18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g) withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge based on its use of “commerce” without defining that term as “interstate or foreign commerce.”

United States v. Gatlin · filed 2006-09-07(g)

In Nichols, we rejected an identical constitutional challenge to § 922(g) because the term “commerce” is not defined as “interstate or foreign commerce.” Nichols, 124 F.3d at 1266. Thus, we similarly reject Gatlin’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Martinez-Rios · filed 2006-10-05(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Florentino Martinez-Rios raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Turner · filed 2006-10-05(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Leslie Turner raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Smith · filed 2006-10-05(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Carlos Ray Smith presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession- of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges based on the absence of proof that the defendant’s conduct substantially affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Matthews · filed 2006-10-12(g)(1)

And, Matthews appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, based on his arguments (which he did not raise in the district court) that: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 922 is facially unconstitutional because it is an exercise of Congressional power beyond the authorization of the Commerce Clause, and (2) the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because there was no ... evidence that his conduct substantially affected interstate commerce. These arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2006-11-09(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Noe Javier Garcia raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2006-11-09(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, William Earl Thompson presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in- possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Flores · filed 2006-11-09(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Gabriel Flores raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Sanchez · filed 2006-11-09(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Joe Anthony Sanchez presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Wingfield · filed 2006-11-20(g)

The difficulty with this point of view is that it completely ignores our holding in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) under the Commerce Clause). At this time, we have no authority or inclination to disturb the precedent established in Singletary.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Byrd · filed 2006-12-06(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, James LeMarc Byrd raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Martin · filed 2006-12-06(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Kenneth Lincoln Martin raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s prohibition on possessing firearms and ammunition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on possession within one state.

United States v. Revuelto · filed 2007-01-16(g)

Revuelto contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)’s prohibition of firearm and ammunition possession is an unconstitutional exertion of the government’s power to regulate interstate commerce, as applied to Revuelto’s intra-state possession of a firearm and ammunition. This argument, however, was previously rejected by this court in United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir.1995), and again in United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Esekhigbe · filed 2007-03-07(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Charlton Oriaso Esekhigbe raises arguments that are foreclosed by ... and by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession- of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Martin · filed 2007-03-07(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Paul Joe Martin raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Third Circuit precedent.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2007-03-20(g)

As he recognizes, his argument was raised and rejected in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), and it is settled that, absent intervening authority, a panel cannot disturb prior precedent of this court.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally prohibit a felon from possessing a firearm that previously crossed state lines.

United States v. Stokes · filed 2007-04-24(g)(1)

Three prior panels of this court have upheld § 922(g)(1) against Commerce Clause challenges. ... W e are bound by these precedents.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Mathews · filed 2007-05-02(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Frank Fred Mathews raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) is constitutional because its jurisdictional element ensures that a defendant’s conduct implicates interstate commerce to a constitutionally adequate degree in each case.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2007-05-14(g)

In particular, this court has previously held that the jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) ensures on a case-by-case basis that a defendant’s actions implicate interstate commerce to a constitutionally adequate degree, see United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 563 (9th Cir.1996), and that the statute is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional for failing to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Lighteard · filed 2007-06-25(g)(1)

Lighteard also argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require a substantial affect on interstate commerce, relying on Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). This argument is foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on its permitting conviction without proof of a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Mata · filed 2007-06-27(g)

Lastly, Mata argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because it permits conviction in the absence of a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce.4 However, as Mata concedes, this argument is foreclosed by our holding in United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2001).5 Accordingly, this argument fails as well.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Rojas · filed 2007-07-11(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Ricardo Rojas presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession- of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Cleveland · filed 2007-07-11(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Curtis Wayne Cleveland presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in- possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(k) constitutionally prohibits possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number if the firearm has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Teleguz · filed 2007-07-24(k)

Congress has not exceeded the scope of its Commerce Clause powers in enacting § 922(k) because the statute prohibits the possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers only if such firearms have been "shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Flores · filed 2007-08-09(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Joe Flores, Jr., presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government's motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on its lack of a requirement for a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Battin · filed 2007-08-21(g)(1)

Battin’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is also foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(j) and (k) are constitutional as applied when the firearm and ammunition passed through interstate commerce.

United States v. Davis · filed 2007-08-30(j), (k)

In light of his admission that the firearm and ammunition in question passed through interstate commerce, § 922(j) and(k) were constitutional as applied to him.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Harper · filed 2007-09-06(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Quincy Lamar Harper presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Jaime · filed 2007-09-06(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Jose Jaime presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Serna · filed 2007-10-04(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Michael Serna presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Barnes · filed 2007-10-04(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Robert Ray Barnes, Jr., presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause when the firearm has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Pickford · filed 2007-10-31(g)

That argument, however, has already been rejected by this Court in Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, which found that § 922(g) is ... constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1)'s interstate commerce requirement provides the firearm nexus needed to satisfy the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Anderson · filed 2007-12-11(g)(1)

Relying on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Anderson next contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it lacks a proper nexus to interstate commerce. However, we have previously considered and rejected a similar challenge in United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810-11 (4th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Davis · filed 2008-01-30(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Niteroi Davis presents arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected Commerce Clause challenges to the felon-in-possession-of-a- firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Trevino · filed 2008-01-30(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Steven Michael Trevino presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality remains settled under Fifth Circuit precedent despite Lopez and Morrison.

United States v. Cantu-Martinez · filed 2008-02-14(g)(1)

Cantu additionally contends that this court should reconsider its jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Cantu’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on its lack of a substantial-effect-on-interstate-commerce requirement.

United States v. Powdrill · filed 2008-02-20(g)(1)

Powdrill’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Morales · filed 2008-03-05(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Marco Morales presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... The Government’s motion for ... summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(d)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power over intrastate firearm transfers.

United States v. Rose · filed 2008-03-26(d)(1)

Because Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the intrastate transfer of firearms would undercut its regulation of the interstate firearms market, § 922(d)(1) is a proper exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Jones · filed 2008-04-02(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Keith Dewayne Jones presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(d)(1) validly reaches intrastate firearm transfers because those transfers can undercut regulation of the interstate firearms market.

United States v. Rose · filed 2008-04-11(d)(1)

Because Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the intrastate transfer of firearms would undercut its regulation of the interstate firearms market, § 922(d)(1) is a proper exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

Section 922(g)(3) may constitutionally regulate possession of firearms that have been transported at any time in interstate commerce.

United States v. Minnifield · filed 2008-04-25(g)(3)

It is clear that under the Commerce Clause, Congress is allowed to regulate the possession of firearms that have been transported at any time in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession prohibition is a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Hunt · filed 2008-05-16(g)(1)

We therefore reject defendant’s argument that the felon-in-possession law represents an improper exercise of legislative power under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands the Commerce Clause challenge rejected by controlling circuit precedent.

United States v. Rollings · filed 2008-07-09(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Arnold Wayne Rollings presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) is valid under the Commerce Clause despite the claim that it criminalizes conduct without a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Persinger · filed 2008-07-17(g)(1)

Persinger also contends that the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is unconstitutional because it criminalizes conduct that does not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce, and thus does not constitute a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. We have previously rejected this contention, see United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 205 (3d Cir. 2001), and are bound to respect it absent en banc consideration, see id. at 204.

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Ford · filed 2008-08-06(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Eric Lamont Ford presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Campeau · filed 2008-08-06(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Troy David Campeau presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Crawford · filed 2008-08-06(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Billy Damont Crawford presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Blackwell · filed 2008-10-09(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, James Clarence Blackwell presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). Appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Salgado · filed 2008-10-09(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Aristeo Santana Salgado presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition is not invalid under the Commerce Clause in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Living · filed 2008-11-05(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Rosmon Andre Living presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). Appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Mendez · filed 2009-02-18(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Guadalupe Mendez, Jr., presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition survives a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Price · filed 2009-02-18(g)

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Clarence Price presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) requires only a minimal interstate commerce nexus: the firearm must have been in interstate commerce at some point.

United States v. Finney · filed 2009-03-11(g)(1)

Because Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent directly upholds the construction of § 922(g)(1) requiring no more than the minimal nexus that the firearm was—at some point—in interstate commerce, Finney’s “constitutional doubt” argument is meritless as well.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is constitutional under the Commerce Clause as applied to intrastate possession.

United States v. Nobles · filed 2009-03-27(g)(1)

Nobles next challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in–possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), primarily to preserve the claim for review by the Supreme Court. He argues that the intrastate possession of a firearm does not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce and thus does not constitute the basis for a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. We have already ruled on this precise issue in United States v. Singletary, upholding the statute’s constitutionality. 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001). The same ruling is appropriate in this case.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on Lopez and Jones.

United States v. Battle · filed 2009-04-01(g)(1)

Accordingly, any argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional must fail.

Section 922(g)(1) and subsection (j) each require a definite interstate-commerce nexus and withstand a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Berryman · filed 2009-04-17(g)(1), (j)

Berryman’s characterization of these provisions is incorrect; each by its terms requires a definite interstate-commerce nexus. We have held that § 922(g)(1), so construed, is constitutional. United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 205 (3d Cir. 2001). Subsection (j) incorporates materially identical interstate-commerce language, so it too passes Commerce Clause muster.

Section 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Matthews · filed 2009-05-29(g)(1)

Because Officer Bouye had reasonable suspicion to stop Matthews and § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, we will affirm.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Banda · filed 2009-08-18(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Issac Joaquin Banda presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). ... and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2009-08-18(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Ronnie Anthony Thomas presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Perkins · filed 2009-08-21(g)

In any event, there is no merit to the argument. ... We have upheld the constitutionality of section 922(g) in Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400, and of section 924(c) in United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1998).

Section 922(g) withstands Weeks’s Commerce Clause challenge to its application to his firearm charges.

United States v. Weeks · filed 2009-10-23(g)

The Defendant concedes that there is abundant Eleventh Circuit authority upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Court approves and adopts the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge as the judgment of the Court. The Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence [Doc. 14] and Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 15] are DENIED.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Hampton · filed 2009-11-02(g)(1)

Lastly, we turn to Hampton’s argument that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Since Singletary remains the law of this circuit, precedent prevents us from entertaining Hampton’s argument.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Harris · filed 2009-12-16(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Kevin Harris presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-44 (5th Cir. 1996), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001). The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g) withstands an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge when the firearm was manufactured abroad and the ammunition was made outside the state of possession.

United States v. Dorvilus · filed 2009-12-17(g)

Dorvilus also makes an as-applied challenge to the statute, which fails as well. Special Agent Murr testified that Dorvilus’ Glock was manufactured in Austria and the ammunition was made outside of Florida.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. McCain · filed 2009-12-17(g)

Because McCain’s Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g) are foreclosed by our decisions in Nichols and McAllister, we conclude the district court did not plainly err by sentencing McCain under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause on its face or as applied when the firearm has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Charles · filed 2009-12-29(g)(1)

First, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), on its face and as applied to Charles, does not violate the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is not unconstitutional for failing to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Guerra · filed 2010-03-05(g)(1)

In order to preserve the argument for further review, Guerra contends that § 922(g)(1) does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce and is, therefore, unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). As Guerra concedes, his argument is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2010-04-22(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Luis Roberto Garcia presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Phaknikone · filed 2010-05-10(g)(1)

Phaknikone concedes, however, that this argument is foreclosed by our precedents. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003); Scott, 263 F.3d at 1274. Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional.

Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional on the ground that it regulates activity without a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Pardo · filed 2010-05-20(g)(1)

In order to preserve the argument for further review, Pardo contends that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional pursuant to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), because it regulates activity not having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As Pardo concedes, his argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by felons survives a Commerce Clause challenge based on its reach to noncommercial possession.

United States v. Lewis · filed 2010-06-11(g)(1)

To preserve the argument for further review, Lewis contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez because it regulates activity that does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.37 As Lewis concedes, though, his argument is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, and a firearm’s past travel in interstate commerce satisfies its interstate commerce element.

United States v. Allen · filed 2010-08-17(g)(1)

Absent en banc review, we may not revisit these decisions, and therefore reject Allen’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Feaster · filed 2010-08-24(g)(1)

For starters, Feaster’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is an unconstitutional extension of Congress’s Commerce Clause power is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling circuit precedent.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2011-04-19(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Roy Ellison Thomas presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir.2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling circuit precedent.

United States v. Hay · filed 2011-04-19(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Herbert Cisco Hay presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir.2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a challenge that firearm possession must substantially affect interstate commerce to fall within federal authority.

United States v. Perry · filed 2011-05-23(g)(1)

Perry also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally extends federal control to possession of a firearm that does not substantially affect interstate commerce. He concedes, however, that his constitutional argument is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Colon · filed 2011-06-30(g)

Colon also contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) exceeds Congress‟s power under the Commerce Clause. We have considered and rejected this argument, and as Colon concedes, we are bound by United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001).

Section 922(g)(1)’s commerce element withstands Morrison’s as-applied Commerce Clause challenge under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Morrison · filed 2011-08-09(g)(1)

Morrison also claims that the “in or affecting commerce” element of his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) felon in possession charge is unconstitutional because, as applied to Morrison, it exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. ... Morrison admits that the precedent of this Circuit forecloses his current argument. ... Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Jones · filed 2011-08-16(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Jousiawu J. Jones presents arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922’s firearm possession prohibitions withstand a Commerce Clause challenge when the firearm previously crossed state lines.

United States v. Hinton · filed 2011-10-20(g)(1), (j)

Hinton contends that the interstate commerce element, as applied to him, is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. We affirm.

Section 922(g)(1) constitutionally reaches a felon’s intrastate firearm possession when the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Edwards · filed 2011-11-02(g)(1)

The binding precedent of this Circuit forecloses Edwards’s arguments that Congress violated the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in enacting § 922(g)(1). Since this binding precedent is “clear under current law,” the district court did not plainly err in convicting Edwards of violating § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because a gun’s past interstate travel satisfies its interstate commerce element.

United States v. Yarbrough · filed 2011-11-18(g)(1)

Because we already squarely decided that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional, Yarbrough’s facial challenge fails.

Section 922(g) is not unconstitutional on its face or as applied for failing to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Randle Jackson, III · filed 2011-12-06(g)

Finally, Jackson argues that ... 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce and is, therefore, unconstitutional on its face and ...as applied. He properly acknowledges that both issues are foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Ernest Cook, III · filed 2011-12-07(g)(1)

Additionally, we find meritless Cook’s claim that his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g) withstands challenges that its undefined use of “commerce” and its reach exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Detrick C. Smith · filed 2011-12-09(g)

Smith also argues that the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is unconstitutional because Congress failed to define “commerce” as interstate or foreign commerce and because the statute exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. But, Smith concedes -- and we agree -- that these arguments are foreclosed by our decisions in United States v. Nichols, 124 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997), and United v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge when the firearm has a minimal nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2011-12-19(g)

Thus, Bailey’s argument that § 922(g) is facially unconstitutional is foreclosed by our binding precedent. Bailey’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g) is also unavailing because the evidence established his possession of a firearm had a minimal nexus to interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon is constitutional under the Commerce Clause when the firearm previously moved in interstate commerce.

United States v. Ferguson · filed 2012-02-16(g)(1)

The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has rejected the argument that the felon in possession statute exceeds Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. ... The motion to dismiss the indictment for want of jurisdiction will be denied.

Section 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms, is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

Wainwright v. United States · filed 2012-04-25(g)(1)

Regarding Wainwright’s Commerce Clause argument, in United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1996), we held that we were bound by Scar- borough, 431 U.S. at 575, that § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion on that point by relying on ... Scarborough.

Section 922(k) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it requires the firearm to have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce and regulates conduct that can substantially affect interstate firearms commerce.

United States v. Colon-Quiles · filed 2012-05-04(k)

In sum, the Court finds that section 922(k) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause because the explicit jurisdictional element of the statute requires that a firearm traveled through the channels of interstate or foreign commerce, and because the intrastate possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number could rationally have a substantial aggregate effect on the interstate commerce of firearms.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Zapata · filed 2012-05-17(g)

Zapata also contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional as an improper exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. As Zapata concedes, his argument is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by people convicted of crimes punishable by more than one year of imprisonment is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Fuentes · filed 2012-06-01(g)(1)

Fuentes also argues that the statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it illegal for a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment to possess in or affecting commerce a firearm, is beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and is therefore unconstitutional. As Fuentes recognizes, his argument is squarely foreclosed by our precedent.20 We therefore will not reverse Fuentes’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a felon’s intrastate possession of a firearm and ammunition that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Dupuch · filed 2012-07-13(g)(1)

Thus, the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate commerce, and § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to Dupuch.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally prohibit a felon from possessing a firearm that previously crossed state lines, even if the possession occurred entirely within one state.

United States v. Kirby · filed 2012-07-13(g)(1)

Because we, like the district court, are bound by Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

Section 922(o)’s ban on machine gun possession, including possession of homemade machine guns, is within Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Henry · filed 2012-08-09(o)

That argument fails because we already have held that the Commerce Clause authorizes § 922(o)’s machine gun possession ban.

Section 922(g)(1) and (k) validly prohibit possession of firearms with the specified connection to interstate commerce under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Roszkowski · filed 2012-11-27(g)(1), (k)

Thus, even if Sebelius changed the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it did nothing to undermine the validity of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(k).

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Lagunas-Baltazar · filed 2012-12-18(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Horacio Lagunas-Baltazar raises an argument that he concedes is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Carter · filed 2013-02-19(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Lavarry Joseph Carter raises an argument that he concedes is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), which rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The appellant’s motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g) withstands facial and as-applied challenges based on the claim that it must require a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Villarreal · filed 2013-04-17(g)

Villarreal argues that Section 922(g) does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce and is, therefore, unconstitutional on its face and as applied. As he concedes, his argument is foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, both facially and as applied when the defendant stipulated that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Gilmore · filed 2013-04-23(g)

But prior precedent dictates that § 922(g) is facially constitutional. ... And we have found it constitutional as applied to a defendant who, like Gilmore, stipulated “that the firearm in question had travelled in interstate commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges based on firearms manufactured outside the state of possession.

United States v. McGhee · filed 2013-04-24(g)(1)

Finally, McGhee argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of a firearm by a felon, is unconstitutional on its face, as an invalid exercise of Congress‘s authority under the Constitution‘s Commerce Clause. Alternatively, he argues that it is unconstitutional as applied in this case because evidence that the firearms were manufactured outside of Pennsylvania did not establish a sufficient nexus between McGhee‘s possession of the firearm and interstate commerce. As McGhee ... acknowledges, these arguments are precluded by our decision in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2001).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Alcantar · filed 2013-10-07(g)(1)

In United States v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1989), we concluded that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. ... Accordingly, we are bound by our prior precedents and conclude that this issue is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause because the government must show that the firearm possessed by a felon traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Broughton · filed 2013-10-09(g)(1)

We first reject Mr. Broughton’s claim that the Supreme Court’s National Federation of Independent Business decision renders § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c) unconstitutional. We have previously ruled that these statutes fall within Congress’ power to regulate interstate activity under the Commerce Clause. We concluded ... that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional because the government must show a felon possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce, see United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001), and that § 924(c) is constitutional because it involves the regulation of activity that has an effect on interstate commerce, see United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. DePace, 120 F.3d 233, 235 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenge under binding circuit precedent.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2013-10-21(g)(1)

Wilson also argues that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied because, under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), it does not regulate an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. We expressly rejected that argument in Singletary, 268 F.3d at 205.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Mendez · filed 2013-11-07(g)(1)

Likewise, Mendez’s Commerce Clause challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed, and “‘the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.’”

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Ramirez · filed 2014-01-09(g)(1)

Ramirez’s Commerce Clause challenge to the constitutionality of § ... 922(g)(1) is foreclosed, and “‘the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.’” United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Section 922(g) is constitutional as applied when the firearm has a minimal nexus to interstate commerce, such as having traveled across state lines.

United States v. Sanders · filed 2014-01-15(g)

Sanders’s argument is squarely foreclosed by precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding § 922(g) constitutional as applied because “[t]he jurisdictional requirement is satisfied when the firearm in question has a ‘minimal nexus’ to interstate commerce” such as travelling in interstate commerce).

Section 922(g)(1)’s Commerce Clause validity is settled by circuit precedent, foreclosing this constitutional challenge.

United States v. Thursby · filed 2014-03-26(g)(1)

Whether this court’s review is de novo or for plain error, Thursby’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g) based on an asserted lack of a sufficient interstate nexus is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

United States v. Hall · filed 2014-06-02(g)

Hall’s argument that § 922(g) is unconstitutional because it does not require a sufficient interstate nexus to satisfy the Commerce Clause is foreclosed by our precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Mathis · filed 2014-06-04(g)(1)

He argues in essence that the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) support the proposition that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting § 922(g)(1). This argument is without merit.

Section 922(g)(1) constitutionally regulates a felon’s possession of a firearm that has moved in interstate commerce; the Government need not prove additional economic activity.

United States v. Collins · filed 2014-06-19(g)(1)

Furthermore, this court’s cases upholding § 922(g)(1) uniformly establish that the statute is constitutional in that it properly regulates the possession of guns that have moved in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, and a firearm manufactured outside the state where it was possessed satisfies its interstate commerce requirement.

United States v. Holton · filed 2014-07-07(g)(1)

He also agreed with the government’s recitation of the facts, including that the firearm was manufactured outside the state of Florida and therefore moved in interstate commerce. As such, this was sufficient to show a “minimal nexus” between the firearm and its connection to interstate commerce. See McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390. Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to Holton.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons remains valid under the Commerce Clause after National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.

United States v. Diamond Moody · filed 2014-07-08(g)(1)

Whether our review is de novo or for plain error, Moody’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed.

A Commerce Clause challenge to Section 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Francisco De La Cruz, Jr. · filed 2014-09-15(g)(1)

De La Cruz’s constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed in this circuit and was not overruled by the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

Section 922(g) is constitutional, facially and as applied, under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Barnes · filed 2015-01-06(g)

We have held repeatedly that section 922(g) is constitutional, facially and as applied, as a lawful exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. ... The district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, when it convicted Barnes of violating section 922(g).

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on its failure to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2015-02-02(g)

He argues that the statute that defines his offense, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is unconstitutional because it proscribes possession of a firearm without requiring a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but our Circuit has repeatedly upheld section 922(g) against the identical argument.

Section 922(g) withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge under the court’s binding precedent.

United States v. McDaniels · filed 2015-03-11(g)

McDaniels’ challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g) doesn’t make it out of the gate. As he concedes in his brief, this Court has already rejected each of his Commerce Clause arguments. ... Thus, McDaniels fails to show error, plain or otherwise, with respect to his conviction.

Section 922(o)’s machine gun prohibition is within Congress’s Commerce Clause power, including as applied to an individual who manufactured a machine gun.

United States v. One Palmetto State Armory PA-15 Machinegun Receiver/Frame, Unknown Caliber, Serial Number LW001804 · filed 2015-07-22(o)

In light of the well-established holdings by our Court of Appeals and other circuits that Congress did not exceed its Commerce Clause- power when it prohibited machine gun manufacture and possession, both Watson’s facial and as-applied challenges to the NFA and Section 922(o) must fail.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Lockamy · filed 2015-08-24(g)

Finally, Lockamy asserts that § 922(g) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause. We have consistently rejected this argument.

Section 922(g) is not facially unconstitutional for using “commerce” instead of “interstate or foreign commerce.”

United States v. Erity · filed 2015-11-05(g)

As such, § 922(g) is not facially unconstitutional simply because it uses the word “commerce” rather than “interstate or foreign commerce.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause on its face and applies constitutionally when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. James · filed 2015-11-17(g)(1)

However, we have repeatedly held § 922(g)(1) is not a facially unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. ... Additionally, we have determined that § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally applied to a defendant when, as here, the firearm in question traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied when the firearms identified in the indictment had previously traveled between states.

United States v. Richard Pulley, Jr. · filed 2016-02-24(g)(1)

The two guns identified in the indictment had traveled between states. That suffices “to establish a past connection between the gun[s] and interstate commerce. Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to” Pulley.

Section 922(g) withstands a facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenge based on its regulation of interstate non-economic criminal activity without requiring a substantial nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2016-07-13(g)

Thomas also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him because it regulates interstate non-economic criminal activity without requiring a substantial nexus to interstate commerce. This argument is foreclosed by, United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389 (11th Cir. 1996), and we will not disturb that precedent today.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied when the firearm and ammunition had previously traveled through interstate commerce, establishing a minimal interstate nexus.

United States v. Carlo Junior Senecharles · filed 2016-08-31(g)(1)

Further, because the parties stipulated the firearm and ammunition had traveled through interstate commerce before the offense was committed, the ... Government established a minimal nexus between Senecharles’s firearm and ammunition and interstate commerce, and the statute was constitutional as-applied to him.

Section 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands a facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Sides · filed 2016-09-01(g)(1)

Sides correctly acknowledges that United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013), forecloses his argument, based on Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (NFIB), that § 922(g) is unconstitutional facially and as applied to him because it regulates conduct that falls outside of the Government’s power to regulate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge because it contains an express jurisdictional requirement.

United States v. Towns · filed 2016-09-20(g)(1)

First, challenging his conviction, Towns argues that § 922(g) is unconstitutional. However, acknowledging that United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), forecloses his argument, Towns raises the argument solely for the purpose of “preserving” it in the event of future reconsideration of Lopez. See also United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We have repeatedly held that Section 922(g)(1) is not a facially unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because it contains an express jurisdictional requirement.”). Towns fails to offer an argument justifying reconsideration of Lopez.

Section 922(g) withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges to its commerce language and Congress’s authority to enact it.

United States v. Hughes · filed 2016-11-04(g)

Hughes’s final argument on appeal is that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—the statute under which he was convicted—is unconstitutional, facially and as applied, in two respects. First, Hughes argues that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional because it fails to limit commerce to “interstate commerce.” Second, Hughes argues that the statute is unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting the statute. ... In this case, however, as Hughes acknowledges, we have previously rejected both of his arguments and are bound by those decisions. See United States v. Nichols, 124 F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389 (11th Cir. 1996). As a result, we do not overturn Hughes’s conviction on this basis.

Section 922(g) withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge because a firearm’s past travel in interstate commerce satisfies its interstate commerce element.

United States v. Moorefield · filed 2017-03-20(g)

Second, he challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as an invalid exercise of Congress’s legislative power under the Commerce Clause. As Moorefield acknowledges, our holding in United States v. Singletary is dispositive on the ... latter challenge—“proof . . . that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce, at some time in the past, was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element.” ... Consequently, we will reject this argument and focus instead on Moorefield’s first argument.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge because it requires a connection to interstate commerce; a firearm manufactured in another state supplies the connection needed to withstand an as-applied challenge.

United States v. Smith · filed 2017-06-12(g)(1)

Here, Smith’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by our precedent. See Scott, 263 F.3d at 1273. Furthermore, the government established the minimal nexus between Smith’s firearm and interstate commerce necessary to survive an as-applied challenge, as Smith did not object to ... the facts in his PSI, including the statement that the gun was manufactured in Massachusetts and the ammunition was manufactured in Illinois and Brazil.

Section 922(g)(1) survives a Commerce Clause challenge when the defendant admits the firearm’s effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Rose · filed 2017-07-10(g)(1)

The district judge did not plainly err in failing to determine § 922(g) is facially unconstitutional, because Wright forecloses that argument. Additionally, the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Rose. Rose pled guilty and admitted to all of the essential elements of the offense, which included the firearm’s effect on interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is constitutional under the Commerce Clause despite Lopez.

United States v. Hopes · filed 2017-07-13(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... In view of the foregoing, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2017-08-21(g)(1)

Jackson’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied when the firearm or ammunition previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Kenneth Everette Robinson, Jr. · filed 2017-08-22(g)(1)

We have also held that § 922(g)(1) was not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who only possessed a firearm intrastate because “§ 922(g) is an attempt to regulate guns that have a connection to interstate commerce.” ... Here the government established, through the factual basis of the plea agreement, that the firearm and ammunition involved in Robinson’s offense were manufactured outside of Florida, the state in which the offense took place, thus the firearm and ammunition would have had to travel in and affect interstate commerce.

Section 922(g) is constitutional as applied when a firearm has moved in interstate commerce, even if the defendant possessed it only within one state.

United States v. Hale · filed 2017-08-23(g)

The government established that the firearms moved in interstate commerce, and § 922(g) is constitutional as applied to Hale.

Section 922(g) is not invalid under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Williams · filed 2017-09-25(g)

The problem with his argument is that it is foreclosed by precedent. In United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715–16 (11th Cir. 2010), we held that § 922(g) is not constitutionally invalid under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent despite the decision in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius.

United States v. Ewing · filed 2017-09-21(g)(1)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Lindsey Ewing raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145- 46 (5th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2010). In Alcantar, we rejected the argument that Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) is not facially unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because its commerce element can be satisfied by a firearm’s prior interstate travel.

United States v. Louis Lavaris, Jr. · filed 2017-10-06(g)(1)

As Lavaris concedes, his argument is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2001), in which we held that “the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question,” id. at 518 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and United States v. Luna, 165 F.3d 316, 319-22 (5th Cir. 1999), in which we concluded that § 922(j) was similar to § 922(g) and the phrase “shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce,” provided “the requisite nexus to commerce” to allow Congress to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(o)’s machinegun prohibition is a permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce power.

Bezet v. United States · filed 2017-10-27(o)

First, § 922(o) is a permissible exercise of the commerce power.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Longoria · filed 2017-11-01(g)(1)

Longoria’s Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g) is without merit. We have clearly held that § 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Felix · filed 2017-11-08(g)

However, as he readily concedes, this ... argument is foreclosed by binding precedent. See United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389–91 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 922(g) does not violate Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).

Section 922(g)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power, either facially or as applied to possession of a firearm manufactured outside the state.

United States v. Dixon · filed 2018-01-09(g)

On the contrary, it is well-settled that Section 922(g) “is not constitutionally invalid under the Commerce Clause.” United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 391 (11th Cir. 1996) (Section 922(g) “is not an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.”). Noting this precedent, the court below did not err by entering Dixon’s conviction under Section 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Fernandez · filed 2018-02-09(g)(1)

We have consistently upheld § 922(g)(1) as being “a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 145. Thus, as Fernandez acknowledges, Alcantar forecloses his argument.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ban on firearm possession by convicted felons remains constitutional under the Commerce Clause after National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.

United States v. Jace Martin · filed 2018-02-22(g)(1)

Martin asserts the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in view of National Federation ... of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 530–35 (2012). He correctly concedes this issue is foreclosed by our precedent, United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding National Federation did not address the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) or overrule our precedent holding statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) constitutional), and presents the issue only to preserve it for further review.

Section 922(k)’s interstate commerce element sustains it against a Commerce Clause challenge.

United States v. Donte Bacon · filed 2018-03-08(k)

The same principle applies to § 922(k): the interstate commerce element, which Bacon admitted when entering his plea, ensures that the firearm in question affects interstate commerce and saves the statute from any jurisdictional defects.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under the Commerce Clause after Lopez.

United States v. Lake · filed 2018-04-06(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... In view of the foregoing, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge based on its regulation of conduct outside interstate commerce.

United States v. Lee Bell, Jr. · filed 2018-04-25(g)

Finally, Bell’s notion that § 922(g) is unconstitutional because it regu- lates conduct that falls outside the Commerce Clause is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Reynaldo Rendon, Jr. · filed 2018-04-26(g)(1)

Rendon’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied when the firearm’s travel across state lines establishes a minimal nexus to interstate commerce.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2018-05-24(g)(1)

Here, the government submitted a factual basis, and Garcia admitted at the change of plea hearing, that the firearm in question was manufactured outside Florida, establishing the minimal nexus to interstate commerce. Therefore Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to Garcia.

Section 922(g) may be applied when the firearm a felon possessed previously traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

United States v. Brown · filed 2018-10-01(g)

We also reject Brown’s as-applied challenge because Brown admitted during his plea colloquy that the firearm he possessed had travelled in interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands Commerce Clause challenges because it requires possession in or affecting commerce; it applies when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Ellis · filed 2018-10-10(g)(1)

No error, much less plain error, occurred in convicting Ellis because, as he concedes, his constitutional challenges to section 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by precedent.