42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

K.A. v. Abington Heights School District · filed 2014-06-27

The Supreme Court has specifically held that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless expressly authorized by statute. ... Consequently, Count IV will be dismissed with prejudice as to Ab-ington Heights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Benjamin v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 2014-07-09

Punitive damages may be awarded as a matter of federal law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Georgia law under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1. As to recovery under federal law, “a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against government officials only in their individual capacities, not against a school board or officials sued in their official capacities.

Barnett v. Baldwin County Board of Education · filed 2014-10-08

However, “[i]n a § 1983 action, punitive damages are only available from government officials when they are sued in their individual capacities.” ... Therefore, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages against the Board and the individual Defendants in their official capacity.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipal defendants or defendants sued in their official capacities.

Imhoff v. Temas · filed 2014-12-12

Certainly, because punitive damages, are not recoverable against a municipal defendant in a Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against Defendants in their official capacities.

Punitive damages under § 1983 are a remedy rather than an independent cause of action.

Cortez v. Skol · filed 2015-01-26

Plaintiff’s complaint also includes a separately numbered § 1983 count for punitive damages, but because punitive damages are a remedy rather than an independent cause of action, we refer to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim in the singular.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an individual defendant whose conduct shows reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights, without requiring actual intent or malice.

Warren v. Marcus · filed 2015-01-29

A jury may assess punitive damages under Section 1983 when a defendant’s conduct involves “reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others” without regard to actual intent or malice. ... Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages against him in his individual capacity.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Hardy v. City of Milwaukee · filed 2015-02-27

This standard is satisfied when the “defendant actually derive[d] satisfaction from hurting the plaintiff,” or, “while not having any particular desire to hurt the plaintiff, trample[d] on the plaintiffs rights in a fashion that can fairly be called reckless, to accomplish his own aims.”

Section 1983 permits consideration of punitive damages when a defendant is liable for First Amendment retaliation, but the award remains discretionary.

King v. Chuck Zamiara · filed 2015-06-01

Thus, a defendant who has been found liable for First Amendment retaliation has engaged in conduct that warrants consideration of an award of punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Carroll v. Township · filed 2015-09-02

Punitive damages are appropriate in § 1983 actions when a “‘defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Id. at 430–31 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts intentionally and with callous or reckless disregard or indifference toward the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Butler v. Windsor · filed 2015-10-22

Rather, the punitive damages for § 1983 required only a finding that Officer Reynolds “acted intentionally and with a callous or reckless disregard or indifference toward Plaintiffs constitutional rights,” whereas the punitive damages for the state law claims set forth a higher standard, requiring additional proof for a finding by “clear and convincing evidence that Defendant Richard Reynolds acted with actual malice.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when conduct is motivated by evil motive or intent or shows reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Guerra v. Drake · filed 2004-06-10

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Guerra was not entitled to punitive damages. Cf. Stevens v. McHan, 3 F.3d 1204, 1207 (8th Cir. 1993) (damages award in § 1983 action reviewed for abuse of discretion). In the incidents with McVay, Guerra admittedly disobeyed orders and resisted the deputies, and the evidence supports the district court’s finding that Guerra was left for prolonged periods in the restraint chair on three occasions because specific policies regarding the chair’s use had not been developed. Cf. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (jury may award punitive damages in § 1983 action when conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or to involve reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights).

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipal entities.

Phipps ex rel. M.P. v. Clark County School District · filed 2016-02-22

However, it is well established that punitive damages may not be awarded for § 1983 claims against municipal entities, because municipal entities are unable to form the requisite intent, and because such damages would serve to punish taxpayers.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Deritis v. Roger · filed 2016-02-24

A jury may award punitive damages for claims brought under § 1983 where “the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”...Whether Defendant’s violations of Plaintiffs First Amendment rights justify imposition of punitive damages is better determined after consideration of all of the evidence at trial.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against individual officers whose conduct shows reckless indifference or malice in violating federally protected rights.

Cardoza v. City of New York · filed 2016-04-12

Here, contrary to the trial court’s assessment, there was evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that Perez and Mendez acted with reckless indifference or malice when they, respectively, initiated the prosecution against plaintiff without probable cause and used excessive force in effecting his arrest. Although the jury’s punitive damages awards may be excessive, it cannot be said that plaintiff is not entitled to these damages as a matter of law.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Korth v. Hoover · filed 2016-06-02

First, punitive damages are not permitted against a municipality in a civil-rights action.

A § 1983 punitive damages claim may survive a motion to dismiss when the complaint states a deliberate indifference claim.

Tenon v. Dreibelbis · filed 2016-06-07

Courts generally permit a claim for punitive damages to survive a motion to dismiss if the complaint sets out a cognizable deliberate indifference claim. ... Accordingly, we decline to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when an official acts with evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to a person’s constitutional rights.

Cowart v. Erwin · filed 2016-09-13

A jury may award punitive damages in a § 1983 action when an official’s conduct is “‘motivated by evil intent’ or demonstrates ‘reckless or callous indifference’ to a person’s constitutional rights.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when an official acts with evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to a person’s constitutional rights.

Cowart v. Erwin · filed 2016-09-22

A jury may award punitive damages in a § 1983 action when an official’s conduct is “‘motivated by evil intent’ or demonstrates ‘reckless or callous indifference’ to a person’s constitutional rights.”

Punitive damages under § 1983 require evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Arnold v. City of Fort Wayne · filed 2016-09-28

“A jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to Arnold’s claims for punitive damages.

Punitive damages under § 1983 may remain available when a jury could find that an officer intentionally violated federal rights or acted with reckless indifference to them.

Arditi v. Subers · filed 2016-10-25

If a jury finds Mr. Arditi’s account credible, then it is at least possible that they could find that Officer Young acted intentionally to deprive Mr. Arditi of his Fourth Amendment rights or with reckless indifference to Mr. Arditi’s rights. Indeed, the officers’ mental states—that is, what they knew when Mr. Arditi was being handcuffed—are the key issues of disputed fact in this case. Thus, the Court can not dismiss the punitive damages claim at this time.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Morris v. Bland · filed 2016-11-16

Punitive damages are available in § 1983 actions “for conduct that involves ‘reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others,’ as well as for conduct motivated by evil intent.”

Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983.

Genn ex rel. Genn v. New Haven Board of Education · filed 2016-11-30

Moreover, “a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 punitive damages require evidence of evil intent or reckless indifference to federally protected rights.

Heaney v. Roberts · filed 2017-01-23

Punitive damages may be awarded in § 1983 cases “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). ... Because there is no question that Roberts’s conduct did not rise to the level of reckless indifference or evil intent, we affirm.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Lake v. Flagg · filed 2017-03-28

In Section 1983 cases, the Seventh Circuit has stated that the correct standard for punitive damages is the standard found in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)which held that “a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... Thus, the Court finds that the punitive damages instruction to the jury accurately set for the standard required to obtain punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with reckless or callous indifference to another person’s federally protected rights.

Wesley v. Campbell · filed 2017-07-20

Because a reasonable juror could find that Rigney’s conduct involved reckless or callous indifference to Wesley’s federally protected rights, the district court did not err in denying Rigney’s motion for a directed verdict regarding the availability of punitive damages.

Compensatory damages on a § 1983 claim can support punitive damages against an individual defendant liable on that claim.

Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Mick · filed 2018-03-27

But the jury found Mick and the Village liable on Thorncreek’s § 1983 claim alleging a class-of-one equal-protection violation and awarded more than $2 million in compensatory damages. Mick did not challenge this part of the verdict in his Rule 50(b) motion. The compensatory-damages award on this claim is plainly sufficient to support the $5,000 punitive-damages award against him.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Canny v. Bentley · filed 2018-04-04

"Punitive damages are appropriate in a § 1983 case when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others."

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipalities.

Pearson v. Village of Broadview · filed 2018-06-19

Municipalities are not subject to punitive damages in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Calvin Fletcher, Sr. v. Tomlinson · filed 2018-07-13

“Punitive damages may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 922 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant recklessly disregards a plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Farabee v. Yaratha · filed 2018-07-20

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that punitive damages are appropriate in this case. The Court FINDS that Nurse Barnette's false report was made in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from bodily restraint. ... Accordingly, the Court will GRANT judgment against Defendant Barnette for punitive damages in the amount of $10,000.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an individual defendant when evidence shows that he perceived his conduct violated federal rights; no additional intentional misconduct beyond that required for compensatory liability is necessary.

Eisenhour v. Weber County · filed 2018-07-27

From this we conclude that for Storey to be eligible for punitive damages, it was not necessary that he engage in any intentional misconduct beyond that required for him to be liable for compensatory damages under § 1983. It was necessary, however, for there to be evidence of an additional required mens rea-that he perceived that he was violating Eisenhour's federal rights against sexual discrimination.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

McAdoo v. Martin · filed 2018-08-07

“Punitive damages may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” ... We find no abuse of discretion by the district court in its denial of a punitive damages award to McAdoo.

Section 1983 liability for deliberate indifference does not alone justify punitive damages; the defendant’s conduct must also warrant punishment and deterrence.

Ecclesiastical Washington v. Denney · filed 2018-08-13

Having reviewed the trial evidence, we conclude that Washington presented no evidence that the corrections officials’ actions were “outrageous, intentional, or malicious” to justify imposition of a punitive damages award.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts wantonly and willfully or is motivated by ill will or a desire to injure.

Petties v. Dybas · filed 2018-08-20

Under Section 1983, punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted wantonly and willfully or was motivated by ill-will or a desire to injure. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ request for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim is denied.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

S.T. v. City of Ceres · filed 2018-08-30

As to Ceres, public entities, like the City, are immune from punitive damages under § 1983 and California law.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipal official sued in his official capacity.

McCormack v. Livergood · filed 2018-11-07

To the extent that plaintiff seeks punitive damages against defendant Livergood in his official capacity, he is precluded from doing so. It is well settled that the Supreme Court has held punitive damages may not be awarded against municipalities under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when the defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Kitchen v. Tegtmeier · filed 2018-11-27

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, punitive damages are awarded if “the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... We find that Kitchen failed to present evidence to support his claim for punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights, but such damages are not awarded as of right.

Feliciano v. Thomann · filed 2019-01-11

As to Hector Feliciano’s request for a new trial with respect to punitive damages, contrary to Appellants’ contention, punitive damages “are never awarded as of right, no matter how egregious the defendant’s conduct.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983). Rather, “[a] jury may ‘assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 186 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Wade, 461 U.S. at 56).

Punitive damages under Section 1983 depend on the defendant’s mental state during the alleged rights violation; discovery abuse does not support such an award.

Kingsley v. Lawrence County, Missouri · filed 2019-01-15

But it is a defendant’s mental state when performing the conduct that allegedly violated the plaintiff’s federal rights that forms the basis of a punitive damages award under § 1983, not litigation behavior such as discovery abuse.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Jackson v. Mike-Lopez · filed 2019-02-04

Reviewing the Complaint de novo, the Court also finds that Plaintiffs can seek punitive damages against Mike-Lopez. “Punitive damages may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 922 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a charter school treated as a municipal entity.

Luu v. Esterly · filed 2019-02-14

Further, LVA is immune from a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law and is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Felkner v. Rhode Island College · filed 2019-03-18

Punitive damages are available in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

Wooten v. Roach · filed 2019-03-27

With no opposition to the argument, and the Supreme Court of the United States' holding that "a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983" the Court finds the motion should be granted as to this issue.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against government entities or officials sued in their official capacities.

Marglon v. Child Protection Services · filed 2019-04-02

Government entities are immune from punitive damages claims under § 1983. ... Punitive damages are therefore unavailable for Marglon’s § 1983 claim against CPS and against defendant Destigev in her official capacity.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Kimble v. Jenkins · filed 2019-06-11

Punitive damages are unavailable because Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that defendant’s conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983).

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with reckless or callous indifference to another person’s constitutional rights.

Marroquin v. Fernandez-Carr · filed 2019-07-09

“[A] jury may award punitive damages under section 1983 either when a defendant’s conduct was driven by evil motive or intent, or when it involved a reckless or ... callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others.” ... As the Court held with respect to deliberate indifference, a factfinder could reasonably find that Defendants’ withholding of hygiene necessities for six months constituted a reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Doc. 93 at 13-17. The same dispute of ... fact precludes judgment on Plaintiffs punitive damages claim.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Archer v. Orr · filed 2019-07-15

However, “[a] municipality is immune from punitive damages ... under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” ... Thus, plaintiff’s request for punitive damages against the City is dismissed.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a county or a county officer sued in his official capacity.

Gabriel v. Andrew County, MO · filed 2019-07-16

The Court likewise dismisses Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages under § 1983 against Andrew County and Atkins in his official capacity.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or reckless disregard for federally protected rights.

SMITH v. MERCURI · filed 2019-07-24

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey's Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15–5.12, a defendant whose conduct is motivated by evil motive or demonstrates a reckless disregard toward others' rights may be subjected to punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against officers in their personal capacities for intentional or reckless violations of civil rights.

Jenkins v. Frank · filed 2019-08-05

Insofar as plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Chief Ivory and Officer Frank in their personal capacities under section 1983, such damages are available to remedy intentional or reckless violations of civil rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an individual sued in his individual capacity.

Zawada v. Hogan · filed 2019-08-07

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages from an individual (in his individual capacity) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an individual defendant sued in an individual capacity.

Elite Medical & Rehabilitation Group v. Esurance Insurance Company · filed 2019-08-07

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages from an individual (in his individual capacity) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a supervisor even when the supervisor was not directly involved in subordinates' constitutional violations.

Burke v. Regalado · filed 2019-08-20

We have not addressed whether a jury may award punitive damages under § 1983 against supervisors who were not directly involved in subordinates' violations of an inmate's constitutional rights. All but one of our sibling circuits to address the issue have approved of punitive damages in such circumstances. ... We join those courts.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a government entity, including a sheriff sued in his official capacity.

Lachney v. Hilton · filed 2019-08-30

As punitive damages may not be awarded against a government entity, in this case the Rapides Parish Law Enforcement District, summary judgment is proper.

Section 1983 permits joint and several liability for punitive damages when defendants’ collective conduct causes a single indivisible injury.

Smith v. Charleston County · filed 2019-09-03

The Court determined, based on the trial evidence and general principles applicable to § 1983 actions, that liability and damages, including punitive damages, were joint and several because Plaintiff suffered a single indivisible injury.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Synnott v. Burgermeister · filed 2019-09-05

In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a jury may assess punitive damages "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." ... The Court therefore declines to disturb the jury's award of punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Kudla v. Hammond City of · filed 2019-09-11

Punitive damages are not available against municipalities, under either § 1983 or Indiana law.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against defendants sued in their individual capacities.

Parada v. Anoka County · filed 2019-09-16

Punitive damages are authorized in connection with § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Hunter, Jr. v. Long · filed 2019-09-26

In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983), the Supreme Court held that “a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... When the evidence is so viewed, a reasonable jury could find that the Officers acted with callous indifference to the Plaintiff’s federally protected rights. ... Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute of material fact, at this summary judgment stage, on the issue of whether punitive damages are appropriate.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against school districts.

Tyler v. BD. OF ED. OF NEW CASTLE COUNTY, ETC. · filed 1981-08-07

In this Court’s view, school districts such as defendant, like municipalities proper, come within the scope of the Newport decision, in keeping with the rationale that Congress did not intend to burden innocent taxpayers with such liability. ... The Court will therefore strike the award of punitive damages against defendant.

Punitive damages under § 1983 may be awarded for conduct motivated by evil intent or showing reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights, but an award remains discretionary.

Oby v. Sander · filed 2019-10-01

“Punitive damages may be awarded in § 1983 cases ‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). We review a district court’s determination on punitive damages deferentially; reversal of the district court’s decision is not required even where a party has made a showing justifying punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a political subdivision.

Doe v. Finneytown Local School District · filed 2019-10-07

Here, Plaintiffs have asserted 20 U.S.C. § 1681, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Ohio state law claims against Defendant. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 1). None of these claims allows Plaintiffs to recover punitive damages from Defendant, a political subdivision.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality on a Monell claim.

Akey v. Placer County · filed 2019-10-11

Upon consideration, the court finds it was clear error to allow the jury to award punitive damages on N.D.’s Monell claim by providing a place to do so on the verdict form, even though the court properly instructed the jury on the matter.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

BROWN v. MAY · filed 2019-10-23

However, “a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against individual defendants whose conduct is motivated by evil intent or shows reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Jackson v. Dallas School District · filed 2013-06-19

The law provides that a plaintiff may obtain an award of punitive damages in a section 1983 action “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). ... Thus, we will not dismiss the punitive damages claim.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Ryan v. Correctional Health Partners · filed 2019-11-12

As to Ms. Ryan’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court notes that punitive damages are available when the “defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Thus, because Ms. Ryan may properly seek punitive damages in her Complaint as to any of her claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there would be no prejudice or undue delay in allowing this amendment to her Complaint.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against local governments.

Mallory v. Municipal Court of Tupelo, MS · filed 2019-11-20

Local governments, such as the Municipal Court of Tupelo, Mississippi, are immune from punitive damages under Section 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for conduct motivated by evil intent or marked by reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights; courts review those awards for excessiveness.

Jennings v. City of New York · filed 2019-11-22

Even after considering the Gore guideposts, courts “retain . . . responsibility to review punitive awards for excessiveness in applying federal statutes such as section 1983. That task requires comparison with awards approved in similar cases.” ... In short, application of the guideposts in Gore provides no reason to conclude that the punitive damages awarded by the jury in the second trial are excessive.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

Lawler v. Hardeman County, Tennessee · filed 2019-11-25

It is well-settled that punitive damages are not recoverable under § 1983 against a municipality.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights or with evil intent.

Fish v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore · filed 2019-12-09

Here, Fish presents no evidence that either Tode or Allen acted with actual malice, reckless or callous indifference, or evil intent. See supra Part II(E). Fish thus fails to show he is entitled to punitive damages for his state or federal law claims.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against the City.

Mangal v. City of Pascagoula, Jackson County, MS · filed 2019-12-12

The City also argues in passing – and the plaintiffs concede – that punitive damages are unavailable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim is therefore dismissed.

In a § 1983 action seeking punitive damages, evidence of a defendant’s intent is relevant to whether punitive damages are appropriate.

HURT v. VANTLIN · filed 2019-12-13

Plaintiffs seek punitive damages in this case, and the Court finds that evidence of Defendants’ intent is relevant to whether punitive damages are appropriate. The EPD Defendants’ Supplemental Motion in Limine No. 2 is DENIED.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Irving v. Wells · filed 2019-12-16

A factfinder may assess punitive damages in a § 1983 action when a “defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that would support a claim of evil motive or intent and his request for punitive damages will be denied.

Section 1983 bars punitive damages against municipalities and officials in their official capacities but permits such claims against officials in their individual capacities.

Garanin v. City of Scranton · filed 2019-12-17

Although punitive damages are not available against the municipal entity and against the defendants in their official capacity, plaintiffs may seek punitive damages against defendants in their individual capacity.

Municipalities are not subject to punitive damages in suits under § 1983.

Del Rio v. Village of Caseyville · filed 2019-12-19

Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized Newport in Robinson v. City of Harvey, Ill., wherein the Court reiterated that municipalities are not subject to punitive damages in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ request to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages in Counts VII and VIII is GRANTED.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a private prison company performing a governmental function.

Moore v. LaSalle Corrections Inc · filed 2019-12-19

Just like a municipality, a private entity which fulfills a traditionally governmental role cannot independently form the malicious state of mind necessary for an award of punitive damages. It may only do so through its employees, and in this circuit, it cannot be held responsible for the acts of those employees in §1983 actions. ... For these reasons, the Court agrees with LaSalle that it cannot be cast for punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to recover punitive damages from an individual defendant sued in an individual capacity.

Horton v. Detroit, City of · filed 2020-01-02

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages from an individual (in his individual capacity) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Benjamin v. Lafayette · filed 2020-02-03

The Court agrees that the punitive damages claims under § 1983 are barred by City of Newport.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality or officers sued in their official capacities, but permits them against officers sued personally when the alleged conduct supports such damages.

Mallet v. Geans · filed 2020-02-03

The Court agrees that the punitive damages claims under § 1983 are barred by City of Newport. ... Accordingly, punitive damages are unavailable against the three officer defendants to the extent that they are based on actions taken in their official capacity. ... These allegations are sufficient to state punitive damages claims against the defendant officers in their personal capacity for purposes of Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Woodcock v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC · filed 2020-02-04

Punitive damages are only available in an action brought under § 1983 "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of the plaintiff." ... Thus, no reasonable jury could award punitive damages to Plaintiffs on their federal claims.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Flint v. Short · filed 2020-02-12

Punitive damages are available in section 1983 actions only when a defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to federally-protected rights.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipalities or defendants sued in their official capacities.

WILLIAMS-BEY v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY · filed 2020-02-21

Given this well-settled law, I will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against both Defendant PHA and against the individual Defendants in their official capacities.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a defendant sued in an individual capacity.

Foulks v. City of Detroit · filed 2020-02-24

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages from a defendant (in his individual capacity) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Punitive damages are available under § 1983 when a defendant acts with evil intent or reckless indifference to federally protected rights.

Parnell v. Detroit, City of · filed 2020-03-02

Here, there is evidence upon which the jury may rely to conclude that Defendants acted with evil intent or with reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s civil rights.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipal entities unless Congress specifically authorizes them.

Mitchell v. Jefferson Parish · filed 2020-03-04

A § 1983 plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against municipal entities, like Jefferson Parish and the Bureau, unless Congress specifically provides to the contrary.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipalities.

Henry v. County Of Nassau · filed 2020-03-12

As for the County, Defendants correctly note that punitive ... damages are not recoverable from a municipality.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Quinn v. Gould · filed 2020-03-13

Municipalities may not be exposed to punitive damages under § 1983. ... Mr. Quinn impermissibly asserts a claim for punitive damages against the City of Bristol.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against an individual whose conduct shows evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Borden v. Fort Bend County · filed 2020-03-17

A jury may assess punitive damages against an individual for a § 1983 claim when “the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... The Medical Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim for punitive damages is therefore DENIED with respect to Rabius.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Clark v. Coleman · filed 2020-03-24

Punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are appropriate “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... Absent any competent evidence that Coleman’s actions were motivated by anything other than a ... misunderstanding of the limits of his constitutional authority, there is simply no basis to submit the question of punitive damages to a jury.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a defendant sued in an individual capacity.

Doe MC-23 v. The University of Michigan · filed 2020-03-25

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages from a defendant (in his individual ... capacity) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Punitive damages under § 1983 require conduct motivated by evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Sturdevant v. Brott · filed 2020-03-25

“Punitive damages may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 922 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). ... Because he has not pleaded any facts that would support a finding that the Defendants were motivated by evil motive or intent, Sturdevant’s claim for punitive damages also must be dismissed.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against state employees sued in their individual capacities on an equal protection claim.

Deng v. State of Nevada ex rel. Board of Regents of the Nevada System of Higher Education · filed 2020-03-25

However, punitive damages may be recovered against the defendants in their individual capacities on Deng’s § 1983 equal protection claim. See Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 2005).

Section 1983 permits a jury to award punitive damages after finding liability without awarding nominal or compensatory damages.

Lunsford v. Shy · filed 2020-03-27

A jury may award punitive damages subsequent to finding liability for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim without an accompanying award of nominal or compensatory damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Owens v. Lamb · filed 2020-03-27

“Punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter reprehensible conduct” and “may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon a showing of evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” ... A reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ conduct was reprehensible and that they acted with reckless indifference toward Owens, a disabled inmate confined to a wheelchair. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Owens’s claim for punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a defendant sued in an individual capacity.

Doe MC-31 v. The University of Michigan · filed 2020-04-03

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages from a defendant (in his individual capacity) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 allows a jury to consider punitive damages for a First Amendment retaliation claim.

Brockman v. McCullick · filed 2020-04-06

Because a jury has the discretion to award punitive damages based upon the Defendants’ conduct, Brockman’s claim for punitive damages is to be decided by the factfinder, rather than the Court.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a defendant sued in an individual capacity.

Doe MC-34 v. The University of Michigan · filed 2020-04-08

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages from a defendant (in his individual capacity) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against municipalities.

NASH v. COUNTY OF MERCER · filed 2020-04-08

Punitive damages are not available against municipalities under § 1983 or the NJCRA.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against a defendant sued in an individual capacity.

Carter v. Klenner · filed 2020-04-24

A plaintiff may recover punitive damages from a defendant (in his individual capacity) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Shaw v. Schulte · filed 2020-05-07

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs can recover punitive damages when they show that defendants’ conduct was “motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Eisenhour v. Cty., 897 F.3d 1272, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Davis v. Milton Police Department · filed 2020-05-11

Simply put, municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against governmental entities.

Jane Doe 1 v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District · filed 2020-05-19

Governmental entities are also immune from liability for punitive damages in § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

Dayton v. City of Marco Island · filed 2020-05-26

Marco Island is correct that “punitive damages are not available under § 1983 from a municipality.”

Section 1983 allows punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Parker v. Shelby County · filed 2020-05-27

Punitive damages are available in a § 1983 action if the plaintiff shows that the defendant’s actions were “motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The Court finds that the plaintiff’s pleadings are sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages for evil motive or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights; evidence sufficient for liability alone does not establish entitlement to punitive damages.

Holliday v. Leigh · filed 2020-06-15

Thus, even where there is sufficient factual support to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to liability under § 1983, it does not follow that such factual support exists for an instruction on punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or intent, or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Robinson v. City of St. Louis, Missouri · filed 2020-06-22

The jury clearly rejected Defendant’s explanation and found that Defendant acted with evil motive or intent, recklessness, or callous indifference. The Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a sheriff sued in his official capacity.

Gallegos v. Allen · filed 2020-06-22

Finally, Judge Cobb found that the Sheriff is immune from being sued for punitive damages in his official capacity. ... The Court agrees with Judge Cobb’s findings and will adopt the R&R (ECF No. 69) in full as to the MTD.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages against defendants sued in their individual capacities when they act with evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

GENTLES v. THE BOROUGH OF POTTSTOWN · filed 2020-06-22

Punitive damages are available against individual Section 1983 defendants, not working in their official capacities, when their “conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983); see also Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1989). ... Inasmuch as Plaintiff is suing Defendants in both their official and individual capacities, this Court shall deny this portion of the Motion to Dismiss.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when an official’s conduct shows reckless or callous indifference to constitutional rights.

McCall v. Ferguson · filed 2020-06-23

The Court finds that Defendant’s conduct demonstrated reckless or callous indifference to the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; thus, an award of punitive damages is warranted in this case.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Ogunkoya v. Drake · filed 2020-07-07

This case shall proceed to discovery on all of the claims asserted by the plaintiff in the Third Amended Complaint, although the plaintiff may not recover punitive damages against the County of Monroe.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

ALVARADO v. JOHNSON · filed 2020-07-08

Punitive damages are not available against a municipality pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a municipality.

TOWNSEND v. CITY OF CHESTER · filed 2020-07-29

Punitive damages are not available against a municipality under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Greenburger v. Roundtree · filed 2020-08-16

As the R&R notes, a “plaintiff may receive punitive damages in a Section 1983 case where he ‘demonstrates that the defendant’s conduct is . . . motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others,’ that is, where he ‘has produced evidence of a positive element of conscious wrongdoing or malice.’” ... Finding no error in Judge Cave’s analysis, this Court will award Plaintiff $85,000 in punitive damages.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

Henderson v. Jones County School District · filed 2020-09-01

Punitive damages are unavailable under § 1983 against municipalities.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Miller v. Nye County · filed 2020-09-22

So because municipalities like the County cannot be liable for punitive damages under § 1983, Miller in repleading this claim may not seek punitive damages against the County.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against municipalities.

James v. City of Henderson · filed 2020-09-28

Punitive damages are not available against municipalities for section 1983 claims.

Section 1983 generally bars punitive damages against municipalities.

Boyd v. Larregui · filed 2020-09-30

Additionally, Plaintiff's request for punitive damages against the City of Bridgeport is stricken from the Complaint because a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Municipalities and officials sued in their official capacities are immune from punitive damages in § 1983 cases.

Olympian Group, LLC v. Blevins · filed 2020-09-30

In a § 1983 case, municipalities and government officials sued in their official capacities are immune from punitive damages.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with an evil motive or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Bacon v. Lockwood Andrews & Newnam, PC · filed 2020-10-22

As a result, Plaintiff may continue to seek punitive damages against these Defendants with respect to her remaining § 1983 bodily integrity claim.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a political subdivision.

Chapter 7 Trustee Fredrich Cruse v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District · filed 2020-10-22

As neither § 1981a nor § 1983 permit a plaintiff to receive punitive damages against a political subdivision, see § 1981a(b)(1) and City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (holding municipalities are not subject to punitive damages under § 1983), the Court will grant Defendant Bi-State’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.

Section 1983 punitive damages require an evil motive or intent, or reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff’s rights.

Scrivo v. Kendrick-Hall · filed 2020-10-29

Plaintiff has not shown that punitive damages are appropriate because she has not proven an evil motive or intent motivated Defendant's conduct or that Defendant acted recklessly or callously indifferent to her rights.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil motive or with reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.

Moore v. LaSalle Corrections Inc · filed 2020-10-30

“Punitive damages may be awarded in § 1983 cases ‘when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” ... The Court finds that no reasonable jury could find that Officer Crowson acted with “evil motive or intent” or with “criminal indifference to civil obligations.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against Officer Crowson is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Section 1983 permits punitive damages when a defendant acts with evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to constitutional rights.

North Atlantic Security Company v. Blache · filed 2020-11-10

“Punitive damages may be awarded [under § 1983] only when the defendant’s individual conduct ‘is “motivated by evil intent” or demonstrates “reckless or callous indifference” to a person’s constitutional rights.’”154 ... North Atlantic has sufficiently alleged that Blache acted with reckless indifference to its constitutional rights.

Section 1983 does not permit recovery of punitive damages from deceased defendants.

Heidelberg v. Hibser · filed 2020-11-30

Generally, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages from defendants found liable under § 1983. ... The deceased Defendants are not relieved from responsibility for compensatory damages, and other state actors will continue to be deterred by the availability of punitive damages against living Defendants. Plaintiff may not recover punitive damages from the deceased Defendants.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a municipality.

Volpe v. Ryder · filed 2020-11-30

In particular, Plaintiffs have not objected to Judge Lindsay’s recommendation that the punitive damages claim against the County be dismissed because punitive damages cannot be recovered from a municipality under Section 1983. Applying clear error review, the Court adopts Judge Lindsay’s recommendation and dismisses this claim.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against government entities.

Estate of A. R. v. Sikeston R-6 School District · filed 2020-12-01

Punitive damages are not awarded for § 1983 claims against government entities.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against public entities.

Taylor v. County of Calaveras · filed 2020-12-17

Public entities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983 and California law. ... Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment precluding punitive damages against the County is granted.

Section 1983 does not permit punitive damages against a county.

Herrick v. Clark · filed 2020-12-18

In any event, he would be barred from seeking punitive damages against Fulton County under § 1983.

Section 1983 does not allow punitive damages against a governmental entity or its employees sued in their official capacities.

Carver v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice · filed 2021-01-21

Finally, punitive damages or exemplary damages are not recoverable under § 1983 against a governmental entity or its employees when sued in their official capacities.

Section 1983 damages for a temporary delay in a land-use application may be measured by the probability that the proposed development would have been approved absent the unconstitutional conduct.

Herrington v. County of Sonoma · filed 1991-12-30

The court’s damages formula reduces the speculative aspects of the inquiry, by focusing on the relevant issues involved in the Herringtons’ subdivision application and assessing the probability of approval based on criteria normally considered by the County in processing subdivision proposals. The probability analysis also eliminates the necessity for a separate determination of plaintiffs’ duty to mitigate their damages, since probability subsumes that issue.

Section 1983 claimants may assert violations of their own property rights rather than the rights of others.

Frazier v. City of Grand Ledge, MI · filed 2001-03-19

It appears Defendant misstates the issue. The Plaintiffs claim that their personal property rights were violated by the zoning ordinance and are not seeking to enforce any property rights on behalf of those who live in their AFC home.

A corporation with no contractual or property interest in a proposed facility cannot assert prospective residents’ rights under § 1983 when it has no authority to represent them.

Develo-Cepts, Inc. v. City of Galveston · filed 1984-02-16

Appellant also claims to have standing to represent the mentally retarded people that might have lived in the facility under the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act) and cites Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) in support of this contention. ... In our case, no such association exists to give Develo-cepts authority to represent retarded people. De-velo-cepts, having no contractual or property interest in the property in question, has no standing in its own right. Furthermore it has no standing to represent the mentally retarded people who might have lived in the facility.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of their own federal rights or have standing to assert the rights of others.

San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles · filed 1998-11-06

They have no standing to assert that the rights of the mentally ill have been violated by the City. With no alleged violation of their own rights and no standing to assert the rights of others, the Fentises have no claim under § 1983.

A § 1983 plaintiff seeking to assert another person’s constitutional rights must establish third party standing, which can be denied when the right holder can sue and their interests may conflict.

Amato v. Wilentz · filed 1991-12-30

When we also factor in federalism concerns and bear in mind that third party standing is exceptional, the balance is clearly tipped, and we conclude that the plaintiffs here lacked third party standing to raise Warner Brothers’ First Amendment rights.

A plaintiff cannot base a Section 1983 claim on the constitutional rights of third parties when he does not allege deprivation of his own rights.

Salmon v. Miller · filed 1996-12-05

The plaintiff does not allege that he was deprived of the right to a jury trial; instead, the plaintiff is attempting to assert the right to a jury trial of those issued speeding tickets through his section 1983 action. Generally, a plaintiff “must assert his own legal-rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” ... Therefore, the right to a trial by jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot serve as the basis for the plaintiffs section 1983 claim.

Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking to assert the constitutional rights of others must satisfy prudential third party standing requirements even if they have suffered their own economic injury.

Lauer Farms, Inc. v. Waushara County Board of Adjustment · filed 1997-11-25

In this case the plaintiffs must also satisfy these prudential considerations. This is because the facts demonstrate that it is the constitutional rights of the migrant workers that the plaintiffs in this case are, in reality, advancing. Indeed, although the plaintiffs claim that they “suffered damages in the form of economic loss and the loss of civil rights”, a fair reading of the amended complaint, as fleshed out by the undisputed facts, reveals that it is the alleged discriminatory conduct engaged in by the defendant against the prospective “Hispanic and Jamaican workers” that forms the basis of the plaintiffs’ claims under §§ 1981-1983.

Section 1983 plaintiffs generally must assert violations of their own rights; a claim based on another person's speech requires pleaded circumstances permitting third-party standing.

Urban v. Tularosa · filed 1998-10-06

However, as the district court recognized, the sign was his mother's political speech, not plaintiff's. Ordinarily, litigants must assert their own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest their claims on the legal rights or interests of third parties. ... However, plaintiff's complaint does not plead any such circumstances in this case. ... Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's First Amendment claim.

Section 1983 permits a directly injured party to seek damages for retaliation against a closely related party’s speech when the speaker cannot fully vindicate the harm.

El Dia, Inc. v. Rossello · filed 1998-11-24

Therefore, we find that P.R. Cement has derivative standing to sue for damages suffered in retaliation for critical press coverage in El Nuevo Día in violation of El Dia’s free speech-lrights.

Section 1983 permits an injured plaintiff to assert another person’s First Amendment rights when the plaintiff can effectively vindicate those rights and the other person faces an obstacle to suing.

Camacho v. Brandon · filed 1999-07-16

Applying these principles to the instant case, we hold that plaintiff has third-party standing to bring this § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 does not allow a plaintiff to pursue discrimination claims on behalf of other persons.

Sidari v. Orleans County · filed 2000-06-14

With regard to those portions of the Decision and Order [# 137] which struck other portions of the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was and is properly denied, since plaintiff has no standing to raise discrimination claims on behalf of other persons.

Section 1983 does not give an organization third-party standing based solely on its expenditure of resources when the people whose rights it asserts can sue on their own behalf.

NAT COAL. FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES v. Scales · filed 2001-07-05

Under such circumstances, the mere allegation of expending additional resources is insufficient to overcome the prudential concerns weighing against the grant of third-party standing under § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to assert another person’s First Amendment rights when those rights are inextricably tied to the plaintiff’s own interests and the rights holder cannot assert them.

Persaud v. McSorley · filed 2003-08-04

The Court believes that P. Persaud’s enjoyment of his First Amendment rights is inextricably bound up with M. Persaud’s interest in not receiving the traffic tickets. Moreover, on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint, the Court concludes that P. Persaud does not have standing to assert his own right because he has not suffered an injury in fact.

Section 1983 does not allow a person to assert another person's civil rights claims when that person can assert them directly.

McDonald v. Van Houtte · filed 2005-12-07

Because McDonald has not demonstrated that his wife is unable to assert her own claims, he does not have standing to represent her claims himself.

A property owner lacks standing to bring a Section 1983 claim based on the constitutional rights of prospective halfway house residents when its relationship with them is too distant.

Bannum, Inc. v. City of St. Louis · filed 2006-07-11

Having determined that Ban-num lacks standing to bring a Section 1983 constitutional claim, we note further that Bannum is barred from bringing non-constitutional state claims.

Section 1983 does not permit a third party to sue for another person’s equal protection rights when that person’s estate can pursue the claim directly.

Estate of Martin v. California Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 2009-03-26

We therefore hold that Mary Martin does not have standing to bring a claim under § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated her mother’s right to equal protection under the laws.

Section 1983 permits abortion providers to assert their patients’ rights when challenging abortion regulations.

Hopkins v. Jegley · filed 2017-07-28

The Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed abortion providers to raise the rights of their patients in cases brought under § 1983, and this Court will do the same.

Section 1983 permits abortion providers to assert their patients’ rights.

Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Rutledge · filed 2019-08-06

This Court agrees with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on this point and rejects defendants’ argument regarding standing under § 1983.

Section 1983 allows abortion providers to seek an injunction against state abortion restrictions that violate their patients’ federal rights.

Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen · filed 2013-12-20

Yet the cases are legion that allow an abortion provider, such as Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin or Milwaukee Women’s Medical Services, to sue to enjoin as violations of federal law (hence litigable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) state laws that restrict abortion.

In a Section 1983 deliberate indifference claim, defendants cannot use Texas’s responsible third party procedure to avoid joint and several liability and full compensation.

Howard v. Marquardt · filed 2019-12-02

Application of the Texas proportionate responsibility scheme in this case involving allegations of deliberate indifference would frustrate the two primary goals of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — compensation and deterrence.

A plaintiff cannot pursue a spouse’s rights under Section 1983 merely because they are married; third-party standing requires a showing that the spouse cannot prosecute the lawsuit independently.

(PC) Lessie v. Lozano · filed 2020-04-28

Simply being married does not automatically entitle a spouse to “next friend” standing.