18 U.S.C. § 922

An indictment under § 922(g)(9) is valid on its face when it tracks the statute and alleges each element; the jury decides whether the Government can prove guilt.

United States v. Hayes · filed 2005-06-24(g)(9)

Moreover, because the indictment tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and properly alleges each element of the statute, the indictment is valid on its face. ... Thus, whether the Government is able to prove that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged is a matter for the jury to decide and is not a proper basis on which to challenge the indictment itself.

An indictment sufficiently alleges a § 922(g)(1) offense when it charges a previously convicted felon with possessing a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Todd · filed 2006-05-01(g)(1)

The charges contained in Count 2 of the Superseding Indictment satisfied the requirements of the criminal statute. According to the allegations in the indictment, Mr. Todd possessed a firearm, namely a 9mm Beretta handgun, that had previously traveled in interstate commerce. These allegations, if proved, are sufficient to establish a violation of section 922(g)(2).

An indictment under § 922(g)(1) sufficiently alleges the commerce element by stating that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Humphreys, James · filed 2006-11-21(g)(1)

But since its allegation that “the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce prior to the defendant’s possession of the firearm” is at the heart of the issue raised and nothing else is required, see United States v. Hubbard, 61 F.3d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. McCarty, 862 F.2d ... 143, 145-46 (7th Cir. 1988), we conclude, and Humphreys acknowledges, that he is really challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him.

An indictment under § 922(g)(1) must allege that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce.

United States v. Eldridge Hills · filed 2011-05-12(g)(1)

We have determined that the language used in Hills’s indictment was sufficient to allege the interstate commerce element of a § 922(g)(1) violation.

An indictment charging possession of firearms “in and affecting commerce” sufficiently alleges § 922(g)(1)’s commerce element without separately alleging interstate shipment.

United States v. Downing · filed 2011-05-24(g)(1)

Downing also argues that the indictment failed to allege shipment in interstate commerce, contending that this is an essential element of the offense. The indictment tracked the statutory language and charged possession “in and affecting commerce.” See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We find this charging language sufficient and therefore conclude that Downing’s argument lacks merit.

An indictment charging possession of a machinegun under § 922(o)(1) sufficiently informs the defendant when it describes the firearms and the characteristics that make them machineguns, even without citing the statutory definition.

United States v. Laureano-Perez · filed 2015-07-30(o)(1)

This description contains all of the elements of Section 922(o)(1),15 ... It also describes the specific machineguns at issue. As such, Cummings was fairly informed of what he had to defend against, and the indictment was therefore sufficient.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require proof that the defendant possessed the particular firearm named in the indictment; possession of another firearm can suffice.

United States v. Hall · filed 2016-07-08(g)(1)

Therefore, to obtain a conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, the Government only needed to demonstrate that Hall had at least constructive possession of one of the firearms found at the House.

An indictment for felon possession under § 922(g)(1) sufficiently alleges the interstate commerce element by stating that the firearm had been transported in interstate commerce.

United States v. Wyatt · filed 2017-04-04(g)(1)

We agree with the government that “by alleging that the firearm was transported in interstate commerce, the indictment stated the particular method by which the firearm had been in, or affected, commerce.” Thus the indictment “substantially states the element.”

Section 922(g)(1) does not require an indictment to allege that the defendant knew the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Pina · filed 2018-02-21(g)(1)

Our precedent likewise forecloses his claim that, in the light of Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009), his indictment should have been dismissed because it failed to allege he knew the firearm he possessed had, at some point, traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to allege one prior felony conviction to charge a defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm.

United States v. Rhodes · filed 2018-08-28(g)(1)

Further, to convict under § 922(g), the government need ... only allege that the defendant was previously convicted of one felony.

An indictment under § 922(g)(1) sufficiently alleges felon in possession when it states a prior felony conviction, knowing firearm possession, and a connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Shavonte Hill · filed 2018-12-26(g)(1)

The indictment states that “[o]n or about January 27, 2017 . . . [Hill] . . . having been convicted of crimes punishable of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . did knowingly possess . . . a Draco 7.62X39mm pistol with serial number DA 4743-15RO and was manufactured by ROMARM/CUGIR . . . , said possession being in and affecting interstate commerce and said firearms having been shipped and transported in interstate commerce, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).” That sets forth all of the elements for convicting Hill of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

An indictment that closely follows § 922(g)(1)'s language sufficiently charges felon-in-possession even if it does not expressly allege knowledge of prohibited status.

United States v. Gurley · filed 2020-05-11(g)(1)

Gurley also argues that the indictment was insufficient because it failed to allege that he knew of his prohibited status under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... The language of his indictment closely followed the language of § 922(g)(1), however, and we thus conclude that it sufficiently charged Gurley with being a felon in possession of a firearm.

An indictment can sufficiently allege a § 922(g)(1) offense by mirroring the statute and giving specific details of the alleged violation.

Dubose v. United States · filed 2020-06-03(g)(1)

Dubose was indicted before Rehaif was decided, and his indictment was sufficient to allege a violation of § 922(g) because the language mirrored the statute and included specific details of the alleged violation.

An indictment’s failure to allege knowledge of prohibited status under Section 922(g)(1) does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.

United States v. Semidey · filed 2020-07-31(g)(1)

Thus, “the indictment’s failure to allege that [the defendant] knew [his status] was not a jurisdictional defect.” Id. at 92. We thus decline to dismiss the indictment.

An indictment charging a § 922(g) offense does not lose its jurisdictional basis because it omits a mens rea element.

Marks v. United States · filed 2021-01-22(g)

Thus, as we concluded in Moore, neither a criminal indictment’s failure to include a mens rea element in charging a defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), nor that indictment’s failure to track the language of § 924(a)(2), deprives a district court of jurisdiction to enter a conviction against a defendant.

Section 922(g)(1) includes a knowledge-of-status element, but an indictment tracking its text states a federal crime for jurisdictional purposes without expressly alleging that knowledge.

United States v. Morales · filed 2021-02-05(g)(1)

Since the text of § 922(g) implies a knowledge-of-status element, an indictment that tracks this text sufficiently states a crime against the United States.

An indictment charging a § 922(g) offense must allege its essential elements.

United States v. Franklin Mills · filed 2021-09-17(g)

We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Mills’ motion to dismiss the indictment, as the indictment properly “allege[d] the essential elements of the [§ 922(g)] offense.” Id.; see Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2097 (2021); United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 196-98 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Smith, 939 F.3d 612, 614 (4th Cir. 2019).

An indictment under § 922(g)(1) adequately charges the offense when it alleges knowing firearm possession after a qualifying conviction and knowledge of that conviction.

United States v. Walters · filed 2023-11-15(g)(1)

In accordance with Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019), the superseding indictment charged that Walters knowingly possessed a firearm after being convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year of imprisonment and that Walters knew he had been previously convicted of such ... a crime. Any challenge to the adequacy of the superseding indictment would be frivolous.

An indictment charging a § 922(g)(1) offense need not include the word “unlawfully” when it states the offense’s elements and sufficiently informs the defendant of the charge.

Williams v. United States · filed 2024-09-23(g)(1)

Movant points to no authority that requires an indictment for this charge to contain the word “unlawfully” nor does Movant show he was misled by the nature of the charges in the Indictment. Count One of the Indictment follows the wording of the statute. It fully, expressly and without ambiguity sets forth the elements necessary to constitute the offense and contains a statement of facts and circumstances sufficient to inform Movant of the offense with which he is charged.

An indictment under § 922(g)(1) sufficiently alleges the offense when it identifies prior felony convictions, firearm possession, and a connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Gibson · filed 2025-05-09(g)(1)

Here, the indictment stated that Gibson had been convicted of several crimes, including robbery, burglary, criminal confinement, and dealing in a sawed-off shotgun. It then stated that he did “knowingly and unlawfully possess” specific firearms. And it concluded that he possessed these arms “in and affecting commerce.” So the requisite standard was easily met here.

A § 922(g)(1) indictment adequately alleges knowledge of felon status when “did so knowingly” refers back to the allegation that the defendant was a felon.

United States v. Richardson · filed 2026-04-08(g)(1)

“Reasonably read,” the phrase “did so knowingly” applies to each material element spelled ... out before it—including Richardson’s felon status.

Section 922(g)(1) excludes pneumatic weapons because compressed air does not make them firearms under federal law.

Rodriguez-Contreras v. Jefferson B. Sessions III · filed 2017-10-12(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits the possession of a “firearm” by someone who has been convicted of a felony. ... Compressed air is not an explosive, which means that pneumatic weapons are not “firearms” under federal law.

Section 922(g)(1) does not use the definition of “firearm” in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), whose definitions apply only within that chapter.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2015-02-03(g)(1)

As the government explained in its response to the motion, however, the definition of “firearm” in § 5845(a) does not apply in the context of § 922(g). Section 5845 governs what firearms are required to have special taxes or registration by the very nature of the firearm itself, see 26 U.S.C. § 5841, and the statute specifically provides that its definitions are “[f]or the purpose of this chapter,” 26 U.S.C. § 5845.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm element can be established by evidence that the defendant possessed a loaded semiautomatic pistol.

United States v. Swan · filed 2012-07-10(g)(1)

A “firearm” was defined as “any weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” ... Given the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the government established Swan’s possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require a firearm to be operable for a felon-in-possession conviction.

United States v. Williams · filed 2009-08-20(g)(1)

We have repeatedly rejected the contention that a firearm needs to be operable in order to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing any firearm; the firearm’s identity is not an element of the offense.

United States v. Mayberry · filed 2009-08-13(g)(1)

The identity of the firearm is not an element of the offense; thus any firearm suffices to trigger a violation of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not make the specific type of firearm an essential element of the offense.

United States v. Smith · filed 2001-12-18(g)(1)

Likewise, the United States Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held the specific type of firearm possessed by a felon is not an essential element of the offense charged under § 922(g)(1). ... Joining the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, we hold the logic of Robison should extend to § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a felon knowingly possessed a firearm, but does not require proof of a specific type of firearm.

United States v. White · filed 2004-01-26(g)(1)

A specific type of firearm possessed by a felon is not an essential element of the offense charged under § 922(g)(1). The elements do not require proof of a specific firearm, but merely require a defendant to knowingly and intentionally possess a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the firearm to be loaded.

People v. Lawrence · filed 2005-04-25(g)(1)

As the People correctly concede, it was error for the County Court to sentence the defendant as a persistent violent felony offender based on his federal conviction of possession of a firearm under 18 USC § 922 (g) (1). The predicate crime in this case did not require as one of its elements that the firearm be loaded, whereas the New York crime which the People argued was equivalent to the federal crime, Penal Law § 265.02 (4), requires pos*699session of a loaded firearm.

Section 922(g) does not require a firearm to be loaded for a felon-in-possession offense.

United States v. Keys · filed 2005-08-09(g)

Indeed, possession of a firearm was the charge; finding the gun to be loaded is not a necessary element of the offense.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a starter gun that can readily be converted to expel a projectile, regardless of whether the felon intends to convert it.

United States v. Mullins · filed 2006-05-01(g)(1)

The government was not required to prove that Mullins himself intended to convert the starter gun, but only that the gun, as an objective matter, could readily be converted.

Section 922(g) requires the government to prove that the object possessed meets the federal definition of a firearm.

United States v. Counce · filed 2006-05-03(g)(1)

To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove that an object satisfies the federal definition of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm element can be proved by expert testimony that the possessed device meets the statutory definition of a firearm.

United States v. Derring · filed 2013-09-03(g)(1)

Upon review of the record, we conclude that Derring is mistaken; the Government’s expert witness clearly testified that the device Derring possessed was a firearm: A: A firearm is any weapon that is designed to, or can be readily assembled to fire a projectile by means of an explosion. [...] Q: Does this firearm meet the definition of a firearm that you gave us earlier in the fact that it is a weapon that is designed to expel a projectile by the action of explosive? [sic] A: It does. Accordingly, we affirm.

Section 922(g)(1) does not cover air guns because they are not firearms under the federal definition.

United States v. Castillo-Rivera · filed 2017-03-30(g)(1)

We note at the outset that Castillo-Rivera is correct that an air gun is not a firearm within the federal definition.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a stipulated rifle as a firearm despite objections about its age and functionality.

LeFlore v. United States · filed 2020-05-15(g)(1)

To the extent that Leflore appears to argue that he should never have been convicted in the first place, his arguments regarding the age and functionality of the weapon involved have no merit, as Leflore already stipulated to the variety of weapon involved, which satisfied the definition of firearm for the purposes of the offense with which he was charged.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing firearms on the Navajo Reservation despite treaty hunting rights.

United States v. Fox · filed 2009-07-29(g)(1)

Just as Mr. Fox lost the opportunity to hunt while physically incarcerated as a result of his conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prevents Mr. Fox from hunting with firearms as though it was explicitly part of his sentence for his earlier felonies.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a tribal member despite a treaty right to hunt unless the treaty specifically exempts tribal members from the federal law.

United States v. James H. Gallaher, Jr. · filed 2001-12-26(g)(1)

Gallaher argues that §§ 922(g)(1) nonetheless cannot apply to him because it would impermissibly abrogate rights guaranteed to him as a Colville Indian by the Colville Treaty. We reject this contention. In order to exempt tribal members from a federal law of otherwise general applicability, the treaty itself must specifically so provide.

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a convicted felon who belongs to the Blackfeet Tribe; the Tribe’s rights under the 1855 Treaty do not exempt individual members.

United States v. Mancha · filed 2002-11-13(g)(1)

The 1855 Blackfeet Treaty (“1855 Treaty”) does not exempt Mancha, a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe (“Tribe”), from 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (the felon-in-possession statute).

Section 922(g)(1) applies to a Navajo tribal member despite the tribe’s treaty hunting right, which does not provide a defense to a felon-in-possession charge.

United States v. Fox · filed 2007-07-16(g)(1)

Based on the Court’s above analysis, which concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) applies to Fox despite the Navajo Tribe’s treaty right to hunt, the Court finds that the law does not support Fox’s theory of defense.

Section 922(g)(9) does not apply based on an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction unless the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived counsel; at a guilty plea, that requires being informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

United States v. Akins · filed 2002-01-10(g)(9)

We hold that for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), a defendant pleading guilty to a misdemeanor must be informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation before waiver of the right to counsel will be deemed knowing and intelligent.

In a § 922(g)(9) prosecution, the judge decides whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived counsel and jury trial rights in the predicate domestic violence case.

United States v. Bethurum · filed 2003-09-23(g)(9)

We conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the burden fell on the government to prove to the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bethurum had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights at the time of his prior domestic violence conviction. The question of the effectiveness of the waivers should have been determined as a matter of law by the trial judge pursuant to Rule 104.

Section 922(g)(9) requires the government to prove a prior domestic violence misdemeanor conviction; the defendant bears the burden of proving the exception for a conviction obtained without counsel or a valid waiver.

United States v. Hartsock · filed 2003-10-10(g)(9)

We conclude that the exception is an affirmative defense and not an element of the crime, that the government need only prove the prior conviction, and that the defendant bears the burden of proving he or she is within the exception.

Section 922(g)(9) allows a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction to serve as a predicate when the defendant had no jury trial right in the court of conviction and did not appeal to a court where that right would arise.

United States v. Gordon · filed 2008-02-12(g)(9)

Accordingly, the district court properly found Gordon was not ... entitled to a jury as a matter of law, and that his J&DR conviction was a valid predicate under § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g)(9) permits a tribal domestic violence misdemeanor conviction to serve as a firearm possession predicate when the defendant received the right to counsel available in the tribal proceeding.

United States v. Lakota First · filed 2013-10-01(g)(9)

Because First was not denied his right to counsel as it existed in the tribal court misdemeanor proceeding, we hold that his resulting conviction could properly serve as a predicate to a § 922(g)(9) prosecution.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing ammunition or a silencer.

United States v. Coffell · filed 2017-12-14(g)(1)

The same goes for the ammunition and silencer, which § 922(g) likewise prohibits a convicted felon from possessing.

Section 922(g)(1) gives felons sufficient notice that possessing ammunition is unlawful, even if they did not know of the prohibition.

United States v. Young · filed 2014-09-11(g)(1)

Nor could he, as the language in § 922(g) plainly states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person—(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [to] possess . . . any firearm or ammunition.” ... Nonetheless, the Fifth Amendment notice requirement is satisfied by the statute, and we must reject Young’s Fifth Amendment claim.

Section 922(g)(1) requires possession of either a firearm or ammunition; proof of both is unnecessary even when the indictment charges both.

United States v. Rendon-Martinez · filed 2011-08-25(g)(1)

Although he was charged with illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition, § 922(g)(1) criminalizes the possession by a felon of “any firearm or ammunition” (emphasis added).

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction for possessing either a firearm or ammunition, but simultaneous possession supports only one conviction and sentence.

United States v. Leake · filed 2010-10-08(g)(1)

And while the simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition can only support one conviction and sentence under § 922(g)(1), United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2009), a defendant may be convicted under § 922(g)(1) for possessing either.

Section 922(g)(1) permits conviction based on possession of ammunition alone when a single count charges possession of both a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Brown · filed 2007-10-23(g)(1)

Given that the statute and indictment only required the jury to find that Brown possessed the ammunition in order to find him guilty of the crime, it was permissible for the jury to decide to stop deliberating at that point and render its verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits possession of either a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Goddard · filed 2006-03-20(g)(1)

Because the statute makes unlawful the possession of either a firearm or ammunition we need not reach the issue of the authenticity of the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing ammunition even if the state where the possession occurs does not prohibit it.

United States v. Wilson · filed 2006-02-02(g)(1)

Contrary to the assumption that runs through Wilson’s argument, a federal prosecution for felon in possession of ammunition under § 922(g)(1) is in no manner dependent on whether the state in which the crime is committed has enacted a parallel statute criminalizing the same conduct.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury to convict based on possession of either a firearm or ammunition when the indictment charges possession of both.

United States v. Green · filed 2006-01-27(g)(1)

Count Three of the indictment charged Defendant with possessing a firearm and ammunition. The court instructed the jury it could find Defendant guilty as to Count One if they concluded he possessed either cocaine or marijuana with the intent to distribute and guilty as to Count Three if it concluded he possessed either a firearm or ammunition. ... Our decision in United States v. Earls, 42 F.3d 1321, 1327 (10th Cir. 1994) forecloses Defendant’s argument.

Brief, transitory handling of ammunition does not constitute constructive possession under § 922(g)(1), and the jury must be instructed on that defense when the evidence supports it.

United States v. Williams · filed 2002-01-28(g)(1)

Williams’ theory of the defense was dependent on the jury accepting that he momentarily handled his fiancé’s ammunition prior to the day of his arrest, and that such transitory handling did not constitute “possession” under the law. ... Case law supports the theory that briefly sampling or handling contraband does not constitute constructive possession. ... The district court’s refusal to provide the defense instruction, or some variation thereof, was error.

A felon’s actual possession of ammunition can support a § 922(g) conviction without proof that he constructively possessed a firearm.

United States v. Webber · filed 2002-06-20(g)

Because evidence shows Webber actually possessed the 9mm ammunition seized after his state convictions, the evidence supports Webber’s § 922(g) conviction, and we need not decide whether Webber constructively possessed the shotgun.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove that the bullets possessed were live.

United States v. Williams · filed 2003-07-07(g)(1)

That the bullets are “live,” however, is not an element of § 922(g)(1), and the government was therefore not required to make any showing in this regard.

Evidence that a defendant had dominion and control over a bedroom and its contents can support a conviction for possessing ammunition under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Johnson · filed 2004-03-19(g)(1)

A rational factfinder could conclude that appellant had dominion and control over that bedroom and the items inside it on the day of the search.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be proved by testimony that the defendant carried and dropped a loaded gun.

United States v. Sanders · filed 2005-04-20(g)(1)

As discussed, to convict a defendant under section 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant had a previous felony conviction; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (3) the firearm or ammunition had traveled in or affected interstate commerce. ... This testimony alone, if believed, is sufficient evidence on which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Sanders possessed the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on possession of either a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Patterson · filed 2005-05-13(g)(1)

We note, however, that Patterson's conviction could also be supported by a finding that he possessed ammunition.

Section 922(g) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing ammunition.

United States v. Brannon · filed 2005-07-07(g)

As a convicted felon, defendant could not possess ammunition. ... After a court trial based on stipulated facts, I found defendant guilty of a violation of § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) uses the statutory definition of ammunition, which includes cartridge cases, primers, bullets, and propellant powder designed for use in a firearm.

United States v. Blair · filed 2006-07-11(g)(1)

This argument fails. “Ammunition” has a statutory definition, which indicates that “[t]he term ‘ammunition’ means ammunition or cartridge cases, primers, bullets, or propellant powder designed for use in any firearm.” 18 U.S.C § 921(a)(17)(A). This is the meaning of the term “ammunition” as used in all of the statutes under which Blair was indicted. Id. at § 921(a)(indicating the scope of the definitions contained therein). This was also the definition with which the jury was properly instructed.

Section 922(g)(1) turns on whether bullets were designed for use in a covered firearm; loading them into an antique gun does not itself exempt them.

United States v. Mixon, Sheyerman · filed 2006-07-12(g)(1)

But it’s the design of the bullets, not the location, that matters.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing ammunition, and ammunition alone can sustain a conviction.

United States v. Coughlin · filed 2006-09-18(g)(1)

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) clearly criminalizes being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition. Accordingly, Coughlin was charged with being a felon in possession of not only a firearm, but also ammunition. Since the lawfully-obtained ammunition is sufficient to sustain Coughlin’s conviction, Coughlin’s challenges to the searches yielding the gun are moot.

A § 922(g) ammunition conviction can stand when substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that the defendant possessed the ammunition.

United States v. Rose · filed 2007-01-30(g)

Rose specifically attacks the sufficiency of the evidence at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually or constructively possessed the ammunition at issue in this case. ... After a careful review of the record, we find the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence.

Section 922(g) prohibits a felon from possessing ammunition as well as a firearm.

United States v. Cannon · filed 2007-03-30(g)

That is, even if we were to completely discount the woman’s statement and Darden’s testimony, there remains evidence that Cannon violated § 922(g) by possessing ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on a felon's possession of ammunition alone.

United States v. Tahguv · filed 2008-02-08(g)(1)

Although he attempted to recant his admission that he possessed a firearm, he consistently admitted possessing ammunition, which alone is sufficient for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing ammunition when the felony conviction counts under federal law, even if state law permits the possession.

United States v. Crampton · filed 2008-03-10(g)(1)

That is a distinction without a difference, because (1) Caron holds that we use federal law to determine what the felon may possess, and (2) the federal statute prohibits felons from possessing a “firearm or ammunition.”

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possessing ammunition even if state law allows it.

United States v. Bullock · filed 2008-12-17(g)(1)

Bullock contends that he should not be penalized under federal law for conduct (possession of ammunition) that he was free to do under state law. But this is a mere irony. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has observed on similar facts, “a federal prosecution for felon in possession of ammunition ... is in no manner dependent on whether the state in which the crime is committed has enacted a parallel statute criminalizing the same conduct.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon possessed a firearm or ammunition; proof of both is unnecessary.

United States v. Thompson · filed 2009-04-06(g)(1)

In other words, the government in this case was required to prove only that Thompson possessed a firearm or ammunition to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), not that he possessed both.

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession of ammunition; possession of a loaded revolver can support an inference that the defendant knew it contained ammunition.

United States v. Cook · filed 2010-05-07(g)

The testimony that Cook was found in possession of the loaded revolver is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Cook knowingly possessed the ammunition in the revolver.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed ammunition.

United States v. Hopkins · filed 2011-07-01(g)(1)

In reviewing the jury charge as a whole, we find the jury was adequately informed of the necessity of finding Hopkins knowingly possessed ammunition in Instruction No. 16 in order to find him guilty of the crime charged.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession conviction based on knowing possession of ammunition alone.

United States v. Widi · filed 2012-07-06(g)(1)

So even if none of the jurors believed Widi possessed any of the guns, he was still patently guilty of the single felon in possession count based on the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the ammunition.

United States v. Rene Huerta, Jr. · filed 2013-12-31(g)(1)

The conviction requires proof Huerta knowingly possessed the ammunition.

Evidence proving possession for related counts can also establish § 922(g)(1)’s ammunition-possession element.

United States v. Hornbeak · filed 2014-08-08(g)(1)

Therefore, the same evidence used to establish the possession element in counts 4 and 5 also demonstrates that any rational trier of fact could have found that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the ammunition charged in count 6.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by evidence that ammunition was found with the defendant’s identifying documents in a safe in a bedroom he occupied.

United States v. Durham · filed 2015-12-01(g)(1)

This, along with ... Durham’s testimony that he lived in the northeast bedroom “off and on,” and was in the bedroom with the open safe when the police arrived to execute the search warrant, is sufficient to convict him of a § 922(g)(1) violation.

Section 922(g)(1)'s ammunition possession element can be supported by evidence that shotgun shells were found on the defendant’s person.

United States v. Smith · filed 2016-01-26(g)(1)

Here, the Government introduced evidence of four shotgun shells found on Smith’s person. ... Given that the other elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) were stipulated to by the parties, the only element in dispute is whether Smith possessed ammunition. ... we conclude that a reasonable jury could find the evidence sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Smith.

Section 922(g) treats possession of a firearm and possession of ammunition separately; ammunition is not an element of firearm possession.

J.M. Britton v. PA BPP · filed 2016-03-14(g)

However, use of the term “or” rather than “and” in that context means that the presence of ammunition is not also a required element of a firearm possession.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury to infer knowing possession of ammunition from the evidence surrounding a shooting.

United States v. Eason · filed 2016-07-14(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we cannot find that “no reasonable jury” could have concluded that Eason knowingly possessed ammunition as charged in Count 2.

Section 922(g)(1)’s ammunition possession element can be satisfied by possession of any of the rounds alleged in the indictment.

United States v. Lee · filed 2016-08-11(g)(1)

Because a finding that he possessed any of these rounds could independently establish that he possessed ammunition, we conclude that the jury was permitted to convict based on its unanimous finding that he possessed the three rounds that were recovered from his pocket.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed ammunition.

United States v. Serrano · filed 2016-12-15(g)(1)

To carry its burden under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed ammunition.

A jury can find possession under § 922(g)(1) when the defendant uses another person's home to store firearms and ammunition.

United States v. Chong · filed 2017-12-13(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient to support Tran’s convictions for possessing firearms and ammunition. The jury could reasonably have concluded that Tran was using Chong’s home to store the firearms and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed ammunition, which a jury may infer from circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Woodley · filed 2018-03-14(g)(1)

Based on the record evidence, we find that a reasonable jury could have found that Woodley knowingly possessed the ammunition recovered from the scene of the shooting. This satisfactory showing of element two of the offense, coupled with Woodley’s stipulation of elements one and three, proves sufficient to sustain Woodley’s conviction of the charged offense.

A felon who fires live rounds possesses ammunition under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Wilcher · filed 2018-07-30(g)(1)

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we find that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Wilcher fired live rounds, and he therefore possessed ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he possessed live ammunition designed for use in a firearm.

United States v. Grau · filed 2018-10-12(g)(1)

The court conveyed to the jury, in the language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), that in order to convict, the jury needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Grau knew that he possessed live ammunition designed for use in a firearm, and that Grau’s position was that the government failed to prove that he did.

Section 922(g)(1) covers possession of ammunition as well as firearms.

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: Benjamin G. Childs · filed 2020-06-23(g)(1)

In 2002, Mr. Childs pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a “firearm or ammunition” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This offense is legally broader than its Washington counterpart, RCW 9.41.040(1)(b), which does not encompass ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction based on possession of ammunition alone when the indictment alleges possession of both a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Mayo · filed 2021-06-18(g)(1)

Next, Mayo argues that the verdict cannot stand because the indictment charged that he possessed both a firearm and ammunition and the jury found only that he possessed ammunition. This argument is unavailing because offenses may be charged conjunctively and proven disjunctively.

Section 922(g)(1) allows a conviction based on a convicted felon’s possession of ammunition alone.

United States v. Danyel Megal Black · filed 2022-01-05(g)(1)

Further, the district court did not err when it denied Black’s motion for judgment of acquit- tal because the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Black exercised dominion and control over his bedroom where the ammunition was found, and possession of ammunition alone was sufficient to convict him under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits a finding of knowing ammunition possession based on eyewitness and physical evidence, even when the firearm is not recovered.

United States v. Anthony Obi, Jr. · filed 2022-02-08(g)(1)

Viewing the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we must, a reasonable jury could find from the victims’ testimony that Obi was the shooter; and from the physical evidence, the victims’ testimony, and the testimony of expert Buchert and Detective Davis that the shell casings were discharged from the shooter’s firearm and therefore had been ammunition knowingly in the shooter’s possession.

Section 922(g) bars a person with felony convictions from possessing ammunition and prevents a court from ordering seized ammunition returned directly to that person.

Acosta v. United States · filed 2022-06-01(g)

As a person with felony convictions, Mr. Acosta is prohibited from possessing ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); ... In the absence of a request and without any indication of who, if anyone, would be willing and legally permitted to take possession of the ammunition that Mr. Acosta cannot possess, I deny Mr. Acosta’s motion to have it returned to him.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed ammunition; firing a loaded gun can establish that possession.

United States v. Saunders · filed 2023-05-03(g)(1)

To prove the charge of unlawful possession of ammunition, the government was required to show, inter alia, that Saunders knowingly possessed the ammunition. The government did so, in this particular case, by proving that Saunders fired a loaded gun in a crowded street. Thus, the facts and circumstances surrounding the shooting were inextricably intertwined with proving his knowing possession of the ammunition.

Evidence that a felon committed a shooting can support a finding that he possessed ammunition under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Quincy Chambers · filed 2025-04-04(g)(1)

On the theory that Chambers committed the shooting, a jury convicted him for possessing ammunition as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Chambers claims the evidence insufficiently proves he shot Anderson and, therefore, that he possessed ammunition. ... Viewing the evidence most favorably to the government and deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations, the jury had sufficient evidence to find Chambers committed the shooting.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be satisfied by sole or joint constructive possession of ammunition.

United States v. Evan Brown Bull · filed 2025-05-14(g)(1)

After careful review of the trial record, we conclude that the above-summarized evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown Bull had constructive knowing possession (sole or joint) of the ammunition found in the F-150 glove box.

Section 922(g)’s ammunition-possession requirement can be satisfied by evidence that the defendant fired the ammunition.

United States v. Airhart · filed 2025-08-08(g)

Furthermore, no one disputes that, of the five people present at the scene, only two had firearms—allowing for a near-definitive process-of-elimination inference that Airhart fired the shots and thus possessed the 10-millimeter ammunition. ... For the same reasons we have concluded that the evidentiary errors were harmless, sufficient evidence supports the verdict—even without the contested evidence.

The evidence was sufficient to support a § 922(g)(1) conviction for possessing ammunition.

United States v. Young · filed 2026-01-12(g)(1)

We thus reject Young’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

Section 922(m) is a lesser-included offense of § 922(b)(5), so a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction when the evidence could support conviction of the lesser offense but acquittal of the greater.

United States v. McCullough, Hiram A. · filed 2003-10-30(m)

Thus, because § 922(m) is a lesser- included offense of § 922(b)(5) and because McCullough presented evidence such that a rational jury could find him not guilty of the greater offense and guilty of the lesser, the ... district court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider § 922(m) as a lesser-included offense.

A knowing firearms recordkeeping violation under § 922(m) is a lesser included offense of a willful violation of § 922(b)(5), but the instruction requires evidence from which a rational jury could find the lesser offense without the greater.

United States v. Podhorn · filed 2008-12-08(m)

As Podhorn points out, and as the Government concedes, McCullough held that "knowingly" selling firearms without maintaining proper records, 18 U.S.C. § 922(m), is a lesser included offense within the offense of willfully selling firearms without maintaining proper records in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5). ... He cannot satisfy the second step of McCullough because no rational jury could have found him guilty of the lesser offense but not guilty of the greater offense. There was thus no error in failing to give the jury instruction on the lesser included offense, much less plain error.

Section 922(g)(1) is the lesser felon-in-possession offense relative to the enhanced offense under § 924(e)(1).

United States v. Thomas · filed 2025-07-02(g)(1)

Because Erlinger is an outgrowth of Apprendi, the conclusion that a jury must find the occasions-different element effectively confirms that § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e)(1) convictions are related, lesser and greater offenses, respectively.

Section 922(g)(9) can apply when the predicate domestic violence conviction predates the statute, provided the firearm possession occurred after its enactment.

United States v. Pfeifer · filed 2004-06-10(g)(9)

It is immaterial that the predicate offense occurred before § 922(g)(9) was enacted. ... Because Pfeifer possessed a firearm after the enactment of § 922(g)(9), we adopt the reasoning of our sister circuits and conclude that his conviction does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Section 922(g)(9) applies to firearm possession after its enactment even when the predicate domestic violence conviction occurred earlier.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, — v. ROBERT LEE PFEIFER, ALSO KNOWN AS BARNEY PFEIFER, — · filed 2004-08-06(g)(9)

It is immaterial that the predicate offense occurred before § 922(g)(9) was enacted.

Section 922(g)(9) may bar firearm possession based on a local misdemeanor domestic violence conviction that predates the 2022 amendment without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Humphrey v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2026-03-31(g)(9)

Federal law only began precluding individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses under local law from possessing firearms in 2022. ... A conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence, whether that conviction is under federal, state, tribal, or local law, can “reasonably be said to indicate unfitness” to possess firearms.

Section 922(g)(9) may bar firearm possession based on a municipal domestic-violence misdemeanor conviction that predates the 2022 amendment without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Humphrey v. Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2026-04-15(g)(9)

As we stated in Arzate-Nunez, “bona fide attempt[s] to regulate future conduct” by restricting an individual’s ability to possess firearms do not violate the ex post facto clause “even when they rely on past criminal convictions.” Id. ... A conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence, whether that conviction is under federal, state, tribal, or local law, can “reasonably be said to indicate unfitness” to possess firearms.

Section 922(g) permits charges under multiple subsections for a single incident of possession, but only one sentence may be imposed for that incident.

United States v. Zareck · filed 2014-12-12(g)

To his credit and the credit of his office, Assistant United States Attorney Michael Leo Ivory appropriately concedes that the district court erred by imposing sentences for the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as well as § 922(g)(3). ... Although we have authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to modify the judgment of sentence on appeal, we think it more prudent to vacate the judgment of sentence and remand to the district court to allow that court to impose sentence on whichever subsection it deems appropriate.

Separate convictions for a felon's possession of a firearm and ammunition can be multiplicitous under § 922(g)(1), requiring dismissal of one count.

United States v. Ayala-Juarez · filed 2012-07-02(g)(1)

Each count charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Ayala’s sentences are VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for dismissal of the multiplicitous count and for resentencing on the count selected by the government.

Section 922(g)(1) allows only one conviction and sentence for simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition in the same incident.

United States v. Tann · filed 2009-08-24(g)(1)

We apply the rationale of those cases as well as that of Bell to hold that Tann’s possession of both a firearm and ammunition, seized at the same time in the same location, supports only one conviction and sentence under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate convictions for possessing the same firearm when a felon gives up possession and later reacquires it.

United States v. Baker · filed 2006-04-10(g)(1)

“A felon may be charged and convicted on two counts of possessing the same firearm if he first possesses a weapon, he is aware that his possession is interrupted, and he thereafter reacquires possession of the weapon himself.” ... Thus, we conclude he was reasonably charged with, and convicted of, two separate counts of being a felon in possession of the same handgun.

Section 922(g) permits separate counts for firearms and ammunition when the government proves they were possessed separately.

United States v. Miller · filed 2005-12-02(g)

Because the district court correctly concluded that if the government presented evidence that Miller separately possessed the weapons and ammunition charged in the indictment he could properly be convicted on each count, the district court did not err when it denied Miller’s pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment as multiplicitous.

Section 922(g) permits separate convictions and sentences under its felon and drug user provisions for a single act of firearm possession.

United States v. Earnest Richardson · filed 2005-11-04(g)(1), (g)(3)

In United States v. Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110, 1115 (8th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), we held that separate convictions under § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(3) arising out of a single act of firearm possession were not multiplicitous. See Walker, 380 F.3d at 394. Guided, as we are, by the decision of an earlier panel, see United States v. Peltier, 276 F.3d 1003, 1006 (8th Cir. 2002), we must affirm the imposition of separate sentences for each count of conviction.

Section 922(g) does not permit separate punishments under its felon and drug user prohibitions for a single act of possessing one firearm; the counts must be merged for sentencing.

United States v. Earnest Richardson · filed 2005-08-19(g)

Richardson was a felon and drug user in possession of a single gun; there were multiple prohibitions but not multiple crimes, as there were in Peterson. We find the counts should have been merged for sentencing purposes.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction for a single incident of firearm possession, even when the person belongs to multiple prohibited classes.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2011-07-27(g)

Here too, Thomas received a concurrent sentence and separate $100 special assessments for each count, and we must remand the case to the district court with instructions to vacate one of the § 922(g) sentences and merge the two § 922(g) counts of conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction when a felon possesses a firearm and ammunition at the same time.

United States v. Harris · filed 2011-10-28(g)(1)

Because both the possession of the handgun and the ammunition occurred at the same time, however, the two counts of conviction should have been merged and Harris should have been sentenced on only one count.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction for a single incident of firearm possession, even when the person belongs to more than one prohibited class.

United States v. Ocampo · filed 2013-01-28(g)

In sum, although the Sixth Circuit has not expressly addressed whether multiple convictions under § 922(g) based on a single incident of firearm possession violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, the answer is plain. It does.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction for a single possession of the same firearm, even when the defendant falls into two prohibited categories.

United States v. Medina-Mendoza · filed 2013-07-24(g)

But it was plain error for the district court to sentence him more than once — even to concurrent sentences— because the § 922(g) counts are based on his single possession of the same gun, and the second conviction is presumed to have collateral consequences.

A single incident of firearm possession cannot support separate punishments under § 922(g)(1) and (g)(5).

United States v. Garcia-Balderas · filed 2016-07-14(g)(1), (g)(5)

As the Government concedes, the simultaneous charges under § 922(g)(1) and (g)(5), which arise from the same single incident of possession of firearms, violate the constitutional prohibition on multiple punishments for one offence.

Section 922(g) does not permit consecutive sentences for possessing the same firearm under two prohibited-person categories.

United States v. Cadet · filed 2019-07-29(g)

The district court plainly erred in imposing consecutive sentences for Cadet’s dual violations of § 922(g) in light of Winchester.

Section 922(o)'s machinegun possession offense is a lesser-included offense of possessing an unregistered machinegun under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), so both convictions cannot stand for the same possession.

United States v. Kuzma · filed 2020-08-03(o)

The § 922(o) charge is therefore a lesser-included offense of the § 5861(d) charge.

Section 922(g)(2) prohibits firearm possession by a person who fled a state to avoid prosecution, and the intent to avoid prosecution may be inferred from the person's conduct.

United States v. Mindreci · filed 2006-01-18(g)(2)

Although when Defendant left Minnesota is unclear, we conclude the jury could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that Defendant left Minnesota with the intent to avoid prosecution for the pending charges.

Section 922(g)(2)'s fugitive element requires proof that the defendant left the state knowing charges were pending there.

United States v. Bennette · filed 2006-12-06(g)(2)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we find that this evidence was sufficient to show that Bennette knew he had committed a crime when he “created” his “severance package” in Maine and thus it supported the jury’s finding that Bennette left Maine with the knowledge that there were charges pending against him in that state.

Section 922(g)(2) does not require an active-concealment jury instruction to establish that a person is a fugitive from justice.

United States v. Borg · filed 2008-04-28(g)(2)

In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Borg’s proposed jury instructions concerning “active concealment” because those instructions were not legally supported.

Section 922(g) treats a single incident of possession that violates multiple subsections as one offense, so an acquittal under one subsection bars a later conviction under another.

United States v. Mavromatis · filed 2014-10-28(g)

The view of the Department of Justice is that Congress intended not to establish multiple offenses when the same incident of possession violates two subsections of § 922(g). ... Accordingly, the government’s motion for remand is granted. We remand this case to the district court with instructions to vacate the conviction and dismiss the indictment.

Alternative § 922(g)(1) and (g)(3) counts based on possession of the same firearm may be presented to the jury without requiring the government to elect between them before trial.

United States v. Harwell · filed 2006-03-31(g)(1), (g)(3)

The risk of false impressions here does not appear to be great or unfairly prejudicial to the defendant, as the entire case involves simply the defendant’s alleged possession of two weapons on a single day, and the indictment plainly identifies which counts are brought as alternative disqualifying statuses. Just as in Johnson, there is the possibility the jury may acquit the defendant Harwell of one count and convict on the alternative count. The court will not require the government to elect between the alternative counts.

Section 922(g) permits felon and drug user possession charges to be presented to the jury as alternative theories of one offense.

United States v. Platter · filed 2006-06-12(g)

The court finds that, in Defendant’s case, the jury’s verdict is not at risk of becoming tainted by allowing the government to present two separate theories under Section 922(g). The counts shall be presented to the jury as alternatives of one offense.

Section 922(b)(1) and (c)(1)'s restrictions on handgun purchases by otherwise-qualified 18-to-20-year-olds violate the Second Amendment.

Brown v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives · filed 2023-12-01(b)(1), (c)(1)

In summary, because Plaintiffs’ conduct – the purchase of handguns – “fall[s] [within] the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command’” and the challenged statutes and regulations are not “consistent with the Nation’s historic tradition of firearm regulation,” the Court FINDS 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1) and (c)(1) facially unconstitutional and as applied to Plaintiffs.

Sections 922(b)(1) and (c)(1) unconstitutionally prohibit licensed dealers from selling handguns to adults ages eighteen through twenty.

Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol · filed 2025-01-30(b)(1), (c)(1)

This is a second challenge in our court to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1) and (c)(1), which together prohibit Federal Firearms Licensees from selling handguns to eighteen-to-twenty-year-old adults. ... We are now compelled to focus intently on the evidence of firearm access and ownership by eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds near and at the founding, and we conclude that (1) NRA I is incompatible with the Bruen and Rahimi decisions of the Supreme Court, and (2) these provisions are inconsistent with the Second Amendment.

Section 922(b)(1)’s restriction on licensed handgun sales to 18- to 20-year-olds is constitutional under the Second Amendment.

McCoy v. ATF · filed 2025-06-18(b)(1)

Section 922(b)(1) fits squarely within this tradition and is therefore constitutional.

Section 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment; a firearm manufactured outside the state of possession satisfies the interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Gata · filed 2023-03-28(g)

And, as Santillon Gata concedes, his ... arguments that § 922(g) is unconstitutional1 are barred by our prior panel precedents holding that § 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, even when the gun was only manufactured outside the state of conviction, and under the Tenth Amendment because it does not invade the province of the states.

Congress has the constitutional authority to enact Section 922(g)'s felon-in-possession prohibition.

United States v. McNulty-Snodgrass · filed 2022-07-18(g)

Snodgrass’s constitutional argument is foreclosed by precedent.

Section 922(g) is not facially unconstitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Strong · filed 2021-01-14(g)

Strong contends that the district court plainly erred in accepting his guilty plea to possessing a firearm after felony conviction because the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is facially unconstitutional. ... As Strong readily admits, these claims are foreclosed by this court’s precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon is constitutional.

United States v. Jesse Penn, Jr. · filed 2017-08-30(g)(1)

First, we agree that our decision in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2001), upholds the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute.

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under Fifth Circuit precedent despite the argument based on Nat'l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius.

United States v. De La Cruz · filed 2016-10-18(g)(1)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Francisco De La Cruz, Jr., raises an argument that is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2013). In Alcantar, 733 F.3d at 145-46, we rejected the argument that Nat'l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012), affected our prior jurisprudence rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing firearms that have moved in interstate commerce is within Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Becknell · filed 2015-03-03(g)(1)

Our cases squarely foreclose this argument. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that Congress lacked power to enact § 922(g)); United States v. Urbano, 563 F.3d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir. 2009) (same). Consequently, the district court properly rejected Becknell’s Commerce Clause challenge.

Section 922(g)(1) may prohibit a felon from possessing a firearm and ammunition that have moved in interstate commerce without exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Deiter · filed 2014-08-19(g)(1)

Mr. Deiter also claims his conviction cannot stand because Congress lacked authority under the commerce clause to prohibit his possession of a firearm and ammunition. The district court correctly rejected this argument in light of binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court and this circuit.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Lister · filed 2014-07-31(g)(1)

Since our decision in United States v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1989), we have consistently held that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits felons from possessing firearms in or affecting commerce, and its commerce element defeats a facial constitutional challenge.

United States v. Walker · filed 2011-08-16(g)(1)

Walker also argues that section 922(g)(1) is “unconstitutional because the possession of firearms by a convicted felon does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,” but his argument is foreclosed by precedent. In United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389–90 (11th Cir. 1996), this Court held that section 922(g)(1) prohibits possession of a firearm “in or affecting commerce,” and that “jurisdictional element defeats [a] facial challenge” to the provision.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits felons from possessing ammunition within a state when the ammunition previously traveled in interstate commerce, and that prohibition is within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Campbell · filed 2010-05-10(g)(1)

Because we are bound by Scarborough and Patton’s holdings, we reject Defendant’s Commerce Clause challenge to Section 922(g)(1)’s ... prohibition of felons’ intrastate possession of ammunition that once traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, including when challenged on the basis of intrastate firearm possession.

United States v. Noe · filed 2009-08-13(g)(1)

We specifically addressed this issue in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir.2001), and held that § 922(g)(1) was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 205. As we have already decided this issue, we need not revisit it here.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional even though it does not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

United States v. Leal · filed 2007-02-01(g)(1)

Leal also contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional be- cause it does not require a substantial effect on interstate com- merce. This court has repeatedly held that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a felon-in-possession prosecution when the ammunition was manufactured abroad; that connection supports federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Goodwin · filed 2007-01-24(g)(1)

Goodwin argues that the foreign manufacture of the ammunition is insufficient to warrant federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Gonzales, 307 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the argument that a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause “in accord with the conclusion of every other circuit that has considered the problem”).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge based on its asserted lack of a sufficient connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Diaz, Sergio · filed 2006-11-03(g)(1)

On appeal, Diaz reiterates his argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face because it lacks the required nexus to interstate commerce under Lopez. ... We have consistently rejected Diaz’s argument.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a convicted felon is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Joseph Bradley Murphy, Jr. · filed 2006-07-12(g)(1)

As a result, § 922(g)(1) remains a constitutional exercise of Congress’s legislative power, and we affirm Murphy’s conviction pursuant to it.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face, and its commerce element requires proof that the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Chealy · filed 2006-07-20(g)(1)

To the extent Chealy raises an as-applied challenge to § 922(g), we have held that the “in or affecting commerce” language of § 922(g) is a jurisdictional element of the offense that the government is required to prove by demonstrating that the firearm and ammunition possessed by Chealy traveled in interstate commerce. United States v. Clay, 355 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, the dispositive issue is whether a jury could rationally conclude, based on the evidence, that the firearm and ammunition seized from Chealy was possessed in and affecting interstate commerce. Id. Section 922(g) is not unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to Chealy.

Section 922(g)(1) survives a Commerce Clause challenge to its application to intrastate firearm possession.

United States v. Brownlee · filed 2006-07-18(g)(1)

Brownlee also contends that his federal prosecution for the crimes of carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119), using a firearm in relation to a federal crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), was unconstitutional. ... In light of the binding effect we give to precedential opinions of panels of this Court, and because we discern no principled distinction between the statutes already ruled on by our Court and § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), we must reject Brownlee’s argument and hold that the statutes he challenges survive constitutional scrutiny.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Allen · filed 2006-07-19(g)

Section 922(g) constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause; therefore, the district court should have dismissed the indictment; ... We find no merit in these claims and accordingly affirm appellant’s conviction. Appellant’s first ground for reversal is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996).

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon is constitutional.

United States v. Hull · filed 2006-07-28(g)(1)

(5) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a firearm, is unconstitutional. We have rejected this last contention outright, and will not give it further consideration here. United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001).