18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(o) requires possession of an automatic weapon, an element distinct from the firearm use or carrying required by § 924(c), so sentences under both provisions do not violate double jeopardy principles.

United States v. Buchanan · filed 1995-11-29(o)

Count five, alleging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), required the possession of an automatic weapon; and count six, applying 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), required that the defendant not only possess a firearm, but that he also be a convicted felon. Thus counts five and six involve distinct elements not required by counts three and four.

Section 922(i) permits a separate charge for transporting a stolen firearm across state lines, but a single shipment of the firearm and its ammunition cannot be split into multiple charges.

United States v. Roberson · filed 1995-12-19(i)

It was permissible for the government to charge separately the shipment of the handgun and ammunition in interstate commerce as a separate specification under 18 U.S.C. § 922(i). What was clearly impermissible was to subdivide that single transaction into four.

Section 922(g) permits separate possession counts when firearms are stored at different locations.

United States v. James Norwood Hutching, Also Known as Norwood, Also Known as "Cowboy" · filed 1996-02-05(g)

Counts 18, 19, and 20 each charged Mr. Hutching with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a previously convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2), but each count charged Mr. Hutching with possession of a different firearm. ... The “simultaneous possession” of multiple firearms generally “constitutes only ... one offense” unless there is evidence that the weapons were stored in different places or acquired at different times. ... In this case, the three weapons, while all seized on the same day, were located at different sites; one was in Mr. Hutehing’s bedroom, one was in a car parked in his garage, and the other was in his pickup truck. The scattered locations of the guns constituted separate storages that permitted possession of each firearm to constitute a separate offense.

Section 922(o) prohibits possession of an automatic weapon, while § 922(g)(1) requires that a firearm possessor be a convicted felon.

United States v. Diana Gonzales Buchanan, Fedell Anderson, Vernon Bonner, and John Buchanan · filed 1996-02-22(o), (g)(1)

Count five, alleging violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), required the possession of an automatic weapon; and count six, applying 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), required that the defendant not only possess a firearm, but that he also be a convicted felon. Thus counts five and six involve distinct elements not required by counts three and four. Under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) ("[T]he test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.”), John Buchanan's sentences under counts five and six do not violate double jeopardy principles.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one sentence for a felon's simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Alonzo Hall, Sedrick Latroy McKinney · filed 1996-03-13(g)(1)

Substantial precedent from other circuits supports the view that the simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition should be punished as one offense. ... Having given consideration to the merits on our own, we accept the confession of error. While McKinney's convictions are affirmed, we vacate McKinney's sentence and remand for resentencing.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction and sentence when a felon simultaneously possesses a firearm and ammunition.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James L. KEEN, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1996-09-18(g)(1)

Therefore, upon remand, the government may only seek to convict and sentence Keen for one violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction and sentence for a felon’s simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Keen · filed 1997-01-02(g)(1)

Therefore, upon remand, the government may only seek to convict and sentence Keen for one violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate convictions for distinct episodes of firearm possession.

Tinsley v. United States · filed 1997-02-12(g)(1)

In the present case, Tinsley's possession of a .44 caliber handgun in a McKinney, Kentucky parking lot on October 3, 1987, was separate and distinct from his possession of the firearms later seized during the October 30, 1987 search of his residence. Therefore, we find no error in Tinsley's conviction and subsequent sentence on both Count 1 and Count 2 of the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one charge when a felon possesses a loaded firearm and the ammunition inside it together.

United States v. Phillips · filed 1997-04-30(g)(1)

Judge Hogan held that “possession of a single firearm loaded with a single magazine can give rise to only one offense under § 922(g).” ... This Court concurs and holds that Counts One and Two of the indictment in this case are multiplici-tous.

The Ninth Circuit permits only one § 922(g)(1) conviction for simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition arising from a single occurrence.

United States v. Miner · filed 1997-09-17(g)(1)

He was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) on each count. Dual convictions for possessing the firearm and ammunition arising out of a single occurrence cannot stand.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction for a single act of possession, even when the person belongs to multiple prohibited classes and possesses multiple firearms and ammunition together.

United States v. Douglas Lee Dunford, Sr. · filed 1998-07-02(g)

Thus, we hold that while a person must be á member of at least one of the nine classes prohibited from possessing guns under § 922(g), a person who is disqualified because of membership in multiple classes does not thereby commit separate and multiple offenses. ... We will apply the rule stated in Mullins to hold now that Dunford’s possession of the six firearms and ammunition, seized at the same time from his house, supports only one conviction of 18 U.S.C. § -922(g).

Section 922(g) permits multiple convictions for a felon’s possession of multiple weapons only if the weapons were acquired or stored at different times or places.

United States v. Harold Cunningham and Percy Barron · filed 1998-08-26(g)

When a felon possesses multiple weapons, only one offense is committed, unless the weapons are stored or acquired at different times or places. In other words, where there is more than one charge under section 922(g), separate acquisition and storage of the weapons is an element of the crimes charged.

Section 922(g)(1) permits firearm and ammunition possession violations to be charged in separate counts.

United States v. Carnes · filed 1999-02-08(g)(1)

Returning to the present case, the Court finds that the prosecution may charge the firearm and ammunition violations in separate counts.

Section 922(g) treats continuous, uninterrupted possession of the same firearm as one offense, even when the possession spans separate dates.

United States v. Martin · filed 2000-01-18(g)

The Government concedes that Defendant is guilty of only ... violation of § ... 922(g), and thus his multiple § 922(g) convictions cannot stand. ... Accordingly, Defendant’s conviction and sentence on the second § 922(g) charge, i.e., count six of the indictment, are vacated.

Section 922(g) permits separate possession charges for firearms stored in separate locations, such as a vehicle and a home.

Sellman v. United States · filed 2000-04-20(g)

Considering that Sellman stored one firearm in his vehicle and the remaining five in his home, two separate firearm charges were permissible, and conviction on each count did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Section 922(g) does not permit separate punishments when the same firearm possession violates both its felon-in-possession and drug-user-in-possession provisions.

United States v. Shea · filed 2000-05-03(g)(1), (g)(3)

The law is somewhat clearer that multiple "punishments" are not proper, although the matter was not previously addressed by this court; and while no objection was made at sentencing in the district court, we accept the government's view that relief should be granted as to the sentence. ... The judgments of conviction and sentence as to each of the defendants is affirmed except that McDonald's sentence on the drug-user-in-possession count, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), is vacated and remanded to the district court with instructions to merge the sentence with that imposed for the felon-in-possession count, id. § 922(g)(1), and with no separate mandatory assessment fee.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon's possession of a firearm, and the offense continues for as long as the possession continues.

United States v. Dillard · filed 2000-05-22(g)(1)

The offense proscribed by section 922(g)(1) is not the felon's "acquisition" of a firearm; it is the felon's possession of a firearm. The offense continues to be committed as long as the felon continues to be in possession.

Section 922(g) permits separate possession convictions only when the government shows that the firearms or ammunition were stored or acquired separately.

United States v. Adams · filed 2000-06-01(g)

Because there was no showing that Chester separately stored or acquired these items, we reverse Chester’s conviction on count twenty-six.

Section 922(g)(1) and (j) permit only one charge when a defendant’s possession of multiple firearms is simultaneous and undifferentiated.

United States v. Buchmeier, Shane · filed 2001-06-26(g)(1), (j)

We have thus determined that when a defendant’s possession of multiple firearms is simultaneous and undifferentiated, the government may only charge that defendant with one violation of sec. 922(g)(1) and sec. 922(j), regardless of the actual quantity of firearms involved.

Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(j) permit only one charge for multiple firearms possessed or received simultaneously in an undifferentiated transaction.

United States v. Buchmeier · filed 2001-06-26

We have thus determined that when a defendant’s possession of multiple firearms is simultaneous and undifferentiated, the government may only charge that defendant with one violation of § 922(g)(1) and § 922(j), regardless of the actual quantity of firearms involved.

Section 922(n) and § 922(a)(6) permit separate convictions because each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not.

United States v. Wolfe · filed 2001-07-19(n), (a)(6)

A defendant may be indicted or convicted under both 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) and § 922(a)(6) under the Blockburger test.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate convictions for possession of the same firearm when the defendant knows his possession was interrupted and later reacquires the firearm.

United States v. Conley · filed 2002-05-23(g)(1)

Thus, under circumstances similar to this case, a felon may be charged and convicted of two counts of possessing the same firearm only if: (1) he possesses the weapon; (2) he is aware that his possession of the weapon has been interrupted; and (3) he thereafter reacquires possession of the weapon himself.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction for possession of a single firearm when the defendant has both a prior felony conviction and a protective order.

United States v. Rowe · filed 2002-08-21(g)

Defendant contends that (1) his two convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for possession of a single firearm subjected him to double jeopardy, and (2) the district court’s sentencing determination that the gun was “stolen” was not supported by sufficient evidence. ... The government correctly concedes the double jeopardy claim. ... Accordingly, we REMAND with instructions to VACATE one of the two convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) treats simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition as one offense, supporting only one conviction and sentence.

United States v. Butler · filed 2002-11-07(g)(1)

Because simultaneous possession of a firearm and of ammuni- tion is but one offense,2 United States v. Keen, 96 F.3d 425, 433-34 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended, 104 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 402 (11th Cir. 1996), we remand the case for entry of judgment on only Count 1 or Count 2 and for sentencing and a special assessment as to only one of the two counts.

Separate counts for simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition merge at sentencing.

United States v. Myree · filed 2003-02-03(g)(1)

The simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition may be prosecuted under separate counts, but such counts merge at sentencing.

Section 922(g) treats simultaneous possession of multiple firearms by a person in more than one prohibited class as one offense.

United States v. Shorter · filed 2003-05-12(g)

Thus, we hold that Shorter stands convicted of only one 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) offense.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate charges for a firearm and ammunition when a felon acquired them at different times.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2003-08-21(g)(1)

Where a weapon and ammunition are obtained at separate times, the government is allowed to charge multiple violations of § 922(g).

Section 922 permits charges for stealing firearms and possessing the same stolen firearms without requiring the government to elect between them, so long as the jury is properly instructed.

United States v. Schenk · filed 2003-11-03(u), (j)

Count one alleges that defendant stole firearms from Nick’s Pawn Shop in Salina, Kansas in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(u) and 924(f)(1). ... Count two alleges that defendant received, concealed, stored and disposed of the same stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2). ... Under the circumstances of this case, the court does not believe election by the government is necessary as long as the jury is properly instructed consistent with the Brown case. Therefore, the court shall deny the motion to elect.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate felon-in-possession counts for different firearms possessed at different times in separate incidents.

United States v. MacKey · filed 2004-01-15(g)(1)

When multiple counts of the same charge are based on “different firearms received and possessed ... at different times,” such an indictment and conviction are proper. ... Mackey’s argument again ignores the fact that the witnesses at his trial clearly described different weapons in separate armed robbery events.

Section 922(g) permits separate charges for firearm and ammunition possessions that are distinct in time and supported by different evidence.

United States v. Goodine · filed 2005-03-15(g)

As a result, we decline to extend Dunford to these circumstances, where the government seeks to retry Goodine on a § 922(g) offense after his acquittal on a factually distinct charge under that same statute.

Section 922(g) allows only one conviction for a single incident of firearm possession, even when multiple classifications, firearms, or ammunition are involved.

United States v. Earnest Richardson · filed 2006-03-02(g)

We now overrule Peterson and join all the other Circuits that have addressed this issue to hold that Congress intended the “allowable unit of prosecution” to be an incident of possession regardless of whether a defendant satisfied more than one § 922(g) classification, possessed more than one firearm, or possessed a firearm and ammunition.

Section 922(g) prohibits felons and fugitives from possessing firearms, and convictions under multiple § 922(g) provisions arising from one act of possession constitute one offense.

United States v. Gamboa · filed 2006-03-03(g)(1), (g)(2)

Gamboa was convicted both of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Six), and of being a fugitive in possession of a firearm, § 922(g)(2) (Count Seven). Gamboa asserts that these firearm convictions result from a single act that constituted both offenses, and therefore the convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This court en banc recently determined that separate counts alleging that a defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1), and that the same defendant was also a drug user in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(3), both counts arising out of a single act of firearm possession, constituted but one offense. See United States v. Earnest Jesse Richardson, No. 04-3472 (8th Cir. Mar. 2, 2006). Accordingly, we grant the Government’s pending request to merge the convictions on Counts Six and Seven, and remand Count Seven to the district court with instructions to vacate the conviction, the sentence, and the special assessment imposed on that Count.

Section 922(g)(1) treats simultaneous possession of multiple firearms as a single offense.

United States v. Olson · filed 2006-04-24(g)(1)

There was not a duplicitous indictment here, however, because the possession or simultaneous receipt of multiple firearms constitutes a single offense.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction when a single act of firearm possession violates both its felon and drug user prohibitions.

United States v. Pierce · filed 2006-05-09(g)

However, our review of the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), persuades us that Pierce’s separate convictions on two separate counts (felon in possession and drug user in possession), arising out of a single act of firearm possession, requires that we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing based on a single conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) generally permits only one charge for simultaneous possession of firearms or ammunition, but separate charges may be warranted when the items were acquired on different occasions or stored at different sites.

United States v. Olmeda · filed 2006-08-29(g)

Thus, we here hold that, although a convicted felon who simultaneously possesses various firearms and rounds of ammunition can generally only be charged with a single violation of § 922(g), multiple charges may well be warranted if the evidence shows that the felon acquired possession of the firearms or ammunition on different occasions, or that he stored them at different sites.

Section 922(g) treats simultaneously acquired and possessed weapons or ammunition as one offense unless they were acquired or stored separately.

United States v. Leach · filed 2006-11-06(g)

As the government acknowledges, a defendant who simultaneously acquires and possesses weapons or ammunition does not commit separate crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction for a single incident of firearm possession, even when the defendant belongs to more than one prohibited class.

United States v. Parker, Jesse J. · filed 2007-11-21(g)

Although the gov- ernment is free to pursue multiple theories of violation at trial, see Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 860 n.7 (1985), only one conviction may result under § 922(g) for a single incident of possession, even though the defendant may belong to more than one disqualified class.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction for a single incident of firearm possession, even when the defendant belongs to more than one class barred from possessing firearms.

United States v. Parker · filed 2007-11-21(g)

We agree that the two firearm possession convictions — under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (3) — are multiplicitous, as they arise from a single incident of firearm possession.

Section 922(g)(1) and (g)(3) may be presented as alternative theories for one firearm possession offense; the government need not automatically elect one theory.

United States v. Platter · filed 2008-01-10(g)(1), (g)(3)

We decline Kent’s invitation to craft a per se rule of election for every prosecution under § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(3); whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to require election must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

Section 922(g)(9) permits separate counts for firearm possessions that are not necessarily simultaneous.

United States v. Booker · filed 2008-05-16(g)(9)

While Count Two includes several firearms on a particular date, Count One refers only to one firearm, and includes two dates, one of which is the same as the date i n Count Two, and the other is approximately two weeks earlier. ... Therefore, the Government?s allegations are properly charged in two separate Counts.

Section 922(j) and (g)(1) create separate offenses because each requires proof of a fact the other does not; a person may be prosecuted for both based on the same firearms.

United States v. Smith · filed 2008-06-30(j), (g)(1)

As discussed above, § 922(j) and (g)(1) are separate offenses for which the Government could lawfully prosecute Smith.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction for a single incident of firearm possession, even if the person falls within multiple prohibited categories.

United States v. Yocum · filed 2010-11-29(g)

By convicting Yocum of two counts of violating § 922(g) based on a single act of possession, the district court committed a plain error that affected his substantial rights.

Section 922(g) treats an incident of possession as one offense even when a person simultaneously possesses multiple pieces of ammunition.

United States v. Steiner · filed 2016-03-03(g)

We have held that the allowable unit of prosecution under § 922(g) is the “incident of possession,” regardless of whether a defendant possessed more than one firearm, or possessed a firearm and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) treats simultaneous possession of firearms and ammunition as one offense, but two sentences are not plain error when the law is unclear whether separate possessions can be inferred.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2017-01-12(g)(1)

In other words, Congress did not intend the simultaneous possession of firearms and ammunition, i.e., “one episode of possession of firearms and ammunition,” to stand as separate offenses. ... Given this lack of clarity, it was not plain error for the district court to impose two sentences in this case.

Section 922(g) treats simultaneous possession of several types of ammunition as one offense; a special instruction requiring jurors to agree on the exact ammunition is unnecessary when the evidence shows one incident of possession.

United States v. Steiner · filed 2017-02-01(g)

For the additional reasons that follow, we therefore conclude the indictment properly charged Steiner with a single violation of § 922(g) under Count Two and that a special unanimity instruction was not required.

Section 922(g) requires possession of any firearm or ammunition; possession of multiple firearms is unnecessary.

United States v. Miller · filed 2018-08-20(g)

Criminal liability under the felon-in-possession statute does not require the possession of two or more firearms; the statute makes it illegal for “any person... convicted [of] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... . to possess [] any firearm or ammunition ....” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (emphasis added).

Section 922(g)(1) defines an offense distinct from § 924(c) because each requires proof of a fact the other does not.

United States v. Jefferson · filed 2020-05-22(g)(1)

Yet we have previously explained that violations of § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c) are ... distinct offenses because “each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction and sentence when a single incident violates multiple subdivisions.

United States v. Cadet · filed 2020-07-08(g)

Here, the district court plainly erred in imposing two separate convictions and sentences for violation of two subdivisions § 922(g) because both convictions ... arose out of the same incident.

Section 922(g)(1) generally treats simultaneous possession of firearms and ammunition as one violation.

United States v. Alford · filed 2020-11-17(g)(1)

He argues that this Court has held that a defendant like Alford who simultaneously possesses firearms and ammunition is generally guilty of only one violation of the statute, not two, and that none of the exceptions to this general rule apply to his case. ... After reviewing the record, we concur. ... On remand, the district court should vacate one of the counts of conviction as well as the challenged condition of release.

Possession of different firearms at different times can support separate offenses under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Willis · filed 2023-08-07(g)(1)

Here, Willis clearly pled guilty to possessing distinct firearms during three distinct timeframes. And he was convicted of and sentenced for each of those distinct units of possession. In particular, Willis possessed 11 firearms between August 8 and August 23, 2019 (Count 1); possessed 3 different firearms between August 26 and August 28, 2019 (Count 2); and possessed 3 different firearms on September 4, 2019 (Count 3). Willis’s sentence therefore is not multiplicitous.

Section 922(g) treats simultaneous possession of multiple firearms as a single offense.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2024-12-10(g)

He argues that the convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because simultaneous possession of several firearms is a single offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... Accordingly, we VACATE Bueno Garcia’s sentences and REMAND for dismissal of one of the § 922(g) convictions and for resentencing.

Section 922(g) treats each transaction or acquisition by which a person attempts to arm himself unlawfully as the unit of prosecution.

United States v. Rogers · filed 2022-08-12(g)

The courts of appeals have held that the unit of prosecution for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is “each transaction or acquisition by which he attempts to arm himself unlawfully.” Buchmeier, 255 F.3d at 422–23. Here the Government charged broadly that Mr. Rogers had possessed a single Mossberg gun. It made no attempt to maintain that the possession of the display case gun was an offense different from the constructive possession of the substituted item purchased by A.W. on his behalf.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that a felon intended to use a fully assembled homemade explosive device as a weapon when the device qualifies as a destructive device.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry Bruce LUSSIER, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1997-11-03(g)(1)

The fully assembled C02 devices were not “parts” under subsection (C), but were instead fully assembled “device[s] similar to” bombs, grenades, etc. ... They therefore fell under subsection (A) where proof of intent is not required.

Section 922(a)(1) does not cover dealing in commercial blasting dynamite, even when the seller knows the buyer intends a destructive use.

United States v. Posnjak · filed 1972-03-24(a)(1)

When we turn to the specific statutory language at issue on this appeal, we conclude that it supports the contention that commercial blasting dynamite is not covered by the Acts.

Under § 922(a)(6), the jury decides whether a shotgun is sufficiently operable or convertible to qualify as a firearm.

United States v. Joshua Daily Rouse · filed 1972-06-08(a)(6)

The question of whether the shotgun purchased by defendant was sufficiently operable or convertible to constitute a firearm was for the jury, and the court properly charged on that issue.

Section 922(e)’s common-carrier requirement depends on what the transportation company does, rather than its corporate form.

United States v. Zamor · filed 2021-02-16(e)

Although Teeters did not distinguish between Monarch’s corporate entities, “[w]hether a transportation agency is a common carrier depends not upon its corporate character . . . but upon what it does.” Lone Star Steel Co. v. McGee, 380 F.2d 640, 648 (5th Cir. 1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence suggesting that “Monarch Shipping Lines Inc.” is not a registered common carrier in no way contradicts the evidence adduced at trial.

Section 922(e)’s delivery requirement can be met when a person carrying an unreported firearm physically contacts a common carrier while boarding it.

United States v. Hartzog · filed 1993-01-12(e)

We conclude, and so hold, that at least where one, while in the unreported possession of a firearm, comes into physical contact with a carrier during the act of boarding that carrier, he can be said to have delivered the firearms to the carrier for transportation within the meaning of section 922(e).

Section 922(e) prohibits delivering a bag containing a firearm and ammunition to an airline for interstate shipment without notifying the airline of them.

United States v. Echols · filed 1972-06-15(e)

Count 1 alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(e) and 924(a), interstate transportation of a firearm and ammunition. ... The Court finds the defendant, William Edward Echols, guilty as charged in Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the aforementioned indictment. ... Defendant had knowingly delivered this bag to TWA, to be loaded onto the aircraft for shipment to St. Louis, Missouri. ... Defendant did not give notice to TWA that his baggage contained the aforementioned weapon and ammunition.

Section 922(e) allows a passenger to comply without written notice by delivering the firearm or ammunition to the carrier’s pilot, captain, conductor, or operator; handing over a suitcase containing it is insufficient.

United States v. Burton · filed 1972-12-01(e)

Therefore, to fall within the exception provided for passengers in this provision actual delivery of the firearm and ammunition to one of the designated persons must have been accomplished. The defendant did not deliver the firearm as required, and, accordingly, his act of handing over the suitcase to the carrier did not constitute compliance with the statute.

Section 922(e)’s passenger exception requires a transfer of control that gives the carrier actual notice of the firearm.

United States v. Williams · filed 1973-10-08(e)

If the Congressional purpose in enacting the Gun Control Act of 1968 is to be realized, “custody” must be construed to mean a transfer of control in a manner which gives the carrier actual notice of the presence of a firearm.

Section 922(e) requires written notice when a person knowingly delivers firearms to a common carrier for overseas transportation.

United States v. Keuylian · filed 1979-06-14(e)

Thus there was more than enough evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Keuylian knowingly delivered the luggage and the guns contained in it to both American Airlines and Air France for overseas shipment. ... Similarly, there was sufficient evidence that Air France and American Airlines were both common carriers. ... Similarly, Keuylian admitted on the stand that no written notice was given to American Airlines. ... All elements of the offense were therefore established.

Section 922(e)’s passenger exception requires the defendant to establish that he owns or legally possesses the firearm.

United States v. Henry · filed 1980-04-14(e)

The appellant has failed to establish that he comes within the exception, for no evidence was presented as to whether Henry owned or legally possessed the firearm.

Section 922(e)'s carrier notice requirement does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and requires general intent, not knowledge of the duty to give notice.

United States v. Flores · filed 1985-02-21(e)

We hold that appellant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not violated by, and cannot be claimed in connection with, the reporting requirement of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(e). ... We conclude, therefore, that section 922(e) is a general intent statute.

Section 922(e) requires a passenger shipping a firearm to give the carrier actual notice, either in writing or by delivering the firearm into its custody in a way that makes the carrier aware of it.

United States v. Vazquez · filed 1985-11-29(e)

Section 922(e) plainly requires the passenger to provide to the carrier actual notice of the shipment, either in writing or by physical delivery of the weapons into the carrier’s custody in a manner that makes the carrier aware that weapons are being shipped.

Section 922(e)’s passenger exception requires a firearm to be delivered into custody in a way that gives the carrier actual notice of it.

United States v. Dunn · filed 1987-04-03(e)

In light of these factors, we adopt an interpretation of § 922(e) which construes “custody” to mean the transfer of control in a manner which gives the carrier actual notice of the presence of a firearm.

Section 922(e) requires knowing delivery of firearms or ammunition to a contract carrier for interstate or foreign transport without written notice of the contents; actual interstate transportation is not an element.

United States v. Solan · filed 1992-05-29(e)

The elements of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(e) are (1) the delivery of firearms or ammunition to a contract carrier (2) that the delivery was made for the purpose of transporting the package in interstate or foreign commerce, (3) knowledge of the delivery to the contract carrier, and (4) lack of written notice to the carrier that such firearm or ammunition is being transported. As the defense states in the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, the actual interstate transportation by the contract carrier is not an element of the crime and the defendant could have been indicted even if the interstate transportation by UPS had never taken place.

A prosecution under § 922(e) requires proof that the defendant knew it was illegal to deliver a firearm to a carrier without written notice.

United States v. Otiaba · filed 1994-09-07(e)

Here, section 924(a)(1)(D) provides that a criminal penalty can only be imposed on a defendant who “willfully violates” section 922(e). The use of this phrase indicates to the court that the prosecution should be required to prove, as an essential element of the offense, that the defendant in this case knew that it was illegal to check the suitcase containing the firearm and ammunition without first providing written notice to the airline.

Section 922(e) prohibits delivering a firearm to a carrier for interstate transportation without notice and requires willfulness as an element.

United States v. Ali · filed 1996-01-09(e)

18 U.S.C. § 922(e) makes it unlawful to deliver a firearm to a carrier for transportation in interstate commerce without notice to the carrier. Willfulness is an element of this crime.

Section 922(e)’s passenger exception requires a traveler to make the carrier aware of a firearm when delivering the bag; disclosure after check-in and a security scan is too late.

United States v. Krug · filed 2001-08-30(e)

When Krug took his bag to the counter, put it in the baggage well, and began the check-in process with Woerner, he did not inform her that he had a firearm in his luggage. Thus, he did not deliver the bag in a manner that would make the airline aware that he was transporting a firearm. In fact, he did not reveal that his luggage contained firearms until he had accompanied Thomas to the security station, his bag had gone through the X-ray machine, and they were waiting for police to arrive to do a “dump search” of the bag. This type of delayed admission is not sufficient to satisfy the passenger exception.

A person acting alone can violate § 922(e) by delivering a package containing firearms to a common carrier without written notice.

United States v. Rodriquez · filed 2002-12-05(e)

Rodriquez’ sole contention on appeal is that Wharton’s Rule deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enter a conviction against Rodriquez, despite his guilty plea, for conspiring to deliver to a common carrier without written notice a package containing firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e), and aiding and abetting the possession on board an aircraft of a concealed dangerous weapon that would be accessible to the individual in flight, in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). Even if Wharton’s Rule had any application when the only charge is conspiracy and no merger issue is present, ... it would not help Rodriquez here, because both underlying substantive offenses can be committed by an individual acting alone.

A § 922(e) offense involving delivery of a firearm requires proof of actual or constructive possession of the firearm.

Malilia v. Holder · filed 2011-02-03(e)

But to establish the elements of a § 922 viola- tion, the government must prove that the defendant had actual or constructive possession of the firearm.

Section 922(e) prohibits knowingly delivering a container holding a firearm to a common carrier without giving the carrier written notice of the firearm.

United States v. Edouard · filed 2016-04-12(e)

Specifically, § 922(e) makes it a federal crime “knowingly to deliver” to a common carrier a container in which there is a firearm without providing the carrier with written notice of the firearm. ... The forgoing evidence amply supports the jury’s findings that Edouard knowingly attempted to export the firearms to Haiti contrary to § 922(e)’s notice requirements.

Section 922(e) requires written notice to the carrier when shipping firearms or ammunition in interstate commerce to someone other than a specified licensee.

Fowler v. Criticare Home Health Services, Inc. · filed 2000-08-04(e)

His assumption does not create a genuine issue of material fact on whether he held a “reasonable belief,” especially when both the statute and policy on which he wishes to rely necessarily suggest that firearms and ammunition can be shipped lawfully on carriers such as UPS.

Section 922(e) prohibits knowingly delivering firearms to a common carrier for interstate or foreign shipment without written notice to the carrier.

United States v. De Hernandez · filed 2010-07-27(e)

Here, the evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict with respect to all of the convicted counts. The evidence presented at trial showed that Mejia worked closely with others to purchase a number of firearms for export and to deliver several of the purchased firearms to a common carrier without notice to the common carrier that weapons were delivered, and that several of these firearms were actually exported by the common carrier.

Section 922(e) requires written notice to a common carrier when a person knowingly delivers a container holding a firearm; omitting the firearm from the bill of lading can support a conviction.

United States v. Nihad Al Jaberi · filed 2024-04-05(e)

Al Jaberi’s failure to disclose the firearms on the bill of lading’s cargo description—which was later uploaded to AES—is also sufficient to sustain his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) and 13 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1).

Section 922(b)(5) requires a federally licensed firearms dealer who sells a firearm to keep the required records of the sale.

United States v. McCoy · filed 2012-05-09(b)(5)

In order to convict McCoy on Counts Three, Seven, and Nine, the government must prove that: (1) McCoy was a federally licensed dealer, (2) who sold a firearm to a person, and (3) failed to keep the required records. ... These acts are sufficient to support the convictions on Counts Three, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten.

Section 922(b)(5) requires a licensed firearms dealer to record the actual buyer's name, age, and place of residence; willfully recording false information violates that requirement.

United States v. Patrick Carney (03-1735) Sean Carney (03-1736) · filed 2004-10-08(b)(5)

At bottom, the mere fact that the Carneys willfully accepted, and maintained in their records, incorrect information regarding the name, age, and address of the buyer of certain firearms, as opposed to simply failing to record any information on those subjects in their transaction records, is an immaterial distinction. The plain language of § 922(b)(5) covers both scenarios, in that a licensed dealer's willful recordation of false data, instead of the accurate data, is both the moral and the functional equivalent of the willful recordation of no information at all regarding the legally required matters.

Section 922(b)(5) requires a licensed firearms dealer to record the identity of the person to whom the dealer delivers a firearm, including when a straw purchaser is named in the sale records.

United States v. Rietzke · filed 2002-02-04(b)(5)

Licensed firearms dealers are required to maintain records of the persons to whom they sell or deliver weapons. ... Thus, the government established a factual basis for the charge that Rietzke failed to make a record for Mitchell Critton, the person to whom he delivered and whom he knew to be the actual purchaser of the two firearms.

Section 922(m) is willfully violated when a firearms licensee signs the transaction form as the salesperson despite not making the sale.

Trader Vic's Ltd. v. O'NEILL · filed 2001-10-04(m)

Therefore the court finds that Reid’s affidavit is wholly inconsistent with his prior position that he signed the form even when he was not actually involved in the transfer of the firearm. This act constitutes a willful violation of 27 C.F.R. § 178 .121(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(m) as reflected by the Inspection Report dated September 14, 1993.

Section 922(b)(5) requires licensed firearms dealers to record firearm sales; willful failure to do so is a felony under § 924(a)(1)(D).

United States v. Choice · filed 2000-01-20(b)(5)

We therefore rely upon the plain meaning of the statute and hold that the willful failure to keep records in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5) is a felony, punished under § 924(a)(1)(D).

Section 922(m) prohibits a licensed dealer from knowingly failing to keep required records, but the applicable regulation does not require records for ammunition received for personal use or test-firing.

United States v. Various Firearms · filed 1975-09-04(m)

18 U.S.C. § 922(m) makes it unlawful for a licensed firearms dealer to knowingly fail “to properly maintain any record which he is required to keep pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 923] or regulations promulgated thereunder.” ... Unless the ammunition is received for the purpose of sale or distribution, the dealer is not required, by the regulation, to maintain a record of it.

Section 922(m) prohibits a licensed firearms dealer from knowingly recording someone as a firearm’s purchaser when that person was not the true purchaser, even if the person used a real name and address.

United States v. Frank Grady and John Jankowski · filed 1976-10-27(m)

All that was necessary to establish a violation of the statute was that persons who were not the true purchasers were knowingly permitted to sign as if they were.

Section 922(m) makes a corporate firearms dealer liable for an employee’s knowing false entries on required sales forms when the employee acts within the scope of employment and intends to benefit the corporation.

United States v. Gibson Products Co., Inc. · filed 1976-11-11(m)

In determining if the factual situation which existed in this case, as found by the Court beyond a reasonable doubt, constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(m), it is necessary to review the law applicable here. ... The Court concludes that the evidence, as the Court has found it, beyond a reasonable doubt, establishes that Alvarado acted within the scope of his employment, and with an intent to benefit the Corporation, when he made the illegal entries on Form 4473. The Defendant Gibson’s Products Company, Inc., is therefore guilty of Counts 1 through 5 in Criminal Action No. 76-B-262 and is guilty if Counts 1 through 14 in Criminal Action No. 76-B-393.

Section 922(m) prohibits a licensed dealer from knowingly entering a false transaction date on Form 4473; the required date is when the dealer transfers custody of the firearm to a non-licensee.

United States v. Messner · filed 1977-03-09(m)

As we have heretofore pointed out, the date which the statute and regulations require the dealer to enter on the 4473 as the transaction date, is the date on which he transferred possession or custody of the firearm to a non-licensee.

Section 922(b)(5) requires a licensed dealer to verify the purchaser’s identification before a firearm sale and to refrain from selling when the dealer knows the purchaser’s information is false or incomplete.

United States v. Albert Newman and Jeanette Richardson · filed 1980-10-14(b)(5)

The regulation makes clear that the duty-creating use of the verb “note” in § 922(b)(5) encompasses the duty to obtain a completed Form 4473 from the purchaser with a correct and verified identification in Section A before consummating the sale.

Section 922(b)(5) requires a licensed dealer to record a firearm sale even if the dealer originally acquired the firearm for personal use.

United States v. Faurote · filed 1984-11-20(b)(5)

The instruction properly informs the jury that each time a licensed dealer disposes of a firearm, whether it be a firearm originally acquired for personal or business use, the dealer must comply with the Federal regulations and record that transaction.

Section 922(m) requires a licensed firearms dealer to record the sale of a firearm originally acquired for personal use.

United States v. Rex G. Endicott, United States of America v. John Stuart Robertson · filed 1986-10-27(m)

Endicott challenges his conviction for the knowing failure to make appropriate entries and maintain records regarding the sale of two pistols, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(m). He contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury, "[a] licensed firearms dealer must record the sales of all firearms. This includes the sale of a firearm that was originally acquired for personal use." ... Accordingly, we hold that the district court's instruction to the jury was not error.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for firearms reporting violations under § 922(m).

United States v. Lassiter · filed 1987-05-27(m)

The record also contains evidence sufficient to sustain Lassiter’s conviction on firearms reporting violations under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(m).

Section 922(m) covers a firearms dealer’s recording of a sham transaction as a false statement.

United States v. Theodore "Ted" Hern, Jr. · filed 1991-02-27(m)

We also reject Hern’s assertion that the recording of a sham transaction is not a false statement within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(m).

Section 922(m) prohibits a licensed firearms dealer from knowingly making false entries in required records.

Cisewski v. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms · filed 1991-08-02(m)

There is no question that the false entries into records and altered documents were willful violations.

Section 922(b)(5) requires a licensed firearms dealer to record identifying information for the actual buyer, rather than a straw purchaser.

WILLIAMS, DANIEL v. BEEMILLER, INC. · filed 2012-10-05(b)(5)

At a minimum, the records must contain “the name, age, and place of residence” of any person who purchases a firearm from a licensed dealer (§ 922 [b] [5]; see Nelson, 221 F3d at 1209). Further, “the information required [by 18 USC § 922] is information about the identity of the actual buyer, who supplies the money and intends to possess the firearm, as opposed to that individual’s ‘straw [purchaser]’ or agent” (Nelson, 221 F3d at 1209 [emphasis added]).

Section 922(b)(5) requires a licensed firearms seller to record the real buyer or intended recipient, rather than a nominal purchaser.

United States v. Kelerchian · filed 2019-08-22(b)(5)

“Person” in this case means the real buyer or intended recipient of the firearm, not a nominal or straw purchaser.

A violation of § 922(b)(1) does not establish negligence per se under Wisconsin law.

Olson v. Ratzel · filed 1979-03-08(b)(1)

Thus, both because of our doubts concerning the balancing of interests underlying Congressional enactment of the Gun Control Act, and because of the superiority of the duty of ordinary care as the standard of civil liability, we hold that violations of 18 U.S.C.A. §922 are not negligence per se.

An alleged violation of § 922(b)(1) does not establish negligence per se for a hunting accident during otherwise lawful firearm use.

Alderman v. Bradley · filed 1997-08-01(b)(1)

Based on our review of the language and legislative history of the Federal Gun Control Act we conclude the alleged violation, in the context of the undisputed facts of the present case, does not constitute negligence per se. We agree the Act was intended to thwart the unlawful distribution of firearms in contravention and circumvention of state and local laws. It was not intended, however, to protect against accidents which occur, as a result of negligence, during the ordinary and legitimate use of firearms.

Section 922(d) can supply a duty and standard of care for an Arizona negligence per se claim based on transferring a firearm to a person known or reasonably believed to be an unlawful drug user or addict.

Martin v. Schroeder · filed 2005-02-09(d)

We conclude the Act’s purpose is, in part, to protect the class of persons who could be harmed or injured by an unlawful drug user or addict with a gun. Therefore, it supports a claim of negligence per se. Based on the Act, we recognize a duty and derive the relevant standard of care in this case. ... Martin failed to produce any evidence that, at the time the Schroeders gave Matt the firearm, they knew or had reason to believe he was addicted to marijuana within the meaning of the Act. Furthermore, Martin failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether, at the time of the transfer, the Schroeders knew or had reason to believe that Matt was an “unlawful user” as the term is used in § 922.

A violation of § 922(b)(1) constitutes negligence per se.

Williams ex rel. Raymond v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. · filed 2012-09-06(b)(1)

A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) constitutes negligence per se.

Violations of Section 922’s firearm-transfer restrictions may establish duty and breach in a Kansas negligence action, but the plaintiff must also prove the other elements of the tort.

Shirley ex rel. Graham v. Glass · filed 2013-07-19

In the present case, Shirley seeks to include in her case certain statutory prohibitions on distributing firearms to felons and regulations designed in part to control systematically the manner in which firearms are distributed in order to reduce the likelihood that felons will acquire them. See K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4203; 18 U.S.C. § 922; 18 U.S.C. § 924. ... We conclude that violations of firearm-transfer statutes may be used by a plaintiff to establish a duty and a breach of a duty. Beyond establishing duty and breach, however, the plaintiffs will still have to prove the other elements of the tort they allege, including knowledge or constructive knowledge and causation.

Section 922(a)(6) treats the actual purchaser’s identity as material even when that purchaser is eligible to buy a firearm.

United States v. Morales · filed 2012-08-07(a)(6)

Where, as here, the purchaser is in fact eligible to purchase the firearm, his identity is no less material to the lawfulness of the transaction. Morales, in misrepresenting the identity of the actual purchaser of the firearms, violated Section 922(a)(6) and we affirm his convictions.

Section 922(d)(1) bars a dealer from selling a firearm through a lawful buyer when the dealer knows or has reason to know it is for a prohibited possessor.

Simon Perri, Jr., D/B/A Perri Jewelers v. Department of the Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms · filed 1981-04-02(d)(1)

Prohibiting sham or “strawman” purchases serves this purpose. This occurs when a lawful purchaser buys for an unlawful one. This court has said that a dealer who sells a gun knowing, or with reason to know, it is for an unlawful possessor, violates the Act.

Section 922(a)(6) covers agents who knowingly identify themselves as firearm buyers when purchasing guns for someone else; specific intent is not required.

United States v. Willie Lawrence Dana M. Somogye · filed 1982-06-22(a)(6)

Therefore Lawrence and Somogye were not buyers and their statements on the forms were false in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). Moreover the facts as stipulated show that they acted knowingly. That level of intent suffices under the statute; specific intent need not be shown, appellant’s arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits an eligible buyer from falsely claiming to be the purchaser of a firearm when buying it for someone who is legally ineligible.

United States v. Remsza · filed 1996-03-12(a)(6)

When a legally eligible purchaser represents that he is the purchaser of a firearm when, in fact, he is the “straw purchaser” for another who is legally ineligible, the purchaser violates § 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits an intermediary from making a false statement that enables someone ineligible to buy a firearm from a licensed dealer to obtain one.

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2372, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4240 United States of America v. Mary Peggy Moore, United States o · filed 1997-03-31(a)(6)

The straw man doctrine, which is nothing more than a long-standing construction of the relevant statutes, holds that a person violates section 922(a)(6) by acting as an intermediary or agent of someone who is ineligible to obtain a firearm from a licensed dealer and making a false statement that enables the ineligible principal to obtain a firearm.

Section 922(b)(5) does not require a licensed firearms dealer to disclose a suspicion that the person named on Form 4473 is not the actual buyer.

United States v. Dollar · filed 1998-10-09(b)(5)

The United States has cited 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5) ... as the statutory source of the duty. The statute imposes no such duty.

Section 922(b)(5) and (s)(3) require firearms dealers to record the identity of the actual buyer, rather than a person buying on the buyer’s behalf.

United States v. Nelson · filed 2000-08-10(b)(5), (s)(3)

Additionally, the information required under § 922(b)(5) and § 922(s)(3) is information about the identity of the actual buyer, who supplies the money and intends to possess the firearm, as opposed to that individual's "straw man" or agent.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a purchaser from claiming to be the actual buyer when buying firearms to deliver and sell immediately to an ineligible buyer, even without proof that the buyer requested the purchase in advance.

United States v. Ortiz · filed 2003-01-14(a)(6)

While there is no direct evidence that Jenkins asked Ortiz to purchase the guns before Ortiz actually bought them, there ... is overwhelming circumstantial evidence that, at the time of the purchases in Georgia, Ortiz equally was not buying the guns sold to Jenkins for himself or as a gift to another, but specifically was purchasing the guns for the sole purpose of immediately delivering and selling them to an ineligible buyer in New York City, whether the buyer is Rivera or Jenkins. In this factual circumstance, Ortiz may not necessarily be a straw man for Jenkins, but Ortiz is no less involved in a sham transaction and misrepresenting that he is the “actual buyer” of the firearms when he answers “yes” to question 9a on ATF Form 4473.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a straw purchaser from falsely identifying himself as the actual buyer when purchasing firearms from a federally licensed dealer.

United States v. Blake · filed 2005-01-19(a)(6)

After the Government charged Blake with making a false statement to a federally licensed firearms dealer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), Blake filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court* denied the motion, holding the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and Blake’s “straw purchase” clearly violated the statute, relying on United States v. Moore, 109 F.3d 1456, 1460-63 (9th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Nelson, 221 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2000). ... Having carefully considered the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude the district court thoroughly analyzed Blake’s assertion and properly rejected it. Because we have nothing to add to the district court’s explanation, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s order.

Section 922(a)(6) treats a false statement about the actual buyer’s identity as material to a firearm sale even when both the actual buyer and the straw purchaser may lawfully buy firearms.

United States v. Frazier · filed 2010-05-14(a)(6)

Therefore, under § 922(a)(6), Davis’s and Lubin’s false statements of the identity of the actual buyer satisfy the “fact material to the lawfulness of a sale” element, regardless of whether the actors were all lawfully eligible to purchase a firearm.

Section 922(a)(6) treats the identity of the actual firearm buyer as material to a sale even when the intended recipient may lawfully buy a firearm.

United States v. Bruce Abramski, Jr. · filed 2013-01-23(a)(6)

In sum, we are satisfied that the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the district court, correctly and properly ruled that the identity of the actual purchaser of a firearm is a constant that is always material to the lawfulness of a firearm acquisition under § 922(a)(6).

Section 922(a)(6) makes a straw purchaser’s false claim to be the actual buyer material to a firearm sale even when the true buyer could legally buy the gun.

Abramski v. United States · filed 2014-06-16(a)(6)

In this case, we consider how that law applies to a so-called straw purchaser—namely, a person who buys a gun on someone else’s behalf while falsely claiming that it is for himself. We hold that such a misrepresentation is punishable under the statute, whether or not the true buyer could have purchased the gun without the straw.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a purchaser from claiming to be the actual buyer on Form 4473 when the purchaser intends to resell the firearms, even if the eventual buyer is not yet identified.

United States v. Duval · filed 2017-10-03(a)(6)

Even if Duval was not acting as a classic straw purchaser who is fronted the money for the firearm transaction ahead of time by a specific buyer, his actions nonetheless qualified as a crime under § 922(a)(6) because Duval could only be the “actual buyer” for purposes of Form 4473 if he intended to keep the firearms for himself or to give them as a gift.

Section 922(a)(6) prohibits a firearm buyer from falsely claiming to be the actual purchaser when the buyer intends to acquire the firearm for someone else.

United States v. Zambrano · filed 2018-10-09(a)(6)

Because a reasonable jury could conclude that, at the time Mejia and Roman completed the ATF Forms 4473 they had no intention of keeping the firearms—but rather, intended to immediately chop them up for parts and ship them to Colombia—it could reasonably conclude that the men misrepresented that they were the actual purchasers on the ATF Forms.

Section 922(a)(6) permits an aiding and abetting conviction when the evidence shows the defendant knew a straw purchaser would falsely claim to be the firearm’s buyer, even if he did not know that conduct was a crime.

United States v. Gearheart · filed 2025-06-05(a)(6)

And, a jury reasonably could infer that Gearheart knew L.S. would have to represent herself, rather than Gearheart, as the pistol’s buyer to obtain it from Doomsday. Thus, the evidence permitted the jury to infer that Gearheart knew of the facts that rendered L.S.’s conduct criminal, even if he did not recognize that they constituted a crime.

Section 922(b)(2) permits states to regulate the transfer and possession of machine guns more strictly than federal law.

Opinion No. (1981) · filed 1981-04-21(b)(2)

In enacting 18 U.S.C. § 922 (b)(2), Congress was attempting to give the states power to regulate the transfer and possession of machine guns beyond the regulatory measures of the federal government if it so desired.

Section 922(o) does not excuse possession or transfer of machine guns because a firearms dealer allegedly failed to register parts sold to the defendant.

United States v. Bascue · filed 1998-05-12(o)

The defendants point to no statute or regulation violated by the firearms dealer and no statute or regulation excusing the making, possessing and transferring of machine guns by the defendants.

Section 922 creates no private right of action, so its violation cannot support a negligence per se claim under Kansas law.

Shirley Ex Rel. Graham v. Glass · filed 2010-10-08

Based on this court's analysis in Pemberton, we determine that no private right of action was created by 18 U.S.C. § 922. As a result, Shirley cannot pursue a negligence per se claim based on 18 U.S.C. § 922 against the appellees.

Section 922 does not give victims injured by firearms obtained in violation of it a private cause of action or create a duty of reasonable care.

Lewis v. Jamesway Corp. · filed 2002-02-25

The Act neither created a private cause of action for victims injured by firearms obtained in violation of section 922, nor created a duty of care of a reasonable person (see, Hamilton v Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 NY2d 222, 234-240; Alderman v Bradley, 957 SW2d 264, 267 [Ky]; Hulsman v Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Haw 58, 647 P2d 713, 720).

Section 922 creates neither a seller’s duty in a negligence action nor a private right to damages for injuries from firearm misuse.

Hulsman v. Hemmeter Development Corp. · filed 1982-06-30

We find that the federal statutes regulating firearm sales did not create a duty on a seller in a negligence action nor did it create a private right of action for damages.

A dealer's unlawful sale under § 922(d) can support liability for injuries caused by misuse of the firearm even when the buyer gives it to someone else.

K-Mart Enterprises of Fla., Inc. v. Keller · filed 1983-09-27(d)(1), (d)(3)

That William would commit such an act was, to revert to the prior analysis, directly within the "scope of the risk" which would not have arisen if K-Mart had obeyed the statutory directive not to sell him the rifle in the first place.

Section 922(b)(1)'s restriction on selling firearms to minors does not impose absolute civil liability under Arizona's exceptional-statute doctrine.

Crown v. Raymond · filed 1988-06-16(b)(1)

We find sufficient similarities between the statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to minors and the statutes prohibiting the sale of firearms to minors to conclude that the latter do not constitute exceptional statutes under the reasoning of Del E. Webb so as to warrant the imposition of absolute liability upon Raymond.

Section 922(d) protects the public from firearm misuse by prohibited purchasers, and its violation can support a statutory negligence claim for resulting injuries.

Kalina v. Kmart Corporation, No. Cv-90-269920 S (Aug. 5, 1993) · filed 1993-08-05(d)

The plaintiff's decedent, alleged to have died as a result of gunshot wounds inflicted by Douglas Pratt who had obtained a firearm and ammunition notwithstanding his alleged statutory disabilities, clearly was a member of the class that 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d) is intended to protect who suffered injury from Pratt's misuse of the firearm of a type that 922(d) intended to prevent. Thus, the second count is actionable under a theory of statutory negligence.

A vendor's violation of § 922(b)(1) can be the proximate cause of injury or death resulting from the ammunition purchaser's intentional criminal act.

Coker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1994-09-08(b)(1)

Considering that rule, and applying the foregoing observations made in Huddleston and Keller, with which we agree, we are unwilling to hold as a matter of law in ruling on a motion to dismiss that an ammunition vendor's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) cannot be found to be the proximate cause of injury or death caused by the purchaser's intentional or criminal act.

Section 922’s prohibition on selling ammunition to minors does not by itself establish civil liability for a later injury; the plaintiff must prove proximate cause.

Scoggins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1997-03-26

Although we agree that the enactment of the federal statute reflects Congressional concern with the inherent danger of such conduct, we nevertheless do not agree that this fact alone requires that Wal-Mart be found liable or that there is even sufficient evidence to send the question to the jury.

A vendor’s violation of § 922(b)(1) can be found to proximately cause injury or death from a purchaser’s intentional or criminal act.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coker · filed 1997-06-23(b)(1)

There, this court held that it was “unwilling to hold as a matter of law in ruling on a motion to dismiss that an ammunition vendor’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) cannot be found to be the proximate cause of injury or death caused by the purchaser’s intentional or criminal act.” ... Thus, proximate cause was properly an issue for the jury in this action.

Section 922 does not create a substantive right enforceable through § 1983.

Starr v. Price · filed 2005-09-08(d)(8)

The Brady Act provision relied upon by Plaintiff does not satisfy these criteria. It creates no class of protected individuals and imposes no binding obligation on the state. Therefore, we find that 18 U.S.C. § 922 does not create a substantive right, and we will dismiss Plaintiffs section 1983 claims based on this statute.

Section 922(d)(1) does not provide a civil cause of action for injuries arising from an illegal firearm sale.

Bannerman v. Mountain State Pawn, Incorporated · filed 2011-06-27(d)(1)

Moreover, neither the Gun Control Act, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2006), nor the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901 (2006) et. seq., provided Appellants with a civil cause of action.

Section 922(g)(1)’s antique firearm exception is an affirmative defense; the government need not prove a firearm was made after 1898 unless the defendant raises that defense at trial.

United States v. Swain · filed 2022-08-17(g)(1)

Accordingly, the Government is not required to prove that the firearm in question was manufactured after 1898 unless the defendant raises the exception as an affirmative defense at trial.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that a firearm is not an antique unless the defendant timely raises the antique firearm defense and supports it with evidence.

United States v. Murdock · filed 2011-08-24(g)(1)

I agree with the circuit courts that have addressed the issue and conclude that the antiquity of the firearm is not an element of the felon in possession of a firearm offense. Rather it is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise and support by some evidence before the government has to disprove its applicability.

In § 922 prosecutions, the antique firearm exception is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise with evidence; the government need not disprove it in every case.

United States v. Harold F. Mayo, Jr. And Mark A. McGarghan · filed 1983-04-08

By its terms, the statute creates an affirmative defense in the form of an exception. We find no indication in the language of the statute that Congress intended the government to prove in all criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922 that the illegal firearms transactions involved weapons that were not antiques.

In § 922 prosecutions, the defendant must raise the antique weapons exception before the government must disprove its applicability.

United States v. Laroche · filed 1984-01-30

We agree with the Second Circuit and hold that the antique weapons exception is in essence an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant before the burden shifts to the government to disprove its applicability. Here the defense introduced no evidence that the weapons came within the exception; accordingly the government was under no obligation to disprove its applicability.

A § 922(g) conviction requires the government to prove that the firearm was not an antique manufactured in or before 1898.

United States v. Smith · filed 1988-05-04(g)

One element that the government must establish is that the weapon is not an antique in that it was not manufactured in or before 1898. This was never established and thus I must find Benjamin not guilty.

Section 922(g) prohibits a person covered by the statute from possessing ammunition even when it is loaded in an antique firearm that the person may lawfully possess.

United States v. Cox · filed 1989-08-08(g)

We reject the argument that possession of the ammunition alone is insufficient to constitute a violation when the ammunition is loaded in an antique firearm. The proscription of the statute is in the disjunctive. It follows that possession of ammunition alone is sufficient to constitute a violation irrespective of whether possession of the gun is also proscribed.

In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, the defendant must raise a genuine dispute about whether the firearm is an antique before the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not.

United States v. Washington · filed 1994-04-18(g)(1)

A defendant who seeks acquittal on the ground that the firearm he possessed is an antique firearm bears the burden to produce evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute about whether the firearm is an antique. Only then does the government need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm is not an antique firearm.

For a § 922(g) charge, the defendant must support the antique firearm defense with some evidence before the government must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Lawrence · filed 2003-11-13(g)

Based on the text of the statute, and the Congress’s purpose of deterring trafficking in firearms while protecting the interests of legitimate antique weapons collectors, we hold that the exemption for antique firearms contained in § 921(a)(16) is an affirmative defense that must be raised by defendant and supported by some evidence before the government has to prove the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1) does not cover antique shotguns.

United States v. Stevens · filed 2005-12-13(g)(1)

Contrary to the district court’s finding, section 922(g)(1) does not include antique shotguns.

Section 922(g)(1) does not apply to possession of an antique shotgun.

United States v. Stevens · filed 2006-02-21(g)(1)

Contrary to the district, court’s finding, section 922(g)(1) does not include antique shotguns.

Section 922(g) does not count an antique rifle as a firearm.

United States v. Cadieux · filed 2007-08-21(g)

As an antique, the rifle is not a “firearm” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that a gun was manufactured after 1898; the antique firearm exception is an affirmative defense.

United States v. Dorsey · filed 2008-04-02(g)(1)

That the gun was manufactured prior to 1898 is not an element of the offense—it is an affirmative defense; therefore, stating to the jury that the government had to prove that the gun was manufactured after 1898 would have been an incorrect statement of the law.

A weapon manufactured in 1900 is not an antique firearm excluded from § 922(d)(1).

United States v. Dotson · filed 2009-07-07(d)(1)

Next, as to the conspiracy to deliver a firearm to a convicted felon, Dotson contends that there was insufficient evidence that the weapon at issue was a “firearm” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), and not an “antique firearm.” A firearm manufactured in or before 1898 is an antique firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(16)(A). A government expert testified that the firearm was manufactured in 1900. In addition, an ATF firearms examiner determined that it was likely that the firearm was manufactured in 1900. There was ample evidence that the weapon was not an antique.

The antique firearms exception is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise and support with evidence before the Government must disprove it.

United States v. McMillan · filed 2009-10-13(j), (g)(1)

Moreover, the antique firearms exception is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant and supported by evidence before the Government must disprove its application.

For a § 922(g)(1) ammunition charge, the government must prove the rounds were designed for use in a firearm; the defendant must raise the antique firearm exception as an affirmative defense.

United States v. Royal · filed 2013-10-01(g)(1)

Consequently, it is the government’s initial burden to prove as an element of the offense that the rounds were “designed for use in any firearm.” ... Instead, if a defendant seeks the shelter of the antique firearms exception as it relates to § 921(a)(17)(A)’s “designed for use” clause, it remains incumbent on him to raise the exception as an affirmative defense at trial.

Section 922(g)(1) treats the antique firearm exception as an affirmative defense that the defendant must put at issue by producing evidence.

United States v. Benamor · filed 2019-06-06(g)(1)

That leaves Defendant with only the affirmative defense of the “antique firearm” exception on which to rely. Defendant had the burden of production to put that affirmative defense at issue.

Section 922(g)(1)’s antique firearm exception is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise by meeting a burden of production.

United States v. Benamor · filed 2019-09-05(g)(1)

That leaves Defendant with only the affirmative defense of the “antique firearm” exception on which to rely. Defendant had the burden of production to put that affirmative defense at issue.

Section 922(g)(1) does not prohibit a convicted felon from possessing an antique firearm.

United States v. Leahy · filed 1995-02-13(g)(1)

A common sense reading of the search warrant would not permit seizure of antique firearms because § 921(a)(3) states that the term firearm “does not include an antique firearm,” which defendant could have lawfully possessed.

Section 922(g)(1) excludes antique firearms from its felon-in-possession prohibition; Florida’s differently worded antique-firearm exception does not make its offense categorically broader.

Aspilaire v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2021-04-06(g)(1)

A weapon may be considered an antique firearm under federal law—but not under Florida law—if it is used in the commission of a crime. ... Florida’s felon-in-possession statute is not broader than the federal statute on its face, so Aspilaire is not entitled to relief based on the statutory language.

Section 922(k) makes possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number a crime.

Gon v. Holt · filed 2014-12-16(k)

The only other firearm that Ye Gon is charged with possessing had an obliterated serial number, and its possession is thus criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).

Section 922(k) prohibits possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number.

In Re the Extradition of Zhenly Ye Gon · filed 2011-02-09(k)

Finally, the pistol had an obliterated serial number, the possession of which would violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).