28 U.S.C. § 1391

Federal venue under § 1391 cannot be displaced by a state law limiting actions against a state agency to courts in a particular county.

Sherman v. Ulmer · filed 1961-12-08

Since (1) the Commission is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, (2) it is a citizen for diversity purposes (Gerr v. Emrick, supra), (3) there is a substantive right of action against it and a remedy for its enforcement in a state court, and (4) the enforcement of this right in a federal court will produce an end result no different from that reached in a state court, we hold that the limitation of actions against the Commission to “the proper courts at the county of Dauphin” is procedural and not substantive and is ineffective either to oust federal jurisdiction or disturb federal venue.

Section 1391(a) governs venue in diversity actions; state venue statutes do not apply.

Accurate Controls, Inc. v. Cerro Gordo County Board of Supervisors · filed 2009-06-18(a)

To put it another way, where a “transitory” action, such as this one, not involving real property, is in federal court solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, venue is determined by the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), “and State venue statutes are not applicable.”

Section 1391(e) does not apply to actions in the District Court of the Canal Zone because the Canal Zone is not a judicial district under Title 28.

Doyle v. Fleming · filed 1963-07-08(e)

The Canal Zone is not included and it would follow therefore that § 1391(e) above is not applicable.

Section 1391(a) governs venue for transitory diversity actions, not local actions concerning property.

Pellerin Laundry MacHinery Sales Company v. Hogue · filed 1963-07-12(a)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391, fails to distinguish clearly between transitory and local actions, but despite the ineptness of the section, it applies only to transitory actions.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant is found when an action seeks only monetary damages for injury to property and does not affect its ownership or use.

French v. Clinchfield Coal Co. · filed 1976-01-06

Where, as here, the action is not shown to have an effect on the continued ownership or use of the property, but involves only monetary damages for the injury done to the owner, the action is transitory, and venue lies where the defendant is found.

Section 1391’s general venue provisions permit a local action seeking possession of property only in the district where the property is located.

Central Transport, Inc. v. Theurer, Inc. · filed 1977-04-15(a), (c)

It is therefore determined that the lawsuit is local in nature and that venue is proper only in the district where the tires are located.

Section 1391(c) applies to a transitory lease and damages action seeking personal relief, even when the action may indirectly affect land outside the district.

Raphael J. Musicus, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Incorporated · filed 1984-09-05(c)

We therefore conclude that the plaintiff’s action to recover various types of damages caused by the defendant’s alleged breaches of the two leases and its fraudulent misrepresentations and to adjudicate the respective rights of the parties under the leases would be characterized as transitory under both Illinois and federal law. The federal venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) therefore apply, and venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where the claim arose, and related trespass claims do not make an action local when its primary claims seek reconveyance for fraud and undue influence.

Firestone v. Galbreath · filed 1989-09-27(b)

Venue is proper in the district in which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... The claims for trespass alone do not render the entire action a local action, where plaintiffs’ primary claims seek re-conveyance of the property on the grounds of fraud and undue influence.

Section 1391(a)(2) removes the local action distinction from venue decisions, but does not change the local action doctrine’s effect on subject matter jurisdiction.

Eldee-K Rental Properties, LLC v. Directv, Inc. · filed 2014-04-09(a)(2)

Venue and subject matter jurisdiction are distinct concepts, and Congress’s rejection of the local action doctrine in the venue context does not overrule the Supreme Court’s prior determination that the local action doctrine is jurisdictional.

Section 1391(a)(2) requires proper venue to be determined without regard to whether an action is local or transitory.

Tap Rock Resources LLC v. Marathon Oil Permian LLC · filed 2023-11-30(a)(2)

In December 2011, Section 1391(a) was amended to remove any distinction between local or transitory actions.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil lawsuits and does not determine a bankruptcy debtor’s residence for venue under § 1408.

In Re FRG, Inc. · filed 1989-07-28

Section 1391 of the Judicial Code is a general venue section applicable to civil litigation governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ... The reference to “defendants” plainly indicates the section’s inapplicability to the question of residence of a debtor in a bankruptcy case.

Section 1391(c)'s corporate-residence rule does not apply to bankruptcy proceedings.

In re L. F. Popell Co. · filed 1963-08-30(c)

To begin with, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) clearly does not apply to bankruptcy proceedings so that any argument based upon it must proceed on the-basis of analogy only.

Section 1391 does not specify where to file a bankruptcy case or permit a related civil proceeding where the bankruptcy case is pending unless all defendants reside in that district.

In Re Johnson County Gas Co., Inc. · filed 1983-06-13

The venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 do not offer guidance as to where a bankruptcy case may be filed and certainly do not authorize a civil proceeding to be commenced in a court where a bankruptcy case is pending unless all the defendants reside in the district.

Section 1391(b) does not govern venue for an adversary proceeding alleging post-petition breaches of a pre-petition contract when § 1409(a) provides venue.

Nutri/System, Inc. v. Carma, Inc. (In Re Nutri/System, Inc.) · filed 1993-10-05(b)

However, we hold that because this adversary proceeding involves allegations of post-petition breaches of a pre-petition contract, venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a), and therefore section 1409(d) and section 1391(b) are inapplicable.

Section 1391 is not the statutory basis for venue in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding; § 1409 governs.

Stephen C Jenkins - Adversary Proceeding · filed 2019-09-04

and erroneously referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as the statutory basis for venue of the action.

Section 1391(f) permits a contribution claim between alleged tortfeasors arising from an automobile accident to be brought in the district where the accident occurred.

North River Insurance v. Davis · filed 1965-01-04(f)

I hold this district to be the proper venue under subsection (f) because, as I pointed out in the opening paragraphs of this opinion, this claim is essentially a tort claim and Congress has allowed the trial of such claims in the district in which they arise.

Section 1391(f) permits an automobile accident action to be brought in the district where the accident occurred.

Tiernan v. Westext Transport, Inc. · filed 1965-06-29(f)

Venue over all defendants would be properly laid in Massachusetts under the new provision for automobile accident cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (f).

Section 1391(e) applies to actions pending when it was enacted.

C. F. Pruess, Sr. v. Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of Interior · filed 1965-11-19(e)

Initially, we must consider whether Section 1391(e) should be taken to apply to cases pending at the time of its passage. We conclude that it does.

Section 1391(b)'s 1990 amendment applies to actions pending on its effective date when applying it causes no manifest injustice.

VDI TECHNOLOGIES v. Price · filed 1991-12-19(b)

Similarly, this court finds that the amendment at issue of section 1391(b) does not alter substantive rules of conduct, nor will applying it to the case at bar, which was pending on the effective date of the revision, result in a manifest injustice.

The 1990 amendment to § 1391(b) applies to pending cases because it is procedural, provided its application does not result in manifest injustice.

Moore v. Agency for International Development · filed 1993-06-15(b)

Section 1391(b) is a procedural rule; it does not alter substantive law. ... Nor does the application of the 1990 version here result in manifest injustice. Accordingly, we conclude that section 1391(b) as amended in 1990 applies.

Section 1391(c) applies to venue under the Jones Act.

Pierce v. Elk Towing Co. · filed 1966-04-20(c)

The sole question raised in each of these appeals is whether the venue provision of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 was expanded by the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Subsequently the United States Supreme Court in Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 86 *505S.Ct. 1394, 16 L.Ed.2d 474 (1966), overruled Leith, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 applied. ... We of course must reverse the district court on the authority of Pure Oil.

Section 1391(c)'s definition of corporate residence applies to the Jones Act's venue provision, allowing suit where a corporate employer does business.

Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez · filed 1966-05-16(c)

We conclude that here, in contrast to the situation dealt with in Fourco, the basic intent of the Congress is best furthered by carrying the broader residence definition of § 1391 (c) into the Jones Act.

Section 1391 supplies the venue rules for Jones Act claims after Congress removed the Jones Act’s venue provision.

Havener v. Gabby G Fisheries Inc. · filed 2021-02-12

Accordingly, the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, applies to Plaintiff’s Jones Act claims.

Section 1391(c)'s definition of a corporation's residence for venue applies to Jones Act actions.

Haskins v. Point Towing Co. · filed 1968-05-16(c)

The statement in Leith was made in the context of deciding that the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) of a corporation’s residence for venue did not apply to venue under the Jones Act, which was overruled in Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, supra, n. 15.

Section 1391(e) does not establish venue in a district without facts supporting venue there.

Amari J. Moody v. Broadview Federal Credit Union · filed 2026-04-16(e)

... Plaintiff improperly cited 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as a basis for venue, failed to provide a factual basis for venue in the Southern District of New York, and improperly put forth a merits argument to address the issue of venue. ... Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety.

Section 1391(e)(1)(B) permits venue in a suit against a federal official where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

State of Missouri v. United States Department of Interior - Bureau of Reclamation · filed 2020-06-08(e)(1)(B)

Thus, there is no dispute that the District of North Dakota would be a proper venue for this proceeding.

Section 1391(e)(1) does not provide venue based on a federal officer’s residence after that officer is dismissed from the case.

Little v. King · filed 2011-01-20(e)(1)

In support of finding venue proper in this District, Little points to § 1391(e), which provides: “A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity ... may ... be brought in any judicial district in which ... a defendant in the action resides ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). With Attorney General Holder dismissed as a defendant, this provision is inapplicable.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in an action against federal officials where the cause of action arose or the land involved is located.

Exxon Corp. v. Lujan · filed 1990-02-02(e)

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as the cause of action arose in Wyoming and the lands involved are situated therein.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where all defendants reside or where the claim arose.

Pollack v. Meese · filed 1990-03-28(b)

Since none of the individual defendants resides in the District of Columbia, and the alleged offenses did not arise in the District of Columbia, proper venue in this district cannot be established under § 1391(b).

Section 1391(e) governs venue for an action in the nature of mandamus against a federal agency for failure to perform a mandatory duty.

Citizens for a Better Environment v. Costle · filed 1981-04-15(e)

The action is brought under § 7604(a)(2) and is an action in the nature of mandamus governed by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). Accordingly, ILF’s venue objection is not well-taken and the motion is denied.

Section 1391(e) does not permit service by certified mail on a federal official sued individually for money damages.

Micklus, Gregory Bernard v. Carlson, Norman, Director, U. S. Bureau of Prisons Fenton, Charles, Warden, U.S.P. Lewisburg · filed 1980-09-03(e)

Moreover, as a result of recent guidance from the Supreme Court, the appellant’s apparent suggestion that service by certified mail was sufficient under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) must also be rejected.

Section 1391(e) does not provide personal jurisdiction over federal officers sued in their individual capacities.

McKnight v. Civiletti · filed 1980-10-09(e)

Although the issue before the Court in Stafford was whether venue was proper, its broad holding makes it clear that § 1391(e) may not be invoked to assert personal jurisdiction over federal officers sued in an individual capacity.

Section 1391(e)'s venue and service provisions do not apply to damages actions against federal officials or agents sued in their individual capacities.

Fox v. Harris · filed 1980-04-25(e)

The liberal venue provisions of section 1391(e) do not govern damages actions brought against federal officials or agents in their individual capacities.

Section 1391(e) does not provide expanded venue for personal damages suits against federal officials.

Stafford v. Briggs · filed 1980-02-20(e)

A suit for money damages which must be paid out of the pocket of the private individual who happens to be — or formerly was — employed by the Federal Government plainly is not one “essentially against the United States,” and thus is not encompassed by the venue provisions of § 1391 (e).

Section 1391(e) did not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants in this action.

Grove Press, Inc. v. Central Intelligence Agency · filed 1979-09-10(e)

The district court, Hon. Vincent L. Broderick, judge, denied the motion, sustaining jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). ... The issues involved here have been decided by our opinion in Blackburn v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1979). ... For these reasons, the order of the district court is reversed and the matter remanded to that court to determine whether personal jurisdiction over the defendants was had under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1978-1979).

Section 1391(e) does not apply to personal damages actions against federal officials sued in their individual capacities.

Blackburn v. Guy L. Goodwin, and John J. Kearney, Lewis Cole v. Guy L. Goodwin, and John J. Kearney · filed 1979-09-10(e)

Although the case is not without difficulty, we are persuaded that section 1391(e) does not apply here. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court and dismiss both complaints as to the appellant Goodwin for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(e) does not provide venue over former federal officers or employees who left federal service before suit was filed.

Lamont v. Haig · filed 1978-10-16(e)

We now reaffirm Relf and explicitly hold that former federal officers and employees are beyond the reach of Section 1391(e).

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the plaintiff’s district of residence for a civil action against federal officers or employees acting in their official capacities.

Smith v. U. S. Board of Parole · filed 1967-05-19(e)

Venue is proper in the District of plaintiff’s residence in a civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States acting in his official capacity. Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1391(e).

Section 1391(e) provides venue only when each defendant is a qualifying federal officer, employee, or agency.

Chase Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board · filed 1967-05-23(e)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) only applies where “each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States” (emphasis supplied). Liberty does not qualify under any of the above-quoted language.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in this district for an action against the Secretary of Agriculture.

Cranston v. Freeman · filed 1968-08-02(e)

Venue is properly laid in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(e) broadens venue for actions against heads of executive departments and permits service of process outside the district.

Silberberg v. Willis · filed 1969-12-02(e)

Although they were in the District of Columbia they were validly served on November 12. They then became subject to the jurisdiction of this Court over their persons. This follows from 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(e) which broadens the venue of actions against heads of executive departments and provides for extraterritorial service of process.

Section 1391(e) permits an action essentially against the United States to be brought locally even when nonfederal parties are joined as co-defendants.

MacIas v. Finch · filed 1970-01-05(e)

This court accepts the government’s basic contention that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) does not contemplate that a federal official in Washington should be dragged into every local controversy involving both private and governmental parties. Nonetheless, when Congress added subsection (e) to section 1391 in 1962, it did express an intent to broaden the allowable venue to an extent somewhat beyond the literal terms of the language which it used in its enactment. ... Thus, when read in conjunction with the congressional commentary surrounding its enactment, section 1391(e) appears to envision that a federal defendant residing in Washington could be brought into an action outside Washington although non-federal parties were also joined as co-defendants where the action was “essentially against the United States.” ... Accordingly, this court finds against the federal defendant’s contentions concerning lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.

Section 1391(e) sets venue requirements for actions against federal officers.

Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney · filed 1970-04-06(e)

The court also determines that the venue requirements of § 1391(e) are satisfied.

Section 1391(e) provides venue for a mandamus action against federal officers.

Feliciano v. Laird · filed 1970-04-16(e)

Original jurisdiction to issue mandamus has been vested in the several district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), and venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964).

Section 1391(e) permits a civil action against federal officers acting officially to be brought in any district where one defendant resides.

Nestor v. Hershey · filed 1969-12-16(e)

Section 1391(e) requires only that once it is determined that “each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity,” then venue is proper in any judicial district in which “a defendant * * * resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) (1964) (Emphasis added).

Section 1391(e) permits suits against federal officers in a district where a defendant resides, the cause of action arose, property is situated, or the plaintiff resides when no real property is involved.

United States Ex Rel. Lohmeyer v. Laird · filed 1970-05-20(e)

In the instant case the petitioner is a resident of Maryland. Hence, under section 1391(e) (4) of Title 28 suit was properly brought in this district.

Section 1391(e) permits an action against a federal officer or agency to be brought in specified districts, including where the defendant resides, where the cause of action arose, or where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Arlett Peoples v. United States Department of Agriculture · filed 1970-05-26(e)

It provides for venue in any district where the defendant resides, where the cause of action arose, where real property involved in the action is situated, or if no real property is involved where plaintiff resides.

Section 1391(e) permits a civil action against a federal officer where the plaintiff resides, but does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings governed by § 2241.

Switkes v. Laird · filed 1970-07-02(e)

A habeas corpus proceeding is not believed to be a “civil action” as those words are used in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). While habeas corpus is often said to be “civil”, the Supreme Court has said that this label is “gross and inexact” and that “the proceeding is unique”. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-294, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969). Moreover, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 authorizing the district courts to grant the writ “within their respective jurisdictions” would seem to be an instance of “otherwise provided by law” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(e) permits venue and service in an action only when every defendant is a United States officer or employee acting in an official capacity or under color of legal authority.

Stinson v. Finch · filed 1970-08-03(e)

However, the statute by its express terms applies only to actions in which each defendant is a United States officer and employee — a condition which is not met in the instant case — and this court declines to hold that personal jurisdiction exists when Congress has plainly decreed otherwise.

Section 1391(e) permits suit outside the District of Columbia against national government officials and agencies, but does not extend to essentially local federal agencies such as local Selective Service boards.

Holicky v. Selective Service Local Board No. 3 · filed 1971-06-28(e)

The legislative history of 1391(e) resolves this difficulty in plaintiff’s favor; Congress did intend to expand the reach of federal trial courts. However, that same legislative history also rather strongly suggests that our reach does not extend to agencies such as local Selective Service boards.

Subsection (e) allows an action involving a federal agency or officer to be brought where the cause arose, including when the action also includes nonfederal defendants.

Heath v. Aspen Skiing Corporation · filed 1971-03-30(e)

The Secretary of Agriculture is a necessary party, and if relief were to be granted against defendants, his joinder would be necessary and could be accomplished under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(e) permits a civil action against a federal officer to be brought in the plaintiff’s district of residence when the officer is present there through agents.

Montilla v. Laird · filed 1971-07-17(e)

Plaintiff asserted in its complaint that there was personal jurisdiction by reason of Title 28, Section 1391(e) and by reason of the fact that plaintiff and one of the defendants, the Commander, Headquarters Third U. S. Army — Puerto Rico, Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, are residents in the geographical jurisdiction of this Court. ... This Court believes the problem faced in Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 91 S.Ct. 995, 28 L.Ed.2d 251, 1971, is not present for the action before us is a civil action. ... Thus it can be said that the commanding officer has entered this district through agents and for legal purposes, is thus present in this district.

Section 1391(e) does not make venue proper wherever a subordinate federal official can be found; the district must have some contact with the parties or subject matter.

Kings County Economic Community Development Ass'n v. Hardin · filed 1971-07-21(e)

There are thus three considerations militating against the interpretation urged by plaintiffs: (1) it is inconsistent with the general rule that venue is confined to districts with some minimum contact with the real parties in interest or the subject matter of the action; (2) it assumes that subsections (2), (3), and (4) are unnecessary to § 1391(e) since subsection (1) would, without these other provisions, allow suit in nearly any district chosen by plaintiffs; and (3) it allows the most obvious kind of forum shopping in a category of action of increasing importance and frequency in the federal courts.

Section 1391(e)(4) permits venue where any plaintiff resides when no real property is directly at issue.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 1971-12-08(e)(4)

Section 1391(e) was designed to facilitate plaintiffs in bringing actions against the Government. Such suits serve as one means of keeping government responsive to the citizenry, and of insuring that the myriad executive and administrative agencies respond to the equally multifarious dictates of Congress. Exceptions to § 1391(e) should therefore be construed narrowly. While we agree with the District Court of the District of Columbia that the issue is not entirely free from doubt, we therefore hold that § 831g is not an exception to § 1391(e). ... The court concludes that “the plaintiff” in § 1391(e) (4) means “a plaintiff” rather than “all plaintiffs.” Since plaintiff Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) is admittedly a resident of this District, venue properly lies here. ... The touchstone for applying § 1391(e) (4) cannot sensibly be whether real property is marginally affected by the case at issue. Rather, the action must center directly on the real property, as with actions concerning the right, title or interest in real property. ... Thus, we find that real property is not involved here within the meaning of that section.

Section 1391(e) does not extend its venue provisions to a federal corporation like TVA that was already suable outside the District of Columbia under ordinary venue rules.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority · filed 1972-03-27(e)

The TVA was not within the bill as it had first passed the House, since it was not the sort of federal agency that could have been sued with assurance only in the District of Columbia. ... It did not come within the "mischief" at which the new statute was directed, 7 and to which the Committee said it was limited. TVA had always been suable, subject to the same venue limitations as any other corporation, not only in its congressionally fixed residence, the Northern District of Alabama, but in any district where it did business. ... When the statute is read in its full context, with realization of its purpose, and in light of its legislative history, it is plain that Congress did not so direct.

Section 1391(d) allows an alien defendant to be sued in any federal district because suits against aliens are outside all federal venue laws.

Brunette MacHine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc. · filed 1972-06-07(d)

For § 1391 (d) is properly regarded, not as a venue restriction at all, but rather as a declaration of the long-established rule that suits against aliens are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and special.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the district where the plaintiffs reside under the pleaded facts.

Maddox v. Bradley · filed 1972-06-21(e)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) established venue in the Northern District of Texas under the facts pleaded by plaintiffs.

Section 1391(e) permits certain civil actions against federal officers or agencies to be brought in specified districts.

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army · filed 1972-08-04(e)

Subject matter jurisdiction exists by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and venue is properly laid under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(e) provides venue and jurisdiction in federal district court for mandamus and injunction actions against federal officers but does not create a cause of action or waive sovereign immunity.

Akin Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Development · filed 1972-10-06(e)

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1361 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), relied upon for jurisdiction by the plaintiff, do provide general venue and jurisdiction in the United States District Court of actions against Federal officers in mandamus and injunction cases, they do not create new causes of action nor constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Section 1391(e)(4) permits venue in the plaintiff's district of residence when no real property is involved, and incarceration does not change the plaintiff's residence for that purpose.

Ellingburg v. L. M. Connett, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution Records Office Officials · filed 1972-03-20(e)(4)

Since none of the defendants resides in the Northern District of Texas, venue in the Northern District may not be predicated on Sec. 1391(e) (1). The cause of action arose in the Eastern District of Texas; venue in the Northern District, therefore, may not be predicated on Sec. 1391(e) (2). Sec. 1391(e) (3) may not be used to establish venue in the Northern District of Texas, because no real property is involved in the case. Section 1391(e) (4), however, may be a basis for venue in the Northern District. For purposes of the venue statute, "One does not change his residence to the prison by virtue of being incarcerated there". Cohen v. United States, 9 Cir. 1962, 297 F.2d 760, 774. "It is well established that the words 'inhabitant' and 'resident in', as used in Section 51 of the Judicial Code mean neither more nor less than legal domicile . . .." King v. Wall & Beaver Street Corp., 1945, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 234, 145 F.2d 377, 379. See also Neuberger v. United States, 2 Cir. 1926, 13 F.2d 541; United States v. Stabler, 3 Cir. 1948, 169 F.2d 995; Smith v. Murchison, S.D.N.Y.1970, 310 F.Supp. 1079; 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 2784-90. ... This record is silent as to Ellingburg's domicile/residence. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court for it to determine Ellingburg's "residence". If his "residence" is located in the Northern District of Texas, venue is proper in that district under Sec. 1391(e) (4); if venue is proper, the district court should proceed to hear the case. If venue is not proper, the district court should consider a change of venue under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1406.

Section 1391(e) supports joining a federal agency secretary as an essential party in an action involving federal assistance.

Linker v. Unified School District 259, Wichita, Kansas · filed 1972-06-27(e)

Given these facts, it is elementary that Secretary Richardson, as HEW’s Secretary, is an essential party as contemplated by Rule 19 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), and was properly joined as a party defendant.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in an action against a federal official where the official resides, the claim arose, or the plaintiff resides, with a prisoner's preincarceration domicile controlling.

United States Ex Rel. Harrison v. Pace · filed 1973-04-27(e)

If the action is against a federal official, venue is proper in the district where either the defendant-official resides, where the claim arose or where the plaintiff-petitioner resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). For venue purposes the term “resides” refers to domicile, 1 Moore’s Federal Practice ff 0.142 [5-2], at 1484 n. 5, and a state or federal prisoner retains the domicile he had before he was incarcerated. 25 Am.Jur.2d, Domicile § 41, at 31. An examination of Harrison’s Classification Study, prepared by the Bureau of Prisons, and of his Presentence Report, prepared by the Probation Department, indicates that petitioner was domiciled in Philadelphia before his incarceration at Lewisburg. Hence, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(e) limits where an action seeking mandamus against federal officials may be brought.

McCune v. United States · filed 1974-04-16(e)

Proceedings to mandamus prison and justice department officials must be commenced in one of the districts specified in Section 1391(e) and petitioner, a resident of the Eastern District of New York prior to his incarceration, has entirely failed to demonstrate the propriety of his laying venue for the instant application in this district.

Section 1391(e) permits venue for an action against federal officers in the district where the cause of action arose, even if the plaintiff's residence there is uncertain.

Charles R. Wren, Jr. v. Carlson · filed 1974-09-12(e)

We cannot be sure that jurisdiction in the Northern District of Georgia can be founded on the theory that appellant is resident therein, for 'one does not change his residence to the prison by virtue of being incarcerated there.' Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 774 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865, 82 S.Ct. 1029, 8 L.Ed.2d 84 (1962). But, in any event, appellant's purported cause of action-- the denial of conjugal visitation by his wife in the United States Penitentiary-- arose in the Northern District of Georgia wherein the penitentiary is situated.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the District of Columbia when the defendant federal officers are found there for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

Starnes v. Honorable Matthew F. McGuire Arthur Everett Small, Jr. v. Honorable George L. Hart, Jr · filed 1974-11-08(e)

When the federal officers named as defendants are to be found within the District of Columbia for purposes of personal jurisdiction, venue is properly laid here under Section 1391(e).

Section 1391(e) permits a suit against an executive agency in the district where the plaintiff resides; for a prisoner, that may be the district where the prisoner lived before incarceration.

Billiteri v. United States Board of Parole · filed 1974-11-26(e)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), suits against executive agencies, like the Board, may be brought outside the District of Columbia, in the district in which the plaintiff resides. ... For a prisoner, the district of residence may be the one in which he resided prior to his incarceration.

Section 1391(e) permits venue where petitioners were domiciled before their incarceration.

Candarini v. Attorney General of United States · filed 1974-01-25(e)

Concomitantly, venue is proper in this district due to the fact that at least five of the petitioners were domiciled in the Eastern District of New York prior to their incarceration. Cf. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e); Ott v. United States Board of Parole, 324 F.Supp. 1034, 1037 (W.D.Mo.1971).

Section 1391(e) does not apply to federal defendants who could not previously have been sued in Washington, D.C.

Rimar v. McCowan · filed 1974-03-29(e)

It is clear here that none of the “Federal Defendants” could previously have been sued in Washington, D.C. On the authority of Natural Resources Defense Council v. T. V. A., supra, this court is of the opinion that section 1391(e) does not apply to them.

Section 1391 permits venue in the district where an unattached, inactive reservist resides.

United States ex rel. Tice v. Seamans · filed 1973-06-27

There is jurisdiction and venue in the District where an unattached, inactive reservist resides.

Section 1391(e) does not provide venue for suits against federal officers or employees individually.

Relf v. Gasch · filed 1975-04-03(e)

But § 1391(e) does not come into operation when an action is brought against an officer or employee individually.

Section 1391(e) permits a suit against federal officers acting in their official capacity or under color of legal authority in the district where the cause of action arose.

Patmore v. Carlson · filed 1975-04-28(e)

This Court disagrees with defendants’ conclusion. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) states in part, “A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which: ... (2) the cause of action arose . . . ”. ... This penitentiary is within the Eastern District of Illinois.

Section 1391(e) permits venue where the defendant resides or the cause of action arose.

Morris v. United States · filed 1975-08-28(e)

Venue is proper in any judicial district in which the defendant resides or the cause of action arose; both of these conditions are satisfied in the present action.

Section 1391(e) permits venue where the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resided before incarceration.

United States v. Kahane · filed 1975-05-07(e)

Venue is proper under section 1361 since defendant is currently under this court’s jurisdiction and control and “the cause of action arose” in this district and because the defendant resided in this district before incarceration. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(e)(4) permits venue in the district where the plaintiff resides when no real property is involved.

MOBAY CHEMICAL CORP., CHEMAGRO AGR. DIV. v. Train · filed 1975-05-23(e)(4)

And, as plaintiff resides in this District, and no real property is herein involved, venue is proper in this District pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4) (1966).

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a civil action against a federal officer or agency in the district where the cause of action arose.

Ricks v. United States · filed 1976-10-05(e)

Venue in the Southern District of Georgia is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) which provides for same in civil actions against officers and agencies of the United States in the district where the cause of action arose.

Section 1391(e) permits venue for a mandamus action against federal officials in a proper district, including the district identified here by the prisoner's residence before imprisonment.

Billiteri v. United States Board Of Parole · filed 1976-08-30(e)

Billiteri's residence, before he was imprisoned at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, was in the Western District of New York, and it was in this district that he was indicted, convicted and sentenced. The venue for seeking mandamus before the court in that district was proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), and the allegations of the complaint in Docket Civ. 74-365, if proven, would constitute proper bases for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Section 1391(e) does not provide venue for a suit against a former federal official.

Kipperman v. McCone · filed 1976-10-26(e)

Nor can the Court agree that Section 1391(e), ... which relates to venue in civil actions against certain government employees, affords venue in a suit against an individual who has retired from government service as has defendant McCone.

Section 1391(e) does not apply to suits against federal officials in their individual capacities.

Kenyatta v. Kelley · filed 1977-03-31(e)

Treating plaintiffs’ Section 1391(e) argument first, I join with the weight of authority in concluding that that statute does not apply where suit is brought against a federal official in his individual capacity.

Section 1391(e) supplies personal jurisdiction and venue for damages actions against present and former federal officials acting under color of legal authority.

Driver v. Helms · filed 1977-04-01(e)

Since the Court holds that § 1391(e) authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction in light of the allegations in the complaint, it necessarily holds that § 1391(e) supplies venue as well.

Section 1391(e) permits a civil action against a federal agency in a district where the agency resides or the cause of action arose.

GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission · filed 1977-09-15(e)

The district court there would have personal jurisdiction over the Commission because it resides in the District of Columbia and because the “wrongful” conduct as alleged in the complaint occurred there; for the same reason, venue would be appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) or (2) which allows a civil action against an agency of the United States to be brought in the judicial district in which the agency resides or in which the cause of action arose.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue in a district where a federal official defendant resides for a damages action alleging injury under color of legal authority.

Briggs v. Guy Goodwin, Individually and as Attorney for the Department of Justice (Stafford) · filed 1977-12-01(e)(1)

To sum up, Section 1391(e)(1), providing as it does for venue in actions for redress of injuries inflicted by federal officials under color of legal authority, supports cognizance of this litigation in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(e) applies to damages actions against federal officers sued in their individual capacities for acts under color of legal authority.

Driver v. Helms · filed 1978-05-25(e)

We conclude, after considering such questions, as have many other courts, that § 1391(e) should cover damage actions against officers in their individual capacities.

Section 1391(e) permits these actions seeking review of the Secretary of the Interior’s decisions to be brought in this judicial district.

Marathon Oil Co. v. Andrus · filed 1978-06-26(e)

They are properly brought in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391(e) applies to personal damages actions against federal officers sued in their individual capacities.

United States v. Underwood · filed 1978-06-23(e)

We conclude, after considering such questions, as have many other courts, that § 1391(e) should cover damage actions against officers in their individual capacities.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue in a district where none of the individual defendants reside and the claim did not arise.

Schenker v. United States Parole Commission · filed 1980-03-05(b)

The question of proper venue is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). None of the named individual defendants reside in this district, and there is no indication that this is where the claim arose.

Section 1391(e) permits extraterritorial service in mandamus suits against federal officials but does not authorize damages suits against officials in their individual capacity.

Logiurato v. Action · filed 1980-04-29(e)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, however, § 1391(e) provides for competence only in suits requesting writs of mandamus against federal officials. It does not authorize the courts to entertain suits for money damages against officials in their individual capacity.

Section 1391(e) governs venue in a suit against federal officials in the Northern Mariana Islands when an earlier statute naming Guam as the appropriate court predates the Northern Mariana Islands district court.

Marianas Fisheries, Inc. v. Kreps · filed 1980-12-18(e)

For these reasons, the general provisions pertaining to the venue of district courts provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) more appropriately apply in this case.

Section 1391(e)(4) permits venue where the plaintiff resides for a later-joined federal officer or employee only if that person still holds that status when joined.

Sutain v. Shapiro and Lieberman Pincus Lieberman W. Donald Maurer Clarence Shapiro, Jointly and Severally · filed 1982-05-27(e)(4)

The purpose of the rule is quite well served by fixing venue as of the time such a defendant is joined. Only if such a defendant remains an officer or employee at that time should the plaintiff be entitled to fix venue, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4), where the plaintiff resides.

Section 1391(e) permits venue for a suit against a federal agency in a district where the agency is found or a defendant resides.

City of Springfield v. Washington Public Power Supply System · filed 1983-03-15(e)

Venue is also proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which directs that suit against a federal agency be brought in a district in which the agency is found or defendant resides. BPA and the other federal parties are residents of this district.

Section 1391(e) permits a suit seeking to compel or enjoin federal action to be brought in a local district where venue is authorized.

Milliken & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission · filed 1983-05-10(e)

It is clear from the legislative history that section 1391(e) provides for venue in cases where the plaintiff seeks to compel or enjoin governmental action by suing a federal officer in his official capacity. ... The Court is of the opinion that under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) plaintiff may pursue his claim in the courts of the District of South Carolina.

Section 1391(e) does not provide jurisdiction over a federal official in an individual capacity merely because it provides jurisdiction over that official in an official capacity.

Green v. Mccall · filed 1983-06-07(e)

Plaintiffs did not concede the correctness of the Commissioners' interpretation of Stafford v. Briggs, and on this appeal they contend that since Sec. 1391(e) provides jurisdiction over an official in his official capacity, it provides pendent jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity. We find this argument meritless.

Section 1391(e) does not provide venue for suits against former federal employees.

Ross v. United States · filed 1983-11-02(e)

Section 1391(e) applies only to present federal employees.

Section 1391(e)’s venue and service provisions do not apply to damages suits against federal employees in their individual capacities.

First Western Government Securities, Inc. v. United States · filed 1984-01-10(e)

Here, the plaintiffs have named the individuals as defendants; and their complaint seeks damages from the individuals, thus making the action one against the defendants personally and not in the nature of mandamus. ... Because 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) is inapplicable to the case at bar, jurisdiction can be asserted over these out-of-state defendants only if they are subject to jurisdiction under the Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-1-124(1) (1973).

Section 1391(e) does not provide venue for a damages claim against a federal prison warden in his personal capacity.

Lucas v. Benny O. Hodges, Administrator, Lorton Reformatory · filed 1984-03-23(e)

Apart from any problems of personal jurisdiction, the claim for damages against the prison warden in his personal capacity cannot properly be heard in this district under the applicable venue provision, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1391(e).

Section 1391(e) does not establish venue for monetary damages claims against individual federal officials who neither reside in the district nor face claims arising there.

Shermco Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Air Force · filed 1984-01-26(e)

As 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) was construed in Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 100 S.Ct. 774, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980), venue is not proper in this court for claims of monetary damages against the following individual defendants, who neither reside in this district nor had any of Shermco’s claims against them arise in this district: Ralph Munch, the contracting officer; Max Alger, former Auditor General of the Defense Supply Agency; W.J. Kelly, an Air Force Brigadier General in charge of procurement and production; and Dewey Lowe, a Major General in the Air Force who directed its procurement policy.

Section 1391(e) applies to suits against federal officers in their official capacity or under color of legal authority, but does not provide personal jurisdiction over them in individual-capacity damages suits.

Gilbert v. Dagrossa · filed 1985-04-05(e)

Further section 1391(e) is a venue statute which only applies to actions in which the defendant is sued in his official capacity or under color of legal authority. It does not provide personal jurisdiction in an action against a federal official in his individual capacity.

Section 1391(e) does not apply to suits for monetary relief against federal officials in their individual capacities.

Borntrager v. Stevas · filed 1985-08-30(e)

The plaintiff's reliance on Sec. 1391(e) is unjustified because the Supreme Court has explicitly held that Sec. 1391(e) applies only to mandamus actions and not to suits for monetary relief against federal officials in their individual capacities, Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 100 S.Ct. 774, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980).

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the District of Columbia for a declaratory and injunctive suit against an agency within the Department of Justice, even when its offices are in Maryland.

In Re United States Parole Commission · filed 1986-09-02(e)

Venue in the District of Columbia is proper for Pearson’s declaratory and injunctive suit against the Commission, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1982); though the Commission's offices are physically located in Bethesda, Maryland, the Commission is an independent agency in the Department of Justice, see 18 U.S.C. § 1402 (1982).

Section 1391(e) permits an action against a federal officer in a district where a defendant resides, the cause of action arose, relevant real property is situated, or the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Emmerling v. Cobb · filed 1986-09-03(e)

The controlling venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), provides: ... Where no party to this action resides in Massachusetts, the cause of action arose in Maine, and no real property is at issue, I rule that this action should be dismissed for lack of venue.

Section 1391(e) permits an action against a federal officer or agency to be brought where the defendant resides or, when no real property is involved, where the plaintiff resides.

State of Del. v. Bennett · filed 1988-10-25(e)

Under 28 U.S.C. section 1391(e), venue for actions in which the defendant is an officer or an agency of the United States lies in any judicial district where: (1) the defendant resides; (2) the cause of action arose; (3) where real property involved in the dispute is located; or (4) where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the dispute. Thus, this action could have been brought properly in Delaware, where the plaintiff resides, or in the District of Columbia, where the defendants reside.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a district where a challenged nationwide federal program affects local operations and plaintiffs reside, even if the program was created elsewhere.

NAT. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS v. Burnley · filed 1988-11-17(e)

While the decisions creating the program were made in the District of Columbia, the program itself is nationwide in scope and will affect air traffic controllers and the Department of Transportation's air safety efforts in this district, as well as in every other district in the country. Two of the four plaintiffs reside in this district. ... Accordingly, under the specific circumstances of this case, therefore, venue is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

Section 1391 permits a civil action against a federal officer to be brought where the defendant resides, where the claim arose, where relevant real property is situated, or, if no real property is involved, where the plaintiff resides.

Colorado Clinical Labs, Inc. v. Sullivan · filed 1989-07-13(e)

Under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue for a civil action involving an officer of the United States as a named defendant is proper only where the defendant resides, where the claim arose, where real property involved in the action is situated, or where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved. ... Plaintiffs TCL and TCL/Gulf are Texas corporations. Venue for their lawsuit is either Texas or the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ff(b) and 405(g), or 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in this district for a suit against federal officials based on the plaintiffs’ local manufacturing and sales.

Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services · filed 1989-08-28(e)

Venue lies in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). Plaintiff, PPG Industries, Inc. has a chemical manufacturing facility in the district; Standard Chlorine Chemical Company and PPG Industries, Inc. manufacture paradichlorobenzene which is sold in this district. Plaintiff Lagasse Brothers, Inc. is a Louisiana corporation which sells PDCB in this district.

Section 1391(e) permits venue where most of the affected national forest is located and the regional forester who executed the challenged decision has an office.

Sierra Club v. Marita · filed 1991-06-28(e)

Venue in the Eastern District of Wisconsin is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because the majority of the Nicolet is located in the Eastern District, and because the ROD was executed by the Regional Forester of the Eastern Region of the Forest Service, whose regional office is located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Complaint ¶ 4).

Section 1391(e) permits venue where the plaintiff resides in suits against federal agencies, except when another law provides a different venue rule.

Sheila M. BOLAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anthony M. FRANK, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service, Defen · filed 1991-07-11(e)

It is clear that section 1391(e) has its limitations. It applies to civil actions in which an agency of the United States is a defendant “except as otherwise provided by law.” Section 2000e-5(f)(3), having been incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act, is one such law that “otherwise provide[s].”

Section 1391(e) permits venue for a suit against a federal agency in a district where the agency maintains offices.

Medina v. United States · filed 1992-03-04(e)

Section two of the Mandamus and Venue Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), provides that venue is proper in “any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides_” ... the Court will treat Ms. Medina’s motion as properly before it. In so doing, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that INS maintains offices within this judicial district.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a district where at least one defendant resides when a federal officer or employee acting in an official capacity is named as a defendant.

Judy A. Reiman Kevin Beckly John Karl Reiman v. H.F. Garcia · filed 1993-08-03(e)

Section 1391(e), however, only requires that at least one defendant reside within the district when an officer or employee of the United States acting in his or her official capacity is named as a defendant.

Section 1391(e) permits multiple plaintiffs suing a federal officer to bring an action in a district where one plaintiff resides.

Minn-Dak Farmers Co-Op. v. Espy · filed 1994-04-21(e)

Because not each of the plaintiffs reside in this district, defendant argues venue here is improper. Defendant's specious argument ignores a long line of federal cases holding otherwise. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C., 588 F.2d 895 (3d Cir.1978). To accept defendant's narrow reading of the statute would result in an unnecessary multiplicity of lawsuits. This court does not believe Congress intended each and every plaintiff with a cause of action against a governmental officer located in Washington, D.C. to travel to that city to plead his or her case. Such a requirement would exalt the federal officer or employee above the citizens he is bound to serve. In keeping with Exxon, this court determines this action is properly venued.

Under § 1391(e), one resident plaintiff can establish venue for multiple plaintiffs, but a plaintiff who lacks standing cannot be added to manufacture venue.

Institute of Certified Practitioners, Inc. v. Bentsen · filed 1994-09-28(e)

Where, as here, there is more than one plaintiff, it has been held that only one of the plaintiffs need reside in the district in question for venue to be properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). As such, Shinn’s only tie to this District is through the Institute. Having found that the Institute lacks standing to bring this action and has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, plaintiff cannot manufacture venue by adding the Institute as a party.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for suits against federal officials in their individual capacities; venue does not lie in a district where the defendants do not all reside in the same state and no substantial part of the alleged events occurred.

Robertson v. Merola · filed 1995-08-08(b)

Because all of the Defendants do not reside in the same state, venue cannot lie in this district under § 1391(b)(1). Further, because a substantial part of the alleged events or omissions giving rise to the Plaintiffs claims did not take place in the District of Columbia, but rather in Minnesota, New York, or Pennsylvania, venue cannot lie in this district under § 1391(b)(2).

Section 1391(e) applies when federal officials are sued in their official capacities or under color of legal authority, but does not provide venue for individual-capacity claims against them.

Arshal v. Dalton · filed 1996-12-06(e)

To the extent Arshal is suing the defendants in their individual capacities, his reliance on section 1391(e) is misplaced because that section only applies when the defendants are sued in their official capacities or under color of legal authority.

Section 1391(b) does not permit venue for an individual-capacity suit against federal officials in a district where none of them resides and no substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

Valdes v. Gordon · filed 1996-12-19(b)

When federal officials are sued in their individual capacities, the venue provisions which apply in a case against the government itself do not control. ... All the defendants reside in Florida. Therefore, venue cannot lie in this district under subsection (1) of § 1391(b). Furthermore, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the plaintiffs claims occurred in Florida and not in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, venue cannot lie in this district over the plaintifPs claims.

Section 1391(e) does not make venue proper against a federal agency merely because it maintains a regional office in the district.

Schwarz v. Internal Revenue Service · filed 1998-03-16(e)

Venue is not proper merely because a federal agency maintains a regional office in a district.

Section 1391(e) permits an official-capacity suit against a federal officer in a district where a defendant resides, a substantial part of the events occurred, or the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Depew v. Hawk · filed 1998-03-25(e)

But, without the addition of Attorney Dahl, venue is not proper in the District of Massachusetts. ... Defendant Hawk is a resident of the State of Maryland. Furthermore, a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs claim did not occur in Massachusetts.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the plaintiff’s district of residence in a suit against a federal agency.

THERMAL SCIENCE v. US Nuclear Regulatory Com'n · filed 1998-06-23(e)

Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), because the NRC is an agency of the United States and plaintiff TSI resides in this District.

Section 1391(e) permits an ADEA action against a federal officer or agency in a district where the defendant resides, the claim arose, or the plaintiff resides.

Lengacher v. Reno · filed 1999-12-17(e)

Venue in an ADEA action is governed by the general venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), which provides, in pertinent part, that a civil action against an officer or employee, or an agency, of the United States may be brought in any judicial district where (i) the defendant in the action resides, (ii) the cause of action arose, or (iii) the plaintiff resides. From this it follows that venue for plaintiffs ADEA claim would be proper in this district because plaintiff apparently resides here.

Under § 1391(e), venue is improper in a district where neither the plaintiff nor a defendant resides and no substantial part of the alleged events occurred.

Janis v. Ashcroft · filed 2003-11-05(e)

Although we note that Janis asserted his claims in the wrong venue as he filed his complaint in a judicial district where neither he nor any defendant resides nor where a substantial part of the alleged events occurred, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), we question the propriety of the district court’s sua sponte dismissal for what was essentially a lack of proper venue.

Section 1391(e) does not support venue in a district where neither the federal official nor the plaintiff resides and few, if any, events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Al-Marri, Ali Saleh v. Rumsfeld, Donald · filed 2004-03-08(e)

Neither Secretary Rumsfeld nor Commander Marr “resides” in the Central District of Illinois; al-Marri does not reside there either; few if any of the events that determine whether (and how) al-Marri can be held un- der the law of war and the authority granted by 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), occurred in the Central District of Illinois.

Section 1391(e) permits a suit against a federal agency to be brought in Nebraska after the claimant moves there.

Randolph v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration · filed 2004-09-13(e)

Nebraska is thus a proper forum for this suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (detailing venue requirements for suits brought against federal agencies).

Section 1391(e) permits venue in an action against federal officers where a substantial part of the events occurred or where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

The New York Times Co. v. Gonzales · filed 2005-03-02(e)

Pursuant to § 1391(e)(2)(3) venue has been properly laid in this district: A substantial portion of the events giving rise to this claim are alleged to have occurred here (Comply 9), The Times is based here (Compl.V 10), and it may be presumed that the records at issue are in this district.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a suit against federal officers where a defendant resides, a substantial part of the events occurred, or the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Blacher v. Ridge · filed 2006-02-23(e)

In a civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States, venue is proper in the District where: (1) the defendant resides; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). ... Therefore, this district is not the proper venue because neither the plaintiff nor the defendants reside in this district, and none of the complained of activity occurred in this district.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a suit against a federal agency where a defendant resides, a substantial part of the events occurred, or the plaintiff resides.

Varma v. Gutierrez · filed 2006-03-21(e)

Thus, under none of the designated criteria of § 1391(e) is venue appropriate in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in the plaintiff’s district of residence for an action against a federal officer in an official capacity when no real property is involved.

Rauch v. Chertoff · filed 2006-09-06(e)

Not only has defendant demonstrated that in a civil action against a department of the United States government or any of its officers acting in their official capacity, venue is proper “in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant ... resides, (2) a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim occurred ..., or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), but it has also demonstrated that plaintiff has no basis for venue in this District. As no real property is involved in this case, the action could have been brought in the Eastern District of Louisiana by virtue of plaintiffs residency alone.

Section 1391(e) permits venue for an official-capacity claim against a federal officer where the defendant resides, substantial events occurred, or the plaintiff resides.

Dehaemers v. Wynne · filed 2007-11-29(e)

Under that provision, venue for Plaintiffs ADEA claim is proper (1) where the Air Force resides, (2) where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the action occurred, or (3) where Plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). For the reasons discussed above, and because Plaintiffs Amended Complaint alleges that he is a resident of Virginia, the second and third prongs of Section 1391(e) clearly dictate that venue for Plaintiffs ADEA claim lies in the Eastern District of Virginia.

Section 1391(e) permits a civil action against a federal agency in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred.

POULLARD v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2008-03-06(e)

A civil action against a federal government agency “may be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ..., or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). Under these criteria, venue in this district is not proper. A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to plaintiffs claims occurred at FCI Beaumont where plaintiff currently is incarcerated. This civil action may be brought in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(e) permits venue where a federal agency defendant is headquartered or a federal officer defendant maintains an official residence.

Galindo v. Gonzales · filed 2008-05-08(e)

Under this standard, venue is not improper in the District of Columbia, as the BOP is headquartered in the District, and the United States Attorney General maintains his official residence here.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in an action against a federal officer where a defendant resides or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Al-Ahmed v. Chertoff · filed 2008-07-14(e)

In an action brought against an officer or employee of the United States or any of its agencies, venue is proper in any district where (1) a defendant resides; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). In this case, venue is clearly proper in the Eastern District of Virginia because defendant Susan Dibbins, acting District Director of USCIS’s Washington Field Office, resides in that district, and the events or omissions giving rise to plaintiffs claims have occurred or will occur there.

Section 1391(e) permits an action against federal officers to be brought in a district where a defendant resides.

Aftab v. Gonzalez · filed 2009-02-17(e)

The TSC Director resides in the Northern District of Texas. ... This action could have been brought, then, in the transferee district.

Section 1391(e) does not establish venue where the defendants who reside in the district are dismissed and the acts or omissions giving rise to the remaining claims occurred elsewhere.

Scinto v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · filed 2009-03-30(e)

Venue therefore cannot rest on Section 1391(e)(1). Furthermore, because the acts or omissions giving rise to plaintiffs claim all occurred while he was incarcerated in North Carolina, venue cannot lie under Section 1391(e)(2).

Section 1391(e) permits venue in an action against federal officers or agencies where a defendant resides, where a substantial part of the events occurred, or where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Duckworth v. the United States of America · filed 2009-07-24(e)

Venue under Section 1391(e) is proper either in Washington, D.C., because that is where Defendants reside, or in Rhode Island, because that is where Plaintiffs reside and where the substantial part of the events of this litigation occurred.

Section 1391(e) permits a suit against a federal agency or officer where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events occurred, unless another law provides otherwise.

DINE CITIZENS AGAINST RUINING OUR ENV. v. Klein · filed 2009-09-30(e)

As neither of these circumstances are present here, this provision is inapplicable. Because venue is proper in this district pursuant to the general venue provision stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), the Federal Defendants' and Intervenors' motions to dismiss for improper venue are denied.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a suit against federal agencies or officers in a district where a substantial part of the events occurred or the property at issue is located.

Intrepid Potash-New Mexico, LLC v. United States Department of Interior · filed 2009-11-18(e)

The District of New Mexico satisfies this venue statute since Intrepid is challenging the IBLA’s affirmance of the BLM New Mexico director’s decision to approve applications by a defendant corporation headquartered in New Mexico for permits to drill on land that is located in New Mexico.

Section 1391(e)(2) permits venue in an action against a federal agency or officer where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Bergmann v. United States Department of Transportation · filed 2010-05-07(e)(2)

As plaintiff concedes, this action could have been brought in the Eastern District of Michigan because (i) a significant number of events giving rise to plaintiffs claims occurred in the Eastern District of Michigan, and (ii) plaintiff is a resident of Michigan.

Section 1391(e) permits a suit against a federal agency in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Pueblo v. National Indian Gaming Commission · filed 2010-08-17(e)

In a civil action against an agency or department of the United States government, venue is proper in any judicial district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). ... Accordingly, the Western District of Texas is a proper venue for this case.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a suit against a federal agency in a district where the agency’s decision directly affects the plaintiff’s operations.

Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. National Indian Gaming Commission · filed 2010-08-17(e)

This action could have been brought in the Western District of Texas because NIGC’s decision not to provide training to the Pueblo directly impacts the Pueblo’s gaming operations in that district.

Section 1391(e) permits venue in a suit against federal officers or agencies where a defendant resides, where a substantial part of the events or omissions occurred, or where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Chauhan v. Napolitano · filed 2010-10-25(e)

In an action brought against an officer of employee of the United States or its agencies venue is proper in any district where (1) a defendant resides; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) the plaintiff resides, if no real property is involved in the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). ... The director of USCIS’ Dallas Field Office, who has been named as a defendant, resides in that district. The plaintiffs also reside in that district. As set forth in Section I.A., a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the Dallas Field Office. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas.

Section 1391(e) permits an official-capacity action against a federal officer in a district where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Ravulapalli v. Napolitano · filed 2011-03-29(e)

It is clear that this action could have been brought in the Northern District of Texas because Defendant David L. Roark, Director of the USCIS Texas Service Center, resides there and personnel at the Texas Service Center denied Plaintiffs’ 1-485 applications.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue in the District of Columbia for an action seeking review of a federal agency decision.

Albino v. United States · filed 2012-05-31(e)(1)

Although plaintiff does not request transfer to a particular district court, venue in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is proper.

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits venue in a suit against the federal government in a district where the plaintiff resides.

Preservation Society of Charleston v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers · filed 2012-09-27(e)(1)(C)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general federal venue statute, venue in a suit against the federal government will lie, at a minimum, in any district in which the plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C). Here, the District of South Carolina is Plaintiffs’ home forum, making venue proper in that district.

Section 1391(e)(1)(B) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim against a federal officer occurred.

Villa v. Salazar · filed 2013-03-28(e)(1)(B)

However, venue is also proper in the Eastern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B) because that district is where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

Section 1391(e)(1) permits a suit against a federal agency in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. National Labor Relations Board · filed 2013-04-04(e)(1)

Regarding the threshold question under § 1404(a), it is undisputed that this case could have been brought in the District of New Jersey, where the plaintiffs facilities and employees impacted by this litigation are located, where the union election petition was filed, and where the defendant has ordered that a union election take place. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) (“A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which ... a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.”).

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue for actions against executive branch officials, but does not cover officers or employees of the legislative branch.

International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers v. United States · filed 2013-04-01(e)(1)

Every court that has examined the issue has concluded that § 1391(e) applies only to actions against executive branch officials, and the Court finds no rationale to depart from this persuasive and well-reasoned authority. The Court concludes that venue is not proper in this district, and Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.

Section 1391(e)(1)(B) permits venue where a substantial part of the events giving rise to a claim occurred.

Tuttle v. Salazar · filed 2013-07-09(e)(1)(B)

Venue is also proper in the Central District of California under § 1391(e)(1)(B) because that district is where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”

Section 1391(e)(1) permits venue in an action against federal officers or agencies where a defendant resides, substantial claim events occurred, or the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Niagara Preservation, Coalition, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission · filed 2013-07-24(e)(1)

In an action brought against an officer or employee of the United States or its agencies, venue is proper is any district where (1) a defendant resides; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) the plaintiff resides, if no real property is involved in the action. ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that this action could have been brought in the Western District of New York, and turns to the question of whether transfer is appropriate under § 1404(a).

Section 1391(e) permits venue for a claim against a federal agency in a district where the agency resides.

Smith v. United States Bureau of Prisons · filed 2013-09-20(e)

For claims against government agencies or officials, venue is proper in a judicial district where a defendant resides, or a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). ... Although the respondent in this matter, the United States Bureau of Prisons, is technically located in this District, the individuals alleged to have obstructed the correspondence are the employees at USP Victorville.

Section 1391(e)(1)(C) permits venue in a suit against the federal government where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker · filed 2013-10-28(e)(1)(C)

Under the general federal venue statute, venue in a suit against the federal government will lie in any district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C). This dispute concerns the effects of Framework 48 and associated decisions, and federal officials in Gloucester, Massachusetts, were involved in writing and promulgating those rules. See Transfer Mot. at 2. Many of the fishermen affected by the challenged regulations, moreover, are located in Massachusetts, and the fish themselves populate the waters off the Bay State’s coast. See id. Venue is thus proper in that district.

Section 1391(e)(1) permits a civil action against federal officers or agencies in a judicial district where any defendant resides.

Reynolds v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2014-01-21(e)(1)

With the exception of Counts Eight and Nine, discussed separately in Sections II.F and II.E, respectively, the venue for each of the plaintiff’s claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), which permits civil actions against officers or agencies of the United States to be brought in any “judicial district in which any defendant resides.” Because each of the defendants reside and maintain offices and records in this district, venue is not only proper under § 1391, but is also appropriate “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice” under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Section 1391(e) permits an action against a federal officer acting in an official capacity to be brought in the district where the plaintiff resides.

Gardner v. Mabus · filed 2014-06-20(e)

“Under the general venue statute, actions against an officer or employee of the United States acting in his official capacity may be brought where (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim arose, or (3) the plaintiff resides.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)). In this case, since Plaintiff resides in the District of Columbia, the case may be brought here or in Virginia.

Section 1391(e) permits a civil action against a federal agency to be brought in the district where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved.

Berry v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2014-06-20(e)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), “[a] civil action in which a defendant is . . . an agency of the United States . . . may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (A) a defendant to the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” ... Accordingly, the Court finds that this action could have been brought in the Eastern District of Michigan.