28 U.S.C. § 1391

When jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity, § 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the cause of action arose.

Weaver v. Gillen · filed 1985-05-08(b)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, it is clear that venue is improper in the Western District of New York. When diversity is not the only basis of jurisdiction, venue is proper only in the district where all defendants reside or where the cause of action arose (§ 1391(b)). The Western District of Texas satisfies both these criteria.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a federal-question action where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Wise v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service · filed 1986-01-09(b)

Venue is improper in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides that “[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose____” Since plaintiffs action is based upon the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights in violation of federal law, jurisdiction is not founded on diversity. Only one defendant in this action is a Montana resident. Therefore, plaintiffs suit could have been brought only in the District of Alaska, where all the events on which plaintiffs claim is based occurred.

Section 1391(b) permits a suit not grounded solely on diversity jurisdiction in a district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Gazis v. John S. Latsis (USA) Inc. · filed 1990-01-30(b)

Except for suits grounded solely on diversity jurisdiction, the general federal venue provision allows suits to be brought in the judicial district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391(a) applies the same test for where a claim arose in contract cases as in other diversity cases; the place of performance is relevant but does not alone determine venue.

Missouri Housing Development Commission v. Edward W. Brice, Jr., Paul Goodrich, Joseph Timilty · filed 1990-11-26(a)

Accordingly, we hold that although the place of performance is certainly relevant to any discussion of venue, venue in contract cases should be evaluated under the same tests applicable to non-contract diversity cases.

Section 1391 permits a nondiversity civil action in a district where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Whittington v. Milby · filed 1991-04-24(b)

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391, the general federal venue statute, provides in relevant part that "[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law." In the case at bar, all of the individual defendants reside in Laurel County, which is in the Eastern District of Kentucky. Mr. Whittington's cause of action also arose in the Eastern District, because the proceeding which terminated his parental rights was held in the Laurel County Circuit Court.

Under the version of § 1391(b) in effect when the action was filed, venue did not lie in the Western District, though § 1392(a) permitted the action there.

Arnold v. Maynard · filed 1991-08-19(b)

Although venue would not lie in the Western District under this provision, Arnold contends that venue in that district is nonetheless proper under section 1392(a), which provides that "[a]ny civil action, not of a local nature, against defendants residing in different districts in the same State, may be brought in any of such districts." 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a)(1988). We agree.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where no defendant resides and none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Lawrence S. Krain, M.D. v. Robert Devich Vaino Spencer, Justice United States of America Herman Romm, M.D. · filed 1992-06-04(b)

The complaint does not allege that any of the defendants reside in the Northern District of California or that any of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this district. ... Accordingly, venue was improper in the Northern District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a civil rights action in a district where the defendants reside or where a substantial part of the events occurred.

Butler v. Theo White, Warden · filed 1992-08-10(b)

As defendants, Butler named prison officials in Blythe, California, which is in the Southern District of California. The district court did not err by denying Butler leave to file without prepayment of the filing fee on the ground of improper venue and instructing him that venue was proper in the Southern District of California.

Section 1391(b) permits venue in a nondiversity case where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events occurred.

Le Blanc v. Cleveland · filed 1995-09-22(b)

While the plaintiff selected a forum in the Southern District of New York, the action cannot be brought in this district because it does not comply with the mandates of Section 1391. Neither Grant nor Cleveland lives in the Southern District of New York as required by subsection (1); they both live in the Northern district of New York. As for subsection (2), all the events which underlie the claim occurred in the Northern District of New York.

Section 1391's general venue rules do not apply to cases removed from state court to federal court.

Willowbrook Foundation, Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n · filed 2000-02-10

However, the general venue statutes, including Section 1391, do not apply to cases that are removed to federal court from state court.

Section 1391(b) permits an ADEA action in a district where a defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Johnson v. Washington Gas Light Co. · filed 2000-03-17(b)

An action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act may be brought in a judicial district where “any defendant resides” or where “a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1998). Because defendant is incorporated in both the District of Columbia and Virginia, plaintiffs ADEA claims are properly brought in this District.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in removed cases; Section 1441(a) does.

Global Satellite Communication Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd. · filed 2004-07-29

Section 1441(a), and not the ordinary federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, governs venue in removed cases.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in cases removed from state court; section 1441 does.

Collin County v. Siemens Business Services, Inc. · filed 2007-10-04

Given that section 1441, and not section 1391, governs venue in removal cases, the use of the term “county” rather than “district” at the very least falls short of a clear and unequivocal waiver of federal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where the defendants do not all reside, no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred, and another district is available.

Walton v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2008-02-05(b)

Venue is not proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all defendants do not reside in the District of Columbia, a substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiffs claim took place elsewhere, and because this is not a case in which no other district is available.

Section 1391(b) allows venue where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, where a substantial part of the events occurred, or where a defendant may be found if no other district is available.

Hazel v. Lappin · filed 2009-05-15(b)

Venue is not proper in this district under any of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b): defendants do not all reside in the District of Columbia, no substantial part of the events giving rise to plaintiffs claim took place here, and this is not a case in which no other district is available.

Section 1391(a) governs venue in diversity cases but does not apply to cases removed from state court.

AIG FINANCIAL PRODUCTS CORP. v. Public Utility District No. 1 · filed 2009-12-15(a)

Although the District is correct that venue in diversity cases is generally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) controls in actions which have been removed from state court.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for Bivens claims where all defendants reside in the district or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred there.

Hemmings v. United States · filed 2010-04-16(b)

Appellant’s claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), were properly dismissed for lack of venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Not all the defendants reside in the District of Columbia, and a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the elaim[s]” did not occur in the District.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in a case removed from state court; the removal statute governs instead.

Scherr v. Western Sky Financial, LLC · filed 2015-01-06

Indeed, in Polizzi, the Supreme Court specifically held that § 1391 does not determine venue in a removed case, because the text of § 1391 “limits the district in which an action may be brought” and, because a removed action was technically brought in state court, § 1391 lacked operative force. ... Venue is proper under § 1441, and defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in cases removed from state court; § 1441(a) does.

Baxter v. Select Portfolio Services, Inc. · filed 2019-04-18

Section 1441(a) governs venue under these circumstances, not § 1391.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights cases and permits suit in the judicial district where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Miller v. McDaniel · filed 2019-10-23

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391(b) governs venue in Bivens actions and permits venue where a defendant resides, if all defendants reside in one state, or where a substantial part of the underlying events occurred.

Fields v. Gilley · filed 2025-03-03(b)

Venue in a lawsuit filed pursuant to Bivens is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391 does not determine venue in Title VII cases; Title VII’s special venue provision governs.

Maxberry v. Dejoy · filed 2025-05-13

Venue in a Title VII case is not determined under the general venue statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391; ... Rather, Title VII’s special venue provision governs.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern a case properly removed from state court to the federal district encompassing that court.

ADVOCACY TRUST LLC v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION · filed 2025-09-26

Thus, Defendant FedEx’s argument that venue is improper under § 1391 is misplaced because venue is automatically proper in a federal court that a case was properly removed to.

Section 1391(b) does not govern venue in cases removed from state court.

Hagin · filed 2026-03-03(b)

Venue of removed cases is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, has no application.

For diversity venue based on defendants’ residence, § 1391(a) requires every defendant to reside in the district, with corporate residence determined under § 1391(c).

Trask v. Service Merchandise Co. · filed 1991-01-26(a), (c)

It is this court’s opinion, however, that in light of the conclusion that Arai is not “doing business” within this jurisdiction, venue in this district is improper, because the requirement set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and further defined in § 1391(c), that all of the defendants reside in this district, has not been met.

Section 1391(c)'s definition of corporate residence does not govern venue in patent infringement actions.

Magee v. Essex-Tec Corp. · filed 1988-12-13(c)

In the case of a corporation not subject to the general corporation venue statute, 28 U.S. C. § 1391(c), it is a “resident” of only the state of its incorporation.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a patent declaratory judgment action involving a federal question where all defendants reside or where the claim arose, unless another law provides otherwise.

Dicar, Inc. v. LE Sauer MacHine Co., Inc. · filed 1982-01-04(b)

Where there is some other ground for jurisdiction, as where there is a federal question as well as diversity (which is the case here), § 1391(b) governs. That allows venue only in the district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law (see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1397, Interpleader).

Section 1391(b) and (c) govern venue in declaratory judgment actions for patent invalidity and noninfringement.

Emerson Electric Co. v. The Black And Decker Manufacturing Company · filed 1979-09-18(b), (c)

Venue in a declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity and noninfringement is governed by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c), 12 not the patent infringement venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).

Section 1391(c)’s general corporate venue rule does not supplement the exclusive patent infringement venue rule in § 1400(b).

Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. · filed 1957-04-29(c)

We hold that 28 U. S. C. § 1400 (b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c).

Section 1391(c) does not supplement the exclusive venue rule for patent infringement actions under § 1400(b).

The Dow Chemical Company v. Metlon Corporation, and Hayden C. Cobb, Jr. · filed 1960-07-07(c)

It is now well settled that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) “is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).”

Section 1391(c) does not govern venue in patent infringement actions; § 1400(b) governs those actions entirely.

Johnson & Johnson, a Corporation v. Honorable Frank A. Picard, United States District Judge · filed 1960-08-26(c)

While service of summons on the resident agent might be sufficient to confer jurisdiction and venue under Title 28, U.S.C. § 1391(c) in the ordinary civil action, this is not true in a patent infringement action which is governed entirely by § 1400(b).

Section 1391(c) does not supplement the exclusive venue rule for patent infringement actions in § 1400(b).

Aileen Mills Co. v. Ojay Mills, Incorporated · filed 1960-10-03(c)

This statute, the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, is not to be supplemented by the general venue provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) does not supplement the exclusive venue rule for patent infringement actions in § 1400(b).

General Radio Company v. Superior Electric Company · filed 1961-08-25(c)

On these facts we t-hink the court below correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of venue insofar as it claims patent infringement. ... In Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 1957, 353 U.S. 222, 229, 77 S.Ct. 787, 792, 1 L.Ed.2d 786, the court, reaffirming its decision in Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 1942, 315 U.S. 561, 62 S.Ct. 780, 86 L.Ed. 1026, held categorically that § 1400(b) of Title 28 U.S.C. quoted in the margin ... “is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).”

Section 1391(c) governs venue for a declaratory judgment action challenging patent validity because that action is not an action for patent infringement.

Metlon Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 1959-12-29(c)

I fully agree with Judge Herlands’ analysis and conclusions in that ease that an action for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a patent is not an “action for patent infringement” within § 1400, and that thus the general venue provision of § 1391(c) controls.

Section 1391(c) defines corporate residence only for defendants; that definition also governs corporate residence under § 1391(e).

Abbott Laboratories v. Celebrezze · filed 1964-04-30(c)

This court is persuaded by those who argue that Congress did not intend the sweeping change which plaintiffs assert and that for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) residence is defined only for corporate defendants. The court also holds that the residence of a corporation for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) is defined in Section 1391(c). The twenty-six corporations which are not incorporated in Delaware are not properly before the court as plaintiffs in the present action.

Section 1391(c) governs venue in declaratory judgment actions alleging patent invalidity and noninfringement; venue is proper where the corporate defendant is engaged in business.

The General Tire & Rubber Company v. The Honorable R. Dorsey Watkins, United States District Judge for the Districtof Ma · filed 1964-01-07(c)

In a declaratory judgment action alleging invalidity and noninfringement venue jurisdiction is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and not by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). ... 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) requires only that the defendant corporation be engaged in business in the district, an admitted fact in this case.

Section 1391(c)’s corporate doing-business test does not supplement the venue rule for patent infringement actions in § 1400(b).

Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Casco Products Corp. And E.A. Langenfeld Associates, Ltd. · filed 1965-03-23(c)

If we were to treat the two phrases as synonymous, we would ignore the holding in Fourco Glass to the effect that section 1391(c) does not supplement section 1400(b).

Section 1391(c)’s doing-business standard does not determine venue in patent infringement actions; Section 1400(b)’s regular-and-established-place-of-business standard governs.

Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Kransco Manufacturing, Inc. · filed 1965-06-10(c)

Venue in patent infringement actions is governed exclusively by Section 1400(b) of Title 28 (Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 77 S.Ct. 787, 1 L.Ed.2d 786 (1957)), and while certain activities may constitute “doing business” under the general venue statutes (28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)), the “doing business” test is not to be substituted for the “regular and established place of business” test in Section 1400(b), and the terms are not to be treated synonymously.

Section 1391(d) does not control venue in patent infringement actions against alien corporations; Section 1400(b) governs those actions.

Coulter Electronics, Inc., an Illinois Corporation v. A. B. Lars Ljungberg & Co. · filed 1967-05-09(d)

The view expressed in Moore and in the Olin Mathieson case that in the case of alien corporations, § 1391(d) controls venue, seems to us to be unsound.

Section 1391 governs venue for patent declaratory judgment actions and proceedings to review Patent Office interference decisions under 35 U.S.C. § 146.

ACF Industries, Incorporated v. Hecht · filed 1967-02-16

That section is the venue provision for patent infringement actions only. Both W-3222, the declaratory judgment action, and W-3558, the review proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 146, are governed by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(c) governs venue for a declaratory judgment action seeking patent invalidity and noninfringement.

Medtronic, Inc. v. American Optical Corporation · filed 1971-09-17(c)

Since the instant action is a declaratory judgment action and not an action for patent infringement, § 1391(c) is the controlling venue provision.

Section 1391(c) governs venue for a declaratory judgment action alleging patent invalidity and non-infringement.

Berkshire International Corp. v. Alba-Waldensian, Inc. · filed 1972-12-29(c)

Although a suit for patent infringement is controlled by the venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 77 S.Ct. 787, 1 L.Ed.2d 786 (1957), a declaratory judgment action alleging patent invalidity and non-infringement is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391’s general venue provisions do not modify the exclusive venue rule for patent infringement actions in § 1400(b).

A. O. Smith-Inland, Inc. v. Hoeganaes Corp. · filed 1976-01-12

Venue in an action for patent infringement is governed exclusively by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) and is not modified by the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1970).

Section 1391(c) does not expand corporate residence for patent infringement venue; a domestic corporation resides only in its state of incorporation.

Dual Manufacturing and Engineering, Inc. And the Berkline Corporation v. Burris Industries, Inc. · filed 1976-03-23(c)

In the case of a corporation not subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), it is a “resident” of only the state of its incorporation. ... Therefore, Burris “resides” only in North Carolina.

Section 1391(c)'s general venue provisions give way to the exclusive patent infringement venue rule in § 1400(b).

Lighting Systems, Inc. v. International Merchandising Associates, Inc. · filed 1979-01-22(c)

The Supreme Court held that Section 1400(b) is exclusive ... in the case of patent infringement and that the general venue provisions of section 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) had to give way where there was a specific section dealing with a certain cause of action, i. e., patent infringement. ... While Fourco has been criticized in 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.144[9] (2d ed. 1978), it is nevertheless the law of the land until overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court and this court must abide by it.

Section 1391(a)'s definition of corporate residence does not apply to venue in patent infringement actions.

Choat v. Rome Industries, Inc. · filed 1979-03-12(a)

The liberal definition of corporate residence found in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) does not apply to patent infringement actions.

Section 1391’s general venue provisions cannot supersede § 1400(b), the exclusive venue provision for patent infringement actions.

Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Input Graphics, Inc. · filed 1982-02-04

... I am constrained by the Supreme Court’s longstanding rule that section 1400(b) is the exclusive venue provision in patent infringement cases which may not be superseded by the general venue provisions in section 1391.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a patent noninfringement declaratory judgment action in the district where the claim arose.

United States Aluminum Corporation, a California Corporation v. Kawneer Co., Inc., a Corporation · filed 1982-12-07(b)

Venue in a declaratory judgment action for patent noninfringement and invalidity is governed by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c), and not the special patent infringement venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). ... Section 1391(b) provides in essence, venue is proper in the district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose. Here, because the conduct in dispute is the shipment of Aluminum’s mullions and their installation by Glass and Metal Erectors in Atlanta, venue does exist in the Northern District of Georgia, and the action is being transferred to where it “might have been brought.”

Section 1391’s general venue provisions give way to the specific venue requirements for patent infringement claims.

Network Systems Corp. v. Masstor Systems Corp. · filed 1984-07-12

Thus the general venue provisions of section 1391 must give way where Congress has established such a specific section dealing with a certain cause of action, i.e. patent infringement.

Section 1391(c)'s corporate residence rule does not change the special venue rule for patent infringement actions under § 1400(b).

Doelcher Products, Inc. v. Hydrofoil International, Inc. · filed 1989-09-27(c)

Second, the recent amendment to § 1391(c) in no way indicates that an alteration was intended in the operation of § 1400(b). Not only is the language of the statute itself silent in this respect, the legislative history behind the amendment of § 1391(c) is devoid of any indication that an amendment to § 1400(b) was intended or even contemplated. Absent clear indication in the language of the statute or unmistakeble intent expressed in the legislative history, elementary principles of statutory construction preclude this Court from finding that venue in patent actions shall hereafter be governed by amended § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c)’s corporate residence rule does not supplement the exclusive patent venue rule in § 1400(b); its 1988 amendment did not change that rule.

Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. Amerace Corp. · filed 1990-02-06(c)

Because the congressional history shows no clear intent to change settled law, we conclude that the 1988 amendment of § 1391(c) had no effect on the exclusivity of § 1400(b).

Section 1391’s exception for venue otherwise provided by law applies to the entire section, including its corporate residence definition, so that definition does not displace the patent venue rule for domestic corporations.

TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC · filed 2017-05-22(a)(1)

Respondent suggests that the saving clause in §1391(a) does not apply to the definitional provisions in §1391(c), Brief for Respondent 31–32, but that interpretation is belied by the text of §1391(a), which makes clear that the saving clause applies to the entire “section.”

Section 1391(c)’s general rule for corporate residence does not determine residence for patent venue under § 1400(b).

Columbia Sportswear North America, Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. · filed 2017-09-05(c)

Venue in general is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... In sum, TC Heartland reaffirmed that for venue purposes in patent cases, a domestic corporation “resides” only in its state of incorporation. ... While Defendant no longer “resides” in the Southern District of California for patent venue purposes because it is not incorporated there, § 1400(b) provides that venue is also proper where the defendant “has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”

Section 1391(c) does not govern venue in patent infringement actions.

Boston Scientific Corp. v. Cook Group Inc. · filed 2017-09-11(c)

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), does not have any application in a patent case.

Section 1391 does not supplement the patent venue rules in § 1400(b), even when affiliated defendants reside in different states.

Tower Labs., Ltd. v. Lush Cosmetics Ltd. · filed 2018-01-24

This does not mean, however, that Plaintiff has thrown in the towel; on the contrary, Tower believes that § 1400(b) should yield to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. ... The Supreme Court, admittedly, did not address the circumstances here-in which companies that reside in various states are affiliated corporate entities-but its broad, unqualified language regarding the force of § 1400(b) precludes the outcome Plaintiff seeks, as other courts have recently held.

Section 1391 does not supplement the exclusive venue rules for patent infringement actions.

Genuine Enabling Tech., LLC v. Nintendo Co. · filed 2019-02-25

This statute constitutes "the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings and [is] not supplemented or modified by the general venue statutes," set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) does not govern venue for a patent holder’s declaratory judgment action for infringement when the holder has an actionable patent infringement claim.

Apicore US LLC v. Beloteca, Inc. · filed 2019-04-18(b)

Accordingly, the Court finds that venue is not proper here because § 1400(b), not § 1391, governs this case.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in Hatch-Waxman patent infringement actions; venue is governed exclusively by § 1400(b).

AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. · filed 2019-10-18

Fourth, and finally, AstraZeneca asserts that given “the unique nature” of Hatch-Waxman litigation, venue is proper under the general venue statute of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 in addition to § 1400(b). See D.I. 39 at 19. Chief Judge Stark rejected this very argument in Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2018 WL 5109836, at *5-—*6. For the cogent reasons stated in that opinion, I agree that this case “is incontestably a ‘civil action for patent infringement’ [and therefore] venue is governed solely and exclusively by § 1400(b).” Jd. at *6.

Section 1391(b)(1)'s residence rule does not establish venue for a patent infringement claim governed by § 1400(b).

FCX Solar, LLC v. FTC Solar, Inc. · filed 2021-10-25(b)(1)

As TC Heartland made clear, residence under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) has a different scope then residence under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).

Section 1391(c) does not govern venue for domestic defendants in Hatch-Waxman patent infringement actions; § 1400(b) controls.

Celgene Corporation v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. · filed 2021-11-05(c)

Celgene also argues—largely on policy grounds— that venue in Hatch-Waxman cases should be governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), the general venue provision. But TC Heartland and Valeant say otherwise. ... It follows that § 1400(b) is the sole venue pro- vision with respect to domestic defendants in Hatch-Wax- man actions.

Section 1391 does not determine venue in patent infringement cases; § 1400(b) does.

Rugged Cross Hunting Blinds, LLC v. Good Sportsman's Marketing, LLC · filed 2024-01-22

In patent infringement cases, venue is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) rather than 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern patent infringement actions; § 1400(b) governs their venue.

Kageta Tech LLC v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2024-03-06

Venue in patent cases is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), rather than the more permissive general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not govern patent infringement claims; § 1400(b) controls venue for those claims.

VDPP, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. · filed 2024-03-27

For most claims brought in federal court, “[t]he general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, governs a plaintiff’s choice of venue.” Id. Patent infringement claims are an exception. Venue for patent infringement claims is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).

Section 1391 does not supplement the exclusive patent venue rules in § 1400(b).

LOYAL-T SYSTEMS LLC v. AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY · filed 2024-10-03

While personal jurisdiction considerations may be relevant to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the Supreme Court has confirmed that Section 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent cases.

Section 1391’s general venue rules do not establish venue for patent infringement suits, which are governed by § 1400.

Ps Products Inc. v. Panther Trading Co. Inc. · filed 2024-12-06

In each of the twenty-five ... lawsuits filed, PSP incorrectly asserted venue based on the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, rather than the patent-specific venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400.

Section 1391 does not provide venue for patent infringement actions; § 1400 is the sole statutory basis.

Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Valve Corporation · filed 2025-01-31

An objectively reasonable attorney would not believe and would not have alleged—four times—that venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 when it is clear that 28 U.S.C. § 1400 is the sole statutory basis for venue in patent cases.

Section 1391(b)’s general venue rules do not govern patent infringement actions; § 1400(b) exclusively controls venue in those actions.

Buzz Seating, Inc. v. Reimers Furniture MFG, Inc. · filed 2025-09-29(b)

The general venue provision invokes considerations as to where the defendants reside, where a substantial part of the events took place, and where any property subject to the action is situated. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Patent infringement cases are special. “28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions.”

Section 1391(b)(3) does not provide fallback venue for patent infringement claims against domestic defendants when § 1400(b) governs.

Netlist, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. · filed 2026-03-06(b)(3)

This Court has previously established that “28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the ‘sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions’ and is not supplemented by the general venue statutes.” ... Accordingly, Plaintiff’s invocation of § 1391 in this case is unavailing.

Section 1391(c)(2)’s corporate-residence rule does not govern venue in patent infringement actions; § 1400(b) controls.

Cactus Wellhead, LLC v. Cameron International Corporation · filed 2026-03-12(c)(2)

Cameron’s opening brief cites 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) when arguing that venue would be proper in the Southern District of Texas because Cameron is subject to personal jurisdiction there. Cameron mistakenly identifies the law. See TC Heartland, 581 U.S. at 266 (citing Fourco Glass, 353 U.S. at 229) (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the “sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions” and is not supplemented by the general venue statutes).

Section 1391(c) does not control venue in patent infringement actions; § 1400(b) is the exclusive venue provision.

Core Distribution v. World Trade Corporation · filed 2026-05-07(c)

But that’s not quite right. “The Supreme Court in TC Heartland reaffirmed that § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions.”

Section 1391(c)'s corporate venue rule does not supplement the exclusive venue rule for patent infringement actions in § 1400(b).

Holub Industries, Inc. v. Charles C. Wyche, United States District Judge · filed 1961-05-13(c)

We held in Dow Chemical Co. v. Melton Corp., 4 Cir., 281 F.2d 292, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229, 77 S.Ct. 787, 792, 1 L.Ed.2d 786, that this statute “is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).”

Section 1391(c)'s corporate venue rule does not supplement the exclusive venue rule for patent infringement suits.

Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. · filed 1971-04-29(c)

However, for completely understandable reasons, no attempt was made by plaintiff to obtain service under that section, and no consideration need be given to this jurisdictional question, because, as has been noted, § 1391(c) is of no assistance to plaintiff here.

Section 1391(c)’s corporate residence rule does not expand venue for patent infringement actions governed by § 1400(b).

Action Communication Systems, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp. · filed 1977-01-27(c)

Plaintiff’s argument would be most compelling but for the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 77 S.Ct. 787, 1 L.Ed.2d 786 (1957). There the Court specifically ruled that the general venue statute § 1391(c) does not modify the special patent statute § 1400(b). Thus, venue was improper in a judicial district where the Defendant was merely “doing business” as provided in § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) does not supplement the exclusive patent infringement venue rules in § 1400(b), including for contributory infringement and inducement claims.

Ipco Hospital Supply Corp. v. Les Fils D'Auguste Maillefer S.A. · filed 1978-03-07(c)

that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Actions for contributory infringement and inducing infringement are exclusively subject to the provisions of section 1400(b) to the same extent as actions for direct infringement.

Section 1391(c)'s corporate residency rule does not apply to venue in patent infringement cases.

Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc. · filed 2017-06-29(c)

Under the general venue statute, which defines residency “[f]or all venue purposes,” a domestic corporation resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). However, the Supreme Court has held that this statute is inapplicable in patent infringement cases.

Section 1391(c) does not govern venue in patent infringement suits; the patent venue statute does.

Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc. · filed 2017-09-28(c)

When reserving the issue, Lego Systems errantly cited the inapplicable general venue statute ( 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) ) instead of the patent venue statute ( 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) ) or the provision governing improper venue challenges ( 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ).

Section 1391(c)'s corporate residence rule does not supplement the special venue rule for patent infringement actions in § 1400(b).

Almondnet, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc. · filed 2018-08-21(c)

The issue before that court, stated simply, was whether the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), amended in 1988 to provide that a defendant corporation shall be presumed to reside in any district in which it is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction was intended by Congress to be read together with § 1400 (b), the limited venue statute applicable to an action against a corporation for patent infringement, which requires the action to be brought in the state of its incorporation. ... A reading of TC Heartland as discussed above can only be understood as re-affirming the law as it is was announced in Stonite and Fourco and even before them in Shaw v. Quincy Mining Company , 145 U.S. 444, 453, 12 S.Ct. 935, 36 L.Ed. 768 (1892) ("under the existing Act of Congress, a corporation incorporated in one state only, cannot be compelled to answer in a court of another state"). It did not change the law.

Section 1391(c)(2)'s general definition of corporate residence does not govern venue in patent infringement actions under § 1400(b).

CR Bard, Inc. v. Smiths Medical ASD, Inc. · filed 2020-11-16(c)(2)

This change, which severed § 1400(b) from § 1391(c), made available an objection to venue based on lack of residence for defendants nationwide who were currently involved in pending patent disputes.

Section 1391 governs venue in non-patent civil cases; patent venue is governed by § 1400(b).

Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Infinera Corporation · filed 2021-02-10

Oddly, they cite 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the venue statute for non-patent civil cases.

Section 1391(c)(2)’s general definition of corporate residence does not govern venue in patent infringement actions under § 1400(b).

CR Bard v. AngioDynamics · filed 2020-11-16(c)(2)

In contrast to § 1391’s default definition, the term “resides” as applied to patent venue in § 1400(b) “refers only to the State of incorporation” of corporate defendants.

Section 1391(a)’s diversity venue rule applies to defendants first added after removal because the action against them begins in federal court.

Craft v. Murphy · filed 1957-11-15(a)

There is no question but that if these actions had been originally commenced in this Court, venue as to the Blairs would have been improper, since neither all the plaintiffs nor all the defendants resided in this district. ... This Court is of the opinion that these actions were, as to the Blairs, commenced on October 15, 1957, in this Court and that the case of Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 74 S.Ct. 83, 86, 98 L.Ed. 39, is controlling. ... Since this Court is holding that there is no venue in this district as to the Blairs in either of these cases, the question concerning jurisdiction raised in the Blairs’ motion becomes an academic one and necessitates no action by this Court.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in actions removed from state court; § 1441(a) does.

Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Kirkevold · filed 1980-02-06

Thus, according to Pol-izzi, it is irrelevant if either the federal court or the state court would have initially been a proper forum for venue purposes when actions have been removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Section 1391(a) does not require an ancillary third-party proceeding to satisfy venue requirements independently when venue is proper for the original action.

McGrath v. Lund's Fisheries, Inc. · filed 1959-01-19(a)

There is thus raised some conflict between the aims and purposes of the third party proceeding under Rule 14, F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A., on the one hand and on the other, the venue benefits accruing to a party by virtue of the venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... A great majority, and all of the later cases and text writers, take the position that the venue of the third party proceedings will follow that of the original proceedings and third party defendants may be brought in without regard to venue. ... I am of the opinion that the motion to dismiss the third party complaint in so far as the movant is concerned must be denied.

Section 1391 does not give a third party defendant joined on a counterclaim a stricter venue rule than prevailing jurisdictional principles require.

Jorgensen Bros. v. Commerce-Pacific, Inc. · filed 1962-07-03

We do not think that the venue statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, § 1392, ... entitle a third party defendant to a more strict venue construction than current prevailing jurisdictional concepts.

Section 1391(b) need not independently support venue over third-party defendants when venue is proper in the principal action.

Garner v. Enright · filed 1976-07-27(b)

Assuming no independent basis for venue over third-party defendants exists under § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, or the general federal question venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), an independent foundation is unnecessary provided venue is properly laid in the principal action.

Section 1391’s general venue rules yield to Rule 14 when a third party defendant is impleaded, so that defendant may not contest venue.

F & D, INC. v. O'Hara & Kendall Aviation, Inc. · filed 1982-07-14

Combs, as a third party defendant, may not contest venue: “This circuit has long held that Rule 14 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] overrides the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and that an impleaded third party defendant may not raise the venue issue.”

In a diversity case, contingent cross-claims treated as third-party claims and the plaintiff’s claims against those defendants need not independently satisfy the venue requirements of § 1391(a).

Carcella v. L & L Coach Lines, Inc. · filed 1984-07-27(a)

Under such circumstances, and in view of the existence of personal jurisdiction over the Quick defendants as discussed supra, it is appropriate for this Court to view and to treat the cross-claims as the equivalent of third-party claims, which do not require the satisfaction of any venue requirements, ... and to allow the plaintiff to claim against the cross-claim defendants without having to satisfy any venue requirement.

Section 1391 venue is determined when the plaintiff files suit; a later claim against a third-party defendant does not change that venue determination.

Andersen v. Sportmart, Inc. · filed 1999-07-14

The thrust of these authorities, as applied in this case, is that lack of personal jurisdiction over a third-party defendant does not affect the appropriateness of the venue choice made by a plaintiff at the outset of the litigation.

Section 1391 permits venue for a third-party complaint in the district where the alleged work and injury occurred.

Cuddeback v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2022-04-12(b)(2)

The proposed third-party complaint also satisfies the venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because it alleges that C&H conducted work on the parking lot where Plaintiff fell in O’Fallon, Ilinois, which is located within this District.

Section 1391(c)(3) allows a foreign corporate defendant to be sued in any judicial district.

Craig v. American Tuna Inc. · filed 2022-04-01(c)(3)

Here, Defendant American Tuna is a California corporation headquartered in San Diego, California, and Defendant WWF, a foreign corporation, is subject to suit in any judicial district.

Section 1391(c)(3) allows a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

Downrange Headquarters v. 2494924 Ontario Inc · filed 2019-11-22(c)(3)

Defendants claim that venue is improper, Dkt. Nos. 8, 9 at 17–18, but 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) provides that “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district.” ... Venue is thus irrelevant to this case and Defendants’ argument fails.

Section 1391(d) permits an alien corporation to be sued in any district.

State of Maryland Ex Rel. Mitchell v. Capital Airlines, Inc. · filed 1961-11-11(d)

The moving defendants are alien corporations, and as such have no residence in this country and by the express terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) are suable in any district.

Section 1391(d) permits an alien to be sued in any district and supplements the antitrust venue provisions.

Hoffman Motors Corporation v. Alfa Romeo SpA · filed 1965-07-28(d)

The general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, including that with respect to aliens should be considered as supplementing the prior provisions in the anti-trust act in accordance with congressional intent.

Section 1391(d) permits an alien corporation to be sued in any district.

Japan Gas Lighter Association v. Ronson Corp. · filed 1966-07-15(d)

Since Nationale is an alien corporation, venue is proper for it in any district by virtue of the express terms of Subsection 1391(d).

Section 1391(c) does not apply to alien corporations.

Scott v. Middle East Airlines Co., SA · filed 1965-02-26(c)

Since, however MEA is an alien corporation, § 1391(c) is inapplicable.

Section 1391(d) permits an alien defendant, including an alien corporation, to be sued in any district.

Seilon, Inc. v. Brema S.P.A. · filed 1967-07-25(d)

With respect to venue, the defendants’ motion is not well taken. The general venue statute provides that an alien defendant may be sued in any district, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) and this rule applies to alien corporations as well as individuals.

Section 1391(d) allows an alien corporation to be sued in any district and supplements the patent venue rule in § 1400(b).

Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Laboratori Pro-Ter Prodotti Therapeutici S. P. A. · filed 1967-10-06(d)

On the contrary, Fourco’s rationale, which was based almost entirely on the Reviser’s Notes, indicates a Congressional intent that the requirements of § 1400(b) were not to be exclusive in suits against aliens but were to be supplemented by § 1391(d).

Section 1391(d) permits an alien to be sued in any federal district.

SCM Corporation v. Brother International Corporation · filed 1970-08-12(d)

After carefully considering these alternatives as well as their underlying authority, this Court is persuaded by and has decided to adopt the well-considered opinion of Judge Mansfield in Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Laboratori Pro-Ter Prodotti Therapeutici S.p.A., supra. ... That Section 1391(d) is applicable to patent infringement actions is further suggested by the Reviser’s notes to that section.

Section 1391(d) allows an alien to be sued in any federal district.

Kockum Industries, Inc. v. Brunette MacHine Works Ltd. · filed 1971-04-20(d)

Judge Mansfield there ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) controls. We agree with that decision and" with the carefully reasoned opinion upon which it is based.

Section 1391(d) allows an alien to be sued in any district.

Vogel v. Jones · filed 1971-05-17(d)

Such apparent anomaly does not result essentially from the ancillary nature of the discovery proceedings alone, but is also a consequence of the venue statute applicable to aliens. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), "[a]n alien may be sued in any district."

Section 1391(d) permits a resident plaintiff to sue an alien in any district where valid service can be made, but it does not create personal jurisdiction.

Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris Corp. · filed 1977-03-24(d)

Section 1391(d), as its title indicates, is a venue statute and not a statute creating personal jurisdiction in federal district courts. The effect of Sec. 1391(d) is to permit a resident plaintiff to bring an action against an alien in any district where valid service can be made upon the alien.

Section 1391(d) permits suit against an alien in a district even when another venue provision would not permit it.

RCA RECORDS, a DIV. OF RCA CORP. v. Hanks · filed 1982-09-16(d)

Once alienage is established, § 1391(d) takes precedence over all other venue provisions.

Section 1391(d) allows an alien corporation to be sued in any district.

Papafagos v. Fiat Auto, S.P.A. · filed 1983-08-08(d)

Fiat’s argument that the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (c) are here applicable is without merit. Fiat is admittedly an alien corporation, and, as such, venue is to be determined as to it by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), which provides: “An alien may be sued in any district.”

Section 1391(d) permits an alien defendant to be sued in any district, including in a patent infringement action.

Fairfax Dental (Ireland) Ltd. v. S.J. Filhol Ltd. · filed 1986-09-19(d)

However, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), which provides that an alien may be sued in any district, does apply in patent suits.

Section 1391(d) permits an alien defendant to be sued in any district.

Hantover, Inc. v. Omet, S.N.C. of Volentieri & C. · filed 1988-06-09(d)

Moreover, this case falls under the provisions of Section 1391(d), which provides that an alien may be sued in any district. Because each defendant named in plaintiff’s first amended complaint is a resident of Italy (see affidavit of Sergio Volentieri, attached as Exhibit A to Omet’s motion to dismiss, at 113), Section 1391(d) applies and venue is properly in this Court.

Section 1391(d) permits an alien defendant to be sued in any district.

Xuncax v. Gramajo · filed 1995-04-12(d)

Venue is proper in this District because defendant, an alien, was served with process while he was present in Massachusetts on a visit from Guatemala.

Section 1391(d) permits venue against a foreign corporation in any district, including in an antitrust action under the Clayton Act.

In Re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litigation · filed 2001-04-25(d)

This Court therefore holds that plaintiffs can rely on § 1391(d) for venue and on Section 12's extraterritorial service and personal jurisdiction provision to the "bounds permitted by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."

Section 1391(d) permits a foreign corporation to be sued in any federal judicial district.

Gateway, Inc. v. Vitech America, Inc. · filed 2001-06-01(d)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mi-crotec from the lawsuit in the Southern District of New York is denied.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits suit against a foreign defendant in any judicial district but does not prevent transfer under section 1404(a).

In Re Princeton Digital Image Corp. · filed 2012-11-26(c)(3)

Princeton relies on Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972) in urging us to adopt the position that when venue is properly established under section 1391(c)(3), as it is in this case in the Eastern District of Texas, all other gen- eral and special venue laws are inoperable, including section 1404(a). Princeton overreads Brunette. ... Nothing of that nature is involved when a case is transferred pursuant to section 1404(a). There is no question that a federal court will have jurisdiction, only which federal court is the most convenient and fair for trial. We therefore discern no error in the trial court's decision to transfer this case.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a foreign defendant to be sued in any judicial district.

Adaptix, Inc. v. HTC Corp. · filed 2013-03-28(c)(3)

As a foreign entity, HTC Corporation venue is proper in any district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3).

Section 1391(c)(3) allows a defendant who is not resident in the United States to be sued in any judicial district and excludes that defendant when determining venue for other defendants.

Tatung Co. v. Hsu · filed 2014-09-02(c)(3)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district, and the joinder of such a defendant shall be disregarded in determining where the action may be brought with respect to other defendants.” Therefore, it appears that Movants themselves cannot argue that venue is improper under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1). ... Therefore, the Court DENIES Movants’ Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits suit against defendants residing outside the United States in any judicial district, even when a special venue statute applies.

Ramzan v. GDS Holdings Limited · filed 2019-09-30(c)(3)

Accordingly, as GDS, Huang, and Newman reside outside of the United States, venue is proper pursuant to Section 1391 in any district, including the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(d) does not satisfy the Clayton Act’s venue requirement for invoking its worldwide service provision.

In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litigation · filed 2019-10-04(d)

However, if venue is not proper under the Clayton Act, then Plaintiffs cannot rely on § 1391(d) to apply the Clayton Act’s worldwide service provisions and establish personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.

Section 1391(c)(3) allows a foreign defendant to be sued in any judicial district.

Fitbit, Inc v. Koninklijke Philips N.V. · filed 2020-08-26(c)(3)

In terms of venue, Philips, as a foreign entity, may be sued in any judicial district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3).

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a foreign entity to be sued in any judicial district.

Fitbit LLC v. Koninklijke Philips N.V. · filed 2020-08-26(c)(3)

In terms of venue, Philips, as a foreign entity, may be sued in any judicial district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3).

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a foreign corporation with no U.S. residence to be sued in any judicial district and precludes it from challenging venue.

George's, Inc. v. Lloyd's of London Syndicate 4000 Issuing Certificate Number CPP1877167 · filed 2020-11-20(c)(3)

The Court is persuaded by the rationales set forth in these cases and agrees that § 1391(c)(3) precludes foreign corporations from challenging venue.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant that does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

In re California Gasoline Spot Market Antitrust Litigation · filed 2020-12-18(c)(3)

As Plaintiffs note in their opposition brief, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district.” SK Trading does not respond to this argument, and in fact, makes no reference to venue in its reply brief. The motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) is therefore denied.

Section 1391(c) permits a defendant who is not a U.S. resident to be sued in any judicial district.

Google LLC v. Starovikov · filed 2021-12-16(c)

Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) because Defendants are not residents of the United States and may be sued in any judicial district.

Section 1391 permits a foreign corporation to be sued in any district even when other defendants are domestic.

Allen v. Foxway Transportation, Inc. · filed 2022-01-27(c)(3)

Gateway does not cite caselaw requiring all defendants to be foreign before the alien-venue rule can apply against particular foreign defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 does not require this either. So the alien-venue rule still applies here.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant that does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

Swissdigital USA Co., LTD v. WENGER S.A. · filed 2022-05-11(c)(3)

Wenger asserts that this case could have originally been brought in the Southern District of Florida because “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district.” ECF No. 27 at 8; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Plaintiff does not dispute that venue would have been proper in the Southern District of Florida. This Court finds that venue would have been proper in the Southern District of Florida; thus, the Court proceeds with its analysis of the private and public interest factors to determine if the Southern District of Florida is clearly more convenient than the Western District of Texas.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a foreign corporation to be sued in any judicial district.

MemoryWeb, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. · filed 2022-06-17(c)(3)

In addition, SEC is a foreign corporation, and venue is proper over SEC in any district, including the NDCA. Id. at 6–7; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3). MemoryWeb does not dispute either point. See generally ECF No. 51. This Court finds that had MemoryWeb originally filed its case in the NDCA, venue would have been proper.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant not resident in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

EcoFactor, Inc. v. Ecobee Inc. · filed 2022-08-22(c)(3)

Accordingly, under 28 U.S.C § 1391(c)(3), venue is proper in this District for a foreign corporation as “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district.”

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

Google LLC v. Starovikov · filed 2022-09-30(c)(3)

Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) because Doe Defendants are not residents of the United States and may be sued in any judicial district.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

Betty's Best, Inc. v. Yuyao Aggpo Electronic Technology Co. LTD · filed 2022-12-15(c)(3)

Venue against foreign defendants is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), which states that “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district.” Because Defendants do not reside in any one state, venue is also proper in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

Doe v. d'Espalungue d'Arros · filed 2024-01-19(c)(3)

Venue is proper because the assault occurred in the Western District of Louisiana, the Plaintiffs reside in Lafayette, Louisiana, and because the Defendant is a foreign national who may be sued in any judicial district.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant that does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

Shenzhen Wanfan Technology Co. Ltd. v. Orbital Structures Pty Ltd · filed 2024-01-29(c)(3)

While Orbital argues that venue is improper in this District, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), “a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district.” Orbital therefore has no basis to argue that the case should be dismissed for improper venue.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district, regardless of citizenship.

Yogaratnam v. Doe · filed 2024-02-23(c)(3)

Venue is proper in this District because Defendants are not residents in the United States, and therefore may be sued in any judicial district.

Section 1391(c)(3) permits a defendant who does not reside in the United States to be sued in any judicial district.

Yogaratnam v. Doe · filed 2024-05-08(c)(3)

Venue is proper in this District because Defendants are not residents in the United States, and therefore may be sued in any judicial district.