18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(h)(1) covers a convicted felon’s intrastate receipt of a firearm that previously moved in interstate commerce, even if the recipient did not participate in its interstate transportation.

United States v. Rose · filed 1977-06-28(h)(1)

A thorough analysis led the Court in Barrett to the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) reaches the intrastate receipt of a firearm that had previously moved in interstate commerce. Defendant does not challenge the established fact that the firearm found in his possession had previously moved in interstate commerce, and it is there, in light of Barrett, that our inquiry ends.

Section 922(h)(1) covers a felon’s intrastate receipt of a firearm previously shipped interstate, even from a private party years after the shipment.

United States v. Haddad · filed 1977-08-10(h)(1)

There is no reason to limit this language to direct interstate receipt or receipt from one who deals in interstate firearm transactions. ... The proximity of the felons receipt of the firearm to interstate commerce has little relationship to the accomplishment of the statutory goal. Appellant’s receipt of the pistol clearly falls within the intended reach of section 922(h).

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate transportation element can be proved by inferring transportation from possession in one state of a firearm recently stolen in another.

United States v. Little · filed 1977-09-28(g)(1)

However, the jury could infer interstate transportation from possession in one state of property recently stolen in another. ... Certainly the .303 rifle bolstered the government’s case, but we conclude that even without it the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 922(j) does not cover firearms that were not stolen when they crossed state lines.

United States v. West · filed 1977-10-06(j)

If § 922(j) is similarly construed, the acts set forth in the indictment and proved clearly would not amount to a violation of that section because the guns were not stolen at the time they crossed state lines into Tennessee. ... We hold, therefore, that the language of the indictment and the undisputed facts at the trial support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 659, but not under § 922(j).

Section 922(h)’s interstate commerce requirement can be established by testimony that the firearm was shipped across state lines.

United States v. Lekin · filed 1977-10-31(h)

Even if there were any merit to this argument, defendant’s contention overlooks the testimony of the individual who sold the firearm to him. The witness testified that the firearm he sold the defendant was shipped from Ridge-field, Connecticut to Sports Outfitters, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The defendant’s argument is frivolous.

Section 922(h)’s commerce requirement is satisfied when a firearm manufactured abroad is later received in Texas, even if its route cannot be proved.

United States v. Wilson · filed 1978-03-13(h)

Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that to get from Germany to Texas the gun had to travel in interstate and foreign commerce. Under the statute, § 922(h), this was enough, Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 96 S.Ct. 498, 46 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); United States v. Jones, 6 Cir. 1976, 533 F.2d 1387, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 2919, 53 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1977).

Section 922(h) covers a prohibited person’s receipt of a firearm after its interstate shipment is complete, even if the person acquires it entirely within one state.

United States v. Francisco · filed 1978-05-09(h)

The statute applies if a person within the prohibited category receives the weapon after the interstate shipment is complete, even if he has no contact with any state other than the one in which he makes the acquisition.

Section 922(h)(1)’s interstate commerce requirement remains satisfied when three years pass between a firearm’s interstate travel and its receipt.

United States v. Jose Luis Oropeza and Mark James Minton · filed 1977-11-08(h)(1)

A three year delay between the time the weapon traveled in commerce and the time of receipt does not destroy the nexus required for conviction under the statute.

Section 922(h) permits a jury to infer receipt of a firearm from knowing possession without conclusively presuming receipt.

United States v. Buster Howard Turnmire, A/K/A Buster Howard Bare · filed 1978-03-28(h)

Accordingly, we hold that the instruction as given by the district court did not erroneously define the term “receive” for the consideration of the jury nor did it impermissibly create a conclusive presumption that Turnmire had “received” a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h).

Section 922(i) requires sufficient evidence that the defendant transported stolen firearms in interstate commerce.

United States v. Suthard · filed 1987-06-16(i)

Although this standard is heavily weighted in favor of jury verdicts, we are persuaded that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to establish the critical interstate transportation element of a § 922(i) violation.

Section 922(j) requires the sale of a stolen firearm connected to interstate or foreign commerce, with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen.

United States v. Littles · filed 1992-06-30(j)

The elements of the 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) offense alleged in the specification are that appellant (1) sold a stolen firearm (2) which was moving as, which was a part of, or which constituted interstate or foreign commerce (3) knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm was stolen.

A conviction for aiding and abetting receipt and concealment of stolen firearms under § 922(j) can rest on circumstantial evidence of the defendant's knowledge and intentional assistance.

United States v. Strong · filed 1993-09-15(j)

Relying on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that William Strong knew what his brother planned to do with the truck and that William intended to assist his brother John in the illegal gun sale. The district court did not err when it denied the motion for judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(j) covers stolen firearms that traveled in interstate commerce either before or after they were stolen.

United States v. Honaker · filed 1993-09-20(j)

These two statements leave no doubt that Congress intended Sec. 922(j) to apply to firearms that have travelled in interstate commerce, both prior to or after being stolen.

Section 922(j) permits conviction when the evidence supports a finding that the defendant knowingly possessed stolen firearms with his co-conspirators.

United States v. Raymond H. Curtsinger (92-6044) and Pete Gilbert (92-6067) · filed 1993-10-20(j)

Based upon these facts, a rational jury or juror could find that Gilbert, as a co-conspirator along with Odom, Jaggers, and Curtsinger, knowingly possessed operational stolen firearms, including a sawed-off shotgun, which were carried and used during the robbery of the Farmers Bank.

Section 922(u) requires the theft or unlawful taking of a firearm from a licensed dealer’s business inventory.

United States v. Johnny Arnold Halliburton (95-5648) and Nancy Jane Welborn (95-5649) · filed 1996-01-17(u)

As to the argument that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(u) was not so much concerned with theft, per se, as with protection of the system under which the firearms trade is regulated, we would simply point out that there cannot be a violation of Sec. 922(u) unless a person "steal[s] or unlawfully take[s] or carr[ies] away" a firearm.

Sections 922(j) and 922(k) do not make notifying the police a defense to their firearm offenses.

United States v. Soskin · filed 1996-11-26(j), (k)

Nowhere does § 922(j) or § 922(k) provide that notification of the police constitutes a defense.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew or had reason to know the firearm was stolen; proof that the gun was stolen alone does not establish that knowledge.

United States v. Howard · filed 2000-06-15(j)

We conclude, therefore, that Congress did not intend that scienter under Section 922(j) be established by showing only that a gun was in fact stolen.

Section 922(j) prohibits bartering a firearm when the defendant has reasonable cause to believe it is stolen, even if he did not know it was stolen when he received it.

United States v. Webber · filed 2001-07-06(j)

Thus, the evidence was sufficient to convict Webber, in the words of the statute, of “barter[ing]” the firearm for an oil painting and a wildlife print “knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm . . . was stolen.”

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and knew or had reason to know it was stolen.

United States v. Daniels · filed 2002-11-25(j)

From the foregoing summary, it is clear that the government presented ample evidence that Daniels knowingly possessed firearms and that he knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearms were stolen.

Section 922(j) prohibits possessing stolen firearms, and an admission that the defendant stored stolen firearms supports probable cause for that charge.

United States v. Say · filed 2002-12-05(j)

Mr. Say is charged with conspiracy to possess and possession of stolen firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 922(j). Under this latter statute, it is unlawful for any person to possess stolen firearms. Mr. Say has admitted that he went with a group of individuals to the Ryan residence, assisted in stealing firearms and following the robbery, stored those firearms, for a period of time, in an apartment that he shared with Mr. Rodriguez. Therefore, I find probable cause for the offenses charged against Mr. Say in this Criminal Complaint.

Section 922(j) prohibits knowingly possessing a stolen firearm that has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, and section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a felony from knowingly possessing a firearm that is in or has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Breeden · filed 2003-05-01(j) and (g)(1)

To convict Breeden of possession of a stolen firearm, the Government was required to prove that Breeden knowingly possessed a stolen firearm that had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). To convict Breeden of possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, the Government had to prove that Breeden: (1) previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) knowingly possessed the firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affected commerce, because the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Sections 922(g)(1) and 922(j) prohibit a convicted felon from possessing a firearm and require proof of possession, theft, knowledge, and interstate commerce for possession of stolen firearms.

United States v. Moye · filed 2005-09-09(g)(1), (j)

Count I charged Moye with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person "who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to possess a firearm, which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. ... The evidence here, taken in the light most favorable to the Government, is insufficient to establish that Moye constructively possessed any of the weapons. ... Under Count II, to be convicted of possessing stolen firearms per 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), the Government must prove: (1) that the defendant possessed the firearm described in the indictment; (2) that at the time the defendant possessed it, the firearm was stolen; (3) that the defendant acted knowingly; and (4) that the firearm had at some time traveled in interstate commerce. ... Given our finding on Count I, Moye could not be convicted of himself possessing stolen firearms because no evidence existed from which the jury could infer that Moye was in constructive possession of stolen firearms.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a person with a prior felony conviction from possessing firearms that have traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Caldwell · filed 2005-09-12(g)(1)

To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government bore the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Caldwell had a previous felony conviction; (2) he possessed the firearms in question; and (3) the firearms traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

Section 922(j) covers possession of stolen firearms by the person who took them, because taking property entails possessing it.

United States v. Torrellas · filed 2006-07-11(j)

A person who takes property has, at the very least at the instant of the taking, possession of that property.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew the firearms were stolen.

United States v. Southern · filed 2006-08-11(j)

We find there was substantial evidence to support the finding that Southern had knowledge the firearms were stolen.

Section 922(j) requires knowing possession of a stolen firearm, knowledge or reasonable cause to believe it was stolen, and movement of the firearm in interstate commerce before or after the theft.

United States v. Martinez · filed 2006-10-04(j)

A stolen firearms offense, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), requires the government to prove that the defendant (1) knowingly possessed the stolen firearm, (2) knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it was stolen and (3) that the firearm had moved or been shipped in interstate commerce either before or after it was stolen.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant possessed a stolen firearm that was part of interstate commerce, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it was stolen.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2008-05-01(j)

In this case, to establish possession of a stolen firearm, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) possessed; (2) a stolen firearm; (3) which was part of interstate commerce; (4) knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm was stolen. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant handled a stolen firearm, knew or had reason to know it was stolen, and that the firearm was part of interstate commerce.

United States v. Williams · filed 2008-08-28(j)

To convict under section 922(j), the government must prove (1) the defendant received, possessed, concealed, stored, bartered, sold, or disposed of a stolen firearm, (2) the defendant knew or had reason to know the firearm was stolen, and (3) the firearm was part of interstate commerce.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen; evidence of a suspicious sale alone does not establish that knowledge.

United States v. Ayala-Garcia · filed 2009-07-24(j)

Although the government may be correct that the evidence permitted the jury to conclude that the weapons transaction was unlawful,8 we see no evidence to support the particular finding of knowledge required to support a conviction under section 922(j), i.e., that Alicea-Cotto knew, or had reason to believe, that the weapon he sold to Alvarado had been stolen.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant possessed a stolen firearm that had moved in interstate commerce and knew or had reason to know it was stolen.

United States v. Gaston · filed 2010-06-10(j)

In order to prove Gaston possessed a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), the Government had to demonstrate that (1) Gaston possessed the stolen firearm; (2) the firearm had moved in interstate commerce; and (3) Gaston knew or had reason to know that the firearm was stolen.

Section 922(j) does not require stolen firearms to have a value exceeding $1000.

United States v. Chapman · filed 2010-08-04(j)

A knowing recipient of stolen firearms in violation of § 922(j), like a felon in possession of stolen firearms, will not necessarily violate the Iowa felony theft statute, because the federal statute does not require value in excess of $1000.

Section 922(j) requires scienter for the crime of possessing a stolen firearm.

United States v. Davy · filed 2011-07-12(j)

But Davy’s general argument is correct: scienter is required for the substantive crime of possession of a stolen gun, but not for application of the stolen-gun sentencing enhancement.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearms were stolen; a jury may infer that knowledge from circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Livingston · filed 2013-03-07(j)

We see no error here because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Livingston knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearms were stolen.

Section 922(j)’s prohibition on bartering stolen firearms does not cover an attempt to exchange money for firearms.

United States v. Victor Hagman, III · filed 2014-01-27(j)

Hagman’s alleged attempt to exchange money for the eleven missing firearms does not constitute bartering for the purposes of § 922(j).

Section 922(j) requires possession or receipt of a stolen firearm that moved in interstate commerce and knowledge or reasonable cause to believe it was stolen; the jury may credit the owner’s testimony that the defendant took it without permission.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2015-08-25(j)

The elements required to establish the receipt or possession of a stolen firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) are: “1) the receipt or possession of stolen firearms; 2) which moved or were shipped in interstate commerce before or after being stolen; and 3) knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that they were stolen.” United States v. Roalin, 62 F. App’x 594, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). ... In light of the foregoing, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, this Court finds that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(j) requires knowing possession of stolen firearms that have been shipped in interstate commerce.

United States v. Miquan Smith · filed 2016-01-14(j)

Accordingly, to sustain Smith’s convictions under both counts, a reasonable juror must be able to conclude that Smith conspired, and aided and abetted Johnson, to knowingly possess stolen guns that had been shipped in interstate commerce.

Section 922(j)’s knowledge element can be proved by evidence that the defendant had reasonable cause to believe the firearms or ammunition were stolen.

United States v. Buck Otto White · filed 2016-03-08(j)

This evidence, coupled with White’s possession of numerous items stolen from Nevins’s home, could have led a reasonable jury to conclude that White knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the firearms and ammunition were stolen.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen; concealing a gun alone does not establish that knowledge.

United States v. Ronald White, Jr. · filed 2016-06-02(j)

The evidence does not indicate whether the circumstances were suspicious, nor does the proof indicate that White had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen. Even if the jury could infer from White’s placement of the gun that he did not believe it was legally obtained, as explained in Ayala-Garcia, no reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the reason that White believed he needed to hide the gun was because it had been stolen.

Section 922(j) permits possession of stolen firearms and knowledge that they were stolen to be proved through circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Hemsher · filed 2018-06-20(j)

The evidence sufficiently connected Hemsher to the guns in Wingler's apartment as well as to the gun in the Camry, because the evidence showed he was the last person to occupy the Camry and to exercise control over the gun prior to it being located. ... Further, there was circumstantial evidence that Hemsher knew the guns were stolen given his comment to Wingler that he got the guns from his "buddy" who stole them from his dad, the burglary victim who identified the recovered guns as his own.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed or disposed of a stolen firearm, knew or had reasonable cause to believe it was stolen, and that the firearm had an interstate-commerce nexus.

United States v. Waln · filed 2019-02-28(j)

The crime of possession of a stolen firearm requires the jury to conclude that Waln knowingly possessed, received, concealed, stored, bartered, sold or disposed of firearm that was stolen and that Waln knew or had reasonable cause to believe was stolen, in addition to the interstate-commerce nexus discussed above.

Section 922(j) does not require a firearm to have been stolen before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Richardson · filed 2019-09-12(j)

Neither the unambiguous language of § 922(j), nor our interpretations of the statute, require the government to prove that the firearm was stolen prior to the defendant’s possession of it.

Section 922(j) requires knowledge that the firearm was stolen, but does not require knowledge of its interstate commerce nexus.

Payne v. USA - 2255 · filed 2022-05-18(j)

Second, he was advised that knowledge of the stolen nature of the firearm was an element and he admitted as much. Third, there is no requirement that the Government prove knowledge of the interstate nexus, which is necessary to show federal jurisdiction.

Section 922(j) requires knowledge that the firearms were stolen; Rehaif’s knowledge-of-restricted-status rule for § 922(g) does not apply.

Amalfitano v. United States · filed 2022-11-18(j)

Further, Rehaif does not apply here. Rehaif held that the defendant who was convicted of possessing firearms as a restricted person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), had to know of his restriction (such as a felony record, illegal alien, or fugitive status etc.). In contrast, Petitioner pled to 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) which is knowing possession of stolen firearms in interstate commerce. The stolen nature of the guns was an element of Petitioner’s crime and he knew all the elements and agreed to them, admitting guilt to them expressly at his plea.

Section 922(i) does not require a prior state theft conviction to prove interstate transportation of a stolen firearm.

United States v. Christy · filed 2024-02-12(i)

But as the Government points out, a prior state conviction for theft is not a required element under any of those statutes.

Section 922(g) restricts firearm possession by fugitives and persons committed to mental institutions, rather than the conduct of people who distribute firearms.

Rollins v. Wackenhut Services, Inc. · filed 2011-08-10(g)

However, §922(g) restricts the actions of fugitives and mentally ill persons, not the actions of those who distribute firearms.

Section 922(d)(1) prohibits transferring ammunition to a person the seller has reasonable cause to believe is a convicted felon, whether or not the person pays for it.

DiMartino v. Buckles · filed 2001-01-02(d)(1)

Howéver, whether Howard paid for the ammunition does not matter. Section 922 only requires that a person “sell or otherwise dispose of’ ammunition to a convicted felon. These facts are sufficient to demonstrate that Larry DiMartino disposed of ammunition to a convicted felon, and that Larry DiMartino had reasonable cause to believe that Howard was a convicted felon.

Section 922(g)(4) permits a jury to find a qualifying commitment from hospital records indicating that the required medical evaluations occurred, even when the evaluations themselves are missing.

United States v. Jones · filed 2000-10-26(g)(4)

Therefore, I cannot dismiss the indictment on the facts before me, since a reasonable jury might find from these records that Jones was in fact committed to a mental institution within the meaning of the statute.

Section 922(g)(8) requires the person to be subject to a domestic violence protective order when possessing the firearm; an expired order cannot support the charge.

United States v. Bailes · filed 1998-06-29(g)(8)

The defendant is charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it unlawful for persons subject to domestic violence protective orders to possess firearms. ... In light of these facts, the defendant could not have been subject to the May 15,1997 protective order on October 23,1997 because the protective order expired upon entry of the September 30,1997 order.

Section 922(g)(8) requires the government to prove that the defendant was subject to a protective order.

United States v. Drew · filed 1998-05-18(g)(8)

This relief is not warranted. The existence of a protective order is an element that- the Government must prove.

Section 922(g)(9) prohibits firearm possession after a misdemeanor domestic violence plea that remains a conviction because probation has not been completed.

Carew v. Centracchio · filed 1998-03-04(g)(9)

On the date that defendant discharged plaintiff, plaintiff had not yet successfully completed his term of one year probation which had been imposed on October 9,1996. He was therefore subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(b)(1) allows licensed sellers to sell ammunition usable in a rifle or shotgun to people over eighteen, even if it is also usable in a handgun.

Bell v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc. · filed 1995-07-25(b)(1)

The statutory language thus indicates that Congress intended to allow persons over the age of eighteen access to ammunition usable in rifles or shotguns, even if the ammunition also is usable in handguns.

Section 922(g)(2) covers a person who fled a state to avoid prosecution and remained concealed from authorities after returning.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tony E. COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1995-07-24(g)(2)

Because Collins took affirmative steps to avoid arrest and prosecution even after he returned to Illinois, we conclude that he was a fugitive for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(15) and 922(g)(2).

Section 922(g)(4) covers a person whom a state court found mentally ill and ordered committed to a mental institution for temporary treatment.

United States v. Whiton · filed 1995-04-19(g)(4)

We conclude that there is no real question but that Whiton was committed to a mental institution under Texas law. An application was filed in state court requesting that he be committed to a mental institution. Following a court hearing, a Texas state judge found that Whiton was mentally ill and ordered that he be “committed” to the Hospital for temporary mental health services.

Section 922(d)(4) covers a person found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a mental institution.

United States v. Clarence Carfield Daniel Buffaloe · filed 1971-10-12(d)(4)

We agree with the district judge that Buffaloe was adjudicated and committed within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (4), which prohibits the sale of firearms to a person who “has been adjudicated a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution.”

Section 922(g)(1) makes a person’s interstate firearm transportation an offense if the person was a convicted felon at the time, even if pardoned later.

United States v. Dameron · filed 1972-05-12(g)(1)

The subsequent pardon does not, however, free appellant from the legal consequences of his prior actions. Before the pardon was obtained, appellant, or persons similarly situated, would commit a separate offense by knowingly transporting a firearm in interstate commerce. The statutory prohibition was triggered by his status as a convicted felon, a status which did not change until the pardon was received. The pardon simply came too late to save appellant from this charge.

Sections 922(g) and (h) use the maximum prison term authorized for a state firearm offense to determine whether it is punishable by more than one year, even if the state later treats the conviction as a misdemeanor.

McMullen v. United States · filed 1972-10-30(g), (h)

The action taken under state law by the state Judge in disposing of the case does not change the nature and character of the offense insofar as its classification under the federal statutes and regulations are concerned.

Section 922(h)(4) requires a commitment rather than hospitalization for observation, and its term “mental defective” does not include mental illness.

United States v. Hansel · filed 1973-02-20(h)(4)

There is nothing in 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) which indicates an intent to prohibit the possession of firearms by persons who had been hospitalized for observation and examination, where they were found not to be mentally ill. The statute makes it clear that a commitment is required. ... We do not reach the question of whether the “finding” was an “adjudication” because we believe that the term “mental defective” as used in the Gun Control Act does not include mental illness.

Section 922(b)(2) prohibits a licensed dealer from selling or delivering firearms in violation of applicable state law unless the dealer knows or has reasonable cause to believe the purchase or possession is lawful.

Mayesh v. Schultz · filed 1973-03-05(b)(2)

Since the material facts are undisputed, as a matter of law the plaintiff clearly and knowingly violated the Illinois holding provisions, S.H.A. ch. 38, 24-3(g), and hence, 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2).

Section 922(g) does not require an indictment to describe the prior felony when the defendant offers to stipulate to the qualifying conviction.

United States v. Kemper · filed 1975-01-30(g)

In the case before us, the material which was requested to be stricken was not a necessary element of the statutory offense in light of the defendant’s willingness to stipulate to the prior conviction itself.

Section 922(h)(1) does not prevent a person with a felony conviction from carrying a state-issued firearm while serving as a state corrections officer.

Hyland v. Fukuda · filed 1975-09-30(h)(1)

Given these factors, this court concludes that Section 922(h)(1) would not prevent plaintiff from carrying a firearm as an Adult Corrections Officer II.

Section 922(g)(2) requires proof that a person left a state intending to avoid arrest or prosecution to qualify as a fugitive from justice.

United States v. Durcan · filed 1976-07-22(g)(2)

In order to establish that Durcan was a “fugitive from justice” within the meaning of section 922(g)(2), an indispensable requisite of the prosecution’s proof was that Durcan had left Florida with the intent to avoid arrest or prosecution.

Section 922(h)'s ban on felons acquiring any firearm includes rifles and shotguns.

United States v. Mitchell · filed 1977-07-20(h)

While the Act does contain language to the effect that Congress did not intend to burden hunting, trapshooting, and other lawful use of firearms by law-abiding citizens, 82 Stat. 1213, Title I, § 101, the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) prohibits the acquisition of “any firearm” by a felon.

Section 922(h)(1) does not permit a firearm-receipt charge based on a conviction set aside under the Youth Corrections Act.

United States v. Purgason · filed 1977-11-15(h)(1)

To us it is clear that a conviction which is set aside by the court is vacated and can have no further operative effect. ... Since we conclude that Purgason’s prior conviction was improperly used as the basis for the charges against him, the convictions are reversed.

Section 922(h)(3) covers prolonged heroin use continuing through the firearm purchases, and its term “unlawful user” is not vague as applied to that conduct.

United States v. Ocegueda · filed 1977-11-28(h)(3)

Had Ocegueda used a drug that may be used legally by laymen in some circumstances, or had his use of heroin been infrequent and in the distant past, we would be faced with an entirely different vagueness challenge to the term “unlawful user” in § 922(h)(3). However, Ocegueda’s prolonged use of heroin, occurring before, during and after the period of the gun purchases, presents a situation where the term cannot be considered vague under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Section 922(h) does not impose criminal liability for receiving a firearm on a person whose state pardon satisfies § 1203(2), although federal licensing procedures still apply.

United States v. Pasquale Matassini, A/K/A Pat Matassini, and Robert E. Rodriguez · filed 1978-01-10(h)

We further hold that any defendant, including Matassini, who can bring himself within the requirements of § 1203(2) is also exempt from liability for the receipt offense under § 922(h), although not exempt from the administrative procedures established by Title IV for licensing purposes.

Section 922(h)(1) bars a person with an outstanding felony conviction from receiving a firearm shipped in interstate commerce, even if the conviction is later vacated or reversed.

United States v. Bryant · filed 1978-03-27(h)(1)

If one is a convicted felon, he is prohibited from receiving a firearm shipped in interstate commerce. At the time of his crime, he was a convicted felon insofar as his status was concerned, whether the conviction was later vacated or reversed.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the Government to allege and prove the defendant’s prior felony conviction as an element of the firearm transportation offense.

United States v. Allsup · filed 1978-06-12(g)(1)

First, the fact that Allsup had previously been convicted of a felony was an element of the crime with which he was charged, the transportation and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Government was required to allege and prove the conviction as an essential element of its case.

Section 922(h) treats a person as a convicted felon despite a Texas court’s later termination of probation, setting aside of the verdict, and dismissal of the indictment.

United States v. Padia · filed 1978-11-15(h)

We agree with the district court that Padia was a convicted felon for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) and accordingly that the defendant was guilty of the charge asserted in the indictment.

Section 922(h) covers a felon's voluntary receipt of a firearm returned after police seizure; the seizure and return do not break its interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Robbins · filed 1978-08-10(h)

Robbins argues that he did not “receive” the gun within the meaning of § 922(h) because it was delivered to him by the Commissioner on February 18 only because the justice court judge had ordered that the gun be delivered to him rather than to one Beaudry, who, Robbins says, owned it. There was no order requiring that Robbins take the gun. The record shows that he obtained it and signed a receipt for it voluntarily, and that he referred to it as his gun. The seizure of the gun by the Arlington police and its subsequent delivery to Robbins did not, as he argues, “insulate” the gun from the interstate commerce nexus. Robbins’ argument is without merit.

Section 922(h)(1) does not prohibit a convicted felon from receiving a firearm owned by a state and used exclusively for its purposes because section 925(a)(1) exempts that firearm.

Hyland v. Fukuda · filed 1978-08-21(h)(1)

We agree with the district judge that the plain terms of section 925(a)(1) remove firearms owned by the state and used exclusively for its purposes from the limitations of section 922. We therefore reject the Department's assertion that section 922 justifies its refusal to consider Hyland's application for employment as an ACO-2.

Section 922(h) allows an expunged state conviction to support a federal firearm conviction when state law permits that conviction to be proved in a later prosecution.

United States v. Herrell · filed 1978-11-16(h)

We decided in Potts that expunction under the Washington statute did not eliminate a prior state conviction as a basis for a federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We find that Potts controls Herrell’s claim and thus reject this asserted error.

Section 922 treats a Colorado judgment entered after a nolo contendere plea as a prior conviction when Colorado law gives that judgment effect beyond the original case.

United States v. Brzoticky · filed 1978-11-27

From the consideration of the Colorado cases it must be concluded that the Nolo plea in Colorado is there considered to now have application beyond the original case. Thus with the judgment entered thereon there is a determination of guilt, and is a "conviction." This is sufficient to meet the "conviction in any court" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922.

Section 922(h)(1) applies when a person has a valid conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, even if the sentencing court could not impose a sentence that long.

United States v. Rivera · filed 1979-02-15(h)(1)

The fact that in retrospect the defendant could not have been sentenced in excess of one year because of the court’s limited sentencing jurisdiction is not determinative. The statutory focus of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) is upon the existence of a prior valid felony conviction and not the vagaries of the sentence actually imposed.

Section 922(h) prohibits a convicted felon from receiving a firearm; conduct outside any possible emergency or exigent circumstances defense does not warrant an instruction on that theory.

United States v. Scales · filed 1979-07-18(h)

The conduct of Scales is even more clearly not within a theory of emergency or exigent circumstances.

Section 922(h)(1) treats a state court’s acceptance of a guilty plea followed by sentencing as a conviction under federal law.

United States v. Benson · filed 1979-07-19(h)(1)

We believe the court's acceptance and subsequent sentencing constitute a "conviction" under § 922(h)(1).

Section 922(h)(1) makes receipt of a firearm while under a qualifying indictment a completed offense; later dismissal of that indictment does not undo it.

United States v. Weingartner · filed 1979-10-04(h)(1)

The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the dismissal of the 1974 indictment against defendant Weingartner is neither material to nor exculpatory of defendant’s alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1).

Section 922(g) makes a qualifying prior conviction an element of the firearm offense, so evidence of that conviction must be admitted at trial.

United States v. Harry Aleman and Leonard Foresta · filed 1979-10-30(g)

In the present case the prior conviction is an element of the crime. Its admission was not a matter of the trial court’s discretion.

Section 922(h) treats receipt as distinct from continued possession; coming upon a firearm already received does not amount to receiving it again.

United States v. Cantrell · filed 1980-01-07(h)

We believe that no jury would formulate such a bizarre theory and, as a matter of law, no jury should be permitted to attach such a meaning to "receipt." Under neither common sense nor the law do we "receive" our possessions anew each time we come upon them.

Section 922(h)(1) prohibits a felon's receipt of a firearm transported in interstate commerce, an act distinct from possession.

United States v. Larranaga · filed 1980-01-18(h)(1)

The provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) and 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a), insofar as the latter statute relates to "possession," proscribe different conduct, not the same conduct.

Section 922(h)(1) makes a qualifying indictment or conviction an element of the offense, which a defendant cannot eliminate through a proposed stipulation.

United States v. Williams · filed 1980-03-17(h)(1)

First, we perceive no authority for counsel or the court to modify a criminal statute enacted by Congress by eliminating through stipulation one of the elements of the crime.

Section 922(h)(1) requires receipt of a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce; possession alone does not satisfy it.

United States v. McCrary · filed 1981-04-23(h)(1)

As previously stated, an offense under that statute is limited to the receipt by a convicted felon of any firearm that has traveled through interstate commerce. Acquittal of these charges necessarily leads to the conclusion that the jury found the appellant did not receive the weapons within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1).

Section 922(h)(1) requires proof that the defendant’s qualifying indictment was still pending when he received the firearm; the indictment alone does not establish that status.

United States v. Sam Tombrello, Jr., Floyd Leon Watson, Jimmy Lee Wright · filed 1982-01-22(h)(1)

Here, it was not enough to sho^y merely that Tombrello had been indicted; the government was instead required to prove that he was “under indictment” at the time of the offense. The indictment alone would have been insufficient for this purpose because it could have subsequently been dismissed.

Section 922(h)(1) does not require a firearm to be operable.

United States v. Goodheim · filed 1982-09-07(h)(1)

The statutory language defining “firearm” for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) and § 1202(a)(1) does not require that the weapon be operable.

Section 922(h)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from receiving firearms.

Fezzey v. Dodge · filed 1982-11-22(h)(1)

Under section 922(h)(1) any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year is prohibited from receiving firearms. Fezzey's abduction conviction placed him within this prohibition.

Section 922’s firearms disability remains in effect after a judicial pardon and expungement under Utah Code § 77-18-2 because that statute does not fully erase the prior conviction.

Thompson v. Department of the Treasury · filed 1982-12-29

Absent the judicial pardon and expungement, Thompson’s 1968 felony conviction clearly places him under the federal firearms disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922 and 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202. ... Hence, since 1980 a judicial pardon and expungement under section 77-18-2 is not a complete and unqualified expungement that erases the prior conviction sufficiently to relieve petitioner Thompson from his firearms disabilities.

Section 922(h)(1) requires receipt of a firearm; a defendant’s admission that he bought it may be corroborated by his later sale of it and his role managing the shop.

United States v. Wolfenbarger · filed 1983-01-25(h)(1)

Mr. Wolfenbarger’s conviction under section 922(h)(1) required him to have “received” the shotgun. ... We find that Mr. Wolfenbarger’s sale of the gun and his position as decision maker in the daily operation of Shady Sam’s Pawnshop corroborated his statement that he bought the gun. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in denying his motion for acquittal.

Section 922(h)(1) treats a nolo contendere plea followed by probation as a conviction, even if state law does not.

United States v. Bustamante · filed 1983-04-25(h)(1)

We therefore hold that Bustamante has been “convicted” for purposes of § 922(h)(1).

Section 922(h)(1) treats knowing acceptance or taking possession of a firearm as receipt.

United States v. Griffin · filed 1983-05-20(h)(1)

“Receipt,” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), is interpreted broadly and includes any knowing acceptance or taking of possession of a firearm.

Section 922(h) permits only one receipt charge for several firearms received at the same time and place.

United States v. Conn · filed 1983-06-22(h)

Conn contends that the indictment contained multiple counts. We agree. This court has held that a defendant cannot be charged with possession or receipt of several weapons received at the same time and same place.

Section 922(h)(1) prohibits a person convicted of a qualifying felony from receiving a firearm shipped in interstate commerce, even after a state pardon expressly authorizes firearm possession.

Markham v. United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms · filed 1983-06-09(h)(1)

For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that a convicted felon who receives a firearm which has been shipped in interstate commerce may be prosecuted under § 922(h) even though he has been pardoned by the chief executive of a state and has been expressly authorized to possess a firearm by that official.

Section 922(h)(1)’s receipt element can be proved through constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Herman J. Lamare, Jr. · filed 1983-06-27(h)(1)

To prove receipt it is not necessary to show that the defendant actually received the pistol since “receipt under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) may be shown circumstantially by proving possession .... ” United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1337 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973), and possession can be either actual or constructive, exclusive or joint.

Section 922(h)(1) treats a prior felony plea as a conviction even when state law withholds adjudication.

United States v. Gustavo Garcia A/K/A "Popeye" · filed 1984-03-19(h)(1)

Garcia’s contention that a state procedure for withholding adjudication of a criminal charge will not support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(h)(1) (1976) of receiving ammunition after having been convicted of a felony is foreclosed by Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., -- U.S. --, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983).

Section 922(h)’s prior-conviction element may be proved with a prison record containing a minor middle-name error when other evidence identifies the defendant as the person convicted.

United States v. Silva · filed 1984-10-01(h)

We have little doubt that Daniel Melson Silva and Daniel Nelson Silva are one and the same person, and that the discrepancy in the middle name was created by the slip of a typist’s finger. ... The trial court properly rejected Appellant’s motion to exclude the prison record on the ground that it was not the record of Daniel Nelson Silva.

Section 922(h) allows a justification defense when a convicted felon faces an imminent serious threat, did not create the danger, has no reasonable legal alternative, and can reasonably expect the firearm to avert the harm.

United States v. Lonnie Dwain Clark, A/K/A Chick Clark · filed 1984-08-31(h)

Since the basic issue involved in a prosecution under either 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) or 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1) is the same — receipt or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon — , we adopt the Gant four-part test for determining whether a defendant has successfully asserted the justification defense in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h).

Section 922(h)(1) permits firearm receipt to be inferred from constructive possession, but the government must first prove constructive possession.

United States v. Beverly · filed 1984-12-03(h)(1)

To prove “receipt” beyond a reasonable doubt, the government may establish “receipt” by inference after proving constructive possession. ... Because the government has not established constructive possession, we need not consider whether the government’s proof permits the inference of constructive “receipt” under Section 922.

Section 922(h)(1) applies to a person whose state civil rights were restored after a felony conviction.

United States v. Pearson Ware · filed 1985-04-18(h)(1)

Therefore, the fact that Florida restored appellant’s civil rights would be immaterial and irrelevant to a prosecution under section 922(h)(1).

A prior felony conviction remains an element of a § 922(g) offense when the defendant stipulates to it, but the nature of the conviction may be excluded as unfairly prejudicial.

United States v. Torres · filed 1985-06-20(g)

Accordingly, defendant’s motion is granted to the extent that the government is barred from introducing evidence of the nature of defendant’s prior felony convictions, and defendant’s motion is denied to the extent that the court will charge the jury that an element of the offenses charged in counts 4 and 7 is the presence of a prior felony conviction and that defendant stipulates to that element.

Section 922(h)(1) does not require actual possession of a firearm; constructive possession can establish receipt.

United States v. Mary Burton Fuller, United States of America v. David Lawrence · filed 1985-07-22(h)(1)

The offense, however, was not restricted by the requirement that Lawrence have actual possession.

Section 922(h)(1) applies when a felony conviction is outstanding at the time a person receives a firearm, even if that conviction is later modified retroactively to a misdemeanor.

Bonfiglio v. John Hodden, Superintendent, Federal Correctional Institution, Ray Brook, New York · filed 1985-08-08(h)(1)

Applying these holdings to the case before us, we conclude that at the time he purchased the weapons, Bonfiglio was under the disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. section 922(h)(1).

Section 922(h)(1) bars a person convicted of a qualifying offense from receiving a firearm while the conviction is pending appeal.

United States v. Torres · filed 1985-08-15(h)(1)

Nevertheless it would indeed be a strange construction of the statute which would impose its sanctions to those under indictment and not yet tried and not to include within its prohibition those convicted of a crime but whose conviction has been appealed. Such construction would be untenable.

Section 922(h)(1) does not allow a collateral challenge to the predicate felony conviction as a defense to a firearms charge, including a charge of aiding and abetting.

United States v. Davis · filed 1985-10-15(h)(1)

Because the convicted felon himself cannot challenge the validity of his own predicate offense against the firearms charge, neither can one charged as an aider and abettor to that crime. As to either, the object of the statute is the same: to prevent felons from obtaining firearms until their status is actually cleared.

Section 922(h)(1) makes the prior conviction an element of the felon firearm offense that must be stated in the indictment.

Dees v. United States · filed 1986-05-23(h)(1)

Dees contends that his indictment for possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(h)(1) and 924(a) violated his right to Fifth Amendment due process because it mentioned the prior offense that was the predicate for these violations. This is frivolous, since the prior conviction is an element of the offense charged and must be revealed to fairly inform the person charged of the offense.

Section 922(h)(1) covers convictions by foreign courts because its reference to conviction “in any court” is not limited to courts in the United States.

United States v. Winson · filed 1986-06-18(h)(1)

At the same time, it is equally evident that the cited language in section 922 was not intended by the Congress to be limited only to convictions by the courts of the United States or of a state or political subdivision thereof as is the specific language of 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202.

Section 922(h)(1) treats knowing possession of a firearm as receipt even when someone else owns it.

United States v. Manni · filed 1987-01-21(h)(1)

Defendant’s second argument is that while he “possessed” the firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202, he did not “receive” it within the meaning of § 922(h)(1) because the rifle was owned by his brother. This argument is simply wrong. It is well settled that the term receipt includes any knowing acceptance or possession of a firearm.

Section 922 treats a prior felony conviction as a firearms disability if the conviction had not been declared void before the firearm was obtained.

United States v. Mayfield · filed 1987-01-30(h)(1)

While for most purposes the law ignores a void conviction, the federal firearms statutes represent a considered and deliberate exception to this inasmuch as they require that the conviction be declared void before a firearm is purchased.

Section 922(h)(1) treats a Florida guilty plea as a conviction even when the state court withholds adjudication.

United States v. Reinaldo Orellanes, A/K/A Reinaldo Orellana · filed 1987-02-17(h)(1)

We affirm the district court’s ruling that one who pleads guilty in a Florida state court and has imposition of sentence withheld, may nevertheless be held to have been “convicted” for purposes of applying federal criminal statutes which punish certain conduct following conviction of a felony.

Section 922(g)(1) permits prosecution for firearm possession based on a prior felony conviction even when an uncounseled conviction cannot support an enhanced sentence.

United States v. Gantt. · filed 1987-03-09(g)(1)

Even though on the present record Gantt cannot be sentenced under the ACCA, any one of his convictions enables the government to try him under the indictment for violation of the Gun Control Act.

Section 922(h)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly receiving a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Stevens · filed 1987-04-29(h)(1)

In each of the instances charged, there was some evidence that defendant knowingly either received or possessed the relevant firearms and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. There was plenary evidence that he was a convicted felon at all relevant times. This establishes all the necessary elements for violation of § 1202, ... and § 922, ... in each applicable instance.

Section 922(h) bars a convicted felon from receiving a firearm based on felony status at the time of receipt, even if the predicate conviction is later reversed on constitutional grounds.

United States v. Bagley · filed 1987-05-11(h)

While the Court adopts those portions of the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation concerning the factual and procedural background and Bagley’s challenges to convictions, as well as the recommendation concerning the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1), the Court rejects those portions of the Report setting forth the effect of reversal of the predicate conviction and the Magistrate’s recommendation that Bagley’s firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C.Appx. § 1202(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) be vacated.

Section 922(d)(1) requires proof that the dealer knew or had reasonable cause to believe the recipient was under indictment for or convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison; knowledge that the transfer was illegal is insufficient.

United States v. Ramon Castro Garcia, United States of America v. Ramon Castro Dominicci · filed 1987-05-13(d)(1)

Although the evidence permitted an inference that appellants knew this was an illegal weapons transaction, that is simply not enough to sustain the convictions. Something more was required to prove the specific knowledge charged as part of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession by convicted felons but does not prevent them from retaining a nonpossessory property interest in the firearms.

United States v. Idi Amin Seifuddin, United States of America v. Harvey W. Merriweather · filed 1987-06-24(g)(1)

The firearms in this case were not shown to be contraband per se. The illegal act is possession of the firearms by the defendants. The defendants therefore could hold a property interest in the forfeited property without that interest being possessory.

Section 922(h) does not prohibit a nonfelon from receiving firearms previously owned by a felon.

City of Milwaukee v. Dyson · filed 1987-08-25(h)(1)

In addition, both sec. 941.29, Stats., and 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(h) (1982) simply prohibit a felon from receiving or possessing a firearm. Since Dyson’s son was not a felon, neither statute prohibits him from receiving the weapons.

Section 922(h) requires proof of a prior felony conviction as an element of a charge that a felon received a firearm.

United States v. Byrd · filed 1987-08-31(h)

The existence of a prior felony conviction is an essential element of any indictment charging violation of Sections 922(h) or 1202(a).

Section 922(h)(1) covers firearm receipt after a state conviction for a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, even if the conviction is later reduced to a misdemeanor.

United States v. Tallmadge · filed 1987-10-01(h)(1)

Tallmadge argues that the reduction of the crime to a misdemeanor upon the successful completion of the term of probation precludes prosecution under section 922(h). ... We rejected a similar contention in United States v. Pruner, 606 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.1979). ... Thus, the maximum permissible punishment in California for possession of a machinegun is clearly covered by the language of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(h)(1).

Section 922(d)(4) prohibits selling a firearm to a person committed to a mental institution when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe the person was committed.

Ellsworth v. Bishop Jewelry and Loan Co. · filed 1987-12-18(d)(4)

It is apparent that for Ellsworth to make out a prima facie case showing Bishop violated the statute Ellsworth must have shown that Bishop sold a firearm to a person who had been committed to a mental institution and that Bishop knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the person had been committed to a mental institution.

Section 922(h)(2) covers a person who leaves a state to avoid prosecution for a military crime as a fugitive from justice.

United States v. Rick Lynn Mittleider, A/K/A Rick Wyman · filed 1987-12-22(h)(2)

While 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(15) has not previously been interpreted in this context, we conclude that the only possible construction of the statute is that an individual who has fled from any state to avoid prosecution for a military crime is a fugitive for purposes of violations of the federal firearms laws.

Section 922(g) continues the prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons after the repeal of former § 1202.

United States v. Jackson · filed 1988-01-19(g)

But Congress did not substitute a legal right for what had been a legal wrong; it simply altered the elements of the offense. New 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922(g) and 924(e)(1) continue the prohibition and the 15-year minimum term, if each of the three prior convictions was of "a violent felony or a serious drug offense".

Section 922(h)(1)’s firearm receipt element can be satisfied by proof of constructive possession.

United States v. Rivera · filed 1988-02-18(h)(1)

Proof of constructive possession of a weapon satisfies the receipt element of Sec. 922.

Section 922(g) replaced former subsection (h), and using the former subsection was harmless where the relevant wording was identical and caused no prejudice.

United States v. John Burton Devore, Jr. · filed 1988-02-26(g)

DeVore should have been tried and sentenced under section 922(g). The relevant wording of the two sections is identical, however, and neither party raised the matter on appeal. We note that this clerical error caused no prejudice to DeVore and consider it immaterial and harmless.

Section 922(h)(1) requires proof of a prior felony conviction and an interstate commerce connection for the firearm charge.

United States v. Bouthot · filed 1988-04-08(h)(1)

In this case, the state charge of carrying a firearm without a license in violation of M.G.L. c. 269, § 10 and the federal charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) and 18 U.S.C.App. II § 1202(a) are separate statutory offenses. To prevail on the federal charges the government must establish not only possession of a firearm, but also each defendant’s status as a convicted felon and that the gun in question travelled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which may be actual or constructive.

United States v. Johnson · filed 1988-09-21(g)(1)

The instruction given by the district court, however, fully covered relevant issues of actual and constructive possession. ... It framed the issue for the jury to consider as whether Johnson knowingly had the weapon in his possession.

Section 922(n) prohibits a person under felony indictment from receiving firearms by redeeming them from a pawnbroker, even if the person owned them before the indictment.

United States v. Bond · filed 1988-10-05(n)

Congress explicitly included pawnbrokers and pawn transactions in § 922, and failed to include redemptive transactions among the statutory exceptions, therefore; this court will not narrowly construe the word “receive,” as used in § 922(n), as being limited to sale transactions and excluding redemptive transactions.

Section 922(g)(4) does not treat temporary emergency detention as a commitment when it does not lead to a formal commitment under state law.

United States v. Giardina · filed 1988-12-06(g)(4)

Temporary, emergency detentions for treatment of mental disorders or difficulties, which do not lead to formal commitments under state law, do not constitute the commitment envisioned by 18 U.S.C. § 922.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon's possession of a firearm regardless of who owns it.

United States v. Savage · filed 1988-12-16(g)(1)

Second, we fail to see the relevancy of who the record owner of the gun was. The defendant was not accused of owning the gun, but of being in possession of the gun. Assuming Hayes would have testified as the defendant asserts, the testimony would not have exculpated the defendant.

Section 922(g)(1) treats an accepted guilty plea followed by sentencing as a conviction.

United States v. Martin · filed 1989-03-07(g)(1)

A plea of guilty, the acceptance by the court of the plea, and the imposition of sentence constitute a "conviction" within the meaning of Sec. 922(g).

Section 922(d)(4) prohibits a firearm sale when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe the buyer has been adjudicated mentally defective or committed to a mental institution; a buyer’s answers on a federal form do not by themselves resolve what the seller knew.

Peek v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. · filed 1989-03-22(d)(4)

We reject that argument since regardless of a purchaser’s answers on the form, a seller might know or have reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser has been adjudicated as a mental defective, or had been committed to any mental institution.

Section 922(a)(6) permits the government to prove more than one prior felony conviction to establish that a firearm purchaser falsely denied having a felony conviction.

United States v. Ford · filed 1989-04-10(a)(6)

It appears to us that the proof of six prior felony convictions did not constitute reversible error so far as Count I is concerned. The government was, under the authorities cited, entitled to prove more than one prior violent felony conviction as predicate crimes for conviction under Count I and Count III.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of one prior felony conviction; additional felony convictions are not elements of the offense.

United States v. Jose Lopez Quintero, A/K/A Joe Lopez Quintero · filed 1989-04-18(g)(1)

While the § 922(g)(1) charge required the government to establish that Quintero had one prior felony conviction, the additional felony convictions were not an element of the offense charged and should not have come before the jury.

Section 922(g)’s reference to a conviction in “any court” includes a conviction by an English court.

United States v. Atkins · filed 1989-04-11(g)

Thus, considering the plain meaning of the subject language, Atkins’ conviction appears to satisfy the requirements of the statute. “Any” is hardly an ambiguous term, being all-inclusive in nature.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a gun collection whose firearms have moved in or affect interstate commerce.

United States v. Pope · filed 1989-04-14(g)(1)

As a convicted felon, Pope is not entitled to maintain a gun collection under 18 U.S.C. ... § 922(g)(1). Virtually all guns have moved in commerce or “affect” commerce. Even a homemade gun could affect the interstate gun market.

An indictment under § 922(g)(1) sufficiently states a charge when it identifies the statute and the interstate commerce element and fairly informs the defendant of the offense.

United States v. James Lester Valiant A/K/A Lester J. Valiant · filed 1989-04-27(g)(1)

Here, the indictment clearly informed Valiant of the crime charged and stated an offense recognized by the law. The indictment referred to the specific statute the Government claimed Valiant violated and also to the interstate commerce element of the crime. Contrary to Valiant’s argument, we find the indictment was sufficient to state a charge under section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(5) covers an alien who entered the United States illegally and had not applied for legal status when he possessed a firearm.

United States v. Garcia · filed 1989-05-23(g)(5)

Under these circumstances, he was “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” for the purposes of this section.