42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 requires a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation to hold a private jail medical contractor liable; vicarious liability alone is insufficient.

McKuhen v. Transformhealthrx, Inc. · filed 2016-07-15

To establish THRX’s liability under § 1983, the McKuhens cannot rely on theories of vicarious liability; instead, they must show a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 applies Monell’s policy-or-custom liability standard to private companies acting under color of state law.

Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Incorp · filed 2016-10-12

Wexford is a private corporation, but we’ve held that the Mo-nell theory of municipal liability applies in § 1983 claims brought against private companies that act under color of state law.

Section 1983 applies municipal liability rules to private companies acting under color of state law.

Chatham v. Davis · filed 2016-10-17

The claim against Wexford proceeds under the theory of municipal liability announced in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which we’ve held applies in § 1983 claims brought against private companies acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison medical contractor for a policy or custom when the individual defendants committed no underlying constitutional violation.

Taylor v. Spraga · filed 2017-02-22

In addition, because'the court concludes that the individual defendants did not violate- plaintiffs constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment, CCS cannot be liable based on the theory that it established or maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom responsible for violating plaintiffs rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a prison medical contractor; liability must rest on a policy, practice, or custom that caused the injury.

Bracey v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections · filed 2017-04-19

With respect to MHM Correctional Services, Inc., the contract provider of mental health services and employer of Drs. Saavedra and Fonder, as explained by the Magistrate Judge, liability under § 1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior, see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d. Cir. 1988), but instead must be based on some policy, practice, or custom within the institution that caused the injury. Here, Bracey failed to identify any policy, practice or custom of MHM that caused a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private corporation’s policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Ross v. Corizon, LLC · filed 2017-06-30

Mr. Ross has not provided evidence of a custom or policy implemented by Corizon to withhold medically necessary medications in order to save money. See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310 (to impose liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a municipality had a “policy or custom” of deliberate indifference that led to the violation of his constitutional right).

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for its employees’ unconstitutional acts solely because it employs them; liability requires the corporation’s participation or a causal connection to the violation.

Ross v. Corizon Medical Services · filed 2017-06-30

As for Mr. Ross’ claim that Cori-zon, through the actions of Dr. Lafontant and Dr. Melendez, acted with deliberate indifference according to its policy and custom to save money, generally, “supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates ‘on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.’ ” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). We have extended that rule to private corporations like Corizon.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a private entity to show that it acted under color of state law and that its official policy or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Fodge v. Bossolono-Williams · filed 2017-08-14

The district court properly dismissed Fodge’s claim against Corizon because Fodge failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any constitutional deprivation occurred as a result of a custom or policy of Corizon.

A private entity performing a government function may be liable under § 1983 when an official policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Conley v. Nielsen · filed 2017-08-24

The district court properly dismissed Conley’s medical deliberate indifference claim against the “medical care provider” at the County Jail because Conley’s operative complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the alleged constitutional violation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private corporation acting as a state actor; the plaintiff must show that the wrongdoing followed an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Frederick Cashner, Jr. v. Widup · filed 2017-11-28

A private corporation is shielded from vicarious liability in actions brought under § 1983, unless, like ACH, it is effectively a state actor and the plaintiff can demonstrate that the wrongdoers acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom.

A private corporation providing prison medical care may be liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Campbell v. Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Health · filed 2018-01-11

However, even if the private entity is a “person” for purposes of § 1983, liability can only be imposed on the entity itself if its “policy or custom resulted in the alleged constitutional violations at issue.” Id. Here, Campbell does not allege facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that the alleged constitutional violations of Dr. Churchville and Nurse Shumaker were the result of a “policy or custom” of MPCH. Accordingly, the § 1983 claim against MPCH is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private company for a constitutional violation to show that the company’s policy, pattern, or practice caused it.

Montano v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2018-02-07

To prevail against Wexford, Montano must show that it had an official policy, pattern, or practice that caused a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits claims against private entities acting as government agents when their policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Barrows v. Larry · filed 2018-02-21

The Monell standard applies to private entities acting as government agents, which are treated as municipalities for the purposes of § 1983 claims.

A private corporation can be liable under Section 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

A.M. v. Bridges Pub. Charter Sch. · filed 2018-02-27

But more importantly, plaintiffs fail to contend that the alleged conduct led to the constitutional violation. It is unclear to the Court, based on the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, when the school officials were made aware of the alleged abuse. Were they informed after the fact or were they made aware earlier and failed to stop future abusive acts? That distinction is critical to understanding whether the school officials' alleged failure to act created a custom which led to a constitutional violation (in this case a Fourth Amendment violation). Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient factual basis to support such a theory. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT defendant Bridges motion to dismiss Count I.

A private corporation is liable under Section 1983 only if an employee acted pursuant to its custom or policy and that policy directly caused the alleged constitutional deprivation.

A. M. v. Bridges Public Charter School · filed 2018-02-28

In order to find aprivate corporation liable underSection 1983 an employeemusthaveactedpumuanttoacustomorpolicy and there must be a"direct causal link between a[] policy and the alleged constitutional depnvation." ... Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient factual basis to support such a theoiy. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT defendant Bridges motion to dismiss Count I.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation providing government services when its own unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice causes a constitutional violation.

Smith v. Wexford Health Source Inc. · filed 2018-04-17

A private corporation that has contracted to provide essential government services, such as Defendant Wexford, may be liable under § 1983 if an inmate’s constitutional violation during the provision of such services was caused by an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice of the corporation itself.

A private corporation providing prison medical care is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or widespread practice causes a constitutional injury; a complaint must allege facts supporting an inference that such a policy or practice exists.

Johnson Sr. v. Frain · filed 2018-05-04

Looking at the alleged instances of misconduct, surrounding circumstances, and additional facts, Johnson has failed to provide sufficient information from which the Court could infer a plausible Monell claim against Wexford.

A § 1983 claim against a private entity acting under color of state law must identify an official policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Wabuyabo v. Correct Care Solutions · filed 2018-05-21

As the district court noted, to state a claim against CCS, Mr. Wabuyabo must identify an official policy or custom that led to the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison medical contractor to show a policy or custom that caused an underlying constitutional violation.

Alexander v. Monroe County · filed 2018-05-22

To support a claim against a private corporation providing medical services under contract with a state prison system, a plaintiff must be able to show “a policy or custom that resulted in the alleged constitutional violations.”

A private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its own policy or widespread custom causes the constitutional injury.

Mohammed v. Westcare Illinois, Inc. · filed 2018-05-25

The failure to identify a specific WestCare policy or widespread practice related to the movement and housing of inmates is fatal to Mohammed’s § 1983 claims against WestCare.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a private medical contractor’s policy or custom caused a constitutional violation before the contractor can be held liable.

Johnson v. Caputo · filed 2018-06-11

Johnson can only hold PrimeCare liable for his alleged constitutional violations if he can “provide evidence that there was a relevant [PrimeCare] policy or custom” that “caused the constitutional violation[s].” See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84. Johnson has not identified any such policy or custom.

Section 1983 liability for a private entity requires a showing that its custom or policy violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Griffin v. Unknown Gregoline · filed 2018-06-19

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) because Griffin failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether CCA’s custom or policy violated Griffin’s Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 permits a Monell claim against a private company when the plaintiff plausibly alleges a widespread practice causing a constitutional deprivation, even if the allegations draw only on the plaintiff’s own experience.

Zavala v. Damon · filed 2018-07-17

Therefore, Zavala’s claims that Wexford’s cost-cutting policies, evidenced by its denial of the recommended post-operative treatment and therapy in his case, suffices at the pleading stage to state a Monell claim against Wexford.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison health provider when its custom, policy, or practice causes a constitutional violation.

Irvin v. Wexford Health Source, Inc. · filed 2018-07-20

To state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, its subdivisions, or other local government units, a plaintiff must articulate facts supporting an inference that a municipal or local government custom, policy, or practice caused the constitutional violation. ... Courts apply this standard to claims against Wexford.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private company only when its policy, pattern, or practice causes a constitutional violation.

Campbell v. Obaisi · filed 2018-07-23

To prevail on his claim against Wexford, Campbell must show that Wexford has an official policy, pattern, or practice that caused a constitutional violation.

A private corporation can be liable under § 1983 for an employee’s acts only when its own unconstitutional policy or custom caused the violation; respondeat superior does not apply.

Burton v. Ghosh · filed 2018-08-14

In any case, Burton’s amended complaint does not appear to set forth a Monell claim against Wexford, which is the only way that Wexford could be held liable for its employee’s acts. ... Thus, Wexford must be dismissed for this reason as well.

Section 1983 permits liability against a corporation providing prison health care if its custom or policy causes a constitutional violation.

Vernon McGinnis, Jr. v. Hammer · filed 2018-09-11

Defendant Correct Care Service LLC, as a corporation providing health services to inmates, may be liable if its custom or policy causes a constitutional violation. ... Here, as discussed above, McGinnis has failed to allege a constitutional violation, let alone one that the non-medical officials had a reason to be aware of, or that Correct Care Service caused as a result of its custom or policy.

Section 1983 permits claims against a private prison medical contractor when its policy, custom, or practice directly causes a constitutional violation.

Brown v. Obaisi · filed 2018-09-18

A corporation that has contracted to provide prisoners with medical care may be liable under § 1983. ... But to proceed to trial on this claim, Brown must offer evidence that a Wexford policy, custom, or practice was the “direct cause” or “moving force” behind a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation when its policy, custom, or practice caused the injury; the corporation is not liable solely because it employed the person who acted.

K. v. Spacapan · filed 2018-09-27

Seventh Circuit precedent precludes respondeat superior liability against private corporations under § 1983. See Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 792–95 (7th Cir. 2014). Instead, § 1983 claims against private corporations are analyzed under the standard applied to municipalities and government entities in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Therefore, to state a § 1983 claim against Aunt Martha’s, Kelly must allege that her injury was “caused by an [Aunt Martha’s] policy, custom, or practice, or a series of bad acts that together raise the inference of such a policy.” Shields, 746 F.3d at 796.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation vicariously liable for constitutional violations by its employees.

Sauer v. Wexford Health Source · filed 2018-10-15

To the extent plaintiff has brought a claim against Wexford through its employees who plaintiff has named as defendants and who provided medical services to inmates at Dixon, Wexford cannot be held vicariously liable under a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ civil rights violations.

Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2018-11-09

The Court thus concludes that Wexford, as a private corporation, cannot be liable pursuant to § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private jail medical contractor when its policy causes a constitutional deprivation.

Day v. Delong · filed 2019-01-09

Thus, a reasonable juror could find that the policy was the direct cause of the harm to Day, that harm being the unconstitutional denial of medical treatment. Therefore, NaphCare and Saunders will not be awarded summary judgment on Day's deliberate indifference claim.

Section 1983 permits liability against a prison medical contractor only when its policy causes a constitutional injury.

Booker v. Wexford Health Source · filed 2019-02-15

Because no reasonable juror could find that Booker was treated with deliberate indifference to his medical needs, there was no constitutional violation for which to hold Wexford responsible. And even if there were an underlying violation, there is no indication that Wexford’s policy of viewing an inmate’s medical complaints with healthy skepticism was the moving force behind it.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a corporate medical provider when its policy causes a deprivation of constitutional rights.

Serio v. Rauner · filed 2019-03-12

Because this is evidence that a Wexford policy gave rise to a deprivation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights, Plaintiff's Mone// claim survives summary judgement.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Cole v. Lemke · filed 2019-03-15

Wexford cannot be liable for the actions of its employees if those employees are not also liable.

Section 1983 permits corporate liability for a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise when that failure causes a constitutional violation.

Winebarger v. Corizon, LLC · filed 2019-03-18

The Court finds based on the totality of the evidence presented by Plaintiff that a reasonable juror could conclude Defendant Corizon’s training and supervision directives to its medical providers resulted in the delay of expensive but necessary medical procedures for inmates, including Plaintiff.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private jail food provider to show that the provider’s policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Pleasant-Bey v. Shelby County Government · filed 2019-04-15

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against Aramark, Plaintiff “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... Plaintiff has not alleged that a policy or custom of Aramark—or Shelby County—was the “moving force” behind the denial of halal foods to him at SCJ.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation when an unconstitutional policy or practice it adopted or allowed causes the injury.

Morgan v. Reich · filed 2019-05-01

Wexford, though a private corporation, has potential liability for constitutional infringement under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). This is so, if the alleged injury results from the application of an unconstitutional policy or practice promulgated or allowed by Wexford.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity acting under color of state law to identify an official policy or custom that directly caused the constitutional violation.

Broadus v. Correctional Health Partners · filed 2019-05-07

Instead, Broadus was required to identify an official policy or a custom that was the “direct cause” or “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation vicariously liable for its employees’ acts unless a corporate policy or custom caused the deprivation of rights.

Sellers v. St. Joseph Hospital · filed 2019-05-14

The Plaintiff has not set forth any factual allegations that St. Joseph’s Hospital caused a deprivation of his rights or that Salvator Lansana, M.D. acted pursuant to a policy or custom of the hospital. Accordingly, the Plaintiff does not have a § 1983 claim against St. Joseph’s Hospital.

Section 1983 permits liability against a corporation acting under color of state law for its unconstitutional policies or practices, but not merely for its employees’ actions.

Ventry v. Correct Care Solutions Corporation · filed 2019-05-15

Correct Care may only be held liable for its unconstitutional policies or practices in this § 1983 action if it had a “policy, custom, or official action that inflicted an actionable injury.”

Section 1983 requires a policy or well-settled custom of a private prison operator to be the moving force behind an alleged deprivation for the operator to be liable.

Moss v. Perry · filed 2019-05-29

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Moss “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... Moss, however, has not alleged that a policy or custom of CoreCivic was the “moving force” behind the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. He therefore fails to state a claim against CoreCivic or any Defendant in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical contractor only when the contractor’s own unconstitutional policy or custom caused the violation.

Gibson v. Obaisi · filed 2019-05-30

That is, "a private corporation cannot be held liable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself."

A private prison corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or settled custom is the moving force behind a deprivation of rights.

Walker v. Chapman · filed 2019-05-31

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Plaintiff “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... Walker has not alleged that a policy or custom of CoreCivic was the “moving force” behind the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. ... He therefore fails to state a claim against CoreCivic or against any Defendant in his or her official capacity.

Section 1983 applies municipal liability standards to private prison operators: a company policy or well-settled custom must cause the alleged deprivation of rights.

Ralston v. Ford · filed 2019-06-04

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Ralston “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... Construing Ralston’s allegations in his favor, he has sufficiently alleged that CoreCivic put in place the policy that was the “moving force” behind his alleged constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 allows a claim against a private prison operator when its policy or settled custom is the moving force behind an alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Hopkins v. Ford · filed 2019-06-04

Construing Hopkins’s allegations in his favor, he has sufficiently alleged that CoreCivic put in place the policy that was the “moving force” behind his alleged constitutional deprivations.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison operator when its policy or settled custom causes a deprivation of federal rights.

Kilian v. Ford · filed 2019-06-04

Construing Kilian’s allegations in his favor, he has sufficiently alleged that CoreCivic put in place the policy that was the “moving force” behind his alleged constitutional deprivations.

A private company providing prison medical care is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or well-settled custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Turner v. Franks · filed 2019-06-05

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against Quality Health Care, therefore, Turner “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private corporation that provides jail medical care to allege a policy or custom that caused the constitutional injury.

Cook v. Southern Health Partners · filed 2019-06-24

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that a policy or custom was the moving force behind the allegedly unconstitutional treatment of his broken hand. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant SHP.

A private corporation providing medical services can be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Hogan v. Correct Care Solutions Corp · filed 2019-06-24

Plaintiff does not allege the existence of a CCS policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged unconstitutional action. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant CCS.

A corporation may be liable under § 1983 for employee misconduct only if a causative custom or policy is alleged.

Miles (ID 67725) v. Sayeed · filed 2019-07-02

The Court also found that this action is subject to dismissal as against Defendant Corizon Health Services because Plaintiff has not alleged the requisite causative custom or policy. In the Tenth Circuit, “to hold a corporation liable under § 1983 for employee misconduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of the same sort of custom or policy that permits imposition of liability against municipalities under Monell.”

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely for the actions of its employees.

Collins v. Baucom · filed 2019-07-10

A private corporation is not liable under § 1983 for actions allegedly committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits damages against a private correctional medical provider only when its policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Graham v. Carter · filed 2019-07-11

Graham has sued Corizon, but Corizon cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 unless a policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private medical contractor for a constitutional injury caused by its policy or practice, but conclusory allegations of a policy do not suffice.

Martinez v. Tilden · filed 2019-07-17

While Wexford may be liable for a constitutional injury under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978), the allegations “must allow [the court] to draw the reasonable inference that the [defendant] established a policy or practice” which caused the injury. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff fails to identify any particular policy and, even if such a policy exists, fails to plead that Wexford was aware of any inadequate care. Wexford is DISMISSED, though Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to replead against Wexford, should he wish.

A private corporation is liable under § 1983 only if its unconstitutional policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s injury.

MULLINS v. WEXFORD HEALTHCARE SOURCES · filed 2019-07-17

As a private corporation, Wexford “cannot be held liable under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 unless it maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom” that caused Mr. Mullins’s injury. ... There is no evidence in the record that Wexford has any unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom of denying requests for medical treatment or of condoning deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Wexford is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation vicariously liable for its employees’ civil rights violations; liability may rest on a company policy that caused the violation.

Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2019-07-26

In Is- kander v. Village of Forrest Park, we joined our sister circuits in ... holding that “a private corporation is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil rights.” 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). ... Wilson has not con- vinced us that this is the case in which we should change course.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation for its employees’ misconduct only when a corporate policy or custom caused the deprivation.

Montano v. Corizon, LLC · filed 2019-08-02

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient for the Court to reasonably infer that Centurion is liable for the alleged misconduct of its employees through either a policy or custom. Hence, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a plausible Monell claim against Centurion. Counts I and II, therefore, are subject to dismissal without prejudice under Rule 12(c) for that reason.

A corporation performing traditional state functions faces a § 1983 claim only when an official policy or custom caused the alleged injury.

Grayson v. Core Civic · filed 2019-08-09

An inmate only states a claim against a corporation performing traditional state functions when he alleges that his injury was caused by an action taken pursuant to some official policy or custom.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for its employees’ actions based solely on respondeat superior.

Kelly v. Conmed Healthcare Services · filed 2019-08-13

Thus, a private corporation is not liable under § 1983 for actions allegedly committed by its employees when such liability is predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits suit against a private contractor performing state functions when the contractor’s own policy or custom causes the alleged violation.

Doss v. Corizon Medical Corporation · filed 2019-08-15

Section 1983 permits suit against “a private entity that contracts to perform traditional state functions,” but that contractor is only liable under a Monell claim “for a policy or custom of that private contractor, rather than a policy or custom of” a governmental entity.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private contractor to show that a corporate policy, practice, or custom caused the injury.

Anthony v. Salisbury · filed 2019-08-16

Further, because Anthony also sues Mental Health Services, he must show that it has a “corporate policy, practice, or custom that cause[d] [his] injury.” Baker v. Stevenson, 605 F. App’x 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2005)). Yet Anthony does not explain how the decision to discharge him was pursuant to any MHS policy, practice, or custom. So MHS is entitled to summary judgment.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a corporation whose policy or practice allegedly caused a constitutional violation.

Ingram v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2019-08-19

A corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right. ... This is sufficient to state a claim against Wexford at this early stage, and Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Wexford will be allowed to proceed.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity acting under color of state law when its policy or custom causes a violation of federal rights.

Nunes v. Stephens · filed 2019-08-22

However, assuming a sufficient link to “state action,” a private entity may be held liable through Monell principles in a § 1983 cause of action. ... Therefore, dismissal because ASVG is not a “person” under § 1983 is not appropriate.

Section 1983 permits a corporation to be held liable for deliberate indifference only when its policy or practice caused a constitutional violation.

White v. Baldwin · filed 2019-08-22

Further, as a corporation, Wexford can only be held liable for deliberate indifference if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private contractor providing government services when the contractor’s unconstitutional policy or custom caused the violation.

Grimsley v. Wexford Health Source · filed 2019-08-29

When a private corporation has contracted to provide essential government services, such as health care for inmates, the corporation can be held liable under Section 1983 if the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself. ... Here, Plaintiff has not alleged an unconstitutional policy or custom resulted in delay or denial of medical treatment.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private jail medical contractor when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Woodruff v. Ridings · filed 2019-08-29

Thus, liability of a contracted private entity must be based on a policy or custom of the entity.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity acting under color of state law when its policy, decision, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Valdez v. County of Kings · filed 2019-08-30

Defendant NaphCare can only be liable under § 1983 if Plaintiff raises a triable issue of fact that the alleged violation occurred as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by NaphCare.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation only when its policy or practice caused the alleged constitutional violation; the corporation is not liable merely for its employees’ actions.

Morgan v. Wexford Health Services, Inc. · filed 2019-09-03

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Wexford because it cannot be held liable based on the actions of its employees or agents. Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014) (“respondent superior liability does not apply to private corporations under § 1983”). Wexford can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison healthcare provider when its policy or practice causes a constitutional violation.

Burnett v. Chapman · filed 2019-09-03

As a private corporation providing healthcare for prisoners, Wexford can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right. ... While Plaintiff lists Wexford as a defendant, he does not allege that any Wexford policy or practice caused the individual dental providers to deny and/or delay treatment. As such, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Wexford in Count 1 will also be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.

Private contractors providing medical care to state inmates may be liable under § 1983 when their policy, practice, or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Burns v. Buser · filed 2019-09-03

Because Wexford and Correct Rx contracted with Maryland to provide state inmates with medical services, they can be held liable for constitutional violations under § 1983 if they had an official policy, practice, or custom that caused plaintiff's constitutional rights to be violated.

Section 1983 permits a corporation under contract with the state to be held liable when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Guilfoil v. Connections · filed 2019-09-04

Assuming the acts of Defendant's employee have violated a person's constitutional rights, those acts may be deemed the result of a policy or custom of the entity for whom the employee works, thereby rendering the entity liable under § 1983, where the inadequacy of existing practice is so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private company for its employees’ conduct only when the company’s official policy or custom causes a deprivation of federal rights.

Fogle v. Correct RX Pharmacy Services Inc · filed 2019-09-04

Private companies that employ individuals acting under color of state law who allegedly commit unlawful acts “are liable under § 1983 only when an official policy or custom of the [company] causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.” ... Finally, there is no evidence that Correct Rx had a custom or practice to decline to fill valid requests for over-the-counter medications.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private entity unless an agent is adequately alleged to have committed a constitutional violation.

Hernandez v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC · filed 2019-09-05

The Court, therefore, cannot permit a constitutional claim against any entity where none of its agents has been adequately alleged to have committed any such wrong.

Section 1983 requires a complaint against a private corporation to identify an unconstitutional corporate policy or name the person responsible for the violation.

Riggins, Davarius v. Schmidt's Auto Inc · filed 2019-09-10

A complaint under § 1983 must identify the corporation’s unconstitutional policy or it must name the particular person who is responsible for the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison health care contractor when its policy or custom causes a rights violation; the complaint must identify the policy or custom and how it caused the injury.

Bartlett v. Barbes · filed 2019-09-10

A plaintiff does this by showing that the contractor had a “policy or custom” that caused the violation of his rights.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private prison medical corporation; liability requires an unconstitutional corporate policy or practice that caused the deprivation.

Xavier v. Myers · filed 2019-09-16

The corporation cannot be liable on this basis alone because respondeat superior liability is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 makes a private corporation performing a state function liable only when its policy or custom causes the constitutional violation.

Bridget v. Green · filed 2019-09-16

“Rather, a private corporation is only liable when an official policy or custom of the corporation causes, or is the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.”

Section 1983 permits claims against a corporation acting under color of state law only for its own unconstitutional policy or custom, not merely because it employed the alleged wrongdoer.

Smith v. Miller · filed 2019-09-16

In other words, the mere fact that CAMC employed Miller does not make CAMC liable under § 1983. Because Smith does not allege that CAMC had a policy or custom that contributed to the alleged violation of his constitutional rights, or that Miller was a final policymaker for the corporation, no actionable § 1983 claim is stated against CAMC.

A prison medical contractor is not liable under Section 1983 for a gap in its warning policies without evidence that it knew the gap created serious health risks.

Williams v. Kelly · filed 2019-09-18

Williams’s claim against Wexford also fails. Williams needed to show that Wexford knew about serious health risks created by its policies (or “gaps” in its policies) regarding the side effects of drugs. See Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2016); Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sherriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). But Williams has not furnished evidence that Wexford knew of any doctors who had failed to warn their patients of substantially risky, serious side effects from their prescribed drugs.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a private company liable to satisfy Monell’s policy or custom rule.

Murray v. Obaisi · filed 2019-09-20

Imposing liability against Wexford under Section 1983 requires Plaintiff to satisfy Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

A private medical contractor is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the alleged injury; it is not liable solely for its employees’ acts.

Snider 834248 v. Schmidt · filed 2019-09-23

As indicated above, however, Corizon is not liable simply because one or more of its employees violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Corizon.

Section 1983 liability for a private hospital requires a policy, decision, or custom that caused the injury and conduct attributable to the government.

Leal v. Community Hospital of Fresno · filed 2019-09-24

Here, Plaintiff does not allege facts which suggest that Community Hospital of Fresno maintained a policy, decision, or custom that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, much less one that may properly be attributed to the government for purposes of Section 1983.

Section 1983 requires an injury caused by a corporate policy or custom to hold a corporation liable; vicarious liability is insufficient.

Williams v. US Corrections, LLC. · filed 2019-09-24

Finally, to hold the corporate Defendants liable, Plaintiff cannot rely on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 817–18 (6th Cir. 1996), but must allege an injury caused by the execution of some corporate policy or custom.

Section 1983 makes a corporation liable for a violation of federal rights caused by its policy or custom, not solely by its employees’ actions.

Craft 143507 v. Ouellette · filed 2019-09-25

Rather, to impose liability against Corizon, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered a violation of his federal rights “because of” a Corizon policy or custom.

A private entity working on the state’s behalf is liable under § 1983 only through the municipal liability framework, which requires a policy or custom causing the constitutional injury.

Muhammad v. Core Civic Inc · filed 2019-09-26

In the Tenth Circuit, a business entity working on the state’s behalf can only be liable under § 1983 through the municipal liability framework established by the Supreme Court in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

A private medical contractor is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or practice causes a constitutional violation.

Tuduj v. Johnson · filed 2019-09-30

The Seventh Circuit has held that a corporate entity violates an inmate’s constitutional rights only when it has a policy that creates conditions that infringe upon an inmate’s constitutional rights. ... First, the Court finds that Tuduj cannot prevail on this claim against Wexford as explained supra because Tuduj has not demonstrated the individual Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Second, Tuduj offers no evidence that such a policy or practice exists.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private corporation to show that its policy or custom caused the violation.

Duke v. Southern Health Partners · filed 2019-10-01

A plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 against a private corporation must show that a policy or custom caused the violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private corporation to allege that the wrongdoers acted under an unconstitutional policy or custom attributable to it.

Charleston v. Jones · filed 2019-10-02

To state a claim against Wexford, plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged wrongdoers acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom attributable to Wexford.

A private corporation providing prison medical care is not vicariously liable under Section 1983; its unconstitutional policy or practice must cause the deprivation.

Tully v. Wexford Health Source · filed 2019-10-02

Normally, a private corporation is shielded from vicarious liability under Section 1983. ... Wexford can only be liable for deliberate indifference if an unconstitutional policy or practice of the corporation caused the constitutional deprivation. ... Tully’s failure to identify a concrete policy or affirmative act on the part of Wexford is fatal to his claims against this defendant.

A private entity can be liable under Section 1983 only if its policy, custom, or pattern caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Watson v. Sprague · filed 2019-10-03

Even assuming a contract relationship with Shared Imaging of Calif. and Doe Pharmaceutical sufficient for Section 1983 liability, Watson does not allege an “official policy, custom, or pattern” of either defendant that caused an alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation acting under color of state law when its own policy or custom causes an actionable injury.

Baker v. Stamps · filed 2019-10-04

Rather, to state a claim against Corizon, Plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of Corizon inflicted injury actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits corporate liability for employee misconduct when a causative corporate custom or policy is shown.

Miles (ID 67725) v. Sayeed · filed 2019-10-08

In the Tenth Circuit, “to hold a corporation liable under § 1983 for employee misconduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of the same sort of custom or policy that permits imposition of liability against municipalities under Monell.” ... Plaintiff has not alleged the requisite causative custom or policy.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private company acting under color of state law when its policy or widespread custom causes a constitutional injury.

Thomas v. Wexford Health Services · filed 2019-10-09

While Wexford is a private entity, “the Monell theory of municipal liability applies in § 1983 claims brought against private companies that act under color of state law.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 664 (citations omitted). To hold Wexford “liable under § 1983 and Monell, [Thomas] must demonstrate that the defendants’ official policy, widespread custom, or action by an official with policy-making authority was the moving force behind his constitutional injury.” Daniel v. Cook Cty., 833 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Section 1983 requires allegations connecting a private medical corporation’s policy, custom, or practice to the alleged denial of medical care.

Dixon v. Wexford Medical Source · filed 2019-10-09

Although a claim may arise against Wexford for maintaining an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must set forth allegations suggesting that ... his denial of medical care resulted from one or more of these policies, customs, or practices.

Section 1983 requires proof that a private corporation’s policy, custom, or practice caused the plaintiff’s injury to hold the corporation liable on a policy claim.

Howell v. Butler · filed 2019-10-09

Accordingly, even when all of the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff failed to establish that his injury was caused by a policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference implemented or maintained by Wexford.

A corporate entity is liable under Section 1983 only when its policy or custom causes the constitutional injury.

Neidlinger v. Aramark · filed 2019-10-09

Liability for corporate entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 exists only when the execution of a policy or custom inflicts the injury.

Section 1983 does not make a private company acting under color of state law liable solely for its employees’ conduct; liability requires a policy or custom that caused the injury.

Braulick v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2019-10-10

As such, CoreCivic’s liability under Section 1983 may not be predicated upon a respondeat superior theory of liability.

Section 1983 does not make a private healthcare corporation liable solely because it employed or supervised someone who violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Tippins 342855 v. Parish · filed 2019-10-15

Corizon is not liable simply because it employed or supervised an individual who violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison medical provider to show that the provider’s policy or settled custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Owen v. Hendrix · filed 2019-10-17

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against MHM, Owen “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights.

A § 1983 claim against a private prison operator requires a policy or well-settled custom that caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Taylor v. Collins · filed 2019-10-18

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Taylor “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights.

A private prison corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or well-settled custom is the moving force behind the alleged deprivation of rights.

Hudson v. Core Civic · filed 2019-10-18

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, a plaintiff “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... Hudson, however, has not alleged that a policy or custom of CoreCivic was the “moving force” behind the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison contractor liable merely because an employee failed to follow company policy or custom.

Tankesly v. Aramark Correctional Services · filed 2019-10-21

Allegations that an employee failed to follow an Aramark policy or custom do not amount to a cognizable claim in an action under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation liable solely for its employees’ acts; corporate liability requires an injury caused by a policy or practice.

Tomajcik, Thomas v. Gunderson, H.A. · filed 2019-10-22

This law does not allow him to sue a corporation for acts allegedly committed by its employees.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison operator to allege that a company policy or well-settled custom was the moving force behind the deprivation of rights.

King v. Core Civic · filed 2019-10-22

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, King “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... However, King does not allege that the CoreCivic officials denied his attorney visits pursuant to a policy or custom of CoreCivic and that the policy was the “moving force” behind the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. His allegations do not state a claim against CoreCivic.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a corporate medical provider to identify a corporate policy that caused a constitutional injury.

Arthur Beatty, Sr. v. Person · filed 2019-10-23

Second, Beatty argues that Corizon and Wexford were deliberately indifferent to his pain. To avoid summary judgment in their favor, Beatty needed to point to a policy that caused a constitutional injury.

A private medical contractor cannot be liable under § 1983 solely for its employees’ acts; the plaintiff must show a policy that caused the deprivation of rights.

Webb v. Osborne · filed 2019-10-23

However, Webb cannot base § 1983 liability against Southern Health Partners on the doctrine of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, see Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996), but must instead show “some policy that caused a deprivation of [Plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment rights.” Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2001).

Section 1983 treats a private corporation contracting to provide jail medical services like a municipality: liability requires a policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional injury.

Moore v. Hopkins County, Kentucky · filed 2019-10-23

Section 1983 claims made against a private corporation in contract with Hopkins County are analyzed in the same way as a claim against a municipality. Id. To show municipal liability, the plaintiff must (1) identify the municipal policy; (2) connect the policy to the municipality; and (3) show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy. Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). Moore has not provided any evidence of a policy or custom that led to the alleged constitutional violation. ACH is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private prison medical contractor; the contractor is liable only if its unconstitutional policy or practice caused the deprivation.

Bogan v. Wexford Health Sources · filed 2019-10-28

Normally, a private corporation is shielded from vicarious liability under Section 1983. ... Wexford can only be liable for deliberate indifference if an unconstitutional policy or practice of the corporation caused the constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not make a company vicariously liable for its employees’ acts; a claim against the company requires an official policy or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

Robinson v. Lamb · filed 2019-10-30

Wexford cannot be held vicariously liable under the respondeat superior theory alone; rather, an official policy or custom must have caused an alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely for its employees’ actions; a policy or practice must have caused the alleged violation.

Scott v. Ritz · filed 2019-11-01

Wexford can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right.

A corporation sued under Section 1983 cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ acts; the injury must be caused by a corporate policy or custom.

Moore v. Prisoner Transport Services · filed 2019-11-04

To hold this corporate Defendant liable for the infliction of any physical or emotional injury, Plaintiff cannot rely on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability for the actions of “D. Jensen and his partner employees,” Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 817–18 (6th Cir. 1996), but must allege that the injury was caused by the execution of some corporate policy or custom.

A company that contracts to provide medical care to prisoners is liable under § 1983 only if a policy or custom caused the injury.

Smith v. G. Salter · filed 2019-11-06

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against a company that has contracted to provide medical care to prisoners, Smith must establish that his injury was the result of a policy or custom.

Section 1983 claims against private prison operators are subject to the policy or custom requirement used for municipalities.

Oladokun v. Correctional Treatment Facility · filed 2013-11-22

But many courts have adopted the custom or policy requirement when adjudicating § 1983 claims against private entities and the Court will do so here.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation for its employees’ conduct.

Whitfield v. Wexford of Indiana LLC · filed 2019-11-08

Whitfield has also sued Wexford of Indiana, LLC, but there is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires an inmate suing a private correctional health care corporation to allege that a corporate policy or practice caused the injury.

Gee v. Smith County Sheriff's Office · filed 2019-11-08

Moreover, he does not allege that any deficiency in his care was caused by any corporate policy or practice, as required to state a claim against the only Defendant against which he seeks relief on this claim.

A private entity acting as a municipality is liable under § 1983 only when its own policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Hamilton v. Judicial Correctional Services LLC · filed 2019-11-13

Thus, liability in a § 1983 action only attaches where the entity itself, through a custom or policy, causes the constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 requires a claim against a corporation to allege that an employee or agent committed a constitutional violation directly resulting from a corporate policy or custom.

Francis v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2019-11-15

To state a claim in a § 1983 action against a corporate entity, the plaintiff must allege that a corporate employee or agent committed a constitutional violation and that the violation was a direct result of some policy or custom of the corporation.

Section 1983 does not allow a corporation to be held liable solely for its employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Gakuba v. Swells · filed 2019-11-18

But the corporation cannot be liable on this basis alone because respondeat superior liability is not recognized under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison corporation only when its policy or well-settled custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Sanford v. Armour · filed 2019-11-18

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Sanford “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights.

A private entity sued under Section 1983 must have an official policy, custom, or pattern that caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Watson v. Sprague · filed 2019-11-19

Even assuming a contract relationship with Shared Imaging of Calif. and Doe Pharmaceutical sufficient for Section 1983 liability, Watson does not allege an “official policy, custom, or pattern” of either defendant that caused an alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a prison medical provider; its policy or widespread practice must directly cause a constitutional injury.

Murphy v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. · filed 2019-11-19

Finally, Defendant Wexford cannot be held liable for damages because there is no underlying constitutional violation. And even if a violation did occur, Plaintiff’s failed to show that Defendant Wexford’s policies were a “direct cause” of or “moving force” behind his constitutional injury. See Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 832 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that vicarious liability is unavailable in a § 1983 suit). Plaintiff’s failure to identify any specific policy or provide evidence of a widespread practice necessarily entitles Defendant Wexford to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation liable solely for its employees’ actions under respondeat superior.

Gakuba v. Wampler · filed 2019-11-19

But the corporation cannot be liable on this basis alone because respondeat superior liability is not recognized under § 1983.

A private corporation acting under color of state law is liable under § 1983 only when its custom or policy causes a constitutional violation; respondeat superior is insufficient.

Dowling v. Prison Transport Service · filed 2019-11-19

A private corporation acting under color of state law may not be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations based upon a theory of respondeat superior, but rather may be liable only where its custom or policy caused a constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a corporation only when its unconstitutional policy or practice caused the constitutional deprivation.

Spence v. Sullivan · filed 2019-11-20

Wexford will only be liable for deliberate indifference if an unconstitutional policy or practice of the corporation caused the constitutional deprivation.

A private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its own unconstitutional policy or custom causes an injury.

Bryant v. Cape Girardeau, County of · filed 2019-11-21

To state a claim against Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of Advanced Correctional inflicted injury actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a corporation acting under color of state law solely because it employs the person who caused an injury; the injury must result from a policy, custom, or official action.

Little v. Corizon · filed 2019-11-25

As noted above, Corizon cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior. Moreover, plaintiff has not presented any facts that he suffered his injury due to a “policy, custom, or official action” on the part of Corizon. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim against Corizon must be dismissed.

A private prison operator is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or well-settled custom is the moving force behind the alleged deprivation of rights.

Davis v. CoreCivic · filed 2019-12-06

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Davis “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011). Davis, however, does not allege anything about CoreCivic, much less that one of its policies of customs was the moving force behind the alleged violation of his rights. He therefore fails to state a claim against CoreCivic.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private entity performing a government function when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Ruznic v. Corizon Medical Services · filed 2019-12-09

To bring a § 1983 claim against a municipality (local governmental entity) or a private entity performing a government function—such as Corizon—a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). ... These allegations give rise to a reasonable inference that Corizon has a policy or custom amounting to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison healthcare contractor for a detainee’s suicide when its custom or policy shows deliberate indifference; employees’ failure to follow existing policies alone does not establish corporate liability.

Carlos v. York County · filed 2019-12-09

However, we find that the record is devoid of facts to suggest that PrimeCare could be found liable under §1983 based on the failures of its employees to follow its suicide prevention policies.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison medical provider to show that the provider’s policy or settled custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Earl v. Quality Correctional Health Care · filed 2019-12-09

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against QCHC, Earl “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison medical provider based on a policy or practice that violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.

STONE v. WEXFORD INC. · filed 2019-12-10

Mr. Stone’s claim that his medication was delayed as a result of a failure on Wexford’s part to provide adequate staff shall proceed as a claim that Wexford maintained a policy or practice that violated his Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison medical provider to allege that the provider’s policy or custom caused the rights violation.

Franklin v. Quality Correctional Health Care · filed 2019-12-10

Franklin has not alleged that a policy or custom of QCHC was the “moving force” behind the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

A private entity is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused a constitutional injury.

Ellis v. Corizon Incorporated · filed 2019-12-13

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ellis’s deliberate indifference claim against defendant Corizon Inc. because Ellis failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any policy or custom of Corizon Inc. caused him to suffer a constitutional injury.

A § 1983 claim against a private corporation providing prison medical care requires a company policy or well-settled custom to have caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Watkins v. Quality Correctional Health Care · filed 2019-12-16

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against QCHC, Watkins “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... Because Watkins does not allege that a policy or custom of QCHC was the “moving force” behind the alleged violations of his constitutional rights, he fails to state a claim against QCHC.

A private corporation providing prison medical care is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or settled custom is the moving force behind a deprivation of rights.

Richardson v. Quality Correctional Healthcare · filed 2019-12-17

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against QCHC, Richardson “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... Because Richardson does not allege that a policy or custom of QCHC was the “moving force” behind the alleged violations of his constitutional rights, he fails to state a claim against QCHC.

A private corporation is liable under Section 1983 only if its official policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Davis v. Miller · filed 2019-12-18

A Plaintiff seeking relief under Section 1983 against a private corporation must show that an official policy or custom caused the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

A prison medical contractor can face a § 1983 claim when the complaint plausibly alleges that its own policy caused the prisoner’s injury.

Irvin v. Wexford Health Source, Inc. · filed 2019-12-19

The court agrees with plaintiff that the classification of a hernia surgery as “cosmetic” suggests the possibility of a practice rather than a treatment decision aimed solely at plaintiff.

A private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its own unconstitutional policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

BARNETT v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. · filed 2019-12-19

Thus, to hold a private corporation liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged “constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself.”

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable solely for its employees’ acts; liability requires an injury caused by the corporation’s policy, custom, or practice.

Gatewood v. Varga · filed 2019-12-23

Plaintiff has offered no basis for liability on the part of Wexford, the company that contracts with the IDOC to provide medical care to inmates. “Respondeat superior liability [which makes employers liable for the actions of their employees] does not apply to private corporations under § 1983.”

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private corporation that provides healthcare to inmates.

THE ESTATE OF ROBERT WAYNE LEWIS v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY · filed 2019-12-23

Under § 1983, a plaintiff cannot hold liable a private corporation that provides healthcare to inmates on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity performing a public function when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Norman 147187 v. Corizon Healthcare Incorporated · filed 2019-12-30

To prevail on a claim against Defendant Corizon as a private entity serving a traditional public function, Plaintiff must meet the test articulated in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978). ... The evidence in the record is insufficient to establish that Corizon had a policy, custom, or practice of denying root canals.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity that provides prisoner medical care to allege that the entity’s policy, decision, or custom caused a constitutional violation.

Mason 240482 v. Ryan · filed 2019-12-30

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, such as providing medical care for prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity.

A private company acting under color of state law can be liable under § 1983 when its policy or widespread practice causes a constitutional injury.

Robinson v. Pfister · filed 2019-12-30

Mr. Robinson fails to provide competent evidence of an unconstitutional policy or widespread practice sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison medical provider to show that the provider’s policy or well-settled custom caused the deprivation of rights.

Sanders v. MHM Services · filed 2020-01-02

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against MHM, Sanders “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private prison operator to show that its policy or settled custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Little v. Perry · filed 2020-01-02

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, Little “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011). Little does not allege anything about CoreCivic, much less that one of its policies or customs was the moving force behind the alleged violations of his rights. He therefore fails to state a claim against CoreCivic or against Warden Perry in his official capacity.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private ferry operator under Monell without a connection between the injury and an official policy, custom, or inadequate training.

Brees v. HMS Global Maritime Inc · filed 2020-01-06

Plaintiff has not shown that his injuries flowed from any actions taken pursuant to an official policy or custom or from inadequate training.

Section 1983 does not make private corporations vicariously liable for their employees’ conduct; corporate liability requires a policy or custom that caused a constitutional violation.

Pacheco v. GEO Group · filed 2020-01-06

As private corporations, Defendants Geo and Sun Rise cannot be vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A private corporation performing state functions is liable under § 1983 only when an employee or agent commits a constitutional violation directly caused by the corporation’s policy or custom.

Urioste v. Corizon and Centurion Health Care Providers · filed 2020-01-08

However, to succeed in a § 1983 action against a corporate entity, the plaintiff must prove that the corporate employee or agent committed a constitutional violation and that the violation was a direct result of some policy or custom of the corporation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation when its policy, custom, or practice caused a constitutional violation.

Brown v. David · filed 2020-01-16

In order to maintain a claim against a private corporation in this context, a plaintiff must establish that a policy, custom, or practice attributable to the corporation actually caused a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 1983 permits claims against a private prison healthcare corporation acting under color of state law when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation; the corporation cannot be held liable solely for its employees’ conduct.

GRAHAM v. CONNORS · filed 2020-01-21

As a private corporation contracted to provide prison health services, Defendant Corizon may be liable under § 1983 for actions taken under color of state law. ... However, private corporations like Defendant Corizon may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior. ... Rather, Plaintiff must allege that he suffered a constitutional violation as a result of one or more of Corizon’s policies or customs. ... In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Corizon had a custom or policy that caused deliberate indifference to his medical needs.