18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison; the crime need not be classified as a felony.

United States v. Schoolcraft · filed 1989-07-18(g)(1)

The statute, however, does not require the defendant to have been convicted of a felony, but only of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

Section 922 does not treat an alien with a pending application for adjustment to permanent resident status as illegally or unlawfully in the United States for these firearm offenses.

United States v. Brissett · filed 1989-09-20(a)(6), (g)(5)

An alien applicant for adjustment of status to permanent resident is not “without authorization” to remain in the United States, and thus is not “illegally” or “unlawfully” in the country within the criminal statutes invoked in this case.

Section 922(d)(1) prohibits selling a firearm when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe the buyer is a convicted felon.

United States v. Clarence Cox, Jr., United States of America v. Clarence Cox, Jr. · filed 1990-02-09(d)(1)

The statute proscribing the offense, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(d)(1), makes it unlawful to sell a firearm while "knowing or having reasonable cause to believe" that the purchaser is a convicted felon. ... The record provides ample indication that Cox knew or should have known of Barnhill's prior convictions when he sold him the pistol.

Section 922(g)(2) covers a person who leaves a state and then knowingly refuses to return to answer pending charges, even if avoiding prosecution was not the reason for leaving.

United States v. Spillane · filed 1990-10-23(g)(2)

We can find no logical distinction between the person who leaves to avoid prosecution and the person who, once gone, refuses to return for the same reason, to avoid prosecution. It is this logic that leads us to now disagree with the underdeveloped ruling of Durcan. Any person who, knowing that charges are pending, purposely (1) leaves the jurisdiction of prosecution and (2) refuses to answer those charges by way of appearance before the prosecuting tribunal, is a fugitive from justice. It is not necessary that the accused make a furtive exit from the prosecuting jurisdiction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of at least one prior felony, but the government may prove more than one conviction.

United States v. Avery Smith · filed 1990-10-29(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of at least one pri- or felony, and this court has held that it is not error to allow the government to prove more than one conviction when only one need be proved.

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat a Florida nolo contendere plea as a predicate conviction when adjudication was withheld, probation was completed, and the person never lost civil rights.

United States v. Thompson · filed 1991-02-04(g)(1)

If a “conviction” for which a person has had his civil rights fully restored shall not result in section 922 liability, then it follows that a “conviction” which never results in a loss of civil rights — if indeed such is defined as a “conviction” — should also not expose a person to section 922 liability.

Section 922(a)(6) and (n) permit an outstanding state felony indictment to serve as a predicate for firearm offenses even if it is later quashed because of a defect in grand jury selection.

United States v. Chambers · filed 1991-02-21(a)(6), (n)

We hold that Chambers’ state indictment does not fail as a predicate for criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) or 922(n) merely by reason of the fact that subsequent to the time the firearms offenses were committed the state indictment was quashed because the grand jury was selected under article 19.01(b) rather than article 19.17.

Section 922(g)(1) makes firearm possession unlawful for a person with a prior felony conviction, which the jury must determine.

United States v. Yeagin · filed 1991-03-14(g)(1)

The jury’s concern, in contrast, is whether the defendant had a prior felony conviction, thus making possession of a firearm unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988).

Section 922(d)(1) permits a jury to infer that a firearm seller knew the buyer was a convicted felon from statements the buyer made during earlier transactions.

United States v. Kennedy · filed 1991-11-21(d)(1)

At both February meetings and the March 1 meeting, Fredell had made a wide range of comments, including that he had been in the penitentiary, that it was illegal for him to buy guns, and that he would go back to jail if caught with firearms in his possession. It is reasonable to conclude that the jury gave Kennedy the benefit of the doubt on the two February sales, but, by the time the March 1 sale was consummated, enough had been said and enough had occurred to convince the jury that Kennedy was not going to let a good customer get away simply because of a felony record. There is ample evidence in the record to support such a conclusion.

Section 922(h) does not require an instruction that the defendant knew his prior offense was punishable by more than one year in prison when he should have known that fact.

United States v. James Allen Lorenzo, Jr. · filed 1991-12-19(h)

Defendant attacks his conviction on the ground that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that to convict him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) it had to find that he knew he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. His argument lacks merit. ... Here, however, defendant should have known that the offense of which he had previously been convicted was punishable by more than one year in prison. ... Accordingly, the district court properly refused defendant's proposed jury instruction.

Section 922(g)(4) treats an involuntary admission under New York’s two-physician certification procedure as a commitment to a mental institution; a judicial order is not required.

United States v. Waters · filed 1992-03-17(g)(4)

Rather, what is required is a “formal” commitment, which, in the instance of New York, can be accomplished through a two-physician certification.

Section 922(g)(2) requires proof that the defendant fled to avoid prosecution, knowingly possessed a firearm, and possessed it in or affecting commerce.

United States v. Colon-Osorio · filed 1994-01-06(g)(2)

The fugitive-in-possession charge requires proof (1) that a defendant fled to avoid prosecution for a crime; (2) that he knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm was possessed in or affecting commerce.

Section 922(g)(4) treats involuntary admission under New York’s mental health procedures as a commitment that bars firearm possession.

United States v. Waters · filed 1994-04-07(g)(4)

Accordingly, we hold that the involuntary admission procedures of the New York Mental Hygiene Law constitute a “commitment” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), and Waters’ conviction on this issue is affirmed.

Section 922(g)(3) requires proof that a person was an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance during the period of firearm possession, not proof of drug use at the exact moment of possession.

United States v. McIntosh · filed 1994-05-12(g)(3)

The plain language requires that the government only prove McIntosh was an “unlawful user” or addicted to a controlled substance during the time he possessed firearms.

Section 922(d)(4) prohibits selling a firearm to someone adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe that status.

Jamison v. Dance's Sporting Goods, Inc. · filed 1994-06-07(d)(4)

In sum, there is nothing before the court that would support an inference that Smith knew or had reasonable cause to believe that Gee had been “adjudicated as a mental defective or [had] been committed to any mental institution.” Thus, plaintiffs have failed to make a showing that at trial they could prove the existence of an element essential to their case, that Smith violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4).

Section 922(d) bars a firearm sale when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe the buyer has a disqualifying status; the plaintiff did not establish a duty to independently verify the buyer’s answers.

Jantzen v. Leslie Edelman of New York, Inc. · filed 1995-11-27(d)

Although the motion was made after the completion of discovery, the plaintiff failed to offer evidence that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe that Del Rio had a criminal charge pending against him at the time of the sale, that he was a fugitive, or that he was an illegal alien (see, 18 USC § 922 [d] [1], [2], [5]). The evidence in the record established that the defendant obtained a signed Department of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms form 4473 from Del Rio, as required by the FGCA, in which Del Rio denied that he was the subject of any criminal charges or that he was illegally in the United States. The plaintiff has failed to establish that the FGCA imposed any duty on the defendant to independently verify this information or that the defendant had any reason to know that the information was false.

Section 922(n) prohibits persons under indictment for serious crimes from shipping or transporting firearms in interstate commerce, subject to an exception for licensed dealers who timely apply to renew their licenses.

David v. Mosley · filed 1996-02-16(n)

Section 922(n) is a clear statutory command prohibiting all persons under indictment for crimes carrying more than a year’s imprisonment from shipping or transporting firearms in interstate commerce. Thus, the reach of Section 922(n) is quite extensive. Its broad purpose is to proscribe commerce in guns by those facing serious criminal punishment and its reach is correspondingly broad in an effort to protect the public. Excepted from this expansive proscription are licensed firearms dealers, persons who earn their living in whole or in part from commerce in firearms, if they have timely applied for a renewal of their license.

Section 922(g)(3)'s unlawful-user prong requires an allegation of drug use; possession of drugs alone does not establish a violation.

United States v. Reed · filed 1996-04-12(g)(3)

As in Bailey, the meaning of “user of’ in § 922(g)(3) cannot be interpreted to support a violation based on possession alone; “use” of the controlled substance must be alleged.

Section 922(d)(1) prohibits selling a firearm to someone the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a convicted felon, even when the sale is an ATF straw purchase.

United States v. Beaufort · filed 1996-04-24(d)(1)

This argument is meritless because § 922(d)(1) makes it crime to sell a firearm to a person either knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the person is a convicted felon. Anthony Brown told Beaufort he had a prior felony conviction and Beaufort went ahead with the sale, instructing Brown to give false answers on the ATF form. The fact that it was a straw purchase for the ATF means that Brown did not commit a crime, but does not absolve Beaufort.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession by a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order that meets its notice, restraint, and threat criteria.

State v. SA · filed 1996-05-14(g)(8)

The restraining order to which defendant is subject satisfies all the criteria of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) — (C). Consequently, at the time the judge ordered the State to return defendant's firearms to him, it was illegal under federal law for defendant to possess those firearms.

Section 922(g)(2) makes fugitive status an essential element of the firearm possession offense.

United States v. Flores-Campa · filed 1996-07-10(g)(2)

His status as a fugitive is an essential element of this charge. As such, the Government was entitled to introduce the outstanding indictment and arrest warrant, even if the documents indicated the underlying nature of the charges.

Section 922(g)(8) prohibits firearm possession by a person subject to a qualifying domestic violence restraining order issued after notice and an opportunity to participate in a hearing.

Travieso v. Lopez · filed 1998-11-04(g)(8)

We disagree, and hold that section 922(g) requires only actual notice and opportunity to participate in a hearing which results in a restraining order against appellant which either finds him to be a credible threat or prohibits his use, attempt, or threat to use physical force likely to cause bodily harm to appellee.

Section 922(g)(4) treats an involuntary hospitalization supported by a second psychiatrist’s certification as a commitment to a mental institution.

United States v. Vertz · filed 2000-05-30(g)(4)

Based upon the fact that Defendant Vertz’s 1988 hospitalization was supported by a second psychiatrist’s certification, the Court finds that this hospitalization qualified as a commitment to a mental institution under the federal firearms statute.

Section 922(d) covers a temporary, unpaid transfer of a firearm to a known felon when the felon acquires possession.

United States v. Jefferson · filed 2003-07-02(d)

Given the substantial duration of Jefferson’s transfer to his brother and his brother’s undisputed exclusive control over the firearm, we see no problem with the district courts’ definition of “dispose of,” “to transfer a firearm so that the transferee acquires possession of the firearm.”

Section 922(d)(3) requires the recipient to be an unlawful user of a controlled substance when the firearm is transferred; a risk of future use is insufficient.

United States v. Collins · filed 2003-11-21(d)(3)

The statute requires an evaluation of Chepanonis’s status as an unlawful user at the time of the disposal of the firearms to him; the district court’s instruction, however, focused the jury on Chepanonis’s status as an unlawful user at any point after the firearms were in his possession.

Section 922(d)(3) requires the person disposing of a firearm to know or have reasonable cause to believe the recipient is an unlawful drug user at the time of disposal; a risk of future use is insufficient.

United States v. Gregory Collins, United States of America v. Gregory Collins · filed 2004-01-15(d)(3)

The statute requires an evaluation of Chepanonis’s status as an unlawful user at the time of the disposal of the firearms to him; the district court’s instruction, however, focused the jury on Chepanonis’s status as an unlawful user at any point after the firearms were in his possession.

Section 922(d)(1) prohibits disposing of firearms or ammunition to a person known or reasonably believed to have a felony conviction; it does not prohibit taking them into a prison.

United States v. Celina Clay · filed 2009-04-08(d)(1)

First, a distinction of conduct exists, because the relevant portions of § 922(d)(1) prohibit persons from “dispos[ing] of firearms or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person . . . has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”—but does not prohibit the taking of weapons or ammunition into a prison.

Section 922(d) treats a firearm as disposed of to a prohibited person when that person gains possession, including constructive possession through control of the place where the firearm is kept.

United States v. Stegmeier · filed 2012-12-13(d)

Under either definition, a recipient’s possession is sufficient proof that a defendant disposed of a firearm. Constructive possession is “control over the place where the firearm was located, or control, ownership, or dominion of the firearm itself.”

Section 922’s restrictions on transferring firearms to minors and people committed to mental institutions can support a statutory negligence claim, with causation left to the jury.

Howard Bros. of Phenix City, Inc. v. Penley · filed 1986-07-23(b)(1), (d)(4)

Not only was there a violation of a common law duty, but Peters made no attempt to comply with state and federal statutes. She delivered a pistol to a minor without any attempt to ascertain his age, as well as to a mental cripple with no attempt to ascertain his mental condition. She likewise delivered a pistol to a person who, by his own testimony was high on alcohol and drugs. This condition also escaped her attention. The jury was entitled to pass upon the question as to whether such common law and statutory negligence was a proximate contributing cause of Penley's injury.

Section 922(g) treats possession of multiple firearms at the same time and place as one violation.

United States v. Faison · filed 2021-01-05(g)

In other words, a defendant violates § 922(g) once when he possesses at one time and place “any firearm or ammunition,” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); it does not matter if he has one, two, three, or more firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction when a felon possesses a firearm and ammunition in a single episode.

United States v. Norman · filed 2015-10-19(g)(1)

We conclude that this is an insufficient disjunction in Norman’s treatment of the gun and bullets to constitute separate “episodes of possession.” Accordingly, Norman’s separate sentences for his two convictions under § 922(g)(1) violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) covers felons possessing shotguns whether or not the shotguns are sawed-off, so that offense does not merge with possession of a sawed-off shotgun.

United States v. Seibert · filed 2005-02-07(g)(1)

The two offenses did not merge, because they are not the same thing. One applies to sawed-off shotguns whether the person in possession is a felon or not, the other applies to felons possessing shotguns, whether they are sawed-off or not. Where each offense contains an element not contained in the other, they do not merge, and separate punishment does not amount to double jeopardy.

Convictions under § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(5)(A) for possessing the same firearm violate double jeopardy, so one must be vacated.

United States v. Ortiz-Gonzalez · filed 2004-11-17(g)(1), (g)(5)(A)

Ortiz-Gonzalez is correct that his convictions on counts one and four violate his rights against double jeopardy. See id. On remand the district court therefore must vacate the conviction on either count one or count four and resentence Ortiz-Gonzalez.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate charges for a felon's simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Walker · filed 2004-08-24(g)(1)

This language, though brief, makes clear that the possession of a firearm and ammunition are separate offenses under § 922(g)(1).

Multiple ammunition-possession charges under § 922(g)(1) can be multiplicitous.

United States v. Perez · filed 2004-08-04(g)(1)

We agree that the indictment’s charging of a number of ammunition possession offenses was multiplicitous.

Section 922(g) supports only one conviction when a person unlawfully possesses multiple firearms at the same time.

United States v. Collins · filed 2004-04-22(g)

In United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1998), this court held that the unlawful possession of more than one firearm at the same time supports only one conviction under § 922(g). ... Under Dunford, the district court erred when it sentenced Collins on two separate counts of § 922(g).

Separate convictions under § 922(g)(1) for multiple firearms require a jury finding that the firearms were separately acquired or stored.

United States v. Ayers · filed 2004-03-24(g)(1)

The parties have stipulated, and we agree, that Ayers’s two counts of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) merge because the jury was neither instructed to, nor did it find, that Ayers separately acquired or stored the two firearms, as is required to sustain separate convictions for multiple weapons under section 922(g).

Simultaneous possession of multiple firearms in one place at one time is a single violation of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Barnard · filed 2004-02-11(g)(1)

As the jury instructions made clear, simultaneous possession of multiple firearms in one place at one time is a single violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats uninterrupted possession of the same firearm as one offense, even when the government identifies possession on separate days.

United States v. Yednak · filed 2002-02-12(g)(1)

Rather, the government’s proffer merely shows that Yednak had the gun on May 10 and that he still had the gun on May 11. Under these circumstances, we find that there is no factual basis to support two separate counts of possession under section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction when a person in multiple prohibited categories possesses a single firearm.

United States v. Hooks · filed 2002-02-01(g)

We have previously held that an individual’s double jeopardy rights are violated when he is convicted of multiple violations of § 922(g) where only one firearm is involved. ... Because Hooks has shown that he was convicted twice for the same offense in violation of his double jeopardy rights and because we exercise our discretion to consider this plain error, we agree with the parties that one of Hooks’ convictions must be vacated.

Section 922(g)(1) permits cumulative punishment with § 924(c)(1) without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2001-10-11(g)(1)

As we held in United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1114-15 (7th Cir.1990), imposing cumulative punishments for violations of sections 922(g) and 924(c) does not violate the double-jeopardy clause.

A single instance of possession of multiple firearms and ammunition supports only one conviction under § 922(g)(9).

United States v. Brown · filed 2001-03-23(g)(9)

The government concedes that under United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1998), it was error for the district court to convict Brown of multiple offenses based on only one instance of possession of the two firearms and two boxes of ammunition. Id. at 390. Given that this Court decided Dunford more than two years before Brown’s conviction and that there has been no vacillation from its holding, the error was plain.

Section 922(g)(1) does not permit separate convictions for a felon’s possession of a firearm and the ammunition contained in that firearm.

United States v. Aquino · filed 2001-01-05(g)(1)

Count II of the indictment concerned the ammunition contained in the firearm that'is the subject of Count I, which charged possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The government concedes that convictions for both crimes under these circumstances was plain error. ... We accordingly vacate and dismiss defendant’s conviction on Count II.

Section 922(o)'s structure does not indicate congressional intent to punish both transferring and possessing the same machineguns separately or cumulatively.

United States v. Husain · filed 2000-12-06(o)

The structure of § 922(o) does not indicate to us that Congress intended to separately or cumulatively punish both transferring and possessing the same machineguns.

Section 922(g)(3) and (k) define separate offenses that permit separate punishment when an unlawful drug user knowingly possesses a firearm with a defaced serial number.

United States v. Bastian · filed 2000-09-12(g)(3), (k)

The foregoing analysis supports a reasonable inference that Congress intended to authorize separate punishments under the two provisions of § 922 at issue. Accordingly, the Court presumes that multiple punishments are authorized and proceeds to test the presumption against the legislative history of the provisions of the statute to determine whether there is any indication of a contrary legislative intent. The Court has found, and Bastían has offered, nothing in the legislative history of either subsection which would suggest that Congress intended to preclude multiple punishments for the offenses here.

Simultaneous possession of multiple firearms in one place at one time is one violation of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Verrecchia · filed 1999-11-19(g)(1)

We thus join our sister circuits in holding that the simultaneous possession by a felon of multiple firearms, that is, possession of multiple firearms in one place' at one time, is only one violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) treats multiple incidents of firearm possession as one charge, but a defendant may waive double jeopardy protection to allow separate prosecutions.

United States v. Capozzi · filed 1999-10-22(g)(1)

Although the felon-in-possession charge properly links together the three incidents of possession as one charge under § 922(g)(1), the defendant has agreed to waive double jeopardy rights. Thus, the government may prosecute the three incidents of felon-in-possession separately. Absent a waiver of double jeopardy rights, consecutive prosecutions of a felon in possession charge, even where possession takes place on different occasions, violates double jeopardy.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon's possession of a loaded firearm and its ammunition as a single offense.

United States v. Clark, Andre P. · filed 1999-08-03(g)(1)

Because the phrase is no less ambiguous for charges based on weapons and ammunition than for charges based on multiple weapons, Cunningham compels the conclusion that posses- sion of a loaded weapon constitutes a single offense as well.

Section 922(g) treats a felon's possession of multiple weapons as one offense unless the weapons were acquired or stored at different times or places; the jury must find that distinction to support multiple convictions.

United States v. Cunningham, Harold · filed 1998-06-19(g)

When a felon possesses multiple weapons, only one offense is committed, unless the weapons are stored or acquired at different times or places. ... In this case, the jury was never instructed to find that the weapons were separately acquired or stored in order to convict on each section 922(g) charge, and thus these convictions must merge into one.

Section 922 permits separate convictions under subsections (j) and (k) for the same firearm because each offense requires proof of a different element.

United States v. Mansolo · filed 1997-12-17(j), (k)

Thus, we hold that there was no error in permitting Mansolo to be tried and convicted under both 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction and punishment when the same firearm possession violates multiple subsections.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1997-12-16(g)

In light of the more persuasive reasoning contained in Winchester and Munoz-Romo, and in light of the Solicitor General’s position maintained in Munoz-Romo, we conclude Counts 1 and 2 are multiplicitous and that Johnson can only be convicted and punished for one of the § 922(g) counts.

A district court held that § 922(g)(1) allows separate firearm and ammunition counts, even when both arise from a loaded gun; the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result in Miner.

United States v. Bowyer · filed 1997-11-19(g)(1)

This case involves two crimes charged under the same statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... The statute defines two separate crimes: (1) the possession of any firearm; and (2) the possession of ammunition. These two crimes require proof of different elements.

Section 922 permits separate convictions under subsections (j) and (k) for possession of the same firearm because the offenses require proof of different facts.

United States v. Mansolo · filed 1997-11-18(j), (k)

Thus, we hold that there was no error in permitting Mansolo to be tried and convicted under both 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).

Section 922(g)(1) requires separate convictions and sentences for a felon's possession of a firearm and its ammunition to be merged.

United States v. Lewis · filed 1995-10-31(g)(1)

The government has conceded that the Sec. 922(g)(1) convictions and sentences should have been merged, however, and we shall remand the case so that the district court can effect such a merger.

Section 922(g)(1) treats firearm possession by a felon as a continuing offense, so earlier possession of the same gun can be part of the charged possession.

United States v. Bonner · filed 1995-08-17(g)(1)

As gun possession is a continuing offense, United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191, 193 (9th Cir.1993), the testimony spoke to the same "possession" with which he was charged.

Unlawful possession under § 922(g) or (o) is a continuing offense that lasts while the possession continues.

United States v. Cornelius Maxim, Jr., Also Known as Corkey · filed 1995-05-19(g), (o)

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and (o) are both continuing offenses because “the federal gun control statute punishes the possession and not merely the acquisition of a firearm.”

Section 922(g) allows separate firearm possession counts when the firearms are kept in separate locations, such as a home and an automobile.

United States v. Mitran · filed 1993-05-21(g)

Notwithstanding this waiver, we note that no error occurred where the six firearms charged in Count I were in defendant's home, and the two firearms charged in Count II were in defendant's automobile.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction for an uninterrupted course of possessing the same firearm, including when the defendant retains constructive possession while it is being repaired.

United States v. Horodner · filed 1993-05-18(g)(1)

In short, he retained constructive possession. This possession was one uninterrupted course of conduct. ... As a result, only one conviction was appropriate.

A § 922(g) felon-in-possession conviction may be sentenced separately from a § 924(c) conviction involving the same firearm.

United States v. Ghaffar · filed 1993-05-14(g)

In contrast to Ball, application of the Blockburger test to the circumstances in the case at hand results in a finding that Congress intended to punish these offenses independently. To prove' Count III the Government need only prove the defendant’s convicted status and his mere possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) permits only one punishment for a single act of possessing a firearm, even when the possessor falls within multiple prohibited categories.

United States v. Munoz-Romo · filed 1993-04-14(g)

Given this statutory structure, we are not persuaded that Congress in § 922 intended to authorize multiple punishments for a single act of possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits cumulative punishment with 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) because the two offenses have distinct elements.

United States v. Manuel Concepcion, Roberto Aponte, and Nelson Frias · filed 1993-03-25(g)(1)

There is no question that the offenses of possession of unregistered weapon, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and possession of a weapon as a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), are distinct offenses, each including at least one element that the other does not, ... and there is no indication here that Congress intended that a defendant convicted of both a § 922(g)(1) offense and a § 5861(d) offense not be punished cumulatively for both.

Section 922(g) treats simultaneous possession of several firearms as one offense; when the defendant did not object to multiple counts before trial, the convictions may be merged for sentencing.

United States v. Dennard · filed 1993-02-11(g)

It is established that the “simultaneous possession of several weapons constitutes only one offense under Section [922(g)].” ... Accordingly, the Court will deny Den-nard’s motion to vacate Counts 3 and 4 as multiplicious. However, the Court will merge Counts 3, 4 and 5 for purposes of sentencing.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction and sentence for a felon’s simultaneous possession of multiple firearms and ammunition.

United States v. James Berry, Jr. · filed 1992-11-05(g)(1)

The evil Congress sought to suppress by section 922 was the arming of felons; the section is based on the status of the offender and not the number of guns possessed. ... For the same reasons, we cannot conclude that Congress intended the simultaneous possession of ammunition to stand as a distinct unit of prosecution.

Section 922(i) permits only one conviction and sentence when multiple stolen firearms are transported across a state line in a single trip.

United States v. Carty · filed 1971-09-13(i)

18 U.S.C. § 922(i) under which appellant was convicted, as the Mann Act, makes no provision for separate sentences for each firearm transported. Counts 2, 3 and 4 are attributable to three separate weapons that Carty took across a state line in a single trip. He can, therefore, be sentenced to a maximum of ten years, five for transporting the stolen car and five for the weapons.

Section 922(g) may be used to prosecute firearm transportation even when another statute prohibits the same conduct and carries a lower penalty.

Mauney v. United States · filed 1972-01-26(g)

The record shows that Mauney was tried and convicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The sentence was within the maximum provided by 18 U. S.C. § 924(a). Where two statutes proscribe identical conduct, the Government may elect to prosecute under the statute providing the more severe penalty.

Section 922(j) does not treat the concealment of two stolen firearms as two offenses merely because two weapons are involved; the allegations must establish separate conduct.

McFarland v. G. W. Pickett, Warden United States Penitentiary, Marion, Illinois · filed 1972-11-22(j)

Defendant’s plea of guilty to possession of the stolen firearms could not, therefore, constitute an admission of guilt of two offenses when only one was alleged to have occurred.

Section 922 permits a separate punishment for knowingly transporting stolen firearms alongside punishment for a felon's transportation and receipt of the same firearms.

Hornbeck v. United States · filed 1974-10-04(i)

The completely different nature of the element of proof required in count three (knowledge that the weapons had been stolen) negatives any possible implication that Congress did not intend to authorize cumulative punishments for a multi-count violation of § 922.

Section 922(a)(6) treats a false statement on each separate firearm purchase form as a separate offense.

United States v. Long · filed 1975-10-20(a)(6)

The unit of prosecution proscribed by Congress was the giving of false information. Since Long gave false information on each separate form for each gun, it is clear that two separate violations of the law occurred and each was a proper unit of prosecution.

Section 922 does not create a comprehensive scheme that prevents the government from charging firearms conduct under other applicable statutes.

United States v. Phillips · filed 1975-08-26

18 U.S.C. § 922, unlike § 2113, does not subdivide firearms offenses into a cohesive series of steps displaying a continuum of increasingly serious criminal conduct with increasing penalties for each more aggravated offense. Thus, despite the fact that Phillips’ potential punishment in the instant case was increased by the Government’s choice of statutes, that choice did not contravene any discernible congressional intent and did not deny the defendant due process.

Section 922(h)(1) overlaps with another prohibition on firearm receipt by a convicted felon, but the government may prosecute under either provision absent a congressional limit on its choice.

United States v. Panetta · filed 1977-06-24(h)(1)

Panetta also complains of the fact that both 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) and 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1) punish the receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon, but the former section, under which he was convicted, carries a five year maximum penalty plus a $5,000. fine, while the latter section contains only a two year maximum penalty plus a $10,000. fine. ... However, absent a Congressional scheme limiting its choice of statutes, which is not present here, the government was free to prosecute Panetta under either section of the Act.

Section 922(h)(1) treats the simultaneous receipt of multiple firearms in a single theft as one offense.

United States v. Powers · filed 1978-02-28(h)(1)

As in Kinsley, the statute in the present case, § 922(h)(1), utilizes the word “any” to define the offense, a word which frequently gives rise to Bell-type ambiguity. ... Accordingly we dismiss Powers’ counts three and four convictions on our interpretation of United States v. Kinsley, supra, 518 F.2d 665.

Section 922(a)(6) and (h)(1) permit separate convictions and sentences arising from one firearm purchase because a false statement and receipt of a firearm are distinct elements.

United States v. Gardner · filed 1978-08-07(a)(6), (h)(1)

Under these circumstances, separate offenses may arise out of the same act provided each offense requires proof of at least one different element. ... The element of receipt is unique to the § 922(h)(1) count just as a false statement is unique to the § 922(a)(6) count. Thus, Gardner could properly be convicted and sentenced on each count.

A conviction for interstate firearm transportation under § 922(g)(1) may stand alongside a possession conviction when the acts occurred several days apart.

United States v. Wayne Allen Musgrove, A/K/A Wayne Douglas Musgrove · filed 1978-08-07(g)(1)

There was no error on the part of the district court in permitting defendant to be convicted on both counts. The act of possession and the act of interstate transportation were proved to have occurred several days apart.

Section 922(h) permits a consecutive sentence alongside sentences for violations of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(b), (c), and (d) arising from the same conduct.

United States v. Robert Lee Wright, Jr. · filed 1978-08-28(h)

In conclusion, we find that imposing consecutive sentences for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(b), (c) and (d) is not barred by either applicable double jeopardy principles or any statutory construction based on congressional intent.

Section 922(k) permits a separate conviction alongside § 924(c)(2) or D.C. Code § 3204 when the offenses have distinct elements.

United States v. James Robert Dorsey, United States of America v. Faye Margaret Crawford A/K/A Faye Margaret Powell · filed 1979-01-12(k)

Accordingly, we conclude that Crawford’s dual convictions under section 922(k) and either section 924(c)(2) or section 3204 are consistent with congressional intent.

Section 922 permits separate convictions for a false statement in acquiring a firearm and receipt of a firearm shipped in interstate commerce because each offense requires proof of a different element.

United States v. Gardner · filed 1979-09-25(a)(6), (h)(1)

We held the offenses were valid because each offense required proof of at least one different element. ... Our holding in United States v. Gardner, supra, 579 F.2d 474, is dispositive of Gardner’s contention in the instant’case that the district court erred in denying his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on Count II on the basis that conviction under Counts I and II constitutes double jeopardy.

Section 922(h)(1) treats simultaneous receipt of multiple firearms as one offense, and § 922(a)(6) treats simultaneous false statements on multiple forms for one purchase as one offense.

United States v. Richard Mason, United States of America v. Ethelbert B. Burgess · filed 1979-12-11(a)(6), (h)(1)

Since the definitive unit of prosecution cannot be determined from the language of the statute, and since the legislative history is uninstructive on this point, ... under the rule of lenity Burgess is entitled to have his simultaneous receipt of multiple weapons treated as only one offense. ... Accordingly, we hold that Mason and Burgess are also entitled to have their simultaneous executions of multiple forms treated as only one offense.

Section 922(m)'s firearms record offense requires proof distinct from mail fraud, so the two offenses may be charged together.

Robert L. Demier, Barbara Demier v. United States · filed 1980-02-28(m)

As shown, there is a marked disparity between the elements required to be proved to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 as compared with the proof required under 18 U.S.C. § 922(m). Proof of the elements of one offense would not, standing alone, support conviction of the other offense.

Section 922(h) treats the undifferentiated receipt of multiple firearms as one offense; separate punishment requires proof that the firearms were received at different times or stored in separate places.

United States v. Hodges · filed 1980-10-14(h)

These decisions firmly establish the proposition that Congress intended, whether wisely or not, to punish the undifferentiated possession or receipt of multiple firearms in violation of either § 1202(a) or § 922(h) no more severely than the possession or receipt of a single firearm. Congress did not intend, in other words, to make the firearms themselves the allowable units of prosecution, unless they were received at different times or stored in separate places.

Section 922(a)(6) does not authorize consecutive sentences for two false written statements in a single firearm purchase document.

Brown v. United States · filed 1980-05-21(a)(6)

Having reviewed the language of section 922(a)(6), the statutory scheme of the Act, and its legislative history, we cannot say that Congress clearly expressed an intent to impose cumulative punishments upon Brown. Therefore, we are compelled by the rule of lenity to hold that imposition of consecutive sentences for Counts I and II was error.

Section 922(h)(1) permits prosecution as an alternative to Section 1202(a)(1), but the government may not proceed under both statutes.

United States v. Larson · filed 1980-08-28(h)(1)

The United States Attorney has the discretion to prosecute under either Section 922(h)(1) or Section 1202(a)(1). The United States Attorney may not proceed under both statutes.

Separate firearm purchases at different stores are separate transactions even when made to supply a single buyer.

United States v. Miller · filed 1981-03-30

Miller went to separate gun shops, and after giving false information to each shopkeeper, received firearms which he later sold to an undercover ATF agent. His claim that these separate purchases should be treated as a single transaction, because they were made for the purpose of supplying a single buyer, has no more merit than a claim that robbing seven banks was a single transaction because the funds were to be used for a single purpose.

Section 922(g)(1) cannot support a conviction alongside a conviction under 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1) involving the same firearm; one conviction must be vacated.

United States v. Ivy · filed 1981-05-04(g)(1)

Jimmie Lavern Ivy was convicted of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1) and of interstate transportation of the same firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... We conclude that the combination of these precedents requires us to reverse the judgment of the district court. ... One of Ivy’s convictions must be vacated.

Section 922(h)(1) cannot be prosecuted alongside § 1202(a)(1) when possession of the same firearm is incidental to its receipt.

United States v. Square · filed 1981-06-12(h)(1)

Based on its review of the statutes involved and the applicable case law, the Court holds that where possession of . a firearm is incidental to receipt of that same firearm, prosecution under both § 922(h)(1) and § 1202(a)(1) is barred under the Fifth Amendment.

Section 922(h) treats receipt of a firearm and ammunition acquired together and stored together as one offense.

United States v. Oliver · filed 1982-07-16(h)

Receipt of ammunition and receipt of the revolver may not stand as separate offenses.

Section 922(g)(1) permits sentencing for transporting one firearm alongside a § 1202(a) possession conviction involving a different firearm.

United States v. Jozsef Tibor Wiga, United States of America v. Jozsef Tibor Wiga · filed 1981-12-07(g)(1)

We agree with the government that the district court was not precluded by law from sentencing Wiga under § 922(g) (pursuant to the sentencing provisions of § 924) for one firearm and § 1202(a) for the other.

Section 922(h)(1) treats simultaneous receipt of multiple firearms as one offense.

United States v. Frankenberry · filed 1982-12-27(h)(1)

We will, therefore, apply the precedent of Mari-no and Bell to hold that simultaneous receipt of more than one weapon covered by section 922(h)(1) supports conviction for only one offense.

Section 922(h) treats simultaneous receipt of more than one firearm as one offense.

United States v. Valentine · filed 1983-04-20(h)

We likewise hold that simultaneous receipt of more than one weapon constitutes only one offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h).

Section 922(h)(1) requires firearms received in a single transaction to be charged in one count; separate receipt transactions may be charged separately.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1983-06-23(h)(1)

We have held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1976) requires that simultaneous receipt of several firearms be charged in a single count, rather than charging a separate count for each firearm received in a single transaction. ... The stipulated facts herein, however, support the conclusion that Johnson’s receipts of the weapons listed in the first three counts of the indictment were in fact separate transactions.

Section 922(h)(1) permits a jury to consider a firearm receipt charge alongside a charge under 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1).

United States v. Pugh · filed 1983-12-05(h)(1)

Pugh further alleges the following grounds for reversal of his convictions or sentence: ... the court erred in permitting the jury to consider the charge under both 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1); ... We have carefully considered each of these contentions but find them to be without merit.

Section 922(h)(1) permits only one receipt offense for a firearm and ammunition received together, absent evidence of separate receipts.

United States v. Michael A. Pelusio, Thomas A. Pelusio · filed 1983-12-22(h)(1)

Lastly, we are persuaded that, absent any evidence that the defendants received the .12 gauge shotgun and the five rounds of ammunition on separate occasions, they could not lawfully be found guilty of receipt of the gun and the ammunition as separate crimes forming the subject of multiplicitous counts. Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) makes it unlawful for any person indicted for or convicted of a felony “to receive any firearm or ammunition” that has been shipped in interstate commerce.

Section 922(a)(6) treats false statements and false identification about the same material fact in a single firearm purchase as one offense subject to one punishment.

United States v. John Carmine Mastrangelo, A/K/A John A. Marino, A/K/A John James Rossi · filed 1984-06-01(a)(6)

The making of false statements and the exhibiting of false identification concerning the same material fact and the same firearm constitutes one offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and is subject to only one punishment under section 924.

Section 922(m) treats false entries made on separate occasions on separate firearm transfer forms as separate offenses, each subject to prosecution.

United States v. Solomon · filed 1984-03-05(m)

Since the appellant directed that false information be provided on two occasions on two ATF forms in connection with the sale of two guns, two separate violations of the law occurred and each was a proper unit of prosecution.

Section 922(h) does not allow a separate conviction for receiving a firearm when the defendant’s continuous possession of that firearm is also punished under § 1202(a).

United States v. Ricky Darvin Martin · filed 1984-04-19(h)

Neither the language nor the legislative history of sections 922(h) and 1202(a) indicates that Congress intended to punish cumulatively the receipt and continuous possession of a firearm.

Section 922(h)(1) does not authorize cumulative punishment for receiving a firearm when possession of the same firearm is incidental to its receipt.

United States v. Ball · filed 1984-05-08(h)(1)

We determined in ... that Congress did not intend to authorize cumulative punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) and 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) where unlawful possession of the firearm in question is incidental to unlawful receipt of the same gun. ... Accordingly, we follow Burton and remand with instructions to modify the sentences so as to make them run concurrently.

Section 922(h)(1) permits prosecution for a felon’s receipt of a firearm, but when the same act also establishes possession of that firearm under § 1202(a)(1), only one conviction and sentence may be entered.

Ball v. United States · filed 1985-03-26(h)(1)

We hold that Congress did not intend a convicted felon, in Ball’s position, to be convicted of both receiving a firearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(h), and possessing that firearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a).

Section 922(h) permits separate counts for ammunition received at different times and stored in different places.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Respondent v. Gann · filed 1984-05-03(h)

The possession of different types of ammunition which were received at different times and stored in different places supports separate units of prosecution for receipt of ammunition under Sec. 922(h).

Section 922(m) does not authorize a federal judge to withhold adjudication of guilt when sentencing a defendant for falsifying a federal firearms form.

United States v. James Charles Cannon, in Re United States of America · filed 1985-12-23(m)

Cannon pled guilty to Count III of the indictment, which charged that he falsely prepared an ATF form in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(m), 924(a) and 2. No authority is contained in those sections for the withholding of adjudication.

Section 922(i) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearms were stolen, permitting a separate sentence from the felon-possession offense because the offenses have different elements.

United States v. Reis · filed 1986-04-08(i)

As to Counts Two and Three in the instant case, it is obvious that the elements are different. Count Two requires proof that the defendant knew the firearms were stolen. Count Three does not. Count Three requires proof that the defendant was a previously convicted felon. Count Two does not. The separate punishments under Counts Two and Three in the instant case are consistent with the rule enunciated in Ball.

Section 922(h) permits only one sentence for receipt of multiple firearms unless the government proves the firearms were separately acquired or stored.

United States v. Baugh · filed 1986-06-11(h)

It is well-settled that, unless the government specifically proves a defendant either separately acquired or stored his weapons, he is presumed to have committed only one crime, not a series of crimes.

Section 922(i) separately punishes interstate transportation of a stolen firearm, allowing a conviction alongside felon in possession under § 1202(a)(1) in one proceeding.

United States v. Michael Monroe Bass, United States of America v. Charles Earl Price · filed 1986-07-01(i)

We thus conclude that Congress intended to separately punish possession of a weapon by a felon, that this purpose is distinct from that underlying section 922(i), and that a conviction in one proceeding under both sections does not violate the double jeopardy clause.

Section 922(h)(1) and (k) define distinct offenses that may carry consecutive sentences when a felon receives a firearm with an altered serial number.

United States v. Ouimette · filed 1986-08-08(h)(1), (k)

Subsection (h) requires proof that a person who receives any gun is a member of a statutorily disqualified class, whereas subsection (k) demands proof that the gun possessed by any person has been altered in a way that impedes identification. The different elements of proof required by each subsection demonstrate that, under Blockburger, two distinct offenses exist, carrying separate penalties that may be cumulated.

Section 922(h) does not allow a separate conviction for receiving a firearm when the defendant is also convicted of possessing the same firearm under former § 1202(a)(1).

United States v. Hinson · filed 1987-03-02(h)

Appellant contends, and the government agrees, that Hinson's simultaneous convictions under 18 U.S.C. Appendix II Sec. 1202(a)(1), and under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(h) for the revolver (Counts II and III) and for the shotgun (Counts V and VI) are violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. One of the convictions involving each of these weapons must, therefore, be vacated.

Section 922(a)(1) permits a conviction and sentence for firearms dealing alongside a conviction and sentence for firearms possession.

United States v. Swiatek · filed 1987-05-13(a)(1)

Second, Swiatek argues that he cannot be convicted and sentenced for both dealing and possession of firearms. This argument is foreclosed by Allen, 798 F.2d at 1000.

Section 922(g)(1) and (i) permit cumulative sentences for transporting the same firearm because the charges require proof of different elements: felon status and knowledge that the firearm was stolen.

United States v. Gary Don Nation · filed 1987-11-16(g)(1), (i)

Under section 922(g)(1), the government must prove not only that Nation transported the firearm between states, but also that Nation was a felon. Under section 922(i), however, the government must prove that Nation transported the firearm while knowing that it was stolen. ... In conclusion, we hold that in applying the standard in Blockburger, as further defined in Ball, it is clear that the cumulative sentencing was permissibly imposed in this case.

Section 922(h)(1) does not permit a separate firearm receipt conviction alongside a possession conviction when both depend on the same conduct and the government cannot establish a distinct act of receipt.

United States v. Jones · filed 1988-03-09(h)(1)

In other words, a mere showing that some receipt occurred, without more, or that receipt occurred separately from possession cannot support both convictions. To punish defendant for unlawful receipt and unlawful possession in this case, in view of the fact that possession of the firearms was incidental to receipt, the government must be able to establish dates or specific acts or transactions of receipt.

A single act of furnishing false identification during one purchase of both a firearm and ammunition constitutes one violation of § 922(a)(6).

United States v. Evans · filed 1988-08-18(a)(6)

We conclude that in such an instance there is but a single violation of section 922(a)(6).

Section 922(h) permits a firearm receipt conviction alongside a possession conviction when the receipt and possession are separate acts, with a third party holding the firearm between them.

United States v. Gordon · filed 1988-06-07(h)

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, supports a finding that appellant received the pistol on August 14, 1986, when he pawned it at the Outdoor Store, and that he came into possession of the pistol again on September 3, 1986. During the intervening time possession of the firearm was in the Outdoor Store. Therefore, the acts of receiving and possessing were separate and distinct and they are not duplicitous.

Section 922(a)(6) permits separate convictions for false statements involving firearms and ammunition bought in the same transaction, and a conviction under § 924(a) for the same transaction.

United States v. Evans · filed 1988-06-23(a)(6)

Although we are of the opinion that the government’s argument is incomplete, we agree with the government that sections 922(a)(6) and 924(a) create separate offenses. More specifically, we determine that the two statutes are sufficiently separate to permit Evans to be convicted of offenses under both statutes in connection with each of the three weapons transactions charged in the indictment.

Section 922(a)(1) requires proof of engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a license; the same conduct may also be punished as felon possession under former § 1202(a)(1).

United States v. Karlin · filed 1988-09-14(a)(1)

Moreover, even if it were, the offense of possession of a firearm as a felon under § 1202(a)(1) is separate and distinct from the offense of engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a license under § 922(a)(1). Section 1202(a)(1) required proof of a previous conviction of felony, which is not required under § 922(a)(1). Section 922(a)(1) requires proof of engaging in the business of dealing in firearms, which was not required under § 1202(a)(1). It is accordingly presumed that Congress intended the same conduct to be punishable under both provisions.

Section 922(g) permits separate firearm and ammunition possession counts when each count requires proof of a distinct element, including possession on a different day or a different prohibited status.

United States v. Steven Peterson, United States of America v. Mary Peterson · filed 1989-02-10(g)

Each of the firearm counts filed against Steven Peterson required an element of proof unique to the other charges. Proof was required to show that Steven, as a convicted felon, unlawfully possessed ammunition during the days of each search, since each day was a separate offense. Similarly, the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was a separate offense requiring additional proof. Finally, proof of Steven’s controlled substances use was needed to find guilt based on the fourth and last count. Thus, the charges were not duplicative, but simply reflected the broad pattern of Steven’s illegal behavior.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a felon possessed a firearm and defines an offense separate from possession of an unregistered firearm under D.C. law, allowing cumulative punishment.

United States v. Shirlene Wood, United States of America v. Ronald McKinley Lee, Sr. · filed 1989-07-21(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires proof that the person possesses a firearm and that he is a felon. D.C.Code § 6-2311 requires proof that the person possesses a firearm and that he does not have a valid registration certificate. Under the Blockburger standard, which this circuit has applied, these statutes define separate offenses.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant was a felon, an element absent from the Virgin Islands firearm offense for double jeopardy purposes.

United States v. Blyden · filed 1990-03-05(g)(1)

The federal information charges defendants with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (possession of a firearm by a felon) (Count One), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2) (possession of a firearm by a fugitive from justice) (Count Two), 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) (possession of firearm by person indicted for felony) (Count Three), 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(l) (possession of a machine gun) (Count Four), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (possession of firearm during and in relation to crime of violence) (Count Five). Each of these charges requires proof of an additional fact not required for a conviction on the Virgin Islands offenses. To sustain a conviction, the government must prove: with respect to Count One, that the defendant was a felon; with respect to Count Two, that the defendant was a fugitive from justice; and with respect to Count Three, that the defendant had been indicted for a felony.

Continuous, uninterrupted possession of the same firearm is one offense under Section 922(g)(1), allowing only one conviction.

United States v. Ford · filed 1990-04-30(g)(1)

Because Ford's possession of the gun was continuous and uninterrupted, it constitutes a continuing offense within the meaning of Jones, and only one conviction may stand.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate convictions when a felon’s possession of one firearm ends before possession of another begins.

United States v. Bintzler · filed 1990-07-18(g)(1)

He gave up possession of the shotgun to obtain possession of the pistol. There were clearly two possessions, and therefore two crimes and no double jeopardy violation.

Section 922(g) does not permit separate punishments under multiple prohibited-status subdivisions for a single incident of firearm possession.

United States v. Winchester · filed 1990-11-01(g)

To avoid such a result, we hold that Congress did not intend to provide for the punishment of a defendant under two or more separate subdivisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) permits a single possession count for multiple firearms found in one room when their locations do not establish separate storage.

United States v. Roehl · filed 1990-11-05(g)

Five firearms found in one room are not necessarily stored separately for purposes of constituting more than a single offense under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). Four of the firearms were stored in the cabinet behind the bar. While the handgun was found on the mattress, this is not sufficient evidence to conclude that it was stored separately. The jury instruction cleared up any confusion that might have resulted from having charged possession of five guns in one count. The indictment was not duplicitous, and the verdict was unanimous.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one sentence for possession of multiple firearms absent proof that they were acquired or stored separately.

United States v. McKinney · filed 1990-11-21(g)(1)

These cases are directly on point and we conclude that McKinney cannot receive separate sentences for the firearms charges. Sections 924(c)(1) and 922(g)(1), under these facts, are only punishable as single offenses. The government did not demonstrate that the guns were stored or obtained in different locations or used in carrying out different drug trafficking crimes.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate trial counts for possession of a gun and its ammunition, but the counts merge for sentencing.

United States v. Throneburg · filed 1990-12-17(g)(1)

In the case at bar, the separate counts for the ammunition and the gun — counts which require other factual proofs — are appropriate separate units of prosecution for purposes of trial, although they would merge for purposes of sentencing.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, making felon firearm possession distinct from the other firearm offenses charged.

United States v. Jeffrey David Howard, Ricky Leroy Stanley, Derrick Smith, Samuel J. Cooper, Jr. · filed 1991-01-18(g)(1)

Count 15 charged Stanley with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. ... Finally, even if he did all of the above, Stanley would not be charged with Count 15 unless he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The additional elements of proof required to convict under each count of the indictment refute appellants’ multiplicity argument by satisfying the Blockburger test.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon's receipt of a firearm to be proved circumstantially through possession.

United States v. Parrish · filed 1991-04-24(g)(1)

One cannot possess something without receiving it, either actually or constructively, and receipt may be proven circumstantially by possession.

Section 922(g) requires proof that a convicted felon possessed a firearm in or affecting commerce, so a conviction under it is distinct from armed bank robbery for double jeopardy purposes.

United States v. Fox · filed 1991-08-15(g)

Unlike section 922(g), this “dangerous weapon or device” need not be a firearm, and certainly not a firearm in or affecting commerce. Also, an armed bank robbery may be committed by any individual, not just a convicted felon, a requirement of section 922(g). These fundamental differences in the proof required for conviction under these provisions confirm that the crimes at issue here satisfy the Blockburger test.

Section 922(g)(1) allows multiple convictions for a felon’s possession of multiple firearms only if the jury finds separate acquisition or possession.

United States v. Szalkiewicz · filed 1991-09-23(g)(1)

Because the jury made no finding of fact as to separate acquisition or possession, Szalkiewicz’s multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) cannot stand.

Section 922(g) permits separate convictions and punishments for possession of the same firearm by a felon and by an alien unlawfully in the United States because each offense requires proof of a different status.

United States v. Munoz-Romo · filed 1991-12-03(g)(1), (g)(5)

In applying the above described analysis from York, we note, first, that the plain wording of § 922(g) permits the multiple punishments in issue. There is no indication in the statute that only one conviction is permitted under it, even if the same weapon is in issue on separate charges under each of its seven subparts.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate punishment for a felon’s possession of a firearm and possession of an unregistered weapon under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), even when the weapons are possessed at the same time and place.

United States v. Parker · filed 1992-05-13(g)(1)

Congress has in general prohibited two separate and distinct categories of conduct in §§ 922(g) and 5861(d): the possession of any firearm by a felon; and the possession by anyone of any of a small class of especially dangerous weapons, if the particular weapon is not registered to the possessor.

A § 922(g) firearm offense and a § 5861(d) unregistered-weapon offense involving a different firearm may be punished separately, even if both weapons were possessed at the same time and place.

U.S. v. Parker · filed 1992-05-20(g)

Accepting, arguendo, Parker's implicit premise that the receipt of the revolver charged in count one and the possession of the unregistered sawed-off shotgun charged in count three each refer to Parker's possession of both weapons at the same time and place, we nevertheless conclude that the relevant statutes authorize, and the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit, his conviction and punishment for both offenses in the same prosecution.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate firearm and ammunition counts at trial, but counts based on simultaneous possession must merge at sentencing.

United States v. Overton · filed 1992-05-14(g)(1)

Here, while the district court properly allowed the government to prosecute Overton on both counts, upon conviction for both, it should have merged the two counts for sentencing purposes.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the person possessing the firearm was a convicted felon, making it a distinct offense from firearm use during a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c).

United States v. Jerome Michael Becker, Sandy Lee Robinson, A/K/A Anthony Dwayne Barnes · filed 1992-07-09(g)

We read the plain language of the statutes the same way and find that Counts III and IV of defendant Robinson's indictment were not multiplicitous.

Section 922(o) charges for possessing and transferring a machine gun are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes as charges under § 5861(d) and (e) arising from the same conduct, so an earlier prosecution bars the later one.

United States v. Dalton · filed 1992-07-31(o)

Thus, it makes no difference that Dalton was prosecuted first under sections 5861(d) and (e) and second under section 922(o). Whatever the sequence double jeopardy bars the later prosecution because they are the same offense.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate counts for a felon's firearm possessions that occur at different times and places.

United States v. Winn · filed 1992-07-09(g)(1)

However, the evidence at trial was of two discrete crimes-the possession of the pistol at Anthony Carter's on May 14 and the possession of the other two guns three days later at Winn's own home.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a separate conviction alongside a § 924(c) firearm conviction without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1992-09-29(g)(1)

We join with other circuits in concluding that separate convictions under § 924(c) and under § 922(g) do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

A prior prosecution under § 922(i) for transporting a stolen firearm does not bar a prosecution under § 922(g)(1) for possessing the same firearm as a felon, because each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not.

United States v. David L. Liller, A/K/A David Linzy Craig · filed 1993-07-21(g)(1)

Only the new charge under section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the possessor is a felon, and only the old charge under section 922(i) requires proof that the firearm was stolen and was transported interstate. Thus, each charge requires proof of a fact not required for the other. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the Government from prosecuting Liller for possession of a firearm by a felon despite his prior prosecution for transporting the same weapon in interstate commerce knowing it was stolen.

Section 922(g) permits multiple alleged incidents of possessing the same firearm to be charged as evidence of a single possession offense.

United States v. Dodson · filed 1993-08-11(g)

In the instant case, Dodson was charged with only one count: felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922(g). As the district court stated, the various alleged incidents during the time period did not constitute separate crimes. Rather, each incident was merely evidence of the single crime of possession of the firearm. The indictment was not duplicitous and was therefore proper.

Section 922(g) allows only one sentence when a felon simultaneously possesses multiple firearms.

United States v. Dennard · filed 1993-09-13(g)

Here, upon defendant's convictions for the three felon-in-possession charges, the District Court should have merged the three counts for sentencing purposes and imposed only one sentence.

Section 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits engaging in the business of dealing firearms, while § 922(a)(3) prohibits receiving firearms from outside the defendant’s state of residence; the offenses require different elements.

Foy v. United States · filed 1993-11-03(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)

In the instant case, a review of the firearms offenses establishes that each require proof of an element that the others do not. Under Count Five, Foy was charged with the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), which makes it illegal to engage in the business of dealing in firearms. Count Seven, on the other hand, charged Foy with the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), which makes it illegal for the defendant to receive, in the state in which he resides, firearms from outside the state.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction for a felon's simultaneous possession of two firearms.

United States v. Tellez · filed 1993-12-21(g)(1)

Tellez also contends that the indictment charging him with two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for the simultaneous possession of two firearms violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. ... This case is on all fours with United States v. Berry, 977 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1992). We therefore remand this case to the district court so the government can dismiss one of the counts of conviction and the district court can amend its sentence.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction when a convicted felon simultaneously possesses two firearms.

United States v. Tellez · filed 1993-12-30(g)(1)

Tellez also contends that the indictment charging him with two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for the simultaneous possession of two firearms violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. ... We therefore remand this case to the district court so the government can dismiss one of the counts of conviction and the district court can amend its sentence.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate counts when firearms kept in different structures involve sufficiently distinct possession and conduct.

United States v. Treur · filed 1994-06-02(g)(1)

Treur contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to join counts one and two, both alleging that on May 5, 1992, Treur illegally possessed firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), because the firearms and ammunition alleged in count one were found at the same residence as the shotgun alleged in count two. ... Treur's possession of and course of conduct with regard to the firearms and ammunition in his bedroom was sufficiently different in character from his possession and course of conduct with regard to the firearm in the detached garage/shed such that they could serve as the basis for two separate counts in Treur's indictment. We thus affirm the district court's denial of Treur's motion to join Counts One and Two.

Section 922(g) requires the firearm and ammunition possession counts here to be merged for sentencing, with one special assessment abated.

United States v. Leonard Taylor (92-4050) and Eugene N. Wilson (92-4058) · filed 1994-06-14(g)

Both defendants appeal the sentences imposed separately for Counts 8 and 9, which charged each of them with being a felon in possession of firearms and a felon in possession of ammunition. The government correctly urges that pursuant to United States v. Throneburg, 921 F.2d 654 (6th Cir.1990), the sentences on those two counts, must be merged, with the result that one $50 special assessment must be abated and sentencing entries for Taylor and Wilson must be amended to reflect this merger.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate convictions for firearms acquired simultaneously when the defendant treats them differently in separate criminal episodes.

United States v. Hamilton · filed 1994-07-22(g)(1)

Thus, Hamilton's treatment of the two firearms was disparate, justify ing his conviction in West Virginia and Oklahoma of two guns acquired simultaneously, 7 but utilized in two different episodes of criminal activity. We find, therefore, no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Section 922(g) treats simultaneous possession of multiple firearms as one offense unless the firearms were acquired or stored at different times or places.

United States v. Baze · filed 1994-08-02(g)

The simultaneous possession of more than one firearm, as here, constitutes a single offense under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g), unless there is evidence that the weapons were acquired or stored at different times or places.