28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.

Virts v. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2013-06-18(c)(2)

A corporation “shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). ... Venue is appropriate in the proposed District of New Jersey because Prudential “resides” there as a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Newark.

Under § 1391(b)(1), venue is improper in a district where a corporate defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction and therefore does not reside.

Foreign Candy Co. v. Tropical Paradise, Inc. · filed 2013-06-24(b)(1)

Here, I concluded, above, that Tropical Paradise is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this district, so that this district is not one in which Tropical Paradise “resides,” within the meaning of § 1391(c)(2). Thus, venue is not proper in this district under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(c) treats an entity as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for venue purposes.

Graphics Properties Holdings Inc. v. Asus Computer International, Inc. · filed 2013-06-28(c)

An entity resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.” 28 U.S,.C. § 1391(c). For this reason, both parties agree that the outcome of the venue issue should be the same as the outcome of the personal jurisdiction question. (D.I. 34 at 18) Having found that personal jurisdiction exists, the Court will deny ACI’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Aucoin v. the Prudential Insurance Company of America · filed 2013-08-14(c)(2)

Defendant Prudential “resides” there, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (defining corporate residency “[f]or all venue purposes” as where the corporation is subject to a court’s personal jurisdiction), and D.R. Horton can be “found” there, see Annual Report at 2 (listing New Jersey among the states where it conducts homebuilding operations).

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where a corporate defendant has waived its challenge to personal jurisdiction.

Colombo Candy & Tobacco Wholesale Co. v. Ameristar Casino Council Bluffs, Inc. · filed 2013-09-19(b)

Because Ameristar has waived its challenge to personal jurisdiction in the District of Nebraska, venue in this district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporation as residing in any judicial district whose court has personal jurisdiction over it in the action.

Sentry Select Insurance v. McCoy Corp. · filed 2013-09-30(c)(2)

As corporations, defendants are deemed residents of “any judicial district in which [they are] subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). In light of the court’s ruling above, both defendants are, therefore, residents of the Western District of Wisconsin for venue purposes, which means that venue is proper here under § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district only when it is subject to personal jurisdiction there for the action.

Ghaffari v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2013-11-19(c)(2)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), a corporate defendant is deemed to reside “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” ... Because Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant in the District of Columbia, see ECF No. 10 (return-of-service affidavit), Wells Fargo is not deemed to reside here in this case for venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing, for venue purposes, in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Symbolstix, LLC v. Smarty Ears, LLC · filed 2015-12-28(c)

“A corporation is deemed to reside in any district’in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.’” ... As explained above, Smarty Ears is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Ohio.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant resides, and treats the corporation as residing where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Federated Mutual Insurance Company v. Federated National Holding Company, Inc. · filed 2018-06-22(b)(1), (c)(2)

A corporate defendant is “deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). As already explained, Respondent is subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota and is therefore deemed to reside in Minnesota. As a result, venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1), and dismissal is not warranted.

Section 1391 treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, including when it waives an objection to that jurisdiction.

CONSOLIDATED PROPERTIES INC. v. THE SHERWIN WILLIAMS COMPANY · filed 2018-09-25(b)(1), (c)(2)

Where, as here, a defendant waives a challenge to personal jurisdiction, ... that defendant is subject to the courts personal jurisdiction. Konigsberg, 435 F.2d at 552. As Sherwin-Williams is subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction, it is deemed to reside in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Thus, venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(1).

A corporate defendant resides where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, so its principal place of business can establish proper venue under § 1391(b)(1).

Vitalife, Inc. v. Omniguide, Inc. · filed 2018-12-07(b)(1), (c)

"A civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). A corporate defendant, such as Omniguide, "shall be deemed to reside ... in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Because Omniguide maintains its principal place of business in Massachusetts, the District of Massachusetts is a proper venue.

Section 1391 treats a defendant as residing, for venue purposes, in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

American Dairy Queen Corporation v. W.B. Mason Co., Inc. · filed 2019-01-08(c)

For venue purposes, a defendant is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1392 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)). Here, the Court has found that W.B. Mason is subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota by maintaining its Minn. Stat. § 303 status with the Minnesota Secretary of State and registering an agent for service of process. Therefore, venue is proper.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction because its nerve center is there.

Sporn v. TransUnion Interactive, Inc. · filed 2019-01-10(c)(2)

Similarly, venue is proper in NDIL pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1391(cO(2), (d), and (e)(1)(A) because TUI’s “nerve center” is in Illinois.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant resides, and a corporate defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Nat'l Women's Political Caucus, Inc. v. Metropolitan Louisville Women's Political Caucus, Inc. · filed 2019-01-14(b)(1), (c)(2)

Venue is plainly proper under section 1391(b)(1) : MLWPC is a corporation, and a corporation is "deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question." § 1391(c)(2). Because the Court has already held that MLWPC is subject to personal jurisdiction in D.C., the District is also an appropriate venue.

Section 1391 treats a corporate defendant as residing wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction, making venue proper there when it is the sole defendant.

EVEREST INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY v. ENGLE MARTIN & ASSOCIATES, LLC · filed 2020-11-30(b)(1), (c)(2)

Having found that Engle Martin is subject to personal jurisdiction, the Court further finds that venue is proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(1).

A national banking association resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Healy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-12-03(c)

Further, because Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is a national banking association, (Doc. No. 1-2 ¶ 13), Defendant will be “deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question,” id. § 1391(c). ... Accordingly, had Plaintiff originally brought this lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia, Defendant could have successfully moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction and, consequently, improper venue.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant resides, including a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Twitter, Inc. v. Voip-Pal.com, Inc. · filed 2020-12-14(b)(1), (c)(2)

Under § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in any judicial district where a defendant resides. ... Under § 1391(c)(2), for purposes of venue, a corporate defendant “reside[s] ... in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” ... Because the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant in the instant cases, venue is also proper in this district.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Carroll v. Westfield National Insurance Company · filed 2022-06-22(c)

Because Westfield does business in the Southern District, venue would be proper as a matter of law if the case had been brought there.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Xinuos, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corporation · filed 2022-11-14(c)

Defendants IBM and Red Hat are both corporations, and thus, venue is proper in any place where the corporations are subject to personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where all defendants reside and treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Trims Unlimited LLC v. Protech Leaded Eyewear Inc. · filed 2023-04-03(b)(1), (c)(2)

Venue is proper in any judicial district where all defendants reside. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),(c)(2). A corporation is deemed to reside in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. Because the Court finds that Trims plausibly alleged a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction over Protech, venue is proper here.

Section 1391(c) deems a corporate defendant to reside in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Willis v. Vericel Corporation · filed 2023-04-14(c)

Because Vericel is subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction, it is deemed to reside in the Western District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Venue in this District is therefore proper, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss this case for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) must be DENIED.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporation resides in a district where its contacts would suffice for personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Murray v. United Electrical Contractors, Inc. · filed 2023-05-08(d)

The Court concludes that Defendant, as a Michigan corporation with sufficient contacts with the Eastern District, must be deemed to be a resident of both the Western District and Eastern District, such that § 1391(b)(1) and (2) are satisfied.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant resides, and treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

United States v. AZ Diabetic Supply, Inc. · filed 2023-05-25(b)(1), (c)(2)

Additionally, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because defendant AZ Diabetic is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; under § 1391(c)(2), a corporation resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Yeti Coolers, LLC v. Love Deals Inc. · filed 2023-07-24(b)(1), (c)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper “in a judicial district in which any defendant resides if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” And a corporation is deemed to reside “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas, making venue proper in this district.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; corporate residence depends on personal jurisdiction.

Multiscaff Limited v. Aptim Federal Services, LLC · filed 2023-08-09(b)(1)

Having already determined that the forum selection clause grants personal jurisdiction over APTIM, the Court similarly concludes that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Virginia because of the operation of the forum selection clause.

A corporation that consents to personal jurisdiction by registering to do business in Pennsylvania is a resident there for venue purposes.

ROBINSON v. HOME GOODS, INC. · filed 2023-08-22(c)(2)

Because the defendant corporations consented to jurisdiction when they registered to do business in Pennsylvania, they are deemed residents of Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for purposes of venue. Hence, venue in this district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).

Section 1391’s venue and corporate residency rules can make venue proper in the district where a corporate defendant is headquartered.

Polansky v. Forest River, Inc. · filed 2023-08-24(b), (c)(2), (d)

Second, venue is appropriate in the Northern District of Indiana because Forest River’s headquarters are located in Elkhart County, Indiana. (See Declaration of Dan Evans, ECF No. 42-2 at ⁋ 4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c)(2), and (d)).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

Mosure v. Southwest Airlines, Co. · filed 2023-09-22(c)(2)

Venue would also lie in that judicial district as it is where Southwest “resides[.]”

For venue purposes, a corporate defendant does not reside in a district of a state with multiple judicial districts unless its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Cabrera v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2023-09-26(b)(1)

The Court concludes that because the Northern District when analyzed as its own state could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Ford, Ford does not “reside” in the Northern District for purposes of § 1391(b)(1).

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, making venue proper there when it is the sole defendant.

ZANGARA v. NATIONAL BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS · filed 2023-10-06(b)(1), (c)(2)

Venue is also proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the transferee district. Venue properly lies in a “judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Defendant is a non-profit corporation—a corporate defendant “shall be deemed to reside. . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). In short, a corporate defendant’s residence for venue purposes is the same as its citizenship for personal jurisdiction purposes.

Section 1391 permits venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, and treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action.

INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTANTS, INC. v. MAESC CO., LIMITED · filed 2024-10-21(b)(1), (c)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in a judicial district “where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.” A corporation such as Defendant is “deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which [it] is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Because this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant with respect to the civil action in question, this Court finds that venue is also proper.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides, and subsection (c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Silver v. Capital One Services LLC · filed 2025-06-18(b)(1), (c)(2)

For a corporation, “residency” is defined as “any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). ... In light of Defendant being subject to personal jurisdiction in this District and not contesting venue, the Court will proceed to the merits.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant has its principal place of business and is subject to personal jurisdiction.

MATIAS v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC. · filed 2025-07-29(b), (c)(2)

Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois because Abbott has a principal place of business in Illinois and it is subject to personal jurisdiction there. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (c)(2).

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the defendant resides; a corporate defendant resides in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction.

QUALTRICS, LLC v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. · filed 2025-08-06(b)(1), (c)(2)

With its principal place of business in Philadelphia, Defendant has contacts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Therefore, Defendant resides in this district, so venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

A parent corporation may be treated as doing business in a district where its subsidiary operates when their separation is purely fictitious and their business functions are intertwined.

United States v. Buffalo Weaving and Belting Co. · filed 1956-05-24(c)

Three corporations, maintained on paper, disperse the financial responsibility without any functional division either of the financial or of the commercial aspects of the business. Under these circumstances, Merriam may be found to be doing business in New York, and service on its president in the Buffalo office may be sustained, without any violation either of the general rules of corporate presence or the requirements of due process of law.

Section 1391(a)'s venue protection is not waived merely because a non-resident motorist drives in a state that permits service through its secretary of state.

Olberding v. Illinois Central Railroad · filed 1953-11-09(a)

But to conclude from this holding that the motorist, who never consented to anything and whose consent is altogether immaterial, has actually agreed to be sued and has thus waived his federal venue rights is surely to move in the world of Alice in Wonderland. The fact that a non-resident motorist who comes into Kentucky can, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, be subjected to suit in the appropriate Kentucky state court has nothing whatever to do with his rights under 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (a).

Section 1391(a)'s venue protection is waived when a foreign corporation designates an in-state agent for service of process as a condition of doing business there.

Imus v. Hemingway Brothers Interstate Trucking Co. · filed 1954-02-24(a)

The Neirbo doctrine applies to the situation as to the corporate defendant before us. As a requirement of carrying on business activities here, defendant designated the Secretary of State its agent for service of process pursuant to the Connecticut statute. ... The motion to dismiss is therefore denied as to the corporation, granted as to the individual defendant.

Section 1391(a)'s venue defense in a diversity action may be waived when a defendant actually appoints an agent to accept service of process in the state.

Davis v. Smith · filed 1954-11-22(a)

Where, however, as here, a defendant performs the affirmative “act” and in fact actually appoints an agent to accept service of process, whether voluntarily or under the requirement of a local statute, under the Neirbo case such defendant has waived the personal defense of venue and is amenable to suit in the federal court in the state of appointment.

A corporation’s consent to suit in a limited part of a state waives its objection to federal venue only in the district covering that area.

Sunbury Wire Rope Manufacturing Co. v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1955-07-15(c)

It should be noted moreover that Roebling’s consent to be sued is even more limited than was the consent in the Bird case, since Roebling in obtaining a certificate of withdrawal in effect revoked its consent to be sued in the county where its registered office was located and restricted its consent to venue in the county (and federal district) in which the cause of action arose.

An objection to venue under § 1391 is waived when a defendant makes no formal objection and moves for summary judgment on the merits.

Prince Heyward v. Public Housing Administration · filed 1956-11-30

As to venue of the action we deem it sufficient to say that there appears in the record no formal objection to venue, and PHA by filing the motion for summary judgment and thus putting at issue the merits of the case effectively waived whatever objection to venue as it may have had.

A defendant waives an objection to venue under § 1391 by failing to raise it before answering a cross-claim on the merits.

W. A. Stackpole Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Malden Spinning & Dyeing Company, W. A. Stackpole Motor Transportation, In · filed 1958-12-26

Application of these rules disposes of the appellant’s contention of lack of venue, for it answered Graham’s first cross-claim for damage to his truck on the merits, and even requested trial by jury, without suggesting any impropriety with respect to venue.

Section 1391 permits dismissal for improper venue when defendants have not waived their venue rights.

National Union Fire Insurance v. Petro · filed 1960-12-12

Defendants Francis H. Rogers and John L. Harbolt, administrator of the estate of Edith Rogers, deceased, have not waived their federal venue rights under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and therefore the plaintiff insurance company’s action as to said Francis H. Rogers and the action as to John L. Harbolt, administrator of the estate of Edith Rogers, deceased, should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction by lack of proper venue.

Section 1391(c) permits a party to waive an objection to venue; a plaintiff who chooses the district and waits until trial to object to a counterclaim waives that objection.

Reliance Molded Plastics, Inc. v. Jiffy Products · filed 1963-04-01(c)

The motion during trial to dismiss the counterclaim for impropriety of venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), was properly denied. ... Plaintiff chose to initiate its lawsuit in this District, and by so doing has waived its right to assert improper venue against defendant’s counterclaim filed pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 13(a).

Doing business in a state does not waive the venue privilege under § 1391(c) for a claim outside the reach of that state's service rule.

Locke Manufacturing Co. v. Sabel · filed 1965-06-11(c)

Thus, since under Neirbo the waiver occurs only to the extent that the service statute allows service of process, (See 1 Moore’s Federal Practice 1916, Venue, The Neir-bo Rule, Section 0.146 [7].), and since the Kentucky rule allows service on the agents of nonresidents doing business within the State only where the claim arises out of that business, (See Rule 4.04(8) of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.), and since in the present case plaintiff’s cause of action for patent invalidity did not arise out of any business done here, it must be concluded that the venue provision of Title 28, U.S.C. § 1391(c) has not been waived and plaintiff’s second cause of action must be dismissed.

Section 1391's venue requirements protect litigants' convenience and can be waived by a defendant who fails to object timely.

Concession Consultants, Inc. v. Mirisch · filed 1966-01-21

The standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964 ed.) are "not a qualification upon the power of the court to adjudicate, but a limitation designed for the convenience of litigants, and, as such may be waived by them."

A corporation may waive Section 1391(c)'s venue requirements by consenting to service through a state official, even when the claim arose outside the state.

Herpst v. S. B. I. Liquidating Corp. · filed 1968-02-07(c)

Relying upon the precedents of Anderson and Carlisle, supra, we must conclude that the venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 has been effectively waived under the circumstances herein presented.

An objection to improper venue under § 1391 is personal and is waived when a party fails to raise it in its answer.

St. Hilaire v. Shapiro · filed 1976-01-26

The defendants, and third-party plaintiff did not interpose in their answer any objection to venue, nor did they have to change venue. They simply joined in the motion by the third-party defendant to transfer the action to the Northern District of New York. This they may not do, and the privilege to object to improper venue being personal was waived by the defendants and third-party plaintiff.

A Rule 12 motion does not waive a potential right under § 1391(e) when venue was proper at the time of filing.

Texaco, Inc. v. Department of Energy · filed 1980-05-06(e)

When the DOE filed this Rule 12 motion, venue was appropriate because of the presence of Texaco. Accordingly, that filing did not waive any right the DOE may have under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

An objection to venue under § 1391(f) is waived if it is not raised in the district court.

Harris Corporation v. National Iranian Radio and Television and Bank Melli Iran, Defendants · filed 1982-11-22(f)

The parties agree that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) controls the question of venue since Harris seeks to invoke jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA” or “Act”). ... Since the propriety of venue was never questioned before the district court, the appellants have waived any right to raise the issue on appeal.

Section 1391 gives a party a waivable privilege to object to improper venue.

South Seas Catamaran, Inc. v. Motor Vessel "Leeway" · filed 1988-05-04(a)

The policy underlying Rule 12(h) stems from the judicially recognized principle that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 vests a defendant with a privilege, rather than a right, to attack a claim on the grounds of improper venue, and privileges, unlike inalienable rights, can be lost if not asserted in a timely fashion. ... At bar, plaintiff never filed a preliminary 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss nor did it raise the defense of improper venue in its answer to defendant’s counterclaim (filed with this court on September 14, 1987) and, thus, has waived its right to assert it at this late juncture.

A defendant’s waiver of objections to personal jurisdiction can support a finding of proper venue under § 1391(b).

Zumbro, Inc. v. California Natural Products · filed 1994-08-08(b)

Given that Imagine has waived any objections to this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, Dakota Sportswear supports the conclusion that this forum is also a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

An objection to venue under § 1391(f) is waived when a defendant could have raised it in the first motion to dismiss but did not.

RSM PRODUCTION CORP. v. Fridman · filed 2009-02-19(f)

The alternative argument, improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f), could, and should, have been raised as part of the initial Motion to Dismiss.

Section 1391(b)’s venue requirements may be waived through a contractual consent-to-venue clause.

Big O Tires, LLC v. Felix Bros., Inc. · filed 2010-07-12(b)

The general venue statute, § 1391, indicates where venue is proper. ... Such a waiver precludes defendants from now arguing that venue is improper.

An intervenor who voluntarily enters a case cannot object to venue, and the court will not dismiss for improper venue if the original defendants do not object, even if § 1391(e)(2) is unsatisfied.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, & Enforcement · filed 2011-05-23(e)(2)

The intervenors are not entitled to challenge venue, and the Federal Defendants (who would have been so entitled) have elected not to do so by not objecting to the venue of this District Court. Therefore, Rule 12(b)(3) dismissal is not appropriate here, regardless of whether § 1391(e)(2) is satisfied.

Section 1391 governs whether venue is proper; a party that expressly consents to venue in a forum cannot plausibly challenge venue there as improper.

Continental Motors, Inc. v. Jewell Aircraft, Inc. · filed 2012-07-31

The first, whether venue is proper, is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and cannot seriously be challenged here. After all, JA signed the Agreement, expressly consenting to venue in Alabama.

Venue under § 1391 may be waived when defendants do not challenge the plaintiff’s chosen district.

Gill v. Department of Justice · filed 2016-07-22

Defendants raise no issues with Plaintiff’s claim of venue. This Court holds that venue has been waived and the case remains in the District of Columbia.

A defendant may waive an objection to venue under § 1391(b) by consenting to a forum selection clause, even when none of the section’s venue categories is satisfied.

Montrose Environmental Group, Inc. v. Yeddula · filed 2020-07-28(b)

This court agrees with Howmedica’s well-reasoned analysis and finds “[v]enue may be proper . . . if a party has consented to suit in a particular district, thus having waived any right to challenge venue.”

Section 1391(b)'s venue requirements can be waived through a forum selection clause, allowing an action to proceed where statutory venue would otherwise be improper.

Vound Colorado, Ltd. v. E-Hounds, Inc. · filed 2022-03-08(b)

Because Defendant allegedly waived its objection to venue, the action may proceed in this district “even though venue would not otherwise be proper under section 1391.”

A defendant may waive an objection to venue under § 1391(b) through a valid forum selection clause.

ELEVANCE HEALTH, INC. v. MOHAN · filed 2023-09-15(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in any judicial district: (1) where any defendant resides; (2) in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) if no district in which an action may be brought under this section, where any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction. Despite this general rule, a potential defendant nonetheless may waive venue objections by contractual consent, such as through a forum selection clause. ... Accordingly, Ms. Mohan has waived any objection to improper venue.

Section 1391(b) does not require an independent showing of proper venue when the defendant has agreed to the forum and waived its venue objection.

Chalmers v. DSSV, Inc. · filed 2023-09-22(b)

Having specifically contracted for venue in California in its Agreement with Plaintiff, Defendant has waived its right to argue that venue in this district is improper. See id. And having found that Defendant waived objections to litigating in this district, this Court need not find that venue is independently proper under the federal venue statutes. See id. (observing that were it otherwise, “a forum selection clause would never be valid unless, by chance, the venue specified in the clause happened to satisfy § 1391(b), in which case the forum selection clause would have been completely unnecessary”) (citations and quotations omitted).

Section 1391(b) requires a suit against a federal official acting in an official capacity on a national level to be brought in the district of the official's official residence.

Fischler v. McCarthy · filed 1954-01-06(b)

Accordingly the general venue provisions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) apply and it follows that the action must be brought in the district where the defendant resides. Since this action is now one solely against a federal official, acting in his official capacity on a national level, the proper venue lies in the district of official residence of the Senator, i. e. the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(b) governs whether venue is proper in the district court.

Fischler v. Mccarthy · filed 1954-12-20(b)

The dismissal is affirmed for lack of venue in the district court. See 28 U. S.C. § 1391(b); Butterworth v. Hill, 114 U.S. 128, 5 S.Ct. 796, 29 L.Ed. 119; and the opinion of Judge Kaufman below as reported in D.C.S.D.N.Y., 117 F. Supp. 643, at pages 646-647.

Section 1391(e) permits a suit against a federal officer to be brought in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides.

Seebach v. Cullen · filed 1963-11-01(e)

Such a suit may be brought in the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e).

Section 1391(e) governs venue but does not expand the substantive coverage of the Civil Rights Act.

Virgil Norton, Virgil Wesley and James Chapman v. McShane · filed 1964-07-15(e)

The new venue section, 28 U.S.C. 1391(e), certainly does not expand the scope of coverage of 42 U.S.C. 1938.

Section 1391 permits venue where the initial agency action was taken.

Rechany v. Roland · filed 1964-10-12

Venue properly lies here where the initial action was taken under 28 U.S.C. §’1391 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. IV, 1962).

Section 1391(e) permits an agency head to be sued where the real property involved in the action is situated.

Dredge Corp. v. Penny · filed 1964-11-13(e)

But, with the enactment of 76 Stat. 744, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1962), the agency head in a suit such as this can be sued where the real property involved in the action is situated. It follows that a holding against indispensability no longer serves the purpose of avoiding hardships of the kind referred to above. In this case, after remand and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), the corporation will have an opportunity, without destroying venue, to join the Secretary as a party defendant in each suit.

Section 1391(e) does not provide venue when another statute specifies venue for the action or when the defendants are sued personally rather than in their official capacities.

Paley v. Wolk · filed 1965-12-29(e)

While the plaintiff has apparently proceeded in this court on the basis of the liberal venue provisions of 28 U.S. C. § 1391(e), that provision is inapplicable where the venue for a particular action is specified by statute. ... Under such circumstances, plaintiff cannot avail himself of the liberal venue provisions of § 1391(e), since the action would be against the defendants personally rather than in their official capacities.

Section 1391(e) permits a suit against federal officials in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides.

Young v. Director, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Vito. J. Rossello v. United States Board of Parole · filed 1966-11-08(e)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) now permits suit against government officials in the judicial district of plaintiff’s residence.

Section 1391(d) permits an alien defendant to be sued in any district, including in a patent infringement action.

Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Molins Organizations, Ltd. · filed 1966-12-06(d)

The court concludes that venue in the Eastern District of Virginia is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), which allows an alien to be sued in any district.

Section 1391(e) permits suit against federal officials in districts beyond the District of Columbia and allows service by certified mail beyond the district, but the officials must still be served.

Bell v. Groak · filed 1966-12-08(e)

Congress has since extended the venue provisions so that suit may be brought in other districts. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). This section also provides for service “ * * * by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.” Thus, it is clear that the requirement of service upon the individual Commissioners is still essential, and that the amendment of the complaint to name them as defendants was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b) places venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose; state supreme court justices have their official residence where they perform their duties.

O'neill v. Battisti · filed 1973-05-07(b)

It is clear that venue does not lie in the Northern District of Ohio in the action filed there by Judge Heitzler against the Justices of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391 (b), a civil action must be brought in the judicial district where all the defendants reside or where the claim arose. The official residence of the Supreme Court of Ohio is in the place where it performs its official duties, that is, Columbus, the State Capital and the seat of State Government. Under Ohio law, regular sessions of the Supreme Court are held only in Columbus. See O.R.C. Sec. 2503.33. Columbus is in the Southern District of Ohio.

Section 1391(e) permits a civil action against federal officials or agencies in a district where a defendant resides, the cause of action arose, real property is situated, or the plaintiff resides when no real property is involved.

Hartke v. Federal Aviation Administration · filed 1973-11-02(e)

The plaintiff does not allege that he resides in the Eastern District of New York. Since the complaint states that plaintiff was stopped while boarding an Allegheny Airlines flight in Evansville, Indiana, it appears that the cause of action did not arise in the Eastern District of New York. No real property is involved in this action. Thus, venue is proper in this district only if the individual defendant, John H. Shaffer, sued in his capacity as Administrator of the FAA, resides in this district. ... The residence of a public official sued in his official capacity is his official residence; that is, the place where his office is maintained. ... In the instant case, the residence of the Administrator of the FAA is in the District of Columbia. Venue in this district is, therefore, improper.

Under § 1391(e), official residence controls venue for federal officials sued individually over acts committed under color of legal authority.

Misko v. United States · filed 1978-01-09(e)

With regard to the venue objection which has been timely raised, the Court holds that the official residence of the federal defendants must control. Although this issue was not addressed directly by the Court of Appeals in Briggs, it is a fair implication from the court’s opinion that official residence is the relevant inquiry under section 1391(e) when officials are sued, as here, in their individual capacity for acts committed under color of legal authority.

Section 1391(e) treats a federal officer’s residence for venue purposes as the place where the officer performs official duties.

Archuleta v. Sullivan · filed 1989-11-21(e)

However, where a plaintiff files a civil action against a defendant who is an officer or employee of the United States, or any agency thereof, acting in his official capacity, this circuit has held that under § 1391(e) the place where the defendant resides is not the defendant’s personal residence but his official residence, i.e., where his official duties are performed. ... The Defendant in this action is the agency “head,” the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, who maintains his office in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, venue is proper in this matter as to Plaintiffs age discrimination claim.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue where a federal officer performs a significant amount of official duties, even if the officer also works in another district.

Bartman v. Cheney · filed 1993-04-21(e)(1)

When an officer or agency head performs a “significant amount” of his or her official duties in the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia is a proper place for venue. ... There is no doubt that, while the Secretary of Defense may perform much of his work at the Pentagon, located in Virginia, he also performs a significant amount of his official duties in the District of Columbia. Venue therefore is proper in this Court.

Under § 1391(e), a federal officer or agency may reside in more than one district for venue if it performs a significant amount of official duties there.

Smith v. Dalton · filed 1996-05-28(e)

However, officers and agencies of the United States can have more than one residence which would allow venue to be proper in more than one jurisdiction.

Section 1391(e) permits venue for a claim against a federal department head in districts where the official conducts his duties.

Chin-Young v. Mattis · filed 2019-09-06(e)

Under that statute, venue is proper, among other places, “[where] a defendant in the action resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). The head of a federal department or agency “‘resides’ where he conducts his official duties.” Webster v. Mattis, 279 F. Supp. 3d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2017). The Secretary of Defense “performs a significant [portion] of his official duties in both Washington, D.C. and at the Pentagon in Virginia.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, venue for Plaintiff’s ADEA claim is proper in both the District of Columbia and the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue in a district where a federal officer performs significant official duties and therefore resides.

McGrone v. Austin III · filed 2022-03-25(e)(1)

The same is true for the ADEA claims, as the Secretary “resides” for § 1391(e)(1) purposes both in the District of Columbia and the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 1391(e)(1)(A) permits venue for an official-capacity claim against a federal officer where the officer or agency has its official residence.

Nader v. Secretary of the Air Force · filed 2022-12-23(e)(1)(A)

The Court concludes that the Secretary of the Air Force does not reside in the District of Columbia. Under § 1391(e)(1)(A), “[t]he residence of an official defendant is determined on the basis of the official residence of the federal officer or agency.”

For venue under § 1391(e)(1)(A), a federal officer sued in an official capacity resides where the officer's agency is located.

Rugila v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-04-02(e)(1)(A)

Under established caselaw, where, as here, an action is brought against a federal officer in his or her official capacity, the officer's residency is the place in which the federal agency is located.

Section 1391(a) permits alien plaintiffs in a diversity action to sue in the district where the claim arose, even though they have no residence for venue purposes.

Acosta v. Grammer · filed 1975-10-20(a)

The Court notes that the decisions cited by the defendants all deal with § 1391(a) prior to the 1966 amendment to that statute which added the provision that venue in a diversity case might also lie in the district "in which the claim arose". ... An examination of the statutory language of § 1391(a) clearly indicates that the present lawsuit is possessed of proper venue.

Section 1391(e) does not require every plaintiff suing a federal agency to independently establish venue; one plaintiff’s residence in the district is sufficient.

Exxon Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission · filed 1978-12-07(e)

Thus, we are not bound by Abbott to construe 1391(e) as requiring that every plaintiff must independently meet that section's test. Instead we hold that venue is proper for this action because at least one plaintiff did reside in Delaware.

Section 1391(a) permits an alien plaintiff in a diversity suit to bring the action where the defendant resides or where the claim arose.

Fleifel v. Vessa · filed 1980-11-20(a)

This court holds that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), as amended, provides the alien plaintiff in this diversity suit with the choice of venue in the district in which the defendant resides or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391(a) does not limit a corporate plaintiff's choice of venue to its state of incorporation.

International Investment & Equine Consultants, Inc. v. Jebrock · filed 1983-10-25(a)

The suit was brought in the Western District of Pennsylvania by a Delaware Corporation having its principal office in the Western District of Pennsylvania. ... We find that venue was proper in this District and no sufficient showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) that the convenience of the parties and the witnesses compel the transfer of this case to Florida.

Section 1391(c)(1) treats a natural person as residing in the district where the person is domiciled; an H-1B applicant living abroad is not domiciled in a district merely because she has a lease and prospective employment there.

Fang v. Rubio · filed 2025-09-29(c)(1)

Accordingly, the amended 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) (“For all venue purposes . . . a natural person, including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled”) does not make her a resident of this District.

Under § 1391(a), a partnership with an office in a district resides there for venue purposes in a diversity action.

B AND B ASSOCIATES v. Fonner · filed 1988-11-29(a)

Here, plaintiff is a New York partnership having its office in this district and therefore resides in this district for venue purposes.

For diversity venue under § 1391(a), a joint venture may be treated as an entity distinct from its venturers and as residing where it has its principal place of business.

Reading Metal Craft Co. v. Hopf Drive Associates · filed 1988-07-27(a)

To effectuate that purpose, the joint venture placed its principal place of business in Rockland County, New York. It would appear reasonable, then, to regard the joint venture as a jural entity distinct from its individual joint venture partners and to place venue in the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(e)(4) permits venue in a district where a sufficient percentage of an unincorporated union plaintiff’s members reside.

Columbia Power Trades Council v. United States Department of Energy · filed 1980-09-23(e)(4)

In this case, a sufficient percentage of plaintiff’s members reside in the Western District of Washington to warrant a finding of proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4).

Section 1391 treats an unincorporated association as resident in a district where it does business for venue purposes.

Portsmouth Baseball Corporation v. Frick · filed 1955-06-22(c)

My own conclusion is thus that, just as corporations may now be sued and are resident in a district if they are doing business there, so this unincorporated association may be sued and is resident in this district if it is doing business here.

An unincorporated association resides for venue purposes in any district where it does business.

American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International · filed 1958-12-12(b)

Thus, when Section 1391 was enacted in 1948 and changed the venue requirement from “inhabitant” to “resident” it was already the law as laid down by Judge Hand that an unincorporated association should, be treated for venue purposes in the same manner as a corporation. ... The cases following Graham have in my view perpetuated this error and I am in accord with the Portsmouth case. ... I therefore hold that venue against the defendant Union is properly laid in this district and its motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue is denied.

Section 1391(b) does not limit venue against unincorporated associations to the districts where their principal offices are located.

Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers · filed 1962-02-02(b)

...venue may be laid against them under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) only in the judicial district where they all “reside”, and that the place of such residence is the place where their principal office and place of business is located, which is concededly in Cleveland, Ohio, and Buffalo, New York. This court overruled defendants’ contention in this regard, citing American Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilot’s Ass’n., Inc., 169 F.Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y.1958).

Section 1391(b) treats an unincorporated association as residing in every judicial district where it does business.

Rutland Railway Corporation v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers · filed 1962-06-18(b)

But we do not find any manifestation here of a congressional policy of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and so we follow the reasoning in Sperry Prods. and assimilate the residence of unincorporated associations under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) to that of corporations, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Since the residence of a corporation for venue purposes has been expanded to include all the judicial districts in which the corporation is doing business, the residence of an unincorporated association for venue purposes should likewise be expanded to include all the judicial districts in which the unincorporated entity is doing business.

Section 1391(b) permits suit against an unincorporated association wherever it does business.

Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen · filed 1967-06-05(b)

We think it most nearly approximates the intent of Congress to recognize the reality of the multi-state, unincorporated association such as a labor union and to permit suit against that entity, like the analogous corporate entity, wherever it is “doing business.”

Under § 1391(e)(4), an unincorporated association must conduct activities or have an office or agent in a district to reside there for venue; merely having members there is insufficient.

Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Conover · filed 1984-10-02(e)(4)

In order to be “doing business” in a district for venue under Section 1391(e)(4), an unincorporated association must conduct some activities or have an office or agent within the district. In other words, something more than merely having members present in the district is required for an unincorporated association’s residence under Section 1391(e)(4).

Under the 1988 version of § 1391(c), a partnership is treated like a corporation for venue purposes and resides in a district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Injection Research Specialists v. Polaris Industries, L.P. · filed 1991-03-29(c)

Thus it is evident that the propriety of venue in suits involving defendant partnerships must be assessed under corporate venue standards. ... I conclude that the first test for venue under § 1400(b) with respect to a partnership defendant is whether it was subject to personal jurisdiction in the district of suit at the time the action was commenced.

Section 1391(c) treats a limited liability company as a corporation for venue purposes.

Pippett v. Waterford Development, LLC · filed 2001-07-30(c)

Waterford is a limited liability company, an unincorporated association similar to a partnership, limited partnership, or a labor union. An unincorporated association has no citizenship independent of its members for determining jurisdiction, but for determining venue it is treated as a corporation.

Section 1391(c)'s corporate residence rule extends to a partnership with three corporate-entity partners, making venue proper in a district where the partnership is subject to personal jurisdiction.

MacCallum v. New York Yankees Partnership · filed 2005-06-24(c)

Following this precedent, I conclude that section 1391(c) should be construed to include partnerships, at least under the circumstances of this ease, where three of the partnership’s four partners are corporate entities themselves.

Section 1391(d)’s district-specific contacts rule applies to corporations, while an unincorporated entity’s residence depends on personal jurisdiction over it in the action.

Reynolds v. Air Line Pilots Association, International · filed 2025-03-31(d)

The contact in this specific district, however, is only controlling for corporations. ... ALPA is an unincorporated entity with residency “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” (ECF No. 28 ¶ 26).

Section 1391(b) governs venue in non-diversity federal cases and identifies the districts where suit may be brought.

Stern v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2007-10-15(b)

When federal jurisdiction is not premised solely on diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) controls venue, establishing that venue is proper in: ... The Bureau is correct, however, in asserting that venue would be proper in the Southern District of Georgia.

Section 1391(b) allows venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose when jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship.

Lipshie v. AM Cable TV Industries, Inc. (In Re Geauga Trenching Corp.) · filed 1990-02-21(b)

Section 1391(b) provides a choice of venue that is either the place where all the defendants reside or where the claim arose. ... In the exercise of the discretion granted to us only under § 1391(b), we will order this adversary proceeding transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a civil action not founded solely on diversity only where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Nation v. United States Government · filed 1981-03-25(b)

Otherwise, the statute governing venue in a civil action where “jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship” is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Said statute provides for venue “only in the judicial district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose.” Therefore, as to all Defendants, and particularly the Defendant Sheriff of Marion County (assuming that the Defendant Hall and United States Government are dismissed because no claim is stated against them), venue is not proper in Dayton.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where all defendants reside.

Stark Carpet Corporation v. M-Geough Robinson, Inc. · filed 1980-01-17(b), (c)

This lawsuit could have been brought in the District of Massachusetts because all the defendants reside there.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the district where a plaintiff corporation is incorporated and resides.

Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission · filed 1979-07-30(e)

Venue is properly laid in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because plaintiff Standard Oil Company is incorporated and resides in the State of Indiana.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside.

United States v. State of Mich. · filed 1979-05-07(b)

Venue is properly laid in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that all defendants reside within the Western District of Michigan.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside.

United States v. Michigan · filed 1979-05-07(b)

(5) Venue is properly laid in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that all defendants reside within the Western District of Michigan.

Section 1391(b) permits a federal common law nuisance action against a municipal corporation in the district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, regardless of state venue rules.

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1979-04-26(b)

... that an action against a municipal corporation and based on the federal common law of nuisance may be filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), in either the district where all the defendants reside or the district where the claim arose, without regard to any otherwise applicable state venue statutes or common law rules.

Section 1391 supports a venue defense when the defendant neither resides nor is physically present in the district.

Moyer v. Brownell · filed 1956-01-05

The third defense is valid since Herbert Brownell is neither a resident of nor physically present within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 can bar venue for a common-law claim against a nonresident defendant even when related federal securities claims may proceed in the district.

Holdings v. Bellanca Corp. · filed 1958-06-12

Venue for the second cause of action against Albert may not be laid in this district (28 U.S.C. § 1391). That cause of action should be dismissed as to him.

Section 1391(b) ties venue to where defendants reside; residence generally means an actual place of abode rather than domicile based on intent.

Stacher v. United States · filed 1958-07-15(b)

We accept appellant’s position that there is an essential difference between “domicile” which generally involves intent, and “residence” which generally involves an actual place of abode.

Section 1391(a) required a Delaware resident defendant for venue in this diversity action, and working in Delaware did not make McBride a Delaware resident.

Underwood v. McBride · filed 1960-03-28(a)

It is my conclusion that McBride is not a resident of Delaware within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and, further, there being no diversity of citizenship, defendant’s motion will be granted.

Section 1391(b)’s defendant-residence venue rule yields when another law provides a special venue rule.

Roumell v. Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen Local No. 46 · filed 1961-10-19(b)

The language “within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred” amounts to a special venue provision, and so is an exception to the general venue statute, 28 U.S. C. § 1391(b), which lays venue at the defendant’s residence “except as otherwise provided by law.”

Section 1391 supplies the general venue rules for a Miller Act bond suit when the Act’s performance-district limit does not apply.

United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company · filed 1962-01-11

With jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1352, the general venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1391) would be applicable.

Section 1391(b)’s general venue rule yields when a federal statute provides a specific venue rule.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Briggs · filed 1964-10-19(b)

Whenever there is a specific venue provision in a federal statute, that provision controls to the exclusion of the general provisions of § 1391.

Section 1391 does not determine venue for claims governed by the securities Acts’ special venue provisions.

Zorn v. Anderson · filed 1966-12-05

Venue is determined not by reference to the general venue provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, but to the special venue provisions of the aforementioned Acts.

Section 1391 makes defendants’ residence the principal venue consideration when jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship.

Cole v. Trustees of Columbia University · filed 1969-06-04

Even assuming jurisdiction over this matter, however, the action is properly brought in the District of Columbia. It is established that in cases where jurisdiction is not solely founded on diversity of citizenship, the defendants’ residence is the principal consideration for the purposes of venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp.1969).

Section 1391(c) permits venue against corporate purchasers in a district where venue is proper over them.

Elgin A. McKenna as of the Estate of Patrick A. McKenna Deceased v. Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior · filed 1969-07-10(c)

Venue as to the purchasers would clearly be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1964), and perhaps even under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) (1964), and the purchasers would certainly have no standing to raise a venue objection as to the Government officials.

Section 1391 permits a corporation to be sued in any district where it does business.

Minnesota Automotive, Inc. v. Stromberg Hydraulic Brake & Coupling Co. · filed 1970-02-02(c)

In resolving this issue it is important to note that the applicable standard is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and not at 28 U.S.C. § 1400. ... In light of all the facts presented to this Court, the Court finds that the defendant was "doing business" in Minnesota.

Section 1391(b) permits a nondiversity civil action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, subject to statutory exceptions.

International Business Coordinators, Inc. v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. · filed 1969-10-30(b)

It appears from the complaint that plaintiff and at least one defendant (Miller Advertising, Inc.) are both New York corporations. Thus, all defendants do not reside in New York. Venue, therefore, does not lie in this district under the general venue statute. ... Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides: ... “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside or where the cause of action arose.

Keadle v. Benedict · filed 1970-11-24(b)

This Court agrees with defendants Benedict and Martin that venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is inappropriate, and notes, in addition to their allegations, that venue is improper for this Court even under the amended version of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970) since the cause of action here arose in Franklin County, also in the Middle District.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a federal question action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Schacht v. Javits · filed 1971-09-17(b)

With respect to jurisdiction based on a Federal question, venue surely could not be laid in the District Court in California for all the defendants do not reside there, nor did the claim arise there (ibid).

Section 1391(e) does not allow a federal court to extend its jurisdiction to a local federal agency outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.

Powers v. John N. Mitchell, as Attorney General of the United States · filed 1972-06-30(e)

Second, venue was improper because 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which extends federal jurisdiction to “agencies,” does not allow a federal court to extend its jurisdiction to a local federal agency such as a selective service board which is not within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b) allows a civil action to be brought where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Jones v. Bales · filed 1972-07-13(b)

Regarding this action as one pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court is faced in limine with venue issues. There is no special venue statute for civil rights actions. 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.144 [17] at 1680 (1964). Thus, the general venue statute 28 U.S. C. § 1391 (1972 Supp.) controls. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” Since all the defendants here do not reside in this district, the action must be brought where the claim arose.

Section 1391(b) requires venue to be established independently as to each defendant.

JWT, INCORPORATED v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. · filed 1972-09-14(b)

J.W.T. does not predicate venue on the venue provision of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, but rather upon the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... However, that ease does not help plaintiff; it holds that venue as to each defendant must be established independently. ... J.W.T. has made no such showing. The complaint alleges concerted action among the suppliers and distributors, but it alleges no acts or courses of conduct by the individual defendants in this district. Therefore, the complaint must be dismissed as to them.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside.

United States v. Washington · filed 1974-02-12(b)

Venue is properly laid in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that all Defendants reside within the Western District of Washington.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue where a defendant in the action resides.

Briggs v. Goodwin · filed 1974-11-20(e)(1)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e)(1) provides that proper venue lies where a Defendant in the action resides. Since Defendant Goodwin’s Motion to Dismiss has been denied, and he remains in this action, the Court finds venue proper in this District.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue for a civil rights action in a district where none of the alleged acts occurred and none of the alleged perpetrators reside.

Jaynes v. Manly W. Jaynes, Jr. · filed 1974-04-22(b)

The district court treated the case as primarily a civil rights case and dismissed it on the ground of improper venue, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) & 1406(a). It did so correctly, since none of the acts alleged to have deprived appellant of her civil rights took place in the Northern District of New York, and none of the alleged perpetrators reside in the Northern District of New York.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for a civil rights action not founded solely on diversity: the action may be brought where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, unless another law provides otherwise.

D'AMICO v. Treat · filed 1974-07-10(b)

There is no applicable law with regard to venue under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 which would exempt this case from the general provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... It is clear from the relevant pleadings that the defendant is domiciled and resides in the State of California and that the alleged claim arose in California where the defendant allegedly performed his wrongful acts and where the plaintiff applied for employment. It is clear that in this action the Federal District Court in the Northern District of Illinois is not the proper' forum for the purposes of venue.

Section 1391(b)'s residence-based venue option requires all defendants to reside in the district.

Sinwell, William v. Governor Milton Shapp, Governor of Pennsylvania · filed 1976-05-25(b)

The district court therefore properly referred to the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... In the present case, defendants (various prison officials and other state government officers) do not all reside in the Middle District, and the district judge correctly rejected possibility 1).

Section 1391 makes venue improper in a district where the defendant does not reside and none of the alleged acts occurred.

Lowery v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Bill Shaw, and Clarence Jones · filed 1976-06-11

W. J. Estelle, Jr. is not a resident of the Northern District of Texas and none of the acts complained of occurred within this district. If an action is to be maintained against Mr. Estelle it must be filed by plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas or in such other district which may be appropriate. ... These findings and conclusions are not in error, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to dismiss the action for lack of venue. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391,1406.

Section 1391(b) limits venue in a nondiversity civil action to a district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Buhl v. Jeffes · filed 1977-08-16(b)

Because the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 would require separate suits to be maintained in this case since Defendant Jeffes is a resident of the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the claim apparently has arisen in this district, § 1392(a) is applicable.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a federal-question action only where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Birnbaum v. Blum · filed 1982-09-20(b)

However, these arguments are no substitute for the law’s clear mandate that the action may only be tried in the district “where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) permits venue over alleged co-conspirators in a district where acts in furtherance of the conspiracy allegedly occurred.

McLaughlin v. Bradlee · filed 1984-12-21(b)

The plaintiff alleges that at least some of the conspirators furthered the conspiracy by taking actions within the District of Columbia. (Complaint ¶ 40). Accordingly, venue is established as to all co-conspirators in this district.