42 U.S.C. § 1983

A business may bring a § 1983 Equal Protection claim based on discrimination against its customers when it suffers its own injury and has a close relationship with customers who face obstacles to suing.

FSI Green Park South Property LLC v. Pelham, City of, The · filed 2020-08-24

And Green Park, as a large property management company allegedly suffering significant economic damages and the fear of future losses, is uniquely positioned to vindicate the rights of its tenants, who as Latinos may face the same impediments to bringing suit the court noted in Young Apartments, including language barriers, limited financial resources, and the fear of further discrimination. Accordingly, Green Park has satisfied its burden to establish third-party standing.

Section 1983 permits abortion providers to assert their patients’ rights in suits challenging abortion restrictions.

Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Rutledge · filed 2019-07-23

Defendants also contend that plaintiffs cannot assert third-party rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because, defendants claim, § 1983 extends only to litigants who assert their own rights. There is no language in the statute that supports this argument.

Section 1983 permits an organization to seek relief for voters’ constitutional rights when the grounds for the prudential rule against third-party standing do not apply.

Richardson v. Texas Secretary of State · filed 2020-09-08

However, having reviewed the record and the applicable law, the Court will briefly explain why it concludes that CTD also has prudential standing to seek the requested relief. ... On that basis, the Court therefore finds that neither underlying justification for the general doctrine against third-party standing is applicable with respect to CTD’s claims against the Secretary in this case.

Section 1983 permits an injured party to assert another person’s federal rights when their relationship is sufficiently close and substantial obstacles hinder that person from suing.

Nashville Community Bail Fund, The v. Gentry · filed 2020-10-26

Under Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent regarding third-party standing, such a plaintiff, if he was injured by the deprivation of a federal right, has a cause of action under § 1983, even if it is not strictly his federal right that was violated.

Section 1983 permits abortion providers to assert their patients’ constitutional rights.

Hopkins v. Jegley · filed 2020-12-22

The Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed abortion providers to raise the rights of their patients in cases brought under § 1983, and this Court will do the same.

Section 1983 permits abortion providers to assert their patients’ constitutional rights.

Hopkins v. Jegley · filed 2021-01-05

The Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed abortion providers to raise the rights of their patients in cases brought under § 1983, and this Court will do the same.

A prisoner may voluntarily settle and release a Section 1983 claim in exchange for expungement of disciplinary violations, barring further pursuit of the action.

95-1768 James W. Chambers v. Morgan Warren Bill Rodgers Rick Jones William Kitchell Fred Johnson Allen Luebbers Paul K. · filed 1995-12-01

An inmate may settle his claims voluntarily like any other litigant. ... In this case, however, Chambers voluntarily released his claims and is therefore barred from pursuing this action.

Section 1983 damages claims survive an administrative settlement that does not clearly waive them.

W B v. Matula · filed 1995-10-17

However, since the settlement agreement did not clearly waive such claims, we do not determine whether such a waiver would be against public policy. We do conclude that the agreement does not bar such claims as a matter of law, and therefore reverse and remand the matter for trial.

Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a settlement agreement; enforcement is a contract claim.

Ross v. Awe · filed 2020-03-10

Furthermore, enforcement of a settlement agreement is a claim in contract and cannot be enforced through a § 1983 action.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for breach of a settlement agreement.

O'Neil v. Cunningham · filed 2020-11-30

A breach of the settlement agreement cannot serve as the basis of a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim based solely on a settlement agreement because the agreement creates no federal right.

Atwood v. Days · filed 2021-01-12

Standing alone, a settlement agreement cannot serve as a substantive basis for a § 1983 claim for relief because it does not create “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws.”

A grievance settlement that the employee did not personally endorse does not bar the employee’s Section 1983 claim through res judicata or collateral estoppel.

Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1991-12-31

Accordingly, we hold that the grievance settlement in this case did not have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect with respect to Bolden's Section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of the NYPD Patrol Guide alone.

Lopez v. City of New York · filed 2016-05-13

Section 1983 is not a remedy for violations of the NYPD Patrol Guide.

Section 1983 liability for an officer’s use of force depends on a constitutional violation; a city’s stricter police policy does not increase that liability.

Patricia Smith, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Brent Robin Smith v. James Freland Peter Schulcz and · filed 1992-01-06

Under § 1983, the issue is whether Officer Schulcz violated the Constitution, not whether he should be disciplined by the local police force. A city can certainly choose to hold its officers to a higher standard than that required by the Constitution without being subjected to increased liability under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability merely because an officer violates a police department standard that is stricter than the Constitution requires.

Stroik v. Ponseti · filed 1994-09-28

Under § 1983, the issue is whether Officer Schulcz violated the Constitution, not whether he should be disciplined by the local police force. A city can certainly choose to hold its officers to a higher standard than that required by the Constitution without being subjected to increased liability under § 1983." Id. Again, we agree.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a police officer merely for violating departmental use-of-force policies when the officer has not violated the Constitution.

Stroik v. Wilbur Ponseti and Warren G. Woodfork, Wilbur Ponseti · filed 1994-10-27

“Furthermore, the fact that Officer Schulcz’s actions may have violated Springdale’s policies regarding police use of force does not require a different result. Under § 1983, the issue is whether Officer Schulcz violated the Constitution, not whether he should be disciplined by the local police force. A city can certainly choose to hold its officers to a higher standard than that required by the Constitution without being subjected to increased liability under § 1983." ... Again, we agree.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim for violations of a police department’s policies or guidelines.

James v. City of Boise · filed 2016-03-23

Indeed, the policies or guidelines adopted by the Boise Police Department do not give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not impose liability for violating police department rules without a violation of a federal constitutional right.

Hinch v. Officer O'Connor · filed 2018-02-15

The Seventh Circuit "has consistently held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws or . . . departmental regulations and police practices . . . . In other words, the violation of police regulations or even a state law is completely immaterial as to the question of whether a violation of the federal constitutional has been established." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Any purported violation of General Order 2-000 or 2-008 is not relevant to determining whether Defendant's use of force was reasonable.

A pro se plaintiff with a colorable Section 1983 claim against supervisory personnel must have an opportunity for additional discovery before dismissal for failing to identify personally involved officials, when the plaintiff could not be expected to know their identities.

Davis v. Kelly · filed 1998-11-23

We therefore hold that when a pro se plaintiff brings a colorable claim against supervisory personnel, and those supervisory personnel respond with a dispositive motion grounded in the plaintiff’s failure to identify the individuals who were personally involved, under circumstances in which the plaintiff would not be expected to have that knowledge, dismissal should not occur without an opportunity for additional discovery.

A Section 1983 plaintiff who has not adequately identified the officers allegedly involved in an assault must be allowed discovery to determine their identities before the claim is dismissed on that ground.

Murphy v. Kellar · filed 1992-01-10

Whether or not Murphy can adequately identify the prison officers who allegedly assaulted him can only be determined conclusively if Murphy is given the opportunity to conduct discovery. Accordingly, we REVERSE AND REMAND.

A private prison company and its employees sued in their official capacities may be liable under Section 1983 when a corporate policy or custom caused the constitutional deprivation.

Shade v. Core Civic · filed 2021-01-26

Private entities acting under color of state law, including their employees in their official capacities, may be liable under Section 1983 where a plaintiff alleges that a corporate “policy or custom” that was “the moving force behind” a constitutional deprivation. ... But the plaintiff here expressly alleges that the individual defendants’ unconstitutional actions were contrary to policy and to their training. Accordingly, there is no basis for corporate liability in this case.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private prison health contractor only when its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

HOLLIDAY v. PRIME CARE MEDICAL · filed 2021-01-25

A private corporation under contract to provide prison health services may be liable under § 1983 only if that entity’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits a private prison medical contractor to be held liable for a constitutional violation caused by its policy or custom, but not solely for its employees’ acts.

Dittmer v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2021-01-25

“Private corporations that perform a traditional state function such as providing medical services to prison inmates may be sued under § 1983 . . . [but] cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a policy of denying care in violation of the Eighth Amendment for which Defendant Corizon may be held liable.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation acting under color of state law when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

HUTCHISON v. MOORE · filed 2020-12-03

To be liable under § 1983, private corporations acting under color of state law must have an express policy or custom that resulted in a constitutional deprivation.

A prisoner suing a private medical contractor under § 1983 must plausibly allege that the contractor’s policy or custom caused the inadequate medical treatment.

Alkarawi v. Grace · filed 2020-10-09

In its Initial Review Order, the Court explained that, to state a colorable Eighth Amendment against that entity, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the inadequate medical treatment occurred as a result of a custom or policy of Corizon. ... These allegations do not plausibly suggest that Corizon has a policy or custom of delaying medical treatment.

A private jail medical provider that controls medical decisions without government oversight can be a policymaker for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Belcher v. Lopinto · filed 2020-10-05

Accordingly, CH is a “policymaker” for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Section 1983 applies the same policy-or-custom liability requirements to private corporations acting under color of state law as it does to municipalities.

Burton 495156 v. Michigan Department of Corrections · filed 2020-09-24

The requirements for a valid § 1983 claim against a municipality apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983.

A private prison health provider is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

BUTLER v. DONATE · filed 2020-07-07

Butler also has not alleged a policy or custom of PrimeCare that would support a claim against that entity.

Private corporations acting under color of state law are subject to the same Section 1983 liability requirements as municipalities.

Ragan 314744 v. Wellman · filed 2020-06-18

The requirements for a valid § 1983 claim against a municipal authority apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a medical care claim to proceed against a prison health provider based on an alleged policy that caused inadequate care, and against a warden alleged to have ignored direct requests for treatment.

Russell v. Wexford Health Source, Inc. · filed 2020-02-18

Furthermore, Russell alleges that Wexford Health Source’s (“Wexford”) policy of considering costs when determining whether to provide care resulted in his inadequate care (Doc. 8, p. 16), and that Warden Brookhart was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because he spoke with her and sent her an emergency grievance, but she ignored his requests for treatment. Both these allegations are sufficient for Count 2 to survive ... Finally, Count 2 survives screening against Dr. Ahmed, who Russell claims misdiagnosed him with allergies and failed to treat his continuous pain.

A private corporation operating a prison acts under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes and is liable only when a corporate policy caused the alleged harm.

Hughes v. Tennessee Department of Corrections · filed 2020-01-29

There is no question that Core Civic is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983 because it performs the traditional state function of operating a prison, Street v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996), and that its liability may only be established upon a showing that a corporate policy caused the alleged harm.

A private prison operator is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or well-settled custom is the moving force behind the alleged deprivation of rights.

Prescott v. Hardeman County Correctional Facility · filed 2019-10-30

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, a plaintiff “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... Prescott does not allege that he was assaulted in segregation because of an unconstitutional policy or custom of CoreCivic.

A private prison corporation is liable under § 1983 only when its policy or well-settled custom caused the alleged deprivation of rights.

Simpkins v. Roberson · filed 2019-10-22

To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic, a plaintiff “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. ... Simpkins, however, does not allege that he is being denied medical treatment because of an unconstitutional policy or custom of CoreCivic.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison corporation liable solely for its employees’ actions.

Mathis v. Byrd · filed 2019-06-25

Judge Erwin correctly noted that, as a private actor, “CCA cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely based on the actions of its employees.”

A private corporation performing a government function can be held liable under Section 1983.

White v. Kansas Department of Corrections · filed 2016-11-15

The district court concluded, without explanation, that a “private corporation performing a government function can be held liable” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. R., Vol. I, at 363. “Guided by Supreme Court and persuasive circuit court authority,” we have no reason to question this conclusion.

Section 1983 applies the same municipal-liability requirements to private corporations deemed state actors as it does to municipalities.

Stojcevski v. County of Macomb · filed 2015-11-09

The requirements for a valid § 1983 claim against a municipality apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a prisoner to sue a private corporation operating a prison for an alleged constitutional injury.

Olivas v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2006-01-12

Although Corrections Corporation of America is a private corporation, the Corporation may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional injury, because the operation of a prison is a fundamental government function.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation vicariously liable for its employees’ civil rights violations; liability requires an official policy that caused the violation.

Bond v. Cullinan · filed 2004-02-24

Since a “private corporation is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ ... civil rights,” Bond would have had to show that an official policy of CMS and Wexford caused the violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison medical contractor based on its treatment protocol and its doctors’ participation in an alleged constitutional violation.

Burke v. North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Medcenter One · filed 2002-07-15

We believe Mr. Burke also stated a section 1983 claim against Medcenter One: he alleged that its hepatitis C treatment protocol and its doctors’ complicity with the actions of NDDCR’s medical director were damaging his health in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private corporation for its employees’ actions absent an impermissible corporate policy.

Islam v. Jackson · filed 1992-01-23

In addition to the reasons stated above, plaintiffs action against defendant Montross Inn fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because, under section 1983, a private corporation cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees absent a showing of an impermissible corporate policy.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against a private party for police action when the plaintiff does not allege that the party had some control over the police decision to arrest or search.

James Bronson, Jr. v. City of Berkeley · filed 1992-05-15

Bronson did not allege that anyone connected to the motel "had some control over [the police officers'] decision to arrest [him] or search his residence." King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 829 (9th Cir.1986). ... Accordingly, Bronson did not state a valid § 1983 claim against Ling or the motel and the counts against them were properly dismissed.

Section 1983 treats a private prison medical contractor’s employee decision as corporate policy only if the employee has final policymaking authority under state law.

Miller v. Correctional Medical Systems, Inc. · filed 1992-08-28

These principles also apply to the liability of private corporations offering those services. ... An official’s decision can only be treated as policy if that official has final authority to make policy under state law. ... Dr. Robinson does not possess final poli-cymaking authority under state law, even if his decisions are final in practice.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a private corporation for its employees’ actions absent a showing of an impermissible corporate policy.

Marks v. Crawford · filed 1993-07-23

A private corporation cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, absent a showing of an impermissible corporate policy.

A private towing company's mere response to a police request to tow a car is insufficient to establish liability under section 1983.

Jeremy Farnsworth; Gypsy LeGrande v. Del Papa · filed 1993-08-24

Their allegations of malice against City Towing are equally bare. Nowhere do they allege City Towing did anything more than respond to a police request to tow their car. That is not enough to establish a section 1983 violation by a private party.

A private employer may face § 1983 liability when it authorized, supervised, caused, or participated in an employee’s alleged constitutional deprivation.

Martin v. Lociccero · filed 1995-06-16

Furthermore, § 1983 liability against a corporate defendant may be found where the employer “authorized, supervised, caused or participated” in the alleged constitutional deprivation. ... According, the proposed amendment alleges sufficient facts to state a claim against Chase.

Section 1983 makes a prison medical contractor liable for a constitutional violation only if its policies or procedures are unconstitutional or are the moving force behind the violation.

Swan Ex Rel. Carello v. Daniels · filed 1995-06-28

However, CMS is not responsible for the constitutional violations of its employees, but will be liable only if its policies or procedures are unconstitutional or are the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporate employer liable for an employee’s conduct solely through respondeat superior; the employee must have acted pursuant to an employer policy.

Hetzel v. Swartz · filed 1995-12-18

Absent a showing that an employee committed the alleged unlawful act(s) at issue pursuant to a policy of her or his private corporate employer, said employer cannot be held vicariously liable for its employee’s purported misdeed(s) in a civil rights suit.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim against a private attorney requires evidence that the attorney conspired to violate the plaintiff's civil rights.

Backus v. Ward · filed 1998-06-08

There was no evidence the private attorney conspired to violate Backus's civil rights.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private person who participates with state officials in unconstitutional conduct or conspires with them to violate the Constitution.

Smith v. Wambaugh · filed 1998-12-17

We think it evident, then, that a private party may be liable under § 1983 when (1) the party actually participates with state officials in an activity which is constitutionally prohibited, or (2) the private party conspires with state officials to violate the Constitution.

A private medical contractor’s policies cannot cause a § 1983 constitutional violation when its employees committed no constitutional violation.

Higgins v. Correctional Medical Services of Illinois, Inc. · filed 1999-05-24

If there was no constitutional ... violation on the part of the individual defendants, however, CMS’s policies could not have caused one, even if they were trying to keep costs down- — a common goal in this age of health maintenance organizations.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a private corporation liable for its employees’ constitutional violations to allege that an official policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation.

Jones v. Sabis Educational Systems, Inc. · filed 1999-06-01

Therefore, to hold SABIS liable for its employees’ unconstitutional acts, plaintiff must allege that SABIS’s official policy or custom was the “moving force of the constitutional violation.” ... The complaint fails to allege that any “official policy or custom” of SABIS was the “moving force” behind its agents’ deprivation of plaintiffs civil rights.

Section 1983 permits liability against a municipality or a private corporation performing a municipal function when an official policy or custom, or an official with final policymaking authority, causes a constitutional deprivation.

Taylor v. Plousis · filed 2000-06-20

Thus, in order to assert a claim against either the County of Cape May or CHS, plaintiff must show that a constitutional deprivation resulted from an official custom or policy or, alternatively, from the actions of an official with “final authority to establish municipal policy.”

A § 1983 claim against a private corporation must allege that it implemented a policy or custom that violated the plaintiff’s rights or failed to train or supervise its employee.

Meloy v. Schuetzle · filed 2000-08-17

We affirm the district court's dismissal of Medcenter One because Meloy failed to allege Medcenter One implemented a particular policy or custom which violated his Eighth Amendment rights, or failed to train or supervise O’Neill.

Section 1983 permits corporate liability for employees’ unconstitutional acts when a corporate policy, custom, or action by an official policymaker causes the injury.

Edwards v. Acadia Realty Trust, Inc. · filed 2001-03-09

However, a corporation may be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of employees where there is a policy, custom, or action by those who represent official policy which causes the injury. ... Considering the affidavits and depositions in the record, there is simply no evidence supporting Plaintiffs’ claims that the actions taken by the individual employees of these corporate defendants constitute the official policies of those entities. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims fail.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity acting under color of state law when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Lee v. Gelineau, 93-3466 (2001) · filed 2001-06-28

A private entity can be liable under § 1983 when the execution of its policies or customs causes the plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation. ... In addition, there is no evidence of any policy or custom attributable to St. Aloysius that violated the plaintiff's alleged constitutional rights.

Section 1983 requires a private corporation acting under color of state law to have caused the injury through its policy, practice, or custom; respondeat superior is insufficient.

Thomas v. Zinkel · filed 2001-07-26

Liability of such entities may not rest on respondeat superior, but rather must be based upon a governmental policy, practice, or custom that caused the injury. ... The same standard applies to a private corporation, like CPS, that is acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity acting under color of state law when its policy or custom causes a constitutional deprivation.

Lee v. Gelineau, 93-3466 (2001) · filed 2001-10-09

A private entity can be liable under § 1983 when the execution of its policies or customs causes the plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability; a claim against a corporation requires an allegation that its practice or policy caused the injury.

Robinson v. Morgan · filed 2001-11-06

As to the other defendant, PHP Healthcare Corporation, Robinson did not allege that a PHP practice or policy injured him, and the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to claims brought under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability for a private party only when the party jointly engages with public officers in denying civil rights.

Young v. Harrison · filed 2002-03-21

Private parties are only liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they have been jointly engaged with public officers in the denial of civil rights.

Section 1983 does not make a concert promoter liable for the conduct of sworn police officers acting in their official capacities when the promoter was not responsible for them.

Alexander v. Haymon · filed 2003-01-14

Moreover, it is a highly dubious proposition that a private entity can be held liable, under the common law of Ohio, for the actions of sworn, government police officers, acting within the scope of their official duties, and he certainly cannot be held hable under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a private prison operator liable to plead and prove that an official policy or custom caused the injury.

Thomas v. Coble · filed 2003-02-11

The plaintiff must plead and prove an injury caused by an action taken pursuant to some official policy or custom.

Section 1983 permits a private prison medical contractor to be held liable when its own treatment policies or practices cause a constitutional deprivation.

Goodnow v. Palm · filed 2003-05-23

In short, the expressions of pain and related submissions to EMSA authorities documented in Goodnow’s Complaint and in his April 14, 2003 Affidavit, combined with EMSA’s admission that Goodnow’s treatment would be delayed as a matter of the company’s overall back-log and priority placement, leads the Court to conclude that a reasonable jury could implicate EMSA and its treatment policies and plans as part of the conduct in question.

Section 1983 permits a private entity acting under color of state law to be liable for its own policy or practice, but not solely for employing a person who committed a constitutional violation.

Dubbs Ex Rel. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc. · filed 2003-07-21

Therefore, a private actor “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor–or, in other words . . . cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. That principle, however, does not entitle CAP to summary judgment in this case, because CAP’s alleged liability is direct, not vicarious.

A private entity may be directly liable under § 1983 for its own policy or practice, but it cannot be held liable solely because it employs a wrongdoer.

No. 01-5098 · filed 2003-07-21

Therefore, a private actor "cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words... cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." ... That principle, however, does not entitle CAP to summary judgment in this case, because CAP's alleged liability is direct, not vicarious.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation only when its official policy or custom causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights.

Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co. · filed 2003-07-30

Rather, private corporations can only be held liable under § 1983 if "an official policy or custom of the corporation causes the alleged deprivation of federal rights." Id.

Section 1983 permits vicarious liability for a private corporation when its employee commits a violation within the scope of employment.

Hutchison v. Brookshire Bros., Ltd. · filed 2003-09-30

For these reasons, the court holds that neither Monell nor its progeny can be read to shield private corporations from vicarious liability when their employees have committed a § 1983 violation while acting within the scope of their employment.

Section 1983 permits liability against a corporation acting under color of state law when its policies, customs, or actions by those who present policy inflict an actionable injury.

Clay v. Morgan · filed 2003-10-31

A corporation like CMS can be liable only if it acts under color of state law, and its policies, customs, or actions by those who present policy inflict injury actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity managing a public square when it directly enforces a city ordinance that violates constitutional rights.

Yeakle v. City of Portland · filed 2004-02-26

The court finds that it is municipal policy to have PCC 20.12.265 enforced as written. Defendant PCSI manages the Square on behalf of the City. They contract with PPI to provide security within the Square. The exclusion ordinance was enforced in the Square and against plaintiffs by the PCSI. Thus, PCSI is directly responsible for the constitutional harms asserted by plaintiffs.

A private jail medical contractor may be liable under § 1983 when its custom of disregarding suicide prevention procedures causes an inmate’s death.

Harriett G. Woodward, Special Administrator of the Estate of Justin Farver, Deceased v. Correctional Medical Services of · filed 2004-05-17

Here, a reasonable jury could find that CMS’s custom of repeatedly failing to follow proper procedures led to Farver’s successful suicide attempt. ... The jury was entitled to conclude that CMS was liable under § 1983, and Judge Gettleman did not err in denying CMS’s post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 liability for a private company requires allegations that the company acted under color of state law and had its own unconstitutional policy or custom; employee conduct alone is insufficient.

Dashley v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2004-09-21

Absent respondeat superior, to establish § 1983 liability of a private company, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show the company was acting under color of state law and engaging in its own unconstitutional policies.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation for its employees’ unconstitutional actions only when an official policy caused the violation.

Edens v. Larson · filed 2004-09-24

A private corporation can be held hable under § 1983 for its employees’ unconstitutional actions only if the plaintiff can show that an official policy caused the violation. ... Edens presented no non-hearsay evidence that any of the defendant companies had a policy of restricting inmates’ access to medication, and so he cannot hold them liable for the doctors’ actions.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation acting under color of state law vicariously liable for its employees’ acts.

Jackson v. Fauver · filed 2004-09-27

Thus, CMS cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees and agents under the theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.

Section 1983 requires evidence of a relevant policy or custom to hold a corporate medical provider liable.

Jolly v. ARA Health Services · filed 2004-11-16

Because there was no evidence of a CMS policy or custom relevant to Jolly’s claims, summary judgment was also proper as to CMS, see Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993) (corporate liability under § 1983); and the remaining prison-official defendants were properly dismissed because Jolly failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CMS or the physician defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights, see Williams v. Davis, 200 F.3d 538, 539 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (absent constitutional violation, there is no basis for supervisory liability under § 1983).

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for its employees’ acts solely under respondeat superior.

Victory Outreach Center v. Melso · filed 2004-11-29

Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot succeed on a claim against SJU predicated on respondeat superior liability.

Section 1983 does not make a correctional medical company liable for employees’ scheduling errors when the delay results from no company policy or action by someone representing its official policy.

Buckley v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2005-03-16

While the twenty-month delay in scheduling the surgery once it was recommended is troubling, the record shows that the delay was due to staff members’ misunderstanding and miscommunication concerning the scheduling process and failure to follow through--not to a CMS policy or action, or to an action by those representing CMS official policy. See Burke v. N.D. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (corporate liability under § 1983).

Section 1983 permits a private corporation to be held liable for its employees’ constitutional violations only if an official corporate policy caused the violation.

Williams, Lonnie D. v. Prison Health Servic · filed 2006-01-19

A private corporation can be held liable under § 1983 for its employees’ constitutional violations only if an official corporate policy caused the violation.

Section 1983 does not permit a private corporation to be held vicariously liable for its employees’ conduct.

Lassoff v. New Jersey · filed 2006-02-08

Extrapolating the Court’s reasoning in that case, other courts, including this one, have ruled that private corporations may not be held vicariously liable. ... The same result should obtain here. Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against Bally’s will be dismissed.

A corporation acting under color of state law may be liable under § 1983 only when its policy, custom, or action by an official policymaker causes the injury.

Madison-Bey v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2006-05-11

After careful review of the record, see Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (de novo review),we agree with the district court that the complaint failed, because Madison-Bey did not allege that he suffered harm as a result of an unconstitutional policy or custom of CMS, the sole named defendant, see Burke v. N.D. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (corporation acting under color of state law may be liable only if policy, custom, or action by those who represent official policy inflicts injury actionable under § 1983).

Section 1983 corporate liability requires an unconstitutional policy, custom, or action by an official policymaker that causes an actionable injury.

Bey v. Kemper · filed 2006-06-22

...and the record contained no evidence of any unconstitutional CMS policy, or that Williams-Bey suffered an injury actionable under section 1983 because of a policy, custom, or action by those representing official CMS policy.

Section 1983 permits a corporation to be held liable for deliberate indifference only if its policy or practice caused the violation.

Ambrose, Richard v. Puckett, Nancy · filed 2006-09-19

In any case, a corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or practice that caused the violation.

Section 1983 permits a claim against an attorney who willfully and maliciously commences a frivolous garnishment action without a legitimate purpose, if those allegations are proven.

United States General, Inc. v. Schroeder · filed 1975-09-17

The Court finds that, if substantiated at trial by competent evidence, the allegation that this defendant willfully and maliciously commenced a frivolous garnishment action without substantial hope of success or other legitimate purpose constitutes a claim upon which relief may be granted under the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

A corporation providing prison medical care can be liable under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation; liability cannot rest solely on its employees’ conduct.

Davis v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SYSTEMS · filed 2007-03-29

When a plaintiff relies on the theory of respondeat superior to hold a corporation liable, he must allege a policy or custom that demonstrates such deliberate indifference. ... The court finds that, on a motion to dismiss, plaintiff has adequately alleged a policy or custom of ignoring medical complaints and delay of treatment.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private employer for its employees’ constitutional torts only when the employees acted pursuant to an employer policy.

Schwartz v. Town of Plainville · filed 2007-04-09

A private employer such as AMR cannot be held liable for its employees’ constitutional torts unless the employees acted pursuant to a policy of the employer.

Section 1983 does not permit vicarious liability against a corporation.

Foster Ex Rel. Foster v. Elyea · filed 2007-07-17

Under § 1983, corporations, like municipalities, cannot be held vicariously liable.

Section 1983 liability against a corporation requires a policy or custom demonstrating deliberate indifference; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Blackston v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2007-08-16

Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff relies on the theory of respondent superior to hold defendant, a corporation, liable, he has failed to allege a policy or custom that demonstrates such deliberate indifference.

A private prison medical contractor may face liability under § 1983 when its policy or custom causes deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Samuel v. Carroll · filed 2007-08-28

Viewing the underlying facts of the case at bar and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that he has proffered evidence sufficient to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether FCM had a “policy” or “custom” (in the form of a standard eight to nine month delay for tooth repair) that amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiffs serious medical needs.

To proceed against a corporation under § 1983, a plaintiff must raise a triable issue that its policy, custom, or action by those representing official policy caused the constitutional injury.

Southworth v. Missouri Department of Corrections · filed 2007-12-27

To defeat CMS’s summary judgment motion, Southworth had to create trialworthy issues as to whether there was a CMS policy, custom, or action by those who represent official CMS policy, that inflicted an Eighth Amendment injury.

A corporation is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation; it cannot be held liable solely for its employees’ acts.

Davis v. FIRST CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL · filed 2008-01-10

When a plaintiff relies upon a theory of respondeat superior to hold a corporation liable, he must allege a policy or custom that demonstrates such deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 does not make a private employer vicariously liable for its employees’ constitutional torts under respondeat superior.

White v. Moylan · filed 2008-05-20

However, Macy’s cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of its employees based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Section 1983 permits liability for a corporation acting under color of state law only for an unconstitutional policy, custom, or action by those representing official policy that causes an actionable injury.

Croft v. Hampton · filed 2008-07-15

As to CMS, however, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. A corporation acting under color of state law will be held liable only for its own unconstitutional policies, see Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993), and there was insufficient evidence offered here to create a jury question on CMS’s section 1983 liability, see id. (proper test is whether policy, custom, or action by those representing official policy, causes actionable injury).

A § 1983 claim against a private entity performing public functions requires a policy or custom that caused the constitutional deprivation.

German v. Broward County Sheriff's · filed 2009-02-20

To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing public functions, there must be a policy or custom by which the constitutional deprivation was inflicted. ... German failed to present evidence alleging that GEO had a policy or custom of depriving inmates of medical care for financial reasons.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a corporation that contracts with the state for the acts of its employees or agents.

Austin v. Taylor · filed 2009-03-24

Respondeat superior or vicarious liability cannot be a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, therefore, a corporation under contract with the state cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees and agents under those theories.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private corporation when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Burton v. Youth Services International, Inc. · filed 1997-11-25

Without any evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom, summary judgment must be granted on the § 1983 claim stated in the original complaint.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation vicariously liable for an employee’s deprivation of civil rights.

Iskander v. Village of Forest Park and Zayre, Inc. · filed 1982-10-05

Moreover, just as a municipal corporation is not vicariously liable upon a theory of respondeat superior for the constitutional torts of its employees, ... a private corporation is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil rights.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a corporation liable for its employees’ conduct to allege a policy or custom demonstrating deliberate indifference.

Brathwaite v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2009-07-01

Additionally, Brathwaite’s claim against CMS under a theory of respondent superior must fail. When a plaintiff relies on the theory of respondeat superior to hold a corporation liable, he must allege a policy or custom that demonstrates such deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires evidence that a corporation’s policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation; the corporation cannot be held liable solely for its employees’ acts.

Palmer v. Carroll · filed 2009-08-06

In order to establish that CMS is directly liable for the alleged constitutional violations, plaintiff “must provide evidence that there was a relevant [CMS] policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation[s] [plaintiff] allege[s].” ... A reasonable jury could not find that CMS has a policy or custom that demonstrates deliberate indifference to plaintiffs medical needs.

A § 1983 claim against a prison medical provider may have different elements from claims against its individual employees, so verdicts for the employees do not necessarily conflict with a verdict against the provider.

Moore v. Jackson · filed 2001-08-07

The claim against CMS involved different elements than the claims against Dr. Jackson and Nurse Cornell as articulated in the jury instructions, see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. John Labatt Ltd., 89 F.3d 1339, 1347 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997); likewise, the claims against the CMS employees before us in the prior appeal were unlike those against CMS, see Moore, 123 F.3d at 1086-87.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation under contract with the state vicariously liable for its employees’ acts; the corporation may be liable when those acts result from its policy or custom.

Crump v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2009-08-25

Because liability in a § 1983 claim cannot be based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability, a corporation under contract with the state, such as CMS, cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees and agents under those theories. ... CMS could be held directly liable for the acts of its employees, however, if those acts resulted from a policy or custom of CMS.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical provider when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, but not solely because it employs the person who committed the violation.

Francis v. Carroll · filed 2009-09-22

CMS may not be held liable for the harm Plaintiff alleges under a respondeat superior theory; however, it can be held liable if Plaintiff shows that CMS had a “relevant policy or custom [that] caused the constitutional violation” Plaintiff alleges.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison contractor vicariously liable for its employees’ constitutional violations.

Lonoaea v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2009-10-15

Plaintiffs cite this proof in support of their assertion that “defendants knew that Ronnie was at risk for an attack in the SHIP unit,” thereby ignoring the facts that 1) they did not name Phillips, Dudley or Taylor as defendants in this lawsuit, and 2) CCA may not, as discussed below, be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for its employees’ constitutional violations.

Section 1983 does not make a private prison medical contractor liable solely for its employees’ actions.

Camp v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC. · filed 2009-10-22

Thus, to the extent CMS’s liability is based solely on the actions of its employees — specifically, the hiring decisions made by CMS employee Linton — Plaintiffs’ § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim cannot stand.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private corporation for an employee’s conduct only if the employee acted pursuant to a corporate custom or policy.

Smith v. CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AMERICA, INC. · filed 2009-12-16

Where a plaintiff seeks to hold a private corporation responsible for the actions of its employees — as is the case here — the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the employee acted pursuant to a custom or policy of the corporation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity acting for the state when its policy or custom directly causes a constitutional deprivation and it acts with deliberate indifference to the consequences.

Regan v. Upper Darby Township · filed 2010-01-20

Thus, GEO can be liable for any constitutional deprivations suffered by Regan only if “there is a direct causal link between a ... policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” ... In light of this, a reasonable jury could not find that GEO was deliberately indifferent to a consequence of its policy that, based on GEO’s experience, was unlikely to occur.

Section 1983 does not make a private contractor liable for testing misconduct unconnected to the alleged deprivation of due process.

Lott v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. · filed 2010-03-17

Swift’s alleged misconduct in administering tests appears to be unconnected to state authorities’ alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ due process rights — the only civil rights violations alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint. As Swift notes, Plaintiffs allege no facts that would implicate Swift in a due process violation by governmental agencies, and Plaintiffs have failed to explain how Swift’s flawed testing procedures are themselves actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not make a private contractor liable for a rights violation merely because it performs work for a state; its conduct must be connected to the alleged violation.

Pascarella v. Swift Transportation Co. · filed 2010-03-17

It is plausible that Swift’s role as a tester might under certain circumstances subject Swift to § 1983 liability as an agent acting under color of state law, but this fact alone is not sufficient to transform any and all harm Swift may inflict in the course of its business into a federal civil rights violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a corporation providing prison medical care when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Giles v. MEDICAL CONTRACTORS CMS · filed 2010-07-15

Assuming the acts of CMS’ employee(s) have violated plaintiffs constitutional rights, those acts may be deemed the result of a policy or custom of the entity for whom the employee works, thereby rendering the entity liable under § 1983, where the inadequacy of existing practice is so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity only when its policy, decision, or custom caused the constitutional violation.

George v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Department · filed 2010-08-09

Accordingly, even though there is a triable issue of fact regarding violations of constitutional rights by the Sutter Defendants, they can only be liable under § 1983 if Plaintiffs raise a triable issue of fact that the violations occurred as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. Plaintiffs have not done so.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a prison medical contractor for an unconstitutional policy or custom when no underlying constitutional violation occurred.

Cessna v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2011-06-30

The court has concluded that Dr. Wallace did not violate plaintiffs constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. CMS, therefore, cannot be liable based on the theory that it established or maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom responsible for violating plaintiffs rights.

Section 1983 does not make a corporation liable solely for the conduct of its employees.

Davis v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2011-12-01

To the extent Davis challenges the earlier dismissal of Correctional Medical Services (CMS), we conclude that CMS was properly dismissed as Davis was proceeding against it based solely on the conduct of its employees.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical contractor when a constitutional injury arises from the contractor’s policies or customs.

Jones v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc. · filed 2012-02-24

Instead, a government body — or a nongovernmental entity such as CMS, in this case — can be found liable under Section 1983 where a constitutional wrong arises from execution of that entity’s policies or customs.

Section 1983 holds a private security company liable only for constitutional violations caused by its own policy or practice, not solely for its employees’ acts.

Grissom v. District of Columbia · filed 2012-04-06

Specifically, just as the District can only be held liable under § 1983 for its own actions and not under a respondeat superior theory, so too can AlliedBarton only be held liable for constitutional violations affirmatively precipitated by its policy or practice.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a corporation liable for a constitutional violation to allege a policy or custom demonstrating deliberate indifference.

Parkell v. Danberg · filed 2012-07-03

In addition, when a plaintiff relies upon a theory of respondeat superior to hold a corporation such as CMS liable, he must allege a policy or custom that demonstrates such deliberate indifference.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a private corporation liable to show that a policy the corporation adopted or condoned caused constitutionally inadequate care.

Cotts v. Osafa · filed 2012-08-10

Because Wexford was a private corporation, Cotts needed to show that a policy adopted or condoned by Wexford caused him to receive constitutionally inadequate care.

Section 1983 permits a private prison medical provider performing a county function to be held liable like a municipality when its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.

Fields v. Corizon Health, Inc. · filed 2012-09-06

Although Prison Health is not a governmental entity, “[w]here a function which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state (or here, county) is performed by a private entity,” that private entity, like a municipality, may be held liable under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison medical provider when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Williamson v. Correct Care Solutions LLC · filed 2012-09-10

Assuming the acts of employees of a corporate medical provider have violated a person’s constitutional rights, those acts may be deemed the result of a policy or custom of the entity for whom the employee works, thereby rendering the entity liable under § 1983, where the inadequacy of existing practice is so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.

Section 1983 does not make a private corporation liable for its employees’ conduct solely because it employs them; the plaintiff must allege a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.

Luck v. Mount Airy 1, LLC · filed 2012-10-04

Therefore, we find that Mount Airy Casino cannot be found liable based on respondeat superior. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not allege that Mount Airy Casino had a policy or custom which caused plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to be violated. Accordingly, we will grant defendants’ motion and dismiss Mount Airy Casino as a defendant.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a private jail medical provider when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, but not solely because of its employees’ acts.

Ferencz v. Medlock · filed 2012-10-17

Instead, in order for a plaintiff to hold such a corporation responsible under Section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a relevant corporate policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits claims against private entities acting under color of state law when an official policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional violation.

Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc. · filed 2012-10-23

To make out a claim against Desert Palace under Monell, Tsao must show that (1) Desert Palace acted under color of state law, and (2) if a constitutional violation occurred, the violation was caused by an official policy or custom of Desert Palace.

Section 1983 makes a private contractor liable for an injury caused by its official policy or custom; staff misconduct alone does not establish the contractor’s liability.

Lane v. Wexford Health Sources · filed 2013-01-07

Rather, an entity may be liable under § 1983 only if its official policies or customs resulted in injury to the plaintiff. Id. Lane sued Wexford and alleged only that its medical staff inadequately treated his medical conditions. Such allegations do not state a § 1983 claim.

A corporate medical provider may be liable under § 1983 if its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, including when policymakers fail to address a known serious medical need.

Bredbenner v. Malloy · filed 2013-02-20

As discussed, Correct Care may be liable under § 1983 if it adopted a policy or custom that deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights. ... Under these circumstances, there is an issue of fact as to whether policymakers at Correct Care knew of plaintiffs serious medical need but did nothing to address it. Therefore, the court will deny medical defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Correct Care.

Section 1983 does not impose respondeat superior liability on a private employer for its employees’ conduct.

Maniscalco v. Simon · filed 2013-04-05

As an independent ground to uphold the summary judgment for McDon- ald’s, vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is unavailable against private employers sued under § 1983 based on the rationale of Monell.

Section 1983 applies municipal liability rules to private contractors acting under color of state law.

Young v. County of Hawaii · filed 2013-05-22

Accordingly, the cases examining municipal liability in the § 1983 context apply to this case involving a private contractor acting under color of state law.

Section 1983 holds a private correctional medical contractor liable only when its policy, custom, or practice is the moving force behind a constitutional violation; a conclusory allegation of causation is insufficient.

Maxwell v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc. · filed 2013-09-19

Regarding private contractors employed by a state such as CMS and PHS, “liability only attaches where a custom, policy, or practice attributable to the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” ... As a result, Appellant’s conclusory allegation that CMS and PHS policies caused the violation of his constitutional right does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Section 1983 permits liability against a private entity performing a state function when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.

Caplinger v. CCA · filed 2014-02-11

Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against a municipality or private entity performing a state function are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality or entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a private corporation liable to allege a policy or custom that caused the deprivation; alleging that the corporation lacked a policy is insufficient.

Tomberlin v. Clark · filed 2014-02-19

Where no specific, official policy is alleged, the § 1983 plaintiff cannot simply assert that there should be a policy; he must show that a custom exists.

Section 1983 holds a private corporation liable only when its own unconstitutional policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.

Earnest D. Shields v. Illinois Department of Correct · filed 2014-03-12

Such a private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself.

A private prison medical provider may be sued under § 1983, but liability requires a constitutional violation caused by its policy or custom; it cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees.

Rouster Ex Rel. Estate of Rouster v. County of Saginaw · filed 2014-04-09

However, private corporations cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. ... Accordingly, a plaintiff must prove both “that his or her constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.” ... As discussed above, Rouster is unable to prove that Jerry’s constitutional rights were violated. Therefore, we need not consider whether Secure Care’s staffing or training policies might have caused such a violation.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a private corporation liable for employee misconduct to show a causative corporate custom or policy.

Wishneski v. Andrade · filed 2014-07-16

But in this circuit, as in most others, to hold a corporation liable under § 1983 for employee misconduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of the same sort of custom or policy that permits imposition of liability against municipalities under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). ... The magistrate judge treated the official capacity claim against Ms. Buckelew as a claim against her corporate employer and rejected it for lack of the requisite showing of a causative custom or policy. This is, on its face, a correct application of the governing law, and Mr. Wishneski does not raise any meaningful challenge to it on appeal.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private company that performs municipal services to allege that a company policy, custom, or deliberate indifference caused the constitutional violation.

Turner v. Corrections Corporation of America · filed 2014-07-18

Even if CCA acted improperly in regard to Turner’s release, that injury alone is insufficient to create § 1983 liability for the corporation. Because there are no allegations of an unconstitutional CCA policy or the company’s deliberate indifference, the Court finds that Turner has insufficiently pled his § 1983 claim, which will be dismissed without prejudice.

A medical services contractor is directly liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation.

David DeJesus, Sr. v. Correctional Medical Services · filed 2014-07-30

And in order to establish that CMS itself is directly liable for the alleged constitutional violations, DeJesus “must provide evidence that there was a relevant [CMS] policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation alleged.” Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Bd. of the County Comm’rs. of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). DeJesus produced no such evidence.

Section 1983 permits a claim against a prison medical provider only when its policy or custom violates a constitutional right; respondeat superior alone is insufficient.

Cobbs v. Caputo · filed 2014-10-09

In this context, Prime Care Medical can be liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom violates a constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private contractor to allege that the contractor’s policy or custom caused the rights violation.

Szubielski v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC · filed 2014-10-31

As mentioned above, Szubielski must allege that a CCS policy or custom caused the violation in order to survive the motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 does not make a private contractor vicariously liable for its employees’ acts.

Shehee v. Saginaw County · filed 2015-01-05

Unless the Sixth Circuit reverses course, respondeat superior provides no basis to hold a private corporation liable for the tortious acts of its employees. PHS cannot be held liable for Dr. Lloyd’s treatment decisions.

Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a corporate medical provider; the complaint must allege a policy that caused a constitutional violation.

Chapman v. Wyoming Department of Corrections · filed 2015-02-25

The complaint failed to state a claim against Corizon Health Inc. (“Corizon”) because it did not allege that Corizon had adopted a policy that caused a constitutional tort, and because vicarious liability is unavailable under § 1983. ... Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of his complaint.

A § 1983 complaint against a prison medical corporation must state a basis for corporate liability.

Bennett v. Miles · filed 2015-02-27

Finally, while we agree with the district court that Bennett did not state a claim against CMS in his complaint, ... because Bennett’s added allegations in a supplement he offered with a motion for reconsideration appear sufficient to state a claim against CMS, ... we ask the district court on remand to revisit its ruling on Bennett’s motion for reconsideration.

Section 1983 permits private entities performing state functions to be sued for constitutional violations, but liability requires a policy, practice, or custom causing the injury rather than respondeat superior.

Baker v. Stevenson · filed 2015-03-30

As a private entity contracted to perform the traditional state function of prison medical care, Corizon may be sued for constitutional violations. See Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2005). Corizon cannot be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior, but it can be held liable on the basis of a corporate policy, practice, or custom that ... causes the plaintiff’s injury.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on a private corporation through respondeat superior; liability requires a policy or custom causing the constitutional violation.

Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller · filed 2015-04-02

However, a private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996). Rather, the plaintiff must establish a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation. Ford v. Cnty. of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2008).

A private prison healthcare provider can be liable under § 1983 if it maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom.

Perez v. Fenoglio · filed 2015-07-07

In this circuit, a private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless it maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom.

A private prison medical provider may be directly liable under § 1983 when inadequate treatment results from its policy or custom.

Brennan v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections · filed 2015-09-17

Brennan also sufficiently alleged that his inadequate pain treatment was the result of Corizon’s policy allowing doctors to prescribe pain medication three times a day to only prisoners who had broken bones or cancer, or who were recovering from surgery.

Section 1983 does not support liability against a corrections corporation when the plaintiff has not established an underlying constitutional violation by the individual defendant.

Gordon Sees the Ground, Jr. v. Emerson · filed 2015-09-25

The district court properly granted summary judgment for Corrections Corporation of America because plaintiff did not establish a constitutional violation by Emerson.

Section 1983 does not permit damages against a prison medical contractor without an underlying constitutional violation.

Powell v. Vipin Shah · filed 2015-10-28

But as the district court correctly determined, not only is the evidence speculative, but Wexford cannot be held liable for damages if, as here, Powell cannot show an underlying constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability against a private prison health contractor when its policy, custom, or practice causes a constitutional violation.

Sims v. Wexford Health Sources Inc · filed 2015-12-21

In order to hold Wexford liable, Sims must have alleged facts to state a claim that Wexford had a policy, custom, or practice, and that the policy, custom, or practice caused the constitutional violation at issue.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking to hold a correctional corporation liable for an unconstitutional policy to identify the policy.

Morris v. Corrections Corp. of America, et · filed 2015-12-29

Similarly, Morris’s assertion that Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) is liable for implementing unconstitutional policies for its employees is also conclusory as he fails to identify any unconstitutional policy of CCA.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff suing a private entity performing a state function to prove a constitutional deprivation caused by the entity’s policy or custom exhibiting deliberate indifference.

Benge v. Ryan · filed 2016-01-05

The requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing a state function are: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the, entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Section 1983 permits liability for a corporation acting under color of state law only when its policy, custom, or official policy action inflicts an actionable injury.

Still v. Crawford · filed 2005-11-08

Initially, we conclude that the district court appropriately dismissed CMS prior to service and did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Still’s motions for appointment of counsel. See Burke v. N.D. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (corporation acting under color of state law may be liable only if policy, custom, or action by those who represent official policy inflicts injury actionable under § 1983).

A § 1983 claim against a corrections corporation requires a policy that is deliberately indifferent to a constitutional right and causes its violation.

Caplinger v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2016-02-04

To prevail on his claim against CCA, Caplinger must show that “(1) [h]e was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) [CCA] had a ... policy; (3) the policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to h[is] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’”

Private corporations cannot be held liable under § 1983 for their employees’ conduct through respondeat superior.

Glisson Ex Rel. Estate of Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections · filed 2016-02-17

Private corporations like CMS cannot be liable in a § 1983 suit under respondeat superior.

Section 1983 requires a private provider of inmate medical care to have a policy or custom that caused the alleged rights violation; employing the alleged wrongdoers is insufficient.

Massey v. Quality Correctional Health Care · filed 2016-03-24

Thus, to prevail on his claim against QCHC, Massey must show that QCHC had a policy or custom that caused the deliberate indifference of which he complains. But he has not alleged that such a policy or custom existed. At most, he argues that QCHC is liable because it employed Barefield, Thompson, McArthur, and Gurley. That is the type of respondeat superior theory of liability precluded by Monell.

A private entity sued under § 1983 is liable for harm caused by its policy or custom.

Jimenez v. Corrections Corp. of America · filed 2016-03-25

The district court properly dismissed Jimenez’s deliberate indifference claim against defendant Corrections Corporation of America because Jimenez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was harmed by a policy or custom.

A private entity acting under color of state law is liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom directly causes the constitutional violation.

Aguilar v. Colorado State Penitentiary · filed 2016-07-15

Mr. Aguilar’s complaint contains no allegations from which it could be inferred that STMH had a policy or custom that was the direct cause of Mr. Aguilar’s failure to receive a CT scan. Accordingly, STMH cannot be held liable for the alleged constitutional violation.