that the alleged deprivation of his rights was due to a policy or custom of the company.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation only when its official policy or custom causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Tharrington v. Armor Correctional Health Care · filed 2020-10-07

Instead, “a private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a private prison company liable to show that a company policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Polk v. Armstrong · filed 2020-10-08

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Polk must show that the alleged deprivation of his rights was due to a policy or custom of the company.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity that performs a traditional public function to allege that the entity’s policy, decision, or custom caused the rights violation.

Valez v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2020-10-09

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as housing prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity performing a government function to plead facts showing that the entity’s policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional injury.

Garcia v. Corizon Correctional Health Services · filed 2020-10-09

To bring a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a government function, a plaintiff must allege that officials carried out an official policy or unofficial custom that inflicted the injury at issue. ... Without specific factual allegations about (1) what the Corizon policies were; (2) what the Corizon policy makers actually did, and (3) how the policies caused the medical providers to provide inadequate care, Plaintiff has not stated a claim.

A private prison medical contractor is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

CARTER v. PRIMECARE INC. · filed 2020-10-13

Rather, as noted above, PrimeCare is only subject to liability in a § 1983 action if its policies or customs caused the constitutional violations in question. As Carter has not specified a PrimeCare policy or custom that caused the alleged deficiencies in his medical care or that caused the conditions of which he complains, he has not stated a plausible claim against PrimeCare.

Section 1983 requires a policy that caused the alleged rights violation to hold a private contractor liable.

McGee v. Corizon · filed 2020-10-14

And his claim against Corizon is equally deficient because he cites no policy under which McGee’s rights were violated.

Section 1983 requires a private jail medical contractor’s policy or custom to cause the alleged rights violation before the contractor can be liable.

(PC) Harris v. California Forensic Medical Group · filed 2020-10-15

Accordingly, because plaintiff does not argue that CFMG had an official policy or custom that led to a violation of his rights (see generally ECF No. 1), plaintiff has not made a threshold showing that CFMG violated his rights under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison contractor under Monell when its policy or practice causes a constitutional injury.

Ryan v. Correctional Health Partners · filed 2020-10-19

This type of entity can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the Monell standard12 for constitutional injuries caused by its employees when those constitutional violations are part of the entity’s policy and practice.

A private corporation is liable under § 1983 for an Eighth Amendment violation only if its policy, custom, or practice caused the violation.

Thompson v. Stover · filed 2020-10-19

In order to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim against a private corporation such as Wexford, a plaintiff must establish that a policy, custom, or practice attributable to the corporation actually caused a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

A corporation performing delegated prison functions is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom directly causes the alleged injury.

Rodrigues v. French · filed 2020-10-19

To establish liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show: 1) the existence of a . . . policy or custom[;] and 2) a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged.” Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has not alleged that any policy by Centurion or CTR caused the alleged medical indifference.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private medical center for its employees’ acts.

Miller v. The City of Springfield Police Division · filed 2020-10-20

The Court, however, agrees with the Medical Center that -- unlike with regard to state law claims of negligence, see Evans v. Smith, 646 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) -- no § 1983 liability exists against the Medical Center on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability alone.

A private corporation is liable under Section 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Reed v. Williams · filed 2020-10-21

A plaintiff seeking relief under Section 1983 against a private corporation must show that a policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights. Here, Reed fails to identify a policy or custom of the hospital that violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 allows a deliberate indifference claim against a private prison medical contractor when its policy or practice caused the violation.

Richmond v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-10-22

Additionally, Plaintiff has stated a viable claim in Counts 1 and 2 against Wexford. See Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004) (corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference if it had a policy or practice that caused the violation).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private corporation acting as a state actor to allege a policy or custom that caused the deprivation of a federal right.

Carter v. Gautreaux · filed 2020-10-22

The Court does not reach the issue of deliberate indifference, however, because the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a custom or policy by CorrectHealth as Monell requires.

Section 1983 does not make a company liable merely because it employs someone who violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Valdivia v. Wexford Health Services · filed 2020-10-23

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and companies are not liable merely because they employ someone.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private corporation performing state services; a claim against it must arise from a policy, practice, or custom that caused the deprivation of federal rights.

Burton v. Freibuger · filed 2020-10-29

It is well- settled, however, that a corporation like Corizon cannot be held liable in a Section 1983 suit under the theory of vicarious liability.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison health care contractor only when the contractor’s own unconstitutional policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Wyma v. State of Illinois · filed 2020-10-30

Where a private corporation has contracted to provide essential government services, such ... as health care for prisoners, the private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself.

A private entity that contracts to perform a state function may be sued under § 1983, but liability based on its policies requires a constitutional violation by one of its employees.

Campbell v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2020-11-02

Plaintiff has failed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation on the part of any individual Corizon medical provider, so no constitutional injury exists to support a claim against Corizon.

A private entity is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Tripati v. Corizon Incorporated · filed 2020-11-03

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Corizon Incorporated (“Corizon”) because Tripati failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Corizon’s policy or custom violated his Eighth Amendment rights. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (a private entity is liable under § 1983 only if the private entity’s custom or policy violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights).

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity acting under color of state law when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Harris v. Ryan · filed 2020-11-04

Accordingly, Corizon may only be held liable under § 1983 for its employees’ civil rights deprivations if Plaintiff can show that an official policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. ... Accordingly, there are disputed issues of material fact whether Defendant Corizon had a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights and the Court will deny summary judgment to Defendant Corizon.

A private corporation providing jail health care is subject to the same § 1983 rules as a public entity: an injury must be caused by its policy or custom, not merely by an employee.

Esposito v. Ramus · filed 2020-11-06

Under § 1983, a government entity may not be sued solely for injuries inflicted by its employees but is responsible when it is the execution of its policy or custom that causes the injury. ... Because Mend Correctional Healthcare is a private corporation providing essential government services, it “is subject to ‘at least the same rules that apply to public entities’” under § 1983. ... Esposito has alleged no facts suggesting that Mend Correctional Healthcare had such a policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits liability against a corporation only when its policy or custom causes an employee to deprive someone of a federally protected right.

Murrill v. Hough · filed 2020-11-06

A corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the entity’s policies or customs caused one or more of its employees to deprive the plaintiff of a federally protected right.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation acting for the state only when its policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional deprivation.

Bailey v. Wexford Health Sources Inc. · filed 2020-11-06

Rather, liability to the entity itself attaches only when the constitutional deprivation resulted from the entity having implemented an unconstitutional policy, custom or practice.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison operator to allege that its policy, decision, or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Valez v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2020-11-12

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as housing prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity performing a traditional public function to identify a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Hughes v. Shinn · filed 2020-11-13

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. ... Plaintiff does not allege that any of the conduct described in the Complaint was the result of a specific policy or custom of Defendants GEO Group and CCS. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendants GEO Group and CCS.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private corporation; a claim against it requires an unconstitutional policy or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

Knox v. Butler · filed 2020-11-13

Normally, a private corporation is shielded from vicarious liability under § 1983. ... Here, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Wexford had an unconstitutional policy, let alone one that was a moving force behind any constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a damages claim against a prison health contractor to allege that its policy, practice, or custom caused a constitutional violation; the contractor is not automatically liable for its employees’ acts.

WHITE-BEY v. HOLCOMB · filed 2020-11-16

Wexford is not automatically liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the failings of its employees. To state a § 1983 damages claim against Wexford, Mr. White-Bey must allege that a Wexford policy, practice, or custom caused a constitutional violation. He points to no identifiable policy or practice to properly plead a damages claim against Wexford upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, all claims against Wexford are dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private medical contractor to show that its official policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Wamsley v. Prime Care/Medical Staff · filed 2020-11-18

To state a claim against Prime Care, Plaintiff must show that Prime Care acted personally in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights by demonstrating that an official policy or custom of the corporation caused the deprivation of his rights.

Section 1983 permits corporate liability when a corporate policy causes an employee to violate constitutional rights, but the claim fails without an underlying employee violation.

Sperry (ID 47031) v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2020-11-20

Although a corporation may be liable under § 1983 if its policy is the “moving force” which causes an employee to violate a person’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff has not alleged that any Corizon employee violated his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner suing a private prison health care provider to allege a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

PERRY v. WELL-PATH · filed 2020-11-20

Perry asserts in conclusory fashion that Well-Path was deliberately indifferent but fails to allege that Well-Path had a relevant policy or custom that caused him a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a corporation to show that an unconstitutional policy or practice caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Quinn v. May · filed 2020-11-23

In order to survive summary judgment with respect to the corporate defendant, Armor, Quinn must demonstrate both that it maintained unconstitutional policies or practices, and that those policies or practices were the cause of his injuries.

Section 1983 does not permit liability against a private corporation for deliberate indifference in circumstances where no individual practitioner was deliberately indifferent.

Munson v. Overall · filed 2020-11-24

Munson’s claim against Wexford depends on the individual liability of the practitioners. In instances like this, the corporation cannot be found liable if the individual employee is found not to have shown deliberate indifference.

A corporation may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or practice causes deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs.

Brisco v. Lashbrook · filed 2020-11-30

Plaintiff also states a viable claim in Counts 4 and 5 against Wexford. See, e.g., Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004)(noting that corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference if it had a policy or practice that caused the violation).

Section 1983 does not permit a private corporation to be held vicariously liable for its employees’ conduct.

Miller v. Rauner · filed 2020-11-30

Under controlling precedent, a private corporation, like Wexford, cannot be held vicariously liable in litigation under § 1983.

A private contractor cannot be liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation.

Bowles v. Bourbon County, Kentucky · filed 2020-11-30

Bowles’s claim against ACH must fail because there are no underlying constitutional violations in this case.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison medical contractor when its policy, custom, or official action causes an actionable injury.

Weeks v. Birch · filed 2020-11-30

To support a claim against a prison’s medical contractor under §1983, a plaintiff must show that there was a policy, custom, or official action that inflicted an actionable injury. ... The Court agrees with Corizon that the record does not give rise to a genuine factual question whether Corizon’s practices evidence a pattern of actionable injury.

Section 1983 requires allegations that a corporate defendant was responsible for a policy that caused the constitutional harm.

Rodrigues v. French · filed 2020-11-30

There are no allegations Centurion and CTR “promulgated . . . or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that . . . caused the . . . constitutional harm,” as required under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation operating a prison when an employee commits a constitutional violation that directly results from a corporate policy or custom.

Quintana v. Core Civic · filed 2020-11-30

To succeed in a § 1983 action against a corporate entity, however, the plaintiff must prove that the corporate employee or agent committed a constitutional violation, and that the violation was a direct result of some policy or custom of the corporation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private prison medical contractor; a plaintiff must identify a policy, practice, or custom that caused the injury.

Glenn v. Mataloni · filed 2020-11-30

Under § 1983, private corporations, such as Wexford, contracted to provide health care for inmates cannot be held liable pursuant to respondeat superior; instead, a plaintiff must allege that the entity had a policy, practice, or custom that caused his or her injury. ... Plaintiff fails to specify the specific customs or policies that he alleges Defendant Wexford put in place to deny him certain medical care. ... The Court, therefore, will grant the motions to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Wexford.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prisoner transport company when its official policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Williams v. Prisoner Transportation Services, LLC · filed 2020-11-30

That is to say, the PTS Defendants may be liable under § 1983 only if their official policies or customs caused a constitutional injury to Plaintiff.

Section 1983 permits Monell liability against a private company acting under color of state law, but when that liability depends entirely on an individual claim, failure of the individual claim defeats the company claim.

Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-12-01

But “if the plaintiff’s theory of Monell liability rests entirely on individual liability,” as Donald’s does here, then “negating individual liability will automatically preclude a finding of Monell liability.” Id. We therefore agree that summary judgment in favor of Wexford was appropriate because Donald failed to establish a deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Osmundson individually.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity that provides prison medical care to connect the alleged rights violation to the entity’s policy, decision, or custom.

Stewart v. Corizon Healthcare LLC · filed 2020-12-03

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison health care contractor when its own unconstitutional policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Edwards v. Jaimet · filed 2020-12-03

Where a private corporation has contracted to provide essential government services, such as health care for prisoners, the private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself. ... Despite these broad statements, Plaintiff has failed to articulate or point to any particular policy or practice attributable to Wexford that caused him injury, and the Court can find none.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity that houses prisoners to allege that the entity’s policy, decision, or custom caused the violation of federal rights.

Coffey v. Core Civic America · filed 2020-12-04

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as housing prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely for its employees’ actions; a plaintiff must allege that a policy, practice, or custom caused a constitutional violation.

YOUNG v. SMITH · filed 2020-12-10

But "[r]espondeat superior liability does not apply to private corporations under §1983." Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014). To state a § 1983 damages claim against GEO Group, Mr. Young must allege that a policy, practice, or custom of Wexford caused a constitutional violation. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2016). He makes no such allegation, so he has failed to state a viable claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private medical contractor under Monell when the contractor’s policy or practice causes the alleged constitutional injury.

Randle v. Nicholson · filed 2020-12-11

Wexford may be held liable under § 1983 pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). ... He also fails to allege, as he must, how Wexford’s policies or guidelines impacted the care he received. ... The Court accordingly dismisses Randle’s Monell claim against Wexford without prejudice.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ actions; a claim against the corporation must be supported by facts showing a policy or custom.

Rowe v. Wexford of Indiana LLC · filed 2020-12-11

There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Though Mr. Rowe suggests that his rights were violated due to a corporate policy or custom, the facts of the complaint do not support this claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison medical contractor only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

PEREZ v. LITTLE · filed 2020-12-16

A private corporation under contract to provide prison health services such as Wellpath may be liable under § 1983 only if that entity’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation providing prison health care only when the corporation’s own unconstitutional policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Brown v. Crauley · filed 2020-12-18

Again assuming Agnesian Healthcare could be considered a state actor, a private corporation (like Agnesian Healthcare) that has contracted to provide essential government services, such as health care for prisoners, “cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself.” Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014).

A private corporation providing prison health care cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely for its employees’ actions; the violation must be caused by the corporation’s own policy or custom.

Adell v. Waupun Memorial Hospital · filed 2020-12-22

The private corporation may not be held liable for the actions of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a corporate medical provider when there is no underlying constitutional violation.

WILLEY v. WEXFORD OF INDIANA, LLC · filed 2020-12-23

Wexford "cannot be held liable for damages because there is no underlying constitutional violation."

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison corporation for its own wrongdoing, but not solely for its employees’ actions.

Peace v. Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction · filed 2020-12-31

When the defendant is a corporate entity, a Plaintiff may only hold it liable under § 1983 for the entity’s own wrongdoing.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private prison health contractor only when its policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

KYLE v. MCFADDEN · filed 2021-01-04

Similarly, a private corporation under contract to provide prison health services such as Prime Care may be liable under § 1983 only if that entity’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private entity performing a government function when its policy or custom plausibly causes a constitutional violation.

Baxter v. Twin Falls County Jail · filed 2021-01-06

Given Plaintiff’s allegations that he repeatedly sought medical and dental care but that treatment was consistently delayed or denied, the First Amended Complaint raises a plausible inference that—in the period of August to November 2019—Ivy Medical had a policy or unofficial custom or practice that amounted to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (setting forth elements of § 1983 claim against a municipality); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Monell to private entities performing a government function). Thus, Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed against Ivy Medical on his Eighth Amendment medical treatment claims.

A private corporation sued under Section 1983 is liable only if its policy or practice caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Warren v. Wexford Health Source Inc. · filed 2021-01-12

In order to be held liable for deliberate indifference, Wexford, as a corporation, must have had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private prison healthcare contractor; liability requires an injury caused by the contractor’s own policy or custom.

LaPine v. Hartzler · filed 2021-01-13

But a corporation like Corizon may be not held liable in a § 1983 suit under a vicarious liability theory.

Section 1983 treats prison medical contractors as government entities and requires an official policy or custom that causes a constitutional deprivation to hold them liable.

ADAMS v. MARTZ · filed 2021-01-19

Because Corizon and Wexford act under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function, i.e., providing medical care to correctional facilities, they are treated as a government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims. See Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 fn.6 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, to survive summary judgment, Mr. Adams must produce evidence of "the existence of an 'official policy' or other governmental custom that not only causes but is the 'moving force' behind the deprivation of constitutional rights." Teesdale v. City of Chi., 690 F.3d 829, 833-34 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989)); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical contractor when an individual provider violates a constitutional right and an unconstitutional custom or policy causes that violation.

Bigham v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2021-01-22

As private entities providing legally required health care for the Maryland prison system, Wexford and Corizon may be held ‘liable under § 1983 only to the extent that individual medical providers violated Bigham’s constitutional rights, and the violation was caused by an unconstitutional custom or policy, such as a policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a corporation for its own policies and practices, but not solely for an employee’s conduct.

Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2021-01-26

Under Mo- nell and its progeny, a corporation can be liable under § 1983 only for its own policies and practices, not under a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 holds a government contractor liable for a constitutional injury caused by its own policy or custom.

Tietz v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2021-01-26

Thus, to prevail in a § 1983 claim against a government contractor like Corizon, a plaintiff must show that the corporation had a “policy” or “custom” that caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison company to show that its policy or settled custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Church v. White · filed 2021-01-26

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Church “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights.

Section 1983 may enforce an unambiguously conferred right in a Spending Clause statute.

BT Bourbonnais Care, LLC v. Norwood · filed 2017-08-08

Even so, nothing in Armstrong, Gonzaga, or any other case we have found supports the idea that plaintiffs are now flatly forbidden in section 1983 actions to rely on a statute passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause powers.

Section 1983 does not allow individuals to enforce Consent Decree provisions that rely on Medicaid’s provider-network requirement in § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

John B. v. Emkes · filed 2012-02-14

Moreover, the Court has determined that those provisions of the Consent Decree reliant on § 1396a(a)(30)(A) are not individually enforceable through a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(19) or 1396d(a)(13), because those Medicaid provisions confer no enforceable private right.

JORDANO BY AND THROUGH JORDANO v. Steffen · filed 1992-03-11

Accordingly, the Court finds the plaintiff is accorded no private right under § 1396a(a)(19) which is cognizable in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Similarly, § 1396d(a)(13) fails to provide a substantive right enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit redress against a state for violation of section 211 of the Appropriations Act because that provision is directed at the Secretary and imposes no obligation on the state.

Beno v. Shalala · filed 1993-07-01

Plaintiffs also claim that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "creates a vehicle by which plaintiffs can seek redress against the State for violation of the Appropriations Act." Pis.' Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 23. This argument fails because section 211 is directed at the Secretary and imposes no requirement or obligation on the state.

Section 1983 claims grounded solely in age discrimination are precluded by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's exclusive judicial remedy.

Humphrey v. Nebraska Public Power District · filed 1993-07-23

Because Humphrey’s § 1983 claim is grounded solely in age discrimination, it is precluded by the federal act.

Section 1983 does not enforce the Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails because those standards are not federal laws within its meaning.

Fillmore v. Ordonez · filed 1993-07-29

The court agrees with defendant Ordonez’ argument that the Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails, published, in 1980 by the United States Department of Justice, do not provide the basis for a § 1983 claim. ... Nor do such standards amount to federal “laws” within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under Title II of the ADA because the ADA creates enforceable rights and Congress did not foreclose that remedy.

Noland v. Wheatley · filed 1993-10-22

The ADA satisfies the first inquiry. ... The ADA satisfies the second inquiry because it creates enforceable rights for individuals with disabilities. ... Accordingly, the court denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Noland’s § 1983 claims premised upon the ADA.

Section 1983 permits beneficiaries of the public trust created by the Hawaii Admission Act to sue trustees for breach of the trust because the Act creates federally enforceable rights.

Price v. Akaka · filed 1993-11-02

Congress enacted the Admission Act, a federal public trust, which by its nature creates a federally enforceable right for its beneficiaries to maintain an action against the trustee in breach of the trust. As a beneficiary, Price may therefore bring a Sec. 1983 action under the Hawaii Admission Act against the trustees.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under 29 U.S.C. §§ 721(a)(8) and (a)(9), because those provisions create enforceable rights and Title I’s remedial scheme does not foreclose that remedy.

Marshall v. Switzer · filed 1993-11-17

Viewing appellant's claim in light of this statutory scheme leads to the conclusion that appellant is entitled to bring his claim under Sec. 1983. ... But this remedial scheme does not demonstrate a congressional intent to foreclose enforcement of Secs. 721(a)(8) & (a)(9) under Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 permits providers to enforce a state's Medicare cost-sharing obligations for qualified Medicare beneficiaries under § 1396a(a)(10)(E).

Rehabilitation Ass'n of Virginia, Inc. v. Kozlowski · filed 1993-11-22

Whereas providers in Wilder had enforceable rights under § 1983 to challenge the adequacy of Medicaid rates under § 1396a(a)(13)(A), so too do providers have enforceable rights to challenge a state’s obligations under the cost-sharing provisions in § (a)(10)(E).

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, and duplicating unsuccessful special-education and disability statutory claims does not supply a separate basis for relief.

Chuhran v. Walled Lake Consolidated Schools · filed 1993-11-23

As discussed above, § 1983 does not provide a source of substantive rights and Chuhran’s claims under § 1983 are duplicative of his prior statutory claims. Leave to amend to plead these claims against state officials would be fruitless. Accordingly, MDOE’s motion to dismiss will be granted as to Count V.

Section 1983 permits a Medicaid recipient to challenge a statewide exclusion of necessary EPSDT treatment as experimental, with judicial review limited to reasonableness.

Miller v. Whitburn · filed 1993-12-01

A statute creates a right enforceable under Sec. 1983 if (1) it was intended to benefit the putative plaintiffs, (2) it imposes a binding obligation on the governmental unit rather than merely expressing a "congressional preference" for a certain kind of conduct and (3) the interest asserted by the plaintiff is not so vague and amorphous that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce. ... There can be little doubt that the first two Wilder factors have been satisfied in this case. States participating in the Medicaid program must provide EPSDT services to all individuals under age 21. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1396a(a)(10)(A) & 1396d(a)(4)(B). Thus, it is clear that five-year-old Tiffany is an intended beneficiary of EPSDT services, and that the Department has a binding obligation to provide them to her. We also do not believe that Tiffany has asserted a "vague and amorphous" interest. ... Accordingly, the district court may decide only whether the Department's determination that the liver-bowel transplant procedure is experimental is reasonable.

Section 1983 permits Medicaid recipients entitled to EPSDT services to challenge the reasonableness of a state's determination that a needed treatment is experimental.

Miller ex rel. Miller v. Whitburn · filed 1993-12-01

We thus conclude that Wilder guides our analysis here. ... There can be little doubt that the first two Wilder factors have been satisfied in this case. States participating in the Medicaid program must provide EPSDT services to all individuals under age 21. ... Thus, it is clear that five-year-old Tiffany is an intended beneficiary of EPSDT services, and that the Department has a binding obligation to provide them to her. We also do not believe that Tiffany has asserted a “vague and amorphous” interest. ... Essentially, we conclude only that a federal court may review (1) the Department’s definition of “experimental” to ensure that it reasonably comports with our explanation of that term, which is, we believe, consistent with current medical opinion and (2) the question whether the Department reasonably applied this definition of experimental to the liver-bowel transplantation at issue here.

Section 1983 permits residents of state-operated Medicaid facilities to enforce rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1396d and its implementing regulations because those rights are individually enforceable and Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

Conner v. Branstad · filed 1993-12-09

Thus, having found both prongs of the ... test satisfied here, the court concludes that Plaintiffs may seek enforcement of § • 1396d through use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Bankruptcy Code's comprehensive enforcement mechanisms for §§ 362 and 525 appear to foreclose an additional derivative § 1983 cause of action.

Coats v. Vawter (In Re Coats) · filed 1993-12-09

A review of 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and 525 reveals Congress’ intent to establish a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for violations of the automatic stay and governmental discrimination against debtors, respectively. Therefore, on the surface it appears that Congress has enacted alternative remedies and it does not appear that additional derivative causes of action exist in this case by virtue of § 1983.

Section 1983 is unavailable to enforce rights under 47 U.S.C. § 315 because that provision provides its own remedy through a petition to the FCC.

Forbes v. Arkansas Educational Television Communication Network Foundation · filed 1994-06-21

Finally, we agree with the District Court that Sec. 1983 is not available to enforce Forbes's claims under Sec. 315 of the Communications Act, since that provision itself contains the remedy for its violation--a petition to the FCC.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of federal statutory rights unless the statute creates no enforceable right or Congress forecloses enforcement; the Ashurst-Sumners Act creates no right enforceable through Section 1983.

Mcmaster v. State Of Minnesota · filed 1994-07-25

In Wilder, the Supreme Court held that Sec. 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal statutes, with two exceptions: (1) where the statute creates no " 'enforceable rights, privileges or immunities within the meaning of Sec. 1983' "; or (2) where " 'Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself.' " Id. (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987)). ... Furthermore, Ashurst-Sumners creates no federal right enforceable by way of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Section 1983 remains available for constitutional claims alongside the Privacy Protection Act because that Act does not provide an exclusive remedy.

Citicasters, Inc. v. McCaskill · filed 1995-02-01

Therefore, the court does not find that the Act provides an exclusive remedy for plaintiff’s claim that precludes an alternative or additional cause of action under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide additional relief for violations of Federal Aviation Act air traffic regulations because Congress provided a comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Pew v. Scopino · filed 1995-03-15

I agree with the Second Circuit that Congress has thus provided a comprehensive enforcement scheme such that section 1983 does not afford additional relief.

Section 1983 lets tenants enforce rights under the Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention Act in CDBG and Section 8 housing programs.

German v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. · filed 1995-05-08

Plaintiffs have met the three-part Wilder test and have an enforceable right within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring a claim to enforce the LPPPA under the CDBG and Section 8.

Section 1983 permits injunctive and declaratory claims involving cable franchise decisions, but the amended Cable Act forecloses damages claims arising from those decisions.

Lowell and Malissa Edwards v. Mike Armstrong, Individually and as Mayor City of Louisa, Kentucky and the City Council of · filed 1995-06-30

We hold that the current Act forecloses only Sec. 1983 suits for monetary damages, but dismiss plaintiffs' remaining claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under Sec. 1983 because no case or controversy now exists between the Edwardses and the City, now that the Edwardses have sold the cable system to others.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce § 290dd-2’s confidentiality provision because that statute creates no substantive rights for patients.

Rick R. Ellison v. Cocke County, Tennessee and David Kickliter, M.D. · filed 1995-08-24

We also believe that 290dd-2 creates no substantive rights that would enable Ellison to invoke a Section 1983 claim. Significantly, not every violation of federal law gives rise to a Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to challenge the factors in an Older Americans Act funding formula because the formula requirements are too amorphous to create enforceable rights.

City of Chicago v. Lindley · filed 1995-09-08

Accordingly, we hold that the City does not have a right, enforceable under § 1983, to challenge the particular factors that are included in or excluded from Lindley’s funding formula. The OAA’s requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 3025(a)(2)(C) are too amorphous to create rights enforceable under § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot enforce a federal statute when Congress has foreclosed that enforcement and the statute creates no enforceable rights.

Polite v. Casella · filed 1995-10-18

Section 1983 is not available to enforce a violation of a federal statute “where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities” within the meaning of Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only if it creates an enforceable right and Congress has not foreclosed that remedy.

"Tony" L. ex rel. Simpson v. Childers · filed 1995-12-20

A plaintiff may sue under § 1983 for violation of a federal statute unless: (1)“the statute [does] not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983,” or (2) “Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself.”

Title IX does not preclude a section 1983 claim to vindicate independent substantive due process rights.

Lillard v. Shelby County Board of Education · filed 1996-02-21

We first consider whether Title IX’s statutory remedy precludes the plaintiffs from bringing a substantive due process claim under section 1983, an argument made by the defendants for the first time on appeal, and conclude that this argument is without merit.

Section 1983 provides no claim against state or local officials under a federal statute that places its compliance obligations only on the federal government.

Cline v. George W. Rogers, Individually and in His Capacity as Sheriff of McMinn County and McMinn County, Te · filed 1996-06-25

When a statute imposes no direct obligations on the states, and instead places “the onus of compliance with the statute’s substantive provisions on the federal government,” there is no § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for alleged violations of the National Voter Registration Act because that Act's exclusive enforcement scheme forecloses the remedy.

NAT. COAL. DISABILITIES ED & LEGAL DEFENSE v. Allen · filed 1997-03-10

The NVRA provides a detailed method of enforcement which is exclusive, and as a result private persons cannot support a Section 1983 claim based upon an alleged violation of the NVRA.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a federal statute only if the statute expresses in specific and mandatory terms an intent to benefit the plaintiff.

Four T's Inc. v. Little Rock · filed 1997-03-13

To be enforceable under § 1983, the statute at issue must intend to benefit the "putative plaintiff" and such an intent must be expressed in specific and mandatory terms. ... We hold, therefore, the district court did not err when it dismissed Dollar's cause of action to enforce the AAIA under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a Medicaid provider to sue to enforce rights under the Medicaid Act and its implementing regulations.

Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Houstoun · filed 1997-11-03

As a Medicaid provider, Rite Aid has a private right of action to enforce the statute and regulations which mandate adequate reimbursement for prescription drug's and related services. ... Rite Aid has a right of action to bring its claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a separate remedy for unpaid overtime claims when the FLSA supplies the exclusive remedy for those claims.

Barfield v. Madison County, Miss. · filed 1997-11-20

Because the FLSA provides an exclusive remedy for the violation of its terms, the Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to § 1983 must be dismissed.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce § 6104 where § 6104 provides no private right of action.

Schuloff v. Queens College Foundation, Inc. · filed 1998-03-10

As the Court has already determined that § 6104 does not create a private right of action, Schuloff cannot look to § 1983 to enforce the provisions of § 6104.

Section 1983 permits private enforcement of a federal regulation only when the regulation further defines a statutory or constitutional provision that itself creates an enforceable right.

Graus v. Kaladjian · filed 1998-04-28

Upon analysis, this Court concludes that § 1983 does not authorize indiscriminate private enforcement of the vast universe of federal regulations but extends such enforcement only to those regulations that further define the substance of a statutory (or constitutional) provision that itself creates an enforceable right.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce FLSA overtime rights because the FLSA’s enforcement scheme precludes that remedy.

Kendall v. City of Chesapeake · filed 1999-04-08

Rather, Congress has evinced a clear intent to preclude the use of § 1983 for the protection of overtime compensation rights secured by the FLSA.

Section 1983 does not permit plaintiffs to enforce a federal provision unless they are among its intended beneficiaries.

Santiago Ex Rel. Muniz v. Hernandez · filed 1999-04-29

In the present case, plaintiffs are not the intended beneficiaries of the LPPPA, HCDA or RLPHRA or their regulations; thus, under Blessing, they may not bring a § 1983 action, and under Cort, they do not have a private right of action.

Section 1983 permits a private action to enforce HUD’s regulation requiring public housing authorities to reasonably accommodate tenants’ guests.

Diggs v. Housing Authority of the City of Frederick · filed 1999-07-15

The court concludes, therefore, that a private cause of action under § 1983 is available for a violation of HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(d)(1).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce the Food Stamp Act’s expedited food stamp service requirement.

Josephine Victorian and Ruth Helen Jones v. Barbara Miller, Supervisor · filed 1986-09-04

In Tyler v. Mmes. Pasqua & Toloso, 748 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.1984), a panel of this court held that the Food Stamp Act does not create a private right of action to enforce expedited service for food stamps, and that none lies independently under § 1983. ... However, it is a firm rule of this circuit that a panel cannot overrule a prior panel decision, and we are bound by the decision in Tyler until its holding is reconsidered and reversed by the en banc court. ... The district court correctly dismissed appellants’ claims based upon alleged violations of the Food Stamp Act.

Section 1983 does not permit enforcement of a federal statute that creates no enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities.

Endsley, Roy L. v. City of Chicago · filed 2000-10-12

For even if plaintiffs were to bring the sec. 129 claims by way of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, they would still lose. "Section 1983 is not available to enforce a violation of a federal statute where Congress has foreclosed enforcement in the enactment itself and ’where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of sec. 1983.’"

Section 1983's remedy is displaced when Congress provides an alternative remedy through the FWPCA.

Welch Foods, Inc. v. Wilson · filed 2000-11-13

Section 1983 is a statutory remedy, and Congress retains the authority to repeal or replace it with an alternative remedy (see, Smith v Robinson, supra, at 1012), which it did here by the enactment of the FWPCA (see, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v National Sea Clammers Assn., supra, 453 US, at 14-18).

Title IX does not preclude Section 1983 equal protection claims against individual defendants who cannot be sued under Title IX.

Hayut v. State University of New York · filed 2000-12-18

Such defendants are not amenable to suit under Title IX, so it cannot be said that Title IX provides plaintiffs comprehensive remedy as against the individual defendants. Accordingly, the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs Section 1983 claims based on the denial of equal protection must be denied.

Section 1983 does not independently let beneficiaries of federal Spending Power programs sue states or their officers to enforce program benefits.

Westside Mothers v. Haveman · filed 2001-03-26

Thus, § 1983 independently creates no right for beneficiaries of federal programs enacted pursuant to the Spending Power to sue the governmental entities or officers responsible for allocating those benefits.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action to enforce 21 C.F.R. § 610.47 when no underlying statute creates an enforceable private right.

Kinzie v. Dallas County Hospital District · filed 2003-01-03

For the reason’s stated herein, the court determines that § 610.47 does not create a private cause of action for Plaintiff to vindicate through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 remains available for First Amendment political discrimination claims because the Workforce Investment Act’s enforcement scheme does not preclude that remedy.

Borrero-Rodriguez v. Montalvo-Vazquez · filed 2003-01-31

Defendants have made no showing that allowing plaintiffs’ § 1983 action to go forward is incompatible with a carefully tailored, comprehensive scheme established by Congress. There is no such comprehensive scheme outlined in the WIA that would close the door to § 1983 as an independent avenue that plaintiffs may pursue.

Section 1983 provides no separate action for a railroad's ICCTA preemption claim where Congress provided a scheme for review of Surface Transportation Board orders.

Boston and Maine Cor v. Town of Ayer · filed 2003-05-21

Indeed, § 1336(a) authorizes injunctive and declaratory relief but has no provisions for attorneys' fees; it would be more than odd to create an action under § 1983 solely to provide for attorneys' fees. It would be contrary to Congressional intent to create a § 1983 action here.

The Workforce Investment Act does not expressly or impliedly foreclose § 1983 claims.

Ramos v. De La Montana · filed 2003-09-24

In sum, the WIA statute does not manifest Congress’ expressed or implied intent to foreclose § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce FLSA rights because the FLSA’s enforcement scheme precludes that remedy.

Stone v. McGowan · filed 2004-03-02

While the Court is not bound by the Fourth Circuit’s decision, it agrees with and adopts, the persuasive and sound reasoning of Kendall in concluding that Congress evinced a clear intent to preclude the use of Section 1983 for the protection of rights secured by the FLSA.

Section 1983 requires clear statutory language conferring a private right to enforce a federal funding statute; Medicaid providers cannot use it to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A).

Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson · filed 2004-03-17

Although Gonzaga did not overrule Wilder's construction of the now repealed Boren amendment, Gonzaga requires clear statutory language for the creation of private rights enforceable under section 1983 at least where based upon federal funding statutes. ... Subsection (30)(A) does not provide explicit rights for providers.

Section 1983 is unavailable as a remedy for age discrimination claims covered by the ADEA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme.

Cataldo v. Moses · filed 2004-11-03

Accordingly, this Court finds that the ADEA provides a comprehensive enforcement scheme to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy.

Section 1983 does not provide a private action to enforce the AAIA where Congress provided an FAA complaint process and did not intend private enforcement.

Scott Aviation, Inc. v. DUPAGE AIRPORT AUTHORITY · filed 2005-01-24

It is clear that 49 U.S.C. § 47107 provides for assurances to be provided to the Secretary of Transportation and the regulations provide for complaints to be filed with the FAA that allege violations of the AAIA and other statutes. Thus, there is a sufficient indication that Congress did not intend to provide a private cause of action and that the enforcement scheme provided by Congress was not intended to support a private action. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any controlling precedent in support for its position that it can base a Section 1983 claim upon a violation of the AAIA. Therefore, we grant DAA’s motion to dismiss Count II.

Section 1983 claims based on employment rights protected by USERRA are subsumed by USERRA’s enforcement scheme.

Ferguson v. Walker · filed 2005-11-10

This court agrees with the reasoning of the district court in Satterfield and also concludes that Plaintiffs § 1983 claims are subsumed by USERRA.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for violation of a federal statute only when Congress intended that statute to create an enforceable federal right.

Qwest Communications Corp. v. City of Greensboro · filed 2006-07-25

The touchstone for determining whether a section 1983 remedy is available for the violation of a federal statute is whether Congress intended to create a federal right under the statute in question.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under § 604a because § 604a provides an exclusive state-court remedy.

Teen Ranch v. Udow · filed 2007-01-17

In the instant matter, 42 U.S.C. § 604a(i) expressly provides that a plaintiff’s remedy under § 604a resides exclusively in state court. As such, we must conclude that “Congress did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under § 1983.” Abrams, 544 U.S. at 121.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for claims based on rights created by the ADA or ADEA.

McNa v. Communications Inter-Local Agency · filed 2008-03-12

Thus, McNa may not maintain a section 1983 claim to the extent that she bases the claim on underlying violations of the ADA or ADEA.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under § 722 of the Rehabilitation Act because that Act provides a comprehensive remedial scheme.

Wasser v. NY STATE OFF. OF VOC. AND EDUC. SERVS. · filed 2008-08-27

Accordingly, Wasser may not use § 1983 to seek enforcement of his rights under § 722 of the Rehabilitation Act, and his § 1983 claims must be dismissed.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for DPPA violations because the DPPA’s comprehensive remedial scheme is exclusive.

Roberts v. Source for Public Data · filed 2008-12-01

Given this comprehensive remedial scheme, the Court must presume that Congress intended that the enforcement scheme it created in the DPPA would be the exclusive remedy for violations, precluding resort to § 1983 by Plaintiffs. Therefore, Count III fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against an individual supervisor based on the Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Act because Congress foreclosed that means of enforcement.

Grady v. El Paso Community College, Linda Luehrs · filed 1992-12-30

Section 1983 is not available, however, in two settings: (1) where Congress has foreclosed § 1983 enforcement in the enactment itself and (2) where the statute does not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983. ... We conclude that § 1983 will not provide a vehicle allowing Grady to make claims against Luehrs based upon the Act.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of a spending power statute only when Congress unambiguously gives its beneficiaries a right to enforce its requirements.

Gundlach v. Reinstein · filed 1996-04-11

Thus, when a plaintiff seeks to invoke § 1983 to enforce a statute enacted pursuant to the spending power, the relevant inquiry is whether the Congress unambiguously conferred upon the beneficiaries of the statute a right to enforce its requirements.

Section 1983 does not let potential victims of parolees enforce the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision because the Act confers no enforceable right on them.

Hodgson v. Mississippi Department of Corrections · filed 1997-04-30

Based upon this record, the court concludes that neither the United States Congress nor the legislatures of Mississippi and Wisconsin unambiguously conferred upon persons such as Hodgson and his daughter the right to enforce any rights, privileges or immunities under the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot enforce the Uniform Act under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits a challenge to a federally funded state plan that fails a mandatory federal requirement, but does not remedy an isolated violation of an otherwise lawful plan.

Mallett v. Wisconsin Division of Vocational Rehabilitation and Judy R. Norman-Nunnery · filed 1997-12-01

Because § 1983 enforces only “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws,” a plaintiff may utilize § 1983 only to the extent that a state plan which receives federal funding does not conform to one of the federal requirements. Section 1983, therefore, is not an appropriate means of remedying an isolated violation of an otherwise legal plan.

Section 1983 does not allow private plaintiffs to enforce 23 U.S.C. § 129’s toll-revenue requirements.

Roy L. Endsley III and Stephen Graham, Individually and on Behalf of Those Similarly Situated v. City of Chicago · filed 2000-10-12

The district court correctly denied this motion. For even if plaintiffs were to bring the § 129 claims by way of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they would still lose.

Section 1983 does not allow Medicaid providers to enforce Section 30(A) because that provision was not intended to benefit them.

Pennsylvania Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun · filed 2002-03-13

We now hold that the plaintiffs, as Medicaid providers, may not assert their claims under § 1983, and we therefore affirm the order of the District Court on this alternative ground.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act because that Act provides a more restrictive private remedy.

Kraege v. Busalacchi · filed 2009-11-04

Because the Act has a more restrictive private remedy, I conclude that plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim to enforce their rights under the Act is barred.

Section 1983 permits enforcement of rights under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.

Welch v. THEODORIDES-BUSTLE · filed 2010-01-05

The law of the circuit is that the Act creates a private right of action and, in addition, may be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of IDEA-created rights because the IDEA’s remedial scheme precludes such an action.

A.J. ex rel. C.L.J. v. Board of Education · filed 2010-01-08

The Supreme Court has recently clarified that when a statute provides for a private cause of action, courts should ordinarily infer that Congress intended to preclude an action under § 1983. ... Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is dismissed.

Section 1983 cannot be used to bring ADA or other statutory claims that provide their own frameworks for damages.

Ramos-Echevarría v. Pichis, Inc. · filed 2010-03-22

Lastly, it is well settled that “Section 1983 cannot be used as a vehicle for ADA or other statutory claims that provide their own frameworks for damages.”

Section 1983 does not permit private enforcement of HUD regulations that do not confer an enforceable federal right.

Taylor v. Housing Authority of New Haven · filed 2010-03-29

For all these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs may not enforce any part of 24 C.F.R. § 8.28(a) through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) because that provision does not confer individual rights.

Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development · filed 2010-09-07

The Court cannot agree with either of plaintiffs’ contentions. Although “whether a statutory violation may be enforced through § 1983 ‘is a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a particular statute,’” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990)), both “require a determination as to whether or not Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries,” id. at 285. ... It does not identify any class of people who will benefit from the grantee’s certification that it will further fair housing.

Section 1983 cannot be used to pursue an employment age discrimination claim because the ADEA provides the exclusive federal remedy.

Cozzi v. County of Marin · filed 2011-04-18

Thus, a § 1983 claim based on age discrimination is prohibited, because Congress intended the ADEA to provide the exclusive means of pursuing federal claims of age discrimination in employment.

Section 1983 does not permit an age discrimination in employment claim because the ADEA provides a comprehensive statutory scheme for those claims.

Oliver v. Spokane County Fire Dist. 9 · filed 2013-08-05

As Defendants correctly argue, Plaintiff cannot maintain an age discrimination in employment claim under § 1983 when Congress has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to address such claims.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act, including the Equal Pay Act.

Hilliard v. Parish · filed 2014-01-08

Given the foregoing, the Court holds that a plaintiff may not utilize Section 1983 to redress violations of the FLSA.