18 U.S.C. § 922

Section 922(g)(1) treats a felon’s possession of the same firearm as a continuing offense; separate convictions require an interruption in possession.

United States v. Benjamin · filed 2013-03-26(g)(1)

Because the felon-in-possession crime is continuing, charging and punishing a defendant twice for the same firearm requires an interruption in continuity of possession.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction for a single incident of firearm possession, even if the person belongs to multiple disqualified classes or possesses multiple firearms.

United States v. John Bloch, III · filed 2013-05-20(g)

A single incident of firearm possession can yield only one conviction under § 922(g), no matter how many disqualified classes the defendant belongs to or how many firearms he possessed.

Section 922(g) treats simultaneous possession of multiple firearms as one violation that should be charged in one count.

United States v. Robinson · filed 2017-04-25(g)

The simultaneous possession of multiple firearms is still one violation of § 922(g) that should be charged in one count.

Section 922(g)(1) treats distinct incidents of firearm possession as separate offenses when they involve different guns on different dates.

United States v. Hickson · filed 2018-01-08(g)(1)

The problem, however, is that Hickson’s purchase of the twelve firearms in Sandy Springs, Georgia on April 29, 2014, was a separate “incident of possession” that can—for purposes of Section 922(g)(1)—stand apart from the act of illegal possession alleged in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1) permits separate felon-in-possession counts involving the same firearm when possession was interrupted between occasions.

United States v. Gilliam · filed 2019-08-20(g)(1)

The evidence places Gilliam in possession of the same firearm in different locations and on different days with the weapon in someone else’s (Jeffrey’s) exclusive possession for at least some period of time in the interim. ... The district court did not commit plain error by not merging his firearm possession counts.

Section 922(g)(1) permits multiple felon-in-possession convictions only when the firearms were acquired or stored separately.

United States v. Lugo · filed 2019-08-27(g)(1)

In order to sustain multiple convictions of felon-in-possession, a jury must find that the weapons charged in different counts were either stored or acquired separately from one another.

Section 922(g) does not support separate firearm and ammunition counts when the ammunition was not stored or acquired separately from the gun.

United States v. Conner · filed 2005-05-17(g)

Conner next argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred in sentencing him for multiple offenses of 18 U.S.C. §922(g). ... Therefore, on remand, the district court should vacate Counts 2 and 4, and sentence Conner based on Counts 1 and 3.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction and punishment for a single act of firearm possession, even when the defendant belongs to multiple prohibited classes.

United States v. Grant · filed 2021-10-01(g)

Thus, this statute does not permit a court to, as the district court did here, “impose multiple punishments on a defendant who commits one act of possession yet is both a felon and a domestic-violence misdemeanant.” Modena, 430 F. App’x at 446.

Section 922(g) permits only one conviction when the same act with the same firearm violates both the felon and unlawful-alien possession prohibitions.

United States v. Salas · filed 2022-01-20(g)

Finally, Lara Salas argues that one of his firearms convictions should be vacated, given that both arose from the same act involving the same firearm. See United States v. Grant, 15 F.4th 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2021). The government agrees, as do we. One conviction was for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1); the other, for being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(5)(A). The district court must vacate one of these convictions.

Sections 922(n) and 922(g)(1) do not plainly prohibit sentencing for both receiving and possessing the same firearm.

United States v. Gross · filed 2022-01-24(n), (g)(1)

Following oral argument, we ordered supplemental briefing to address whether Gross could be sentenced for both receipt and possession of the same firearm, in violation of both 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We review this issue for plain error and find no error that is plain.

Section 922(g)(1) permits only one conviction for simultaneous possession of multiple firearms; multiplicitous convictions must be merged and one sentence vacated.

United States v. Miles · filed 2023-11-13(g)(1)

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s judgment with respect to Miles’s § 922(g)(1) convictions and REMAND with limited instructions to vacate one of Miles’s § 922(g)(1) sentences and merge his multiplicitous § 922(g)(1) convictions.

Section 922(g)(1) allows separate felon-in-possession charges for firearms acquired at different times or stored in separate places when different evidence supports each possession.

United States v. Burgara · filed 2025-01-02(g)(1)

Once again, at minimum, it is not plain error to conclude that when different evidence shows that a defendant possessed each firearm that was acquired or stored separately, each firearm can support a separate felon in possession charge.

Section 922(g)(1) treats simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition as a single offense, so charging both in one count is not duplicitous.

Hobbs · filed 2025-12-05(g)(1)

Possession of multiple firearms or a firearm loaded with ammunition at one time constitutes a single possession: “[A] defendant violates § 922(g) once when he possesses at one time and place ‘any firearm or ammunition,’ 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); it does not matter if he has one, two, three, or more firearms.” United States v. Faison, 840 F.App’x 736, 739 (4th Cir. 2021). ... Thus, the indictment was neither duplicitous nor constructively amended during trial, and trial counsel did not err by failing to object.

Section 922(g)(8) does not apply to state civil forfeiture cases.

Brewer v. State · filed 2006-11-20(g)(8)

Finally, we agree with the State that 18 USC § 922 (g) (8), cited by appellant, has absolutely no application to state civil forfeiture cases.

A felon’s possession of a firearm may be proved by evidence that he reached toward it, that it was found on his side of the bed, and that he claimed it was his.

United States v. Bell · filed 2007-02-21(g)(1)

Regarding his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, Bell challenges whether there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate he possessed the firearm in question. Evidence consistent with his possession included the officers’ observation of his movement apparently toward the gun upon their entry into the room, the location of the gun under Bell’s side of the bed, Humphrey’s initial statement that the gun belonged to Bell, and Bell’s statement claiming ownership of the gun. Considering this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Bell, who is not contesting he is a felon, possessed the revolver charged in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is supported when the evidence permits a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Fable · filed 2025-10-02(g)(1)

Drawing all inferences in favor of the Government, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Fable possessed the firearm within the meaning of § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element may be proved through DNA and circumstantial evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Charles Grim Rudolph · filed 2025-09-30(g)(1)

In short, a reasonable construction of the testimony offered at trial and the presence of Rudolph’s DNA on the trigger and grip of the firearm allowed the jury to find him guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon beyond a reasonable doubt.

A jury may infer knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) from a defendant’s control of a vehicle and other evidence connecting him to a firearm and ammunition inside it.

United States v. Conley · filed 2023-03-02(g)(1)

Here, there was ample evidence at trial to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Conley knew the firearm and ammunition were in the vehicle. He was the one driving the vehicle, and the (loaded) firearm and ammunition were found in the dash compartment—right next to cash, drugs, and a digital scale that Conley admitted were his.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and constructive possession can satisfy the possession element.

United States v. Pugh · filed 2019-03-28(g)(1)

To show knowing possession of the gun, the government “need not prove actual possession” but rather “need only show constructive possession through direct or circumstantial evidence.” ... A reasonable jury could have concluded, as this jury did, that Pugh knowingly possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) ordinarily does not require proof that the defendant generally knows what firearms are.

United States v. Ebon P.D. Brown · filed 2014-08-27(g)(1)

In the ordinary course, however, a defendant’s general knowledge about firearms is not in question in a felon-in-possession case, and the government is thus not required to show that the defendant “knows what firearms are” to secure a conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; when the government proves actual possession, that proof ordinarily satisfies the knowledge element.

United States v. Caldwell · filed 2014-07-24(g)(1)

Although 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) criminalizes the “knowing” possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a defendant’s knowledge is almost never a material issue when the government relies exclusively on a theory of actual possession. Indeed, absent unusual circumstances (such as when a defendant claims he did not realize the object in his hand was a gun), the knowledge element in a felon-in-possession case will necessarily be satisfied if the jury finds the defendant physically possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be established by circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could find that the defendant possessed the firearm.

United States v. Wilborn · filed 2011-12-13(g)(1)

A rational jury could find that these facts, taken together, demonstrated his possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a firearm, and an officer’s testimony can establish that element.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2011-09-16(g)(1)

In light of Officer Eiserman’s testimony, we conclude that the ... evidence was sufficient to establish the element of possession necessary to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be supported by testimony that the defendant admitted owning the firearm, even when DNA testing is inconclusive.

United States v. Kelly · filed 2010-11-22(g)(1)

As it was free to do, the jury in this case chose to credit the testimony of Sergeant Waller that Kelly had admitted to being the pistol’s owner. ... Therefore, we conclude Kelly’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm was supported by sufficient evidence.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element may be proved by a defendant’s admission that the guns were his, supported by evidence connecting him to where they were found.

United States v. Holmes · filed 2010-09-02(g)(1)

We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to overcome a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support Holmes' conviction on the felon-in-possession charge. Holmes had a key to the house and was seen at the house, and he admitted to Officer Singh that the guns were his, giving a reason corroborated by the officers.

For a § 922(g)(1) charge, independent evidence that the firearm the defendant admitted possessing was stolen can sufficiently corroborate his confession.

United States v. Brown · filed 2010-08-24(g)(1)

Here, the corroborating evidence—that the type of gun stolen from Helms’ house was the type Brown admitted to possessing—“implicate[s]” Brown in the charged crime. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 489–90 n.15. The independent evidence provided sufficient corroboration.

A conviction under § 922(g)(5) may rest on corroborated admissions and independent evidence establishing possession of a firearm.

United States v. Trevorton St. Aubin Facey · filed 2010-07-15(g)(5)

We therefore hold that the district court did not err in denying Facey’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts One and Three because, taken together, his corroborated admissions and independent evidence established that he possessed the firearm involved in both offenses.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; being asleep when found with a weapon does not necessarily defeat proof of knowledge.

United States v. Nevils · filed 2010-03-19(g)(1)

Accordingly, at the ... second step of Jackson, we conclude that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Nevils knowingly possessed the firearms and ammunition found on or near his body, notwithstanding evidence that he was asleep.

Section 922(g)(1) requires no minimum period of firearm possession; brief possession by a felon is enough.

United States v. Nolan · filed 2009-08-17(g)(1)

First, there is no element of time required to establish possession of a firearm within 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is supported by evidence that the defendant knowingly placed a gun in a locked glove box.

United States v. Booker, Earl · filed 2007-09-05(g)(1)

The only possible inference from these facts is that Booker himself placed (and locked) the gun in the glove box, which suggests that Booker knew that the gun was in fact a gun and that he did not want Officer Pols to find it.

A § 922(g)(1) conviction can rest on evidence that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm found between the mattress and box spring of his bed.

United States v. Philson · filed 2007-04-03(g)(1)

Thus, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Philson knowingly possessed the firearm found between the mattress and box spring of his bed.

A confession corroborated by witness testimony can establish the knowing possession element of § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Cartwright · filed 2007-04-12(g)(1)

In the instant case, the possession element-the only element that Appellant disputes-in each count was also established by Appellant’s confession and corroborated by witness testimony.

Evidence that a defendant discarded a jacket containing a gun can support a finding of knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. David · filed 2007-04-17(g)(1)

Based on this evidence, the jury reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that David possessed the gun in the sleeve of his jacket and that he knew the gun was there.

Section 922(g)(1) requires a convicted felon to knowingly possess a firearm; possession may be inferred from evidence that the person had a gun and tried to conceal it.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2007-05-17(g)(1)

Consequently, the only fact for the jury to decide was whether Jackson was in knowing possession of a firearm. ... Given the evidence, however, the jury could have drawn the plausible inference that Jackson had a gun in his possession and attempted to conceal it from police.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, which a jury may infer from the defendant identifying a gun beneath his back and officers finding it there.

United States v. Parrott · filed 2007-07-16(g)(1)

Parrott challenges only the second element of his § 922(g)(1) conviction. ... We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Parrott knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm; possession may be actual or constructive.

United States v. Holt · filed 2007-08-15(g)(1)

The jury’s determination that Holt knowingly possessed firearms is well supported by the evidence presented in this case.

Knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Smith · filed 2007-08-21(g)(1)

Not only does the circumstantial evidence of the testifying officers reasonably support the inference that Defendant had the gun in his possession when he went over the fence, but Defendant also testified on his own behalf, and the jury was entitled to reject his version of the facts as a fabrication.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be proved by a gun found beneath the driver’s seat and the driver’s admission that he had it.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2007-09-21(g)(1)

From the evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm but does not require proof of any particular intent beyond that knowledge.

United States v. Moran · filed 2007-09-25(g)(1)

W e note that the crime of felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is a general intent crime. See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 716. The government need not prove any particular “intent,” but must show only that a felon possessed a firearm “knowingly.”

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence that permits a reasonable inference of possession.

United States v. Cofield · filed 2007-10-23(g)(1)

We conclude that the jurors could reasonably infer from this evidence that Cofield knowingly possessed the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, and a guilty plea must have a sufficient factual basis for that element.

United States v. Nelson · filed 2007-11-02(g)(1)

Although Nelson denied knowledge of possession of the firearm subsequent to his arrest and prior to his mistrial, he knowingly and voluntarily admitted guilt of the elements of the crime, including knowing possession of the firearm at the rearraignment hearing. Our review of the record, including the indictment, the factual stipulation, the rearraignment transcript, and the presentence report, demonstrates that Nelson’s guilty plea was supported by a sufficient factual basis, and the district court’s acceptance of his plea was not plainly erroneous.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Koumbairia · filed 2007-11-15(g)(1)

To sustain a conviction on the Section 922(g)(1) charge, the government was required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed the seized firearm.

Section 922(o) requires knowing possession of a machine gun, which may be actual or constructive, sole or joint.

United States v. Smith · filed 2007-11-20(o)

To convict Smith on either count in the indictment, the government was required to prove he knowingly possessed the machine gun. ... The government may prove Smith’s knowing possession by showing he had either “actual or constructive possession of [the machine gun], and the possession can be sole or joint.”

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which a jury may find from evidence that the defendant handled and hid the gun.

United States v. Venta · filed 2007-11-23(g)(1)

If he did that, then there was sufficient evidence to find: (1) that Venta knew the gun was in the truck, because he put it there; and (2) that he had possession of the gun, because he actually had it on his person before stowing it below the seat.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; evidence that a defendant placed a gun under his seat can establish that element.

United States v. Bailey · filed 2008-01-11(g)(1)

Bailey was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the government met this burden. Stanford stated at the scene that Bailey placed the gun under his seat during the police chase. If this statement is credible, then it must be concluded that Bailey had actual, knowing possession of the firearm – otherwise he could not have placed the gun under his seat.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Edge · filed 2008-01-14(g)(1)

Under Counts 4 and 5, the government must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm at issue. ... There is substantial evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that Edge knowingly possessed the drugs and a gun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, but the government need not prove how the firearm reached a particular location.

United States v. McPike · filed 2008-01-17(g)(1)

The Government does not need to prove exactly how the firearm came to be in Guilfoyle’s house, it need only prove McPike knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element is supported by an officer's testimony that he saw the defendant holding a firearm.

United States v. Williams · filed 2008-02-08(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the requisite light most favorable to the Government, with the requisite reasonable inferences and credibility determinations in support of the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams possessed the firearm as observed and reported by Officer Butler.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which may be actual or constructive.

United States v. Edwards · filed 2008-02-12(g)(1)

The Court’s instruction, taken in toto, adequately explained the concept that “possession” may be “actual” or “constructive,” and that such possession must have additionally been “knowing” for the defendant to be found guilty.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction when the evidence allows a reasonable juror to find knowing firearm possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Winfrey · filed 2008-02-13(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Winfrey knowingly possessed the firearm recovered in his place of residence.

Section 922(g)(1) does not require physical evidence linking the defendant to the firearm to prove possession.

United States v. Suggs · filed 2008-02-19(g)(1)

Contrary to Suggs’ argument on appeal, physical evidence linking the defendant to the firearm is not necessary to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element is satisfied when the evidence permits a jury to find that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. Stewart · filed 2008-03-13(g)(1)

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Stewart knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; mere presence near a firearm does not establish possession.

United States v. Eatherly · filed 2008-03-31(g)(1)

Putting those two definitions together, the District Court's jury instructions defined the "possession" element of the felon-in-possession statute to mean "to voluntarily and intentionally have [a firearm] within your control." Id. at 343-46. Therefore, the actual jury instructions covered Weatherly's proposed "mere presence" instruction, because the jury could not find that Weatherly knowingly possessed the firearm under the actual jury instructions due simply to his "[m]ere presence in the area of any contraband, including a firearm, or awareness of its location." Id. at 63, 343-46.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element requires voluntary and intentional control of a firearm; mere presence near it is insufficient.

United States v. Weatherly · filed 2008-03-31(g)(1)

Putting those two definitions together, the District Court’s jury instructions defined the “possession” element of the felon-in-possession statute to mean “to voluntarily and intentionally have [a firearm] within your control.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s firearm possession element can be proved through circumstantial evidence alone.

United States v. Miller · filed 2008-04-21(g)(1)

Miller contends that the guilty verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. Even without Miller’s confession, a rational trier of fact could have found that Miller possessed the firearm based on the circumstantial evidence alone.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence that the defendant handled the gun and was seen with it earlier.

United States v. Green · filed 2008-04-30(g)(1)

A reasonable fact-finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Green was in knowing possession of a gun based on the following evidence: (1) the arresting officer saw Green make movements with his hand and heard a clicking sound, like metal against stucco, hitting a nearby house; (2) immediately thereafter, the officer discovered the gun where Green had been standing and observed that it was marked with stucco residue; and (3) a witness identified the gun retrieved by the officer as the gun she saw Green brandish earlier that night.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm; evidence that the defendant exercised control over it can establish possession.

United States v. Castillo · filed 2008-05-27(g)(1)

Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Castillo knowingly possessed the rifle.

Section 922(g)'s knowing-possession element requires awareness of possessing the firearm, and brief possession can satisfy it.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2008-06-27(g)

However, this element, as discussed above, requires only a showing that Jackson was aware that he possessed the weapons – which is clearly the case, as he has admitted to holding them in the process of disposing them. Consequently, there is sufficient evidence to sustain the guilty verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove knowing possession of a firearm even when the defendant disputes possession without separately contesting knowledge.

United States v. Tucker · filed 2008-07-24(g)(1)

Nonetheless, the government had the burden of proving “knowing possession” of a firearm because Tucker never admitted to or stipulated to the fact that he knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(o) requires knowing possession of a machinegun and knowledge of its characteristics, but does not require knowledge that possession is unlawful.

United States v. Gilbert · filed 2008-07-15(o)

Accordingly, the charges against Gilbert did not require, as an element of proof, evidence that Gilbert knowingly broke the law, only that he knowingly possessed weapons and knew the characteristics of those weapons.

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession of a firearm; accidental contact does not establish possession.

United States v. Reed · filed 2008-08-20(g)

The provided instruction clearly sets forth that possession must be knowing and that possession is not achieved by accident. Thus, the instruction given encompassed Reed's theory of the case that he accidentally came in contact with the guns.

Section 922(g) requires knowing possession of a firearm; accidental contact alone does not establish possession.

United States v. Reed, Terry L. · filed 2008-08-20(g)(1), (g)(3)

The provided instruction clearly sets forth that possession must be knowing and that possession is not achieved by accident.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be established by evidence that the defendant reached toward a firearm on the floorboard of the vehicle he was driving.

United States v. Jemison · filed 2008-09-12(g)(1)

At Jemison’s trial, one officer testified that Jemison reached for the floorboard of the vehicle upon observing the officer approach the vehicle after the crash, and another officer testified that he discovered the firearm in the middle of the floorboard of the vehicle driven by Jemison. This evidence alone is sufficient to establish Jemison’s knowing possession of the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by evidence that the defendant placed firearms in a car he drove.

United States v. Crawford · filed 2008-09-19(g)(1)

Based on this evidence, the jury could have ... reasonably concluded that Crawford placed the firearms in the car and, thus, knowingly possessed the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be proved by a defendant's dominion and control over the vehicle containing the firearm.

United States v. Arthur Junior Green · filed 2008-10-17(g)(1)

As for his knowing possession of the gun found in his vehicle under both §§ 922 and 924, there was evidence that Green purchased the vehicle in which the gun was found over a week before his arrest, he was driving the vehicle before the gun was found, and the gun was found under the driver’s seat, which was readily accessible to him. At a minimum, this evidence showed that Green constructively possessed the firearm because he had dominion and control over the vehicle in which it was found.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce; possession may be actual or constructive.

United States v. Hamilton · filed 2008-11-05(g)(1)

In this case, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Hamilton violated § 922(g)(1). ... Given the testimony of West and Bentley, in conjunction with the location in which the pistol was found, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Hamilton knowingly possessed the weapon.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; physical contact with a firearm while asleep does not alone establish awareness or intent to control it.

United States v. Nevils · filed 2008-11-19(g)(1)

Thus, the fact that the firearms were physically touching him is not sufficient to show that he was conscious of their presence, and the “mere proximity” cases are quite relevant.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm; witness testimony and the defendant’s signed statement can provide sufficient evidence of possession.

United States v. Elswick · filed 2008-12-31(g)(1)

This constitutes evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Elswick possessed a gun in violation of the statute.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a conviction for knowing possession of ammunition even if control lasts only a second or two.

United States v. Turner · filed 2009-01-26(g)(1)

A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not require evidence of a lengthy possession. United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005). Control over ammunition “for a mere second or two” is legally sufficient as long as the defendant has knowledge of possession.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a firearm was under the driver’s seat of the defendant’s truck, where he sometimes sat.

United States v. Damillon L. Bell · filed 2009-01-28(g)(1)

We believe that this evidence is sufficient for a jury to conclude that Bell knowingly possessed the firearm at issue.

Section 922(g)(1) permits proof of knowing possession through actual or constructive possession when the evidence supports a reasonable inference of dominion and control over the firearm.

United States v. Parrish · filed 2009-02-18(g)(1)

Knowing possession can be shown by either actual or constructive possession, as long as there is a reasonable inference that the accused maintained “dominion and control” over the weapon.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession requirement can be satisfied by evidence that a felon was aware of a firearm and exercised dominion and control over it.

United States v. Gibson · filed 2009-02-20(g)(1)

The record reveals that the evidence was sufficient to convict Gibson. A jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware of and exercised dominion and control over the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) and (5) require knowing possession of a firearm; testimony that a defendant brought firearms into a home and threatened someone with one can support a conviction.

United States v. Curling · filed 2009-02-18(g)(1), (g)(5)

Both the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence support the verdicts on these counts: Tamela Robinson, Curling’s former girlfriend with whom he stayed after re-entering the United States, testified that Curling brought a duffle bag into her home. She later looked in the bag and saw several firearms. She also testified that Curling threatened her with one of the firearms while the two of them were in her children’s room, where Curling slept.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession requirement can be satisfied by evidence that the defendant admitted owning and keeping the firearm.

United States v. Sanders · filed 2009-02-24(g)(1)

The district court did not err in denying Sanders’s motion for judgment of acquittal because a reasonable trier of fact could have found that he knowingly possessed the firearm and that he knowingly possessed the cocaine base with intent to distribute. According to the evidence presented at trial, Castro found the shotgun underneath the bed of the master bedroom. When confronted with the seized weapon, Sanders admitted that he owned the firearm, needed the shotgun for protection, and kept it underneath the bed. Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that Sanders knowingly possessed the firearm and was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Evidence that a felon held a gun and then concealed it among clothes can establish knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Zaldivar · filed 2009-05-05(g)(1)

The only element that is being disputed on appeal is whether Zaldivar had knowing possession of a firearm. A police officer testified that: (1) he saw the handle of a gun in Zaldivar's hand; (2) after seeing the police officer, Zaldivar went back into his apartment, knelt next to a pile of clothes, and proceeded to make strange motions with his body while being located next to the pile of clothes; and (3) police officers then discovered a gun inside that pile of clothes. Therefore, we find that the evidence was sufficient to convict Zaldivar, and, accordingly, we affirm his conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, but does not require knowledge that possession is illegal.

United States v. Thomas Davis, Jr. · filed 2009-05-27(g)(1)

Section 922(g) “is not a specific intent statute.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence of constructive possession.

United States v. Watson · filed 2009-07-06(g)(1)

“The government need not show actual possession in order to establish knowing possession; it need only show constructive possession through direct or circumstantial evidence. Constructive possession exists when the defendant exercises ownership, dominion, or control over the item or has the power and intent to exercise dominion or control.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be established by a defendant’s admission that he knew a firearm was in the car and tried to conceal it.

United States v. Garrison Harris · filed 2009-07-08(g)(1)

Harris’s statement established that he knowingly possessed the weapon.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Muhammad · filed 2009-07-31(g)(1)

This circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Muhammad possessed the firearm while running from the officer.

Section 922(g) requires knowledge and control of a firearm for possession; unknowingly driving a car containing someone else’s gun does not establish possession.

United States v. Canady · filed 2009-08-24(g)

The jury instructions specifically stated that “possession” meant the ability to control, or “knowledge of the power and intent to exercise control over, the weapon.” So if another person shot Vance and placed the weapon in the car, Canady could not have possessed the gun under either instruction.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element is satisfied when a felon consciously and voluntarily handles a firearm knowing what it is, even if he intends to dispose of it.

United States v. McCray · filed 2009-09-21(g)(1)

Consistent with the government’s theory, McCray admitted to removing the firearm from his truck knowing what it was and with the intent to dispose of it, which satisfied the knowing possession element of § 922(g)(1) because he consciously and voluntarily possessed the firearm, not as a result of a mistake or accident.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Addison · filed 2009-10-16(g)(1)

To satisfy the “knowing” requirement of § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that the defendant had actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

Officer testimony that defendants held and tried to hide firearms can suffice to prove knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Hylor · filed 2009-11-23(g)(1)

Officer Freire’s testimony alone, that he observed Hylor and Wilson holding and trying to hide two firearms, was sufficient to support the convictions.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be established by actual or constructive possession of a firearm and ammunition.

United States v. Lightbourn · filed 2009-12-17(g)(1)

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that Lightbourn had either actual or constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition. Wever testified that Lightbourn confessed to him that he possessed the firearm for his own protection and that the firearm accidentally discharged. Thus, Lightbourn’s statement established that he knowingly possessed both the firearm and the ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession requirement is satisfied when a felon knowingly takes a firearm and places it in a vehicle he controls, even if he does not own the vehicle.

United States v. Mims · filed 2010-01-07(g)(1)

Mims was the driver and the only occupant of the vehicle; therefore, although he may not have been the owner, he did have dominion or control over the vehicle in which the firearm was concealed. See id. Moreover, Mims admitted taking possession of the firearm from Justin. It is also clear from the evidence that Mims knowingly possessed the firearm, because he told Rousseau that he took the firearm from Justin and placed it in between the driver’s seat and center console, where it was ultimately found by Rial.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition.

United States v. Davis · filed 2010-01-20(g)(1)

Since Davis stipulated to the other elements of § 922(g), the government needed to prove only that he knowingly possessed the firearms or ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which a jury may infer from the evidence.

United States v. Smith · filed 2010-01-21(g)(1)

We conclude the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Smith possessed the handgun knowingly.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing possession element can be proved by evidence that a defendant threw a firearm over a fence and admitted using it for protection.

United States v. Vu · filed 2010-05-05(g)(1)

On this record, the evidence is sufficient to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Vu knowingly possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires evidence connecting the defendant to a firearm to support a finding of knowing possession.

United States v. Jackson · filed 2010-05-26(g)(1)

Given the record describing the provenance of the guns, Jackson’s actions leading to his arrest, and his statements during booking, the government met its burden to “present evidence to show some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other contraband.” See United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994).

Sections 922(g)(1) and (g)(3) both require knowing possession of a firearm; possession reasonably near an “on or about” date in the indictment can satisfy that element.

United States v. Cornelio-Legarda · filed 2010-06-07(g)(1), (g)(3)

The only element Cornelio-Legarda challenges is that he knowingly possessed a firearm, an element common to both counts. ... Thus, the Government clearly met its burden of proving Cornelio-Legarda possessed a firearm “on or about” April 27, 2007.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be proved by eyewitness testimony that the defendant carried a firearm.

United States v. Appolon · filed 2010-07-27(g)(1)

Here, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appolon’s and Pierre’s convictions. Two eyewitnesses testified at trial that (1) they saw Appolon carrying the assault rifle that formed the basis for his conviction, and (2) they saw Pierre carrying the handgun that formed the basis for his conviction.

An officer’s testimony that a defendant pointed a firearm at him can establish knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Rainer · filed 2010-08-31(g)(1)

Rainer never disputed that he was a convicted felon but he does contend that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly possessed a firearm. That contention is frivolous in light of the officer’s testimony, which the ... jury was entitled to credit, that Rainer had pointed a firearm at him.

Knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) and § 922(j) may be proved by circumstantial evidence of actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Lewis Larch, Jr. · filed 2010-10-08(g)(1), (j)

Accordingly, we find that the government presented sufficient evidence that Larch actually and constructively possessed the firearms in question.

Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce.

United States v. Overby · filed 2010-12-10(g)(1)

We hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict Overby of violating § 922(g)(1), and we therefore affirm.

Section 922(g)’s firearm possession element may be proved by actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Cox · filed 2010-12-27(g)

This testimony provided strong evidence that Cox was in actual as well as constructive possession of the loaded firearm recovered by Officer Kirkwood after Cox’s arrest.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof of knowing possession of a firearm; an officer’s testimony that the defendant placed an object where a gun was found can establish possession.

United States v. Tate · filed 2011-03-01(g)(1)

And under governing precedent, Officer Siegfried’s testimony was sufficient in itself to support the jury’s finding that Tate knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element may be proved by evidence that the defendant knew of and controlled a firearm near his seat.

United States v. Brown · filed 2011-03-09(g)(1)

Considering these facts, it was reasonable for the jury to infer Brown knew about and had control over the firearm resting inches away from his feet for multiple hours.

Section 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm or ammunition; instructions requiring knowing control adequately address a mere-presence defense.

United States v. Damion Bell · filed 2011-03-10(g)

These instructions “clearly indicated that the government must prove that [Bell] ‘knowingly possessed’ the firearm in order to find him guilty.” Weatherly, 525 F.3d at 270.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a felon controlled the room where a firearm was found and knew about the gun.

United States v. Tucker · filed 2011-04-15(g)(1)

By contrast, the evidence of knowing possession in this case is much stronger, and supports the jury’s findings.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession requirement is met when a defendant consciously possesses an object he knows is a firearm.

United States v. Faletogo · filed 2011-04-19(g)(1)

Faletogo’s post-plea suggestion that his admitted conduct may not qualify as knowing possession of a firearm, based only on “his own inaccurate interpretation of the law” does not constitute a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea. ... “To establish that a defendant acted knowingly, the prosecution . . . need only prove that the defendant consciously possessed what he knew to be a firearm.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed and then discarded a firearm.

United States v. Robledo · filed 2011-06-09(g)(1)

The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Robledo knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)'s possession element may be proved through circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew a firearm was in a vehicle's hidden compartment.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2011-06-29(g)(1)

He maintains that a judgment of acquittal is warranted because the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson knew that the vehicle had a hidden compartment and that the compartment contained a gun and illegal drugs. ... At trial, the Government presented substantial, albeit circumstantial, evidence that Johnson possessed the requisite knowledge, including the following evidence: (1) the fact that Johnson was the driver and only person in the vehicle when it was stopped; (2) testimony from the arresting officer about Johnson’s suspicious behavior during the traffic stop; (3) evidence that the alterations to the console were plainly visible and would have been obvious to someone sitting in the driver’s seat; and (4) testimony from Johnson’s girlfriend that the defendant was the only individual who regularly drove the car during the two months preceding his arrest. In light of the record and our obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be proved by evidence that the defendant held and discarded a loaded firearm.

United States v. Lerma · filed 2011-06-29(g)(1)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we readily conclude the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Lerma knowingly possessed the loaded revolver.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be supported by control over a bedroom containing a firearm and ammunition, together with a fingerprint on the firearm’s magazine.

United States v. Ladson · filed 2011-06-24(g)(1)

On Count IV, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Ladson possessed the firearm because he had dominion and control over the bedroom, there was a firearm on the floor next to the bed and ammunition on the bed, and investigators found Ladson’s fingerprint on the firearm’s magazine.

Section 922(g)’s possession element may be supported by evidence that the defendant was the sole occupant of a car containing the firearm and that witnesses linked him to it.

United States v. King · filed 2011-07-07(g)

King was the sole occupant of the vehicle. The government presented testimony from multiple indi- viduals that linked King to the shotgun. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, sufficient evidence supports King’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s possession element can be satisfied by evidence permitting a reasonable jury to find that the defendant possessed a firearm, even when no fingerprints were recovered.

United States v. Roger Crumblin, Jr. · filed 2011-07-28(g)(1)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the record contains ample evidence permitting a reasonable jury to conclude that Crumblin possessed the firearms listed in the indictment.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing possession element can be satisfied by evidence that a firearm was accessible in the defendant's car, even if a passenger also had access.

United States v. Shelton · filed 2011-09-12(g)(1)

Shelton also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he knowingly had possession of the handgun. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). ... In any event, a reasonable jury could find that Shelton, and not his passenger, was in knowing possession of the gun.

A stipulation to the prior felony and interstate commerce elements of § 922(g)(1) does not establish knowing possession of the firearm.

United States v. Delvalle · filed 2011-09-20(g)(1)

The district court should have told the jury Delvalle’s stipulation and signature thereon were not evidence of knowledge or familiarity of this firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which a jury may find from circumstantial evidence and a defendant’s confession.

United States v. Hamilton · filed 2011-11-10(g)(1)

The only element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) that Hamilton disputed at trial was that he knowingly possessed the gun found in the black leather jacket. ... The jury was entitled to reject that story. ... Finally, Hamilton confessed that he possessed the gun at the Six-Pack. Hamilton’s argument is meritless.

Section 922(g)(1) permits a jury to infer knowing possession of a firearm from circumstantial evidence.

United States v. Bynum · filed 2012-02-28(g)(1)

Based on Anderson’s testimony, the recorded phone call, and Bynum’s behavior immediately before and after he retrieved the bag, a reasonable jury could infer that Bynum knew he had retrieved a gun from Anderson’s car.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element may be proved by evidence that the defendant fled police and discarded a firearm during the chase.

United States v. Varner · filed 2012-05-18(g)(1)

From this series of events, a jury could reasonably conclude Varner was fleeing the police because he illegally possessed a firearm and only stopped after he divested himself of the weapon. Moreover, the location of the firearm indicates that Varner lost or discarded it during the chase.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be proved without fingerprints or DNA when other evidence supports possession.

United States v. Antoine Porter · filed 2012-08-02(g)(1)

As to Porter’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the lack of fingerprints or DNA found on the firearm, “forensic evidence is not necessary” for a firearms conviction. ... Although forensic evidence was absent, there was ample evidence to support the jury’s conviction.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence that a felon knew of and controlled firearms in a jointly owned vehicle.

United States v. Tschacher · filed 2012-08-02(g)(1)

We hold that the government adduced sufficient evidence to show Tschacher's knowing possession of a prohibited firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence sufficient for a jury to find possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Salters · filed 2012-09-07(g)(1)

The totality of this testimony, in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the government’s favor, is sufficient to permit a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Salters knowingly possessed a firearm before it was thrown from or fell from the vehicle.

Section 922(g)(1) covers knowing possession of a firearm by a convicted felon even when the possession is brief.

United States v. Ponds · filed 2012-09-24(g)(1)

Even this brief possession of the firearm is sufficient to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1).

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be established by eyewitness testimony describing the defendant’s use of firearms.

United States v. Levonia Gray · filed 2012-11-26(g)(1)

Gray only contests the second element—whether he knowingly possessed a firearm. ... Gray is wrong. The evidence adduced at trial was more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including flight from police and a firearm found in plain view in a vehicle the defendant alone occupied.

United States v. Montgomery · filed 2012-12-17(g)(1)

Even absent eyewitness or forensic evidence establishing possession, a jury could reasonably conclude from these facts that Montgomery was fleeing from police because he illegally possessed a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence connecting a convicted felon to a firearm.

United States v. Davis · filed 2013-02-13(g)(1)

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that Davis had more than “[m]ere proximity” to the firearm; he possessed it.

Evidence that a defendant carried and discarded a firearm can establish knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Keaton · filed 2013-02-25(g)(1)

We conclude that the government put forth sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude Keaton knowingly possessed a ... firearm and ammunition.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew of and exercised dominion and control over the firearm; knowledge alone does not establish possession.

United States v. Combs · filed 2013-03-06(g)(1)

Construing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Combs both knew of and “exercised dominion and control over” the Smith & Wesson handgun, and therefore possessed that firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that a person convicted of a felony knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. Wallace · filed 2013-04-17(g)(1)

The district court also did not err by denying Wallace’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. Wallace repeats the argument he made at trial that he did not possess the firearms knowingly, but the district court correctly submitted this question to the jury. ... Ample evidence proved that Wallace was in knowing possession of the firearms.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be established by officers' testimony that the defendant held and discarded a firearm.

United States v. Weston · filed 2013-05-06(g)(1)

Because no miscarriage of justice occurred in convicting Weston of a violation of § 922(g) based on the officers‟ testimony, there was no plain error and we will not disturb the jury‟s verdict.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearms; evidence of knowledge and possession can support a conviction even when the firearms were kept in a locked room of the defendant’s home.

United States v. Cornelison · filed 2013-06-21(g)(1)

Even if Mabry is not controlling in this case, the evidence taken as a whole amply supports the jury’s conclusion that Cornelison knew about and had possession of the weapons. The district court did not err in denying Cornelison’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing possession element can be satisfied by evidence that the defendant took a firearm and arranged to sell it.

United States v. Milton Rucker, Jr. · filed 2013-11-06(g)(1)

Rucker argues that there was no evidence that he possessed the firearm, citing United States v. Madkins, 994 F.2d 540, 542 (8th Cir. 1993), but Thompson testified that Rucker took the gun after it was found in the duffel bag and made arrangements to sell it. This evidence was sufficient for conviction.

Section 922(g)(1) permits knowing possession of a firearm to be established through actual or constructive possession.

United States v. Chatmon · filed 2014-02-05(g)(1)

Knowing possession of a firearm under § 922(g) may be either actual or constructive.

A firearm within the defendant’s reach, together with matching ammunition in his coat, can support a finding of knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Livingston · filed 2014-05-21(g)(1)

We conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find that Livingston committed the charged offense. First, the Government sufficiently proved that the firearm was found within Livingston’s reach and in the area of the vehicle where Livingston was seated. The Government also presented testimony that Livingston possessed ammunition in a coat he was wearing that matched the ammunition in the gun.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be proved by witness testimony that the defendant possessed a firearm.

United States v. Conway · filed 2014-06-10(g)(1)

Jefferson's testimony alone supports the jury's determination of guilt as to the felon-in-possession charges. She testified to seeing Robinson possess a firearm on two occasions.

A § 922(k) charge fails when the government cannot prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Salas · filed 2014-07-14(k)

Having reviewed all of the evidence, its own trial notes, and the testimony of the witnesses to determine the credibility of each witness, the Court concludes that there was not enough evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Salas knowingly possessed the firearms that form the basis of Counts Six and Eight.

Section 922(g)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm.

United States v. Farmer · filed 2014-11-05(g)(1)

In order to convict Farmer, the jury had to find that he knowingly possessed the firearm found under his car seat in 2012.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be established by evidence that a defendant handled and displayed a firearm.

United States v. Romero · filed 2014-12-02(g)(1)

Trial testimony that there was a firearm under the driver’s seat of a vehicle that Romero was driving, that he pulled the weapon out and showed it to a passenger, and that he stated his willingness to use it, sufficed to establish knowing possession.

A jury may infer knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) from the defendant’s fingerprints on tape binding a gun found in a car he drove.

United States v. Truby · filed 2014-12-18(g)(1)

But the shotgun, found by police in the trunk of a car driven by Mr. Truby, was wrapped in plastic and bound with duct tape bearing his fingerprints. Given this evidence that Mr. Truby handled the shotgun, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) knowingly possessed it and (2) knew its obviously short barrel (clocking in at 12.75 inches) was sawed off.

Section 922(g)(1)'s knowing-possession element can be proved through actual or constructive possession, whether sole or joint.

United States v. Delvonn Battle · filed 2014-12-22(g)(1)

The government can prove knowing possession by showing actual or constructive possession, and possession can be sole or joint.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm.

United States v. Williams · filed 2015-08-07(g)(1)

While Williams’s argument may be supported by Caldwell, it is foreclosed by our precedent. “Knowing possession of a firearm is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and [Williams] placed his knowledge of the firearm’s presence at the scene on his person at issue by pleading not guilty to the crime and requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

A jury may find knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) from video showing the defendant handling the firearm later recovered.

United States v. Holloway · filed 2015-08-12(g)(1)

The jury compared the video to the photos of the firearm recovered during the search, and reasonably determined that Holloway knowingly had possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession requirement is adequately covered by a constructive possession instruction that implies awareness of the firearm.

United States v. Tywan Hill · filed 2015-08-26(g)(1)

Jury instructions that imply knowledge or an awareness of the object possessed when defining constructive possession, substantially cover the requirement that a defendant knowingly possess a firearm—the use of such an instruction does not constitute reversible error.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element may be proved through witness testimony and circumstantial evidence without DNA, fingerprint, or video evidence.

United States v. Boddy · filed 2015-08-27(g)(1)

We are satisfied that ample evidence existed from which a jury could reasonably find Boddy knowingly possessed the firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be proved by circumstantial evidence of actual or constructive possession of a firearm.

United States v. Dunklin · filed 2015-09-15(g)(1)

Because the government presented sufficient evidence to support a finding of knowing possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), we affirm Mr. Dunklin’s conviction.

Photographs and eyewitness testimony that a person possessed and discharged a firearm can provide sufficient evidence of knowing possession under § 922(g)(1).

United States v. Clegg · filed 2016-01-06(g)(1)

The parties stipulated to all of the elements except Clegg’s knowing possession of the firearm, and the Government’s photographic evidence and eyewitness testimony that Clegg possessed and discharged a firearm constituted sufficient evidence on the knowing possession element.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be established by credible eyewitness testimony that the defendant held a firearm.

United States v. Johnson · filed 2016-01-12(g)(1)

The officer’s testimony was sufficient by itself for a reasonable juror to conclude that Johnson possessed knowingly a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be proved by a defendant’s proximity to ammunition and detailed knowledge of it, without fingerprint or DNA evidence.

United States v. Pinkney · filed 2016-03-17(g)(1)

Gaston and Special Agent Graham testified about Pinkney’s admissions regarding the firearm and the ammunition, including that Pinkney knew the caliber of the gun, the caliber of the ammunition, the exact number of rounds in the ammunition box, and that the gun would not load. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to sustain Pinkney’s conviction and sentence.

Section 922(g)(1) and (o)(1) allow knowing possession of a firearm or machinegun to be proved through circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the weapon.

United States v. Berrios-Bonilla · filed 2016-05-13(g)(1), (o)(1)

Despite the truck's numerous occupants, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Berríos placed the machinegun under the passenger seat and convicted him of both weapons possession offenses.

Section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm.

United States v. Oliver · filed 2016-06-29(g)(1)

Because Defendant did not admit or ... stipulate to the fact that he knowingly possessed a firearm, his knowledge was an element that the Government was required to prove.

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing-possession element can be proved by a firearm found near the defendant’s belongings, testimony that he fired a matching gun, and his admission that he received it.

United States v. The-Nimrod Sterling · filed 2016-07-06(g)(1)

Sterling also argues that the Government presented insufficient evidence to convict him of being a felon in possession of a firearm because the evidence did not establish that he actually possessed the 12-gauge shotgun in question or that he knew that the weapon had been placed in his house. This argument lacks merit.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm.

United States v. Cook · filed 2016-11-22(g)(1)

Cook was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). An essential element of that crime is knowing possession of a firearm.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm; a severe alcohol use disorder does not defeat that element without evidence that intoxication prevented knowing possession.

United States v. Taylor · filed 2016-12-20(g)(1)

Thus, even if involuntary intoxication resulting from a severe alcohol use disorder were a valid defense to a felon-in-possession charge, the evidence before the court does not show that Mr. Taylor was so intoxicated that he did not “knowingly” possess the gun.

Section 922(g)(1) requires knowing possession of a firearm, which remains at issue when a defendant pleads not guilty even if the government alleges actual possession.

United States v. Graham · filed 2017-02-22(g)(1)

“Knowing possession of a firearm is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and [Graham] placed his knowledge of the firearm’s presence at the scene on his person at issue by pleading not guilty to the crime and requiring the government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Section 922(g)(1)’s knowing possession element can be supported by evidence that the defendant made a firearm in her purse available to another person.

United States v. Garcia · filed 2017-03-30(g)(1)

It was within the jury’s discretion to credit the testimony at trial that Garcia told her boyfriend to shoot Quirgo and that Quirgo was then shot by her boyfriend, after she opened her purse so that the boyfriend could retrieve the firearm stored inside of it.