28 U.S.C. § 1391

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper for an action against a corporation in a district where it does business.

Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. · filed 1977-10-27(c)

Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. is incorporated in Delaware and does business in Rhode Island, which is therefore proper venue for this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) applies to public corporations and permits venue in a district where they do business.

R. S. Mikesell Associates v. Grand River Dam Authority · filed 1977-11-09(c)

Therefore, as 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) applies to “corporations” and is not specifically limited to private corporations, the Court finds that Defendant is a “corporation” within the meaning of that section. Furthermore, as Plaintiff has alleged in its Complaint herein that Defendant “conducts business within the Eastern District of the United States District Court of the State of Oklahoma,” the Court finds and concludes that § 1391(c) is the applicable venue statute in this case and that venue herein is proper in this Court under said statute.

A corporation licensed to do business statewide resides in every judicial district of that state for venue purposes.

Pope v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1978-01-11(c)

Therefore, as Defendant is licensed to do business in Oklahoma and there is nothing before the Court to indicate that Defendant’s authority to transact business in Oklahoma is not state-wide in effect, the Court finds and concludes that Defendant resides in all three judicial districts of Oklahoma for purposes of establishing venue.

Under § 1391(c), a corporation does business in a district when its activity there is continuous and systematic; attending a trade exposition and making occasional sales visits do not suffice.

Sterling Television Presentations, Inc. v. Shintron Co. · filed 1978-06-14(c)

In order to find that Shintron is “doing business” within this district, I must find that it conducts business here continuously and systematically. ... It cannot seriously be argued that Shintron is “doing business” in this district in any continuous and systematic sense. Its presence at a trade exposition, and its occasional sales forays into the district, are not sufficient.

Section 1391(c) expands where corporations may be sued, but a corporation’s residence in one district does not extend venue there to an individual codefendant when both reside in another district.

Mazzella v. Stineman · filed 1979-06-22(c)

The answer, in my view, is that the problem arises from the interplay of sections 1391(c) and 1392(a), and that Congress, in enacting section 1391(c), did distinguish between individuals and corporations, with the manifest purpose of increasing corporations’ amenability to suit. I therefore see nothing wrong with reading that distinction into section 1392(a) when a plaintiff invokes both provisions in order to obtain a wider choice of fora.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant is incorporated.

Biggers v. Borden, Inc. · filed 1979-07-12(c)

Jurisdiction and venue over Borden could have been had in New Jersey because Borden is a New Jersey corporation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 1391(b) permits venue where a corporate defendant’s business contacts make it a resident of the district, without deciding where the claim arose.

Chicago Reader, Inc. v. Metro College Publishing, Inc. · filed 1980-05-07(b)

However, it is unnecessary to decide if the claim arose here since Metro has sufficient contacts with Illinois to be deemed a resident for the purposes of Section 1391(b).

Section 1391(c) permits venue against a corporate defendant in a district where it does business.

Wilkerson v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc. · filed 1980-09-19(c)

Venue is proper in this Court, as the Defendant is doing, business within this District and Division.

A corporation does business in a district for venue purposes when it sustains a market there through distributors and actively promotes its products there.

Smith Ex Rel. Connor v. Avco-Lycoming · filed 1980-10-06(c)

Regardless of whether the test for venue is more stringent than that for jurisdiction, I am satisfied that Beech’s activities are sufficient to constitute “doing business” under § 1391(c). As noted in the discussion with respect to jurisdiction, Beech has long profited from the Pennsylvania market through the use of a distributorship system, and actively promotes its products in the Commonwealth. Its contacts are not a result of happenstance, but rather reflect a sustained interest in seeing its products sold and serviced here. In my view, this suffices to constitute doing business.

A corporation’s numerous and substantial contacts with a district and its companies can establish that it does business there for venue purposes.

Norval Industries, Inc. v. Superior Companies, Inc. · filed 1981-04-08(c)

In this case, defendants’ numerous and substantial contacts with Minnesota and Minnesota companies realistically amounted to doing business in Minnesota.

A corporation doing business in a judicial district resides there for venue purposes.

Mowrey v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 1981-10-27(c)

In this case it is conceded by the parties that Johnson & Johnson and Pitman-Moore, Inc. both do business in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, we conclude that venue is proper over these defendants in this district.

Section 1391(c) permits venue for a labor union in a district where its business contacts satisfy due process.

Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. · filed 1981-12-02(c)

Although there is some controversy on the question — one of federal law— whether “doing business” within the meaning of Section 1391(c) extends to the limits of due process, this Court believes that the better view is that it does.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where it does business, but sporadic sales do not establish that residence.

Mida Manufacturing Co. v. Femic, Inc. · filed 1982-05-03(c)

Defendants Axelrod and Femic have not systematically or regularly conducted business activity in this district; their “presence” here consists only of a miniscule, erratic number of sales pursuant to mail and telephone ordering and, in the case of Femic, a New Jersey independent salesman’s isolated sale of its product in Pennsylvania. This does not constitute doing business to the extent necessary to require either Axelrod or Femic to be licensed in Pennsylvania. The Court therefore finds that neither of these defendants is “doing business” in this district within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) permits venue where corporate defendants do business.

Hutchison v. C.I.T. Corp. · filed 1982-05-13(c)

Since defendants do business in this district, venue is properly laid here. Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(c).

A corporation that regularly distributes its publication and solicits advertising in a district is doing business there for venue purposes.

CES Publishing Corp. v. Dealerscope, Inc. · filed 1982-08-04(c)

However, I do hold that, although these issues are close, there is jurisdiction over Dealerscope, Inc. and that venue is properly laid in this district. ... Regardless whether the test for venue is more stringent than the test for jurisdiction, however, it appears that Dealerscope, Inc.’s activities in Pennsylvania are sufficient to support a finding that it is doing business here for purposes of venue.

Section 1391(c)'s corporate residence rule applies only to corporate defendants, not corporate plaintiffs.

Rosenfeld v. S.F.C. Corporation · filed 1983-03-21(c)

We need not consider whether High Beta is nonetheless “doing business” in Massachusetts within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), for that section of the Code applies only to corporate defendants, not to corporate plaintiffs.

Section 1391(c) treats a pension fund as doing business in a district when its systematic local activity, considered with the nature of its business and other contacts, establishes venue there.

Flowers Industries, Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Industry International Pension Fund · filed 1983-03-18(c)

Although these last two contacts — the payroll audits and the appearance of Mr. Fleming — are not enough to constitute “doing business” by themselves, when they are considered along with the nature and character of the Fund’s business and its systematic business activity in the Northern District of Georgia, this court is convinced that the defendant is and has been doing business in this district for venue purposes, both pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and 29 U.S.C. § 1451(d).

Section 1391(c) requires a corporation to have business activity in the district beyond the minimum contacts needed for personal jurisdiction.

Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc. · filed 1983-11-10(c)

For these reasons, we hold that for a corporation to be “doing business” under § 1391(c), it must be engaged in activity beyond the minimum contacts required for the positing of in personam jurisdiction.

A corporation with substantial, deliberate, and continuing contacts in a district is doing business there for venue purposes.

In Re Dalkon Shield Litigation · filed 1983-11-16(c)

These facts are sufficient to support a finding that under King v. Johnson Wax, Robins was “doing business” in Maryland at the relevant time because it had substantial, deliberate and continuing contacts with this State.

Section 1391(c) expands where a corporate defendant resides for venue purposes; it does not restrict the alternative diversity venue grounds in § 1391(a).

Webb Research Corp. v. Rockland Industries, Inc. · filed 1983-12-02(c)

The defendant’s contention that under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) venue for a suit against a corporation is proper only where the defendant corporation is incorporated, licensed to do business or doing business is plainly incorrect. Since this is a diversity case, venue is proper in this district because the plaintiff “resides” here.

A corporation licensed to do business statewide resides for venue purposes in every federal district in that state.

Young v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. · filed 1984-12-13(c)

Moreover, a corporation which is licensed to do business statewide is a resident of any district within the state pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) permits suit against a corporation in a district where it does business, and activities sufficient for jurisdiction under New York CPLR § 301 satisfy that requirement.

Oral-B Laboratories, Inc. v. Mi-Lor Corp. · filed 1985-06-19(c)

Since personal jurisdiction can be exercised pursuant to CPLR § 301, § 1391(c) is satisfied and that venue is proper in the Southern District.

A corporation’s principal place of business may be treated as its residence for venue purposes.

Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. · filed 1985-06-21(c)

Defendant SFI’s principal place of business is there, so that the District of Arizona may be regarded as the residence of the corporation for venue purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

A corporation does business in a district for venue purposes when its commercial contacts there are more than minuscule, even if its completed sales there are small.

Floralife, Inc. v. Floraline International, Inc. · filed 1985-10-09(c)

The only issue is whether Floraline is “doing business” in this district or Floralife’s claim arises here. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) (1982). If either of these elements are established, venue in this district is proper. ... Clearly, Floraline is “doing business” in this district and its business contacts are “more than minuscule.”

Section 1391(c) does not make a corporate plaintiff a resident of a district solely because it does business there.

AMVEST Capital Corp. v. Banco Central, S.A. · filed 1986-01-29(c)

The problem with this reasoning, however, is that even though such contacts might suffice to make AMVEST a “resident” for purposes of defending a law suit, they do not qualify it as a “resident” so that plaintiff AMVEST can consider the S.D.N.Y. its “home” forum.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where the corporate parties are found and transact business.

Beermart, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co. · filed 1986-04-18

Further, Beer-Mart and Stroh are found and transact business in this district so this court has personal jurisdiction of the parties and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

The defendants’ combined New York contacts did not amount to doing business there under § 1391(c).

Transistor Devices, Inc. v. Tracor, Inc. · filed 1987-02-25(c)

Accumulating all of defendants’ contacts with New York set forth in the pleadings and accompanying affidavits, the undersigned concludes that defendants have not been “doing business” in New York within the meaning of § 1391(c).

Shipping a corporation’s products to a district for retail sale there does not establish that the corporation is doing business in that district for venue purposes.

L.C. Baron, Inc. v. H.G. Caspari, Inc. · filed 1987-04-23(c)

Plaintiff argues that defendant’s greeting cards and other products are shipped to this district and retailed here. This “stream of commerce” may be enough to show "minimum contacts” for ... but does not constitute "doing business” under § 1391(c).

The defendant’s New York activity did not amount to doing business there under § 1391(c).

Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Harden Industries, Inc. · filed 1987-06-30(c)

Harden’s in-state business activity does not constitute “doing business” under § 301, and venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) is therefore not properly in the Southern District of New York.

Section 1391(c) does not make venue proper wherever a corporate defendant can be served; the court must assess the extent of its business in the district.

International Comfort Products, Inc. v. Hanover House Industries, Inc. · filed 1989-06-07(c)

Further, while section 1391 states that a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction, this does not mean that venue is proper in any district where Hanover could be subjected to service.

Under the former version of § 1391(c), a parent's business in a district may establish its subsidiary's residence there when they operated as a single entity in the disputed transaction.

Reed v. Brae Railcar Management, Inc. · filed 1989-07-05(c)

These facts make it clear that BTI and BRM operated as a single entity for the purposes of the management agreement, and should be treated as such for the purposes of this litigation. Accordingly, because BTI is doing business in this district, we will consider BRM to be doing business here as well. Venue is therefore proper.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Century Wrecker Corp. v. Vulcan Equipment Co. · filed 1989-12-14(c)

Under § 1391(c) a corporation is deemed to reside for purposes of venue in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. There is no question that Vulcan Inc. is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district for venue purposes when its contacts there support personal jurisdiction.

Clark v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co. · filed 1990-05-15(c)

Section 1391(c) of Title 28 requires the court to perform a minimum contacts/due process analysis to determine whether a corporate defendant resides within the district for the purposes of venue.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction; in a state with multiple districts, each district is assessed separately.

Plastic Films, Inc. v. Poly Pak America, Inc. · filed 1991-04-15(c)

If a state has more than one judicial district, a corporate defendant is deemed to reside in only those districts where its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if those districts were separate states.

Section 1391(c) permits venue in a district where the parties have their offices and principal places of business.

C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown · filed 1991-07-11(c)

Since plaintiffs and defendants have their office and principal place of business in Clarkstown, New York, venue in this district is appropriate 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c)’s corporate residence rule does not apply to a sole proprietorship.

Blue Compass Corp. v. Polish Masters of America · filed 1991-10-09(c)

Although a corporation defendant “shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction” for purposes of venue, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), Dumond’s business is not a corporation.

Under the 1988 version of § 1391(c), a defendant resides for venue purposes in any district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Dakota Industries, Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc. · filed 1991-10-16(c)

Under the 1988 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a defendant is “deemed to reside [for venue purposes] in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing, for venue purposes, in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Amp Inc. v. Methode Electronics, Inc. · filed 1993-05-12(c)

Under.section 1391(c), for purposes of venue, a corporation is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” _ Having determined that personal jurisdiction over Methode is proper based on, inter alia, its sales to customers in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, we find that venue is proper in this district.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction; sending catalogs into the district and filling orders there can establish venue.

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Photaz Imports Ltd., Inc. · filed 1993-08-04(c)

Photaz is a mail and phone order business; while the bulk of its business may be in the Metropolitan area, it sends its catalogs into the Western District and has filled orders in the Western District. This activity is sufficient to establish venue in this district and I do not find Photaz’s arguments about the convenience of transfer to the Southern District sufficiently compelling to overcome the presumption in favor of a plaintiffs choice of venue.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as a resident of a district in a state with multiple districts when its contacts with that district would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a state.

Library Publications, Inc. v. Heartland Samplers, Inc. · filed 1993-06-15(c)

Under the 1988 amendments to § 1391, a corporate defendant resides in any district in which it would be subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. In a state which has more than one district, the defendant’s contacts in that district must be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction as if that district were a state. ... Heartland is a resident of the Eastern District for venue purposes, and venue lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing for venue purposes in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Tools USA & Equipment Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equipment, Inc. · filed 1993-09-17(c)

Thus, under the current statute a defendant corporation “resides” (for venue purposes) wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

HARLEY-DAVIDSON v. Columbia Tristar Home Video · filed 1994-05-03(c)

For the purposes of Section 1391(b), a corporate [8] defendant "shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced," 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a mandate that must be accorded its plain meaning. ... Whereas we thus have personal jurisdiction over the defendants, they are deemed to reside, and venue properly lies, in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district of a state with multiple judicial districts when its contacts there would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Rocket Jewelry Box, Inc. v. Noble Gift Packaging, Inc. · filed 1994-07-06(c)

In the case at bar, § 1391(c) establishes personal jurisdiction over Noble in the Eastern District based on its Brooklyn facilities but cannot confer personal jurisdiction over Noble in the Southern District.

For corporate venue in a state with multiple judicial districts, a corporation’s contacts with a district are assessed under due process principles once it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the state.

Smehlik v. Athletes and Artists, Inc. · filed 1994-08-24(c)

The language of the second sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) simply indicates that once it has been established that a defendant may be subjected to personal jurisdiction within the state, venue determinations may be made on the basis of a simple due process analysis.

A corporation resides for venue purposes in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Rhee Bros., Inc. v. Seoul Shik Poom, Inc. · filed 1994-11-30(c)

Furthermore, as a corporation, Defendant is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Jurisdiction having been found under the long-arm statute, this district is an appropriate venue for this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Kmart Corp. v. Key Industries, Inc. · filed 1994-12-14(c)

Moreover, a defendant corporation “shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Because Key is subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan, venue is proper in this Court.

A corporation that systematically does business in a district resides there for venue purposes.

Tools USA & Equipment Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equipment, Inc. · filed 1994-12-27(c)

This court found that Defendant is “doing business” within this district in a systematic manner. Thus, Defendant corporation “resides” within this district, and venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) — 1391(e) (1993).

Section 1391(c)’s definition of corporate residence supplements an ERISA venue provision that allows suit where a defendant resides.

McCracken v. Automobile Club of Southern California, Inc. · filed 1995-06-02(c)

Backed by precedent and the defendants’ concession, the court borrows the definition of corporate residence from § 1391(c) in determining venue under § 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2). Because the defendants are corporations with sufficient minimum contacts to the United States, the court has personal jurisdiction over them. Accordingly, by the terms of § 1391(c), the defendants are deemed to reside in Kansas, and by the terms of § 1132(e)(2), venue is therefore proper in Kansas.

Section 1391(c) permits venue against a corporation in a district where it would be subject to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Ontel Products, Inc. v. Project Strategies Corp. · filed 1995-09-14(c)

Because P.S.C. is a corporation, venue is proper in the Southern District of New York pursuant to the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. P.S.C.’s activities in the Southern District are such that, if the Southern District were a distinct state, P.S.C. would be subject to personal jurisdiction there in accordance with the New York State law of personal jurisdiction detailed in the previous section of this Opinion.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

DiMark Marketing, Inc. v. Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co. · filed 1996-01-25(c)

Because, for the purposes of this motion, we found above that Blue Cross is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this District, we likewise find that for the purposes of venue, Blue Cross is considered to reside here as well, and that therefore, venue is properly laid here.

In a state with multiple federal districts, corporate status alone does not establish residence in every district; the corporation must have contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction in the district.

Tranor v. Brown · filed 1996-01-22(c)

As set forth in the 1988 amendment, venue does not lie against a corporation in a multi-district state solely because of its corporate status. The revised provision does not distinguish between domestic and foreign corporations.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Anglo American Insurance Group, P.L.C. v. CalFed Inc. · filed 1996-02-26(c)

Having found that CalFed has made a prima facie showing that California can exercise jurisdiction over KPMG, the court must conclude that venue is likewise proper in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Laumann Manufacturing Corp. v. Castings USA, Inc. · filed 1996-02-09(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a corporate defendant is considered a resident of a judicial district if it is subject to personal jurisdiction in that particular district at the time the action is commenced. ... Thus, Castings is deemed to reside in the Eastern District of New York because as previously discussed, the requirements of personal jurisdiction have been satisfied.

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a corporate defendant resides, including a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. · filed 1996-04-17(b)(1)

The court concludes, therefore, that the provisions of § 1391(b)(1) having been complied with, Connecticut venue is proper.

Section 1391 permits venue in a district where a defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, and treats a corporation as residing in a district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

American Airlines, Inc. v. ATS · filed 1996-05-02(a)(1), (c)

Pursuant to § 1391(a)(1), venue is proper in any district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state. Under § 1391(c), for venue purposes, a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time that the action was commenced. Since the Court has already found that it has personal jurisdiction over both defendants, and the bulk of the defendants’ contacts with Texas are in the Northern District of Texas, ... the corporate defendants are deemed to reside in the Northern District of Texas. The Court therefore holds that venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as a resident of a district where the court has personal jurisdiction over it for venue purposes.

Uraseal, Inc. v. Electric Motion Co. · filed 1996-05-09(c)

Defendant's venue argument is also rejected because the court herein found jurisdiction. EMC is thus deemed a "resident" of the forum.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district of a state with multiple districts when its contacts there would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate state.

Pacas v. Showell Farms Inc · filed 1996-04-22(c)

Appellants have failed to make out a prima facie case that venue was proper in the Eastern District of North Carolina, as Showell does not have the requisite minimum contacts with the Eastern District.

Section 1391 permits venue where a corporate defendant resides and treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation · filed 1996-12-19(b), (c)

As explained above, the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action was commenced. Thus, venue is proper in the District.

A corporate defendant with no contacts in a district does not reside there for venue purposes under § 1391(b)(1).

Youman v. Newfield Exploration Co. · filed 1997-06-04(b)(1)

Because Newfield has no contacts with this district, it does not “reside” in this district pursuant to section 1391(b)(1).

In a state with multiple federal districts, a corporation resides for diversity venue purposes in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Wilshire Credit Corp. v. Barrett Capital Management Corp. · filed 1997-07-16(a)(1), (c)

Since New York State has more than one federal judicial district, this action is properly brought in the Western District only if Barrett Leasing’s contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if the Western District were a separate state. ... Accordingly, venue is proper in the Western District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(1) and (c).

A corporation resides for venue purposes in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

McGregor v. American Express Travel Related Services Co. (In Re Griffith) · filed 1997-08-26(c)

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) provides that a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which “it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” ... The court sua sponte takes judicial notice of the fact that American Express regularly does business in the Middle District of Alabama.

In a diversity action, venue is proper where a corporate defendant resides, including a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

McCulley v. Anglers Cove Condominium Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1997-08-29(a)(1), (c)

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue' in an action founded on diversity of citizenship may be brought in the district where the defendant resides, and a corporate defendant resides in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. As the Association is subject to in personam jurisdiction in the county in which it maintains its principal place of business, the Middle District of Florida is the proper judicial district to transfer this action.

In a state with multiple judicial districts, § 1391(c) measures a corporation’s residence in a district by whether its contacts there would support personal jurisdiction under federal due process if the district were a separate state.

Lisseveld v. Marcus · filed 1997-06-16(c)

Section 1391(c) makes no reference to the application of the state statutory requirements for personal jurisdiction within the multidistrict state at issue. Accordingly, federal law applies.

For a sole corporate defendant, the court treated personal jurisdiction as dispositive of venue under § 1391(b)(1) and (c).

One World Botanicals Ltd. v. Gulf Coast Nutritionals, Inc. · filed 1997-12-10(b)(1), (c)

Gulf Coast is the only defendant in this case and it is a corporation. (Weiss Aff. I ¶ 1.) Thus, according to the plain language of 28 U.S.C.. § 1391(b)(1) & (e), this Court’s previous discussion of personal jurisdiction is dispositive here.

In a diversity suit, a corporation resides for venue purposes in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Gorman v. Grand Casino of Louisiana, Inc.-Coushatta · filed 1998-04-18(a), (c)

Under § 1391(a) and (c), venue in a diversity suit lies against a corporate defendant in any district where the corporation “resides,” and a corporation is deemed to reside in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. ... Since this court has determined that it has personal jurisdiction over Grand Casino, the defendant resides here for purposes of venue. Therefore, venue is proper.

Under § 1391(c), a corporation resides for venue purposes wherever it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action commenced.

Gallert v. Courtaulds Packaging Co. Inc. · filed 1998-04-30(c)

A defendant corporation resides, for venue purposes, wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). This Court has already determined that it has general jurisdiction over the defendant, which finding renders venue in this district proper, unless some other circumstance would make it improper.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action began.

Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance · filed 1998-06-16(c)

However, Defendant’s reliance upon § 1391(b) is negated by provision (c) ... which allows for venue when the defendant corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the suit is commenced. Therefore, under § 1391(c), venue is appropriate for federal question jurisdiction.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, including through an enforceable consent to jurisdiction.

NCR Credit Corp. v. Ye Seekers Horizon, Inc. · filed 1998-08-10(c)

Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) provides that if a defendant is a corporation, it will be deemed to reside “in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” ... Thus, pursuant to § 1391(c), Defendant resides in New Jersey.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Morrison Co., Inc. v. WCCO Belting, Inc. · filed 1999-01-11(c)

A corporate defendant is deemed to reside “in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” ... Because the Court has found that the defendants are not subject to personal jurisdiction in this district, venue is improper as well.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Peay v. BellSouth Medical Assistance Plan · filed 2000-03-06(c)

The general provision states that “[f]or purposes of venue . . . a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Thus, under § 1132(e)(2), a corporation resides wherever personal jurisdiction is proper.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Nutrition Physiology Corp. v. Enviros Ltd. · filed 2000-03-09(c)

As such, this Court should find that venue is proper if it finds it properly maintains personal jurisdiction over Enviros Ltd. and Biotal Ltd. ... Because the Court finds no evidence of Biotal Ltd.’s committing regular acts of infringement or maintaining a regular and established place of business in Lubbock, Texas, and because it has previously found that it does not possess personal jurisdiction over Biotal Ltd., the Court finds that venue is improper in the Northern District of Texas, Lubbock Division.

Section 1391(c) deems a corporate defendant to reside in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Amoco Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. · filed 2000-03-22(c)

For purposes of venue, “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” Id. § 1391(c). Mobil, the only defendant, does not dispute that this court has personal jurisdiction over it, thus, venue is proper.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Black & Veatch Construction, Inc. v. ABB Power Generation, Inc. · filed 2000-09-25(c)

Because this Court has determined that ABB is subject to personal jurisdiction in Kansas, venue is proper under Section 1391.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Invivo Research, Inc. v. Magnetic Resonance Equipment Corp. · filed 2000-11-06(c)

Being a corporation, MRE “resides” in those districts in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.

Section 1391 treats a corporation as residing for venue purposes in any judicial district where it is subject to jurisdiction when the action begins.

Ruth v. KLI, INC. · filed 2001-03-07(c)

That requirement is met in this case since Defendants, out of state corporations, reside in Houston, Texas for venue purposes.

A corporate defendant resides in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins, making venue proper there.

Goss Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft · filed 2001-03-12(c)

Accordingly, because this Court finds Goss has established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over both KBA Germany and KBA NA in this Court, they are deemed to reside in this district and venue is effectively appropriate over both companies.

Section 1391(c) treats corporate defendants with principal places of business in a district as residents there for venue purposes.

Snyder v. Ply Gem Industries, Inc. · filed 2001-09-25(c)

Since PGI and Nortek maintain their principal places of business within the District of Rhode Island, they are considered residents of the District of Rhode Island, and venue would be proper there.

In a diversity action, a corporate defendant resides in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Smith v. Basin Park Hotel, Inc. · filed 2001-12-27(a)(1), (c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, a diversity action such as this may be brought in any "judicial district where any defendant resides," and a corporation like Defendant is deemed to reside in any "judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) and (c). Thus, the venue inquiry under Rule 12(b)(3) is the same as the personal jurisdiction inquiry under Rule 12(b)(2).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, including when it waives an objection to that jurisdiction.

Centerville ALF, Inc. v. Balanced Care Corp. · filed 2002-03-18(c)

Having conceded that this Court has personal jurisdiction over it for each Plaintiffs claims, by virtue of its failure to raise a 12(b)(2) defense, Defendant is deemed to reside in the Southern District of Ohio for purposes of venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for improper venue, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3), is OVERRULED.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing, for venue purposes, in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

International Truck & Engine Corp. v. Dawson International Inc. · filed 2002-04-12(c)

The statute that defines the residence of a corporation for purposes of venue determinations provides, in pertinent part, that “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1993). Based upon these provisions, the concepts of venue and personal jurisdiction merge into a single inquiry, that is, whether personal jurisdiction exists in the judicial district at the time the action was commenced.

Section 1391(c) makes venue proper for a corporate defendant in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

Beach v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2002-05-22(c)

Because Defendant is a corporation that is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Central District of Illinois, this Court is a proper venue for the dispute.

Section 1391(c) deems a corporate defendant to reside in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Back Bay Farm, LLC. v. Collucio · filed 2002-09-27(c)

Finally, Defendant’s conclusory argument to the contrary, the court believes that venue in Massachusetts is permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) (allowing diversity action to be brought in a judicial distinct where the defendant resides) since Defendant is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

First Tennessee National Corp. v. Horizon National Bank · filed 2002-09-30(c)

As discussed previously, this Court concludes that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is proper. As such, venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). The motion to dismiss based on improper venue is therefore denied.

A corporate defendant subject to personal jurisdiction in a judicial district resides there for venue purposes, and an action may be brought where a defendant resides.

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. All Sports Arena Amusement, Inc. · filed 2002-10-25(b)(1), (c)

Having already determined that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), the defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district in Missouri. As such, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Missouri under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391 treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction, permitting venue there when both corporate defendants reside there.

Johnson-Tanner v. First Cash Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2003-01-02(b)(1), (c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), this district is an appropriate venue if both First Cash and Famous Pawn reside here. As corporations, defendants are “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which [they are] subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Famous Pawn has never contested personal jurisdiction because it operates pawn shops in the District of Columbia. As discussed above, the Court finds that First Cash is subject to personal jurisdiction under the D.C. long-arm statute by virtue of its inextricable links to and control over Famous Pawn. Thus, venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Section 1391(c) tests corporate residence in a district within a state with multiple districts by asking whether the corporation’s contacts there would support personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state.

INJEN TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD. v. Advanced Engine Management, Inc. · filed 2003-04-29(c)

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court holds that Defendant AEM does not “reside” in the Southern District of California for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and, therefore, venue in this district is improper.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district if its contacts would support personal jurisdiction there were the district a separate state.

Meteoro Amusement Corp. v. Six Flags · filed 2003-05-27(c)

In accordance with § 1391(c), therefore, the Northern District of New York (“Northern District”) will be deemed a proper venue if it is determined that SFI is subject to personal jurisdiction there as if it were a separate state.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where its contacts would support personal jurisdiction if the district were a separate state.

Measurement Specialities, Inc. v. Com · filed 2003-08-05(c)

In a state with multiple districts and in which the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction, the corporation resides in any district in that state where its contacts are sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were its own state. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Since Defendant is incorporated in California and has its principal place of business in Monrovia, CA, in the Central District of California, venue would be proper in the Central District.

In a diversity action, § 1391(a)(1) allows venue where the defendant resides, and § 1391(c) deems a corporation to reside in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Universal Premium Acceptance Corp. v. Oxford Bank & Trust · filed 2003-08-18(a)(1), (c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), in a civil action where subject matter jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship, the action can be brought in a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state. Section 1391(c) states that “a corporate defendant shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” As noted, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Oxford Bank. Oxford Bank is therefore deemed a resident of Kansas. Since federal jurisdiction is solely based on diversity of citizenship, the case may be brought in any district where defendant resides. As a result, venue in the District of Kansas is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins, and that rule applies to copyright venue.

AEC One Stop Group, Inc. v. CD Listening Bar, Inc. · filed 2004-07-16(c)

As a corporation, Super D is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1891(e); see also VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1578-79 (Fed.Cir.1990) (holding that § 1391(c) applies to § 1400); accord Aerotel, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 100 F.Supp.2d 189, 194-95 (S.D.N.Y.2000). Super D is a California corporation, and Ogilvie and Walker are both residents of California. Hence, defendants would be subject to jurisdiction in the Central District of California.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Adam v. Hawaii Property Ins., et al. · filed 2004-11-30(c)

For purposes of determining whether venue is proper, a corporate defendant is “deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Consequently, the problem associated with determining personal jurisdiction over one or both of the defendants arises again, and also precludes the court from determining whether Adam’s claims are subject to dismissal (or transfer) based upon improper venue.

Section 1391(c) deems a corporate defendant to reside in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

EVCO Technology & Development Co. v. Precision Shooting Equipment, Inc. · filed 2005-07-29(c)

Venue is proper in this district because PSE is subject to personal jurisdiction here.

Section 1391(c)’s broad definition of corporate residence for venue applies only to corporate defendants.

Caremark Therapeutic Services v. Leavitt · filed 2006-01-12(c)

The plain language of this provision is clear. Its broad definition of residence of corporations for purposes of venue applies only to “a defendant that is a corporation.”

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district for venue purposes when it has minimum contacts there; nationwide service of process alone does not establish residence.

Stickland v. Trion Group, Inc. · filed 2006-11-17(c)

I agree with this criticism. The legislative history of § 1391(c) and the historical context in which Congress enacted it supports an International Shoe minimum, contacts reading of the phrase “subject to personal jurisdiction.”

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as a resident of any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Byerson v. Equifax Information Services, LLC · filed 2006-12-20(c)

Plaintiffs fail to recognize, however, that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), “a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced,” and that personal jurisdiction is not tied to the location of a corporation’s home office. ... Because personal jurisdiction has gone unchallenged by these same three defendants in South Carolina, and because personal jurisdiction is not contested by the Plaintiffs, the Court has no difficulty concluding that the Defendants are residents of South Carolina for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

A corporation resides for venue purposes in the district where it has its principal place of business.

Commission v. Cephalon, Inc. · filed 2008-04-28(c)

Cephalon both “resides,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), and transacts business at its principal place of business in Frazer, Pennsylvania, which is within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Wells Cargo, Inc. v. Transport Insurance · filed 2009-12-13(c)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” In its brief, Transport concedes that if personal jurisdiction is found, venue is proper. (Docket No. 19, p. 13). As explained above, personal jurisdiction is proper. Thus, venue is proper.

In a diversity case, venue is proper in a district where the sole corporate defendant has its principal place of business.

Scherillo v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. · filed 2010-02-17(a)(1), (c)

Plaintiff does not dispute defendant’s assertion that Dun and Bradstreet’s principal place of business is New Jersey. Therefore, Dun and Bradstreet “resides” in New Jersey, and the District of New Jersey is a permissible venue under § 1391(a)(1) and (c).

Section 1391(c) deems a corporate defendant to reside in a judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Equipo De Baloncesto Capitanes De Arecibo, Inc. v. Premier Basketball League, Inc. · filed 2010-04-09(c)

Having found that the Defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in this forum state, the PBL shall thus be deemed to reside in Puerto Rico, as well as in any other venue where it conducts business.

A corporate defendant resides for venue purposes in any district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action commenced.

Convergence Technologies (USA), LLC v. Microloops Corp. · filed 2010-05-11(c)

Accordingly, all three defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in California, ... making venue proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (“For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Jones v. Koons Automotive, Inc. · filed 2010-11-05(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), “[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” It follows then that personal jurisdiction over the sole corporate defendant provides a proper basis, for venue in this district.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

PRAGMATUS AV, LLC v. Facebook, Inc. · filed 2011-01-27(c)

A corporate defendant resides in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). ... Facebook, YouTube, and Linkedln are headquartered in the Northern District of California and therefore reside there and are subject to personal jurisdiction in that forum.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

WorldCare Ltd. Corp. v. World Ins. Co. · filed 2011-02-28(c)

Having determined that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, World does not reside in Connecticut within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) and thus venue in this District is improper.

A corporate defendant may reside in more than one state for venue purposes if it is subject to personal jurisdiction in each.

Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. ADR Options, Inc. · filed 2011-06-28(c)

The law firm failed to acknowledge, however, that a corporation may “reside” in more than one state, see 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (providing for transfer of a case where both the original and the requested venue are proper), and presented no evidence showing that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. ... 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Thus, the firm failed to satisfy its burden of showing that venue was improper in the District of New Jersey, and the District Court erred in dismissing Great Western’s amended complaint on that basis.

Section 1391(c) deems a corporate defendant to reside in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the action begins.

Holland v. Acl Transportation Services, LLC · filed 2011-07-26(c)

... ACLTS resides in Missouri, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (explaining that a corporate defendant "shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced"), thereby making venue proper in both this District and the Eastern District of Missouri.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Children's Legal Services, PLLC v. Shor Levin & Derita, PC · filed 2012-03-28(c)(2)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), a corporation is deemed to reside “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.” The Court has determined that it has personal jurisdiction over Shor Levin; therefore, the defendant is deemed to reside in this district, and venue is properly laid here.

Section 1391(a)(1) permits venue where a corporate defendant resides, and § 1391(c) treats the corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Marshall v. I-Flow, LLC · filed 2012-04-20(a)(1)

Section 1391(c) provides that “a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” As the Court has found personal jurisdiction to exist, venue is also proper here under § 1391(a)(1).

When there is one corporate defendant, § 1391 permits venue in any district where that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Sheffer v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation · filed 2012-07-10(b)(1), (c)(2)

Novartis is the only defendant, so venue is proper in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (c)(2).

Section 1391(b)(1) permits venue in a district where a defendant resides when all defendants reside in that district’s state.

Molex Co. v. Andress · filed 2012-08-10(b)(1)

The federal venue statute provides that venue is proper in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Defendant resides in Houston, Texas, which is encompassed within Southern District of Texas. Accordingly, venue would have been proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, if the case originally had been brought there.

Under § 1391(c)(2), a defendant company resides in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the civil action.

Johns v. Newsmax Media, Inc. · filed 2012-08-24(c)(2)

Because the Court has found that Newsmax is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, Newsmax also “resides” in the District for the purposes of venue. Thus, venue in the District is appropriate.

Section 1391(c) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any judicial district where it was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action commenced.

Pecorino v. Vutec Corp. · filed 2012-11-30(c)

A corporate defendant such as Vutec or Farralane “reside[s] in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

Section 1391(c) treats a corporation as residing in a district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for venue purposes.

Hawkins v. Gerber Products Co. · filed 2013-02-20(c)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), venue is proper for corporations in any district in which a court has personal jurisdiction over that corporation. Defendants have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the Southern District of California to be subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. ... Therefore, Defendants are deemed to reside in the Southern District of California, and venue is proper.

Section 1391(c)(2) treats a corporate defendant as residing in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction.

Virginia Innovation Sciences, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. · filed 2013-03-06(c)(2)

A corporate defendant resides in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Both parties agree that VIS’s patent infringement claims could have been brought in the District of New Jersey. ... Therefore, it is clear that this civil action “might have been brought” in the District of New Jersey.