28 U.S.C. § 1391

In a diversity action, § 1391(a) permits venue where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Garner v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2012-07-24(a)

Where, as here, jurisdiction is based solely on diversity, venue is determined in accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... Assuming that the above allegations are true, venue is proper and BIPI is not entitled to dismissal based on improper venue.

Section 1391(a) permits venue in a diversity action where the defendant resides or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Sellers v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2012-07-25(a)

Where, as here, jurisdiction is based solely on diversity, venue is determined in accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... Assuming that the above allegations are true, venue is proper and BIPI is not entitled to dismissal based on improper venue.

Section 1391(a) permits a diversity action in a district where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Smith v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2012-07-25(a)

Where, as here, jurisdiction is based solely on diversity, venue is determined in accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). ... Assuming that the above allegations are true, venue is proper and BIPI is not entitled to dismissal based on improper venue.

Under § 1391(a), venue is improper in a district where none of the events giving rise to the claims occurred and the defendants do not reside or face personal jurisdiction.

Myers v. Holiday Inn, Inc. · filed 2013-01-16(a)

None of the events or missions giving rise to plaintiff’s claims arose in this district. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), venue in the District of Columbia is not proper.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in actions removed from state court; venue is determined under § 1441(a).

American Insurance Marketing Corp. v. 5 Star Life Insurance · filed 2013-07-26

Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 “has no application” to actions that are removed; rather, the only question that must be answered to determine the propriety of venue is whether removal was effectuated to the district court “for the district and division embracing the place” where the suit was filed originally.

Section 1391(b) permits an ADEA action where the defendant resides or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Tyler v. District of Columbia Housing Authority · filed 2014-02-24(b)

Venue for ADEA actions is governed by the general venue provision of § 1391 of Title 28 of the United States Code. In particular, an action under the ADEA may be brought in a judicial district where “any defendant resides” or where “a substantial part of the events ... giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Because Defendant is a District of Columbia agency and the alleged workplace discrimination occurred in that District, Plaintiff's ADEA claims are properly brought in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391 does not govern venue in actions removed from state court to federal court.

Toomey v. Dahl · filed 2014-10-30

Because this action was removed from state court, section 1391 does not apply.

Section 1391 governs where civil actions may be brought and does not apply to actions removed from state court.

Brighter Sky Productions, LLC v. Marriott International, Inc. · filed 2018-05-16

Section 1391 “has no application to…. a removed action.”

Section 1391(b) does not govern venue in actions removed from state court.

Riemer & Braunstein LLP v. Monroe Capital Management Advisors LLC · filed 2019-05-16(b)

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (“Section 1391(b)”), is not applicable to removed actions.

Section 1391(b)'s venue rules do not govern actions removed from state court; § 1441(a) governs their venue.

Finley v. Kelly · filed 2019-06-14(b)

All of this may be true, but this action was removed from state court and "venue in removed actions is governed solely by § 1441(a)." ... Venue is proper here because this Court (and in particular the Nashville Division) embraces Williamson County from which this case was removed.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights actions and permits suit in the district where the defendants reside or the claim arose.

Miller v. Collier · filed 2019-09-30

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose. ... As a result, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391 governs venue in civil rights actions without a specific venue provision; venue is proper where the defendant resides or the claim arose.

Brown v. Rusk County · filed 2019-11-04

When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where the defendants reside or in which the claim arose.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for a Bivens action based on the defendants’ residence or where the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Jones v. United States of America · filed 2020-06-12(b)

A civil action must be brought in the judicial district where the defendants reside or where the events giving rise to the claim occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D.D.C. 2012) (applying § 1391(b)(2) in Bivens context). There are no federal prisons in New Mexico, and it is not clear how any individual responsible for Jones’ prison classification could reside here. ... Accordingly, it would be futile to sua sponte invite Jones to amend his Bivens claim in this Court.

Section 1391(b) governs venue in Bivens actions and permits suit in a qualifying defendant’s district of residence or a district where a substantial part of the events occurred.

Gladney v. United States of America · filed 2020-08-04(b)

Venue in a Bivens action is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... These claims do not involve events the occurred in the Eastern District of Texas and the additional defendants do not reside in the Eastern District. As a result, venue with respect to the claims against these defendants is not proper in this court.

Section 1391(b) governs venue in Section 1983 actions.

Jackson v. Acevedo · filed 2020-10-30(b)

The relevant venue provision for a Section 1983 action is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which provides as follows: ... (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; ... Here, while plaintiff's claim related to alleged wrongdoing that occurred while he was confined at Southport C.F. arose in the Western District of New York, the factors weigh in favor of the Northern District of New York retaining jurisdiction over this claim.

Section 1391(b) permits a Bivens action in a district where a defendant resides, where a substantial part of the events occurred, or, if no other district is available, where a defendant may be found.

Williams v. Hoey · filed 2020-12-08(b)

A claim brought as a Bivens action may be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all reside in the same state, (2) where “a substantial part” of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) a district which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). In this case, venue is not proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, as the claim arose while Plaintiff was confined at FCI- Williamsburg, which is located within the jurisdictional boundaries of South Carolina.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for Bivens actions and permits suit where the defendants reside or where the claims arose.

Wilson v. Phelps · filed 2021-09-08(b)

Venue for a Bivens actions is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Venue is improper in this district, and the Court finds it to be in the interest of justice to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Section 1391 governs venue in § 1983 actions because § 1983 has no specific venue provision.

Ford v. 19th Judicial District Court East Baton Rouge Parish of Louisiana · filed 2021-09-10(b)

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a specific venue provision, venue is determined under the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) permits venue for a § 1983 action in a district where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Roderick Ford · filed 2022-09-13(b)

Venue for § 1983 actions not founded on diversity is proper in the district where any defendant resides (if all defendants reside in the same state), where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,” or where any defendant may be found.

Section 1391(b) governs venue in Bivens actions based on defendant residence, where substantial events occurred, or a fallback district when no other district is available.

Emrit v. Special Agent in Charge of FBI Field Office in Southern District of New York (SDNY) · filed 2022-11-09(b)

Venue in Bivens cases is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Thus, venue is not proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(2). Lastly, Section 1391(b)(3) does not apply in this action because there are other districts in which venue is proper. In sum, venue is not proper in this district pursuant to any provision of 1391(b).

Section 1391(b) governs venue in Bivens actions and permits suit in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events occurred.

Reid v. Dobbs · filed 2023-01-24(b)

Venue in a lawsuit filed pursuant to Bivens is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... Section 1391(b) states venue is proper in any judicial district where a defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located, or in a district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims being asserted occurred.

Section 1391(b) governs venue in Bivens actions and permits filing in a district where a substantial part of the events occurred.

Reid v. Dobbs Case transferred to the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division. · filed 2023-01-24(b)

Venue in a lawsuit filed pursuant to Bivens is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). ... As a result, while venue with respect to this case is proper in the Eastern District, it is not proper in the Lufkin Division.

Section 1391(b) governs venue for federal civil rights actions under § 1983 and places claims involving defendants and events at Big Muddy Correctional Center in the Southern District of Illinois.

Mayberry v. Wexford Health Sources Inc · filed 2023-04-17(b)

Finally, venue for federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). According to that statute, proper venue for claims involving Defendants and occurrences at Big Muddy Correctional Center in Jefferson County, Illinois lies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The Court will therefore dismiss Defendants Jane or John Doe Dentists at Western Illinois and Big Muddy Correctional Centers.

Section 1391(b) permits venue based on defendant residence, substantial events or property, or, when no other district qualifies, personal jurisdiction over a defendant.

Pesic v. Mauritius International Arbitration Centre Limited · filed 2023-04-17(b)

Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s claims under state law, brought under the court’s diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that any of the defendants resides within this or any other federal judicial district, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his claims occurred within this or any other federal judicial district, a substantial part of property that is the subject of this action is situated within this or any other federal judicial district, or that any of the defendants is somehow subject to this court’s or any other federal district court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to this action.

Section 1391(b) governs venue in a Bivens-type action and permits venue where all defendants reside or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.

Johnson v. Beaumont · filed 2023-08-30(b)

Venue in a Bivens-type action is determined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). When, as in this case, jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides that venue is proper only in the judicial district where all the defendants reside or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 1391(b) does not make the plaintiff’s residence a basis for venue.

Lea v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. · filed 2024-02-28(b)

But the venue statute makes the residency of the defendants (not the plaintiffs) matter.

Section 1391(b) governs venue in a Section 1983 action, allowing suit where all defendants reside or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Mallo v. Maston · filed 2024-03-06(b)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 action may be heard in a venue where all defendants reside, or in the venue where the issue substantially arose.

Section 1391(b) places venue for a Bivens suit where the defendants reside, if they all reside in the same state, or where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

Ramirez v. Gechy · filed 2025-05-22(b)

Section 1391(b) provides that venue is proper only in the federal judicial district where any defendant resides, if all the defendants reside in the same state, or in the district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. ... The events of which plaintiff complains occurred in the Union County, where the defendants appear to reside. As a result, venue with respect to this lawsuit is not proper in this court.

Section 1391(b) provides venue options that a plaintiff may use in an ERISA action even when ERISA has its own venue provision.

Lone Star 24 HR ER Facility, LLC v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas · filed 2025-07-03(b)

“In pleading venue, a plaintiff may use the ERISA provision or ‘may employ the venue options provided by the general venue statute,’” which is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(a) does not establish venue in a district when the only potentially relevant event in that state occurred in another district.

Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc. · filed 2002-07-08(a)

Even if this single instance supported finding such jurisdiction, which the court does not find, this instance also occurred in the sole locale in which venue can be based for the claims against Children’s Hospital pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for venue purposes.

Bride v. Snap Inc. · filed 2021-08-09(c)(2)

For a corporate entity defendant, venue is proper “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), meaning where it is incorporated and headquartered. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). Snap and YOLO are headquartered in Santa Monica and Los Angeles, respectively, Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 41, 42, and so reside in the Central District.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant resides, including a district where its headquarters establish personal jurisdiction.

GAETANO v. GILEAD SCIENCES, INC. · filed 2021-07-27(b)(1), (c)(2)

The action thus could have been brought in that venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides”), (c)(2) (entities are deemed to reside where they are subject to personal jurisdiction); Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 205, 223 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction where it has its principal place of business).

A corporate defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action, making venue proper there.

Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division/IBT v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 2020-07-01(b)(1), (c)(2)

Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides.” 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1). A defendant corporation “shall be deemed to reside . . . in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2); ... Because the D.C. Court has personal jurisdiction over Union Pacific, as discussed above, venue is also proper in the District of Columbia.

Section 1391(b) does not make a district a proper venue merely because the defendant conducts business there.

EMC Mortgage LLC v. American Bancshares Mortgage LLC · filed 2020-01-02(b)

But under Section 1391, the conduct of business is not a factor courts use to determine the propriety of venue.

A corporate defendant that waives its personal-jurisdiction objection is subject to personal jurisdiction for venue purposes and resides in that district under § 1391(c)(2).

Agasino v. American Airlines Inc. · filed 2019-07-26(b)(1), (c)(2)

Because American Airlines is subject to personal jurisdiction, venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (c)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue based on a defendant’s residence, and a corporate defendant seeking transfer for improper venue must address whether its contacts make it a resident of the district.

Cody v. Pinnacle Staffing Group · filed 2019-02-06(b)(1)

Although PSG argues its “only connection with the [S]tate of Missouri for purposes of this action is that Plaintiff resides there” (Doc. #4, at 4), PSG does not discuss or address its contacts, or lack thereof, with the Western District of Missouri. Thus, PSG has not established venue is improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). For this reason, PSG’s motion to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is denied.

A corporation subject to personal jurisdiction in a district is deemed to reside there for venue purposes.

Ratliff v. Venture Express, Inc. · filed 2019-03-12(b)(1), (c)(2)

Because Venture is a corporation “subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to [this] action,” it is “deemed to reside” in this District for the purpose of establishing venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (c)(2).

Section 1391 permits venue in a diversity action against a corporate defendant in a district where the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Agnesini v. Doctor's Associates, Inc. · filed 2011-08-08(a)(1), (c)

To the extent that DAI argues that venue over Moody’s claims does not lie in this District, DAI is mistaken. ... Since there does not appear to be any dispute that DAI is subject to personal jurisdiction in this District, venue here is proper.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper for a corporate defendant doing business in a district when its contacts there suffice for personal jurisdiction.

Smith v. Intex Recreation Corp. · filed 1991-02-01(c)

In this district, it has been held that venue is proper under the “doing business” provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), if there are sufficient contacts to assert personal jurisdiction in the district under the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe and its progeny. ... Under this concept, the answer to the question of personal jurisdiction necessarily provides the answer to the question of venue. Therefore, since this court has concluded that it has jurisdiction over the defendant, and because the court does not see any exceptional circumstances mandating a change of venue for convenience, the defendant’s motion to transfer this matter to the Central District of California is hereby DENIED.

Section 1391 permits venue against a corporate defendant when its business negotiations in the district are material to the claims, even if those contacts are limited.

Ernster v. Ralston Purina Co. · filed 1990-06-28(c)

Deltown's motion to dismiss Counts VI and VIII is based upon its allegation that under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 venue in this district is improper. Deltown relies almost exclusively upon Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corporation, 813 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.1987) for its argument that it has not been "doing business" in this district for venue purposes. However, the Court finds that Maybelline does not support Deltown's position. By Deltown's own admission, its representatives visited and made telephone calls to St. Louis during preliminary negotiations with Van Camp. The Court finds that, because of the nature of this case, those preliminary negotiations could have great import with respect to Deltown's intention to divert Van Camp's business from Excelpro to itself. These negotiations, in fact, may comprise the alleged "inducement" to infringe Ernster's patents. Such activities cannot be said to be "minuscule" with respect to contacts which may prove to be uniquely material to the factual circumstances of this case. ... Having considered all of the above, the Court denies Deltown's motion to dismiss Counts VI and VIII.

Under § 1391(b) and (c), a corporation resides in a judicial district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate state.

ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc. · filed 1990-06-25(b) and (c)

Venue is also proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c), in that Altech has sufficient contacts with the Northern District of Illinois so as to be subject to personal jurisdiction here, assuming that the District was a separate state; therefore, Altech resides in the Northern District of Illinois for purposes of the general venue statute.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate state.

Evans Tempcon, Inc. v. Index Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-07-09(c)

Thus, having found that defendant is properly subjected to long-arm personal jurisdiction in Michigan, it is apparent that venue is proper in the Western District of Michigan, in which all of defendant’s contacts with Michigan occurred.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, § 1391(c) determines a corporate defendant’s residence for venue by its contacts with each district.

Melahn v. Dimensional Oilfield Services, Inc. · filed 1990-08-08(c)

Under section 1391, the defendant cannot be deemed a resident of this district because its most significant contacts are with the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

International Honeycomb Corp. v. Transtech Service Network, Inc. · filed 1990-08-24(c)

A defendant corporation “shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub.L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988)). Therefore, because the Court has already determined that jurisdiction is proper as to TSN, venue is also proper in this district.

A corporate defendant resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, allowing venue there under § 1391(b).

Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. · filed 1990-09-19(b), (c)

Because KG & E is clearly subject to personal jurisdiction in Kansas since it is headquartered in Wichita, Kansas, this case “might have been brought” in the District of Kansas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Koos, Inc. v. Performance Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-10-17(c)

Under Section 1391(c), for purposes of venue, "a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). In effect, then, PII conceded that venue is proper in this district.

A corporation licensed to do business throughout a state may be sued in any district of that state, even if it does no business in that district.

Crawford & Co. v. Temple Drilling Co. · filed 1987-03-03(c)

This court therefore concludes that venue is proper in every district of a state in which a defendant corporation is licensed to do business, regardless of whether it is actually doing business in every district.

Under § 1391(e)(4), a corporation resides in its state of incorporation for venue purposes.

Texas Energy Reserve Corp. v. Department of Energy · filed 1982-03-31(e)(4)

Venue in this action is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4). ... For purposes of this statute, residence of a corporation is defined as the state of incorporation.

A subsidiary’s business in a district does not, by itself, establish venue there for its parent under § 1391(c).

Budd Co. v. United States Department of Transportation · filed 1981-03-13(c)

Even assuming that NJTC is a corporation within the meaning of the statute, the mere fact that its wholly-owned subsidiary does business in this district is not sufficient for § 1391(c) venue purposes as to the parent.

Section 1391(c) permits venue where a corporation does business; substantial sales, receipt of payments, and a bank account in the district were sufficient contacts here.

Rayco Manufacturing Co. v. Chicopee Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1957-01-22(c)

Using this guide, I find no trouble in concluding that Chicopee is amenable to suit in the Southern District of New York. The volume of its sales in this District, the presence in this District of a Post Office box in which it receives payments for goods sold, and its bank account in this District constitute sufficient contacts to make Chicopee answerable to the process of this court.

Section 1391 permits suit against a corporation in a district where it does business; a radio network's use of local affiliated stations to broadcast its programs and advertising qualifies.

Wanamaker v. Lewis · filed 1957-07-05(e)

The court therefore finds as a fact, and concludes as a matter of law, .that Mutual is doing business in Maryland within the provisions of Article 23, Section 88 of the Maryland Code, and 'Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district for a corporation registered to do business in the district’s state.

Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference · filed 1953-07-21(c)

Both railroads have registered to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Venue, therefore, is properly laid in this district under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) permits suit against a corporation in a district where it conducts regular, substantial business.

Glick v. Empire Box Corp. · filed 1954-03-05(c)

Its argument is that it does not do sufficient business in this State for plaintiff’s suit here to satisfy the venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and due process. ... But such facts do not make suit here unreasonable in view of the systematic and regular activity actually carried on here.

Section 1391(c) permits a corporation to be sued in a district where it does business and treats that district as its residence for venue purposes.

Steel Motor Service, Inc. v. Zalke · filed 1954-05-21(c)

The District Court held that the Federal Venue Statute controls. We think this conclusion is correct. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) reads as follows: ... This provision squarely applies. Appellant is doing business within Wayne County, Michigan, where the District Court has its seat, and service was made upon its agent.

Section 1391(c) permits suit against a corporation in the district where it has its main place of business.

Brownell v. La Salle Steel Co. · filed 1955-02-04(c)

The defendant has its main place of business in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and suit might have been there brought, so that such District is not an improper one and is one to which the action might be transferred, if sufficient reasons therefor exist.

Section 1391(c)'s definition of corporate residence also governs where a corporation may be sued within a district under § 1393(a).

Guy F. Atkinson Company v. City of Seattle · filed 1958-01-15(c)

In other words, the verb “resides” in 1393(a) must have the same meaning as the noun “residence” in 1391 (c).

Section 1391(c) defines a corporation’s residence for Jones Act venue purposes to include a district where it does business.

Connolly v. Farrell Lines, Inc. · filed 1959-07-06(c)

We hold in accord with Phillips v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1952, 102 F.Supp. 51 and the cases cited therein that § 1391(c) defines the term “residence” in the Jones Act so that a corporation may be sued in the judicial district where it is doing business and therefore the district court was in error in dismissing the complaint on this ground.

Under § 1391(c), a domestic corporation that does no business in another district of its home state may be sued in the district where its principal place of business is located.

Jacobson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Company · filed 1958-06-19(c)

Absent its “doing business” in any other district in the state, this district must be that in which its principal place of business is located.

Section 1391(c) permits venue for an agency treated as a corporation in a district where it maintains an office and does business.

Gart v. Cole · filed 1958-08-05(c)

Venue is proper within 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Here the Housing and Home Finance Administration maintains a regional office at 346 Broadway, in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, and has administered at least ten Title I projects like the present within the district. It is clear that the Housing and Home Finance Agency is doing business here.

A corporation’s extensive activities in a district through its selling agent can satisfy § 1391(c)’s venue rule.

Ostow & Jacobs, Inc. v. Morgan-Jones, Inc. · filed 1959-11-04(c)

It is well settled that the activities of Aileen in New York as described above are fully sufficient to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) dealing with venue.

Venue is proper in a district where a surety company is licensed and does business when no alternative federal district is suggested.

Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, a Corporation v. United States to Use and Benefit of Bailey-Lewis-Williams · filed 1962-02-15

We add only that venue was properly laid in the District of Columbia, as the surety company was licensed to do business — and does business — here, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1958), and as no other judicial district in the United States was suggested as an alternative forum.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing for venue purposes in a district where it does business, including where it maintains its principal office and conducts substantial administrative activity.

Sheldon Steel Corporation v. Standard Fruit Company · filed 1963-06-12(c)

Section 1391(c) states that a corporation may be sued in the district in which it is (a) incorporated, or (b) licensed to do business, or (c) is doing business, and that such district shall be regarded as its residence for purposes of venue. ... For under any test defendant appears clearly to be “doing business” in the New Orleans Division. ... Federal venue is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant does business.

Pardonnet v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. · filed 1964-06-19(c)

In the case at bar, The Flying Tiger Line, Inc;, does business in Illinois; service was properly had upon it; and venue would lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(c) does not apply to corporations suing as plaintiffs.

Carter-Beveridge Drilling Co., Inc. v. Hughes · filed 1963-10-16(c)

Contrary to appellant’s position, we hold that the venue provisions of 28 U.S. C. § 1391(c) are not applicable to corporations suing as plaintiffs.

Section 1391(c) applies to corporate plaintiffs and corporate defendants when determining venue.

Toilet Goods Association, Inc. v. Celebrezze · filed 1964-11-16(c)

Venue, predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), is proper as to each of the individually named plaintiffs. Although not all the Circuits agree, this Circuit has consistently held that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) applies to plaintiff and defendant corporations alike.

Section 1391(c) governs where a corporation may be sued but does not establish personal jurisdiction over it.

Harold Noel Arrowsmith, Jr. v. United Press International · filed 1963-06-11(c)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), providing that “[a] corporation mfty be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do Jiusiness or is * doing business,” relates to venue and not to jurisdiction, as is made clear by considerations polnted out in the concurring opinion in Jaftex, 282 F.2d at 518, and there recognized by the majority, 282 F.2d at 512.

Section 1391(c) defines a corporation’s residence by where it does business when a venue statute does not define residence.

Snyder v. Eastern Auto Distributors, Inc. · filed 1965-03-10(c)

This Court finds, in the absence of definition or limitation in the statute referred to that, insofar as the corporate defendant here is concerned the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) ... define where defendant resides.

A corporation that does business in a judicial district is a resident of that district for venue purposes.

Mims v. Proctor and Gamble Distributing Company · filed 1966-09-01(c)

There is no dispute as to defendant’s corporate capacity, domestication, licensing and other requisites of doing business such as to qualify South Carolina as its “residence” for the purposes here.

Section 1391(a) governs venue and does not supply personal jurisdiction.

Harold D. Bookout and Betty Houser v. Linda Lou Beck and Daniel L. Beck, by Their Guardian Ad Litem, Edith P. Beck · filed 1965-12-23(a)

Obviously, 28 U.S.C. 1391(a) is of no aid to plaintiff because it is a venue section and jurisdiction must be first found over the subject matter and the person before one reaches venue.

Section 1391(c) governs venue for corporations, not personal jurisdiction over them.

Jake Harold Bowman, Philip G. Griffin, A. Donald Brinton and Midland Industries, Inc. v. Curt G. Joa, Inc. · filed 1966-05-24(c)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) does provide that “[a] corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,” but this relates to venue and not to jurisdiction.

Section 1391 governs venue and does not determine personal jurisdiction or define what constitutes doing business for that purpose.

Caso v. Lafayette Radio Electronics Corporation · filed 1966-12-27(e)

Section 1391 of the Judicial Code seems to us to present the twin difficulties of being historically directed to the question of venue rather than jurisdiction and affording no guidance to the decision of what constitutes “doing business”.

A corporation that operates a business through a partnership it controls is doing business in that district for venue purposes.

Myers v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1967-10-03(c)

Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) designates the residence of a corporation as the judicial districts where it is “doing business.” ... Defendant is operating a newspaper in Texas through the partnership which it controls, and is thus doing business there for venue purposes and would therefore also be subject to service of process in Texas.

Section 1391(c) permits venue where a corporate defendant's business in the district makes it amenable to service of process there.

Didactics Corporation v. Welch Scientific Company · filed 1968-04-05(c)

Adopting that rule, it is determined that the previous finding of defendant Welch’s amenability to substituted service under Ohio’s long-arm statute also satisfies the “doing business” venue requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1964).

A corporate defendant resides in a district for venue purposes when its business there satisfies the personal-jurisdiction standard.

Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Ever-Dry Corporation · filed 1968-08-08(c)

At the same time a determination that this Court has jurisdiction over Ever-Dry would result in a finding that venue lies here, since the test for corporate residence within the district, as required by Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), (b), is the same as the jurisdictional standard, i. e., whether the defendant is “doing business” within the district, Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 267 F.Supp. 938, 940-941 (S.D.N.Y.1967); 1 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.142 [5.-3], pp. 1499-1501.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing only in districts where it actually does business.

Energy Resources Group, Inc. v. Energy Resources Corp. · filed 1969-03-12(c)

Thus, the issue presented is whether in a suit against a foreign corporation licensed to do business in a multi-district state, venue will lie in all districts of the licensing state regardless of the lack of activities in certain of the districts. The court concludes that the answer must be in the negative.

Section 1391(c) provides a broader rule for determining a corporation's residence for venue purposes.

Faberge, Inc. v. Schick Electric, Inc. · filed 1970-04-29(c)

For the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) the defendant resides in the state of its incorporation, which is Delaware, and the broader view of corporate residence contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) does not apply.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant is incorporated and doing business.

Raymond E. Danto, Associates, Inc. v. Arthur D. Little, Inc. · filed 1970-09-16(e)

It is clear that the present suit could have been commenced in a district court in Massachusetts, for that is where the defendant was incorporated and is doing business.

Section 1391 permits venue where the defendant is doing business, using a test essentially the same as the transacting-business standard under 15 U.S.C. § 22.

Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg · filed 1971-10-29

With regard to the state claims, even were they to be considered separate and apart from the federal claim, the test applicable to them under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 does not differ substantially from the test in 15 U.S.C. § 22. The “doing business” test of § 1391 has been held to be essentially the same as the “transacting business” standard of 15 U.S.C. § 22.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporation is doing business and where the claim arose.

Car-Freshner Corp. v. Broadway Manufacturing Co. · filed 1971-12-03(c), (a), (b)

Title 28 United States Code Section 1391(c) (1970) provides that a corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is “doing business”. ... This Court recently held that a trade mark and unfair competition dispute such as herein involved was not only related to, but “arose” in the judicial district in which the products of the parties are sold, that New York CPLR § 302(a) (McKinney 1970) provides that personal jurisdiction over a non-resident is obtainable by out-of-state service, and that Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1391 (a) and (b) permit venue in a judicial district where the “claim arose”. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Ever-Dry Corp., supra.

Section 1391 permits a diversity action where the parties reside or the claim arose and treats a district where a corporation does business as its residence.

Weinberger v. Retail Credit Company · filed 1972-06-13(a), (c)

Venue for the diversity action is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, which provides in pertinent part: ... The affidavits filed in this case indicate that both IBM and RCC are doing business in the District of South Carolina and, more importantly, the factors giving rise to the cause of action set forth in Count I of the complaint arose in the District of South Carolina. Accordingly, it is abundantly clear that Count I of this action could have been brought in the District of South Carolina.

Section 1391(b) and (c) make venue proper based on defendants' residence and define a corporation's residence by where it is incorporated, licensed to do business, or doing business.

Mosley v. Nationwide Purchasing, Inc. · filed 1973-10-09(b), (c)

Under the facts of this case as contained in the record, we believe the trial court correctly concluded that Nationwide was not “doing business” within the District of Columbia as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and (c). ... Venue was therefore laid in the “wrong district” and transfer “in the interests of justice” under section 1406(a) was within the discretion of the trial court.

Under § 1391(b) and (c), shared tariffs and revenues do not establish venue over a corporate subsidiary where the subsidiary does not do business in the district.

N-Triple-C Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1974-05-24(b), (c)

Since none of the moving defendants reside in this district or are licensed to do business here, and since the claim did not arise in this district, plaintiff must rely on the “doing business” section of the venue statute. ... Joint tariffs, or revenues, do not extinguish separate corporate forms. ... Only joint activities within this district could subject these operating companies to jurisdiction and venue here.

Section 1391(c) treats the Commission as doing business in states where it exercises authority and control over water resources, even though its home office is elsewhere.

Borough of Morrisville v. Delaware River Basin Commission · filed 1974-08-08(c)

Although the home office of the Delaware River Basin Commission is in Trenton, N.J., the Commission has authority and control over water resources located in New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Pennsylvania. This authority and control is exercised through such actions as the one complained of here. It is inconceivable that the defendant is not doing business in those four states within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation registered to do business in Georgia as a resident there for venue purposes.

Amchem Products, Inc. v. Gaf Corp. · filed 1974-11-07(c)

With respect to GAF, the court is satisfied that GAF is a resident of this jurisdiction for purposes of venue since it is registered to do business within Georgia. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) does not make a corporation subject to venue in every federal district of a state solely because it is incorporated there.

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. Economy Co. · filed 1973-12-05(c)

This Court finds and concludes that a corporation incorporated in Oklahoma is not subjected to venue in each Federal judicial district in the state under the Trademark laws of the United States solely by virtue of being incorporated in the state.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where it continuously performs important executive functions.

Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Giant Food, Inc. · filed 1975-04-18(c)

The location of defendants’ offices and records in Landover together with the fact that all the business policies of the defendants are established there is sufficient to establish that this suit could have been brought in Maryland. The continuous exercise of a corporation’s important executive functions within a judicial district will support a claim that a defendant is “doing business” in the district for venue purposes.

Section 1391(c)’s definition of corporate residence does not exhaust the meaning of “residing” under § 1392(a).

Board of County Commissioners v. Wilshire Oil Co. · filed 1975-06-11(c)

Neither does 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) contain an exclusive definition of the term “reside” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a).

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant does business.

Du-Al Corporation v. Rudolph Beaver, Inc., and John R. Beaver · filed 1976-08-30(c)

Because Beaver was “doing business” in Maryland, venue was in the District of Maryland under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

A corporation’s continuous, regular, systematic business activity in a district establishes that it does business there for venue purposes.

Zyskind v. Photo-Scan Corp. · filed 1976-09-15(c)

This continuous, regular, systematic activity within the state is sufficient to establish that defendant is doing business in this district and state.

Under § 1391(c), occasional purchases of ships located in a district, negotiated and completed elsewhere, do not make a corporation a resident of that district for venue purposes.

Trinity Metals v. Andy International, Inc. · filed 1977-01-11(c)

The fact that over a period of years the defendant corporation has on occasion purchased ships berthed in the Philadelphia area as a result of negotiations conducted and culminated elsewhere does not constitute doing business to the extent necessary to require it to be licensed in this or any other state. ... We find that the defendant was not “doing business” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(b) permits venue where both defendants reside, and subsection (c) treats a corporation as residing where it is incorporated or licensed to do business.

Sanyo Elec. Trading Co., Ltd. v. Masco Corp. · filed 1977-04-21(b), (c)

Venue in the Southern District of Indiana is also appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) which requires that the action be brought in a district where both Masco and Indiana reside. The residence of a corporation for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) is determined by reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) which provides that a corporation is a resident where it is either incorporated or licensed to do business. Thus, it is clear that this action could have been brought in the Southern District of Indiana.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where it does business for venue purposes, including in a Jones Act suit.

Amelia Zamora Demateos, Administratrix of the Estate of Theodore Reyes, Deceased v. Texaco, Inc. And Texaco Panama, Inc · filed 1977-08-12(c)

It incorporates the venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) which allows suit against a corporation in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes. ... Thus the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was a permissible venue.