42 U.S.C. § 1983

A private party acts under color of state law through joint action only when the party and government officials share a goal of violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Gray-Ziegelbauer, Randy v. Eighth Street Auto, Inc. · filed 2020-01-23

The bottom line is that Gray-Ziegelbauer pleaded facts that are inconsistent with a shared unconstitutional goal between defendants and the sheriff’s department, a requirement for § 1983 liability as joint actors with government officials.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a corporation for an unconstitutional policy or custom when there is no underlying constitutional violation.

Rojas v. Connections CSP Inc. · filed 2020-01-23

Connections, therefore, cannot be liable based on the theory that it established or maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom responsible for violating Plaintiff’s rights.

Section 1983 treats private prison medical contractors acting under color of state law as government entities; a claim against them must rest on a policy, practice, or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

GARLAND v. WEXFORD OF INDIANA · filed 2020-01-24

Because Wexford and Corizon act under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function—providing healthcare services to inmates—they are treated as government entities for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 966 (7th Cir. 2019). A successful claim against Wexford or Corizon therefore must be based on a policy, practice, or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private medical corporation acting under color of state law only when its own policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Scott v. Siddiqui · filed 2020-01-27

Like a municipality, Wexford may only be held liable under Section 1983 for constitutional violations caused by its own policy or custom.

A private corporation providing prison medical care under color of state law may be liable under § 1983 only if the plaintiff meets the Monell liability standard.

Johnson v. IDOC · filed 2020-01-28

As such, Defendant Wexford may be liable under § 1983 only if Plaintiff can meet the Monell municipal liability standard.

A private entity providing prison medical care can be liable under § 1983 when its policy, decision, or custom causes a constitutional violation; employing someone who violated a right is insufficient.

Dent 245514 v. Corizon Incorporated · filed 2020-01-29

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care for prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. ... Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the conduct described in the Complaint was the result of a specific policy or custom of Defendant Corizon. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendant Corizon.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation only when its custom or policy causes a violation of federal rights.

Gattuso v. C.C.S. Medical Dep. · filed 2020-01-29

An entity such as CCS may be held liable under § 1983 only to the extent that it has a custom or policy that causes a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, such as a policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

A corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the constitutional injury; it is not liable merely because it employs the person responsible.

Taylor v. Aramark Food Service · filed 2020-02-03

Corporate entities “cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005). Rather corporate liability exists only “when execution of a [corporation’s] policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.” Id.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity that performs a traditional public function to show that an entity policy, decision, or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Newman v. Ryan · filed 2020-02-04

To support a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

A private entity performing a government function is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional injury.

Nigro v. Christensen · filed 2020-02-05

To bring a § 1983 claim against a municipality (local governmental entity) or a private entity performing a government function—such as Corizon—a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). ... Plaintiff has provided insufficient allegations to state a claim against Corizon.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private corporation to plead a corporate policy that caused the alleged injury.

Lujan v. Corizon Health Care · filed 2020-02-05

The rule requiring plaintiffs to point to a corporate policy is part of the pleading standard under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a corporate prison medical provider liable to show that its policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Hardwick v. Connections · filed 2020-02-06

When a plaintiff relies upon a theory of respondeat superior to hold a corporation such as Connections liable, he must allege a policy or custom that demonstrates such deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private corporation; the plaintiff must show that its policy or practice caused a constitutional violation.

Bradford v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-02-06

Although § 1983 has been interpreted to bar respondeat superior liability, a defendant like Wexford can be held liable if it has a policy or practice that causes a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Smith v. Baldwin · filed 2020-02-07

Respondeat superior liability is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for its employees’ actions solely because it employs them.

Fuller v. Corizon, Inc. · filed 2020-02-07

A private corporation is not liable under § 1983 for actions allegedly committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires facts linking an injury to a corporation’s policy, custom, or official action; a conclusory allegation of a policy is insufficient.

Hardman v. Corizon Medical Services · filed 2020-02-11

That is, there are no facts to sustain the proposition that plaintiff was injured due to a policy, custom, or official action on the part of Corizon. Thus, this allegation fails to state a claim and must be dismissed.

A § 1983 claim against a corporate defendant must identify a custom or policy that caused a constitutional deprivation.

Pacheco v. GEO Group · filed 2020-02-11

Nor does Plaintiff identify any custom or policy of Geo or Sun Rise that caused a deprivation of constitutional rights. Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d at 728. Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a sufficient § 1983claim for relief.

A private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its official policy or custom causes a deprivation of federal rights.

Williams v. West Virginia Division of Corrections · filed 2020-02-13

However, “[a] private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” ... Although discovery may prove otherwise, at this stage, Plaintiff has adequately alleged an improper custom or practice to proceed with her deliberate indifference claim against Wexford.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private company that provides inmate medical care to show that the company’s policy or custom caused the injury; one incident alone is insufficient.

Jenkins v. Hutton · filed 2020-02-13

Although Defendant is a private entity, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the requirement of showing a policy or custom applies in “suits against private entities performing functions traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state, such as the provision of medical care to inmates.” Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 453 (11th Cir. 1997). ... Plaintiff has not shown that a policy or custom of Defendant caused his injuries.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private company when its policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Guerrero v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-02-13

Mr. Guerrero also claims deliberate indifference on the part of Wexford itself. To prevail, Mr. Guerrero must show that an official Wexford policy, practice, or custom caused a constitutional violation.

A private prison health care provider may be liable under § 1983 for a constitutional deprivation caused by its policy or custom, but conclusory allegations do not state a Monell claim.

Green v. Obsu · filed 2020-02-13

Instead, the Amended Complaint presents only “legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations,” which are not sufficient to state a viable Monell claim.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical contractor only when its own unconstitutional policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Willis v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-02-18

When a private corporation has contracted to provide essential government services, such as health care for inmates, the corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself.

Section 1983 requires a private corporate defendant to have acted under color of state law and, for corporate liability, to have caused the constitutional injury through a policy or custom.

White 228524 v. Corizon Inc. · filed 2020-02-19

In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant Aetna will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, both because Aetna is not a state actor and because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating the existence of a policy or custom by Aetna that caused an injury to Plaintiff.

A § 1983 claim against a private prison medical provider requires facts showing a constitutional injury caused by the provider’s policy, decision, or custom.

Johnson v. Corizon Health Services LLC · filed 2020-02-21

To support a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 requires a private prison medical contractor to have a policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation before the contractor can be held liable.

Pedraza v. Inch · filed 2020-02-21

Because Centurion’s liability under § 1983 would be based on its functional equivalence to the government entity responsible for providing medical care and services to FDOC inmates, Pedraza must plead that an official policy or a custom or practice of Centurion was the moving force behind the alleged federal constitutional violation.

A prison healthcare contractor may face liability under Section 1983 when it implements a policy that causes a constitutional violation.

DAVIS v. WETZEL · filed 2020-02-25

The Court finds that Davis has adequately alleged the existence of an unconstitutional policy, and also facts which indicate that Correct Care Solutions played an active role in the implementation of the policy.

A private corporation is liable under Section 1983 only when its official policy or custom causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Griffith v. Mediko · filed 2020-02-28

“Rather, a private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.”

A complaint seeking to hold a corporate prison contractor liable under § 1983 must plausibly allege a policy or custom that disregards inmates’ safety or needs.

Harris v. Aramark Incorporation · filed 2020-03-02

With respect to the Corporate Defendants, the Amended Complaint “fails to plausibly allege, or allege at all for that matter, that Aramark maintained a policy or custom that disregarded inmates’ [safety or] needs, as he needed to do to state a claim against the company.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation when employees act under color of state law and their alleged unconstitutional conduct follows the corporation’s policy or custom.

Wirtz v. Regalado · filed 2020-03-02

A plaintiff can state a plausible Monell claim against a private corporation by alleging facts demonstrating “actions [were] taken by subordinate employees in conformance with preexisting official policies or customs.”

A private corporation acting under color of state law is liable under § 1983 only when its custom or policy causes a constitutional violation.

Atkins III v. Core Civic Association · filed 2020-03-02

However, as nothing in the complaint allows the Court to plausibly infer that any custom or policy of this entity was the moving force behind any violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to this Defendant.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity that provides prison medical care to allege that the entity’s policy, decision, or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Valenzuela v. Centurion Health · filed 2020-03-03

Further, to state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that her constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 requires evidence of an actual policy or practice to support a policy-based claim against a private prison medical provider.

DAWSON v. TALBOT · filed 2020-03-03

With no evidence to show that Wexford has an actual policy, practice, procedure, or habit of intentionally allowing stocks of medications to deplete, and prescriptions to lapse for days before being renewed, Mr. Dawson’s claim has no evidentiary support.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a prison medical contractor to show that a policy, widespread practice, or final policymaker caused the constitutional injury.

L'MINGGIO v. WEXFORD HEALTH · filed 2020-03-05

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim against Wexford or Corizon under § 1983, Mr. L’Minggio must show (1) that Wexford or Corizon had an express policy that, when enforced, caused a constitutional deprivation, (2) that Wexford or Corizon had a practice so widespread that, although not authorized by written or express policy, was so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law, or (3) that his constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policy making authority.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison medical provider to plead facts showing that its policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged constitutional violation.

SHANER v. PRIMECARE MEDICAL INC. · filed 2020-03-10

Even drawing all reasonable inferences in Shaner’s favor, we conclude that these allegations are conclusory and fail to include any facts describing a policy, custom or practice of PrimeCare that caused the alleged violation of Shaner’s constitutional rights. We therefore conclude that the Amended Complaint fails to allege a facially plausible § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment against PrimeCare.

Section 1983 makes a prison health care corporation liable when its unconstitutional policy or practice causes a constitutional deprivation.

Gill v. Sullivan · filed 2020-03-16

Wexford will only be liable for deliberate indifference if an unconstitutional policy or practice of the corporation caused the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on supervision.

Joyner v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-03-16

Wexfordcannot be liable on thebasis of respondeat superior, or supervisory, liability because it is not recognized under Section 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private entity liable solely because its employee committed an unconstitutional act; the plaintiff must show that the entity’s policy or custom caused the violation.

Ward 261123 v. Harris · filed 2020-03-18

Corizon cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the alleged unconstitutional acts of its officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits claims against a private corporation acting under color of law when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury; one patient’s treatment alone does not establish such a policy or custom.

Gaston v. Beatty · filed 2020-03-18

Without more, Physician’s Assistant Modi’s choice to secure two electronic consultations through Arista—limited to evidence about Gaston himself—does not amount to a policy, custom, or practice under Monell.

A corporate medical provider may face a Section 1983 claim when its policy or practice causes a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights.

Turner v. Wetzel · filed 2020-03-18

Similarly, Turner alleges that Correct Care Solutions implemented a policy that prevented antiviral treatment for inmates suffering from Hepatitis C due solely to the cost of the treatment20 and, thus, sufficiently alleges that Correct Care Solutions has implemented a policy or practice that violates his Eighth Amendment rights.

A private company acting under color of state law can be liable under § 1983 when its policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Shafford v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-03-19

To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim against Wexford, Mr. Shafford must show that an official Wexford policy, practice, or custom caused the constitutional violation. Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that Monell liability “applies in § 1983 claims brought against private companies acting under color of state law”).

A private corporation providing jail services may be liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

RIVERS v. REILLY · filed 2020-03-20

The Geo Group Inc., a private corporation under contract to provide services at the George W. Hill Correctional Facility, may be liable under § 1983 only if the entity’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity performing a government function to plead facts showing that the entity’s policy or custom caused the alleged injury.

Feagins v. Corizon Medical Services · filed 2020-03-23

To bring a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a government function, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains. ... Plaintiff has provided insufficient allegations to state a claim against Corizon.

A private corporation providing jail medical care is liable under § 1983 only if its custom or policy causes a violation of federal rights.

Smith v. Warden · filed 2020-03-23

Accordingly, Correct Care may be held liable under § 1983 only to the extent that it has a custom or policy that causes a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, such as a policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Section 1983 applies Monell’s policy-or-custom requirements to a private employer treated as a state actor; allegations of poor supervision and other lawsuits must plausibly connect the employer’s conduct to the claimed injury.

Lopes v. Westchester County · filed 2020-03-25

The Court may therefore apply the Monell analysis to Moving Defendant. ... Therefore, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege claims for a failure to supervise or a consistent and widespread practice of which Moving Defendant must have been aware.

Section 1983 holds a private prison medical contractor liable only when its policy or custom causes the injury, not for its employees’ acts alone.

Walters v. Wexford of Indiana LLC · filed 2020-03-27

But, a corporation “cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” ... Because Walters alleges the medical staff are not following protocol—as opposed to an allegation that he is being denied treatment based upon a policy or custom itself—he has not stated a claim against Wexford.

A private corporation acting under color of state law is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

LLOYD v. IPPLE · filed 2020-03-30

To be liable under § 1983, a private corporation acting under color of state law must have an express policy or custom that resulted in a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a private entity performing a government function to allege that the entity’s policy or custom caused the injury.

McNearney v. Corizon Medical Services · filed 2020-03-31

To bring a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a government function, a plaintiff must allege that officials carried out an official policy or unofficial custom that inflicted the injury at issue.

Section 1983 requires a plausible allegation of an unconstitutional policy to hold a private medical provider liable for its employee’s conduct.

Snow v. Corizon Health Inc. · filed 2020-03-31

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to transform his claim into a Fourteenth Amendment claim that he was deprived of information necessary for informed consent to medical treatment, Plaintiff still has not plausibly alleged that Corizon had an unconstitutional policy or that the medical provider acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation acting under color of state law liable for an employee’s conduct solely because it employs that person; liability requires a policy, custom, or official action that causes an actionable injury.

Roebuck v. Glass · filed 2020-03-31

A corporation acting under color of state law cannot be liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation acting under color of state law only when its custom or policy caused the constitutional violation.

Farr v. Centurion of Tennessee, LLC (PSLC1) · filed 2020-03-31

Also, for a corporation acting under state law to be liable for a violation of constitutional rights, the plaintiff must establish that the corporation’s custom or policy was the moving force behind that violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity performing a traditional public function to allege that the entity’s policy, decision, or custom caused the violation of federal rights.

Robledo 250767 v. Bautista · filed 2020-04-02

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as operating a jail kitchen, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private company providing government services when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Young v. Glanz · filed 2020-04-03

However, the municipal liability principles in Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), extend to private companies that contract to provide services on behalf of governmental entities.

Section 1983 permits a deliberate indifference claim against a private prison medical contractor only when the contractor’s unconstitutional policy or practice caused the deprivation.

Wilson v. IDOC · filed 2020-04-06

Wexford will only be liable for deliberate indifference if an unconstitutional policy or practice of the corporation caused the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private entity acting under color of state law when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Lindley 080874 v. Corizon Health · filed 2020-04-09

Accordingly, Corizon may only be held liable under § 1983 for its employees’ civil rights deprivations if Plaintiff can show that an official policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

A § 1983 claim against a private entity providing prison medical care must allege that the entity’s policy, decision, or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Ramirez 103771 v. Corizon Health · filed 2020-04-14

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical or dental care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

A private corporation acting under color of state law can be liable under § 1983 when its policy, custom, or official action inflicts an actionable injury; it cannot be liable solely for an employee’s conduct.

Houston v. Bredeman · filed 2020-04-14

A corporation acting under color of state law, such as Corizon, cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory. ... Here, however, there is no indication that Corizon’s denial of a surgical consultation resulted from an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Section 1983 applies municipal policy-or-custom liability standards to private prison health care providers acting under color of state law.

Bost v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-04-15

Of import here, Monell liability has been extended to private entities operating under color of state law, including private prison health care providers. ... Thus, those standards applicable to municipalities apply with full force to Wexford.

A § 1983 claim against a private corporation performing a state prison function must allege that the corporation’s policy or practice caused the injury.

AKEMON v. WEXFORD MEDICAL · filed 2020-04-20

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim against Wexford or GEO Group under § 1983, Mr. Akemon must allege that his injury was the result of the defendants’ policy or practice.

Section 1983 holds a corporation acting under color of state law liable only for its own unconstitutional policies.

Sullivan v. State of Missouri · filed 2020-04-22

The complaint also fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Corizon. “A corporation acting under color of state law will only be held liable under § 1983 for its own unconstitutional policies.”

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for its employees’ conduct merely because it employs them; the alleged injury must result from a corporate policy or custom.

Grandison v. Life Treatment Center · filed 2020-04-27

Neither a private company nor a municipality can “be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)); see also Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 2008) (a “private corporation is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil rights”).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity acting under color of state law to show that the entity’s policy or custom caused the rights violation.

Brown v. Nimely · filed 2020-04-27

Under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), to prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against an entity acting under color of state law, a plaintiff must show not only that an agent of the entity violated his rights, but also that the entity’s policies or customs caused the violations.

A private corporation acting under color of state law may be liable under § 1983 for harm caused by its own unconstitutional customs or policies.

Stearns v. Inmate Services Corporation · filed 2020-04-29

As such, ISC may be liable under § 1983 for harms caused by its own unconstitutional customs or policies.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity that provides prisoner medical care to allege that the entity’s policy, decision, or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Arther v. Corizon Health Incorporated · filed 2020-04-29

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care for prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity that performs a public function to identify a specific policy or custom that caused the alleged violation.

Atwood v. Days · filed 2020-04-29

Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the conduct described in the Complaint was the result of a specific policy or custom of Defendant Centurion, or what any such policy or custom was. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 against Centurion and it will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity that performs a traditional public function to identify a policy, decision, or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Valenzuela v. Centurion Health · filed 2020-04-30

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical or dental care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. ... Plaintiff has failed to identify a policy or custom of Defendant Centurion and has failed to explain how that policy or custom violated her constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private corporation; the corporation may be liable when its unconstitutional policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Richerson · filed 2020-04-30

A private corporation is shielded from respondeat superior and vicarious liability under Section 1983. ... It may be subject to Monell liability, however, for which Plaintiff must demonstrate that the wrongdoers acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom of Wexford’s, and that the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

A corporation acting under color of state law is liable under § 1983 only if its express policy or custom resulted in a constitutional deprivation.

TRACY v. WEXFORD OF INDIANA, LLC. · filed 2020-05-01

To be liable under § 1983, corporations acting under color of state law must have an express policy or custom that resulted in a constitutional deprivation.

A private prison medical contractor can be liable under Section 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Walters v. Wexford of Indiana LLC · filed 2020-05-06

Rather, corporate liability exists only “when execution of a [corporation’s] policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.”

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation only when its policy or custom causes the alleged violation, not solely because an employee committed it.

Burkley v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC · filed 2020-05-06

The doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be used to establish corporate liability for constitutional deprivations by its employees. Instead, “private corporations can only be held liable under § 1983 if ‘an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal civil rights.’” Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., 338 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs do not allege any specific policies or customs to be deficient in this case.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation when its official policy or custom directly causes a constitutional injury.

Costine v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC · filed 2020-05-08

For a private corporation, like CCS, to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the entity directly caused the constitutional injury via official policy or custom.

A corporation providing prison medical care is liable under Section 1983 only if its unconstitutional policy or practice caused the constitutional deprivation.

Williams v. Thompson · filed 2020-05-08

Wexford will only be liable for deliberate indifference if an unconstitutional policy or practice of the corporation caused the constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff fails to point to any policy or practice of Wexford that resulted in a delay in his follow-up appointment.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation acting under color of state law liable solely for its employees’ conduct; the plaintiff must allege a policy, custom, or official action that caused an actionable injury.

Booth v. Corizon · filed 2020-05-08

A corporation acting under color of state law, such as Corizon, cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory. Smith v. Insley’s Inc., 499 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2007). Rather, to support such a claim, the plaintiff “must show that there was a policy, custom, or official action that inflicted an actionable injury.”

Section 1983 permits suits against private prison operators, but they are not liable merely because they oversee the person who caused the harm; a policy of their own must cause the violation.

Wilcox v. Management and Training Corporation · filed 2020-05-12

Private prison administrators such as MTC can be “persons” subject to suit under § 1983, but they cannot face liability solely because they oversee a tortfeasor. ... Wilcox does not allege his book was withheld pursuant to any specific policy promulgated by MTC or Warden Martinez. ... The Complaint therefore fails to state a § 1983 claim against any defendant.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity acting under color of state law to allege that its official policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Ward v. Corizon · filed 2020-05-13

The district court properly dismissed Ward’s action because Ward failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that he suffered a constitutional violation as a result of an official policy or custom of Corizon.

A private corporation providing government services can be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Thornton v. Doe · filed 2020-05-15

When a private corporation has contracted to provide essential government services, such as health care for inmates, the corporation can be held liable under §1983 if the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself. ... Based on these allegations and the allegations pertaining to Count 1, Count 5 will proceed against Wexford.

Section 1983 permits claims against private corporations performing state functions when a policy or practice causes a constitutional violation; the plaintiff must identify and support the alleged policy.

WELLS v. CORIZON HEALTH INC. · filed 2020-05-18

A successful Monell claim must first identify the specific policy causing the constitutional harm. ... The summary judgment record contains no evidence of any Corizon policies or evidence of a need to implement a policy for emergency medical services. Mr. Wells has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on this claim.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation acting under color of state law liable solely for its employees’ conduct; the plaintiff must show an actionable injury caused by its policy, custom, or official action.

Barber v. Hill · filed 2020-05-20

A corporation acting under color of state law, such as Corizon, cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory. ... Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated that his constitutional rights were violated due to a Corizon policy, custom, or official action.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation providing essential government services only when its own policy, custom, or practice causes the constitutional deprivation.

Henneberg v. Securus Correctional Services · filed 2020-05-26

A private corporation that contracts to provide essential government services cannot be held liable under Section 1983 unless the corporation’s own policy, custom, or practice causes the constitutional deprivation at issue.

Section 1983 does not make a private contractor performing government duties liable solely for its employees’ acts; liability requires an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Williams v. Wexford Health Sources Inc. · filed 2020-05-28

It is well-established, however, that § 1983 does not permit suits against local governments that arise exclusively from the acts of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, local governments can only be liable under § 1983 if they maintain an ... unconstitutional policy or custom. Id. The Seventh Circuit has held that Monell also applies to private corporations, such as Wexford, when they are contracted to perform typical governmental duties. See Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982).

A private entity providing prison medical care is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, decision, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Derello 37292 v. McAdorey · filed 2020-05-29

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 applies municipal liability principles to private corporations, requiring a policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Vreeland v. Tiona · filed 2020-05-29

However, as the magistrate judge noted in his recommendation, the principles of municipal liability apply to a plaintiff seeking to impose § 1983 liability on a private corporation. Docket No. 355 at 11-12 (citing Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003)). Thus, plaintiff must identify a “policy or custom” of the corporation that caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical contractor for constitutional violations caused by its own policies or practices, but not vicariously for its employees’ acts.

Turner v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-05-29

Wexford can be held liable only for its own constitutional violations. ... Plaintiff has not offered any evidence in the record about Wexford’s policies beyond his own experience.

A private corporation acting under color of state law is liable under § 1983 only if its policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Thompson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2020-06-01

Without any evidence of deliberate indifference regarding Thompson’s treatment, Wexford cannot be held liable for damages on Thompson’s Monell claim.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison medical contractor to plead that the contractor’s policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Adorjan v. Armor Corr. Health Inc. · filed 2020-06-02

Because Armor’s liability under § 1983 would be based on its functional equivalence to the government entity responsible for providing medical care and services to FDOC inmates, Adorjan must plead that an official policy or a custom or practice of Armor was the moving force behind the alleged federal constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a corporation only when its own unconstitutional policy or custom caused the violation.

Nelson v. Wexford Healthcare Providers · filed 2020-06-02

Additionally, Wexford “cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself.”

Section 1983 permits a deliberate indifference claim against a private medical contractor when its unconstitutional policy or practice caused the deprivation.

Truidalle v. Brookhart · filed 2020-06-02

Wexford can only be liable for deliberate indifference if an unconstitutional policy or practice of the corporation caused the constitutional deprivation.

A private corporation providing prison health care can be liable under § 1983 only if its own unconstitutional policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Tully v. Wexford Health Source · filed 2020-06-04

Notably, where a private corporation has contracted to provide essential government services, such as health care for prisoners, the private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself.

Section 1983 permits liability for a prison medical services corporation only when its policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Hastings v. Advanced Correctional Healthcare Inc · filed 2020-06-05

Instead, an entity providing prison medical services is liable under § 1983 only if it is established that the constitutional violation was the result of the corporation’s policy or custom.

A private medical contractor acting under color of state law is treated as a government entity under Section 1983; a claim against it must allege a constitutional deprivation caused by its express policy or custom.

COLE v. TALBOT · filed 2020-06-10

Because Wexford acts under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function, i.e., providing medical care to correctional facilities, it is treated as a government entity for purposes of Section 1983 claims. See Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002). Therefore, to state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim against Wexford, Mr. Cole must allege that he suffered a constitutional deprivation as a result of an express policy or custom of Wexford. Because Mr. Cole makes no such allegations against Wexford, his claim against Wexford must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A corporation sued under § 1983 for its employees’ conduct must be alleged to have a policy or custom demonstrating deliberate indifference.

Woods v. Lawrence · filed 2020-06-15

In addition, when a plaintiff relies upon a theory of respondeat superior to hold a corporation liable, he must allege a policy or custom that demonstrates deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation providing inmate medical care when its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Rolley v. Advance Medical Provider · filed 2020-06-17

Based upon the allegations set forth in the complaint, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant AMP based upon the treatment, or lack thereof, that he received for his neck and arm condition because the complaint does not suggest that any alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights with regard to this condition was the result of a custom or policy implemented or endorsed by Defendant AMP.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable solely because it employs the people who caused a constitutional violation.

Schrock v. Aramark LLC · filed 2020-06-18

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and Aramark cannot be held liable solely because it employs the kitchen staff that prepared the meals in question.

A corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the injury.

Jones v. Aramark · filed 2020-06-23

Rather corporate liability exists only “when execution of a [corporation’s] policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.” Id. Because Mr. Jones has not identified a policy or custom that caused his injury, he may not proceed against Aramark.

Section 1983 permits liability for a corporation acting under color of state law when its express policy or widespread practice causes a constitutional deprivation.

HUBBARD v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC · filed 2020-06-23

A corporation acting under color of state law, like Wexford of Indiana, may be liable under § 1983 if it maintains an express policy or widespread practice that caused an unconstitutional deprivation.

A private prison operator is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the deprivation of rights.

McComsey v. Stokes · filed 2020-06-24

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, McComsey again must show that the alleged deprivation of his rights was due to a policy or custom of the company.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private healthcare contractor acting under color of state law when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; the contractor is not liable merely because it employs the alleged wrongdoer.

Salami 879045 v. Sperling · filed 2020-06-25

The requirements for a valid § 1983 claim against a municipal authority apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983. ... In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts regarding Defendant Corizon’s customs or policies. Accordingly, she has failed to state a claim against Corizon.

A private entity providing prison medical care is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, decision, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Valenzuela v. Ornelas · filed 2020-06-29

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that her constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 does not make a private company liable solely because it employs the people who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights.

Kyles v. Gladiuex · filed 2020-06-29

However, there is no general respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and Aramark cannot be held liable solely because it employs the kitchen staff that prepared the meals in question.

A private corporation is liable under § 1983 for a deprivation caused by its policy, custom, or inadequate training, but not solely for its employees’ actions.

Nolan v. Patterson · filed 2020-06-29

Municipal-liability analysis applies to § 1983 claims against private corporations like WellPath. ... WellPath cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for the actions of its employees. ... Liability must be based on a policy or custom of the contracted private entity or “the inadequacy of [an employee’s] training.”

Section 1983 does not permit liability based solely on an employer’s responsibility for its employees; a claim against a private entity requires a policy or custom that caused the constitutional injury.

Barnes v. Correct Care Solutions · filed 2020-06-29

Thus, to assert a Section 1983 claim against CCS, plaintiff must allege the existence of an official policy or custom that caused injury and a direct causal connection between that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 claims against a private entity performing a government function must allege that the entity’s policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Ingram v. Mouser · filed 2020-07-01

However, amendment would be futile with respect to Claim Three against St. Luke’s because only Monell claims may be asserted under § 1983 against a private entity.

A private prison health care provider is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

TOLEDO v. PRIMECARE MEDICAL DIVISION · filed 2020-07-02

Here, Toledo has not identified any policy or custom of Prime Care that caused him to be deprived of proper care or caused any other constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a corporation acting under color of state law to identify a policy, custom, or official action that caused the injury; the corporation is not liable solely for its employees’ conduct.

Felber v. Doyle · filed 2020-07-07

A corporation acting under color of state law, such as Corizon, cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory. ... Rather, to support such a claim, the plaintiff “must show that there was a policy, custom, or official action that inflicted an actionable injury.”

Section 1983 does not make a private corporate employer liable for its employees’ misconduct unless a corporate policy, custom, practice, or pattern of bad acts caused the injury.

Banks v. LoGiudice · filed 2020-07-09

Under §1983, a plaintiff cannot hold one person liable for the misconduct of another, and cannot sue a private corporate employer for the misconduct of its employees unless the plaintiff can show “that his injury was caused by a [corporate] policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, or a series of bad acts that together raise the inference of such a policy.” Shields v. Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir. 2014). The plaintiff has not alleged that Froedtert had such a policy, custom or practice, nor has he alleged a pattern of bad acts raising the inference of such a policy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private company acting under color of state law when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Von Ryburn v. Obaisi · filed 2020-07-09

Ryburn’s claim against Wexford “proceeds under the theory of municipal liability announced in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which [the Seventh Circuit has] held applies in § 1983 claims brought against private companies acting under color of state law.” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 966 (7th Cir. 2019). ... I conclude that a reasonable jury could find in Ryburn’s favor on his Monell claim.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison health care provider acting under color of state law only when its custom or policy causes a federal rights violation.

Stevens v. Holler · filed 2020-07-10

Accordingly, Correct Care may be held liable under § 1983 only to the extent that it had a custom or policy that caused a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private jail medical contractor under Monell only when its custom or policy causes a constitutional injury.

Meirs v. Ottawa County · filed 2020-07-13

Second, there is no evidence of a custom or pattern of practice showing that CCS had been deliberately indifferent to the needs of inmates. Last, there is no direct causal link between any actions or inactions of CCS and Scott’s death, nor were any CCS policies the “moving force” behind the injury at issue.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity performing a traditional public function to show that the entity’s policy or custom was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

Escalera 144195 v. Corizon Health Incorporated · filed 2020-07-15

To prevail on a claim against Centurion, as a private entity serving a traditional public function, Plaintiff must meet the test articulated in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978). ... To make this showing, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) Centurion had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a prison medical contractor to show that its policy, custom, or official action caused an actionable injury.

Shipp v. Hoffman · filed 2020-07-15

Thus, to maintain a section 1983 claim against Correct Care Solutions, Plaintiff “must show that there was a policy, custom, or official action that inflicted an actionable injury.”

Section 1983 does not impose supervisory liability on a corporation; a corporate policy or practice must cause the constitutional deprivation.

Sims v. Wexford Medical · filed 2020-07-15

Although he alleges that Wexford improperly supervised their employees(Doc. 11, p. 14), the corporation cannot be liable on this basis because respondeat superior, or supervisory,liability is not recognized under Section 1983.

A prison medical contractor may be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a deprivation of rights.

Nichols v. Centurion · filed 2020-07-20

Rather, to demonstrate that Centurion bears any liability, Plaintiff must identify a policy or custom of the entity and show that his particular injury was incurred due to the execution of that policy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison operator when the plaintiff plausibly alleges that its cost saving policy caused a denial of medical care.

TILLERY v. PHILLIPS · filed 2020-07-22

Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Tillery and also drawing any inferences fairly raised by Tillery in his favor, I find that Tillery has alleged a sufficient basis for proceeding on his claim against GEO at this time.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation under contract with the state liable for its employees’ acts under respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Morris v. Miller · filed 2020-07-27

Because respondeat superior or vicarious liability cannot be a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a corporation under contract with the state cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees and agents under those theories.

Section 1983 permits a private company performing a state function to be held liable when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Bean v. Marthakis · filed 2020-07-27

A private company performing a state function can be held liable to the same extent as a municipal entity under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). ... Accordingly, the complaint states a claim against Wexford of Indiana, LLC.

A private prison operator acts under color of state law for § 1983, but a claim against it requires a policy or custom that caused the rights violation.

Raines v. Wilson · filed 2020-07-27

Because it “performs the traditional state function of operating a prison,” CoreCivic “acts under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” ... Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that his inadequate conditions of confinement were directly caused by an official policy or custom of CoreCivic. ... CoreCivic will therefore be dismissed as a party.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private jail medical contractor under Monell when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury; conclusory allegations of a policy or custom are insufficient.

Flores v. County of Fresno · filed 2020-07-28

The court agrees that plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged facts addressing the requisite elements for entity liability under Monell because she has not alleged the existence of a policy, practice, or custom on the part of Corizon.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a private medical care organization to plausibly allege a policy or custom causally linked to the constitutional violation.

Mood v. Westchester County · filed 2020-07-29

As the Complaint is devoid of factual allegations that would plausibly suggest a policy or custom causally linked to this alleged constitutional violation, it fails to state a cognizable Monell claim.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation only when its own unconstitutional policy caused the violation; supervisory liability does not apply.

Wood v. Milwaukee County · filed 2020-07-30

A private corporation “cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy of the corporation itself.” Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 746 U.S. 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014). Supervisory liability does not apply to private corporations under §1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation that provides essential government services when its policy, custom, or practice causes a constitutional deprivation.

Henneberg v. Securus Correctional Services · filed 2020-07-30

A private corporation that contracts to provide essential government services can be liable under Section 1983 if its policy, custom, or practice causes a constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 requires a prisoner suing a private medical contractor for an Eighth Amendment injury to allege that the contractor’s unconstitutional policy or practice caused the injury.

SAGE v. WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES · filed 2020-07-30

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim against Wexford under § 1983, Mr. Sage must allege that his injury was the result of the Wexford's unconstitutional policy or practice.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a corporation under its policy when no employee violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Hernandez (ID 71264) v. Corizon, Inc. · filed 2020-07-31

Because no employee has violated Hernandez’s Eighth Amendment rights, Corizon may not be held liable under § 1983, regardless of whether its policy was the moving force behind Hernandez’s treatment.

Section 1983 requires factual allegations that a private medical corporation’s policy, custom, or routine practice caused a constitutional violation to state a claim against it.

Koch v. Debroha · filed 2020-08-03

In the absence of any particular facts suggesting the existence of an actual policy, custom, or routine practice that caused a constitutional violation, Count 1 must be dismissed without prejudice against this defendant.

Section 1983 treats a private contractor performing a government function as a government entity and requires a claim against it to rest on a policy, practice, or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

RICHARDS v. WEST-DENNING · filed 2020-08-03

Because Wexford acted under color of state law by contracting to perform a government function—providing healthcare services to inmates—it is treated as a government entity for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. ... A successful claim against Wexford therefore must be based on a policy, practice, or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

A private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Williams v. West Virginia Division of Corrections · filed 2020-08-04

Accordingly, as Plaintiff has failed to establish a Wexford policy or custom that caused Plaintiff’s alleged deprivation of federal rights, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Wexford is GRANTED.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a corporate entity when its official policy, practice, or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Smith v. Sevier · filed 2020-08-06

To pursue a claim under Section 1983 against a corporate entity, a plaintiff must show that his injury was the result of that corporate entity’s official policy, practice, or custom.

A private corporation providing prison health care is liable under § 1983 only when its custom or policy causes a violation of federal rights.

Pendergrass v. Wexford Health Sources · filed 2020-08-06

Entities such as Wexford and Corizon may be held liable under § 1983 only to the extent that they have a custom or policy that causes a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, such as a policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison operator when an employee or agent commits a constitutional violation directly caused by the operator’s policy or custom.

Gonzalez v. Guadalupe County Correctional Facility · filed 2020-08-06

However, to succeed in a § 1983 action against a corporate entity, the plaintiff must prove that a corporate employee or agent committed a constitutional violation and that the violation was a direct result of some policy or custom of the corporation.

A private entity is liable under § 1983 only if it acts under color of state law and its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Garcia v. Corizon Health Services · filed 2020-08-11

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Corizon Health, Inc. (“Corizon”) because Garcia failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Corizon’s policy or custom caused him to suffer a constitutional injury.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity performing a government function to allege that an official policy or unofficial custom caused the injury.

Andoe v. Dewalt · filed 2020-08-14

To bring a § 1983 claim against a municipality (local governmental entity) or a private entity performing a government function, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private medical contractor performing a government function when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

HOBSON v. WEXFORD OF INDIANA, LLC. · filed 2020-08-14

Therefore, to state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim against Wexford, the plaintiff must allege that he suffered a constitutional deprivation as the result of an express policy or custom of Wexford. Here, Mr. Hobson has adequately alleged a policy claim against Wexford of Indiana, LLC, specifically that its policy of permitting only one tooth to be examined at a time violates the Eighth Amendment.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical contractor when its employees cause injury by carrying out a corporate policy or custom.

Shearer v. Miller · filed 2020-08-14

Thus, as with a county government, Wellpath is only responsible under § 1983 if its employees cause injury by carrying out the corporation’s formal policies or practices, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), and a plaintiff must specify the corporate policy or custom which he alleges caused his injury.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison contractor when its policy or custom causes a deprivation of federal rights.

Bush v. Kenton County Detention Center · filed 2020-08-18

Thus, as with a county government, Aramark is only responsible under § 1983 if its employees cause injury by carrying out the corporation’s policies or practices, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), and a plaintiff must specify the corporate policy or custom which he alleges caused his injury. ... Thus, construing Bush’s allegations broadly, as this Court is required to do, his allegations sufficiently allege that Aramark has a policy or custom of failing to properly serve and prepare food in accordance with his religious beliefs, thus failing to recognize Bush’s conversion to Messianic Judaism.

Section 1983 requires a private corporation sued for a constitutional injury to have caused it through its policy or custom.

Kempa 3105, LLC v. Sauk Village, Illinois · filed 2020-08-24

Private parties who act under color of law can also be sued, but private corporations are not liable unless, like a municipality, their policy or custom caused the violation. ... Plaintiffs named a private corporation not an individual inspector and as such they were required to clear the Monell hurdle as to the company as well as to the Village.

A section 1983 claim against a private corporation based on a custom must allege that a policymaker had actual or constructive knowledge of the practice.

McElvy v. Southwestern Correctional LLC · filed 2020-09-01

However, Plaintiffs have not adequately pled actual or constructive knowledge of this pattern of conduct to an identifiable governing body or policymaker. ... Accordingly, all section 1983 claims against the corporate defendants must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires a private jail medical contractor’s policy or custom to cause the alleged constitutional violation before the contractor can be held liable.

Adorjan v. Armor Correctional Health Inc. · filed 2020-09-02

Because Armor’s liability under § 1983 would be based on its functional equivalence to the government entity responsible for providing medical care and services to inmates, Adorjan must plead that an official policy or a custom or practice of Armor was the moving force behind the alleged federal constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison medical provider whose policies or customs deny inmates adequate medical care.

Hamilton v. Siddiqui · filed 2020-09-03

Plaintiff states a viable claim in Count 2 against Wexford for its policies and practices.

A corporation sued under § 1983 is liable only when its custom, practice, or policy causes a constitutional violation.

Winter (ID 56375) v. Mansfield · filed 2020-09-03

Here, plaintiff does not allege any facts that support a claim of corporate liability, as he does not claim that any custom, practice, or corporate policy attributable to Corizon caused a violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 applies municipal liability rules to private corporations acting under color of state law, requiring a policy or custom that caused the rights violation.

Boone 501976 v. MaCauley · filed 2020-09-03

This rule of municipal liability applies equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a corporation liable for its employees’ conduct to show that a corporate policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Fletcher v. Department of Corrections · filed 2020-09-04

Finally, when a plaintiff relies upon a theory of respondeat superior to hold a corporation such as Connections liable, he must allege a policy or custom that demonstrates such deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison operator to connect the alleged constitutional violation to the operator’s policy, decision, or custom.

Valez v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2020-09-08

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as housing prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical contractor when it causes a constitutional deprivation.

Thompson 234651 v. Corizon, Inc. · filed 2020-09-08

Consequently, Corizon, like a governmental entity, may be held liable under § 1983 if it actually caused the constitutional deprivation.

A private corporation operating a prison is a state actor under Section 1983, but it may be liable only for harms caused by executing a corporate policy.

Shannon v. Risper · filed 2020-09-08

Risper and his employer CoreCivic are proper defendants to such a claim, inasmuch as CoreCivic performs the traditional state function of operating a prison and is thus a state actor for purposes of Section 1983, Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996), though it may only be held liable for harms caused by the execution of a corporate policy.

A private entity providing prison medical care is liable under § 1983 only when its policy, decision, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Atwood v. Days · filed 2020-09-09

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care for prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. ... Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that Centurion, or any Centurion employee, was in any way involved in the decision to confiscate or deny him access to the TENS. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Centurion based on these allegations.

Section 1983 makes a private corporation providing inmate healthcare liable only when its policy, practice, or custom causes the injury, not solely because it employs the people involved.

Ashford, Jr. v. Prime Care Medical Assoc. · filed 2020-09-10

Moreover, under § 1983, a private corporation, such as Prime Care, contracted to provide healthcare for inmates cannot be held liable pursuant to respondeat superior; instead, a plaintiff must allege that the entity had a policy, practice, or custom that caused his or her injury. ... Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts suggesting that the alleged deficiencies in his medical care were the result of Prime Care’s policies, customs, or practices.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private corporation that provides inmate healthcare to allege that its policy, practice, or custom caused the injury; the corporation is not liable solely for its employees’ conduct.

Ashford, Jr. v. Prime Care Medical Group · filed 2020-09-10

Moreover, under § 1983, a private corporation, such as Prime Care, contracted to provide healthcare for inmates cannot be held liable pursuant to respondeat superior; instead, a plaintiff must allege that the entity had a policy, practice, or custom that caused his or her injury.

Section 1983 holds a private prison corporation liable only when an official policy or custom caused the inmate’s injury.

Casey v. Parker · filed 2020-09-10

For a corporation to be liable, an inmate must prove that his injury was caused by an action taken pursuant to some official policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison medical contractor only when the alleged rights violation results from the contractor’s custom or policy.

Handy Jr. v. Clark · filed 2020-09-11

Thus, while Wexford is responsible for the delivery of medical care in a prison setting, absent a particular custom or policy that led to the deprivation of Handy’s constitutional rights, Wexford cannot be held liable for his claims under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private prison healthcare contractor; the contractor’s policy or custom must cause the constitutional violation.

Perez v. Larson · filed 2020-09-11

Under § 1983, a private corporation contracted by a prison to provide healthcare for inmates cannot be held liable for Eighth Amendment violations on a respondeat superior theory.

A private entity acting under color of state law is liable under § 1983 only when its official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Murrell v. Ryan · filed 2020-09-14

The district court properly dismissed Murrell’s claim against defendant Corizon Health because Murrell failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered a constitutional violation as a result of an official policy or custom of Corizon.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a corporation for its employees’ conduct alone; the plaintiff must show that a corporate policy, custom, or official action caused an actionable injury.

Harris v. Corizon, LLC · filed 2020-09-15

In a section 1983 action, however, a plaintiff may not rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. ... Because no facts support the existence of a Corizon policy or custom to deny medical care, the Court grants Corizon summary judgment.