18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Kendricks · filed 2018-12-13(g)(1)

Similarly, we find no merit to Kendricks’ claim that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. We’ve previously held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional and does not violate the Commerce Clause. United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, ... 389 (11th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Kendricks’ challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by our binding precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge and an as-applied challenge where the firearm previously traveled interstate.

United States v. Conrad · filed 2018-12-13(g)(1)

Conrad’s facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by previous decisions of this court. See United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (rejecting facial Commerce Clause challenge); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting as-applied challenge where firearm had traveled interstate in the past).

Section 922(j)'s requirement that the firearm have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce satisfies the Commerce Clause's minimal nexus requirement.

United States v. Hailer · filed 2019-01-10(j)

We reasoned that, unlike the statutes in Lopez and Morrison, § 922(j) expressly requires the firearm to have been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, which satisfies the minimal nexus requirement. ... Pritchett thus squarely forecloses Haile’s argument.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons remains constitutional under the Commerce Clause after Lopez.

United States v. Hidalgo · filed 2019-05-03(g)(1)

In United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996), we rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) on the basis that neither the holding nor the reasoning in Lopez constitutionally invalidates § 922(g)(1). In view of the foregoing, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally prohibit a felon from possessing a firearm that has traveled across state lines.

United States v. Diaz-Contreras · filed 2019-08-20(g)(1)

This court has held that § 922(g) can constitutionally be applied if a firearm has traveled across state lines.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons is not unconstitutional under Lopez.

United States v. Perez · filed 2019-08-29(g)(1)

“This court has repeatedly emphasized that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is not open to question.” ... In view of the foregoing, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied when the firearms possessed in a state were manufactured outside that state and traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Poliard · filed 2020-01-03(g)(1)

We also reject Poliard’s argument that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because -- as Poliard has stipulated -- the guns that Poliard possessed in Florida were manufactured outside of Florida and, thus, had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Finchum · filed 2020-02-11(g)(1)

Finchum’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a challenge that it exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Glenn McGarity, Jr. · filed 2020-02-26(g)(1)

McGarity’s argument that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied when the firearm and ammunition moved through interstate commerce, satisfying its commerce nexus requirement.

United States v. Finley · filed 2020-03-05(g)(1)

And, in any event, § 922(g) was not unconstitutionally applied in Finley’s case because he admitted in his plea agreement that his gun and ammunition moved through interstate commerce, which is a sufficient nexus.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a felon who possesses a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Sanchez-Rosado · filed 2020-03-09(g)(1)

Our precedent also holds that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a defendant who possesses a firearm that “traveled in interstate commerce,” United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996), and Sanchez-Rosado admitted during his change of plea hearing that the rifle he possessed in Florida had been manufactured in Illinois.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce before the defendant possessed it.

United States v. Owens · filed 2020-04-07(g)(1)

Here, the Government presented testimony at trial establishing that the firearm was manufactured in Connecticut and was shipped to Florida before it was found in Owens’s possession. Consequently, it traveled in interstate commerce and satisfied the minimal-nexus requirement. This defeats his as-applied challenge.

Section 922(g)(1)'s felon-in-possession prohibition does not exceed Congress’ Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Hill · filed 2020-05-05(g)(1)

First, he argues that the statute underlying his conviction exceeds Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. Our precedent forecloses this argument, as he concedes.

Section 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Garrett · filed 2020-06-25(g)(1)

Garrett’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Hernandez · filed 2020-07-14(g)

His argument challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g) as exceeding the Commerce Clause is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013).

Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under the Commerce Clause after Sebelius and requires only that the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Perryman · filed 2020-07-14(g)(1)

In Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), the Supreme Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) to require only that a firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some previous time. Id. at 575. In United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2013), we held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional following Sebelius. Id. at 145–46. Therefore, as Perryman acknowledges, this argument is foreclosed under our caselaw.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing ammunition does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Morales · filed 2020-08-25(g)(1)

Morales argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate economic activities. ... The Government’s position is “clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” ... Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(a)(6) is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority.

United States of America v. Jackson · filed 2020-10-05(a)(6)

Therefore, Jackson’s argument that Counts 1 and 3 must be dismissed because § 922(a)(6) was enacted beyond Congress’s authority is incorrect.

Circuit precedent forecloses facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Gordon · filed 2020-10-15(g)(1)

And our precedent forecloses Gordon’s facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Dickey · filed 1996-12-13(g)(1)

Basing his argument on the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Lopez, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), Dickey contends that his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), should be reversed because Congress exceeded its authority in passing the statute. Unfortunately for Dickey, our Circuit has settled this issue. In United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-43 (5th Cir.1996), we held that we are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575, 97 5.Ct. 1963, 1969, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), that the felon in possession of a firearm statute is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons does not exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Peterson · filed 2005-06-01(g)(1)

Smalls also contends that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, exceeds Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce and is thus unconstitutional. This argument has already been considered and rejected by this Court in United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213 (2d Cir.2001). We again reject this argument.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. De La Cruz-Trevino · filed 2016-10-18(g)

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Francisco De La Cruz-Trevino raises an argument that is foreclosed by United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001). In Daugherty, we rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and held that “the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.” Daugherty, 264 F.3d at 518 (internal ... quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Powell · filed 2021-04-09(g)(1)

Willie Powell appeals his conviction for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon under 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(1), arguing that section 922(g) is unconstitutional, facially and as applied to him, because it violates the Commerce Clause. We affirm because, as Powell concedes, his argument is foreclosed by our binding precedent.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Williams · filed 2021-05-19(g)(1)

Moreover, we have “consistently upheld the constitutionality” of § 922(g)(1), which is “a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Owens · filed 2021-06-22(g)(1)

Relying on National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), Owens argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds ... Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. He concedes that this argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2013). ... The Government’s position is “clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” ... Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED.

Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional for exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause power under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2021-07-02(g)(1)

Thomas’s argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is foreclosed.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge when a firearm possessed in one state was manufactured in another.

United States v. Guinyard · filed 2021-07-12(g)

Additionally, the government provided evidence to prove the firearm was possessed in Florida but was manufactured in Connecticut, thereby establishing the “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce. ... We therefore find no merit to Guinyard’s argument that Section 922(g) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied to Guinyard here.

Section 922(g)(1) is within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Stancil · filed 2021-07-13(g)(1)

We need not consider whether that motion was timely to preserve his argument, because under any standard of review, we are bound to uphold the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Granados · filed 2021-07-21(g)(1)

Granados’s instant challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and applies when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Lisbey · filed 2021-08-06(g)(1)

We have repeatedly held that § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. ... Moreover, the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Lisbey. At his plea colloquy, Lisbey agreed to the government’s recitation of the facts, which included the fact the firearm he possessed “had been manufactured in another state and had to have traveled in interstate commerce to arrive in Alaska.”

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Pleasant · filed 2021-09-15(g)(1)

Pleasant’s instant challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by people with felony convictions does not violate the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Parker · filed 2021-12-22(g)(1)

Parker contends that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional ... As he admits, these claims are foreclosed by this court’s precedent, and he raises the claims to preserve them for further review.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Mince · filed 2022-01-03(g)(1)

Mince’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a facial Commerce Clause challenge because it has an express jurisdictional requirement; firearms and ammunition manufactured outside the state of possession satisfy its interstate-commerce requirement.

United States v. Williams · filed 2022-02-10(g)(1)

We reject Williams’s challenge to the constitutionality of section 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) is not subject to a successful Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Guerra · filed 2022-02-23(g)(1)

Guerra’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)'s prohibition on firearm possession after a felony conviction does not exceed Congress's Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Williams · filed 2022-03-04(g)

§ 922(g) is unconstitutional because the Commerce Clause does not authorize its enactment. The latter claim is foreclosed, as Williams acknowledges.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) based on United States v. Lopez is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Lerma · filed 2022-03-21(g)(1)

Lerma also asserts that, under the analysis set forth in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and is therefore unconstitutional. He admits that this argument is foreclosed and is only raised to preserve the issue for further review. ... The felon-in-possession judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.

Section 922(k) falls within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

Rivera-Ruperto v. United States · filed 2022-03-31(k)

In any event, the First Circuit has “repeatedly and unreservedly rejected” the argument that § 922(k) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession after a felony conviction does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Nickerson · filed 2022-07-19(g)(1)

Relying on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and on Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), Nickerson argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the statute of conviction, exceeds the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and is thus unconstitutional. He correctly concedes that his claim is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon remains constitutional under the Commerce Clause despite National Federation.

United States v. Teran · filed 2022-08-11(g)(1)

We explained that National Federation did not address the constitu- tionality of § 922(g) and did not express an intention to overrule precedent finding § 922(g) constitutional. Id. at 146. Therefore, the parties are correct that Teran’s claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g) does not exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Latson · filed 2022-08-15(g)

Latson argues that his conviction should be vacated because Section 922(g) exceeds Congress’s legislative authority under the Commerce Clause. But Latson’s brief acknowledges that our binding precedent forecloses such a challenge, and we agree.

Section 922(g)'s requirement that a firearm have been in interstate commerce at some point is sufficient to establish its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.

Lawson v. United States · filed 2022-09-13(g)

The Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1995), forecloses Defendant’s first contention, that Congress acted without authority when it enacted § 922(g). In Bolton, the court concluded that “922(g)’s ‘requirement that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.’” Id. ... Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief on his first ground.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Leal · filed 2022-09-16(g)(1)

We have said in other opinions that we consistently uphold the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1), a statutory provision which we described as “a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.” United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 2013). We explained that National Federation did not address the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) and did not express an intention to overrule precedent finding Section 922(g)(1) constitutional. Id. at 145–46. The parties are correct that Leal’s claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority; National Federation did not overturn precedent upholding it.

United States v. Jordan · filed 2022-09-28(g)(1)

In United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 2013), we noted that we have consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), a statutory provision that we described as “a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.” We explained that National Federation did not address the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and did not express an intention to overrule precedent finding § 922(g)(1) constitutional. Id. at 146. Therefore, the parties are correct that Jordan’s claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Homer · filed 2022-10-06(g)(1)

Homer correctly concedes that his arguments challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by a felon is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Marshall · filed 2022-10-20(g)(1)

Second, Marshall argues that, pursuant to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Commerce Clause did not give Congress the authority to enact § 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession proscription. ... We cannot depart from the holdings of Turner and Chesney and therefore reject Marshall’s Commerce Clause challenge.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Nichols · filed 2022-10-06(g)(1)

In United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 2013), we noted that we have consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as “a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.” We explained that National Federation of Independent Business did not address the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and did not express an intention to overrule prior precedent finding § 922(g)(1) constitutional. Id. at 146. Therefore, the parties are correct that Nichols’s claim is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands the argument that possession without a substantial effect on interstate commerce exceeds federal power.

United States v. Griffin · filed 2022-11-23(g)(1)

Griffin also brings two claims that are foreclosed by this Court’s precedent. ... Second, Griffin argues that his § 922(g)(1) conviction must be reversed because that statute unconstitutionally extends federal control to firearm possession that does not substantially affect interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands Easton’s Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Easton · filed 2023-07-07(g)(1)

Easton correctly concedes that his arguments challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Porter · filed 2023-07-26(g)(1)

Porter correctly concedes that his arguments challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Jenkins · filed 2023-08-01(g)

Finally, Jenkins argues that the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. As he concedes, ... his argument is foreclosed.

Section 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by convicted felons, is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Hameen · filed 2023-09-18(g)(1)

Here, our binding precedent forecloses Hameen’s argu- ment that § 922(g) is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(j) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it requires a connection between the firearm and interstate or foreign commerce.

Summey v. United States · filed 2023-09-25(j)

Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) is a valid exercise of Congressional power because it requires proof that the firearm has been shipped or transported in, or is otherwise part of, interstate or foreign commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) is tied to interstate commerce and withstands an as-applied challenge alleging no interstate commerce nexus.

United States v. Desjarlais · filed 2023-10-11(g)(1)

This court has repeatedly held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “clearly is tied to interstate commerce.” ... Desjarlais’s argument is foreclosed by binding precedent, and this panel is bound by it.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) based on United States v. Lopez is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Paiva · filed 2023-11-22(g)(1)

Paiva further argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), because it exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. He is correct that his argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons withstands a Commerce Clause challenge in the Fifth Circuit.

United States v. Lujan · filed 2023-11-27(g)(1)

As to the validity of his guilty plea, Lujan first argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Lujan concedes this argument is foreclosed, so we reject it as meritless.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

United States v. Luna · filed 2023-12-11(g)(1)

Luna next argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Luna correctly concedes this argument is foreclosed, so we reject it as meritless.

Section 922(g) survives a Commerce Clause challenge because it requires a connection to interstate commerce.

United States v. Bryant · filed 2023-12-29(g)

Our court has found that the requisite jurisdictional element in § 922(g) has been met, as established in Wright, and therefore § 922(g) survives under a constitutional challenge.

Section 922(g)(1) survives a facial Commerce Clause challenge and applies to intrastate firearm possession when the firearm has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Ordaz · filed 2024-02-07(g)(1)

As Ordaz concedes, however, his facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by our precedent. ... Here, at trial, the government demonstrated that Ordaz’s firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges under Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Hood · filed 2024-02-21(g)(1)

The district court did not plainly err in convicting Hood under § 922(g) because we have upheld the ... constitutionality of § 922(g) against both facial and as applied challenges under the Commerce Clause, as Hood argues here.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Freeman · filed 2024-03-01(g)

Also, as Freeman correctly concedes, prior precedent forecloses his argument that § 922(g) violates the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(u) may criminalize the theft of firearms that have previously travelled in interstate commerce without exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Smith · filed 2024-03-11(u)

In addition, Smith asserts that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause by criminalizing the theft of firearms that have previously travelled in interstate commerce. However, he correctly concedes that the argument is unavailing. See United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013).

Section 922(n) does not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Bangash · filed 2024-03-12(n)

He argues that ... (2) Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause when it enacted § 922(n); ... Second, as Bangash himself concedes, his Commerce Clause argument is unpersuasive.

Section 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

United States v. Young · filed 2024-05-06(g)(1)

His argument is foreclosed by precedent, as we have “consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)” as a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.

Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by felons is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.

United States v. Hemphill · filed 2024-12-20(g)(1)

Hemphill’s final argument is that his felon in possession of a firearm conviction should be vacated because § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s au- thority under the Commerce Clause. ... Because there has been no intervening change in law, we are bound by our prior precedents. We therefore conclude that this argument is foreclosed.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge under plain-error review.

United States v. Bryant · filed 2025-04-02(g)

And we have squarely held § 922(g) constitutional under Congress’s commerce power.

Section 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession prohibition withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges under Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Pasquazzi · filed 2025-05-08(g)(1)

Here, Pasquazzi’s challenge to § 922(g)(1) constitutionality is foreclosed by precedent. Accordingly, we affirm this issue.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenges under Eleventh Circuit precedent.

United States v. Hood · filed 2025-05-21(g)(1)

The district court did not plainly err in convicting Hood under § 922(g) because we have upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g) against both facial and as applied challenges under the Commerce Clause, as Hood argues here.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, both facially and as applied to a defendant whose firearm traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Shavers · filed 2025-06-20(g)(1)

Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is constitu- tional under the Commerce Clause, both facially and as applied to Shavers.

A Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails under binding Fifth Circuit precedent.

United States v. Phonthalangsy · filed 2025-07-03(g)(1)

His claim that § 922(g)(1) violates the Commerce Clause similarly fails because, as he concedes, it is foreclosed by our caselaw.

Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause both facially and as applied when the firearm and ammunition were manufactured outside the state of possession.

United States v. Whitaker · filed 2025-07-09(g)(1)

We thus grant the govern- ment’s motion for summary affirmance on this claim because our precedents squarely dictate that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause both facially and as applied to Whitaker.

Section 922(g)(1) withstands an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge when the firearm previously crossed state lines, even if the defendant possessed it only within one state.

United States v. Reid · filed 2025-08-19(g)(1)

Because Reid stipulated that the firearm was “manufactured outside the State of Florida and subsequently moved into the State of Florida,” his Commerce Clause argument fails.

Section 922(g) withstands a Commerce Clause challenge when the firearm traveled in interstate commerce; manufacture outside the state of possession establishes that connection.

United States v. Allen · filed 2025-09-12(g)

The Government satisfied its burden in showing that the relevant firearm traveled in interstate commerce because Allen conceded during the plea colloquy that the firearm he possessed was manufactured outside of Florida.

Section 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it contains an express jurisdictional requirement.

United States v. Adan Smith · filed 2026-02-19(g)(1)

The statute is facially constitutional because it contains an express jurisdictional requirement.

Section 922(j) treats knowing possession of a stolen firearm, including constructive possession, as a continuing violation while the possession lasts.

United States v. Al-Rekabi · filed 2006-07-17(j)

A violation of § 922(j) continues so long as the defendant knowingly possesses (actually or constructively) a firearm he knows to be stolen.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence that the defendant admitted buying the firearm and was the sole occupant of the room where it was found.

United States v. Paulette · filed 2006-08-10(g)

Resolving the credibility dispute in favor of the jury’s verdict, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a rational fact-finder to infer that Paulette possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g) requires the government to prove that the defendant actually or constructively possessed a firearm.

United States v. Ashlock · filed 2007-04-03(g)

To carry its burden under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government had to prove that M r. Ashlock actually or constructively possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g) permits a possession conviction even when a person controls a firearm only briefly.

United States v. Lee · filed 2008-08-27(g)

The proposed instruction misstated the law because of its provision that “passing control” did not constitute possession. ... Because “brevity alone does not preclude conviction,” id. (quotation omitted), Lee’s instruction was incorrect when it stated that “passing control” is not possession.

Section 922(j) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a stolen firearm.

United States v. Thomas · filed 2010-06-07(j)

To obtain a conviction under § 922(j) for possession of a stolen weapon, the Government also had to prove knowing possession of a stolen weapon.

Section 922(g) requires proof of actual or constructive possession of a firearm; mere presence nearby is insufficient.

United States v. Punzalan · filed 2011-01-18(g)

To sustain a conviction under § 922(g), the government must prove the defendant’s actual or constructive possession of the firearm and not merely his or her presence in its vicinity.

Section 922(g)’s firearm possession element can be supported by testimony linking the defendant to a discarded handgun.

United States v. Clemons · filed 2011-07-20(g)

The testimony of Handley and others clearly constitutes some evidence probative of Clemons’s possession of the Lorcin handgun.

Section 922(g)’s possession element can be proved by eyewitness testimony that the defendant actually possessed the firearm.

United States v. Owens · filed 2012-01-31(g)

In a light most favorable to the Government, the jury could believe these two eyewitnesses and find that Owens was in actual possession of the firearm. As Owens does not dispute that the remaining elements of the crime were proven, his argument must fail.

Section 922(j) requires possession of a firearm transported in interstate commerce with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe it was stolen; theft of the firearm is not an element.

United States v. Davis · filed 2013-05-01(j)

The elements of Davis’s offense—possession of a stolen firearm in violation of § 922(j)— include: (1) possession of a firearm that (2) has been trans- ported in interstate commerce, and that (3) the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe was stolen. 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). Thus, as in Blake, here the specific conduct underly- ing the elements of the offense, "and thus forming the basis for [the] offense of conviction, does not include the theft." 81 F.3d at 506.

Section 922(g)’s possession requirement can be satisfied when a felon handles, inspects, negotiates for, and pays for firearms before passing them to someone else.

United States v. Casteel · filed 2013-06-21(g)

The jury reasonably found Casteel possessed the firearms as required for conviction under § 922(g).

Section 922(j) permits a jury to infer knowing possession of a stolen firearm and awareness that it was stolen from the circumstances of its disappearance and concealment.

United States v. Donahue · filed 2017-03-08(j)

Given the circumstances surrounding the gun’s disappearance and the manner in which it was discovered in Donahue’s car, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to ... decide that Donahue knowingly possessed the firearm, that the gun was stolen, and that Donahue knew or had reasonable cause to believe that it was stolen.

Section 922(j) prohibits possessing a stolen firearm that moved or was shipped in interstate commerce when the possessor knew or had reasonable cause to believe it was stolen.

United States v. Grantz · filed 2021-11-15(j)

We have thoroughly reviewed the evidence adduced at trial and conclude that it was sufficient to prove (1) Grantz possessed a stolen firearm; (2) which moved or was shipped in interstate commerce; and (3) Grantz knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the firearm was stolen.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits firearm possession after a state misdemeanor conviction when the offense carried a maximum prison term exceeding two years.

Com. v. Willis, C. · filed 2017-01-09(g)(1)

Because the maximum penalty Petitioner could have received for the Second Offense DUI exceeded two years, the Petitioner was prohibited from possessing a firearm under the Federal Act, as of his conviction date on June 19, 2006.

For § 922(g)(1), an Oklahoma drug offender’s deferred sentence under § 2-410 counts as a conviction during the deferral period.

United States v. Law · filed 2014-07-22(g)(1)

What constitutes a predicate felony within the meaning of § 922(g) is controlled by Oklahoma law. ... The amended § 2-410 therefore applies to his deferred sentence, which means that during his five-year deferral period Mr. Law had a “conviction” for the purpose of satisfying the predicate felony requirement for the crime of felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a predicate conviction that qualifies as a felony.

United States v. Lamont King · filed 2012-08-23(g)(1)

We further conclude that under Simmons, the predicate conviction offered in support of Counts Two and Five is not a felony.

A New York first-degree scheme-to-defraud conviction makes a person prohibited under § 922(g)(1) because it does not qualify for the business-practices exemption.

United States v. Miller · filed 2012-05-17(g)(1)

For this reason, Miller was a prohibited person under the felon-in-possession statute, § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) bars firearm receipt after a state misdemeanor conviction punishable by more than two years, but a misdemeanor punishable by two years or less does not trigger the bar.

Perkoski v. Pennsylvania State Police · filed 2011-08-12(g)(1)

Accordingly, although a first-degree misdemeanor would preclude gun ownership under the Federal Gun Control Act, a second-degree misdemeanor would not.

Section 922(g)(1) can rest on other qualifying felony convictions even if one asserted predicate conviction is invalid.

United States v. Pruess · filed 2011-03-14(g)(1)

However, we need not reach the constitutional question as we conclude that, regardless of whether his initial felony conviction was invalid or is invalidated, Pruess had several other felony convictions not based on his status as a felon at the time of the commission of the instant offense that qualify as predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1).

A Missouri felony conviction remains a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when the state has not restored sufficient civil rights to the defendant.

United States v. Akens · filed 2010-03-11(g)(1)

Under Brown, Akens’s Missouri conviction is a sufficient predicate for his § 922(g)(1) conviction.

A conviction for filing a false income tax return qualifies as a predicate for § 922(g)(1) because it is not an unfair trade practice offense.

United States v. Schnell · filed 2009-11-12(g)(1)

Schnell’s only remaining argument is that his first conviction for filing a false tax return is not an appropriate predicate for § 922(g)(1) because it falls within the trade-offense exception of § 921(a)(20). ... His argument is frivolous. Filing a false income tax return is not akin to an unfair trade practice.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a person whose prior conviction is for trafficking in modified telecommunications instruments; that conviction does not fall within the business practices exclusion in § 921(a)(20)(A).

United States v. Schultz · filed 2009-11-05(g)(1)

Kevin Schultz was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Therefore, the § 921(a)(20)(A) exclusion does not apply to Schultz’s predicate conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a prior felony conviction to serve as a predicate despite clerical errors in its judgment when the fact of conviction is established.

United States v. Penney · filed 2009-08-07(g)(1)

Finally, the alleged inaccuracy or clerical error on the judgment form does not vitiate the “fact” of conviction that is necessary and sufficient to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(9) permits prosecution when a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction was set aside only after the defendant was arrested for possessing a firearm.

United States v. Epps · filed 2007-09-07(g)(9)

Second, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980), bars Epps’ assertion that the dismissal of his state court conviction precludes prosecution under § 922(g)(9). Although Congress provided in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) that a conviction that “has been expunged or set aside” may not serve as a predicate conviction for prosecution under § 922(g)(9), Epps’ conviction was not set aside until after he was arrested for possessing a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(9).

Section 922(g) treats a prior conviction as a predicate offense when the crime is punishable by a state prison term, even if the court that entered the conviction could not impose that term.

United States v. Sousa · filed 2006-11-15(g)

Nevertheless, assault with a dangerous weapon carries the potential for a state prison term, and therefore Sousa was convicted of a felony. ... Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that Sousa's 1977 conviction was a predicate offense under § 922(g).

A North Carolina conviction qualifies as a predicate felony under § 922(g)(1) if any defendant convicted of that offense could receive a sentence exceeding one year.

United States v. Montague · filed 2006-11-29(g)(1)

Montague’s argument is squarely foreclosed by this court’s decision in United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246-47 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 297 (2005), which holds that United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1999), is still viable after Blakely and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and reaffirms that a prior North Carolina conviction satisfies § 922(g)(1) if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence in excess of one year. Thus, because it is undisputed that a sentence of over twelve months could be imposed on a defendant convicted of felony breaking and entering a motor vehicle in North Carolina, Montague’s prior conviction was properly considered a predicate felony under § 922(g)(1).

For § 922(g)(1), whether a state conviction is punishable by more than one year depends on the maximum sentence authorized by the state statute, not the sentence available to the particular defendant under state sentencing guidelines.

United States v. Garrison · filed 2006-12-05(g)(1)

Under our case law, whether a predicate state conviction is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is determined by “the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute,” not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed under the state’s sentencing guidelines against the particular defendant for his prior relevant crime.

Section 922(g)(1) applies when the predicate crime is punishable by more than one year in prison, regardless of whether it is labeled a felony.

United States v. Keyes · filed 2007-11-09(g)(1)

The plain language of § 922(g)(1), however, forecloses Defendant’s interpretation. Unlike the INA, the predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1) is not of an “aggravated felony,” nor even a “felony.” Instead, the predicate conviction under § 922(g)(1) is of any “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s prior-conviction element may be met by an Oklahoma deferred drug judgment, allowing the charge to survive a motion to dismiss.

United States v. Neeley · filed 2007-12-18(g)(1)

Because of the express language of 63 Okl. St. Ann. § 2-410, the government will most likely be able to meet its burden to prove that defendant has “been convicted” of a felony for purposes of § 922(g)(1), despite the fact defendant is currently subject to deferred judgment in Oklahoma. Defendant’s motion to dismiss shall therefore be denied.

A deferred judgment that counts as a conviction under Iowa law is a predicate conviction for Section 922(g)(1).

United States v. Reth · filed 2007-12-19(g)(1)

Dana Reth was indicted in the Northern District of Iowa on a charge of possession of a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... Reth appeals, renewing his claim that his deferred judgment was not a "conviction" sufficient to disable his right to possess firearms under Iowa law. ... After careful de novo review, we conclude denial was proper for the reasons stated in the well-reasoned opinion of the district court. Accordingly, we decline certification and affirm the decision of the district court.

Section 922(g)(1) uses the statutory maximum, rather than the state sentencing guidelines maximum, to determine whether a prior crime is punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. Bride · filed 2008-01-07(g)(1)

This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir.2005) (under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a crime is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” if the statutory maximum—not the state sentencing guidelines maximum—for that crime exceeds one year).

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, measured by the maximum sentence available to the particular defendant under state law.

United States v. Hill · filed 2008-01-15(g)(1)

Therefore, at no time was Hill subject to a sentence greater than one year for his 2005 Kansas conviction. Accordingly, Hill does not have a qualifying conviction for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and his conviction must be overturned.

A state felony remains a predicate under § 922(g)(1) when the person is still barred from possessing a gun under state law.

United States v. Brown · filed 2008-01-17(g)(1)

The probationary period did not terminate until March 1996, meaning Brown could not own a gun under Louisiana statutory law until March 2006—i.e., he could not own a gun under federal law in July 2005 when he was arrested.

Section 922(g)(1) covers a person whose prior state conviction is a felony punishable by more than one year, even when prior offenses are elements that make the state crime a felony.

United States v. Carr · filed 2008-01-25(g)(1)

In other words, the “elevation” of Carr’s offense from gross misdemeanor to felony was consummated before sentencing proceedings even began: the felony designation and the potential imprisonment for up to five years resulted directly from the conviction of a crime with a distinctive felony element, not from the sentencing proceedings. Accordingly, Carr’s conviction satisfies all the requirements of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) includes Puerto Rican convictions as domestic predicate convictions.

United States v. Laboy-Torres · filed 2009-01-29(g)(1)

To the contrary, we conclude that Congress intended to include Puerto Rican convictions as predicates for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate felony under § 922(g)(1) is a question of law for the district court.

United States v. Boaz · filed 2009-03-16(g)(1)

We have repeatedly held that whether a particular conviction qualifies as a predicate felony for the purpose of § 922(g) is a question of law for the district court.

Section 922(g) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison; for a North Carolina conviction, that depends on the maximum sentence the particular defendant could have received.

United States v. Carter · filed 2012-03-13(g)

Thus, under Simmons, none of these three convictions were offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year for the purpose of the federal felon-in-possession statute.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a prior conviction punishable by more than one year in prison, measured by the maximum sentence available to the defendant.

United States v. Ohangbon · filed 2012-04-17(g)(1)

Applying Simmons, it appears that Ohangbon did not have the requisite predicate offense to be convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) treats a state felony conviction as a predicate despite the court’s failure to pronounce guilt or sentence when the defendant knew the terms of his guilty plea and sentence.

United States v. Moore · filed 2015-03-17(g)(1)

Moore knew he was pleading guilty and he knew the terms of his bargained-for sentence. The trial court’s failure to pronounce the words, “I find you guilty,” or to announce the specific sentence in Moore’s presence do not render his conviction a nullity for purposes of a federal firearm disability.

Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally use a prior federal misprision-of-felony conviction as the predicate for a felon-in-possession charge.

United States v. Phillips · filed 2016-07-06(g)(1)

And assuming the propriety of felon firearm bans—as we must under Supreme Court precedent and our own—there is little question that Phillips’s predicate conviction for misprision of felony can constitutionally serve as the basis for a felon ban.

Section 922(g)(1) treats mandatory post-release supervision as part of the imprisonment term when determining whether a prior conviction is a predicate offense.

United States v. Ricardo Williams, Jr. · filed 2016-11-03(g)(1)

Therefore, we conclude that based on our decision in Barlow, the district court erred in determining that Hargett and Williams’ prior convictions were not predicate offenses for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1) does not treat an offense punishable only by mandatory probation as a predicate crime, even if the sentence includes a suspended term of imprisonment.

United States v. Hilleland · filed 2021-11-29(g)(1)

Hisey instructs that a crime punishable only with mandatory probation, even with a suspended sentence of imprisonment, is not a predicate crime under § 922(g).

Section 922(g)(1) treats theft and armed robbery as predicate offenses when they are punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.

United States v. LeBlanc · filed 2025-08-05(g)(1)

To start, we look only to those predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1) that are “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Diaz, 116 F.4th at 467 (quoting § 922(g)(1)). That means assessing whether LeBlanc’s prior Louisiana convictions for theft and armed robbery qualify. They plainly do.

A Texas burglary-of-a-vehicle conviction from 1985 qualifies as a predicate offense under § 922(g)(1) because it remains punishable by more than one year under the applicable Texas law.

United States v. Schmidt · filed 2007-05-16(g)(1)

Accordingly, his ... state conviction is a predicate offense for pur- ... poses of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g) and Section 922(j) permit separate charges based on one firearm because each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Bender v. United States · filed 2022-08-08(g), (j)

Second, even if the Smith & Wesson pistol were the only weapon mentioned in Counts 1 and 2, the government is free to prosecute a defendant for separate offenses under Section 922(g) (as in Count 1) and Section 922(j) (as in Count 2) based on a single firearm because “each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate convictions for weapons stored in a vehicle and a building when they constitute separate acts of possession.

United States v. Washington · filed 2016-11-21(g)(1)

Logically, however, storing some weapons in a vehicle and others in a building represent separate acts of possession. ... Accordingly, we conclude that it was not plain error to enter judgment against Washington for two separate section 922(g)(1) convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that firearms were stored or acquired at different times or places to support separate sentences for multiple felon-in-possession counts.

United States v. Ray · filed 2015-08-13(g)(1)

As the government properly acknowledged in its sentencing memorandum, when multiple weapons are confiscated, the government must establish “that the firearms were stored or acquired at different times or places” in order to support separate sentences on felon-in-possession convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Separate § 922(g)(1) counts for a firearm and ammunition turn on whether the items were separately acquired or stored, even if the possession dates overlap.

United States v. John Woolsey, Jr. · filed 2014-07-17(g)(1)

The test is not whether there was any period of overlap, but whether the two items were separately acquired or stored.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate convictions for firearms stored in separate locations because each can constitute a distinct incident of possession.

United States v. Kennedy · filed 2012-06-15(g)(1)

These facts were enough to show that Kennedy did not simultaneously possess the guns, but rather stored them in separate locations, albeit at times on the premises of the same street address. On these facts, it was proper for the Government to charge separate § 922(g)(1) counts.

Section 922(j) does not make the number of firearms an element of receiving or selling stolen firearms.

United States v. Louchart · filed 2012-05-25(j)

The quantity of firearms involved was not an element of the offense, and the quantity of firearms alleged in the indictment was not admitted by Louchart at the plea hearing or in a plea agreement.

Section 922(g) permits the government to present felon and domestic violence misdemeanor possession theories to the jury in separate counts based on the same firearm possession.

United States v. Ayotte · filed 2012-01-11(g)

This means that the Government “is entitled to get both theories before the jury, whether in one count or two” and to proceed in this case with counts for both felon in possession and prior conviction for misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Under First Circuit law, to do so violates neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor congressional intent under § 922(g).

Section 922(o) requires proof that the firearm was a machine gun, while § 922(g)(5)(A) requires proof that its possessor was unlawfully in the country; the two offenses may be charged separately.

United States v.Malachowski · filed 2011-03-23(o), (g)(5)(A)

Each required the government to prove one distinct fact the other did not: Count One required the government to show that Malachowski possessed not just any firearm but a machine gun, and Count Six required the government to show not just that Malachowski possessed a firearm, but that he did so while being in the country unlawfully.

Separate firearm and ammunition convictions under § 922(g)(1) can stand on plain-error review when the record does not show how or when the items were acquired.

United States v. Santiago · filed 2010-07-19(g)(1)

But, because Santiago pled guilty to the separate counts and did not object to the separate convictions, the record is devoid of any evidence concerning how and when these items were acquired. Accordingly, we cannot find that the District Court committed plain error in entering separate convictions pursuant to § 922(g)(1) for gun and ammunition possession.

Section 922(g) requires the firearm possession counts at issue to merge into one conviction.

United States v. Gale · filed 2010-06-23(g)

In vacating the sentence imposed on all counts, we instruct the District Court to merge the § 922(g) offenses into one conviction consistent with Tann, 577 F.3d at 533, 543, and to resentence Gale after setting forth its explanation for the sentence to be imposed on both the § 922(g) count and Count V.

Section 922(g)(1) treats firearms and ammunition seized from the same location on a single day as one offense, so separate counts for their possession are multiplicitous.

United States v. Widi · filed 2010-03-19(g)(1)

Because Counts One and Three of the Superseding Indictment charge Defendant with the same crime and involve firearms and ammunition seized from the same location on a single day, those counts are multiplicitious.

Section 922(g)(1) treats continuous possession of the same firearm as one offense, even when it spans separate days.

United States v. Hope · filed 2008-10-30(g)(1)

Such reasoning implicitly recognizes that continuing possession of the same firearm is a single course of conduct under the statute, constituting one offense.

Section 922(g)(1) treats uninterrupted possession of the same firearm across separate days as one offense.

United States v. Hope · filed 2008-10-08(g)(1)

Such reasoning implicitly recognizes that continuing possession of the same firearm is a single course of conduct under the statute, constituting one offense.

Section 922(g) does not permit separate felon-in-possession and fugitive-in-possession convictions for possessing the same firearm on the same occasion.

United States v. Hollis · filed 2007-10-30(g)(1), (g)(2)

In this case, Munoz-Romo unequivocally prohibits Hollis’s simultaneous conviction for Counts One and Two.

Multiple § 922(g) counts for firearm and ammunition possession merge into one conviction and sentence when the jury convicts on more than one count.

United States v. Sales · filed 2007-09-06(g)

In any event, upon merging the § 922(g) counts, Sales would have only one felon in possession conviction and serve only one sentence. We agree that the case should be remanded so that the district court can effect such a merger.

Section 922(g)(3) permits separate firearm possession convictions for possession at different locations.

United States v. Perry · filed 2007-09-05(g)(3)

Under this court’s precedent, a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of possessing a firearm if he possessed those firearms at different locations. ... Counts seven and twelve involved possession at different locations and, consequently, were not multiplicitous.

Section 922(g)(1) permits multiple felon-in-possession convictions only when the government proves separate acquisition and possession.

United States v. Ankeny · filed 2007-09-05(g)(1)

Accordingly, we remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss all but one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) treats firearm possession across a charged period as one continuing offense, so jurors need not agree on the precise day of possession.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2007-03-12(g)(1)

If half of the jurors found that Jackson possessed the gun on July 12 and half found that he possessed it on July 15, the jury would still be unanimous that he possessed a gun between July 12 and July 15 — which is exactly what the indictment charged.

Section 922(g)(1) treats uninterrupted possession of a firearm as one continuing offense; separate counts require proof that possession stopped between them.

United States v. Jackson, Johnny J. · filed 2007-03-12(g)(1)

Indeed, to convict Jackson on two separate counts of being a felon in possession, the government would have had to prove that he lost possession of the gun at some point between the two charged dates.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate counts for possession of the same firearm when possession is interrupted and the defendant later reacquires it.

United States v. Curls · filed 2007-03-05(g)(1)

Thus, the government’s theory was that M r. Curls’s possession of the firearm was interrupted and that he had reacquired it the following day, when law enforcement officers discovered it in the center console of the car in which he was riding. Accordingly, we conclude that the two counts of the superceding indictment are not multiplicitous.

Section 922(g) permits only one unlawful firearm possession charge for a single possession incident, even when the defendant belongs to multiple prohibited classes.

United States v. Herman · filed 2006-11-17(g)

In Richardson, we held that a defendant involved in a single incident of possession may be prosecuted for only one charge of unlawful firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), even if he fits within more than one prohibited class. Id. at 422. Here, the government concedes that the record must be corrected to include only one count of conviction. ... Accordingly, we affirm Herman’s sentence but remand to the district court with instructions to vacate one of his unlawful possession convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) permits multiple felon-in-possession convictions only when the government proves separate acquisition and possession.

United States v. Kelly David Ankeny, Sr. · filed 2007-06-19(g)(1)

Accordingly, we remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss all but one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) supports only one conviction for firearms possessed together in the same vehicle, even when they are stored in different parts of it.

United States v. Guice, Reginald · filed 2007-08-08(g)(1)

We see no material difference between those cases and this one, and thus we conclude that the district court should not have entered two separate convictions for the two sets of guns.

Section 922(g) does not allow separate felon-in-possession and illegal-alien-in-possession convictions based on the same firearm.

United States v. Medellin-Torres · filed 2008-09-22(g)(1), (g)(5)

Medellin is correct that his convictions for illegal alien in possession of a firearm and felon in possession of a firearm violate his rights against double jeopardy.

Section 922(g)(3) permits a separate charge for each firearm and unit of ammunition possessed by an unlawful drug user.

United States v. Cheeseman · filed 2009-01-15(g)(3)

Each individual firearm and unit of ammunition could have been charged and forfeited as a separate offense under §-922(g).

Section 922(o) and § 922(g)(5)(A) define separate offenses because each requires proof of an element the other does not.

United States v. Malachowski · filed 2009-04-01

Defendant’s motion to dismiss either Count One or Count Six on the ground that the two counts are unduly multiplicitous must be denied because each count requires proof of an element that is not included in the other count. Count One requires the Government to prove defendant possessed a machine gun, whereas Count Six requires proof that defendant was an illegal alien in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) treats firearms and ammunition found in different locations as separate felon-in-possession offenses.

United States v. Fillman · filed 2011-02-03(g)(1)

As to the felon-in-possession counts, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the firearms and ammunition were discovered in different locations and are thus separate offenses.

Section 922(g) treats simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition as one violation unless the possession arose from separate courses of conduct.

United State v. Hunter · filed 2011-04-12(g)

It is true, as counsel recognizes, that simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition (or multiple units of either or both) constitutes a single violation of § 922(g) unless the government can trace the possession to separate courses of conduct.

Section 922(g) permits charges under multiple subdivisions for one act of possession, but does not permit multiple convictions or sentences for that act.

United States v. Modena · filed 2011-07-14(g)

A district court thus cannot impose multiple ... punishments on a defendant who commits one act of possession yet is both a felon and a domestic- violence misdemeanant.

Separate § 922(g) convictions require a jury to find separate acquisitions or possessions of the firearm.

United States v. Fierro · filed 2011-09-15(g)

Moreover, in order to support separate § 922(g) offenses, the separateness of acquisition or possession of a firearm must be found by a jury.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction and sentence for simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition when the government charges and proves a single episode of possession.

United States v. Cristobal Meza, III · filed 2012-11-09(g)(1)

In summary, absent an indictment charging Meza with possessing or receiving the firearms and ammunition on separate occasions, and proof and argument supporting the same, his dual convictions and sentences under § 922(g)(1) cannot stand under Berry.