28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action to be brought in a district where all defendants reside.

Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Woehling · filed 1987-06-09(a)

Actions founded upon diversity jurisdiction may be brought in any district where all of the plaintiffs or all of the defendants reside, or where the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1976). Woehling, the only defendant, resides in New Jersey. (D.I. 9 at 111.) Thus the action might have been brought originally in the District of New Jersey.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a nondiversity civil action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1987-10-02(b)

Venue was improper in Maryland on the basis of the residency of the defendants because all of the defendants did not reside there. ... Venue in Maryland also could not be based on the locus of the plaintiffs’ claim because the alleged misrepresentations and breaches occurred in Virginia.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a nondiversity action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Assn. · filed 1987-11-06(b)

Plaintiffs originally filed this action in Maryland, basing their choice of venue on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(b), which provides that a civil action not founded on diversity of citizenship must be brought in the judicial district where all the defendants reside or in the judicial district in which the claim arose. ... Venue was improper in Maryland on the basis of the residency of the defendants because all of the defendants did not reside there. ... Venue in Maryland also could not be based on the locus of the plaintiffs' claim because the alleged misrepresentations and breaches occurred in Virginia.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a federal RICO claim in the district where the claim arose because RICO’s venue provision is not exclusive.

North Carolina v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc. · filed 1988-02-26(b)

The venue provisions of RICO are permissive, and by their terms are not to be exclusive. Hence, the court may look to § 1965(a) or to the standard venue provisions contained in 28 U.S. C. § 1391(b). ... In the present case the claim arose in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Venue is proper in this court.

For actions not based solely on diversity jurisdiction, § 1391(b) permits venue only where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Farmer v. Carlson · filed 1988-02-29(b)

When jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity, venue is proper only in the district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. ... Here, all the defendants do not reside in this district, and any claims regarding plaintiff’s incarceration at F.C.I. —Petersburg arose in Virginia.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the defendant resides or the claim arose.

Balfour MacLaine, Inc. v. National Coin Exchange, Inc. · filed 1988-04-20(a)

Venue in this district is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), in that National Coin resides here and the claim arose here.

Section 1391(a) authorized venue in Connecticut, so the district was not wrong for purposes of § 1406(a).

TUC Electronics, Inc. v. Eagle Telephonics, Inc. · filed 1988-11-01(a)

As jurisdiction over this action is founded solely upon diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) authorizes venue in the District of Connecticut. Therefore, this cannot be the “wrong district” for purposes of § 1406(a), and the action can be neither dismissed nor transferred under that section.

In a diversity action, § 1391 permits venue where the corporate plaintiff is incorporated and has its principal place of business.

Cosmetics v. Martin · filed 1988-12-06(a)

Because subject matter jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship, California is a proper venue for this action according to 28 U.S.C. § 1391; it is the state where plaintiff is incorporated and has its principal place of business.

Section 1391(b) can provide venue for a RICO claim, but venue is improper where the defendant does not reside and the claim did not arise.

Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. · filed 1989-03-28(b)

Nor was venue proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), consideration of which is not excluded by the venue provision of § 1965. ... CCM cannot be said to have resided in New Mexico nor did Michelson’s claims against it arise there within the meaning of § 1391.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity case in the district where the claim arose.

LaRose v. Sponco Mfg. Inc. · filed 1989-05-03(a)

Venue is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), which states that in diversity cases a civil action may "be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.” This Court has venue because it is where the claim arose.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not apply to actions removed from state court to federal court.

Hartford Fire Insurance v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1989-10-19

However, the general venue statutes, including section 1391, do not apply to cases that are removed to federal court from state court.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity suit in a district where all defendants reside.

Tracy v. Consolidated Rail Corp. · filed 1989-10-31(a)

A diversity suit may be brought in the district in which all defendants reside.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where all defendants reside.

Arrow Electronics, Inc. v. Ducommun Inc. · filed 1989-11-15(a)

In a diversity action, venue is proper in the judicial district(s) where all defendants reside, where all plaintiffs reside, or where the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Defendant resides in the Central District of California, and thus venue would be proper in the proposed transferee court.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in a district where all defendants reside.

Lothschuetz v. Carpenter · filed 1990-03-28(a)

According to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(a), a diversity action may be filed "in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose." Because both defendants in this case reside in the Northern District of Ohio, the case could have been filed in that court in the first instance, and therefore could be transferred to that district under the authority of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the cause of action arose in a case not founded on diversity; a plaintiff’s residence does not establish venue under that subsection.

Fernandez v. Kogan · filed 1990-06-18(b)

The appropriate venue statute for this action is 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) which provides for venue in cases not founded on diversity. This provision does not include the option of venue in the place of plaintiffs’ residence. However, since the cause of action arose in the Southern District of New York, venue is proper in this Court.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where all defendants reside; a proposed venue where a defendant does not reside requires another statutory basis, such as where the claim arose.

Northwestern National Insurance v. Dennehy · filed 1990-06-22(a)

Defendants L.A. Derrick, Jr., Richard S. Johnston, Leo T. Metcalf, James J. Parrish, O.A. Phillips, and David W. Tompkins reside in Texas, so that venue in their cases is proper in Texas. Defendants Dennehy and May do not reside in Texas. In the Dennehy and May cases, venue would not be proper in Texas unless their causes of action arose there.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue in a district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Akl v. Listwa · filed 1990-07-02(a)

Venue is proper in this district, because all the defendants reside here and because the claim arose here.

Section 1391(a) can permit venue in more than one district for a diversity action.

Paribas Corp. v. Shelton Ranch Corp. · filed 1990-07-06(a)

Each court would have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as defendants all are citizens of or incorporated in Texas and Paribas is incorporated under the law of Delaware and venue would properly lie in either court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391 permits a nondiversity action in a district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Whitmire Research Laboratories, Inc. v. P.C.O. Supply, Inc. · filed 1990-12-17(b)

According to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, an action where jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity may be brought “only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose,_” Since this is a declaratory judgment action, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 57, it is not founded solely on diversity. However, all the defendants do not reside in New York, the prospective forum, and it is unclear to this Court (and has not been briefed by the parties), as to where the claim actually arose. Therefore, the Court cannot with certainty say that this action “might have been brought” in the eastern district of New York and therefore will deny the motion to transfer.

Under the version applicable when this suit was filed, § 1391(a) allowed venue in a diversity action where all plaintiffs resided, all defendants resided, or the claim arose.

Munski v. J.R. United Industries, Inc. · filed 1991-02-14(a)

At the time this case was filed, venue in a diversity suit was proper in the judicial district where all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Since plaintiff resides in this district, venue is proper in the trans-feror court. Venue is also proper in the transferee court. Defendants all reside in the Southern District of Florida.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or the claim arose.

Wysnoski v. Millet · filed 1991-03-11(a)

Jurisdiction in this civil action is based on diversity of citizenship alone. Therefore, venue is proper where all the plaintiffs reside, where all the defendants reside, or where the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). The plaintiff resides in this district and therefore, venue in this court is proper.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a nondiversity action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, unless another law provides otherwise.

Whittington v. Milby · filed 1991-03-14(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general federal venue statute, provides in relevant part that “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.” In the case at bar, all of the individual defendants reside in Laurel County, which is in the Eastern District of Kentucky. Mr. Whittington’s cause of action also arose in the Eastern District, because the proceeding which terminated his parental rights was held in the Laurel County Circuit Court.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or where the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

General Latex & Chemical Corp. v. Phoenix Medical Technology, Inc. · filed 1991-05-31(a)(2), (a)(3)

In this case, the Court believes that venue lies in this district. Defendant entered into an agreement with Plaintiff whereby chemicals would be shipped from this district to South Carolina. Defendant’s failure to pay for the goods had an obvious impact on this district and led to a cause of action accruing here. Therefore, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Furthermore, as previously discussed, Defendant is subject to in personam jurisdiction in this district. Thus, venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Lahm v. Wagner · filed 1991-10-29(a)

As noted above, venue would be proper in the Eastern District of Virginia, since that is where the event giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where all defendants reside or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Rusty v. TV-3, Inc. · filed 1991-12-09(a)

Venue in the Southern District of Mississippi is proper because all the defendants in this diversity action reside there, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred there, and the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction within the district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in the district where the defendant is domiciled.

Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Morse · filed 1991-12-26(a)

Once it is decided that defendant is domiciled in this District, the Southern District of New York is an appropriate venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

Section 1391(a) requires facts showing that substantial events giving rise to the claim occurred in the district or that the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction there when the action began.

Banque De La Mediterranee-France, S.A. v. Thergen, Inc. · filed 1992-01-16(a)(2), (a)(3)

However, there are no allegations in the complaint that any of the events giving rise to this claim occurred in this District. ... In this case, neither the complaint nor Banque’s Memorandum alleges that Phelan was ever present in Rhode Island or directed any activities by Thergen in Rhode Island relating to the subject matter of this suit. Accordingly, Banque has failed to establish facts sufficient to support its claim that venue is proper in this District.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or where the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Amplifier Research Corp. v. Hart · filed 1992-08-20(a)(2), (a)(3)

First, clause (2) makes venue proper in this district, since it is here that Amplifier lost business and suffered damages, allegedly because its customers read EMCO’s report. Moreover, since Hart has been dismissed and only EMCO remains as a defendant, venue is proper under clause (3) since EMCO does not contend it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania at the time Amplifier filed suit. I will not dismiss for lack of venue.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in a removed action; section 1441(a) does.

George Lambert, D/B/A Rainbow Fruit v. Sam Kysar and Joan Kysar, D/B/A Lewis River Tree Farm · filed 1993-01-13

Even if their assertion could be construed as a waiver of any objection to venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the venue of a removed action is not governed by § 1391, but by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Section 1391(a) makes venue improper in a diversity action when the defendant does not reside in the district, the relevant events did not occur there, and the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction there.

Nagele v. Holy Redeemer Visiting Nurse Agency, Inc. · filed 1993-02-25(a)

As Pennsylvania does not have jurisdiction over Holy Redeemer Visiting Nurse Agency, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is not the proper venue for this action based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1391’s residency or personal jurisdiction alternatives for conferring proper venue.

Section 1391(a) does not permit venue in a diversity action when none of its required contacts with the chosen district exists.

Peek v. Golden Nugget Hotel and Casino · filed 1992-11-06(a)

None of the contacts mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) has been met.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits venue in a diversity action where the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction if no other listed district is available.

Keller Ex Rel. 501 South Cherry Joint Venture v. Millice · filed 1993-11-29(a)(3)

Assertion of personal jurisdiction over Mil-lice does not constitute a violation of due process. The requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 have been met; therefore, venue is proper in the Southern District of Texas. Accordingly, Millice’s motion to dismiss with prejudice or to transfer venue based on improper venue is denied.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a diversity action in a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Ful Inc. v. Unified School District Number 204 · filed 1993-12-17(a)(1)

Venue is proper in actions based solely on diversity of citizenship in “a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all’ defendants reside in the same State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1). Because the transferee district, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, is the district where District 204, the only defendant in this action, resides, venue and jurisdiction are proper in the transferee district.

Section 1391(a)(3) permits fallback venue in a diversity case only when no other district is available; it does not apply to a single-defendant case.

Samuelson v. Honeywell · filed 1994-08-31(a)(3)

As this authority indicates, the addition of the phrase “if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought” necessarily limits the application of subsection (a)(3) to multiple-defendant actions.

Section 1391(a) makes venue improper in a diversity case where the defendant does not reside, the alleged events did not occur, and another district is available.

McDonald v. Doolittle · filed 1995-03-29(a)

The only defendant to the instant action resides in Nebraska. The plaintiff pleads in her complaint that the alleged negligent acts occurred in Nebraska. The court knows of no reason why this action could not have been brought in Nebraska. For these reasons, the District of Kansas is not a proper venue.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the defendant resides and the alleged acts or omissions occurred.

Thomas v. Vaughn · filed 1995-11-20(a)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), because the defendant resides in this district, and the alleged acts or omissions at issue occurred within the Middle District of Alabama.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern ADA employment actions because the ADA incorporates Title VII’s venue provision.

Chubb v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1995-12-29

The two options are the venue provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), or the general venue provision applicable to proceedings in the federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... Therefore, § 2000e-5(f)(3) applies in the case at hand.

Section 1391(a) does not permit venue for a diversity action in a district where the defendant does not reside and the events giving rise to the claim did not occur, when another district is available.

Kitces v. Wood · filed 1996-03-15(a)

An examination of the applicable venue statute reveals that the District of New Jersey is clearly not the proper venue for this action since the accident did not occur in this District, nor does Wood reside in this District.

Section 1391(a) does not permit venue in a diversity action in a district where the sole defendant neither resides nor is subject to personal jurisdiction and where the events giving rise to the claim did not occur.

O'NEAL v. Hatfield · filed 1996-04-08(a)

According to § 1391(a), the instant ease does not belong in the Southern District of Indiana. The sole defendant resides in Illinois; the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Illinois; and the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Indiana.

For a diversity action, § 1391(a) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides or is subject to personal jurisdiction and the defendants’ conduct giving rise to the claim occurred elsewhere.

Baker v. Abrams · filed 1996-06-28(a)

Moreover, the only events which occurred in this state are those involving the late Attorney Ullman, events which occurred after the defendants had completed their involvement in the matter. The current defendants did nothing within the State of Connecticut. Ullman’s wrongdoing cannot be imputed to the Maine attorneys who, based on the facts before this Court, did nothing improper whatever. Consequently venue in this action is improper and the action must be dismissed.

Section 1391(a) requires a plaintiff bringing a diversity action to establish proper venue in the chosen district.

Dunham v. Hotelera Canco S.A. De C.V. · filed 1996-07-23(a)

It is therefore hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs action be DISMISSED for lack of admiralty and federal question jurisdiction, and for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391 supplies the general venue rules for Section 1983 actions because Section 1983 has no special venue provision.

Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dept. Sean McCormack Asst. D.A. Denis Thomason, Donald Urrutia · filed 1996-07-29(b)

Section 1983 contains no special venue provision. ... Therefore, the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 apply.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in an action removed from state court.

Totonelly v. Cardiology Associates of Corpus Christi, Inc. · filed 1996-07-31

Because this action was removed to this court, the general venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 “has no application.” ... Rather, § 1441(a) is the statutory provision applicable to removed civil actions.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

Optopics Laboratories Corp. v. Nicholas · filed 1996-12-04(a)(1)

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania qualifies as such a district: each defendant is a citizen of Pennsylvania — Lilex Partners is a limited partnership comprised of a Pennsylvania citizen and Lilex Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania — and thus venue is proper there under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) (setting forth proper venue in diversity actions).

Section 1391(a) permits venue for a transitory action joining a replevin request with related personal claims in a district where the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Paulucci v. William Morris Agency, Inc. · filed 1997-01-09(a)

Consequently, since the action is transitory in nature and the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Pack, the Court finds that venue is proper in the District of Minnesota.

Section 1391(a) did not permit venue in this diversity action in Minnesota because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the defendants.

Richards v. ARAMARK Services · filed 1997-03-17(a)

In this diversity action, without personal jurisdiction over both defendants in the State of Minnesota, venue was improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391 does not govern venue in removed actions.

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Herzog Services, Inc. · filed 1998-01-07

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, however, § 1391 has no application to a removed action.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action based on the defendants’ residence, substantial events or property in the district, or, if no other district is available, personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Buchanan, Jasper N. v. Manley, Audrey · filed 1998-06-23(a)

The venue provisions for diversity actions, however, are not met. ... The complaint gives addresses for the non- federal defendants in Illinois and Kentucky, and Buchanan has not alleged that any of them resides in the District of Columbia. Moreover, no part of the events or omissions which gave rise to the claim are alleged to have occurred here. Nor has Buchanan shown that the action could not be brought in any other district. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal for improper venue.

Section 1391(a) does not permit venue in a diversity action when no defendant resides in the district and no events giving rise to the claim occurred there.

Corry v. CFM Majestic Inc. · filed 1998-08-13(a)

So constituted, this suit could not have been brought in this district, as it is not a permissible venue; none of the CFM entities reside in the Eastern District of Virginia, and none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred here.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where defendants’ conduct in the district forms part of the alleged fraud.

Sanders v. Franklin · filed 1998-10-26(a)

Under the Illinois long-arm statute, defendants are amenable to Illinois’ jurisdiction, and in turn venue for purposes of § 1391, when they transact business within Illinois. ... Hence, venue lies in the Northern District of Illinois since the action occurred within its jurisdiction.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in an action removed from state court.

JMTR Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Duchin · filed 1999-02-18

As the JMTR Group properly notes, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 has no application to this case because it is a removed action.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Unlimited Care, Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Eastern Massachusetts, Inc. · filed 1999-03-31(a)(1), (a)(2)

Here, the sole defendant resides in Massachusetts and a substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiff's claim occurred in Massachusetts.

Section 1391(a) governs venue in civil actions founded on diversity of citizenship.

Stanton v. Hyatt Corp. · filed 1999-04-29(a)

The general venue provision of section 1391(a) applies to this civil action founded upon diversity.

In a diversity action, venue is proper in a judicial district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state.

California Casualty & Fire Insurance v. Brinkman · filed 1999-06-03(a)

In addition, the general venue statute provides, in pertinent part, that when jurisdiction for a civil action is founded only on diversity of citizenship, the action may only be brought in “a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Because the Brinkmans both reside in Wyoming, venue in the District of Wyoming is appropriate.

Section 1391(a)’s general venue rules do not apply to removed actions.

Thermal Components Company v. Griffith · filed 2000-04-17(a)

Consequently, § 1441(a), not § 1391, controls venue in removal actions.

In a diversity action, venue is improper as to a defendant who is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the district when the accident giving rise to the claim occurred elsewhere.

Holland v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. · filed 2000-06-08(a)

Since Consolidated Freightways is subject to personal jurisdiction, venue is proper as to that defendant. However, since defendant Pearson is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this court and the accident did not occur here, there is a lack of venue as to this individual defendant.

Section 1391 permits a diversity action in a district where the defendant resides, a substantial part of the events occurred, or the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Tultex Corp. v. Freeze Kids, L.L.C. · filed 2000-06-30(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, a diversity action ... may only be brought in the district where (1) the defendant resides; (2) a substantial part of the events occurred; or (3) the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Because the defendant is a New York corporation and a “substantial part of the events” occurred in New York and New Jersey but not in Virginia, Tul-tex’s contract action could only have been brought in the Western District of Virginia if Freeze Kids is subject to personal jurisdiction in that state.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Snider v. Howard S. Slatkin, Inc. · filed 2000-07-13(a)

Clearly, venue would be proper in the Southern District of New York where the Defendant has its principal place of business and therefore is also subject to personal jurisdiction. In addition, the contract at issue in this action was formed in New York and a significant number of the events that triggered the dispute occurred there.

Section 1391(a) sets venue by judicial district for diversity actions and does not govern venue in removed actions.

Crumrine v. NEG MICON USA, INC. · filed 2000-07-17(a)

In short, venue in this case is determined according to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which establishes venue in removed actions, and according to state law, which determines the propriety of venue in the original state-court action, but venue here is not determined according to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which is the venue statute applicable only to actions originating in federal court.

Section 1391(a) does not permit venue where the defendants do not reside and the underlying events did not occur.

Diebold, Inc. v. Firstcard Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2000-07-20(a)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). This Court has already found that the Busis are not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Court. Neither of the Busis reside in Ohio and none of the events which gave rise to the action- occurred in Ohio.

Section 1391 can provide venue for an action to enjoin arbitration when the district satisfies its general venue rules.

Textile Unlimited, Inc., a California Corporation v. A..bmhand Company, Inc., a Georgia Corporation · filed 2001-02-14

Venue is clearly proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391: Textile is incorporated in the state of California, it maintains its principal place of business in the Central District of California, and A..BMH was subject to in personam jurisdiction in California.

Section 1391(a) does not permit venue in a diversity case where the defendants reside in different states, the claims arose elsewhere, and another district was available for the action.

Estate of Rick Ex Rel. Rick v. Stevens · filed 2001-06-11(a)

Venue is improper here under the applicable federal statute for venue in diversity cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), because this is not "a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State," where Stevens is a resident of South Carolina and the other defendants are residents of Minnesota; it is not "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated,” where the cause of action arose from events in Wisconsin and no property in this forum is at issue; and it is not "a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought," because the action could "otherwise” have been brought in Wisconsin.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in actions removed from state court; § 1441(a) fixes venue in the federal district where the state action was pending.

Hollis v. Florida State University Ex Rel. Board of Regents · filed 2001-07-30

In removed actions the general venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, does not apply.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in removed actions.

S.M.W. Seiko v. Concrete · filed 2001-10-18

Contrary to the parties’ assertions, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is inapplicable to this matter because it is a removed action.

In a diversity action, venue is proper where a corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Yanoor Corp. · filed 2001-11-01(a)(1), (a)(2), (c)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) provides that a civil action founded on diversity of citizenship may be brought in “a judicial district where any defendant resides.” Section 1391(a)(2) provides that an action may be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” As the court has noted above, Yanoor is subject to jurisdiction in this district. Therefore, Yanoor “resides” in this district, making this district a proper venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (“[A] defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”). Also, the events or omissions giving rise to Burlington’s claim occurred in North Carolina in that Burlington alleges that Yanoor did not pay for administrative and other services performed by Burlington in its Greensboro, North Carolina, headquarters. Therefore, venue is proper in the Middle District of North Carolina.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue where the defendants reside or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred; its personal-jurisdiction alternative applies only if no other district is available.

3H ENTERPRISES, INC. v. Dwyre · filed 2001-12-12(a)

It is clear that all of the defendants reside in Texas, and thus under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), jurisdiction would only be proper in Texas. Moreover, all of the actions which form the basis for this alleged tort took place in Texas. The action was brought in Texas. It was prosecuted in Texas courts. The injunction restricts Plaintiffs’ business activities in Texas. Thus, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), venue is proper in Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3) does not apply because there is a forum available to the Plaintiffs in Texas should they choose to use it.

Section 1391(a) does not permit venue in a diversity case where no defendant resides in the district, no substantial part of the events occurred there, and another district is available.

Fanselow v. Rice · filed 2002-07-30(a)

Under this standard, venue was not proper in the Eastern District of Texas. As noted above, the defendant Rice was not a resident of Texas at the time the action was commenced, thus rendering § 1391(a)(1) inapplicable. Nor was § 1391(a)(2) applicable, as it does not appear that “a substantial part of the events ... giving rise” to this suit occurred in Texas. Finally, § 1391(a)(3) does not render Texas a proper forum, as there was a district “in which the action may otherwise be brought” — Nebraska, where the car accident occurred.

Section 1391(a) makes venue improper in a diversity action when no defendant resides in the district, no substantial part of the events occurred there, and the action could be brought in another district.

United Financial Mortgage Corp. v. Bayshores Funding Corp. · filed 2002-10-18(a)

Section 1391(a)(1) is not applicable because no defendant resides in Illinois. As can be seen by the Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis, the overwhelming majority of the events did not occur in Illinois, so § 1391(a)(2) does not provide for proper venue. Finally, the action may be brought in the Central District of California, so § 1391(a)(3) is not applicable.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in actions removed from state court; section 1441(a) does.

Quick v. Coale, Cooley, Lietz, McInerny & Broadus, P.C. · filed 2002-12-12

This court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss because of the well-established rule that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), rather than 28 U.S.C. § 1391, governs venue of removed cases, and therefore, the Middle District of North Carolina is the proper venue for this action.

Section 1391(a) requires proper venue even when diversity jurisdiction exists.

Glendora v. Anderson · filed 2003-01-24(a)

Proper venue is required even where diversity jurisdiction is present.

In a diversity action, § 1391 permits venue where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events occurred; a corporation resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Connors v. R & S PARTS & SERVICES, INC. · filed 2003-03-05(a), (c)

Venue would have been proper in the District of New Jersey under either rationale because R & S maintained its principal place of business in New Jersey at the time this action was commenced, and the accident giving rise to the claims occurred in the transferee district.

Section 1391(a) makes venue improper in a diversity action when the defendant does not reside in the district and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred there.

Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. World Connection Group, Inc. · filed 2003-10-27(a)

As a result of plaintiffs inability to establish a basis for personal jurisdiction over defendant, this Court finds that venue is improper in the Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and that 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is the appropriate statute under which a transfer of venue may be granted.

Section 1391(a) sets the grounds for venue in a diversity action; venue is improper where none of those grounds applies.

Dindio v. First Babylon, Inc. · filed 2004-04-13(a)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), in a diversity action, venue is proper (1) in the district where the defendant resides, (2) in the district where "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” or where the property that is the subject of the action is located, or (3) where there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant “if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” (Emphasis added). None of these situations exist in the instant case.

Section 1391(a) requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that venue is proper in the district where the suit is filed.

Wright v. Zurinsky · filed 2004-11-01(a)

Appellant’s complaint does not allege a federal question and, while diversity may exist, appellant has not demonstrated that venue lies in this district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action based on the defendant’s residence, substantial events in the district, or, if no other district qualifies, personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Alexander-Schauss v. Lew · filed 2004-11-30(a)

Finally, as set out in Part IIIA of the Court’s opinion, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court holds that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan is not the proper venue for Plaintiffs claims.

Section 1391(a) supplies the venue rules used to determine whether a diversity action could have been brought in a proposed transferee district.

Bolt v. Toyota Motor Corp. · filed 2004-12-09(a)

Federal jurisdiction of this case is premised on diversity jurisdiction. Therefore, this case could have been brought in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resided if all defendants resided in the same district; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a judicial district in which a substantial part of the property at issue was located; or (3) if there is no other district in which the action could have been brought, in a judicial district in which any defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action was commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... Given that James Bolt died in the Northern District while working for Western on a United-owned tug, it is easily conceivable that at least one defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District. Because the case could have been brought in the Northern District, the Court turns to the public and private interest factors.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in actions removed from state court; § 1441(a) determines venue for those actions.

Heft v. AAI CORP. · filed 2005-01-24

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, defines the appropriate district for most cases brought in federal court. ... Once a defendant files a notice of removal, the propriety of venue is determined by reference to § 1441(a).

Section 1391 does not govern venue in a removed action; § 1441(a) fixes venue in the federal district embracing the state court.

Three M Enterprises, Inc. v. Texas D.A.R. Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2005-05-05

However, in Lynch, Judge Nickerson of this Court recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 “has no application to a removed action.” 228 F.Supp.2d 644. Rather, the proper venue for removed actions, such as the matter at bar, is governed by the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

In a diversity action against a corporation, § 1391(a) permits venue where the corporation is deemed to reside through personal jurisdiction.

Berg v. Sage Environmental Consulting of Austin, Inc. · filed 2005-06-08(a)

Because this action is based solely on diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) applies. ... Therefore, this action could have been brought in both the Middle District of Louisiana and the Northern District of Texas.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in actions removed from state court to federal court.

Godfredson v. JBC Legal Group, P.C. · filed 2005-08-15

Although defendants’ reasoning is unassailable, their argument nonetheless suffers from a fatal flaw: 28 U.S.C. § 1391 does not apply when, as here, defendants remove a case to federal court from state court.

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity case when the defendants are deemed residents of the forum state or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred there.

Faur v. Sirius International Insurance · filed 2005-04-25(a)(1), (a)(2), (c)

Therefore, as 28 U.S.C. § 1391 tells us, because Defendants can be considered Illinois residents and also because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Illinois, this matter may be brought in any judicial district in Illinois.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred.

Fluidtech, Inc. v. Gemu Valves, Inc. · filed 2006-08-23(a)

As an initial matter, the court finds that this case could have been brought in Georgia. Defendant is a Georgia citizen and a substantial portion of the events giving rise to this action occurred in Georgia. (Compl. at 2; Countercl. at 3.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

In a diversity action, venue is proper in a district where the sole defendant resides.

Glass v. S & M NUTEC, LLC · filed 2006-10-11(a)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought ... in ... a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State.... ” In the present case, in which jurisdiction clearly is predicated solely upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, defendant’s company headquarters is located within the Western District of Missouri, and the vast majority of its operations are conducted therein. Accordingly, defendant resides within that district because it is subject to personal jurisdiction therein.

In a diversity case, venue is proper in a district where a corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline · filed 2007-03-28(a), (c)

Where subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, as in this case, venue is proper in any district where a defendant corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. ... It is not in dispute that Bayer would have been subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in an action removed from state court.

Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin & Baldwin, LLP · filed 2007-07-30

While Defendant asserts that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the Eastern District of Texas, this argument seems to be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which has no application in a removed action.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for Bivens claims and permits venue based on defendants’ residence, where a substantial part of the events occurred, or where a defendant may be found if no other district is available.

Simpson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2007-08-02(b)

Venue in a Bivens case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... The Court concludes that venue is improper in this district. All of the defendants do not reside in the District of Columbia, none of the events relevant to this case occurred in this district, and there is another district where this action otherwise may be brought.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in an action removed from state court; § 1441(a) does.

Kubin-Nicholson Corp. v. Gillon · filed 2007-12-13

However, § 1391 has no in the present case because plaintiff did not bring the action in this court but rather in state court, from which removed it. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) governs the venue of a removed action.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a nondiversity civil action where all defendants reside in the same state, where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, or, if neither applies, where a defendant may be found.

Metcalf v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2008-01-07(b)

In a civil action where the Court’s jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship, as in this case, venue is proper in “(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ... or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Under these criteria, venue in this district is not proper. Not all of the defendants reside in the same state, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to plaintiffs claims occurred elsewhere — in the Southern District of Indiana where plaintiff currently is incarcerated and where the events giving rise to his causes of action occurred.

Section 1391(a) places venue in a diversity action where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events occurred; its personal-jurisdiction option applies only if no other district is available.

Adam v. Hensley · filed 2008-05-16(a)

Because venue in the District of Massachusetts and the District of Hawaii are both proper under §§ 1391(a)(1) and 1391(a)(2), venue in the District of New Hampshire cannot be grounded on 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a)(3).

Section 1391(b) makes venue improper in a nondiversity action when the defendants do not reside in the district, the events giving rise to the claim did not occur there, and the action can be brought elsewhere.

On Site Gas Systems, Inc. v. USF Technologies, Inc. · filed 2008-05-16(b)

Having determined that personal jurisdiction over USF and Ozment is not available in the District of Connecticut, the Court notes that venue in this district is also improper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides: “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may ... be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ... or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” ... In the present case, USF and Ozment do not reside in Connecticut, and the events giving rise to OSG’s claim did not occur in Connecticut.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) does not permit venue where the defendant does not reside, no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, and another district is available.

Erie Insurance Exchange v. Ko · filed 2008-06-20(a)

Venue is not proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) because the defendant does not reside in the District of Columbia, no substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiffs claim occurred in the District of Columbia, and because this is not a case in which no other district is available.

Section 1391(a) determines venue by judicial district, so a diversity action properly venued in the District of Massachusetts need not be tried in a particular county.

Donovan v. TOWN OF EDGARTOWN, MASS. · filed 2008-07-25(a)

Under the federal venue statute, a diversity action may be brought “in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Accordingly, venue in this case is clearly proper anywhere in the District of Massachusetts.

Section 1391(a)(2) and (3) provide alternative grounds for venue in a diversity action.

R.J. Carbone Co. v. Regan · filed 2008-10-14(a)(2), (a)(3)

Because the Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over Regan but not over Associated, and dismisses the Complaint against Associated, venue is proper in this diversity action under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) or (3).

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Vu v. Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. · filed 2009-03-09(a)

Venue is also proper in the Central District of California under § 1391(a) because each of the corporate defendants is subject to personal jurisdiction in California.

Section 1391(a) does not permit venue in a diversity action in a district where no defendant resides and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, unless its fallback provision applies.

Greer v. Safeway, Inc. · filed 2009-03-24(a)

And even if personal jurisdiction could be established, venue in Utah would not be proper. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), in a diversity action venue is proper only in “(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” As the district court noted, Greer does not allege any of the Defendants are residents of Utah, nor does a substantial part of the alleged civil rights and contract violations by the Defendants arise in Utah.

Section 1391(e)'s venue rule for federal officers and employees does not apply to Bivens actions.

Partovi v. Galoski · filed 2009-04-13(e)

Note that § 1391(e), which establishes proper venue in cases where the defendant is an officer or employee of the United States acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, does not apply to Bivens actions.

In a diversity case, venue is proper where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state; a corporation resides in any district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Mak Marketing, Inc. v. Kalapos · filed 2009-05-08(a), (c)

In an action where jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship, as this suit is, venue is generally proper in a district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state. ... Because “a defendant that is a corporation is deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), based on the allegations in the Complaint, all defendants in this action appear to reside in Michigan.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) does not permit venue in a district where neither defendant resides, no substantial part of the events is shown to have occurred, and another district is available.

Henderson v. Keisling · filed 2009-06-22(a)

Applying this statute here, it is clear that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is not a proper venue for Henderson’s claim. One defendant resides in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the other lives in Portland, Oregon. Furthermore, the plaintiff provided no information as to whether a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in the Eastern District, the claim is not in rem, and there are other districts in which the action may be brought.

Section 1391(b) limits venue in a nondiversity action to a district where a defendant resides, a substantial part of the relevant events occurred, or, if no other district is available, a district where a defendant may be found.

Potts v. SEPTIC HEATER CO. · filed 2009-07-13(b)

Having determined that personal jurisdiction over Septic is not available in the District of Connecticut, the Court notes that venue in this district is also improper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides: “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may ... be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ... or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” ... In the present case, Septic does not reside in Connecticut, and the events giving rise to Potts’s claim did not occur in Connecticut.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a nondiversity action based on defendant residence, where the relevant events occurred, or where the property at issue is located.

Kelly v. Novastar · filed 2009-07-27(b)

Plaintiff has not established that venue is proper here. In a civil action where jurisdiction is not founded on diversity of citizenship, venue is appropriate in a district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, or where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). No Defendant resides in the District of Columbia and the events giving rise to the claim occurred entirely in Maryland. The property to which the note in question relates is also located in Maryland.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred or where a corporate defendant resides because it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

MWL Brasil Rodas & Eixos Ltda v. K-IV Enterprises LLC · filed 2009-09-11(a)

Here, venue is clearly proper under § 1391(a). Not only did a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claim occur in New York, but K-IV, as a corporate defendant, is also deemed to reside in this district under the venue statute because K-IV is subject to personal jurisdiction in the district.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the defendants reside, where a substantial part of the events or property is located, or, if no other district is available, where a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Kissi v. Panzer · filed 2009-10-23(a)

None of the defendants reside in the District of Columbia, and the events giving rise to the plaintiffs claims occurred in Maryland. Further, all the parties to this action either actively participated in or were parties to court proceedings or real estate transactions pertaining to property located in Maryland. On this record, the Court must conclude that venue in this district is improper, as it is apparent that this action could and should have been brought in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

Section 1391 remains an available basis for venue in RICO actions because the RICO venue statute supplements rather than replaces it.

ALLEN EX REL. ALLEN v. Devine · filed 2009-11-19(b)

The Court agrees that Section 1965(a) is intended to supplement, and not replace, Section 1391.

Section 1391(a) requires a diversity suit to be brought in a district with a qualifying connection to the defendants or the events giving rise to the claim.

Lewis v. Center Market · filed 2010-05-17(a)

Further, because the facts do not establish that any defendant resides in New Mexico, that “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in New Mexico, or that any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Mexico, the complaint fails to show that the District of New Mexico is the appropriate venue to bring this diversity suit.

Section 1391(e) governs venue for APA actions and can make the District of Columbia a proper venue.

Reilly v. United States · filed 2010-07-09(e)

At oral argument, plaintiff requested that any transfer be to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The statute governing the selection of venue for APA actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), indicates that venue in that court is proper and the court will thus accommodate plaintiffs request.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a nondiversity civil action based on the defendants’ residence, where a substantial part of the events occurred, or, if no other district is available, where a defendant may be found.

Baez v. Connelly · filed 2010-08-27(b)

Venue is not proper in this district under any of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b): defendants do not all reside in the District of Columbia, no substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiffs claim took place here, and this is not a case in which no other district is available.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for individual-capacity Bivens claims, and venue is improper when none of its grounds supports the chosen district.

Gonzalez v. Holder · filed 2011-02-08(b)

Venue in a Bivens case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... The Court concludes that venue is improper in this district. All of the defendants do not reside in the District of Columbia; a substantial part of the events relevant to this case did not occur in this district; there is another district where this action otherwise may be brought.

Under § 1391(a), venue in a diversity case is improper where defendants neither reside nor are subject to personal jurisdiction in the district, and neither substantial claim events nor the property at issue is there.

Rossmann v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC · filed 2011-03-25(a)

As ,a preliminary matter, venue must be determined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), as subject-matter jurisdiction here is founded only on diversity of citizenship. ... As previously noted, defendants neither reside in the District of Columbia nor are subject to personal jurisdiction here. Furthermore, the District appears to have almost no connection to this case whatsoever, and can in no way be said to be the location of “a substantial part of the events or omissions” giving rise to the plaintiffs claims. Moreover, the property that is the subject of the action is situated in Virginia, not the District. The case will therefore be dismissed for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3).

Section 1391(a) applies only to civil actions in which jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship.

Smiley v. Alabama Department of Transportation · filed 2011-03-30(a)

The Complaint improperly predicates venue on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), which applies only to civil actions wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship.

Section 1391 ordinarily governs venue, but § 1441(a) governs venue in removed actions.

Incline Energy, LLC v. Penna Group, LLC · filed 2011-04-01

Whether venue lies in a particular district is normally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) governs venue in removed actions, not § 1391.

Section 1391(b) places venue for a nondiversity civil action in a district connected to the defendant or to the events giving rise to the claim.

Barbour v. 43rd United States President · filed 2011-12-12(b)

In this case, the defendant is located and the claim arose in Washington, D.C., which is in the District of Columbia. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim should have been filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(a) did not establish venue in the District of Columbia for a diversity case involving a Texas defendant and a note executed elsewhere.

Atwal v. Myer · filed 2012-01-31(a)

In addition, although the parties did not address the issue of venue, Atwal’s complaint does not establish that venue is proper in the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in actions removed from state court to federal court.

IHFC Properties, LLC v. APA Marketing, Inc. · filed 2012-02-24

Although section 1391 governs venue in most cases that are filed directly in federal court, it does not apply to actions removed to federal courts, such as this one.