18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(k) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number had been obliterated.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2004-09-08(k)

The evidence in the record and the inferences that could properly be drawn from it were insufficient to support a jury finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Johnson knew that the serial number of the pistol in question was obliterated at the time in question.

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number had been removed, obliterated, or altered.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2004-08-17(k)

The evidence in the record and the inferences that could properly be drawn from it were insufficient to support a jury finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Johnson knew that the serial number of the pistol in question was obliterated at the time in question. Consequently, the jury’s verdict that Johnson violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) and 924(a)(1)(B) cannot stand.

Section 922(k) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Hite, William B. · filed 2004-04-14(k)

In order to convict Hite on either charge in the indictment, the government had the burden of establishing that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearms in question.

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number was obliterated when he possessed it.

United States v. Haywood · filed 2004-04-08(k)

Thus, pursuant to the. amendment, knowledge that the serial number is obliterated at the time of possession is an element of the offense of a § 922(k) violation.

Section 922(k) requires the defendant to know that the firearm’s serial number was removed or obliterated.

United States v. Feliciano · filed 2004-03-17(k)

Under § 922(k), the defendant was guilty of the crime of transporting or possessing the gun with obliterated serial number only if he did so “knowingly” that ... the gun was without its serial number.

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number was altered; the extent of the obliteration can support an inference of that knowledge.

United States v. Nesmith · filed 2002-02-15(k)

However, the government offered sufficient evidence to prove this element. The testimony of two police officers that the defendant possessed the gun in his waistband, along with the testimony of numerous technicians that the extent of the obliteration was such that an individual could not handle the gun and not notice the obliteration, presented a sufficient basis on which a jury could conclude that Nesmith knew the serial numbers were obliterated.

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number had been obliterated; a jury may infer that knowledge from the defendant’s opportunity to inspect the gun and the obviousness of its alterations.

United States v. Pruitt · filed 1999-07-19(k)

In this case, there was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Pruitt knew that the serial number on his gun had been obliterated.

Section 922(k) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number was obliterated.

United States v. Fennell · filed 1995-07-17(k)

Joining two other circuits that have considered this amendment, we conclude that under section 922(k) the government now must establish that the defendant knew of the obliteration.

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number had been altered.

United States v. Moore · filed 1995-04-25(k)

The defendant must know that the firearm had an altered serial number.

Section 922(k) does not require proof that the defendant personally removed, obliterated, or altered the firearm’s serial numbers.

United States v. Ouimette · filed 1985-01-25(k)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), it makes no difference who removed, obliterated or altered the serial numbers.

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce and that its serial number was obliterated.

United States v. Moore · filed 1993-06-15(k)

To support appellant's conviction on this count, the government was required to prove 1) that appellant knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce and 2) that the serial number on the firearm was obliterated.

Section 922(k) requires proof that a defendant knew, when possessing the firearm, that its serial number had been altered or removed.

United States v. Donald Hooker and Donald Ray Reed · filed 1993-07-26(k)

Therefore, we hold a conviction under § 922(k) requires not only knowing possession of a firearm, but also knowledge that the serial numbers on a firearm have been altered or removed, as of the time of the possession.

Section 922(k)’s receipt element can be proved by circumstantial evidence of constructive possession of the firearm.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1993-09-30(k)

Circumstantial evidence of constructive possession suffices to prove "receipt" of a firearm in violation of section 922(k).

Section 922(k) requires the Government to prove that the defendant knew the gun’s serial number had been removed.

United States v. Moreno · filed 1996-04-22(k)

Moreno also asserts that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) must be reversed because the district court failed to instruct the jury that the Government must prove that Moreno had knowledge that the serial number of the gun he possessed was removed, which it must.

Section 922(k) permits possession and knowledge of an obliterated serial number to be proved by circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Williamson · filed 1996-06-04(k)

Williamson was properly convicted on the count of possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number because the jury could have inferred that the gun, which was found in Williamson's bedroom, was the same gun Williamson pointed at Antwan Muse. ... The jury also could have properly inferred that Williamson knew that the serial number had been obliterated because the officers who seized the weapon testified that it was obvious that the serial number had been defaced.

Section 922(k) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew the gun's serial number had been removed, obliterated, or altered.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1996-10-16(k)

As to the § 922(k) conviction, the district court's jury instruction was in error, as it informed the jury that the government did not have to prove that Johnson knew that the gun's serial number had been removed, obliterated, or altered.

Section 922(k) requires knowing possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number that has traveled through interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Betancourt · filed 1997-05-14(k)

The elements of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) possession offense are (1) knowing possession; (2) of a firearm with an obliterated serial number; (3) that traveled through interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(k) prohibits possessing or receiving a firearm with an altered serial number when it has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dennis Charles MACK, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1999-01-12(k)

Section 922(k) makes it unlawful to possess or receive a firearm with the serial number altered if it has been shipped or transported in interstate of foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). Thus, we conclude that the prohibitions of § 922(k) do not exceed Congress's Commerce Clause authority to legislate.

Section 922(k) requires the defendant to know that the firearm’s serial number was removed, obliterated, or altered.

United States v. Luma · filed 2002-04-26(k)

Actual knowledge that the serial number had been tampered with is a necessary element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) at least since passage of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 456, 456 (1986), which modified the corresponding penalty provision, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(B), to require knowing violation of section 922(k) for criminal sanctions to attach.

Section 922(k) covers a firearm whose serial number has been changed enough to make it appreciably harder to read, if the defendant made the change or knew of it.

United States v. Adams · filed 2002-09-20(k)

This is especially so because, and here we agree with the government, any change that makes the serial number appreciably more difficult to discern should be enough, assuming always that the defendant made the change or is otherwise aware of it.

Section 922(k) does not require proof of when the firearm was manufactured.

United States v. Galloway · filed 2003-01-21(k)

Proof of the date on which a firearm was manufactured is not an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number had been removed; that knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Coleridge Lewter, Also Known as Corrupt · filed 2005-03-24(k)

To sustain a conviction under § 922(k), the government must prove the defendant’s knowledge that the serial number had been removed. ... Knowledge that a serial number had been obliterated can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.

Section 922(k) does not require every serial number on a firearm to be obliterated.

United States v. Sullivan · filed 2006-07-11(k)

Indeed, the statute does not require that all serial numbers be obliterated.

Section 922(k) does not require every serial number on a firearm to be obliterated.

United States v. Sean Thomas Sullivan, A/K/A Rico, United States of America v. Kenneth Adrian Campbell, A/K/A Kenny, A/K · filed 2006-07-11(k)

Although this number remained, we are of opinion that it does not establish that the conviction was improper. Indeed, the statute does not require that all serial numbers be obliterated.

Section 922(k) permits a jury to infer knowledge that a firearm’s serial number was obliterated when the defendant knowingly possessed the gun and could see the obliteration by looking at it.

United States v. Thornton, Terrance · filed 2006-09-12(k)

From these facts a rational jury could have concluded that Thornton knowingly possessed the gun. After concluding that he knowingly possessed the gun, the jury also could have concluded that he knew the gun’s serial number had been obliterated, given that one need only look at the gun to attain that knowledge.

Section 922(k) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm, among other elements.

United States v. McCowan · filed 2006-11-30(k)

To prove a violation under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), the government must show, among other elements, that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(k) permits a jury to infer knowledge of an obliterated serial number when a defendant supplies a gun in response to a request for a clean gun.

United States v. Gibson · filed 2008-06-26(k)

Gibson also contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. We reject the contention. Hampton asked for a clean gun. Gibson gave him a gun which had an obliterated serial number. It is reasonable to infer that Gibson knew the gun was clean.

Section 922(k) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number was obliterated.

United States v. Sanchez-Badillo · filed 2008-08-27(k)

In addition to the possession prong of the statute, the government also had to prove that Mendez had actual knowledge of the obliterated serial number.

Section 922(k) covers possession of a firearm whose serial number has been made less legible or conspicuous, even if it remains readable.

United States v. Harris · filed 2013-06-26(k)

Thus, while the possession of a firearm with a serial number that is no longer legible and conspicuous falls in the heartland of § 922(k) and U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), a serial number that is less legible or less conspicuous, but not illegible, is also covered by § 922(k) and U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B).

Section 922(k) covers a firearm whose serial number has been made appreciably more difficult to discern, even if the number itself was not scratched.

United States v. Veletanlic · filed 2021-04-16(k)

But a firearm’s serial number is “altered” if the firearm has been modified in any manner “that makes the serial number appreciably more difficult to discern.” United States v. Carter, 421 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Adams, 305 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2002)). And here, Veletanlic readily concedes that “the [serial-number] viewing window” on the pistol at issue “was obscured so that the serial number [was] not visible.”

A necessity defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge requires sufficient evidence that the defendant had no reasonable lawful alternative to possessing a firearm.

United States v. Durete · filed 2020-12-29(g)(1)

We need not address Durete’s arguments regarding the evidence on each of the elements of a necessity defense because we conclude that he presented insufficient evidence that he lacked a reasonable, lawful alternative to possessing a gun.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a necessity instruction when legal alternatives to keeping the firearm were available.

United States v. Black · filed 2017-12-15(g)(1)

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on the necessity defense. Even assuming that it was necessary for Mr. Black to take the gun from Mr. Howe, Mr. Black failed to show that he had no legal alternative other than to keep it.

A necessity defense to a felon-in-possession charge fails when the claimed imminent harm is supported only by speculation.

United States v. Murphy · filed 2011-06-10(g)(1)

Accepting all of Murphy’s testimony as true, the outcome of the proceeding would not have been any different because Murphy’s affirmative defense of necessity fails. Murphy testified that he saw the gun in the dirt under the truck and picked it up to protect any children who might have come across it. Yet Murphy does not offer any evidence of imminent harm to children other than his own speculative testimony that children may have been in the area.

A justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge requires a showing of imminent danger.

United States v. Tanzymore · filed 2007-03-02(g)(1)

We find Tanzymore failed to establish the threat to his life and safety was imminent. As a result, we find the district court did not err in rejecting the defense.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense, including self-defense, and requires the defendant to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence when it does not negate an element of the offense.

United States v. Leahy · filed 2007-01-19(g)(1)

We hold that there is a justification defense available in felon-in-possession cases, which typically encompasses duress, necessity, and self-defense. Relatedly, we hold that where, as here, proof of the justification defense does not negate an element of the charged crime, the burden of proof in connection with that defense rests with the defendant.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification instruction when the alleged threat has ended and reasonable alternatives to possessing the gun exist, even if the defense is assumed to be available.

United States v. Poe · filed 2006-04-06(g)(1)

After reviewing the record, we conclude that we need not reach the issue of whether justification is available as a defense to a violation of § 922(g) because Poe cannot satisfy the necessary elements. ... Poe was in possession of the gun overnight, long after the threatened harm had subsided. In addition, Poe had reasonable alternatives to possessing the gun on May 18 because he could have disposed of or abandoned the gun at any time after leaving Scott's apartment the night before.

A justification defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge requires extraordinary circumstances; delaying delivery of a gun to police after taking it from a child does not establish the defense.

United States v. Lloyd Chatman, Jr. · filed 2005-10-25(g)(1)

Even if justification might be proved in a way other than set out in Deleveaux the uncontroverted evidence of Chatman’s dilatory behavior – after he allegedly took the gun from a child – falls far short of establishing a justification defense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not allow a justification defense for continued firearm possession after the claimed threat has ceased to be imminent.

United States v. Lugo · filed 2005-01-19(g)(1)

In order to assert a justification defense, a defendant cannot continue to possess a weapon long after the threat has ceased to be imminent.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) may be barred from presenting a justification defense when the offered proof cannot satisfy its prerequisites, even if the defense is assumed to be available.

United States v. Luker · filed 2005-02-02(g)

We do not need to rule on the availability of a justification defense in this case because even if we were willing to grant a felon the opportunity to justify his unlawful possession of a gun in rare circumstances, Luker cannot establish such a defense in this case. ... Because Luker is unable to satisfy even one of the necessary prerequisites to a justification defense, we affirm the district court's ruling that prohibited Luker's use of the defense.

Section 922(g)(1) does not support a necessity defense when the threat has ended or an innocent possession defense when possession extends beyond a fleeting period.

United States v. Williams · filed 2004-11-19(g)(1)

Here, the District Court correctly held that defendant did not present evidence sufficient to sustain a necessity defense or an innocent possession defense.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) bears the burden of proving a necessity defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Tate · filed 2004-11-16(g)

Convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for possession of ammunition by a felon, Raymond Tate raises one issue on appeal: Did the district court correctly instruct the jury that Tate bore the burden of proving his affirmative defense of necessity by a preponderance of the evidence? A decision of our Court, United States v. Brown, 367 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2004), recently resolved this precise question, holding that a defendant bears the burden of proving his affirmative defense of necessity by a preponderance of the evidence. In view of this decision and in view of our disagreement with Tate’s position that courts have flexibility in engrafting affirmative defenses onto criminal statutes but no flexibility in determining who bears the burden of proof under these defenses, we affirm.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) may raise a justification defense, which can excuse possession without disproving the offense’s elements.

United States v. Anaya-Zamora · filed 2004-10-29(g)

The justification instruction the district court gave adequately covered Ana-ya’s defense theory. ... We consistently have applied the justification defense to similar situations.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification instruction when he faces no present, specific, imminent threat and has alternatives to possessing the firearm.

United States v. Campbell · filed 2004-08-09(g)(1)

We conclude that the district court correctly denied Campbell’s request for a justification instruction. At the time Deputy Marsh found Campbell, Campbell was not under a present, specific, imminent threat of death or injury. Furthermore, instead of going back into the woods, he and Thompson could have left the ... home or waited inside the home for deputies to arrive.

The necessity defense to a felon-in-possession charge is narrowly construed and requires evidence that the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to possessing the firearm.

United States v. Waagner · filed 2004-07-14(g)(1)

A defendant bears the burden of introducing some evidence to trigger consideration of the necessity defense. Moreover, this Court has held that the “justification defense for possession of a firearm by a felon should be construed very narrowly.” Singleton, 902 F.2d at 472. ... Waagner has failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing to justify a jury instruction on the necessity defense. Accordingly, the district court did not err by refusing to so instruct the jury.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a temporary innocent possession defense in rare cases, but a necessity instruction can adequately cover it.

United States v. Ivory · filed 2004-07-14(g)(1)

Applying the criteria as set forth in Alvarez, the temporary innocent possession instruction requested by Ivory was a correct statement of the law. ... Nonetheless, because the district court instructed on the defense of necessity, the temporary innocent possession defense was substantially covered by another instruction.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must submit sufficient evidence to present a justification defense to the jury, assuming the defense is available.

United States v. Hodge · filed 2004-07-14(g)(1)

Because Hodge failed to bear his burden of submitting evidence sufficient to warrant the presentation of this affirmative defense, ... we find that the district court did not err in excluding this defense.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) bears the burden of proving the elements of a necessity defense.

United States v. Brown · filed 2004-05-06(g)

In our view, the district court correctly instructed the jury in light of Singleton, which specifically placed the burden to show the elements of the necessity defense on defendant.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification instruction without evidence supporting both a present threat of serious harm and the absence of reasonable legal alternatives, even if the defense is assumed available.

United States v. Rush · filed 2004-03-15(g)(1)

Without deciding whether the justification defense would be avail- able to a defendant accused of being a felon in possession of a fire- arm, we hold that the district court was not in error to deny such a jury instruction in this case, because, even assuming the availability of the defense, the defendant failed to present evidence to support a jury verdict on either the first or the third element of the defense.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a justification defense only if the defendant does not keep the firearm longer than necessary to dispose of it safely.

United States v. Peralta · filed 2004-02-26(g)(1)

Even if Peralta was justified in initially securing the firearm from his agitated and violent brother, his continued possession for more than the amount of time necessary to safely dispose of the weapon bars presentation of a justification defense.

For a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1), placing the burden of proving justification on the defendant was not plain error because the law on that burden was unsettled.

United States v. Diaz · filed 2002-03-26(g)(1)

We affirm appellant's conviction, rejecting his claim that the district court committed plain error by instructing the jury that he bore the burden of proving that his firearm possession was justified. The circuits are split on the burden of proving justification in a felon-in-possession case, and First Circuit law on that particular question is unsettled.

A defendant seeking a justification instruction on a § 922(g)(1) charge must offer evidence of an actual threat of death or serious bodily injury that compelled the firearm possession.

United States v. Brown · filed 2001-03-15(g)(1)

However, the defendant bears the burden of proving that a threat of death or serious bodily injury actually existed, thus compelling the § 922(g)(1) violation.

Section 922(g)(1) permits an innocent possession defense when a firearm is acquired without illicit purpose and the defendant takes reasonable steps to relinquish it promptly.

United States v. Mason, Tony Angelo · filed 2001-01-12(g)(1)

There are two general requirements that must be satisfied in order for a defendant to successfully invoke the innocent possession defense. The record must reveal that (1) the firearm was attained innocently and held with no illicit pur- pose and (2) possession of the firearm was transitory--i.e., in light of the circumstances presented, there is a good basis to find that the defendant took adequate measures to rid himself of possession of the firearm as promptly as reasonably possi- ble.

Section 922(g)(1) permits an innocent possession defense when a person acquires a firearm innocently, holds it without illicit purpose, and takes reasonable steps to relinquish it promptly.

United States v. Mason, Tony Angelo · filed 2000-12-15(g)(1)

There are two general requirements that must be satisfied in order for a defendant to successfully invoke the innocent possession defense. The record must reveal that (1) the firearm was attained innocently and held with no illicit pur- pose and (2) possession of the firearm was transitory--i.e., in light of the circumstances presented, there is a good basis to find that the defendant took adequate measures to rid himself of possession of the firearm as promptly as reasonably possi- ble.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge, but the defendant must present sufficient evidence of every element of that defense.

United States v. Phillips · filed 1998-07-16(g)(1)

Such a defense is available in felon-in-possession eases. ... We agree with the district court that Phillips failed to satisfy any element of the defense.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge only while the defendant is endangered.

United States v. Brown · filed 1995-10-24(g)(1)

The defense of justification protects the defendant for his possession of a firearm only during the time that he is endangered.

A defendant claiming self-defense as justification for possessing a firearm bears the burden of persuading the jury.

United States v. Washington · filed 1995-07-10(g)(1)

Washington bore the burden of proof in persuading the jury that he had possessed the gun in self-defense.

Section 922(g) permits a justification defense, but the defendant must have a reason to possess the ammunition charged.

United States v. Austin · filed 1995-06-09(g)

It is settled law in this circuit and others that a defendant may put forth justification as a defense to a violation of Sec. 922(g). ... This decision did not constitute an abuse of discretion. ... Even conceding that Mr. Austin was justified in retaining control of the gun, there was no reason for him to carry about nine extra rounds of ammunition.

A felon charged with possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(1) cannot raise public authority or entrapment by estoppel without evidence that he reasonably relied on an official’s representations.

United States v. Achter · filed 1995-04-13(g)(1)

Both public authority and entrapment by estoppel require a defendant to establish that he reasonably relied on the representations of a government official. First, Achter did not testify that the deputies advised him that his possession of a firearm would be legal. Second, Achter’s claim of reasonable reliance is belied by his testimony that he knew he could not lawfully possess a firearm and that he relayed this information to the deputies. We conclude that the district court did not err in granting the Government’s motion to exclude the defenses of public authority and entrapment by estoppel.

A felon in possession cannot establish a justification defense without showing a present threat, no reasonable legal alternative, and a direct link between possessing the firearm and avoiding the threatened harm.

United States v. Bechtel · filed 1993-05-25(g)(1)

Bechtel fails to satisfy at least three of the Lemon factors. Bechtel did not demonstrate that he was under "present" threat of death or serious bodily injury because his neighbor was elsewhere when Bechtel took possession of the firearms. Bechtel failed to demonstrate that he had no reasonable legal alternative to acquiring the firearms. Bechtel also failed in his offer of proof to make a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of harm.

A necessity defense to a felon-in-possession charge requires an imminent threat of harm.

United States v. Eaton · filed 1993-02-09(g)(1)

Under Singleton, the threat of harm to justify a necessity defense must be imminent. In this case, Eaton's altercation with McElhenny occurred months before his arrest; therefore, the district court properly excluded evidence regarding Ricky McElhenny's fugitive status and properly refused to give an instruction regarding the necessity defense.

A justification defense to § 922(g)(1) fails when a felon keeps a firearm after a safe opportunity to surrender it.

United States v. Smith · filed 1993-01-05(g)(1)

Thus, even assuming appellant’s possession of the firearm was justified at the outset, his refusal to surrender it at the request of a police officer from whom he did not fear bodily harm (as distinguished from arrest for illegal possession), rendered the justification defense unsupportable under any view of the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a felon charged with possessing a firearm to raise duress or necessity, but the defense requires an imminent threat and no reasonable legal alternative.

United States v. Henry · filed 1988-12-27(g)(1)

The defenses of duress, necessity or self defense have been recognized in prosecutions against convicted felons for possessing a firearm. ... From the proffer there was no proof of an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to Henry. He had ample opportunity to refuse to commit the criminal act. ... We agree that the defense of necessity is difficult, but it is not impossible upon a proper factual showing. Henry failed in his effort to make such a showing of either duress or necessity.

Even assuming justification is available as a defense to § 922(g)(1), generalized fears do not entitle a defendant to a justification instruction; the threat must be present or imminent.

United States v. Arthur Ronald Crittendon A/K/A Jabbar Muwakkil Ragib · filed 1989-08-29(g)(1)

Ragib’s claim of entitlement to an instruction on the defense fails because the evidence does not support a conclusion that he was under a present or imminent threat of death or injury. While his fear of another attack may have been rational and might have been his real motivation for carrying a revolver, generalized fears will not support the defense of justification.

Section 922(g) does not excuse a convicted felon’s unlawful firearm possession for the purpose of killing another in self-defense.

United States v. Bee D. Mason · filed 1990-02-06(g)

The second count charges that the defendant possessed this same weapon after having been convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). ... The Court, therefore, concludes that the evidence adduced was sufficient to support the conviction of the defendant under the two crimes for which he was indicted and that the unlawful possession of a firearm for the purpose of killing another in self-defense does not justify the defendant's conduct.

A justification defense is available to a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1), subject to proof sufficient to establish the defense.

United States v. Harvey · filed 1990-03-26(g)(1)

This Court has recognized the availability of a justification defense to a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. ... Harvey simply failed to establish the defense as a matter of law.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a narrow justification defense when a felon possesses a firearm under duress or necessity.

United States v. Singleton · filed 1990-05-03(g)(1)

Similarly, the Congressional prohibition of possession of a firearm by a felon does not eliminate the possibility of a defendant being able to justify the possession through duress or necessity.

A felon charged under § 922(g)(1) must show a present, imminent threat and no reasonable legal alternative to possessing a firearm to raise a justification defense.

United States v. Marquez · filed 1991-08-01(g)(1)

We agree with the district court that Marquez's offer of proof failed as a matter of law to satisfy either element of the justification defense cited above. ... Thus, it cannot be said that any threat to Marquez was "present, imminent and impending" as required by Vigil. ... We also agree that Marquez's offer of proof failed to show that he had attempted all "reasonable, legal alternative[s]" to possessing a firearm in response to the threats allegedly made against him.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is entitled to a jury instruction on justification when the evidence supports that defense.

United States v. Anthony J. Paolello Anthony J. Paolello · filed 1991-12-04(g)(1)

Even under a narrow view of the justification defense in section 922(g) prosecutions, the evidence presented by Paolello, if believed, supported his defense, and the district court should have instructed the jury accordingly.

Section 922(g) does not incorporate a defense-of-others rule under which a reasonable mistake about whether a threat is unlawful is sufficient to avoid liability.

United States v. Lacy · filed 1991-12-02(g)

Although Professors LaFave and Scott express the view that, in the case of defense of another, a reasonable mistake on the part of the intervenor should be sufficient to avoid liability, they nonetheless concede that courts are split on the issue. ... Where, as here, the common law rule is ambiguous, the rule advocated by Lacy is not a part of the common law background against which Congress legislated. Thus, it is not appropriate for us to interpret the statute to include such a rule, even if we happen to believe, with Professors Lafave and Scott, that the rule is "preferable."

A justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge requires a sufficiently present threat and no reasonable legal alternative to acquiring a firearm.

United States v. Sahakian · filed 1992-05-26(g)(1)

This court has articulated four factors which must be present to make out a justification defense to a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. ... Sahakian could not demonstrate that he was under a sufficiently “present” threat, since the evidence he relied upon to establish the defense was an assault that had occurred 36 days before the possession in question. He also failed to demonstrate that he had no reasonable legal alternatives to acquiring a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a defense of another person when the defendant reasonably perceives an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, even if that perception is mistaken.

United States v. McClennon · filed 1993-06-11(g)(1)

The jury instructions stated that even if defendant's assessment of the risk to Meeks was wrong, defendant could still claim defense of another if his perceptions were within normal bounds. The instructions, viewed as a whole, stated the law correctly and adequately presented the issues.

A defendant charged with possessing a firearm as a felon must produce sufficient evidence of justification to warrant a jury instruction on that defense.

United States v. Turner · filed 1993-08-04(g)(1)

The justification defense for possession of a firearm by a felon is to be construed very narrowly. ... It is clear from a review of defendant's version of the facts that he has failed to sustain his burden of producing sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction to the jury on the defense of justification.

A necessity defense to a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession charge fails when the defendant shows neither imminent harm nor that reasonable legal alternatives were unavailable.

United States v. Carter · filed 1993-09-02(g)(1)

Carter pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1) after the district court ruled that he was not entitled to present a necessity defense. ... There was no evidence that Carter was under an imminent threat of harm when he took possession of the gun. ... Carter has failed to demonstrate either that he attempted other legal alternatives or that he did not have time to try other alternatives. ... Because we conclude that Carter failed to establish two of the four elements required, the district court properly excluded his necessity defense.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must present evidence that carrying a firearm was necessary to obtain a duress or justification instruction.

United States v. Anderson · filed 1993-09-14(g)(1)

There can be neither duress nor justification if the defendant's decision to place himself in the dangerous situation is unconstrained. Additionally, there was no evidence that he could only protect himself by carrying a weapon. The dearth of evidence deprived Anderson of any right to his theory of defense instructions.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) who denies possessing the firearms is not entitled to a temporary innocent possession instruction without evidence supporting that defense.

United States v. Hurd · filed 1993-10-01(g)

However, in this case the whole defense proceeded on the theory that the defendant did not even have constructive possession of the firearms, including presenting witnesses who testified to ownership of them. The requested instruction is completely incongruous with the defense theory, and Hurd directs us to no portion of the record that would indicate the instruction necessary. The court thus did not commit reversible error in refusing to give the instruction here.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a narrowly limited justification defense when possession is necessary to prevent imminent serious harm, including harm to another person.

United States v. Newcomb · filed 1993-10-07(g)(1)

This court has adopted a restrictive view of the availability of the justification defense in connection with section 922(g), in order to ensure that the statute’s strict prohibition of possession of firearms by all convicted felons is effectuated. ... We therefore conclude that a justification defense may be available to a defendant charged with violating either of these statutes.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a self-defense instruction for a felon charged with possessing a firearm only when the evidence supports the defense, including a present threat of death or serious bodily harm.

United States v. John C. Elder, IV · filed 1994-02-11(g)(1)

Without unnecessary elaboration, we conclude that Elder was not entitled to a self-defense instruction in this case. There is not one shred of evidence that Elder or anyone else was under an unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily harm from Day. Consequently, it was not error for the district court to have refused Elder’s self-defense instruction.

A necessity defense to a felon-in-possession charge requires a present threat of death or serious bodily injury when the defendant possesses the firearm.

United States v. Samuels · filed 1994-07-06(g)(1)

Kenneth W. Samuels was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. ... Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's rejection of the necessity defense since Samuels faced no present threat of death or serious bodily injury.

A felon charged under § 922(g) can claim justification only in rare circumstances involving an imminent threat, no reasonable legal alternative, and a direct link between possessing the gun and avoiding harm.

United States v. James · filed 1994-07-27(g)

James was not under a threat of impending death or serious injury; he had a myriad of legal alternatives available to him; and there was no causal relationship between his actions and the avoidance of a threatened harm. Clearly, James cannot claim the justification defense for his actions.

Section 922(g) does not allow a felon’s innocent purpose for possessing a gun as a defense to an unlawful possession charge.

United States v. Rutledge · filed 1994-09-01(g)

Rutledge’s claim that he possessed the gun for innocent purposes was not a legitimate defense to the unlawful possession charges.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a self-defense instruction without a factual foundation.

United States v. Austin · filed 1994-11-18(g)(1)

No factual foundation for a showing of self-defense was made in this case. Thus, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give the requested jury instructions on self-defense.

Section 922(g)(1)'s justification defense is construed narrowly and requires a present or imminent threat when the felon possesses the firearm.

United States v. Perrin · filed 1995-01-31(g)(1)

Graves’ appearance two days prior to Perrin’s arrest does not provide a sufficiently tight nexus between the perceived threat and the possession of the firearm. Consistent with other circuits, we continue to construe the justification defense for possession of a firearm by a felon very narrowly.

A coercion defense to a § 922(g) charge fails where the defendant had reasonable alternatives and faced no real threat of serious harm.

United States v. Blankenship · filed 1995-11-07(g)

Second, Blankenship had reasonable alternatives. Instead of going for the gun, he could have gone for help himself or sent his wife to the neighbors’ residence to call the police as he did after the shooting. Third, there was no evidence that Kellick was armed or presented a real threat of serious harm to Blankenship or his family. Given this record, even if we were to recognize a defense of justification, neither that defense nor the defense of coercion would be available to Blankenship.

A justification defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge requires an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and no legal alternative to possessing the firearm.

Kesman Jr. v. United States · filed 1996-03-07(g)(1)

In 1993, Kesman pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced him to 51 months of imprisonment. ... Kesman has not shown a justification defense because he did not establish that he faced an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury on the occasions that he sold the two firearms to allegedly protect himself, and he did not establish that he had no legal alternative to taking possession of the weapons.

In a felon-in-possession prosecution under § 922(g)(1), the government must disprove a properly raised self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Talbott · filed 1996-03-08(g)(1)

Just as Congress has not defined the defenses by statute, neither has it enacted any statute allocating to the defendant the burden of proving the defenses asserted here. Because no law reallocated the burden of proof to Talbott, the prosecution had the burden not only of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the charged offenses, but also of negating beyond a reasonable doubt the affirmative defenses raised by him.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a justification defense only if the defendant did not recklessly create the situation requiring possession of a firearm and had no reasonable legal alternative.

United States v. Dunn · filed 1996-04-09(g)(1)

To establish justification as a defense, Dunn was required to prove that "he did not recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct" and that "he had no reasonable legal alternative."

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon charged with possessing a firearm to present a justification defense when the evidence, if believed, establishes its elements.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven Paul GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-04-11(g)(1)

Having found Gomez, a convicted felon, in possession of a gun, the government was entitled to go after him. At the same time, Gomez was entitled to tell the jury his side of the story. His evidence, if believed, sufficed to make out a justification defense. It should have been admitted.

Section 922(g) permits a necessity defense to a felon-in-possession charge only in rare circumstances, such as when an ex-felon grabs a gun to stop an immediate threat.

United States v. Perez · filed 1996-06-20(g)

The defense of necessity will rarely lie in a felon-in-possession case unless the ex-felon, not being engaged in criminal activity, does nothing more than grab a gun with which he or another is being threatened (the other might be the possessor of the gun, threatening suicide).

A felon charged with possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(1) cannot present a justification defense to the jury based on vague claims of continuing threats without evidence of a specific threat.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brett Wayne WOFFORD, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1997-05-07(g)(1)

The bald assertion that he was threatened throughout the relevant period is not enough to entitle Wofford to a jury instruction. Indeed, unless a defendant presents evidence of a specific threat or a specific instance when he was threatened, it is impossible for the court to determine whether the four elements to the justification defense have been met. In such circumstances, the justification defense is unavailable as a matter of law.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must present a factual basis for the elements of justification before the jury may consider that defense.

United States v. Wofford · filed 1997-08-21(g)(1)

Because Wofford failed to establish a factual basis for three of the four required elements of a justification defense, the district court did not err when it instructed the jury to disregard Wofford’s testimony regarding the defense.

For § 922(g)(5), a justification defense is assessed when the defendant takes possession of the firearm, not when he later uses it.

United States v. Salgado-Ocampo · filed 1998-11-04(g)(5)

It is important to note that the defendant is charged with illegal possession of a firearm, not illegal use of a firearm. The relevant inquiry is thus whether he was justified at the moment he borrowed the .380 pistol from his neighbor, not when he brandished the weapon at his wife’s neighbor’s boyfriend.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a limited justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge, which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Deleveaux · filed 2000-03-09(g)(1)

We also conclude that this limited justification defense does not negate any element of § 922(g)(1), but is an affirmative defense to § 922(g)(1). ... Because justification is an affirmative defense, the district court properly required Deleveaux to prove justification by a preponderance of the evidence.

A justification defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge requires an immediate emergency; past attacks and generalized danger do not suffice.

United States v. Rice · filed 2000-06-16(g)(1)

The first prong requires nothing less than an immediate emergency. ... The facts, as proffered by the defendant, do not meet the standard of an immediate emergency.

A justification defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge requires an immediate emergency; fear of an attack several days after the last threat is insufficient.

United States v. Ball · filed 2000-06-16(g)(1)

The first prong requires nothing less than an immediate emergency.

A defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm must prove a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Dodd · filed 2000-08-24(g)(1)

We now conclude that, in a case such as this one, given the nature of the justification defense and of the crime charged, the defendant must prove the elements of this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) must show that he had no reasonable legal alternative, including a good faith effort to seek law enforcement aid, to present a justification defense.

United States v. Murphy · filed 2001-08-03(g)

Even assuming Murphy could satisfy the other three elements, there was an insufficient basis to demonstrate that he had no reasonable legal alternative. ... Like the district court, we remain unconvinced based on the facts of his proffer that Murphy made any good faith attempt to seek the aid of law enforcement necessary for a defense of justification.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must show an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and no reasonable lawful alternative to receive a justification instruction.

United States v. Scott · filed 2002-07-18(g)(1)

Scott did not show that he was under an imminent or impending threat causing apprehension of death or serious bodily injury or that there was no reasonable lawful alternative to committing the criminal act.

A defendant charged under Section 922(g)(1) must establish an evidentiary foundation for a justification instruction, including an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and no reasonable lawful alternative to possessing the gun.

United States v. Green · filed 2003-03-11(g)(1)

Green failed to show a present, imminent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury or that there was no reasonable lawful alternative to his possession of the gun.

A necessity claim based on initially taking a gun does not warrant an instruction on a later § 922(g) possession charge after the defendant relinquished the gun.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2003-06-10(g)

The reason he initially acquired the gun had no bearing upon his subsequent possession at the airport several weeks after he left the gun in his brother’s office. Thus, the district court properly refused to instruct the jury on Lewis’s necessity defense.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a narrowly construed justification defense, but the defendant must show an imminent threat and no reasonable legal alternative to possessing a firearm.

United States v. White · filed 2003-09-26(g)(1)

As White correctly observes, justification may be a valid defense to a felon in possession of a firearm charge under § 922(g). ... Moreover, White’s proffer also failed to show that he had no reasonable legal alternative to handgun possession if he was to avoid the perceived threat.

A defendant who raises a justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1) must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Beasley · filed 2003-10-06(g)(1)

The district court did not err in instructing the jury that a defendant who presents a justification defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge must prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) must present sufficient evidence that he had no reasonable alternative to possessing a firearm to receive a justification or duress instruction.

United States v. Maness · filed 2004-10-25(g)

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on the justification or duress defenses. Maness failed to present sufficient evidence establishing that he had no reasonable alternative to arming himself and fleeing.

In the Eighth Circuit, failure to give an unrequested justification instruction in a § 922(g) prosecution is not plain error because the circuit has not adopted that defense.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2005-04-06(g)

We have not been so definitive in establishing the justification defense to prosecution under § 922(g). ... In all those cases we explained that the justification defense, if available, should only be utilized in very limited circumstances. Because this circuit has not adopted the instruction that Thompson seeks, we cannot say that the district court committed plain error in not giving it.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm, subject to a justification defense only while an imminent threat continues.

United States v. Lugo · filed 2005-05-19(g)(1)

Katz’s first assignment of error addresses the court’s decision to deny his request for a jury instruction regarding the defense of justification in his trial for possessing a shotgun in violation of § 922(g)(1). ... In order to assert a justification defense, a defendant cannot continue to possess a weapon long after the threat has ceased to be imminent. See United States v. Holt, 79 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1996). As a result, Katz’s proposed instruction regarding justification was properly denied.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm, and the court held that North Carolina's restoration of Jacobson's rights did not defeat his federal firearm-possession charge.

United States v. Jacobson · filed 2005-05-24(g)(1)

On November 18 a federal grand jury indicted Defendant on a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... We agree with Defendant that we are bound by Caron, and that the district court properly denied his motion in reliance on that decision.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person previously convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Turner · filed 2005-05-26(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) requires that the government prove (1) that the defendant was previously convicted of a felony, (2) that the defendant possessed a firearm and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce (United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 571-72 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce.

United States v. Dilks · filed 2005-06-01(g)(1)

“In order to convict one for felon in possession of a firearm, the government must prove that the defendant (1) has been convicted of a felony; (2) possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce; and (3) knew that he was in possession of the firearm.”

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) cannot rely on a justification defense when lawful alternatives to possessing the firearm were available.

United States v. Bell · filed 2005-06-21(g)(1)

Moreover, we have consistently refused to recognize justification as a defense where the defendant failed to pursue lawful options, particularly when violating § 922(g)(1). ... Even crediting Bell's story, we agree that Bell had a number of lawful options available other than holding the gun for four months, bringing it to the Missouri Hotel, pointing it at two people, and asking if he had their attention. In these circumstances, we have no difficulty in sustaining the District Court's refusal to allow the justification defense.

A justification defense to possession under § 922(g)(5)(A) requires an actual present or imminent threat; a reasonable belief alone is insufficient.

United States v. Campos · filed 2005-06-24(g)(5)(A)

We decline Campos’ suggestion to extend the availability of the justification defense to cases where the defendant “reasonably believes” he is under an “unlawful and present threat.” The facts demonstrate that Campos was not under any actual present or imminent threat of death or injury.

A defendant charged with felon possession under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification instruction without sufficient evidence to support the defense, even assuming that the defense is available.

United States v. Hudson · filed 2005-07-15(g)(1)

Assuming that a justification defense is available in a prosecution under § 922(g), we agree with the district court that Hudson failed to produce sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the defense.

A defendant charged under § 922(g) is not entitled to a justification or duress instruction without sufficient evidence that he had no reasonable alternative to arming himself.

United States v. Maness · filed 2005-07-21(g)

Nor did the district court err in declining to instruct the jury on the justification or duress defenses. Maness failed to present sufficient evidence establishing that he had no reasonable alternative to arming himself and fleeing.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is not entitled to a justification instruction when he had lawful alternatives and possessed the gun without an immediate threat.

United States v. Cage · filed 2005-09-20(g)(1)

Even if we believe Cage’s testimony, we agree with the district court that Cage was not entitled to the defense. Cage could have called the police on the night of January 31 or when Tucker arrived the next morning, but never did so. He could have left his residence after Tucker departed on January 31, but did not. Further, Cage had the gun under his pillow for at least four hours on the morning of February 1, even though he was under no immediate threat of injury. Under the circumstances, we conclude Cage was not entitled to have the defense submitted to the jury.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) bears the burden of proving justification for possessing the firearm.

United States v. Smith · filed 2006-05-08(g)(1)

The district court did not err in instructing the jury that Smith had the burden of proving justification for possessing the firearm.

Section 922(g) allows a necessity defense only in extraordinary circumstances, including an imminent threat and no reasonable legal alternative.

United States v. Laster · filed 2006-06-14(g)

A necessity defense is available in a § 922(g) charge only in extraordinary circumstances. ... Therefore, Laster’s testimony did not establish the defense, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the jury instruction.

For the firearms offenses under § 922(a)(6) and (n), the defendant bears the burden of proving duress by a preponderance of the evidence.

Dixon v. United States · filed 2006-06-22(a)(6), (n)

In the context of the firearms offenses at issue—as will usually be the case, given the long-established common-law rule—we presume that Congress intended the petitioner to bear the burden of proving the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 922(g)(1) does not provide an innocent possession defense for a felon who briefly possesses a firearm intending to turn it over to police.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2006-08-29(g)(1)

That no such defense is provided for § 922(g) strongly suggests that no such defense was intended.

The court declined to recognize a coercion defense to violations of Section 922.

United States v. Harper · filed 2006-10-24

We have not previously recognized a defense of coercion to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922. ... We decline to do so in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a firearm, subject to a justification defense requiring proof of four elements.

United States v. Lee · filed 2006-12-08(g)(1)

To present a justification defense to a charge of § 922(g), a defendant must show that: (1) he was under an unlawful and “present, imminent, and impending” threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that he “had not ‘recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be [forced to choose the criminal conduct]’”; (3) he “had no ‘reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law’ . . .; and (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the [criminal] action taken and the avoidance of the [threatened] harm.”

A defendant charged with felon possession of a firearm is not entitled to a justification instruction when he had reasonable legal alternatives to possessing the firearm.

United States v. Hillian · filed 2006-12-19(g)(1)

We find Hillian failed to avail himself of several reasonable alternatives to the actions taken and conclude the district court did not err when it declined to give a jury instruction on the justification defense.

A justification defense to a felon-in-possession charge requires an imminent threat when the defendant takes possession of the firearm.

United States v. Harmon · filed 2007-01-12(g)(1)

Accordingly, under Harmon’s proffer he could not establish that he was in imminent harm when he took possession of the gun at his sister’s house, and that failing is fatal to the defense under Deleveaux. Harmon was therefore not entitled to pursue the justification defense at his trial, and consequently, the district court did not err in excluding all references to the Pickering shooting.

Section 922(g) does not entitle a defendant to an “innocent possession” jury instruction.

United States v. McLachlan · filed 2007-01-16(g)

Finally, we find no error in the district court’s decision to deny McLachlan’s request for a jury instruction for “innocent possession” of the firearm at issue. We have previously rejected this instruction in § 922(g) cases.

A justification defense to § 922(g)(1) ammunition possession requires the defendant to stop possessing it once the threat ends.

United States v. Ridner · filed 2008-01-17(g)(1)

Scotty also fails to satisfy the fifth factor. It requires the defendant to show that “he did not maintain the illegal conduct any longer than absolutely necessary.” ... Consequently, no reasonable jury could find that Scotty did not possess the ammunition longer than absolutely necessary.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a necessity defense to a felon-in-possession charge only when the defendant lacked a legal alternative to possessing the firearm.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2008-12-24(g)(1)

Here, there is no indication that Mr. Robinson lacked a legal alternative to possessing the gun – for example, calling the police when he heard about the alleged harassment. The district court was correct: to allow the defense here would emasculate the federal felon-in-possession statute.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require an instruction on a proposed affirmative defense when the evidence does not sufficiently support it.

United States v. White · filed 2009-01-09(g)(1)

Accordingly, since the affirmative defenses cited by White lacked sufficient foundation in the evidence, it was appropriate for the district court to decline to charge the jury on those defenses.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) is entitled to a jury instruction on an affirmative defense only when the evidence provides a sufficient foundation for it.

United States v. White · filed 2009-01-09(g)(1)

Even if we assume that the defenses invoked by White should be read into § 922(g)(1), the district court’s charge was not erroneous. A district court need not instruct on an affirmative defense where the defendant has failed to provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation.

A necessity defense to a § 922(g)(1) charge requires the defendant to lack a reasonable lawful alternative to possessing the firearm.

United States v. Fraser · filed 2011-08-02(g)(1)

To succeed with a necessity defense, Mr. Fraser concedes (as he must) that he would have to show he took possession of the gun because he lacked any reasonable lawful alternative.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must adequately show that possessing the firearm responded to an imminent threat of death or bodily injury to present a necessity defense.

United States v. Barnes · filed 2018-07-19(g)(1)

We also ... conclude that the district court properly barred Barnes’s necessity defense because he failed to adequately demonstrate that he took possession of the gun in response to an imminent threat of death or bodily injury.

A defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) must show an imminent threat to present a necessity defense.

United States v. Henderson · filed 2018-12-19(g)(1)

Reviewing de novo, see United States v. Lebreault-Feliz, 807 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2015), we agree with the District Court. The record simply does not support Henderson's assertion that he faced an imminent threat to his life.

A necessity defense to a felon-in-possession charge requires an imminent threat of serious harm and no reasonable legal alternative; a stale threat does not suffice.

United States v. Tovar · filed 2023-12-18(g)(1)

As a result, there was “no imminent threat of harm which would justify” his possession of the weapon. Given the narrowness of the defense, the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.

Section 922(g) does not require the firearm possessed by a felon to have been stolen.

United States v. Driggers · filed 2019-01-16(g)

This was enough to permit the jury to convict Driggers of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). For purposes of that count, it did not matter whether the gun was stolen.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from possessing firearms or ammunition.

State v. Fadness · filed 2012-01-17(g)(1)

It is unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for a person convicted in any court of a felony to possess firearms or ammunition. We refuse to require a Montana district court to participate in a defendant’s violation of this law.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence supporting a reasonable inference of actual possession.

United States v. Miller · filed 2011-04-27(g)(1)

A juror could have inferred (1) that Defendant’s flight from Stratton indicated that he had reason to fear an interaction with the police and (2) that it was highly unlikely that a loaded weapon in good condition had coincidentally been left on the ground within four to six feet of where Defendant fell. Because there was sufficient evidence of actual possession, we need not address Defendant’s arguments that he did not constructively possess the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is supported when the evidence permits a jury to find that the defendant possessed a car’s contents, including a handgun.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2010-04-01(g)(1)

First, Johnson argues his convictions on the two counts relating to possession of a firearm were not supported by sufficient evi- dence. ... In light of our discussion of the more than ample reasons for the search of the car, we find no merit to John- son’s suggestion that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he possessed the items found within it.

Section 922(g) permits a jury to find conscious possession when a defendant picks up and holds a firearm, despite a defense of mistake or accident.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2007-03-22(g)

The jury heard evidence that Anderson picked up the firearm and held it in his hand. This evidence was sufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude that he consciously possessed the firearm, and a rational jury could have discredited Anderson’s defense that he possessed the firearm by mistake or accident.

Possession under § 922(g) may be inferred from a firearm kept in the defendant’s bedroom for his ready access.

United States v. Wells · filed 2007-03-20(g)(1), (g)(3)

Also, Wells explained to ATF agents that the gun in the bedroom was loaded to protect his chickens, and this admission supports the inference that the gun was kept in his bedroom for his ready access. ... We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Wells manufactured marijuana with intent to distribute and that he possessed a firearm.

A felon in possession conviction has sufficient evidentiary support when firearm possession is proved and the defendant stipulates to a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Billups · filed 2007-03-16(g)

On Count Four, Billups’s possession of the 9mm handgun is conclusive on his insufficiency of the evidence contention, because he stipulated to the other element of that charge, that is, being a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction, firearm possession, and a connection between the firearm and interstate commerce.

United States v. Salinas · filed 2007-03-05(g)(1)

To convict Salinas, the government had to prove (1) that Salinas had a prior felony conviction; (2) that he possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when the evidence permits a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm.

United States v. Teeth · filed 2007-02-13(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction when evidence supports a finding that the defendant possessed the firearm and had a prior felony conviction.

United States v. Britt · filed 2007-02-13(g)(1)

Coupled with proof of his prior felony conviction, this evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt on Counts One through Three (felon-in-possession of a firearm, possession with intent to distribute crack, and possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime).

A felon's reaching for a hidden compartment containing a loaded gun supports a conviction for firearm possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Ladd, Allen · filed 2007-02-05(g)(1)

In their Anders brief, counsel first consider whether Ladd could challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he possessed the crack and firearm, but they conclude that any such challenge would be frivolous. We agree. Ladd, a felon, was caught red-handed reaching for a hidden compartment that contained a loaded gun and a distributable amount of crack.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction when the government proves a felon possessed a firearm on one day within an alleged period of continuous possession.

United States v. Ubele · filed 2007-02-02(g)(1)

Further, we have held that “possession is a course of conduct . . . . Proof of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon on one day within an alleged continuous possession is sufficient to support a conviction.” United States v. Rivera, 77 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). ... Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to convict Ubele.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior felony, possession of a gun, and the gun’s travel across state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Ortiz · filed 2007-01-31(g)(1)

There are three elements to a § 922(g)(1) violation: the prior felony, the possession of the gun and the gun’s travel in interstate commerce (that is, across state lines) prior to the defendant’s possession of it.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of a prior felony, possession of a gun, and the gun’s travel across state lines before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Ortiz, Tomas · filed 2007-01-31(g)(1)

There are three elements to a § 922(g)(1) violation: the prior felony, the possession of the gun and the gun’s travel in inter- state commerce (i.e., across state lines) prior to the de- fendant’s possession of it.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element can be established by testimony that the defendant fired the firearm.

United States v. Howard · filed 2007-01-24(g)(1)

The government also presented testimony from Lila Howard that she and defendant fired the rifle on September 5, 2001. Although defendant argues that Lila Howard was not credible, it is not for us to assess credibility. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, it was sufficient to establish possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied by physical possession or by the power and intention to control the firearm.

United States v. McDaniel · filed 2006-04-06(g)(1)

The government may satisfy the possession element of section 922(g)(1) by showing that the defendant either physically possessed the firearm or had “the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over” the weapon.

Knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including a gun near the defendant and his conduct at a police checkpoint.

United States v. Price · filed 2006-01-31(g)(1)

Under § 922(g)(1), the government must show that defendant was a convicted felon, that he knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm had travelled in interstate commerce. ... Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could have determined that he knowingly possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by evidence linking a defendant to a firearm and ammunition found in his residence.

United States v. Meeks · filed 2006-02-09(g)(1)

Meeks first argues that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to convict him of possession of the firearm and ammunition. The evidence at trial demonstrated that the firearm and ammunition in question were found in a bedroom of Meeks’s residence. The case containing the firearm had Meeks’s name and social security number written on it in permanent marker. Two vitamin bottles containing ammunition were discovered inside the case, along with receipts for the ammunition. The bottles and receipts also had Meeks’s name written on them. One of the receipts had his fingerprint on it. On this record, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Witness testimony about a defendant’s firearm possession can support a § 922(g)(1) conviction when the evidence permits a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2006-01-26(g)(1)

Following a jury trial, Rodney Wilson was convicted of ... one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (2000). ... Several witnesses testified to Wilson’s possession of firearms. It was for the jurors to determine what weight to give each witness’s testimony. Drawing all inferences in favor of the Government, a reasonable jury could conclude there was sufficient evidence to convict Wilson beyond a reasonable doubt on all nine counts.