42 U.S.C. § 1983

A § 1983 claim premised on First and Fourteenth Amendment violations fails when the challenged state action violates neither constitutional right.

Hotel And Restaurant Employees And Bartenders International Union Local 54 v. Read · filed 1987-12-04

Local 54 also asserts that it has a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) for violations under color of state law of the union's first and fourteenth amendment rights. In light of our resolution of the union's constitutional attacks on the Casino Control Act, we find that the district court's disposition of the Sec. 1983 claim was appropriate, and we affirm that disposition.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege and prove the violation of a recognized constitutional right.

Combined Communications Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Boger · filed 1988-07-20

To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs must allege and prove the existence and violation of a recognized constitutional right.

Section 1983 excessive force claims begin by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.

Graham v. Connor · filed 1989-05-15

In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.

A Section 1983 claimant must articulate a deprivation of a federal constitutional right.

Motton v. City of Jackson Johnny Parham, Commissioner Health and Sanitation Department City Waste Management · filed 1989-10-18

It is a basic tenet of civil rights law that one asserting a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 must articulate the deprivation of a federal constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff seeking damages to show deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

All-Star Construction & Excavating, Inc. v. Board of Public Works · filed 1994-09-19

Therefore, in order to recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a constitutionally protected right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.

Fernandez-Fernandez v. Municipality of Bayamon · filed 1996-10-16

The cause of action in the instant case is framed strictly on 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. ... The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. ... A First Amendment violation was not claimed by plaintiff, and therefore, this Court is unable to decide this case under First Amendment analysis.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.

King v. Town Of Hempstead · filed 1998-12-01

To bring a § 1983 action, "a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law."

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to identify a claimed constitutional right, privilege, or immunity to sustain a suit.

Stern v. Tarrant County Hospital District · filed 1983-06-06

Defendants correctly assert that in order to sustain a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show the Court some right, privilege, or immunity that he claims under the Constitution.

To hold an official liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must identify a specific constitutional right the official allegedly violated.

Kucharczyk v. Regents of the University of California · filed 1999-05-06

To show that an official is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must first identify a specific constitutional right allegedly violated by that official.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Miles v. CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES DEPT. · filed 2000-08-18

A plaintiff may not sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the defendant's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

A Section 1983 plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Miles v. Child Protective Services Department · filed 2000-08-18

A plaintiff may not sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to assert a violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.

Walters v. Weiss · filed 2003-10-16

In order to establish a cognizable action pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must assert a violation of a federal right not merely a violation of federal law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or another federal law.

Slie v. Bordenkircher · filed 1981-12-02

This Court may entertain Section 1983 actions only where plaintiffs allege that they have suffered a deprivation of some right secured by the Constitution or some other law of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a civil action only when a person is deprived of a constitutional right under color of state law.

Todd v. White Lake Township · filed 1983-01-06

I find that Todd was deprived of no constitutional right because of the officers’ conduct and, therefore, he cannot maintain a § 1983 claim against defendants.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for a violation of state regulations without an accompanying deprivation of a federal right.

Ervin v. David Blackwell and Donald R. Jenkins · filed 1984-05-03

Even if this delay violated the work release regulations, see 13 Mo.Admin. Code § 20-103.011(3)(C) (rescinded 1978), it would not be actionable under section 1983 without an accompanying deprivation of a federal right.

Section 1983 requires an alleged violation of a federal right; a deprivation of a state-created interest beyond federal guarantees affords no relief under the section.

Shevchynski v. Velure · filed 2009-01-14

The district court properly dismissed because, even assuming that defendants were not immune from Shevehynski’s claims, the allegations in the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could have been granted. ... “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States ... [and t]o the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.”

Section 1983 does not support a claim based solely on affirming a disciplinary hearing decision when no constitutional violation occurred.

Eleby v. Selsky · filed 2010-02-08

Thus, plaintiff cannot show that his constitutional rights were violated during the disciplinary proceedings or hearing. Selsky’s affirmance of the hearing officer’s decision therefore cannot give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.

White Oak Property Development, LLC v. Washington Township · filed 2010-06-04

By its plain, unambiguous language, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a “deprivation of [] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]”

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to present a constitutional claim to obtain relief under it.

Lizotte v. Leblanc · filed 2012-01-05

Insofar as Lizotte argues that prison personnel did not follow the required grievance procedures, he has not presented a constitutional claim as required under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging prosecutorial misconduct to plead an injury to a constitutionally protected interest; tort liability alone is insufficient.

Warner v. Brown · filed 2016-11-14

To state a federal claim based on the prosecutors’ alleged misconduct, Warner must plead a constitutional injury. But this he has not done, because tort liability alone, without injury to a constitutionally protected interest, is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right; a violation of state open records law alone cannot support a claim.

Kuntz v. State · filed 2019-02-21

His complaint alleges violations of N.D.C.C. § 44-04-18, and the basis for his § 1983 claim is the State’s alleged violations of the state open records law, rather than any deprivation of a federal right secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal laws.

Section 1983 requires a violation of a federal right; a violation of a statute or regulation alone is insufficient.

HOPE v. FAIR ACRES GERIATRIC CENTER · filed 2020-03-20

To the extent Plaintiff argues that it was error for the Court not to read each regulation aloud as part of the jury instructions, see ECF No. 207 at 12-16, Plaintiff’s argument is mistaken. Throughout the course of litigation, Plaintiff’s counsel has failed to recognize the difference between a federal right under § 1983 and a statute or regulation. See Grammer, 570 F.3d at 525 (“[A] Plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right—not merely a violation of a federal law—to seek redress.”).

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of a federal right.

Jenkins v. National Railroad Corporation · filed 2020-07-14

Section 1983, in turn, requires that a plaintiff allege “the violation of a federal right.” See Duberry v. District of Columbia, 824 F.3d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The complaint alleges no such violation.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federal rights; alleged violations of state law or a government contract alone do not state a claim.

Vega v. Sawyer · filed 2020-08-28

Section 1983 does not create a remedy for every wrong committed under color of state law, but only for those actions that deprive a litigant of a federal right.

Section 1983 applies to defendants acting under color of state law, not under color of federal law.

United States of America v. Cyril T. Faneca, Jr. · filed 1964-06-01

Again, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply since defendants were acting under color of federal law, not state law.

Section 1983 requires state action, and a merely miniscule degree of state involvement is insufficient to support an action under the statute.

27 Puerto Rican Migrant Farm Workers v. Shade Tobacco Growers Agricultural Ass'n · filed 1973-01-10

However, the Court finds that these Civil Rights Statutes do not confer jurisdiction over the subject matter. State action is a prerequisite to an action arising under these sections. The miniscule degree of state involvement in the present case is insufficient to maintain such an action.

Section 1983 does not require a local law or ordinance expressly mandating segregated service; subtler forms of state involvement may suffice to establish state action.

Sherrod v. Pink Hat Cafe · filed 1965-12-20

It is not necessary to establish state action, as required' by the Fourteenth Amendment, and in this case, section 1983, that local law or a local ordinance actually prohibits serving Negroes except in segregated facilities. Much more subtle forms of state involvement have been held sufficient.

Section 1983 applies when a public transit authority's refusal to accept speech for display constitutes state action that deprives plaintiffs of constitutional rights.

Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1967-09-12

Since the Authority is a “public benefit corporation” created by a specific New York statute and operates a public rapid transit system, and since the Authority has the power to approve or reject advertising to be placed by the Advertising Company, the refusal by the Authority and the Advertising Company to accept the posters for display constitutes “state action” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment (see, e. g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 268 F.Supp. 855 (S.D. N. Y.1967); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.1964); Anderson v. Moses, 185 F.Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y.1960)), and plaintiffs’ allegations that they have been deprived of rights guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments are sufficient to give the court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). See, e. g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943); Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957, 86 S.Ct. 435, 15 L.Ed.2d 361 (1965).

Section 1983 provides a remedy only against a person acting under color of state law, and when it has no limitations period of its own, courts borrow the most analogous state limitations period.

Mulligan v. Detective Schlachter, Sergeant Ware, Lieutenant Morin, and Benjamin J. Safir · filed 1968-02-09

With regard to the allegation that appellee Safir represented appellant inadequately, no cause of action has been stated because § 1983 provides a remedy only against one acting under color of state law. Safir, a private attorney, does not fall within this category, despite the fact that he had been appointed by the court. ... Since the Civil Rights Act itself contains no limitation period, the courts will look to the most analogous statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action arose.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivation of rights under color of state law, so it does not authorize claims against the federal government for alleged Fifth Amendment violations.

Vigil v. United States · filed 1968-12-20

The plaintiffs further allege that the complaint states a cognizable claim under Sections 1982 and 1983 of Title 42 , and thus that this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. These Sections do not fill the breach since they implement the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than the Fifth Amendment. They protect against oppressive state action rather than federal excesses.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights remedy for conduct under color of state law, not for federal action.

Browns v. Mitchell · filed 1969-01-31

Inasmuch as the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is concerned only with state action and does not concern itself with federal action we lay to one side as entirely irrelevant any evidence concerning the participation of the federal government in the affairs of the University.

Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivations carried out under color of state law and does not reach purely federal action.

Browns v. Mitchell · filed 1969-04-02

Inasmuch as the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is concerned only with state action and does not concern itself with federal action we lay to one side as entirely irrelevant any evidence concerning the participation of the federal government in the affairs of the University. ... Nor is there anything in the rationale of these cases to lend credence to the hypothesis that these students have a constitutionally protected right to close the doors of the university in order to enforce their demands, or that the disciplinary action taken against the students for such unauthorized conduct is state action redressible as a violation of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a federal right caused under color of state law, and covers informal state-authority influence and joint federal-state action when state officials play a significant role.

Dr. Harold D. Kletschka v. William J. Driver, Individually and as Administrator of the Veterans Administration · filed 1969-04-22

To maintain a cause of action under § 1983 plaintiff must show: 1) that he has been deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; 2) that the defendants subjected plaintiff to this deprivation, or “cause[d]” him to be so subjected; and 3) that the defendants acted “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State * * *.” ... This informal, behind the scenes exertion of state authority is as much within the scope of § 1983 as the more usual examples of formal and open action leading to the denial of federal rights. ... We can see no reason why a joint conspiracy between federal and state officials should not carry the same consequences under § 1983 as does joint action by state officials and private persons. ... When the violation is the joint product of the exercise of a State power and of a non-State power then the test under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 is whether the state or its officials played a “significant” role in the result.

Section 1983 requires proof of state action or state involvement, including a discriminatory state custom or usage in the relevant locale and the State generally; its “under color” requirement has the same meaning as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Company · filed 1969-05-05

The proof presented by plaintiff was clearly insufficient to prove “custom, or usage, of any State” within the meaning of § 1983. The statute requires that the discriminatory custom or usage be proved to exist in the locale where the discrimination took place, and in the State generally. ... The “under color” of law provision in § 1983 has been construed to mean the same as “state action” under the Fourteenth Amendment. ... No state involvement in the discrimination having been shown, plaintiff failed to prove a violation of § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations under color of state law, not for conduct based solely on federal action.

Counts v. Voorhees College · filed 1970-04-29

There were also allegations of federal assistance to the College and proof from plaintiff’s witnesses that it receives some such assistance for construction, scholarships and student aid. Since federal action is not the concern of 42 U.S. C. § 1983, this court’s jurisdiction cannot be invoked from that fact.

Section 1983 requires conduct sufficiently attributable to the state for a claim to proceed under the statute.

Plotkin v. Sanford Silver · filed 1971-11-12

After a careful consideration of the briefs and appendix and also of the voluminous documents submitted by appellant after the oral argument, with the permission of the Court, we find no sufficient showing of state action to bring the case within the orbit of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 or otherwise to make out a cause of action of federal subject matter jurisdiction arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

Section 1983 applies only when a person acts under color of state or territorial law, so it does not cover a tribal officer acting under tribal authority.

Loncassion v. Leekity · filed 1971-11-16

The statute by its terms applies only to persons acting under color of a statute, ordinance, etc. “of any State or Territory.” No claim is made that defendant Leekity was acting under color of state law: as a result § 1983 is inapplicable to him in his action and the plaintiffs claims cannot be said to arise under that statute. Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F.Supp. 429 (D.N.M.1954); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F.Supp. 17 (D.Ariz. 1968). This court has no jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a state prisoner alleging that prison officials denied religious publications and other privileges solely because of his religious beliefs.

Cooper v. Pate · filed 1964-06-22

The petitioner, an inmate at the Illinois State Penitentiary, brought an action under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 and 42 U. S. C. § 1983, § 1979 of the Revised Statutes, alleging that solely because of his religious beliefs he was denied permission to purchase certain religious publications and denied other privileges enjoyed by other prisoners. ... Taking as true the allegations of the complaint, as they must be on a motion to dismiss, the complaint stated a cause of action and it was error to dismiss it.

Section 1983 allows state prisoners to sue for constitutional deprivations including interference with access to courts, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and unjustified censorship, without first exhausting state remedies.

Corby v. J. P. Conboy, Superintendent · filed 1972-03-15

Though the plaintiff has not exhausted his state court remedies, claims of denial of constitutional rights under § 1983 are not subject to such requirements. ... However, a charge of deliberate indifference by prison authorities to a prisoner’s request for essential medical treatment is sufficient to state a claim. ... The present allegations of censorship, however, which at this stage must be accepted as true, adequately state a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and actions by a subdivision of state government satisfy that requirement.

Norlander v. Schleck · filed 1972-07-13

The actions complained of here were those of a subdivision of state government and thus there is “state action” or action under color of State law as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action and is not a vehicle for malpractice suits against court-appointed attorneys.

O'Brien v. Colbath · filed 1972-08-29

Although § 1983 requires proof of “state action” which is obviously lacking in a federal prosecution, in our opinion it was never intended as a vehicle for prosecuting malpractice suits against court-appointed attorneys.

Section 1983 permits a constitutional claim against city officers when the complaint alleges that they failed to obey the Constitution in carrying out their official duties, satisfying the state-action requirement.

Beal v. John v. Lindsay, Individually and as Mayor of the City of New York · filed 1972-10-05

The district judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. He attached importance to the availability of the other parks to the residents of the Crotona area, and suggested a failure to demonstrate the state action required for the maintenance of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional implementation, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). ... We cannot accept any of these grounds. ... One need not look further for state action when the complaint charges officers of a city with failure to obey the Constitution in the discharge of their duties.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; the court held that the alleged due-process violation stated a § 1983 cause of action against the hospital, its staff, and its committee, but not against the attorneys and insurance companies where no sufficient state-law nexus was alleged.

Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hospital · filed 1972-10-25

The alleged violation of due process clearly involves the staff, the hospital, and the committee, and as to those defendants, I rule that a cause of action has been stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since no facts have been alleged sufficient to color the actions of the attorneys and companies with state law, they are not members of the class exposed to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... I rule that as to Attorneys Millham and Soden and the companies no cause of action under which relief can be granted has been stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches actions by a municipal housing authority because those actions are taken under color of state law.

Burr v. The New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority · filed 1973-05-25

This court has held that the actions of the Authority are State actions within the meaning of § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and the court treats that requirement as equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment’s state-action requirement.

Bright v. Isenbarger · filed 1970-07-06

In cases under § 1983, the requirement of “under color of law” has been consistently treated by the Supreme Court as the same thing as the “state action” required under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires state action, so it does not provide a claim against a federal officer absent that element.

Polakoff v. Henderson · filed 1973-08-03

Plaintiffs’ reliance on § 1983 is misplaced. As this action is brought against a federal officer, “state action”, which is required for there to be a claim under § 1983, is lacking.

Section 1983 permits a person deprived of constitutional rights by someone acting under color of state law to sue, without first exhausting administrative remedies.

Baltic Independent School District No. 115 v. South Dakota High School Activities Ass'n · filed 1973-08-20

Under 42 U.S.C. See. 1983, any person who suffers the deprivation of civil rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution, by persons acting under color of state law may bring suit for the' redress of those deprivations. ... The SDHSAA and its members are persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and it is clear to this court that defendants are acting under color of state law. ... “The Association is sufficiently entwined with the public schools to cause its actions to be under color of state law,” and the court thereby does have jurisdiction under 42 U.S. C. Sec. 1983. ... There is also no need under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing legal action as the procedures for attacking state action under that provision is a remedy separate from and in addition to any state remedies.

Section 1983 reaches state action only when the state involvement also amounts to a deprivation of a federally secured right.

Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co. · filed 1973-09-25

Although the issuance of the strip mining permit is clearly state action, it is not actionable state action within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires deprivation of a constitutional right under color of state law, including an allegation of state action.

Thomas v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1973-11-08

There is no cause of action stated here under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As an essential element of his claim for relief, plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a constitutional right “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory.” Similarly, no suit can be maintained under the fourteenth amendment without an allegation of state action. There is no such allegation in the complaint, and even if there were it would not raise a genuine issue of fact.

Section 1983 covers eviction-related actions by a public housing authority as state action when plaintiffs allege substantial deprivations of constitutional rights.

Tyson v. New York City Housing Authority · filed 1974-01-09

The defendants’ action in adjudging the plaintiffs nondesirable tenants and in ordering their eviction are acts of the state and therefore satisfy the state action requirement of Section 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for civil-rights violations committed by persons acting under color of state law, requiring sufficient state involvement in the challenged conduct.

Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc., Rochester, New York v. The United States Jaycees, Tulsa, Oklahoma · filed 1974-04-16

The first question is whether there is a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which gives a remedy to persons whose civil rights have been invaded by officers acting under color of state law. ... The membership policy against which the attack has been leveled has no connection with the state activity of the United States Jaycees. Neither the complaint nor the record establishes or promises to establish the kind of state involvement essential to a civil rights action under § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a state-implicated hospital for violating a person’s constitutional right to procedural due process.

Stuart M. Christhilf, Jr., M.D. v. The Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association, Inc. · filed 1974-04-23

Consequently, the court properly ruled that Dr. Christhilf’s complaint stated a cause of action against the hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches restrictions imposed pursuant to police department rules and guides because they constitute state action.

Gissi v. Codd · filed 1974-05-20

The restrictions, made pursuant to Police Department rules and guides, are clearly state action within the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional deprivations only when the challenged conduct is state action.

Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hospital · filed 1974-06-17

Plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden of proving that the July 28, 1971 action of the medical staff executive committee was “state action” as required by 42 U. S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches conduct by a political party convention when, in the relevant statutory context, that conduct is state action.

Redfearn v. Delaware Republican State Committee · filed 1974-07-29

The district court ruling that the Republican State Convention is in the foregoing statutory context “state action” within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is obviously correct.

Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law, which the court equates with the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement.

Gibbs v. Titelman · filed 1974-08-01

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the “under color of state law” requirement is the same as the “state action” requirement of the fourteenth amendment.

Section 1983 state-action requirement is satisfied when municipal officials are sued in their official capacities for conduct taken in those capacities.

Minshew v. Smith · filed 1974-08-05

Although plaintiffs have also failed to indicate in their complaint whether they are suing Elliott and New-berry in their representative capacities or as individuals, the Court concludes that they are sued as representatives of the City as all allegations and proof were addressed to their actions in their official capacities, and, for this reason finds that the necessary state action for a suit founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is present.

Section 1983 requires state action for a claim under the statute.

Cook v. United States · filed 1974-12-27

There can be no doubt that “state action” is required for there to be a claim under § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches state action, including state-authorized and state-enabled enforcement of a motor-vehicle lien.

Caesar v. Kiser · filed 1975-01-13

The state is, therefore, actively involved in the creation and the enforcement of the lien on motor vehicles and such must be held to constitute “state action” as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 reaches only conduct undertaken under color of state law.

Mattheis v. Jockey Club · filed 1975-01-20

The Civil Rights Act prohibits only conduct “under color of” state law; accordingly, a peripheral inquiry in any suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. is whether the challenged activity is in reality “state action”.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to show state action that deprived them of rights, privileges or immunities secured by federal law or the Constitution.

Mitchell v. West Feliciana Parish School Board · filed 1975-01-30

For plaintiffs to prevail, it is necessary that they show state action which deprived them of rights, privileges or immunities secured them by the federal laws or Constitution.

Section 1983 requires the challenged deprivation to be committed under color of state law, a requirement treated as identical to Fourteenth Amendment state action.

Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Appraisers · filed 1975-02-07

In order to prevail on the claims that § 1983 provides a cause of action here and that the fourteenth amendment serves to protect the plaintiffs, it must be established that state action exists. ... In cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the requirement that the deprivation be inflicted “under color of law” has been consistently treated by the courts as identical to the “state action” required by the terms of the fourteenth amendment. ... A finding that no state action is present in this case would have a fatal impact: no cause of action would exist under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, no jurisdiction would lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and, even if alternative means of establishing a cause of action and jurisdiction were to exist, the plaintiffs’ claims would be foreclosed on their merits because the provisions of the fourteenth amendment would not be applicable.

Section 1983 reaches conduct by a political party performing public functions, because that conduct constitutes state action.

Tom H. Riddell, Jr., Cross-Appellees v. The National Democratic Party, Cross-Appellants · filed 1975-02-21

In our view the Loyalists’ conduct in functioning as a viable political party, holding precinct elections and county nominating conventions, and participating in the national nominating conventions of 1968 and 1972 of the Democratic Party have constituted the performance of such public functions as to give rise to state action for purposes of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983's state-action requirement is satisfied when a court clerk directly participates in the procedure causing the deprivation of property.

Turner v. Blackburn · filed 1975-02-12

We hold that the direct participation by the clerk in the procedure by which plaintiff was deprived of ownership, and threatened to be deprived of possession, of her property constituted state action.

Section 1983 applies when a legislative caucus exercises legislative power normally associated with state sovereignty, making its action state action.

Ammond v. McGahn · filed 1975-03-05

We hold that the Caucus exercises legislative power which is normally associated with sovereignty ... and, therefore, action by the Caucus is “state action” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to national banking associations merely because they are regulated by the Federal government.

C.A.R. Leasing, Inc. v. First Lease, Inc. · filed 1975-04-23

Assuming that the plaintiff is complaining about deprivation of its civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by virtue of a violation of 12 U.S.C. § 24, we fail to see how this is supported by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The mere fact that national banking associations are regulated by the Federal government does not make them subject to civil rights actions.

Section 1983 does not support a claim against state defendants for a property deprivation when their actions do not constitute state action causing the alleged injury.

Sun Enterprises., Ltd. v. Train · filed 1975-05-09

Contending that they have been deprived of property without due process of law and without just' compensation, plaintiffs assert that they may maintain suit against the state defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. ... However, one clear fact which is disclosed in the amended complaint is that the state defendants are not involved in any alleged taking of plaintiffs’ property. ... Any injury being caused to plaintiffs results from the activities of the private defendants for which plaintiffs have remedies under state law. ... The motion of the state defendants to dismiss the amended complaint as against them is granted.

Section 1983 requires the defendant's conduct to occur under color of state law, a requirement equivalent here to the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement.

Pamela Magill, a Minor, by Her Parents and Natural Guardians, William L. Magill and Patricia Magill v. Basebal · filed 1975-05-08

A claim brought under § 1983 must prove acts “under color of state law.” This provision has been treated as equivalent to the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 requires state action connected to the conduct causing the alleged deprivation; substantial state funding alone is insufficient.

Winsey v. Pace College · filed 1975-05-06

Thus, if the Court were to grant relief under Rule 56(f) and it were to be established that Pace did in fact receive substantial monies from the State, this would still not suffice to show the requisite state action. The amount of funding received is simply immaterial unless it can be shown to have caused the alleged injury, to wit, the retaliation.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law; a state insurance commissioner’s approval of allegedly discriminatory policies can satisfy that requirement.

Reichardt v. Payne · filed 1975-04-30

I find that the Commissioner is adequately involved in the alleged discrimination to satisfy the state action requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and I deny the motion to dismiss the first cause of action.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law before its protection may be invoked.

Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc. · filed 1975-08-07

Both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U. S.C. § 1343 require that a person must be subjected to deprivation of a constitutional right by one acting under color of state law before their protections may be invoked. The Defendants here acted under the authority of Fla.Stat. §§ 713.-67-69 when they enforced the “Innkeeper’s Lien” by confiscating the Plaintiffs’ property.

Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for a constitutional deprivation unless the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the State; a Texas nonjudicial foreclosure under a contractual power of sale was not state action merely because Article 3810 regulated its manner.

Pedro and Olga A. Barrera v. Security Building & Investment Corporation · filed 1975-09-25

Article 3810 does not authorize the power of sale. Nor does it even codify the right to contract for and to exercise that power. ... Its purpose and effect is to restrict the manner in which private parties, if they have bargained for the remedy, may exercise it. Article 3810 does not aid, support, or encourage foreclosures under powers of sale. It regulates exercise of those powers. Thus while Article 3810 is, of course, “direct state action”, in the sense that it is a legislative regulation, the state may not be said to have thereby acted to deprive the debtor of his property interest. It has, in fact, acted, however ineffectually, to protect that interest.

Section 1983 does not reach a political party's internal filling of a party office absent state action or action under color of state law.

McMenamin v. PHILADELPHIA CTY. DEM. EX. COM. · filed 1975-10-30

The instant case involves not a primary or a general election, but rather the internal affairs of a political party, specifically the filling of a party office. Under Lynch, supra, the filling of such an office is not state action or action under color of state law. Accordingly, because plaintiff's associational rights were not abridged or impaired by state action — as opposed to the private action of party leaders conducting the internal affairs of their party — she has again failed to state a claim under § 1983 upon which relief may be granted. Her suit must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims challenging a municipal ordinance as unauthorized by state law do not establish federal jurisdiction when the challenged act is not state-authorized action.

Conway v. City of Kenosha, Wisconsin · filed 1975-12-02

In paragraphs 19 and 20 of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the residency requirement at issue is ultra vires in that it was neither promulgated under authority of state law nor adopted in accordance with the procedures established by state law and city ordinance. Even if this latter charge were correct, the plaintiff would not have a reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits of his additional 14th amendment claims, based upon 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1985, and 1986. ... In that case Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the court, said of an ordinance passed without legislative authority: ‘A suit to prevent the enforcement of such an ordinance would not, therefore, be one arising under the Constitution of the United States.’ ”

Section 1983 applies only to state action and requires a plaintiff to allege state action.

Henry v. Schlesinger · filed 1976-01-07

The first issue raised by defendants is whether or not Count II of plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ... Clearly, state action is an element of a cause of action thereunder. ... As plaintiff fails to allege state action in Count II of her complaint, we must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count II of plaintiff’s complaint.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege state action or involvement in the challenged conduct.

Lamont v. Forman Brothers, Inc. · filed 1976-01-07

The complaint contains no allegation of state action or involvement in the defendant’s alleged acts of discrimination, and plaintiffs have therefore failed to state a claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action for recovery.

Rodriguez v. Conagra, Inc. · filed 1976-01-08

Passing the question whether appellants could be thought to allege any rights at all, we are at a loss to see where it could be thought that defendant’s actions involved any state action, a basic requirement for recovery under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of civil rights under color of state law, and a claim may be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Sled v. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body Div. · filed 1976-01-15

In any event, any § 1983 claim is likewise barred by the three-year limitation penod. ... Moreover, § 1983 is inapplicable for want of an allegation that plaintiff’s civil rights were deprived under color of state law.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action absent a deprivation of rights under color of state law.

Reeves v. American Optical Co. · filed 1976-02-11

The same disposition hereby is ordered as to any cause of action bottomed on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for nothing in the complaint implies any deprivation of any of the plaintiff’s rights, privileges or immunities under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State.

Section 1983 reaches constitutional deprivations carried out under state action, including a custom or usage enforced by persistent practices of state officials.

D'Ercole v. D'Ercole · filed 1976-02-19

An issue might have been raised as to the existence of state action in this case, but in any event this court concludes that the tenancy by the entirety is a “custom or usage” enforced by the “persistent practices of state officials” sufficient to satisfy the state action prerequisite for suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A claim lacking the essential allegation of state action is not actionable under § 1983.

Baron v. Carson · filed 1976-03-31

Since Count II lacks the essential allegation of state action reflected in the relevant case law, plaintiff’s claim is not actionable under § 1983 and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires challenged conduct to be fairly attributable to the State; state regulation or prior approval of rates and contracts alone is insufficient without state involvement in the challenged conduct.

Broderick v. Associated Hospital Service · filed 1976-05-06

The mere statutory requirements of prior approval of rates and certificates or contracts of subscription without more, and without a relationship to the challenged discriminatory action charged to the defendants, is insufficient to establish state action.

Section 1983 requires state action for a claim alleging deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Gorman v. University of Miami · filed 1976-05-19

He further seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection has been infringed. The defendants contend that the state action element, which is required if this Court is to have jurisdiction, is missing. In support of their position they have attached affidavits directed to the allegations of the complaint. It appears to this Court that recent decisions of the Fifth Circuit foreclose plaintiff’s claim.

Section 1983 permits a complaint alleging that federal officials conspired with state officials and acted under color of state law.

American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago · filed 1976-05-26

This Court is of the opinion that a complaint which alleges that federal officials acted in conspiracy with state officials under color of state law may properly be filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a plaintiff who fails to prove state action cannot recover on due-process claims under it.

Trivits v. Wilmington Institute · filed 1976-06-23

Since the record fails to reveal the state action demanded for the successful prosecution of a § 1983 suit, plaintiff has failed to prove her federal cause of action, and the Court will dismiss Count I of the amended and supplemental complaint, i. e., all of plaintiff’s due process of law claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 permits a claim to proceed when the complaint, fairly construed, alleges that the challenged acts were performed under color of state law.

Harris v. Harvey · filed 1976-08-05

I find no merit in the defendants’ argument that this action cannot be brought under § 1983 because of an absence of a showing that the acts were performed under color of state law. Fairly construed, I think it is clear that § 1983 may not be denied to the use of the plaintiff on this ground.

Section 1983 does not impose liability on court-appointed criminal defense counsel who is not acting under color of state law.

Harris v. Ward · filed 1976-08-20

It is well-established, however, that court-appointed counsel defending an accused does not act under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or statutory right.

Jawa v. Fayetteville State University · filed 1976-12-21

Plaintiff has failed to discharge his burden of proving by the preponderance, or greater weight of the credible evidence that defendant Lyons, while acting under any statute, custom or usage of any state or territory, subjected or caused to be subjected plaintiff to any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws so as to warrant any finding of liability therefor on the part of defendant Lyons.

Section 1983 requires action sufficiently connected to the State to qualify as state action, and an entity that is not a statutory person cannot be held liable under it.

Boling v. National Zinc Co. · filed 1976-12-30

This Court holds that the State Insurance Fund is not in a sufficiently close nexus with the State of Oklahoma so that its actions constitute state action. However, if such a finding is not true, the State Insurance Fund is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 and must be dismissed.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a due-process deprivation only when the challenged conduct is attributable to state action.

Vanessa Taylor, on Behalf of Herself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Consolidated Edison Co. Of New York, In · filed 1977-02-24

Since the Due Process Clause is directed solely against action on the part of a state, however, these facts would state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (over which we might entertain jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343) only if appellant could allege and show that the denial of a hearing was attributable to action or involvement on the part of the State of New York, as distinguished from private action on the part of Con Ed. ... Under the circumstances, we must therefore hold that any denial of a hearing was not the result of state action.

Section 1983 does not support a claim absent state action.

Dixon v. Universal Atlas Cement Division · filed 1977-04-07

However, there is no state action in this case to support a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law, and a claim should not be dismissed for lack of state action before adequate discovery when the plaintiff may be able to establish it.

Cap v. Lehigh University · filed 1977-06-03

While the allegations of “state action” in the complaint are somewhat inconclusive, it is possible that plaintiff may establish facts sufficient to show that defendant acted under color of state law. The Third Circuit has disapproved the dismissal of a § 1983 complaint for lack of state action without the benefit of adequate discovery on the state action question. ... Defendant’s motion alleging lack of State action is therefore denied.

Section 1983 permits liability for public school officials who, acting under color of state law, conduct a student search that violates the Fourth Amendment.

Bellnier v. Lund · filed 1977-07-11

Accordingly, this Court holds that the defendants may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the search is found to have violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 1983 reaches the University of Pittsburgh because the record showed sufficient state action.

Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh · filed 1977-08-01

Under these circumstances we hold consistent with the decision of Judge Sorg and of the Third Circuit that the record showed sufficient state action to bring the University of Pittsburgh under 1983.

Section 1983 requires a constitutional-right deprivation carried out under color of state law.

Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency · filed 1977-08-05

In order to establish a claim cognizable under § 1983, appellant must show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and that such deprivation was achieved under color of state law. ... Because the Compact giving rise to TRPA is a matter of federal law, the jurisdictional requisite of state action is missing and no action can be stated under § 1983 against these individual members of TRPA.

Section 1983 requires state action as an essential element of a cause of action under the statute.

Lorentzen v. Boston College · filed 1977-10-12

“State action” is an essential element of a cause of action under Section 1983 and of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights cause of action for deprivations carried out under color of state law.

Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc. · filed 1977-11-17

Since the Department of Business Regulation was properly dismissed, and the frontons do not act as agents for the State, there is no state action. Consequently, petitioners' arguments that their complaint states a cause of action, inter alia, pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act, are without merit.

Section 1983 applies to the NCAA’s challenged activity because the court treated the NCAA’s conduct as state action under color of state law.

Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Association · filed 1977-12-16

The plaintiffs assert that, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment and in turn 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they have been denied equal protection of the law and deprived of liberty or property without due process. ... In any event, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that the NCAA’s activities are the equivalent of state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983, and the critical facts in that determination are no different now than they were in the case then being considered. Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 506 F.2d 1028 (CA5 1975). Accord, Associated Students, Inc. v. N.C.A.A., 493 F.2d 1251 (CA9 1974). The practical effect of this holding is that Bylaw 12-1 is to be tested under the Fourteenth Amendment as if it were an enactment of a state legislature.

Section 1983 reaches state action that deprives a person of a federal constitutional right; here, it reaches enforcement of a rule denying physically qualified girls the liberty to compete with boys in interscholastic contact sports.

Yellow Sp. Exempted Vil. Sch. Dist. v. Ohio H. Sch., Etc. · filed 1978-01-09

Association Rule 1 § 6, insofar as it prohibits mixed gender competition in interscholastic contact sports, deprives physically qualified girls of liberty without due process of law and perforce also violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law, and a university's actions may qualify as state action when the state is significantly involved in its affairs.

Benner v. Oswald · filed 1978-03-20

Penn State’s actions in choosing which groups shall have a voice in the selection of members of its Board of Trustees are state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a constitutional deprivation only when the challenged conduct can be characterized as state action.

Richmond v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1978-04-04

Such a denial would be actionable under § 1983 only if defendant’s action could be characterized as that of the state. We find this state action requirement unsatisfied here.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim when no state action is alleged.

Ford v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1978-05-12

Plaintiff has obviously failed to state a claim based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not treat a nonprofit hospital's receipt of Hill-Burton, Medicare, or Medicaid funds, tax exemption, or state licensing requirements as state action.

Clare C. Hodge, M.D. v. Paoli Memorial Hospital · filed 1978-07-07

We have determined to stand with the vast majority of courts of appeals and hold that the receipt of Hill-Burton construction funding, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and the existence of tax exemption, as well as state licensing requirements for nonprofit hospitals, do not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not support an agency-fee claim under the National Labor Relations Act when the case lacks sufficient state action.

Havas v. Communications Workers of America · filed 1978-07-10

Plaintiffs also make reference in their Complaint (¶¶ 41, 43) to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, though nowhere else does the Complaint mention, or attempt to set forth a cause of action under that section. In any event, unlike cases falling within the Railway Labor Act, agency fee cases coming under the National Labor Relations Act do not involve sufficient state action to support a cause of action under § 1983.

Section 1983 requires a sufficient showing of state action before a civil-rights claim can proceed.

Lane v. Jefferson Health Care, Inc. · filed 1978-08-31

At the conclusion of plaintiffs case the Court granted defendants’ motions for a directed verdict as to plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 inasmuch as plaintiff had made an insufficient showing of state action. ... We have reviewed the record and find that our ruling is supported by the evidence.

Section 1983 requires state action or action under color of state law, and receiving Hill-Burton, Medicare, or Medicaid funds, having tax-exempt status, and being subject to state licensing requirements do not by themselves constitute state action for a nonprofit hospital.

Robinson v. Magovern · filed 1978-09-12

“[T]he receipt of Hill-Burton construction funding, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and the existence of tax exemption, as well as the state licensing requirements for nonprofit hospitals, do not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for injunctive relief when a person acting under color of state authority deprives another of federal constitutional rights.

Ludtke v. Kuhn · filed 1978-09-25

Since plaintiff Ludtke has been deprived, under color of the authority of the state, of rights secured to her by both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she is entitled to the injunctive relief sought and to an award of counsel fees.

Section 1983 requires action under color of state law.

Good v. Roy · filed 1978-11-03

Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inapplicable, requiring, as it does, action under color of state law. There is no state action allegation here.

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action against a tribe when tribal sovereign immunity bars the suit, and it requires the challenged conduct to occur under color of state law.

Wilson v. TURTLE MT. BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS · filed 1978-11-13

Plaintiff may not assert claims against the moving defendants under § 1983 for two reasons. First, the tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit is a bar to an action under § 1983 as well as under the Indian Civil Rights Act. ... In addition, the jurisdictional prerequisite of an action under “color of state law,” which must be present for a cause of action to lie under § 1983, is lacking. On the face of plaintiff’s complaints, it is clear that neither the Turtle Mountain Band nor Turtle Mountain Housing Authority was acting “under color of state law.”

Section 1983's "under color of law" requirement is equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement.

Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank & Trust Co. · filed 1978-12-18

The “under color of law” provision is equivalent to the state action requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 1983 applies to the Big Eight Conference's activities when, because of its state-university membership and delegated athletic functions, those activities constitute state action.

Stanley v. Big Eight Conference · filed 1978-12-21

For the purposes of applying the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the activities of the Big Eight Conference constitute “state action”.

Section 1983 requires state action, including significant state involvement, before activities fall within its ambit.

Harris v. Paul R. Hubbert, Individually and as Executive Secretary, Alabama Educationassociation · filed 1979-01-18

Claims brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 require a showing of state action, ... There must be significant state involvement in order to bring activities within the ambit of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. ... We find none here.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for redress when a person acting under color of state law deprives someone of constitutional rights.

Benner v. Oswald · filed 1979-01-24

We disagree and determine that there is sufficient state involvement to constitute state action within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach a volunteer fire department’s internal suspension and dismissal decisions when the municipality has no involvement in those disciplinary actions.

Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department · filed 1979-01-26

This Court finds, first, that the action of the Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department in suspending and dismissing the plaintiff does not constitute state action within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and second, even were there state action, an examination of the merits discloses that this is not a free speech case since there were sufficient grounds to dismiss the plaintiff independent of any First Amendment considerations, and further that the plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated by his suspension and dismissal.

Section 1983 requires a deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right under color of state law, including state involvement when the claim rests on the Fourteenth Amendment.

Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n · filed 1979-02-08

To state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiffs must allege, first, that defendants have deprived them of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and, second, that defendants deprived them of that right acting under color of a state law. ... Since state action is an essential element in all section 1983 claims, plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a cause of action thereunder.

Section 1983 requires facts sufficient to charge defendants with a civil-rights violation before it can support jurisdiction under § 1343(3).

Hamblett v. Board of Savings & Loan Associations · filed 1979-02-28

The court has concluded that the complaint does not allege the existence of facts sufficient to charge defendants with violation of the Civil Rights of plaintiffs within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so as to confer jurisdiction upon the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for constitutional violations lacking state action.

Johnson v. Frederick · filed 1979-03-20

Since there is no state action involved, plaintiff has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only when the challenged conduct involves sufficient state action.

Neeld v. National Hockey League · filed 1979-04-11

Neeld does make an argument to assert some claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (a civil rights act). However, he does not adequately explain how the federal law would apply and furthermore, we are convinced that under the circumstances of this case there is not sufficient state action involvement to maintain the action even if federal law were to apply.

Section 1983 reaches deprivations committed under color of state law; it does not provide the jurisdictional basis for this suit against the United States.

Clark v. United States · filed 1979-04-19

Since jurisdiction was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relied upon by plaintiffs and under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) relied upon by the district court, the only proper jurisdictional foundation is 28 U.S.C. § 1491, which confers jurisdiction of this type of lawsuit upon the Court of Claims.

Section 1983's state-action requirement is satisfied when federal officials conspire with state officials to deprive constitutional rights, making the entire conspiracy actionable.

Hampton v. Hanrahan · filed 1979-04-23

Yet when federal officials are engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive constitutional rights, the state officials provide the requisite state action to make the entire conspiracy actionable under section 1983.

Section 1983 does not reach claims against court-appointed attorneys when their actions are not state action.

Skipper v. Bennett H. Brummer, Davis Cohen, and Lennie Cooperman · filed 1979-07-06

Appellant Skipper filed suit against Brummer, Cohen, Cooperman, three public defender lawyers, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requesting $1,000,000 damages and alleging that appellees denied him effective assistance of counsel by allowing him to proceed to trial without counsel. ... We affirm this result, but for the reason that in this circuit the actions of court-appointed attorneys are not state action.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy to prove both the conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights, and state officials' significant participation can supply the state action needed to reach federal officials in the joint conspiracy.

Hampton v. Edward v. Hanrahan · filed 1979-09-12

First, defendants contend that in order to have an adequate claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and prove both a conspiracy and an actual deprivation of rights; mere proof of a conspiracy is insufficient to establish a section 1983 claim. This statement of the law is correct, See Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538, 540 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975), but we do not see how this affects the viability of plaintiffs' claims in the instant case. ... Yet when federal officials are engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive constitutional rights, the state officials provide the requisite state action to make the entire conspiracy actionable under section 1983. ... There can be no question that the state defendants "played a 'significant' role in the result." Kletschka, supra, 411 F.2d at 449.

Section 1983 does not provide a claim against NASD because NASD is not a state agency.

First Jersey Securities, Inc. v. Bergen · filed 1979-08-29

NASD is not a state agency; therefore, First Jersey is unable to state a claim under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Thomas Owens 116087 v. Swift Agricultural & Chemical Corp. · filed 1979-09-12

In order to recover under this section, the plaintiff must establish that the actions of the defendant of which he complains were committed under color of state law and constituted a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides a civil-rights cause of action for deprivations carried out under color of state law, so allegations against municipal detectives could proceed while the complaint did not show state action by FBI agents.

Greer v. Turner · filed 1979-09-28

The allegations of Greer’s complaint state enough against the city detectives, Turner, Petty and Norment, to withstand a motion to dismiss. As for the FBI agents, Frankenfield and Marx, however, it is not shown how their conduct constituted state action. Since the case must be remanded for further proceedings, it is unnecessary for us to speculate on what allegations, if any at all, might be sufficient to make out a case against the agents under section 1983.

Section 1983 requires the challenged deprivation to be committed under color of state law.

Fiorino v. Turner · filed 1979-09-19

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which would support an inference that any of the defendants were acting under color of state law. Accordingly, plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983's state-action requirement is satisfied when a volunteer fire department is an agency of the state by virtue of its governmental fire-protection function and relationship to the town.

Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department · filed 1979-09-19

It is enough that by virtue of its function and its relationship to the Town, the MVFD is an agency of the state.

Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege a deprivation committed under color of state law, equivalent to Fourteenth Amendment state action.

Sellman v. Baruch College of the City University of New York · filed 1979-11-16

In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege a deprivation perpetrated “under color of state law.” This requirement is equivalent to the fourteenth amendment’s requirement of state action.

Section 1983 applies to conduct under color of state law, but does not apply to federal officers acting under color of federal law.

Campbell v. Amax Coal Company · filed 1979-12-17

In addition, we note that appellants' complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983, which statute does not apply to federal officers acting under color of federal law.

Section 1983 claims require a governmental actor; naming a municipal official and a municipality cured the complaint’s failure to identify one.

Fu v. Sullivan · filed 2020-08-05

Judge James further recommended that Fu’s complaint be dismissed with leave to amend because it failed to identify a governmental actor to support his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. After the case was reassigned, this Court adopted Judge James’s recommendation and dismissed with leave to amend. ECF No. 12. Fu’s amended complaint has cured this defect by naming a municipal official and a municipality as defendants.

Section 1983 requires an allegation that the defendants acted as governmental actors.

Trinwith, Jeffery v. Frazier, Susan · filed 2020-05-28

For example, Trinwith does not allege that any of the defendants are governmental actors, so he cannot bring claims against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor do his proposed claims implicate any provision of the United States Constitution or federal statute.

Section 1983 requires state action as a prerequisite to relief.

Lowell v. Wantz · filed 1980-01-08

Because the activities of The Academy do not constitute state action under any legally cognizable analysis, and because the statute under which Lowell claims entitlement to relief, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requires state action as a prerequisite to that relief, The Academy’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Section 1983 requires state action or conduct under color of state law for a plaintiff to state a claim.

Dunn v. Hackworth · filed 1980-02-08

Without a threshold showing of state action, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 requires state action before federal civil-rights liability can attach to harm attributable to a state official.

Bowers v. DeVito · filed 1980-03-18

Even in cases where under tort law a state actor “could be said either to have had a ‘duty’ to avoid harm to his victim or to have proximately caused her death,” liability under federal law cannot attach unless there is the requisite state action for the purposes of section 1983.

Section 1983 does not apply to actions taken under color of federal law rather than state law.

Townsend v. Carmel · filed 1980-03-18

The arrest was clearly made under the color of federal law, not state law. ... Plaintiff Townsend’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must therefore be dismissed.

Section 1983 claims are subject to the applicable state statute of limitations, require action under color of state law, and are not tolled by filing a Title VII charge.

Steward v. Norfolk, Franklin & Danville Railway Co. · filed 1980-03-19

It seems clear that if plaintiff had any cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, it is time-barred. ... No limit upon the time to bring an action for any wrong covered by that statute was provided by Congress and such “silence of Congress has been interpreted to mean that it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limitations.” ... Hence the two year statute governs this case. ... The language of the statute is plain that the alleged act or acts of discrimination must be “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. State action is therefore necessary, and plaintiff must allege and “show that the defendant acted ‘under color of law.’ ” ... Not only is there a failure to allege any state action, the record is clear that none is proven or even suggested. ... The mere filing of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, even when timely filed, does not toll the running of the statute for any cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

Section 1983 suits require the defendants' actions to be committed under color of state or territorial law.

Wells v. Philbrick · filed 1980-03-25

It is a vital element of § 1983 suits that the actions of the defendants be committed under color of the law of a “State or Territory.”

Section 1983's state-action requirement is satisfied when defendants act sufficiently under color of state law.

Nesmith v. Fulton · filed 1980-04-07

We find that the state action requirement for a § 1983 cause of action is met in this case.

Section 1983 requires state action sufficiently connected to the challenged conduct; federal-government involvement alone cannot establish § 1983 jurisdiction.

Stevens v. Braniff Airways, Inc. · filed 1980-05-14

Involvement of the federal government (or a federal agency such as the Federal Aviation Administration) cannot be a basis for state action and jurisdiction under § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). ... In addition to alleging state action in a § 1983 claim, plaintiff should plead facts sufficient to show the nature of the alleged involvement with the state, as well as the alleged nexus between this involvement and the defendant’s challenged acts or joint participation in the activity.

Section 1983 requires state action sufficient to support federal jurisdiction.

Weinfeld v. Buccaneer Broadcasting, Ltd. · filed 1980-05-19

The Court does not have jurisdiction under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because there is no allegation of racial prejudice against plaintiffs. It does not have jurisdiction under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there is no allegation of state action sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction nor does it state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 in that it fails to allege a conspiracy by Brownell to prevent officials from carrying out their duty or a conspiracy by Brownell to interfere with the judicial process, nor does it charge racially motivated conspiratorial action by Brownell within the meaning of § 1985(3).

Section 1983 requires both a deprivation of a federally secured right and action under color of state law; tribal officials' conduct was not state action merely because state law provided for their election and defined some powers.

Barnes v. White · filed 1980-07-16

A claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must embody two elements which are necessary for recovery. ... First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.” This second element requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant acted “under color of law.” ... However, assuming arguendo that plaintiffs’ claims satisfy the first element necessary under § 1983, their claim for relief under that section must still fall for failure to satisfy the second. ... Nor does the Indian Law provide a sufficient nexus for finding state action. While it is true that the defendants might not be Tribal officers but for the election provisions contained in the Indian Law, the actions complained of do not involve specific powers granted under that law.

Section 1983 has no amount-in-controversy requirement but applies only to conduct constituting state action.

Appling County v. Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia · filed 1980-07-23

There is no amount in controversy requirement under § 1983, but this statute restricts only “state action.”

Section 1983 requires state action, meaning the challenged conduct must have a sufficiently close nexus with the State to be fairly treated as state conduct.

INTERN. SOC. FOR KRISHNA, ETC. v. Barber · filed 1980-08-25

Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their First Amendment rights will be violated if their Sankirtan activities are confined to a booth. Before the Court addresses these alleged violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights, it must first consider whether the alleged actions of defendants amount to "state action", which is the jurisdictional prerequisite of Section 1983. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 453, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974), the Supreme Court held that for state action to exist there must be a "sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the [defendant] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." ... In the present case, neither party disputes the fact that as administrators of the New York State Fair, and responsible for the regulations in dispute, the actions of defendants demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus with the State of New York. ... In sum, the actions of these defendants in enacting and enforcing the booth rules are "state action" and therefore the Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs' constitutional claims which will now be addressed.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for constitutional violations committed under color of state law, and state action is a jurisdictional prerequisite.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber · filed 1980-08-25

Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their First Amendment rights will be violated if their Sankirtan activities are confined to a booth. Before the Court addresses these alleged violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, it must first consider whether the alleged actions of defendants amount to “state action”, which is the jurisdictional prerequisite of Section 1983. ... In the present case, neither party disputes the fact that as administrators of the New York State Fair, and responsible for the regulations in dispute, the actions of defendants demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus with the State of New York. The Division of the State Fair and the New York Industrial Exhibit Authority are both state agencies that exist at the pleasure of the State Legislature for purposes of operating the State Fair. The State provides these agencies and the Fair with its operating budget, fair grounds and buildings, and State Police patrols. In sum, the actions of these defendants in enacting and enforcing the booth rules are “state action” and therefore the Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ constitutional claims which will now be addressed.

Section 1983's state-action requirement is satisfied when an association's substantial participation by public schools supports treating its challenged conduct as state action.

Williams v. Hamilton · filed 1980-10-08

For this reason the Court finds and rules that plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of “state action” to allow this Court to exercise its jurisdiction over this matter.

Section 1983 requires state action, and allegations that defendants acted in concert with government officials suffice to plead that requirement at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Demp v. Emerson Enterprises · filed 1980-11-10

Such allegations suffice to meet the pleading requirements of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Should it subsequently appear that there was no state action, the § 1983 claim will be dismissed.

Section 1983 requires state action that infringes a right secured by the Constitution or federal law.

Blue v. University Interscholastic League · filed 1980-11-19

In order to sustain a claim of unconstitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must establish that state action has operated to infringe a right secured to them by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action only for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.

Whitten v. Petroleum Club of Lafayette · filed 1981-02-13

Since the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action, § 1983 only establishes a cause of action for deprivation under color of state law.

Section 1983 requires state action to support a civil-rights action.

Fike v. Gold Kist, Inc. · filed 1981-02-27

It is clear that no action has been stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor have any facts been shown the court which would establish “state action.” Consequently, the § 1983 aspect of the complaint is clearly to be dismissed.